Shell & Tube Heat Exchanger (STHE)

Overpressure Protection
from Tube Rupture
Colin Deddis, BP Exploration Operating Co Ltd
19 July 2011

The views expressed in this paper are those of the individual authors / presenters and are not
intended to represent the views or position of BP on the matters discussed
 STHE Overpressure Protection
Acknowledgements

Ian Wyatt, Atkins Ltd

Stephen Murray, Health and Safety Executive
Bruce Ewan, University of Sheffield
Colin Weil, Consultant
Mark Scanlon, Energy Institute

The views expressed in this paper are those of the individual authors / presenters and are not
intended to represent the views or position of BP on the matters discussed
 STHE Overpressure Protection

Tube rupture scenario

Guidance & practice changes since 2000
Dynamic analysis of STHE overpressure and relief
Current industry design practices
Design & operational issues with bursting disks in
this service
Energy Institute JIP Proposal

The views expressed in this paper are those of the individual authors / presenters and are not
intended to represent the views or position of BP on the matters discussed
 Different Exchanger Configurations

Similar Tube Rupture consequences

Gas
apply to all of these configurations: Liquid

Single pass gas, single pass liquid

Multiple pass gas and/or multiple pass
liquid
HP Gas on tube side or shell side
Cooling Duty or Heating Duty Gas Liquid

Horizontal or Vertical or Angled

Gas Liquid Liquid Gas

Liquid Gas
Liquid Gas

Courtesy of Ian Wyatt - Atkins

Stages to Tube Rupture

For all configurations there are four phases to the consequences of a

Tube Rupture identified in the tube rupture tests performed as part
of the previous JIP by the Institute of Petroleum:

Phase I Percussive Shock

Phase II Fast Transient

Phase III Liquid Discharge

Phase IV Gas Discharge

Courtesy of Ian Wyatt - Atkins
Phase I Percussive Shock

Rapid rupture creates percussive shock wave

Extremely short lived <0.1ms
Shell does not feel the pressure spikes
Not Modelled

Gas Liquid

Flare Header

Gas Liquid

Courtesy of Ian Wyatt - Atkins

Phase II Fast Transient

Gas entering shell is faster than time to overcome liquid momentum

Fast transient pressure wave results travelling at sonic velocity
Pressure wave usually breaks bursting disc
Shell and pipework overpressures possible
Simulated using software with necessary fast transient capability
Shell baffle path straightened 1D Model

Gas Liquid
Flare Header

Gas Liquid
Courtesy of Ian Wyatt - Atkins
 Phase III Liquid Discharge
Gas Liquid
Flare Header

Gas bubble grows towards exits

Liquid displaced through available exits Gas Liquid

Volume flow balance between bubble and Gas Liquid

displaced liquid Flare Header

Possible to over pressurise Shell and

connected pipework

Gas Liquid

Gas-Liquid interfaces affect pipe supports

Shell baffle path straightened 1D Model Gas Liquid
Flare Header

Gas Liquid
Flare Header Gas Liquid

Gas Liquid
Flare Header

Gas Liquid

Gas Liquid

Courtesy of Ian Wyatt - Atkins

Phase IV Gas Discharge

Gas from rupture passes out of system

Pseudo steady state depending on gas supply
Usually not modelled

Gas Liquid
Flare Header

Gas Liquid

Courtesy of Ian Wyatt - Atkins

 Changes in Industry Guidance (API521/BS EN ISO
23251)

Two-thirds rule replaced with:

Loss of containment of the low-pressure side to atmosphere is unlikely to
result from a tube rupture where the pressure in the low-pressure side
(including upstream and downstream systems) during the tube rupture
does not exceed the corrected hydrotest pressure
Pressure relief for tube rupture is not required where the low-pressure
exchanger side (including upstream and downstream systems) does not
exceed the criteria noted above.
Dynamic analysis added:
This type of analysis is recommended, in addition to the steady-state
approach, where there is a wide difference in design pressure between
the two exchanger sides [e.g. 7 000 kPa (approx. 1 000 psi) or more],
especially where the low-pressure side is liquid-full and the high-pressure
side contains a gas or a fluid that flashes across the rupture. Modelling
has shown that, under these circumstances, transient conditions can
produce overpressure above the test pressure, even when protected by a
pressure-relief device [64], [65], [66]. In these cases, additional protection
measures should be considered.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the individual authors / presenters and are not
intended to represent the views or position of BP on the matters discussed
 Changes in Industry Guidance (API521/BS EN ISO
23251)

Tube rupture design basis added:

