Explanation 

and 
Understanding

Presented By: Sem. Khrys Khein

Ronquillo
– If we correctly identified those factors that are
statistically relevant to the event-to-be-explained,
we have completed the bottom tier of our
explanatory structure.
– A completed S-R basis-one that incorporates all
statistically relevant factor – is, of course, something
we rarely possess; it is idealization. Nevertheless… it
is philosophically important to have an adequate
account of the ideal statistical basis.
– The next step is to provide causal accounts of the
statistical relevance relations involved in the S-R
basis.
– There is no presumption that the causal relations can
be “read off” in any automatic or routine fashion.
We must formulate causal hypothesis and apply
standard scientific procedures to test them.
– According to the causal/mechanical approach I have
been advocating, there are fundamental sorts of
causal mechanisms that figure crucially in providing
scientific explanations of statistical relevance
relations.
– Given statistical relevance relation between events
of type A and events of type B, there may be a direct
causal connection.
– Causal connections are causal processes. In the case
of a direct causal connection, there must be a causal
process connecting any given event A with the
corresponding event B; the causal influence may be
transmitted form A, to B, or it may go in the opposite
direction.
– If the statistical relevance relation between A and B
that we are trying to explain does not arise out of a
direct relation, we search for an indirect causal
relation that obtains an account of a common cause.
– Salmon means at the end of this reading by the
epistemic conception and the ontic conception of
explanations as arguments, like the Hempel and
Oppenheim model, such that what we make an
inference to the explanadum based on the
explanans, whereas in Salmon’s, ontic conception,
explanation is treated as referring to and even
exhibiting causal connections in the world.
 PRAGMATIC MODEL
– Why would anyone seriously suggest that (1) we
could explain the height of a flagpole by the length
of its shadow, an (2) we could even claim that the
length of the shadow causes, or at least is part of the
cause, of the height of the flag pole?
Like this little scenario: Remember my nephew terry,
from the introductory chapter, the one I wanted to
drown so I could get an inheritance? Well, suppose
that Terry got wind of my dastardly designs and
decided to bury his pot of gold somewhere.
– He decided to bury it in a secret spot, but he did not
want to leave any sort of map or massage anywhere,
in case I might find some written record. So, he
found a secret spot on the ground, made some
calculations, and then built a flagpole so that the
very tip of the flagpole’s shadow touched that secret
spot at exactly high noon on summer solstice. In
other words, what mattered to him was that the
shadow end right at the exact spot where the
treasure buried. Give that spot, he then built a
flagpole to be exactly on the ground where it would
reveal the treasure.
– So, given his goal of hiding and later being able to
find his treasure, he built the flagpole a specific
height because he wanted its shadow to end up at
exactly that spot. In other words, we would explain
the height of the flagpole on the basis of the length
of its shadow.
– This is part of the pragmatic model explanation,
namely, that purpose or goal or context, is an
inherent part of any explanation.
– This model is most often associated with Bas van
Fraasen. In laying out a pragmatic model, he sees
explanation as a relation of three parts: theory, fact
and context. Explanations, he says, are answers to
why-questions and why-questions consist of three
elements: a topic of concern, a contrast class, and a
relevance relation.
 The Scientific Image
Bas van Fraasen
A Model for Explanation
I shall propose a new theory of explanation. An
explanation is not the same proposition, or an
argument, or list of propositions; it is an answer. An
explanation is an answer to a why-question. So, a
theory of explanation must be a theory of why-
questions.
 A Theory of Why-questions
– There are several respects in which why-questions
introduce genuinely new elements into the theory of
questions. Let us focus first on the determination of
exactly what question is asked, that is, the contextual
specification of factors needed to understand why-
interrogative.
– After that is done and as an independent enterprise,
we must turn to the evaluation of those answers as
good or better. This evaluation proceeds with
reference to the part of science accepted as
“background theory” in that context.
– As example, consider the question “Why is this
conductor warped?” The questioner implies that the
conductor is warped, and is asking for a reason. Let
us call the proposition that the conductor is warped
the topic of the question.
– Next, this question has a contrast-class, as we saw,
that is a set of propositions which includes the topic.
For this particular interrogative, the contrast could
be that it is this conductor rather than that one, or
that the conductor has warped rather than retained
its shaped.