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GROUP # 3

Kunhui Cai,
Madan Chauhan,
Jim Jacaruso,
Manoj Pant,
Vinay Srivastava,
Yoji Tsubaki

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Theory of Asymmetric Conflict

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†Theory and Concept

Other definitions
6 a) Defined by transformational use of familiar and
unfamiliar µcapability clusters¶ or by pitting of different
organizational structures against each other.
6 b) Involves states of unequal aggregate power capabilities,
measured in terms of material resources i.e. size,
demography, military capability and economic prowess,
strategy and tactics. (T.V. Paul)
6 c) Asymmetric warfare is ³leveraging inferior tactical or
operational strength against the vulnerabilities of a
superior opponent to achieve disproportionate effect with
the aim of undermining the opponent¶s will in order to
achieve the asymmetric actor¶s strategic
objectives.(Kenneth McKenzie).
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†Theory and Concepts

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SOME THOUGHTS ?

Trends in correlations of war data show that strong actors


have been losing more asymmetric conflicts.

A)1800-1849: 34 asymmetric conflicts .


6 88.2% won by strong actors.
 Greek war of Indep,
 US second seminole war,1835-42,
 First Zulu War 1838-42,
 First British Afghan War 1838-42.
B)1850-1899:69 asymmetric conflicts,
6 9.5 % won by strong actors.
 The Second Opium War1856-60,
 Second Schleswig-Holstein war,1864,
 The Russo-Turkoman War 188-81,
 The Second Boer War1899-1902.
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Trends†

C)1900-1949: 31 asymmetric conflicts,


6 65.1% won by strong actors.
 Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905,
 The First Balkan War1912-1913,
 The Iraqi-British Conflict1920-1921,
 The US ±Nicaraguan Conflict192-1933.

D)1950-1998:36 asymmetric conflict


6 45% won by strong actors,.
 South vietnam,1961-65,
 The Anglo Portugal War 1961-5,
 The Mozambique Conflict1964-5,
 The Russo- Chechen War 1994-96.
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REASONS FOR SUCH A TREND

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What guides Weaker Power to go to Conflict with Stronger


power( T V Paul)

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SOME EXAMPLES

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WHY US ± IRAN CONFLICT IS ASYMMETRIC

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Tracing the Conflict

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ISSUES

 
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Nuclear Issues

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Stakeholders
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Group Exercise

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Structural Interest Cognitive Emotional

Core Distribution Underlying Beliefs Fear


Concerns of power & interests, Schemas Loss and
resources goals and Frames grief
µBuilt-in¶ objectives Rage
structural Pathology
inequalities

Goals Justice Integration or Reframing Healing


compromise

Conflict Revolution Negotiation / Facilitated Truth-telling

Management Re- mediation contact Public


Techniques distribution compromise Acknowledge-
bargaining ment
De-
win-win Forgiveness
construction

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POSITIONS AND INTERESTS

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Strategies for Resolution

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