DISCUSSION

I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
 What is administrative law?

• Administrative law is the branch of public law

which fixes the organization and determines the
competence of administrative authorities, and
indicates to the individual remedies for the
violation of his rights. (Goodnow, Comparative
Administrative Law, p. 8)
What is administrative law in actual
practice in the Philippines?

• On the basis of the different definitions of

administrative law, and considering how
administrative law presently operates in this
jurisdiction from day to day, it is perhaps easier
to understand administrative law by having in
mind that:
1. It is a branch of public law;

2. It deals with the activities of executive or administrative

agencies, known and referred to as “boards”, “bureaus”,
“commissions”, “authority”, “office” and “administration”;

3. These “boards”, “bureaus”, “commissions”, “authority”,

“office” and “administration” can exercise quasi-legislative
and quasi-judicial powers and functions in the sense that
they can issue rules and regulations not contrary to the
guidelines set up by law and they can resolve the issues or
the cases submitted to them;
4. Administrative regulations and policies enacted by
administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are
entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to
great respect. They have in their favor a presumption of legality.
(Gonzales vs Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 7675,
March 22, 1990)

Example
There is a legal presumption that the rates fixed by the
National Telecommunications Commission are reasonable. It must
be conceded that the fixing of the rates by the government through
its authorized agent involves the exercise of reasonable discretion
and unless there is an abuse of that discretion, the courts will not
interfere. Courts do not interfere with administrative action prior to
its completion or finality. (Radio Communications of the Philippines
vs NTC, G.R. No. 66683, April 23, 1990)
5. In the resolution of cases or issues presented to
administrative bodies and offices, they are not
bound by the technical rules of evidence. Strict
observance of the same is not indispensable in
administrative cases. (Daduvo vs CSC, 42 SCAD
750, 223 SCRA 747)
6. An administrative decision may properly be amended or
set aside only upon clear showing that the administrative
official or tribunal has acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
There is an abuse of discretion when the same was
performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, such as when
the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion of personal hostility. (Heirs of
Tanjuan vs Office of the President, et al., G.R. No.
126847, December 4, 1996)
7. Factual findings of administrative bodies should be
accorded not only respect but also finality if they are
supported by substantial evidence even if not
overwhelming or preponderant. (Casa Filipino Realty
Corporation vs Office of the President, 241 SCRA 165)

8. Although findings of facts of an administrative agency

is persuasive in courts and carries with it a strong
presumption of correctness, nonetheless, the
interpretation and application of laws is the court’s
prerogative. (Prudential Bank vs Serrano, G.R. No.
49293; Prudential Bank vs Gapultos, G.R. No. 41835,
January 19,1990)
9. Administrative remedies should first be exhausted
before filing a petition for relief. (Walstrom vs
Mapa, Jr., G.R. No. 38387, January 29, 1990)

10. On purely legal question, however, the aggrieved

party need not exhaust administrative remedies.
REASON: Nothing of an administrative nature is
to be done or can be done in the administrative
forum. (Prudential Bank vs Serrano, supra)
11. If a case is such that its determination requires the
expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper
administrative bodies because technical matters or
intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must
first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a
remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the
matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court
(Industrial Enterprises, Inc vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
88550, April 8, 1990). This is known as the principle
of primary jurisdiction
Trace the origin of administrative law
The origin of administrative law could be traced to the
following:

1. Statutes – Setting up administrative authorities either

by creating boards and commissions or administrative
officers or by confiding the powers and duties to
existing boards, commissions, or officers, to amplify,
apply, execute, and supervise the operation of, and
determine controversies arising under particular laws
in the enactment of which the legislature decided for
matters of convenience or for quicker or more efficient
administration to withhold the controversies, at least in
the first instance, from the courts of law.
2. Increase of government functions and
concerns – Complexities of modern life necessarily
increase the functions and concerns of government
which, in turn, requires the legislature to create more
administrative agencies which will take charge in
attending to matters that demand their special
competence and expertise.
3. Necessity of government control and regulation –
The government has intervened in contractual relations
that are affected with public interest. As it is now, the
government has exercised control and regulation of many
aspects of business such as but not limited to labor and
management relations, immigration and deportation,
banking, recruitment of overseas workers, insurance,
telecommunication industry, water services, finance,
foreign exchange, health, food and drugs, regulation of
profession, regulation of sports activities, including the
monitoring of player’s credentials and citizenship, morals,
investment, energy regulation, forest development,
mining, land conversion, election, tax collection and
administration, human settlements and regulation of
subdivisions, civil service and eligibility of government
employees, and many other businesses and activities that
are impressed with public interest.
 In the course of the exercise of the above-
mentioned functions and responsibilities, rules,
regulations, decisions and orders are issued every
now and then by the different agencies of the
government. All of these, in turn, contribute to the
growth and development of administrative law.
What are the sources of administrative
law?
Administrative law is derived from the following
sources:

1. The Constitution (i.e., Article IX, Section 1 of the

1987 Constitution which provides as follows: “The
Constitutional Commissions, which shall
be independent, are the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections,
and the Commission on Audit” ).
2. Statutes creating administrative bodies

Example:
The Board of Energy was created by Presidential
Decree No. 1208, dated October 6, 1977.
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) took over the functions of the Overseas
Employment Development Board (OEDB). It was created
by Executive Order No. 797 dated May 1, 1972.
The Workmen’s Compensation Commission was
abolished on March 31, 1976, and it was replaced by the
Employees Compensation Commission as provided by
Article 176 of the New Labor Code of the Philippines,
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended.
3. Court decisions – interpreting the charters of
administrative agencies and defining their
powers and responsibilities.

Example:
Jurisprudence laid down by the Supreme
Court containing interpretations involving the
principle of primary jurisdiction; exhaustion of
administrative remedies; due process in
administrative proceedings, etc.
4. The body of rules, regulations and orders issued by
administrative agencies

Example:
Rules, regulations, circulars issued by the
different administrative agencies of the government.
Decisions and orders of administrative bodies in
cases submitted to them (i.e. decisions of the National
Labor Relations Commission n complaints filed by
employees against their employers).
What are the administrative bodies or
agencies in the Philippines?
1) Administrative bodies for regulation under police
power.

Example:
a) Commission on Immigration and Deportation
b) Securities and Exchange Commission
c) Professional Regulation Commission
d) Bureau of Food and Drug
e) Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
f) Board of Food Inspectors
g) Monetary Board
h) Land Transportation Office
2) Administrative bodies for regulation of public
utilities.

Example:
a) Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory
Board
b) National Telecommunications Commission
c) Board of Energy
d) National Water and Resources Council
e) Civil Aeronautics Board
f) Board of Marine Inquiry
3) Administrative bodies to carry on
governmental functions.

Example:
a) Bureau of Internal Revenue
b) Bureau of Customs
c) Civil Service Commission
d) Board of Special Inquiry
e) Bureau of Lands
f) Land Registration Authority
4) Administrative bodies that adjudicates and
decides industrial controversies.

Example:
a) National Labor Relations Commission
b) Philippine Overseas Employment Adjudication
Office
c) Human Settlement Regulatory Commission or
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
5) Administrative bodies making the
government a private party.

Example:
a) Commission on Audit
b) Social Security System Adjudication Office
6) Administrative bodies that grant privileges.

Example:
a) Philippine Veterans Affairs Office
b) Board of Pardons and Parole
c) Bureau of Lands
d) Land Transportation and Franchising Regulatory
Board

In the case of PLDT vs City of Bacolod (G.R. No. 149179,

July 15, 2005), the Supreme Court ruled that the Bureau
of Local Government Finance under the Department of
Finance is NOT an administrative agency whose findings
on questions of facts are given weight by the courts.
Define administration
• It is an activity of the executive officer of the
government. The government administers when it
appoints an officer, instructs its diplomatic agents,
assesses and collects its taxes, drills its army,
investigates a case of the commission of crime and
executed the judgment of court. Whenever we see the
government in action as opposed to deliberation or the
rendering of a judicial decision, there we say is
administration. Administration is thus to be found in all
the manifestation of executive action. (Goodnow,
Comparative Administrative Law, p.12).

Administration, as it is presently understood, refers

to the aggregate of those persons in whose hands the
reigns of government are for the time being. (U.S. vs Dorr,
2 Phil. 332)
What are the two aspects of
administration?
There are two (2) aspects of administration,
namely:

1. Internal administration – This includes

the legal structure or organization of public
administration and the legal aspects of each
institutional activity (i.e. personnel, material,
physical and planning activities.
2. External administration – This is
concerned with the problems of administrative
regulations or the exercise of power for
carrying out the ends for which such powers
were delegated. (42 Am. Jur., 290)
Distinguish the following:
(a) Administration and politics;
(b) Administration and law;
(c) Administration of government and
administration of justice;
(d) Administration as an organization and
administration as a government.
(a) Administration and politics

ADMINISTRATION POLITICS
Administration has something to do Politics has something to do with
with the execution of the policies of policies or expressions of the State’s
the State. will

Execution of said policies is entrusted

to the body of officers, called
administrative officers
(b) Administration and law
ADMINISTRATION
Administration achieves public
security by preventive measures. It
selects a hierarchy of officials to each
of whom definite work is assigned, and
it is governed by ends rather than
rules. It is personal. Hence, it is often
arbitrary and is subject to the abuse
incident to personal as contrasted with
impersonal or law-regulated action.
LAW
It operates by redress or punishment
rather than by prevention. It
formulates general rules of action and
visits infraction of these rules with
penalties. It does not supervise action.
It leaves individuals free to act, but
imposes pains on those who do not act
in accordance with the rules
prescribed. (Roscoe Pound in
Proclamation, Pol. Sci. Association,
pp. 232-233)
(c) Administration of government and
administration of justice
ADMINISTRATION OF
GOVERNMENT
The administrative officers who are
charged with the administration of
government determine what is the law
to find out whether they are
competent to act and if so, whether it
is wise for them to act
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
The judicial officers who are charged
with the administration of justice
decides controversies between
individuals and government officers as
to the applicability in the cases in a
question of a particular rule of law.
Hence, they determine what law is
applicable to the facts brought before
them
(d) Administration as an organization
and government
ADMINISTRATION AS AN
ORGANIZATION
Administration refers to that group of
aggregate of persons in whose hands
the reigns of government are for the
time being (U.S. vs Dorr, 2 Phil. 332).
It indicates the entire administrative
organization extending down from the
Chief Executive to the most humble of
his subordinates. It is thus the totality
of the executive and administrative
authorities. (Goodnow, op. cit., p. 5 )
ADMINISTRATION AS A
GOVERNMENT
As an element of the State, a
government is defined as “that
institution or aggregate of institutions
by which an independent society
makes and carries out those rules of
action which are necessary to enable
men to live in a social state, or which
are imposed upon the people forming
that society by those who possess the
power or authority of prescribing
them.” (U.S. vs Dorr, 2 Phil. 332;
Bacani vs National Coconut
Corporation, 53 O.G. 2798)
What are the weaknesses of
administrative action?
Administration suffers from the following weaknesses:

1. Tendency toward arbitrariness;

2. Lack of legal knowledge and attitude in sound judicial
technique;
3. Susceptibility to political bias or pressure, often brought
about by uncertainty of tenure and lack of sufficient
safeguards for independence;
4. A disregard for the safeguards that insure a full and fair
hearing;
5. Absence of standard rules of procedure suitable to the
activities of each agency; and
6. A dangerous combination of legislative, executive, and
judicial functions. (Lawyer’s Journal, Vol. 7, p. 560;
Macapagal, Judicial Supremacy over Administrative
Bodies, Lawyer’s Journal, Vol. 12, pp. 312 – 314)
II. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THEIR
NATURE, CREATION, ESTABLISHMENT
AND ABOLITION
What is the nature of administrative
agencies?

