DIFFERENCE BETWEEN

RULE & OPINION

Rule Opinion
• Makes a new law with • It merely interprets a
the force and effect of a preexisting law, it is
valid law and is binding merely advisory and not
to the courts binding to the courts
 VICTORIA’S MILLING VS SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION
(GR L -16704, 17 MARCH 1962)
FACTS
• The Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22 on October 15, 1958
requiring all employers in computing premiums to include employee’s
remuneration all bonuses and overtime time pay, as well as the cash value of
other media remuneration.
• The petitioner (Victorias Milling Company, Inc.) protest against the circular as
it is contrary to a previous Circular No. 7 dated October 7, 1957.
• Circular No. 7 excludes overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the
employers’ and the employees’ respective monthly premium contributions.
• The counsel questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority of
respondent to promulgate it without Presidential approval and publication in
the official gazette.
• Social Security Commission overruled the objections stating that Circular No.
22 is not a rule or regulation but a mere administrative interpretation
 VICTORIA’S MILLING VS SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION
(GR L -16704, 17 MARCH 1962)
ISSUE
Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation?
RULING
Circular No. 22 is an administrative interpretation. It did not add any duty or
detail that was not already in the law as amended. It merely stated and
circularized the opinion as to how the law should be construed.
 LEGISLATIVE INTERPRETATION

• The Legislature may thus provide in the statute itself an

interpretative or declaratory clause prescribing rules of
construction or indicating how its provisions should be
construed.
• However the legislature cannot limit or restrict the power
granted to the courts to interpret the law.
 ENDENCIA VS DAVID
(93 PHIL 696, 1953)
FACTS
• The supreme in a decision interpreting the constitution has held that judicial
officers are exempt from payment of income tax on their salaries, because
the collection thereof was a diminution of such salaries , specifically
prohibited by the constitution.
• Now comes the legislature and in section 13, Republic Act. No. 590, says
that “no salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic
(naturally including a judicial officer) shall be considered as exempt from the
income tax,” and proceeds to declare that payment of said income tax is not
diminution of his compensation.
 ENDENCIA VS DAVID
(93 PHIL 696, 1953)
ISSUE
May the Legislature lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of
a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the
Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise?
RULING
The legislature cannot upon passing a law which violates a constitutional
provision, validate it so as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a
declaration that it shall be construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition.
STARE DECISIS ET NO QUIETA MOVERE
(TO STAND BY DECISIONS AND NOT DISTURB THE UNDISTURBED)

Once a case has been decided one way , then another case,
involving exactly the same point and issue, should be decided in
the same manner.
 PINES CITY EDUCATIONAL CENTER VS NLRC
(227 SCRA 655, 1993)
FACTS
• Private respondents were all employed as teachers on probationary basis by
petitioner Pines City Educational Center.
• All private respondents, except Roland Picart and Lucia Chan, signed
contracts of employment for petitioner for a fixed duration.
• On March 31, 1989, due to the expiration of private respondents’ contracts
and their poor performance as teachers, they were notified of petitioners’
decision not to renew their contracts anymore.
 PINES CITY EDUCATIONAL CENTER VS NLRC
(227 SCRA 655, 1993)
• Private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor
Arbiter, alleging that the dismissals were without cause and violated due
process.
• Petitioners contended that private respondents’ separation from employment,
apart from their poor performance, was due to the expiration of the periods
stipulated in their contracts.
• The petitioner’s arguments relied heavily on the case of Brent School, Inc. et
al vs Zamora et al
 PINES CITY EDUCATIONAL CENTER VS NLRC
(227 SCRA 655, 1993)
ISSUE
“Is there Prima Facie evidence of grave abuse of discretion on part of the labor
arbiter by wantonly, capriciously and maliciously disregarding provisions of the
law and jurisprudence laid down in decisions of the honorable Supreme Court”
 PINES CITY EDUCATIONAL CENTER VS NLRC
(227 SCRA 655, 1993)
RULING
• The Supreme court ruled in Brent School Inc. et al., vs Zamora et. al that “It
should have no application to instances where a fixed period of
employment was agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the parties,
without any force, duress or improper pressure brought to bear upon
the employee and absent any other circumstances vibrating his
consent, or where it satisfactorily appears that the employer or
employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no
moral dominance whatever being exercised by the former over the
latter”
 PINES CITY EDUCATIONAL CENTER VS NLRC
(227 SCRA 655, 1993)
• Insofar as the private respondents who knowingly and voluntarily agree upon
fixed periods of employment are concerned, their services were lawfully
terminated by reason of the expiration of the periods of their respective
contracts
• With respect to private respondents Roland Picart and Lucia Chan, both of
whom did not sign any contract fixing the periods the periods of their
employment nor to have knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon fixed periods
of employment, petitioners had the burden of proving that the termination of
their services was legal.
 OBITER DICTUM
(BY THE WAY)

An opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law which

is not necessary to the decision of the case before it.
 PEOPLE VS MACADAEG
(91 PHIL 410, 1952)
FACTS
• This is an action of prohibition against the Seventh Guerilla Amnesty Commission to
restrain and prevent it from taking jurisdiction and cognizance of a petition for
amnesty filed by respondent Antonio Guillermo who was convicted and sentenced by
the Supreme Court for murder
• The SC ruled that Guillermo is not entitled to the benefits of amnesty because the
murders which he was convicted were committed “not in furtherance of the
resistance movement but in the course of a fratricidal strife between two rival guerilla
units.”
• Respondents argue that the pronouncement of this Court thereon is not final and
conclusive and is merely an obiter dictum
 PEOPLE VS MACADAEG
(91 PHIL 410, 1952)