The user may perform a detailed analysis and/or appropriately design
the heat exchanger to determine the design basis other than a full-bore
tube rupture. However, each exchanger type should be evaluated for a
small tube leak.
The detailed analysis should consider
a) tube vibration,
b) tube material,
c) tube wall thickness,
d) tube erosion,
e) brittle fracture potential,
f) fatigue or creep,
g) corrosion or degradation of tubes and tubesheets,
h) tube inspection programme,
i) tube to baffle chafing.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the individual authors / presenters and are not
intended to represent the views or position of BP on the matters discussed
 Current Industry Design Practice

API521/BS EN ISO 23251 allows use of relief valves or

bursting disks but states:
The opening time for the device used..should also be
compatible with the requirements of the system.

Opening times of relief valves considered to be too slow,

hence bursting disks commonly used.

Advances in heat exchanger design practice e.g. vibration

analysis, materials selection etc.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the individual authors / presenters and are not
intended to represent the views or position of BP on the matters discussed
 Summary of test conditions and test numbers phase 1

Relief
Relief device Relief pressure
diameter 4mm orifice 8mm orifice 15mm orifice
(bar)
(in)

Open tube 39 38 37 0
Graphite disc 4 51 50 49 10
6 55 54 53 10
Stainless steel disc 4 41 42 40 15
(reversed dome) 8 48 47 46 15
2 Spring loaded pop
- 59 58 57 15
action RV
2 Bellows RV - 62 61 60 15
2 Pilot operated RV - 66 65 64 15
SRV, RV and Graphite Disc at High Pressure
 Example of Pressure Transients in Shell
(HP gas at 180 barg in tubes; cooling water at 5.4 barg; PSV opening in 50 msecs)

Peak pressures due to reflected waves

Pressure in shell local to break at tubesheet

Phase 2 Phase 3
Shell design
pressure = 14 barg

Tube rupture occurs at 0.01 s

The views expressed in this paper are those of the individual authors / presenters and are not
intended to represent the views or position of BP on the matters discussed
 Typical HP/LP shell & tube heat exchanger design
(compressor recycle cooler for offshore service)

Relief to flare Shutdown

(designed for slug flow)
valve

Gas inlet
Bursting disks
in parallel Water outlet

Segmental baffles
(no tube in window)

Water inlet
Gas outlet
Check valve Possible shutdown
valve
Adapted from IP Guidelines for the Design and Sae Operation of Shell & Tube Heat Exchangers to Withstand the Impact of Tube Failure, Aug 2000

The views expressed in this paper are those of the individual authors / presenters and are not
intended to represent the views or position of BP on the matters discussed
 STHE Overpressure Protection

Increased use of bursting disks to protect STHEs over past 10 to 15

years

Estimated frequency of tube failure

0.0009 per unit per year (~1 per 1,100 years)[1]

Frequency of bursting disk failures protecting STHEs

7 incidents in 13 years (~50 exchangers)
0.011 per unit per year (~1 per 90 years)[2]

Future growth in numbers of high pressure STHEs requiring

overpressure protection
1. IP Guidelines for the Design and Sae Operation of Shell & Tube Heat Exchangers to Withstand the Impact of Tube Failure, Aug 2000
2. Estimate based on incidents in upstream oil and gas industry known to BP
The views expressed in this paper are those of the individual authors / presenters and are not
intended to represent the views or position of BP on the matters discussed
 STHE Overpressure Protection

Two major hazards associated with bursting disk failures:

Impairment of relief system liquid inflow & overfill

Incident escalation - reverse rupture may lead to

uncontrolled hydrocarbon release from relief system

The views expressed in this paper are those of the individual authors / presenters and are not
intended to represent the views or position of BP on the matters discussed
 Incident #1 liquid overfill

Flare

Relief Header

PSHH

Flare Knockout Drum

Bursting disk rupture in forward direction

PSHH in void space of bursting disk assembly fails to isolate exchanger
Sustained cooling medium flow into relief system
Liquid overfill & potential overpressure of knockout drum
The views expressed in this paper are those of the individual authors / presenters and are not
intended to represent the views or position of BP on the matters discussed
Health and Safety
Executive

Bursting disc failure: flare

system impairment

Stephen Murray
HSE Inspector, Offshore Division
HSE Safety Alert 01/2008

Summary
uncontrolled flow of seawater into flare system
several hours to identify source
flaring event may have lead to serious gas
release
HSE Safety Alert 01/2008