• An administrative agency is an organ of government

entrusted with the task of enacting specific rules and
regulations to effectuate the purpose of the statute creating
it. Its functions and powers are quasi-legislative or quasi-
judicial, or in some instances, it acts as an agent of the
executive branch of the government, in which case, it is
entrusted with the duty to exercise executive and
administrative functions.
What are the two principal powers and
functions of administrative agencies?
Administrative agencies have two principal kinds
of powers and functions namely:

1. Rule-making power or quasi-legislative

function
2. Power of adjudication or quasi-judicial
function. (Stasoni Cases and other Materials
on Administrative Tribunals, 2nd ed., 71)
How are administrative bodies created
and established?

• Administrative agencies may be created by: (1)

the Constitution; (2) the legislature in legislative
enactments; or (3) by authority of law
Does the legislature exercise control
over administrative agencies?
• Yes. The legislative branch of government enacts the law
that creates an administrative agency: (1) It prescribes
the mode of appointment, the term of office and the
compensation; (2) It fixes its authority and procedure;
(3) It determines the size of its personnel and staff; (4) It
exercises continuing surveillance over its activities; (5) It
may investigate its operations for remedial/corrective
legislation.

At present, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee as

well as the appropriate committees in each House of
Congress play an important role in the investigation of
anomalies and irregularities of the different
administration offices and agencies.
 Likewise, the Ombudsman, a Constitutional
Office organized precisely to look into and
investigate any irregularity of government officials
and employees, exercise an important role in filing
appropriate criminal cases against erring
government officials and employees.
Of course, the Sandiganbayan takes part in
the trial of complaints filed by the Ombudsman.
III. POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
 A. QUASI-LEGISLATIVE OR RULE
MAKING POWER
1. DIFFERENT KINDS OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULES AND
REGULATIONS

a) Supplementary or detailed legislation – They are rules and

regulations “to fix the details” in the execution and enforcement of
a policy set out in the law, e.g., Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code.
b) Interpretative legislation – They are rules and regulations
construing or interpreting the provisions of a statute to be
enforced and they are binding on all concerned until they are
changed, e.g. BIR Circulars, CB Circulars, etc. They have the effect
of law and are entitled to great respect; they have in their favor the
presumption of legality (Gonzales vs Land Bank, 183 SCRA 520).
The erroneous application of the law by public officers does not
bar a subsequent correct application of the law. (Manila Jockey
Club vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103533, December 15, 1998)
c) Contingent legislation – They are rules and
regulations made by an administrative authority on the
existence of certain facts or things upon which the
enforcement of the law depends. (Cruz vs Youngberg,
56 Phil. 234). Contingent Regulation – It is issued on
account of the concurrence of a certain
contingency, as determined by the
administrative agencies. On the basis of the
latter’s determination, the operation of a law
may either be enforced or suspended.

Example:
Authority of the Governor General to lift the
prohibition against the importation of foreign cattle upon
determination that there was no longer a threat of
contagion caused by ruinderpest epidemic, was sustained
by the Supreme Court in Cruz vs. Youngberg (56 Phil.
234).
 2. REQUISITES OF A VALID ADMINISTRATIVE
RULE OR REGULATION

What are the requisites of a valid administrative

regulation?
• The following requisites must be complied with
CODE: ASAR
A–uthorized (Its promulgation must be authorized by the
legislature)
S–cope of authority (It must be within the scope of the
authority given by the legislature)
A–ccording to prescribed procedure (It must be
promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure
R–easonable (It must be reasonable)
 Requisite

DISCUSSION OF EACH REQUISITE

1. Authority to promulgate an
administrative regulation –
This is granted either by the charter itself of an
administrative body, or by the law it is supposed
to enforce. Hence, any and all administrative
regulations issued by the administrative agency
should not be contrary to the said charter or law
that creates them, and that they should be in
conformity with the standards prescribed by law.
Explanation of each requisite

The promulgation of the said rules and

regulations must be authorized by the
legislature – The authority to promulgate
administrative rules and regulations is found in
the charter itself of the administrative body or in
the law which it seeks to enforce.
EXAMPLE:

a) Implementing rules and regulations regarding

employment of women and minors; employment of
househelpers and employment of home workers were
promulgated to implement Articles 153 to 155 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines
b) Implementing rules and regulations to improve
telecommunications industry is authorized under
Republic Act No. 7925
c) Implementing rules and regulations to promote
liberalized foreign investment is authorized under
Republic Act No. 8179
 Requisite

2. The said rules and regulations must be

within the scope of legislative authority
– Rules and regulations which are beyond the
limits of legislative authority are not valid rules
and regulations. It has been the consistent rule
of the Supreme Court that rules and
regulations are valid only when they are within
the framework of the policy which the
legislature seeks to implement. (U.S. vs Barias,
11 Phil. 327)
 Administrative rules and regulations must be
germane to the object and purpose of the law and
must conform to the standards, policies and
limitations prescribed by law. (Delman vs Philippines
Veterans Administration, 51 SCRA 340)

An administrative agency cannot amend an act

of Congress. (Santos vs Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419)

NOTE: In People vs Maceren, 79 SCRA 450, the

Secretary of Agriculture exceeded his authority in
penalizing electro-fishing by means of an
administrative order.
Can traffic enforcers remove license
plates of illegally parked vehicles?
• No. This was declared illegal in Metropolitan Traffic
Command vs Gonong (187 SCRA 432). The alleged
justification to the practice of removing license
plates of illegally parked vehicles was LOI 43, but
another law, Presidential Decree No. 1605, was
issued, and under this law, the authority of the
Metro Manila Commission is limited only to
suspension or revocation of the license of the driver
who violated traffic rules. Said Presidential Decree
No. 1605 did not include the authority to remove
license plates or the confiscation of license of the
erring driver.
Can the impounding of a vehicle be
sustained under a letter of instruction
prohibiting private extra heavy and
heavy vehicles from using public streets
on weekends and holidays?

• No, as declared in Bautista vs Junio, (127 SCRA 329) on

the ground that the impounding of a vehicle finds no
statutory justification, and therefore ultra vires. The
prohibition itself, however, to said vehicles from using
public streets on weekends and holidays, was sustained.
 NEW CASE:
METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY VS. DANTE O. GARIN
G.R. NO. 130230, APRIL 15, 2005

There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the

MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.

The power to confiscate and suspend or revoke driver’s

license without the need of legislative enactment is an
authorized exercise of police power.
FACTS:
1. Atty. Dante Garin parked his vehicle illegally
along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila.
2. Atty. Garin sent a letter to Prospero Oreta, the
MMDA Chairman with these requests: (a) that
his driver’s license be returned to him. On the
same date, he expressed his preference that his
case be filed in court.
3. He did not receive a reply. Subsequently he
filed a complaint with the RTC of Paranaque
City. His contentions are as follows:
a. Without implementing rules and regulations,
Section 5[f] of Republic Act No. 7924 grants
MMDA the unbridled discretion to deprive
erring motorists of their licenses.
b. It will be pre-empt a judicial determination of
the validity of the deprivation, hence, it
violates the due process clause.
c. Said law also violates the constitutional
prohibition against undue delegation of
legislative authority.
d. Said law will also allow MMDA to fix and
impose unspecified and therefore unlimited
fines and other penalties on erring motorists.

MMDA, on the otherhand, invoked its police

power.
ISSUE:
Are the said contentions valid?

HELD:
1. There is no syllable in Republic Act No.
7924 that grants the MMDA police power,
let alone legislative power.

2. Even the Metro Manila Council has not

been delegated any legislative power.
3. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government
units, there is no provision in Republic Act No. 7924
that empowers the MMDA or its council to “enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds
for general wefare” of the inhabitants of Metro Manila.
The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a
“development authority”. It is an agency created for
the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating
with the various national government agencies,
people’s organization and the private sector for the
efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in
the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are
administrative in nature xxx.
4. Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of
government. The power delegated to the
MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila
Council to promulgate its administrative rules
and regulations in the implementation of the
MMDA’s functions.

5. There is no grant of authority to enact

ordinances and regulations for the general
welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis.

6. The power therefore to confiscate and

suspend or revoke driver’s license without the
need of legislative enactment is an authorized
exercise of police power.
 Requisite

3. It must be promulgated in accordance

with prescribed procedure.
Administrative regulations of general
application does not require previous notice and
hearing except where the legislature itself requires
it and mandates that the same shall first require
the ascertainment of facts elicited from an
appropriate investigation.
What is the prescribed procedure
referred to as the third requisite?