ISSUE
Whether the pronouncement of the Court is obiter dictum?
 PEOPLE VS MACADAEG
(91 PHIL 410, 1952)
RULING
• A cursory reading of the decision of this Court in G. R. No. L-2188 **against
respondent Antonio Guillermo discloses that the ruling of the Court that the
said respondent is not entitled to the benefits of the amnesty is not an obiter
dictum, but is a ruling of the Court on an issue expressly raised by the party
appellant on facts or evidence adduced in the course of the trial of his case.
• It is not an opinion uttered by the way; it is a direct ruling on an issue
expressly raised by a party.
 RATIO DECIDENDI VS OBITER DICTUM
Ratio decidendi Obiter dictum
• The point in a case that determines • An opinion expressed by a court
the judgment upon some question of law which is
not necessary to the decision of the
• The principle that the case
case before it
establishes
• Unlike obiter dicta, the ratio
decidendi is, as a general rule,
binding on courts of lower and later
jurisdiction—through the doctrine of
stare decisis
 DELTA MOTORS VS CA
(276 SCRA 212, 1997)
FACTS
• Private Respondent State Investment House, Inc. (SIHI) filed action against
DELTA for a sum of money at the RTC of Manila, Branch VI. DELTA was
required to pay P20M to the private respondent.
• The above decision could not be served by DELTA due to its dissolution. It
had been taken over by Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the meantime.
• Dec. 1986: SIHI moved for service of the decision by way of publication. It
was published in the Thunderer, a weekly Manila newspaper. Afterwards,
SIHI moved for the execution, which the RTC granted on March 1987.
Pursuant to the writ of execution, properties of DELTA in Iloilo and Bacolod
City were levied upon and sold.
 DELTA MOTORS VS CA
(276 SCRA 212, 1997)
• DELTA commenced a special civil action for certiorari with the CA, alleging
that a) the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over DELTA since there was no
valid/proper service of summons rendering the decision void, and b) the
decision never became final and executory
• The CA ruled that against DELTA on the first ground, but ruled that the
decision never became executory because records show that the assailed
judgment had never been properly served against on PNB (which assumed
DELTA’s operation upon its dissolution). The CA also stated that the
publication was not a cure for such a fatal defect.
• DELTA filed an Omnibus motion with the CA to declare all acts and
proceedings relating to the earlier decision as void. The CA issued a
resolution on Jan. 5 1995
 DELTA MOTORS VS CA
(276 SCRA 212, 1997)
• SIHI filed a motion for clarification, asking for a deletion of a portion of the
resolution for it being mere obiter dictum (“While it is true that as a necessary
consequence the decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 22, 1991
ruling that the decision in Civil Case No. 84-23019 "has not attained finality
pending service of a copy thereof on petitioner Delta, which may appeal
therefrom within the reglementary period", all proceedings and/or orders
arising from the trial court's decision in Civil Case No. 84-23019 are null and
void x x x .”) SIHI claimed that the statement was “not necessary for the case
before it” (the denial of the Omnibus motion” and therefore “could not be held
binding for establishing a precedent”).
• CA decreed to amend its resolution and delete the assailed paragraph
 DELTA MOTORS VS CA
(276 SCRA 212, 1997)

ISSUE

Whether or not the assailed paragraph in the CA’s resolution was

obiter dictum?
 DELTA MOTORS VS CA
(276 SCRA 212, 1997)
RULING
Yes, the assailed paragraph is considered obiter dictum.
The phrase was not raised by the petitioner expressly in its petition assailing the
dismissal of its notice of appeal. Hence, it could not be considered a prerequisite
in disposing of the issues. The body of the resolution did not contain any
discussion on such matter nor mention any principle of law to support such
statement.
 LIMITATIONS OF STARE DECISIS
• The rule of Stare Decisis is not absolute. The principle does not
blind adherence to precedents.
• If it is found contrary to law, must be abandoned. The principle
should not apply when there is conflict between the precedent
and the law.
• If the inferior courts feel that the precedent is against their way
of reasoning, they may state their personal opinion but still they
are bound to follow it.
 KOPPEL (PHILIPPINES), INC. VS YATCO
(77 PHIL 496, 1946)
FACTS
• The Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed Koppel's
complaint for the recovery of the sum of P64,122.51 which it
had paid under protest to the Collector of Internal Revenue on
October 30, 1936, as merchant sales tax.
 KOPPEL (PHILIPPINES), INC. VS YATCO
(77 PHIL 496, 1946)
ISSUE
WON Interpretations of administrative Branches are binding on
courts?
 KOPPEL (PHILIPPINES), INC. VS YATCO
(77 PHIL 496, 1946)
RULING
• It is clear that the ruling of the Secretary of Finance was not
binding upon the trial court, much less upon this tribunal, since
the duty and power of interpreting the laws is primarily a
function of the judiciary.
• The rule of Stare Decisis is undoubtedly entitled to more respect
in the construction of statutes than the interpretations given by
officers of the administrative branches of the government, even
those entrusted with the administration of particular laws.