Lessons
Be aware of potential for impairment of
flare/relief system from uncontrolled cooling
medium flow from ruptured bursting disc
Ensure disc rupture will initiate measures to
ensure isolation of cooling medium so that
flare/relief system is not compromised
 Hazard #2 excessive backpressure

80 psig backpressure

50 psig
100 psig

225 psig
225 psig

The views expressed in this paper are those of the individual authors / presenters and are not
intended to represent the views or position of BP on the matters discussed
 Design & Operational Issues

Bursting disks when utilised for overpressure protection of

STHEs
Once opened, they maintain an open flow path from the
process/utility system to the relief system.
A sufficient margin (~30%) needs to be maintained
between operating and set pressure to avoid opening in
absence of a tube failure. In STHE applications, they are
often located on cooling medium systems which can be
susceptible to pressure surges.
Failure in the reverse direction due to superimposed
backpressures from the relief system.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the individual authors / presenters and are not
intended to represent the views or position of BP on the matters discussed
 Design Requirements

Selection of relief route should consider:

Multiphase high velocity liquid slugs
HP or LP flare system (high pressure gas under relief
conditions but large liquid volumes under a failure case)
segregation from other relief routes to avoid mitigate
reverse rupture

HAZOP required to identify potential failure modes and

consequences.

Additional detection and safeguards required for failure

cases.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the individual authors / presenters and are not
intended to represent the views or position of BP on the matters discussed
 Gaps in current industry guidance

Broader design requirements associated with bursting disks

and interface with relief systems not addressed

No industry guidance on a pressure ratio at which relief

valves are acceptable
Large differential pressure may actually favour relief valve
extent of overpressure may yield sufficiently rapid
response
Lower differential pressures shell & nozzles may survive
overpressure.

No acceptance criteria available for short duration transient

overpressures
The views expressed in this paper are those of the individual authors / presenters and are not
intended to represent the views or position of BP on the matters discussed
 Aims of Energy Institute JIP

Eliminate or mitigate hazards associated with overpressure

protection of STHEs

Develop revised set of design guidelines for overpressure

protection of STHEs principally to address:
Heat exchanger design.
Relief device selection.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the individual authors / presenters and are not
intended to represent the views or position of BP on the matters discussed
 Possible Scope of Energy Institute JIP
Heat Exchanger Design (1)

Determine criteria to assess if guillotine fracture is possible based

on the mechanical properties of the materials of construction used in
heat exchanger tubes.

Determine any minimum tube thickness specification required to

prevent guillotine fracture.

Define the vibration analysis requirements that need to be applied to

ensure that the likelihood of guillotine fracture is minimised.

Define any sensitivity analysis of process variations which should be

carried out to ensure that the design is robust.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the individual authors / presenters and are not
intended to represent the views or position of BP on the matters discussed
 Possible Scope of Energy Institute JIP
Heat Exchanger Design (2)

Determine if differential pressure limits can be established below

which transient effects can be ignored.

Determine the maximum allowable transient overpressures in the

shell under tube rupture conditions to cater for peak pressures. This
will require experimental and analytical work.

Determine the impact of transient loads on the piping systems if

bursting disks are not applied for overpressure and develop
appropriate design guidelines to ensure that the piping design is
robust but not overly conservative.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the individual authors / presenters and are not
intended to represent the views or position of BP on the matters discussed
 Possible Scope of Energy Institute JIP
Relief Device Selection

Develop a rule-set for relief device selection to accommodate the

tube rupture case

Scale-up to typical relief device sizes encountered in real

applications.
Testing of response times of a variety of relief valves to a range
of overpressures .
Establish mechanical integrity criteria for relief valves for use in
tube rupture service.
Establish the range of process conditions for which conventional
relief valves could be utilised to protect against tube rupture and
those for which bursting disks are required. This needs to
consider aspects such as differential design pressure between
low and high pressure side of exchanger etc.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the individual authors / presenters and are not
intended to represent the views or position of BP on the matters discussed
 JIP Proposal Summary

Total cost estimate ~330k

Fee structure
30k operating companies and safety regulators
15k - other participants (design houses, consultancies
etc.)
in-kind support from relief valve manufacturers, software
providers etc.

18 months commencing 3Q2011

The views expressed in this paper are those of the individual authors / presenters and are not
intended to represent the views or position of BP on the matters discussed
 Energy Institute JIP Next Steps

Details on EI website:
www.energyinst.org/sthe

Kick off meeting 19 July 2011, Energy Institute, London

The views expressed in this paper are those of the individual authors / presenters and are not
intended to represent the views or position of BP on the matters discussed