• The prescribed procedure is notice and hearing,

if this is so required by law, and publication, as
required by Executive Order No. 200
Is previous notice and hearing always
required in the promulgation of
administrative regulations of general
circulation?
• It is not required unless the legislature requires
it, or unless the regulation is in effect a
settlement of a controversy between specific
parties in which case it is considered as an
administrative adjudication, hence, it will
require notice and hearing.
Regarding the rates prescribed by
administrative agencies, when is prior
notice and hearing required and when
is it not required?
• When the administrative agency prescribes the rates in
the exercise of its legislative functions, prior notice and
hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of
due process. However, when said rates are prescribed by
an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential
to the validity of said rates. (Philippine Consumers
Foundation, Inc. vs Secretary of Education, Culture and
Sports, 153 SCRA 622)
When are rules/rates issued in the
exercise of a legislative function and
when are they issued in the exercise
of a quasi-judicial function?

• When legislative in character:

When the rules or rates issued or prescribed by
an administrative agency are meant to apply to all
enterprises of a given kind throughout the country,
they may partake of a legislative character.
• When quasi-judicial in character:
Where the rules and the rates imposed apply
exclusively to a particular party, based upon a
finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in
character.

EXAMPLE: A Department Order of the

Department of Education and Culture which
prescribed maximum school fees that may be
charged by all private schools in the country for
school year 1987 to 1988.
Was that order issued in the exercise of a
legislative function or quasi-judicial
function?

It was issued in the exercise of legislative function,

according to the Supreme Court in Philippine
Consumers Foundation, Inc. vs Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports. (Supra)
Will a violation of an administrative
regulation give rise to a criminal
prosecution?

• No, unless the law makes the violation

punishable and prescribes a penalty.
 Requisite

4. The administrative rule or regulation

must be reasonable – An administrative
rule or regulation must be reasonable, not
arbitrary and capricious. The reasonableness
of a regulation depends on the reason or the
purpose for which a regulation is issued.
Example:

In Agustin vs Edu, Letter of Instruction No.

229 which required the use of “early warning
devices” (EWD) is not repugnant to the due
process clause. It was considered justified for
traffic safety.
In Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila vs
Board of Transportation, a regulation phasing out
taxicabs more than six years old was reasonable as
it is intended to promote not only the safety of the
passengers but also the comfort and the
convenience of the passengers.
 Prohibition to private extra heavy and heavy
vehicles from using public streets on weekends and
holidays was sustained by the Supreme Court in
Bautista vs. Junio. It is apparently intended to
improve traffic conditions during the designated days.
In Tablarin vs. Gutierrez, MECS Order No. 52,
Series of 1985, which mandates the taking and
passing of the National Medial Admission Test
(NMAT) as a condition for securing certificates of
eligibility for admission, was held to be a valid
exercise of the police power of the State. The rationale
for issuing the said order is the improvement of the
professional and technical quality of the graduates of
medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those
admitted to the student body of the medical schools.
 AGUSTIN VS. EDU
88 SCRA 195
FACTS:
Then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Letter of
Instruction No. 229 requiring the use of “Early Warning Devices
(EWD)”. Petitioner claims that the use of the said early warning
devices is not necessary because his car is already equipped with
blinking lights.

ISSUE:
Is the said Letter of Instruction arbitrary?

HELD:
It is not arbitrary and not repugnant to the due process
clause. There is nothing in Letter of Instruction No. 229 which
compels car owners to purchase the prescribed early warning
device. Vehicle owners can produce the device themselves with a
little ingenuity.
 BAUTISTA VS. JUNIO
127 SCRA 329
FACTS:
Letter of Instruction No. 869 is an energy
conservation measure which prohibits the use of heavy
and extra-heavy private vehicles from using public streets
on weekends and holidays. Pursuant thereto,
Memorandum Circular No. 39 was issued, imposing
penalties of “fine, confiscation of vehicle, and cancellation
of registration”.
Petitioner contends that: (1) said letter of instruction
is a violation of his right to use and enjoy private property
and of his right to travel, hence, a violation of due process;
and (2) that said memorandum circular was likewise
unconstitutional for it violates the doctrine of undue
delegation of power.
ISSUE:
Is the said letter of instruction and memorandum
circular constitutional is the confiscation or impounding of
the vehicle under Memorandum Circular ultra vires or
not?

HELD:
The said Letter of Instruction was sustained but the
confiscation or impounding of the vehicle was ultra vires
because a penalty can only be imposed in accordance with
the procedure required by law. While the imposition of a
fine or the suspension of registration is valid under the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the impounding of
the vehicle finds no statutory justification.
 TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ
152 SCRA 730
FACTS:
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 2382 or the
Medical Act of 1959, MECS Order No. 52, Series of
1985, was issued. It mandates the taking and passing
of the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as a
condition for securing certificates of eligibility for
admission.
Petitioner assails the constitutionality of said
law and MECS Order No. 52, and sought to be
admitted to the College of Medicine for 1987-1988,
without successfully taking the NMAT.
ISSUE:
Are the said law and regulation constitutional?
Whether there is some reasonable relation between
requirement of passing NMAT as a condition for
admission to the medical school on the one hand, and the
securing of the health and safety of the general
community, on the other hand.

HELD:
The Medical Act of 1959, as amended, and MECS
Order No. 52, Series of 1985, are constitutional. They
constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the State
as it is intended to promote the public order, the health
and physical safety and well being of the population.
Likewise, the power to regulate and control the
practice of medicine includes the power to regulate
admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice
medicine.
 There is a violation between the requirement of
passing the NMAT and the securing of the health and
safety of the general community because the
regulation of the practice of medicine is a reasonable
method of protecting the health and safety of the
public.
The said requirement is the protection of the
public from the potentially deadly effects of
incompetence and ignorance in those who would
undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or
trauma.
3. REQUISITES OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REGULATIONS WITH A PENALTY
The requisites for the validity of administrative
regulations with penal sanctions are the following:

1. The law itself which authorizes administrative

authorities to issue the same must declare as
punishable the violation of the rules and regulations
issued under its authority;
2. The law should define or fix the penalty for the
violation of the said rules and regulations;
3. Publication of said rules and regulations must be
made.
 CASES:
PEOPLE VS. MACEREN
79 SCRA 450
FACTS:
Section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits “the use of
any obnoxious or poisonous substance in fishing”. The
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
subsequently promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order
No. 84 prohibiting electro-fishing in all Philippine waters.
Said order was amended by A.O. 841, by instructing the ban
against electro-fishing to fresh water fishes. The
respondents were charged for having violated A.O. 841. The
complaint alleged that the five accused used an electro-
cutting device locally known as “senso” to catch fish through
electric current, in the waters of Barrio San Pablo, Sta, Cruz.
The criminal complaint was dismissed. The dismissal was
affirmed by the CFI. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether A.O. 84 and 841, penalizing electro-fishing, are
devoid of any legal basis, and hence, invalid?

HELD:
Yes. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
exceeded its authority in issuing F.A.O. Nos. 84 and 84-1 and
that those orders are not warranted by R.A. No. 8512. The reason
is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro-
fishing. Since electro-fishing is not banned under the law, and
the Secretary is powerless to penalize it, hence A.O. Nos. 84 and
84-1 are devoid of any legal basis.

Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro-

fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily
embodied in the Old Fisheries Law.
 The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive
official the power to declare what acts should constitute a
criminal offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations
and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself.
But a mere administrative regulation is not legally adequate to
penalize electro-fishing.

Administrative regulations adopted under legislative

authority by a particular department must be in harmony with
the visions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect its general provisions. An administrative
agency cannot amend the act of Congress. The rule-making
power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or
proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted.
The power cannot be extended to amend or expand the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by
the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be
sanctioned.
 PEOPLE VS. QUE PO LAY
51 O.G. 48850
FACTS:
Central Bank issued a circular (Circular No. 20) requiring
those who had foreign currency to sell the same to Central Bank.
Que Po Lay was accused of violating Circular No. 20 but he
claimed that the said circular has not yet been published in the
Official Gazette before his alleged violation of the same and he
should therefore be acquitted.

HELD:
The Supreme Court sustained the defense and held that
before the public is bound by its contents, a law, regulation or
circular must first be published so the people will be officially
informed of the same, particularly the penalties for violating
thereof.
 GIL BALBUENA VS. SECRETARY OF
EDUCATION
110 PHIL. 150, G.R. NO. L-14283
NOVEMBER 21, 1960
FACTS:
Petitioners, members of the religious sect “Jehovah’s
Witnesses”, challenged the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
1265, by virtue of which the Secretary of Education issued
Department Order No. 8, prescribing compulsory flag ceremony
in all schools as an undue delegation of legislative power.
Section 1 of the Act requires all educational institutions to
observe daily flag ceremony, which shall be simple and dignified
and shall include the playing or singing of the Philippine
National Anthem. Section 2 thereof authorizes the Secretary of
Education to issue rules and regulations for the proper conduct
of the flag ceremony.
HELD:

The requirements constitute an adequate standard to wit,

simplicity and dignity of the flag ceremony and the singing of
the national anthem – especially when contrasted with other
standards heretofore upheld by the courts such as “public
interest”, “public welfare”, “interest of law and order”, “justice
equity” and the “substantial merits of the case”, or “adequate
and efficient instruction”. That the legislature did not specify
the details of the flag ceremony is no objection to the validity of
the statute, or all that is required of it is the laying down of
standard and policy that will limit the discretion of the
regulatory agency. To require the statute to establish in detail
the manner of exercise of the delegated power would be to
destroy the administrative flexibility that the delegation is
intended to achieve.
 Without a definite standard, there would be no
reasonable means to ascertain whether or not the
administrative agency concerned has acted within the scope
of authority as determined by the legislature. When this
happens, the power of legislation would eventually be
exercised by a branch of the government other than that in
which it is lodged by the Constitution. (Vigan Electric Light
Co., Inc vs. Public Service Commission, G.R. No. L-19850,
January 30, 1964)
REQUIREMENT AS TO PUBLICATION OF
ALL LAWS AS A CONDITION FOR THEIR
EFFECTIVITY

What should be published?

1. All statutes, including those of local application and private
laws.
2. Presidential Decrees and executive orders promulgated by
the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever
the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. (Tanada vs.
Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446)
How should the publication be made?
Borrowing the words of Justice Isagani
Cruz, the publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all since its purpose id to inform
the public of the contents of the law.
Where should the law be published?

The law should be published in the Official

Gazette, and not just in newspapers of general
circulation. (Tanada vs. Tuvera, Ibid.)
When does a law take effect?
A law takes effect after fifteen (15) days
following the completion of their publication
either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is
otherwise provided. (Art. 2, New Civil Code). As
enunciated in Tanada vs. Tuvera, however, laws
shall be published in the Official Gazette, and not
just in newspapers of general circulation.
Should administrative rules and
regulations be published?
It depends. If the purpose of the
administrative rules and regulations is to enforce
or implement existing law, they must be
published. If the administrative regulation is of
general circulation or penal in nature, it should
be published. If regulations are merely
interpretative or merely internal in nature, they
need not be published.
From what day shall fifteen-day period
(required for the effectivity of a law
or regulation) be counted?

The fifteen-day period is counted from the

date of release for circulation of the edition in the
Official Gazette, not from the date or printed date
of the edition of the Official Gazette. (People vs.
Verdicano, 132 SCRA 523)
What is the meaning of the phrase
“unless otherwise provided”?
This means that the law itself can provide
when it shall become effective. The law can provide
that it shall become effective thirty (30) days, or
twenty (20) days, after its publication in the Official
Gazette, but in no case can it provide that it shall
take effect immediately and without publication, if it
imposes a penalty, following the rationale in Tañada
vs. Tuvera, Pesigan vs. Angeles (129 SCRA 174), and
People vs. Que Po Lay “that before the public is
bound by its contents, especially its penal
provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be
published and the people officially informed of said
contents and its penalties”.
4. POWERS AND FUNCTIONS EXERCISED IN
THE COURSE OF EXERCISING QUASI-
LEGISLATIVE POWERS

An administrative agency merely exercises

the power of subordinate legislation which means
that it can promulgate rules and regulations
intended to carry out the provisions of the law and
implement legislative policy. In the course of
exercising said function, an administrative
agency is vested with different powers and
functions, to wit:
1) Enabling Powers – They are those powers that
enable an administrative agency to do an act which
the law precisely entrust to it.

Example:
a) The Land Transportation Office or LTO, is the
one entrusted with the function of registering all
motor vehicles including driver’s license.
b) The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
is the one entrusted with the function of approving
application of subdivision developers
c) The Commission on Higher Education or
CHED is the one entrusted with the function of
issuing accreditation of colleges in the Philippines.
2) Summary Powers – They are those powers
exercised by administrative authorities to perform
coercive measures upon persons or things without the
need of securing judicial warrant.

Example:
a) An order issued by the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation not to allow a Fil-Am player from playing in
the PBA on the ground of citizenship

b) The forcible evacuation of people residing within

six (6) km. radius of Mayon Volcano to avoid loss of lives
and properties.
3) Examining Powers – This is the power of an
administrative agency to examine and inspect books,
papers, and records to investigate the activities of
persons under its jurisdiction.

Example:
a) The Bureau of Internal Revenue or BIR, can
lawfully examine the financial statements and books of
accounts of persons and companies
b) The Bureau of Immigration and Deportation or
BID, can examine the citizenship papers of any Fil-Am
player whose citizenship is under question
c) The Bureau of Labor Standard can inspect
business establishments to determine whether they
comply or not with occupational help and safety standards
as provided for by the Labor Code of the Philippines
4) Dispensing Power – This is the power of an
administrative officer to grant exemption from the
performance of a general duty.

Example:
a) The Bureau of Internal Revenue can exempt
some business establishments from compliance with
some laws or rules which are entrusted to it for
enforcement.
b) The Movie and Television Regulatory and
Classification Board or MTRCB, can grant exemption
or relax a rule or rules regarding the showing of a film.
5) NOTICE AND HEARING

Is notice and hearing necessary in the promulgation of

a general regulation issued or to be issued by an
administrative body?

It is not necessary when the rules are merely

legal opinions. It is not also necessary when
substantive rules are being prepared and when the
class to be affected is large and the questions to be
resolved involved the use of discretion committed to
the rule making body.
6) WHEN IS IT NECESSARY?

An administrative rule in the nature of

subordinate legislation which will implement a
law by providing its details, must be heard before
they are adopted. In other words, when a rule or
regulation is being issued by an administrative
agency in the exercise of its quasi-legislative
authority, the requirement of notice, hearing and
publication shall be complied with.
 CRUZ VS. CSC
G.R. NO. 144464, NOVEMBER 27, 2001
FACTS:
Private individual Esteban wrote a letter to
the Chairperson of the CSC claiming that during
the examinations for non-professional in the
career civil service, Paitim, the Municipal
Treasurer of Norzagaray, Bulacan, falsely
pretended to be the examinee, Cruz, a co-
employee in the said office, and took the
examination for the latter.
 The Director IV of the CSC wrote a Memorandum to
the Civil Service Commissioner declaring that based on the
record, she found a prima facie case against petitioners
Paitim and Cruz. A fact finding investigation was
conducted and a ‘Formal Charge’ for “Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service” was filed against petitioners before the CSC.

After filing their Answer, petitioners filed a Motion

to Dismiss averring that if the investigation will continue,
they will be deprived of their right to due process because
the CSC was the complainant, the Prosecutor and the
Judge, all at the same time. Said motion was denied as well
as their motion for reconsideration.
 The Attorney III of CSC was directed to
conduct the formal administrative investigation.
She found petitioner guilty of ‘Dishonesty’ and
ordered their dismissal from the government
service.
The CSC thereafter issued a Resolution
finding the petitioners guilty of the charges and
ordered their dismissal from the government
service.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners were denied due process because
the CSC acted as the investigator, the complainant, the
prosecutor and the judge all at the same time.

RULING:
No. Petitioners were not denied due process.
The CSC is mandated to hear and decide administrative
cases instituted by it or instituted before it directly or on appeal
including actions of its officers and the agencies attached to it
pursuant to Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, Section 12,
Paragraph 11 of the Administrative Code of 1987 which states:

(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by

or brought before it directly or on appeal, including
contested appointments, and review decisions and actions of
its officers and of the agencies attached to it. x x x
 The fact that the complaint was filed by the CSC
itself does not mean that it could be an impartial
judge. As an administrative body, its decision was
based on substantial findings. Factual findings of
administrative bodies, being considered experts in
their field, are binding on the Supreme Court.

Petitioners were also properly informed of the

charges. They submitted an Answer and were given
the opportunity to defend themselves. Petitioners
cannot, therefore, claim that there was a denial of due
process much less the lack of jurisdiction on the part
of the CSC to take cognizance of the case.
7) CAN LEGISLATIVE POWERS BE
DELEGATED?

Legislative powers may be delegated in the

following cases:

1. When authorized by the Constitution such

as in the following cases:
a) The Congress may by law grant emergency powers
to the President. (Section 23 [2], Article VI)
b) Congress may by law grant tariff powers to the
President (Section 28 [2], Article VI)
2. Legislative powers may be delegated to
local governments:
a) Police power has been expressly delegated by the
legislature to the local law-making bodies;
b) Eminent Domain.

3. Legislative powers may be delegated to the

people at large:
a) REFERENDUM – a method of submitting an
important legislative measure to a direct vote of the
whole people;
b) PLEBISCITE – a device to obtain a direct
popular vote on a matter of political importance.
4. Legislative powers may be delegated to
administrative bodies (e.g. POEA,
LTFRB, CAB, OWWA, BOI, BMI etc.).
8) TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER A
GIVEN POWER HAS BEEN VALIDLY
EXERCISED BY A PARTICULAR
DEPARTMENT.

FIRST TEST: The first test is to determine whether

or not the power in question, regardless of its nature,
is granted by the Constitution to the department
which seeks to exercise such power. If it is granted by
the Constitution, the exercise of the power is
sustained.
SECOND TEST: If the power sought to be
exercised is not expressly conferred by the
Constitution, can the power sought to be exercised
be reasonably inferred from, or is it necessary to
the proper exercise of, the express power granted
to the department seeking to exercise said power,
hence, justified under the DOCTRINE OF
IMPLICATION.
What is the doctrine of implication?
This means that even in the absence of an
express conferment, the exercise of a given power
may be justified or reasonably inferred from the
express power already granted, or that it may be
necessary to the proper exercise of the express
power granted to the department seeking to
exercise the said power.
Example:

1. Rules of procedure promulgated by the

Electoral Commission were challenged
because they were allegedly not expressly
authorized by the 1935 Constitution. In
Angara vs. Electoral Commission, the
Supreme Court upheld the promulgation of
the said rules of procedure because they were
found out to be necessary to the proper
exercise of the express power of the Electoral
Commission to hear and decide election
contests involving members of the legislature.
2. The power of Congress to conduct legislative
investigation may be implied from the express
power of legislation. This power, however, is now
subject to the following restraints:

a) The legislative inquiry must be in aid of

legislation;

b) The conduct of the investigation must be

strictly in accordance with the rules of procedure
that must have been published in advance for the
information and protection of the witnesses;

c) The rights of persons appearing in or affected by

such inquiries shall be respected.
THIRD TEST: If the power sought to be
exercised is not granted by the Constitution, either
expressly or impliedly, can its exercise be justified
as inherent or incidental? If they are, the exercise
of the said power may be sustained.
FOURTH TEST: Assuming that the power of the act
sought to be performed is expressly or impliedly
granted by the Constitution, or that it is justified as
inherent, the fourth is whether or not the act of power
in question has been performed in accordance with
the rules laid down by the Constitution. A good
example is the compliance required by Section 21,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides
that the power to conduct legislative investigation,
although implied from the power of legislation, is now
subject to the following restraints:
 a) The legislative inquiry must be in aid of legislation;
b) The conduct of investigation must be strictly in
accordance with the rules of procedure that must have
been published in advance for the information and
protection of the witnesses;
c) The rights of persons appearing in, affected by such
inquiries, shall be respected. (Principles, Comments and
Cases in Constitutional Law I, First Edition, by Suarez,
citing Section 21, Article VI, 1987 Constitution)

The other example is when the President extends an

appointment to a person who does not possess the prescribed
qualifications. The courts may exercise its power to intervene.
9) DISTINGUISH LEGISLATIVE POWER
FROM QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER.

Legislative power is the power to make laws and

the power to fix a legislative policy. This cannot be
delegated by the legislature to administrative
agencies. Quasi-legislative power is also known as
the power of subordinate legislation. It is the power
of administrative agencies to issue administrative
rules and regulations in order to implement the law
and the legislative policy fixed by the legislature.
10) WHAT IS THE GUIDELINE TO OBSERVE IN
ORDER TO INSURE THAT THERE IS A VALID
AND LAWFUL DELEGATION OF POWER?

The legislature should lay down (1) A policy and a (2)

definite standard by which the executive or administrative
officer or board may be guided in the exercise of his
discretionary authority. If this is observed, there is a valid
delegation of legislative power (Cervantes vs. Auditor
General, G.R. No. L-4043, May 26, 1952). If, on the other
hand, the statute furnishes no standard and the officer or
board is granted uncontrolled or unlimited discretion,
such a statute is an unconstitutional delegation of power.
1. POLICY – The determination of legislative
policy is vested in the legislature and this cannot
be delegated to the administrative agencies. It
must be clearly declared in the language of the
statute and should not be left to the discretion of
the said administrative agencies.

2. STANDARD – The statute must pronounce

a definite standard which will guide the
administrative agency concerned. A standard
defines the policy fixed by the legislature and
marks and limits.
11) WHAT IS THE CLASSIFICATION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS?

An administrative agency may either be involved in

the task of adopting rules and regulations intended to
carry out the provisions of a law and to implement
legislative policy, or in the task of interpreting the statute
being administered.

The rules they adopt to implement the law and the

said policy are called legislative rules or regulations.

The rules arising from their interpretation of the

law are called interpretative regulations.
12) DISTINGUISH LEGISLATIVE
REGULATIONS FROM
INTERPRETATIVE REGULATION

Legislative regulations Interpretative regulations

What is employed in
promulgating this regulation is
not the discretion to
determine what the law shall
be, as this is exclusively vested
in the legislature, but the
discretion on how the law
shall be enforced.
They constitute the
administrator’s construction
of a statute and they are valid
if they construe the statute
correctly. If not, they are
subject to judicial review.
MTRCB IS AUTHORIZED TO ISSUE PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO.
1986

MTRCB has the power to supervise, regulate, grant,

deny or cancel permits for the exhibition, and/or television
broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs and
publicity materials, and in accordance with this power, the
MTRCB shall see to it that no such pictures, programs and
materials as it determines to be objectionable, shall be
exhibited and subject of broadcast. In the exercise of said
express regulatory and supervisory statutory mandate, it has
the power to issue preventive suspension. In otherwords, the
power to discipline and impose penalties, if granted, carries
with it the power to investigate administrative complaints,
and during such investigation, to preventively suspend the
person subject of the complaint. (Soriano vs. Laguardia,
G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2009)
B. QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER
1. DEFINE QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER.

Quasi-judicial power is the power of an

administrative agency to hear, determine, and make
findings of facts, and to resolve the case presented to
it on the basis of the said findings of facts and on the
basis of its interpretation of the laws and
jurisprudence concerning the issues of the case,
subject only to the power of the courts to review and
scrutinize the same on questions of law and
jurisdiction.
2. WHY IS QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER
GRANTED TO AN ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCY?

Quasi-judicial power is needed so that the

administrative officers in the different boards,
bureaus and offices can perform their executive duties
as well as their quasi-judicial authority. For this
purpose, the legislative may grant to such boards,
bureaus and offices quasi-judicial powers involving
the exercise of judgment and discretion as an incident
to the performance of administrative functions.
3. WHAT IS THE LIMITATION TO THE
LEGISLATURE WHENEVER IT GRANTS
QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER TO AN
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY?

The legislature must state its intention in express

terms that would leave no doubt that the power and
jurisdiction being transferred are not those vested in the
courts but only those powers and jurisdiction which are
incidental to or in connection with the performance of
administrative duties. The case of Miller vs. Mardo, et al.
(Supra) which was cited earlier, illustrates this limitation
to the power of the legislature in granting quasi-judicial
power to administrative agencies.
4. WHAT IS THE MAIN FUNCTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND
THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS IN-
CHARGE OF SAID BOARDS, BUREAUS
AND OFFICES?

Their main function is to enforce the law

entrusted to them for implementation. The exercise
of quasi-judicial power is only incidental to their
main function of enforcing the law.
5. POWERS INCLUDED IN THE TERM
“QUASI-JUDICIAL”.

The following powers are included:

(1)Determinative Powers; and

(2) Summary Powers
Two kinds of determinative powers:

a) Enabling Powers – Powers of administrative bodies to

act, to grant or deny applications for licenses to engage in a
particular business or occupation. (i.e. Power of the Land
Transportation Office to grant professional or non-
professional driver’s license).

b) Directing Powers – Powers of administrative agencies to

see to it that laws and regulations are duly complied with
(i.e. The Housing and Land Use and Regulatory Board may
require subdivision developers to submit subdivision plans
and other requirements to see to it that the Cherry Ville
incident in Antipolo, Rizal, may not happen again).
6. DIFFERENT POWERS
Directing powers are further classified into:

a. Dispensing Powers – Authority to grant

exemption, or be relieved, from complying with a
law or regulation. (i.e. Authority of the Land
Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board
to relieve school bus operators from an earlier
requirement to paint their school buses with
yellow every beginning of the school year).
b. Examining Powers – This refers to the investigatory or
inquisitorial powers of administrative agencies which
includes the following:

(b.1) Power to conduct inspection of accounts, records,

documents, and other papers relative to its investigation.
(b.2) Power to obtain other information which it finds
relevant to a matter being investigated.
(b.3) Power to issue subpoena and notices.
(b.4) Power to swear and interrogate witnesses.
(b.5) Power to inspect premises.
(b.6) Power to require written answers to questionnaires.
(b.7) Power to require periodic or special reports.
(b.8) Power to require the filing of statements. (Am. Jur.
P. 323)
c. Summary Powers – This refers to the power of
administrative agencies to apply compulsion or
force against a person or property without the
need of prior judicial warrant. (i.e. Authority of the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation to
prohibit certain persons and animals from leaving
the NAIA and to order that they be subject first to
quarantine regulations and procedures.
7. WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE
PROCEEDINGS ARISING FROM THE
EXERCISE OF THE SAID POWERS?

They are administrative proceedings that

partake of the nature of a judicial proceeding,
hence, they are described as a proceeding of a
quasi-judicial character. (Morgan vs. U.S. 468)
8. WHY DO THEY PARTAKE OF THE
NATURE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS?

They partake of the nature of judicial

proceedings because they involve the task of hearing,
taking and evaluating the evidence, and the making of
factual findings based on the evidence presented, and
issuing the order or decision on the basis of the said
findings and their interpretation of the law entrusted
to their enforcement, subject only to the ultimate
power of the courts to review the same on questions of
law and jurisdiction.
9. ARE THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
ADVERSARIAL IN NATURE?

Some proceedings before administrative

agencies are adversarial in nature and some are
held ex-parte.
10. WHEN ARE PROCEEDINGS
ADVERSARIAL AND WHEN ARE THEY
HELD EX-PARTE?

They are adversarial when the order or decision of

an administrative agency is in favor of one person or
party and against another. In such a case, the said order
or decision is issued to protect public interest (2 Am.
Jur. 2nd, 143-144). EXAMPLE: Complaint for unlawful
dismissal filed by the employees of Philippine Airlines in
the National Labor Relations Commission. A decision
for or against the employees or for or against Philippine
Airlines is adversarial in nature. A return to work order
that may be issued in the process of an ongoing strike is
designed to protect public interest.
 An administrative proceeding may be held ex-
parte if there is an urgent and compelling reason to
take an immediate action on a matter that is
injurious to a public interest, health and sanitation,
public safety and morals. EXAMPLE: (1) An order
directing policemen to confine lepers to Culion Leper
Colony to protect the people from being adversely
affected by the contagious disease of leprosy; (2) An
order directing that restaurants operating as fronts
of prostitution and illegal gambling activities be
closed to protect morals.
JURISDICTION
11. WHAT IS JURISDICTION?

Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case;

the right to act in a particular case (Palma vs. Q.S., Inc., 17
SCRA 97). The authority to decide a case and not the decision
rendered therein is what makes up jurisdiction. Where there
is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the
decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an
exercise of that jurisdiction. Any error that the Court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error of
judgment, and it is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that,
while errors of jurisdiction may be reviewed and corrected by
certiorari, errors of judgment may be reviewed only by
appeal.
What are the classification of jurisdiction
as to its nature?
General Jurisdiction – Extends to all controversies which may be brought
before a court within the legal bounds of rights and remedies.

Limited or Special Jurisdiction – Jurisdiction which is confined to particular

cases, or which can be exercised only under the limitations and circumstances
prescribed by the statute.

Original Jurisdiction – Jurisdiction conferred upon, or inherent in a court in

the first instance. Original jurisdiction is the jurisdiction of regional trial courts,
when it is exclusive or concurrent; exclusive jurisdiction exists when no other
court has the power to render a judgment in a particular case or class of cases;
concurrent jurisdiction exists when anyone of several distinct courts has the
power to render a judgment in a particular case or class of cases; appellate
jurisdiction is the power to hear, reverse, affirm or modify a judgment rendered
by an inferior court, whether a city/municipal trial court or regional trial court;
general jurisdiction is the largest power any regional trial court can have in that
political unit.
Appellate Jurisdiction – The power and authority conferred upon
a superior court to rehear and determine cases which have been tried
in the lower court, or the review by a superior court of the final
judgment or order of some lower courts.

Exclusive Jurisdiction – Jurisdiction conjorned to a particular

tribunal or grade of courts to the exclusion of all others.

Criminal Jurisdiction – That which exists for the punishment of

crimes.

Civil Jurisdiction – That which exists for the determination of

controversies that are civil in character.

Territorial Jurisdiction – The power of the tribunal considered

with reference to the territory within which it is to be exercised.

This classification, however, is applicable to jurisdiction in civil

and criminal cases tried by the regular courts.
Who has exclusive jurisdiction over courts and
court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of
the Court of Appeals down to the lowest
municipal trial court clerk?
This Court, in the case of Sanz Maceda vs. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464, held that:

“Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the

Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel,
from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal
trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can
oversee the judge’s and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the
proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof.
No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running
afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Public respondent Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of
petitioner on the powers granted to it by the Constitution, for such a justification
not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the Constitution granting
supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their personnel, but
likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary”
12. SOURCE OF AUTHORITY AND
JURISDICTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
BOARDS, BUREAUS AND OFFICES.

Said authority and jurisdiction is derived from

the Constitution, or from the statute that created the
administrative board, bureaus, and offices. The
administrative agencies created under the 1987
Constitution are the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Elections, and the Commission on
Audit. All other agencies are created by law or by the
legislature.
13. ARE THE ORDERS AND THE
DECISIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE
BOARDS, BUREAUS AND OFFICES
FINAL?

The factual findings of said

administrative boards, bureaus and offices are
final if they are supported by substantial evidence.
They are, however, appealable on questions of law
and jurisdiction.
14. WHEN IS AN ADMINISTRATIVE
DECISION CONSIDERED RES JUDICATA?

The Supreme Court ruled that whenever

any board, tribunal or person is by law vested with
authority to judicially determine a question, such
determination, when it has become final, is as
conclusive between the same parties litigating for the
same cause as though the adjudication had been made
by a court of general jurisdiction. (174 SCRA 258)
15. WHAT IS THE DOCTRINE OF RES
JUDICATA IN ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS?

The decisions and orders of

administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to
their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their
finality, the force and binding effect of a final
judgment. (Brillantes vs. Castro, 99 Phil. 497)
 ROXAS VS. SAYOC
200 PHIL. 448
FACTS:
The petitioner claimed that when Republic
Act No. 650, also known as the Import Control
Law, expired, the Commissioner of Customs also
lost jurisdiction over the case involving the
forfeiture of goods in favor of the government. The
said forfeiture was declared by the Collector of
Customs on May 19, 1953 and was affirmed by the
Commissioner of Customs on June 16, 1953.
ISSUE:
Did the Commissioner of Customs retain the
jurisdiction of the case when Republic Act No. 650
expired on June 16, 1953?

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that once the
Commissioner of Customs has acquired jurisdiction
over the case, the expiration of Republic Act No. 650
did not divest said Commissioner of his jurisdiction
duly acquired while said law was in force.
RCPI VS. BOARD OF COMMUNICATIONS
80 SCRA 471
FACTS:
There were two separate complaints for damages
that were filed against petitioner RCPI, one is BC Case
No. 75-01-C where a certain Diego Morales alleged
that he failed to receive a telegram sent by his
daughter to him through RCPI on October 15, 1974,
informing him about the death of his wife. He prayed
for damages. Another case is BC Case No. 75-08-0c
where a certain Pacifico Inocencio alleged that he also
failed to receive a telegram sent by Lourdes Inocencio
to him through RCPI on July 13, 1975. As a result, he
was not allowed to attend the internment of his father
at Moncada, Tarlac. He also prayed for damages.
 The Board of Communications imposed a disciplinary fine of P200.00
against RCPI pursuant to Section 21 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended
and held that RCPI’s service was inadequate and unsatisfactory. RCPI filed two
petitions to review by certiorari which were consolidated.

ISSUE:
Does the Board of Communications have jurisdiction over the said claims
for damages arising from the failure to receive telegrams through RCPI’s facilities?

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the complaints that were filed do not involve
RCPI’s failure to comply with its certificate of public convenience or any order,
decision or regulation of the respondent Board of Communications.
The claim for damages should be ventilated in the proper courts and not in
the Board of Communications. The only power of the latter is to fix rates. It could
not take to task a radio company for any negligence or misfeasance. It was not
vested with such authority.
Hence, the decisions of the Board of Communications in both cases were
set aside and nullified for lack of jurisdiction to take cognizance of both cases.
 MONTEMAYOR VS. ARANETA
UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION
77 SCRA 321
FACTS:
On two separate occasions in 1974, a complaint was filed
against petitioner, a full time professor of Araneta University and was
serving as head of the Department of Humanities and Psychology. The
first is a complaint of immorality filed on April 17, 1974. The second is
a complaint for conduct unbecoming of a faculty member which was
filed on November 8, 1974.
On the first complaint, an investigation was conducted by a
committee created by the President. Petitioner was able to cross-
examine the witnesses against him and he filed an affidavit to explain
his defenses. The committee’s recommendation was to demote
petitioner’s ranking by one degree. This was digested by the President
and later was referred to the Board of Trustees.
 On the second complaint, another committee was
created. After investigation, the committee recommended
his separation from the university the charges against him
having been established. Subsequently, his dismissal was
ordered on December 10, 1974, effective on November 15,
1974. On December 12, 1974, an application for clearance
to terminate him was filed.
Petitioner filed a complaint for reinstatement in the
NLRC on November 21, 1974, with a prayer for payment of
back salaries and all the benefits payable to him.
The NLRC granted the petition but the University
appealed to the Secretary of Labor. The latter ruled that
the dismissal was justified. Hence, a petition for certiorari
was filed in the Supreme Court on the ground that there
was a denial of due process.
ISSUE:
Is petitioner’s contention tenable?

HELD:
There was compliance with procedural due process
regarding the first complaint but it appears that the
hearing of the committee on the second complaint
proceeded despite the absence of petitioner who, in fact
filed a motion for postponement of the hearing o
November 18 and 19, 1974. This deficiency, however, was
cured because petitioner was able to present his case as
well as his evidence before the NLRC. More than this, the
entire record of the proceedings were elevated to NLRC for
review. He was therefore afforded his day in court.
Montemayor’s petition for certiorari was dismissed.
IV. IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES IN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
What are the important principles in
administrative law?

Among the many principles discussed in the

books of administrative law, and oftentimes
referred to by the Supreme Court in cases
involving administrative law, the following are
considered to be important, to wit:
PRINCIPLES OF MAJOR PRINCIPLE
1) Doctrine of finality of administrative decisions
2) Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies
3) Doctrine of primary jurisdiction
4) Doctrine of qualified political agency
5) Doctrine of res judicata in administrative
proceedings
6) Due process in administrative proceedings
7) Requisites of judicial review
DISCUSSION OF EACH PRINCIPLE
1. DOCTRINE OF FINALITY OF
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

What is necessary before a decision of an

administrative body may be subject of judicial
review?
Administrative action must have been fully
completed before a decision of an administrative body may
be subject of judicial review. Otherwise, it will only cause
delay to the disposition of administrative proceedings.
Is there an instance when the court can intervene prior
to the completion of an administrative action?

Yes, such as in the following cases:

1. When the administrative officer assumes to act in
violation of the Constitution and other laws;
2. When a questioned order is not reviewable in any other
way, and the complainant will suffer great and obvious damage
if the order is carried out, or when such relief is expressly
allowed by law;
3. When the questioned order is made in excess of power
and therefore a deprivation of a right granted by the statute. (2
Am. Jur. 2nd, pp. 424-425)
Are the orders and decisions of
administrative boards, bureaus and
offices, final?

Already answered.

What is the doctrine of res judicata in

administrative proceedings?

Already answered.
2. DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
What is the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies?

Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative

review, and provides a system of administrative appeal, or reconsideration,
the courts for reasons of law, comity and convenience, will not entertain a case
unless available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the
appropriate authorities have been given opportunity to act and correct errors
committed in the administrative forum. (Teotico vs. Ageda, Jr., G.R. No.
87437, May 29, 1991)

The doctrine of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the

appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy
falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts
of justice for review. (Sunville Timber Products, Inc. vs. Judge Abad, G.R. No.
85502, February 24, 1991)
What is the consequence of the non-
observance of the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies?

It results in lack of a cause of action which is

one of the grounds allowed in the Rules of Court
for the dismissal of the complaint. (Sunville
Timber Products, Inc. vs. Judge Abad, G.R. No.
85502, February 24, 1991)
Is the deficiency (non-observance of
the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies?
It is not jurisdictional. Failure to invoke it
operates as a waiver of the objection as a ground
for a motion to dismiss and the court may then
proceed with the case as if the doctrine had been
observed. (Sunville Timber Products, Inc. vs.
Judge Abad, G.R. No. 85502, February 24, 1991)
What are the reasons for the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative
remedies?
Under the principle of separation of powers, the
judiciary is enjoined not to interfere on matters which
are within the competence of the other departments.
The theory is that the administrative authorities are in
a better position to resolve questions addressed to
their particular expertise and that errors committed
by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by
their superiors if given a chance to do so. (Sunville
Timber Products, Inc. vs. Judge Abad, G.R. No.
85502, February 24, 1991)
Is the observance of the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies
absolute?
No. The said doctrine yields to the following exceptions as
enumerated in Paat vs Court of Appeals (266 SCRA 167):

1) When there is violation of due process;

2) When the issue involved is purely legal; (see

also Duenas vs. SSHA, G.R. No. 14917, June 4, 2004)

3) When the administrative action is patently

illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; (see also Mangubat vs.
Osmeña, 105 Phil. 1308)
4) When there is estoppel on the part of the
administrative agency concerned; (see also Tan vs.
Veterans Backpay Commission, 105 Phil. 377)

5) When there is irreparable injury; (see also De Lara vs.

Plaribel, 14 SCRA 291)

6) When he respondent is a department secretary whose

acts as an alter ego of the president bears the implied and
assumed approval of the latter; (see also Kilusang Bayan
sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong
Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa, Inc. vs. Dominguez,
G.R. No. 85439)

7) When to require exhaustion of administrative remedies

would be unreasonable;

8) When it would amount to a nullification of the claim;

9) When the subject matter is a private land in land
case proceedings; (see also Marcoso vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 96605, May 8, 1992)

10) When the rule does not provide a plain, speedy

adequate remedy; (see also National Development
Co. vs. Collector of Customs, 9 SCRA 429; National
Food Authority vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
115121-25, 68 SCAD 246, February 9, 1996) and

11) When there are circumstances indicating the

urgency of judicial intervention. (see also Aquino vs.
Luntok, 184 SCRA 177)
Other exceptions:

1. When the claim involved is small; (Cipriano vs. Marcelino, 43

SCRA 291)

2. When strong public interest is involved; (Arrow Transportation

Corp. vs. Board of Transportation, 63 SCRA 193; Sison vs. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 124086, June 26, 2006)

3. In quo warranto proceedings; (Corpus vs. Cuaderno, 4 SCRA

749); and

4. When the issue is rendered moot and academic. (Land Bank of

the Philippines vs. Celada, G.R. No. 164876, January 23, 2006)
 OLD CASES:
1. Pascual vs. Provincial Board, 106 Phil. 466
2. Dimaisip vs. Court of Appeals, 106 Phil. 237
3. Mangubat vs. Osmeña, 105 Phil. 1308
4. Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230
5. Tapales vs. President, 7 SCRA 553
 SUBSEQUENT CASES:
1. Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga
Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng
Muntinlupa, et al. vs. Dominguez, G.R. No.
85439, January 13, 1992
2. Bunye, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
91927, January 13, 1992
3. Heirs of Tanjuan vs. Office of the President, et
al., G.R. No. 126847, December 4, 1996
 SUNVILLE TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC.
VS. JUDGE ABAD
G.R. No. 85502, FEBRUARY 24, 1992
FACTS:
A Timber License Agreement (TLA) was granted
to Sunville Timber Products, Inc. for a period of ten
(10) years expiring on September 31, 1992. On July 31,
1987, Gilbolingco filed a petition with the DENR
praying for the cancellation of the said TLA on the
ground of serious violations of its conditions, and
forestry laws and regulations. The same charges were
later made in complaint for injunction with damages
against Sunville.
 Sunville moved for the dismissal of the case on
the following grounds: (1) The court had no
jurisdiction over the complaint; (2) The plaintiffs had
not yet exhausted administrative remedies; and (3)
The injunction was expressly prohibited by Section 1
of Presidential Decree No. 605.
The said motion to dismiss was denied by the
trial judge and this was sustained by the Court of
Appeals on the ground that administrative remedies
need not be exhausted if there is an urgent need for
judicial intervention. The Court of Appeals also
declared invalid Section 1 of Presidential Decree No.
605 as this is an encroachment on the judicial power
vested in the Supreme Court and the lower courts by
Article VII, Section 1 of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Does the alleged urgent necessity for judicial action justify the
court’s intervention without giving the DENR the opportunity to rule
first on the alleged unlawful logging activities of Sunville?

HELD:
No. The charge involves factual issues calling for the
presentation of supporting evidence. Such evidence is best evaluated
first by the administrative authorities employing their specialized
knowledge of the agreement and the rules allegedly violated before the
courts may step in to exercise their powers of review.
There is no need to declare the unconstitutionality of Section 1,
PD No. 605. The rule is that a question of unconstitutionality of
Section 1, PD No. 605. The rule is that a question of
unconstitutionality must be avoided where the cases can be decided on
some other available ground. The resolution of this question must
await another case, where all the indispensable requisites of judicial
inquiry into a constitutional question are satisfactorily established. In
such an event, it will be time for the Court to make the hammer fall,
and heavily.
 MORCOSO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 96605, MAY 8, 1992
FACTS:
Tirol claims to be the owner of a 4.5 hectares
of land by way of inheritance from his father in
1930. On December 28, 1979, she entered into a
lease agreement with Morcoso, allowing the latter
without paying rental and for a period of six years,
to develop a fishpond in a 85,880 sq. meters of
land within the 4.5 hectares of land, with
usufructuary rights.
 While working on the fishpond, Morcoso was
informed by the personnel of the Bureau of Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources that said portion of land which Tirol
leased to Morcoso is within the alienable and public land.
Records show that Morcoso applied for a fishpond
permit with BFAR in 1973, and that Morcoso refused to
surrender possession of the fishpond to Tirol in 1976 when
the term of the lease required. It is for this reason that
Tirol filed an unlawful detainer case against Morcoso but
the same was dismissed for not having been filed on time.
The trial court ruled that the fishpond belongs to
Tirol, and this was sustained by the Court of Appeals.
Morcoso questioned the said decision on the ground that
the trial court erred in taking cognizance of a conflict of
claims involving a parcel of land under the administration
and control of another government agency.
ISSUE:
Is the contention of Morcoso correct?

HELD:
No. The technical descriptions of the fishpond stated
in the lease contract and in the sketch plan of the BFAR
personnel who conducted an ocular inspection of the
fishpond areas applied for by Morcoso explicitly show that
the latter was the subject of the lease contract between
Tirol and Morcoso.
The fishpond not having been part of the public
domain, the trial court correctly adjudged Tirol as the
rightful owner thereof. Hence, the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies is not applicable, it being clear
that the subject of controversy is a private land.
 NATIONAL FOOD AUTHORITY, ET AL.
VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. NOS. 115121-25, 68 SCAD 246
FEBRUARY 9,1996
FACTS:
Private respondent’s contacts were terminated in the
midst of bidding preparation and their replacements were
hired barely five days after the termination. Masada,
another respondent, is a pre-qualified bidder who
submitted all requirements and was preparing for the
public bidding only to find out that contract had already
been awarded by negotiation. Because of the urgency of
the situation, the private respondents were compelled to
go to court to stop the implementation of said negotiated
security contracts.
ISSUE:
Should there still be an exhaustion of
administrative remedies before going to court to stop
implementation of the negotiated security contracts?

HELD:
The case is an exception to the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. An appeal to
the NFA Board of Council of Trustees and to the
Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to the provisions of
the Administrative Code of 1987 was not plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
 ESPIRITU VS. MELGAR
G.R. NO. 100874, FEBRUARY 13, 1992
FACTS:
Ramir Garing filed three complaints against Mayor
Melgar of Narjan, Oriental Mindoro. The first is a letter-
complaint for grave misconduct, oppression, abuse of
authority, culpable violation of the Constitution and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of public service,
filed with the Secretary of the Department of Interior and
Local Government. The same letter-complaint was filed
with the Provincial Governor of Mindoro requesting that
the Mayor be placed under preventive suspension pending
investigation. The third complaint was filed with the
President Action Center, Office of the President, which
forwarded the same to the Governor.
 After Mayor Melgar submitted his answer to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, the latter recommended
to the Provincial Governor that the Mayor be
preventively suspended for forty-five (45) days
pending the investigation of the complaint. Mayor
Melgar moved to dismiss the complaint but the same
was denied by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Meanwhile, Governor Espiritu placed Mayor Melgar
under preventive suspension on May 28,1991.
Upon receipt of the order of suspension, Mayor
Melgar filed a petition for certiorari with Preliminary
Inspection with prayer for a restraining order in the
Regional Trial Court which was granted.
ISSUE:
Whether the judge of the Regional Trial Court has
jurisdiction to stop the governor from placing a municipal
mayor under preventive suspension pending the
investigation of administrative charges against the latter?
Can Mayor Melgar go to court without exhausting
administrative remedies?

HELD:
The Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the
special civil action and gravely abused its discretion in
refusing to dismiss the case. There is nothing improper in
suspending an officer before the charges against him are
heard and before he is given an opportunity to prove his
innocence. Preventive suspension is allowed so that the
respondent may not hamper the normal course of the
investigation through the use of his influence and
authority over possible witnesses. Mayor Melgar’s direct
recourse to the courts without exhausting administrative
remedies was premature.
 NEW CASES:
NICANOR T. SANTOS DEV’T. CORP. VS.
HON. SEC., DAR
G.R. NO. 159654, FEBRUARY 28, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner is a domestic corporation which
owns a large tract of land known as the Santos
Farm in Tuba, Benguet. A portion of said farm,
according to the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer (MARO) of Tuba, Benguet, would be
placed under the coverage of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) for acquisition
and distribution to prospective beneficiaries.
 Petitioner wrote to the DAR Secretary and to the MARO
that the Santos Farm should be exempted from the coverage of
the CARP program because the property is untenanted,
mountainous and is not planted with rice and corn.
The DAR Regional Director advised petitioner to pursue
the exemption of the Santos Farm in accordance with the
mandates of two DAR Administrative Orders. Instead,
petitioner filed a protest with the DAR and a protest letter to the
DAR Secretary reiterating the grounds for the exemption of the
Santos Farm from the CARP program.
Petitioner also filed a Complaint before DARAB. DARAB
ruled that it has no jurisdiction and referred the Complaint to
the DAR Regional Director. The Complaint was dismissed for
being time-barred and for failure to observe proper formalities.
Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a Petition for Mandamus
with the CA to compel the DAR, DARAB and MARO to act on its
petition for exemption of the Santos Farm from the CARP
coverage. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit and for
being the improper remedy.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner was able to exhaust all the administrative
remedies.

RULING:
Petitioner was not able to exhaust all administrative remedies
hence the CA rightfully dismissed the Complaint.
As a general rule, before a party may be allowed to invoke the
jurisdiction of the courts of justice, he is expected to have exhausted
all means of administrative redress. In the instant case, it is beyond
dispute that petitioner failed to resort to proper administrative
recourse in resisting the Notice of Coverage issued by respondent
MARO. Unsuccessful in its attempt to oppose the Notice of Coverage
when it lodged its protest with the incorrect administrative offices,
petitioner resorted to a judicial remedy. The petition for mandamus,
which it filed, however, was correctly denied by the CA. Truly, a
petition for mandamus is premature if there are administrative
remedies available to petitioner.
 There are instances when judicial action may be resorted
to immediately. Among these exceptions are: (1) when the
question raised is purely legal; (2) when the administrative body
is in estoppels; (3) when the act complained of is patently
illegal; (4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention;
(5) when the respondent acted in disregard of due process; (6)
when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as
an alter ego of the President, bear the implied or assumed
approval of the latter; (7) when irreparable damage will be
suffered; (8) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy; (9) when strong public interest is involved; (10) when
the subject of the controversy is private land; and (11) in quo
warranto proceedings.
In the case at bar, none of these exceptions are present.
Hence, petitioner should have exhausted all administrative
remedies before he can invoke the jurisdiction of the courts of
justice.
 LAGUNA CATV NETWORK, INC. VS.
MARAAN
G.R. NO. 139492, NOVEMBER 19, 2002
FACTS:
Private respondents filed with the Department of Labor
and Employment, Regional Office No. IV (DOLE Region IV),
separate complaints for underpayment of wages and non-
payment of other employee benefits against their employer,
Laguna CATV Network, Inc., petitioner herein.
DOLE Regional Director Maraan, after a summary
investigation, issued an Order directing petitioner to pay the
concerned employees their unpaid claims. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration. Petitioner failed to comply with said
Order so DOLE Regional Director issued a writ of execution.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash but the same was denied.
 Instead of appealing to the Secretary of
Labor, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a
motion for extension of time to file a petition for
review. Petitioner was of the view that an appeal
to the Secretary of Labor ‘would be an exercise in
futility considering that the said appeal will be
filed with the Regional Office and it will surely be
disapproved.’ The Court of Appeals denied said
motion ruling, among others, that petitioner failed
to exhaust administrative remedies.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying its motion
for extension and in dismissing the case on the ground that
petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

RULING:
No. The Court of Appeals was correct in holding that
petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.
As provided under Article 128 of the Labor Code, as
amended, an order issued by the duly authorized representative
of the Secretary of Labor may be appealed to the latter. Thus,
petitioner should have first appealed to the Secretary of Labor
instead of filing with the Court of Appeals a motion for
extension of time to file a petition for review.
 This Court, in a long line of cases, has consistently held
that if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be
resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his
jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before
the court's judicial power can be sought. The party with an
administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed
administrative procedure to obtain relief but also pursue it to its
appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention in
order to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide
the matter itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and
premature resort to the court.
The underlying principle of the rule rests on the
presumption that the administrative agency, if afforded a
complete chance to pass upon the matter will decide the same
correctly. Therefore, petitioner should have completed the
administrative process by appealing the questioned Orders to
the Secretary of Labor.
 CSC vs. DBP
G.R. NO. 158791, JULY 22, 2005
FACTS:
The CSC (petitioner) via the present petition for mandamus seeks to
compel the Department of Budget and Management (respondent) to release the
balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. At the same time, it seeks a
determination by this Court of the extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal
autonomy.
According to petitioner, the balance was intentionally withheld by
respondent on the basis of it's "no report, no release” policy whereby allocations
for agencies are withheld pending their submission of documents mentioned in
the National Budget Circular No. 478. Petitioner contends that the application
of the "no report, no release" policy upon independent constitutional bodies (of
which it is one) is a violation of the principle of fiscal autonomy and, therefore,
unconstitutional.
Respondent, at the outset, opposes the petition on procedural grounds.
It contends, among others, that petitioner did not exhaust administrative
remedies as it could have sought clarification from respondent's Secretary
regarding the extent of fiscal autonomy before resorting to this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies applies.

RULING:
The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies
invoked by respondent applies only where there is an
express legal provision requiring such administrative step
as a condition precedent to taking action in court. As
petitioner is not mandated by any law to seek clarification
from the Secretary of Budget and Management prior to
filing the present action, its failure to do so does not call
for the application of the rule.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (LBP)
VS. CELADA
G.R. NO. 164876, JANUARY 23, 2006

FACTS:
The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
expropriated 14.19343 hectares of respondent
Celada's land in Bohol. Petitioner LBP valued
respondent's land at P21,106.22 per hectare. DAR
offered said amount to respondent but the latter
rejected it. Nevertheless, LBP deposited said sum
in the name of respondent.
 The matter was referred to the DAR Adjudication
Board (DARAB) for summary administrative hearing on
determination of just compensation. While the case was
pending before the DARAB, respondent filed a petition for
judicial determination of just compensation against LBP,
DAR and the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO)
of Carmen, Bohol before the RTC. Respondent claims that
her land is worth at least P15,000 per hectare.
LBP, in its answer, raised non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies and forum shopping. It
contended that respondent should first await the outcome
of the DARAB case before taking any judicial recourse.
The DARAB Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD) issued
an order affirming the valuation of LBP. Thereafter, the
Special Agrarian Court (SAC) ruled that recourse to
DARAB is only for purposes of conciliation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is still applicable despite the order
issued affirming the valuation made by LBP.

RULING:
There is no merit to petitioner's contention that
respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies when she
directly filed the petition for determination of just
compensation with the SAC even before the DARAB case could
be resolved. The issue is now moot considering that the
valuation made by petitioner had long been affirmed by the
DARAB in its Order dated April 12, 2000. As held in LBP vs.
Wycoco,(419 SCRA 67 [2004]) the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not applicable when the issue is
rendered moot and academic, as in the instant case.
 CORSIGA VS. DEFENSOR
G.R. NO. 139302, OCTOBER 28, 2002
FACTS:
Private respondent Ortizo was the Senior
Engineer B in the National Irrigation Administration
(NIA), Jalaur-Suague River Irrigation System, Region
VI. Petitioner Corsiga, then Regional Irrigation
Manager of NIA, Region VI, reassigned private
respondent to Aganan-Sta. Barbara River Irrigation
System. Aggrieved, private respondent wrote
petitioner requesting exemption from the policy of
rotation. When petitioner denied the said request,
private respondent filed with the RTC of Iloilo City a
complaint for prohibition and injunction.
 Petitioner moved to dismiss the petition for
lack of jurisdiction and non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies but the motion was
denied. The appellate court affirmed the trial
court's decision saying that the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies does not
apply where the controverted act is patently
illegal, arbitrary, and oppressive.
ISSUE:
Whether private respondent has a cause of action despite his
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

RULING:
Being a NIA employee covered by the Civil Service Law, in our
view, private respondent should have first complained to the NIA
Administrator, and if necessary, then appeal to the Civil Service
Commission. As ruled in Abe-Abe vs. Manila, 90 SCRA 524 (1979), if a
litigant goes to court without first pursuing his administrative
remedies, his action is premature, and he has no cause of action to
ventilate in court. Hence, petitioner asserts that private respondent's
case is not ripe for judicial determination.
There is no convincing evidence of grave abuse of discretion on
petitioner's part. Private respondent's arguments are mere allegation
which he failed to substantiate. Official functions are presumed to be
regular unless proven otherwise.
Therefore, the instant case is not an exception to the general
rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.
3. DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION OR PRIOR
RESORT

What is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort?

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction dictates that courts

cannot determine a dispute on a question requiring the special
knowledge and expertise of the administrative tribunals (Septimo vs.
Judge Villarama, G.R. No. 101943, February 18, 1992). If the case
therefore is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies
because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved,
then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding
before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter
is within the jurisdiction of a court. (Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88550, April 18, 1990).
What happens when a claim which is originally
cognizable in court, requires the resolution of
issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have
been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body?

In such a case, the judicial process is suspended

pending referral of such issues to the administrative body
for its view. (Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 88550, April 18, 1990)
What is the rationale behind the
observance of the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction or prior resort?
1. Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business
entrusted to an administrative agency are secured.

2. The limited function of review by the judiciary are more

rationally exercised, by preliminary report, for ascertaining and
interpreting the circumstances underlying legal issues, to agencies that
are better equipped than courts by specialization, by insight gained
through experience, and by more flexible procedure. (Ibid.; Antipolo
Realty Corp. vs. National Housing Authority, 153 SCRA 399).
What is the purpose of the doctrine of
primary administrative jurisdiction?
The purpose of the doctrine of primary
administrative jurisdiction, as enunciated in Director
of Lands vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 79684,
February 19, 1991), is more in consonance with
reality. Its purpose, according to the Supreme Court,
is not only to give the administrative agency the
opportunity to decide the controversy by itself
correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and
premature resort to courts”.
What is the difference between the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies and the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction?
Doctrine of exhaustion of Doctrine of primary jurisdiction
administrative remedies
1. The administrative agency has 1. Both the court and administrative
authority to pass on every question agency have jurisdiction to pass on
raised by a person resorting to a question when a particular case is
judicial relief and enables the court presented to court, as an original
to withhold its aid entirely until the matter, rather than a matter of
administrative remedies have been review.
exhausted.
2. The claim or matter is cognizable 2. The claim or matter is cognizable
in the first instance by an by both the court and
administrative agency alone. administrative agency.
3. The purpose of the rule is to 3. Doctrine of primary jurisdiction is
control the timing of judicial relief not concerned with judicial review
from adjudicative action of an but determines in some instances
agency. whether initial action should be
taken by a court or administrative
agency.
 Note: Both principles do not apply
where the issue involved is a pure
question of law.
4. DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL
AGENCY
What is the doctrine of qualified political agency?

The doctrine of qualified political agency is a corollary rule to

the control powers of the President. Under this doctrine, which
recognizes the establishment of a single executive, "all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases
where the Chief Executive is required by Constitution or law to act in
person as the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of
the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.” (Carpio vs. Executive Q
Secretary, G.R. No. 96409, February 14, 1992, En Banc, Paras, J.)
What is the extent of the President's
power of control over the executive
branch of the government?
The presidential power of control over the executive
branch of the government extends over all executive officers
from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk and has been held to
mean, “the power of the President to alter or modify or nullify or
set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance
of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with
that of the latter. It is at the very heart of the meaning of Chief
Executive." (Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 96409,
February 14, 1992, En Banc, Paras, J.)
The President's power of control is directly exercised by
him over the members of the Cabinet, who, in turn, and by his
authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their
respective jurisdictions in the executive department. (Supra)
5. DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA
IN ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS?
What is the doctrine of res judicata in
administrative proceedings?

The doctrine of res judicata forbids the reopening of

a matter that has been determined by competent authority.
The prevailing rule is that the doctrine applies to judicial
and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive and
administrative officers acting within their jurisdiction. The
principle of conclusiveness of prior adjudication extends to
all bodies upon whom judicial power has been confirmed.
What is the basis of the doctrine of res
judicata in administrative
proceedings?
The judgment of courts an awards of quasi-
judicial agencies must become final at some
definite date fixed by the law. (Carreon vs.
W.C.C., 77 SCRA 297)
What are the instances when the
doctrine of res judicata is not
applicable to administrative
proceedings?
In Nasipit Lumber Company, Inc. vs. NLRC, (Section 5, Rule
XIII, Books of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code)
for instance, the Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine of res judicata
does not apply to labor relations proceedings “considering that Section
5, Rule XIII, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Labor Code provides that such proceedings are non-litigious and
summary in nature without regard to legal technicalities obtaining in
courts of law.” Said pronouncement, added the Court, is in consonance
with the jurisprudential dictum that the doctrine of res judicata
applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to
exercise of administrative powers.
Neither does the doctrine apply to judgments based on
prohibited or void contracts. (B.F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc. vs.
Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 159 SCRA 355)
 NEW CASE:

MONTEMAYOR VS. BUNDALIAN

G.R. NO. 149335, JULY 1, 2003
FACTS:
In a letter-complaint addressed to the Philippine
Consulate General in San Francisco, California, USA, private
respondent accused petitioner, then OIC-Regional Director,
Region III, of the DPWH, of accumulating unexplained wealth,
in violation of Section 8 of RA No. 3019. The letter was indorsed
to the Philippine Commission Against Graft and Corruption
(PGAGC) for investigation.
Petitioner pointed out that the charge against him was
the subject of similar cases filed before the Ombudsman. He
attached to his counter-affidavit the Consolidated report of the
Ombudsman dismissing similar charges for insufficiency of
evidence.
 Nevertheless, the PGAGC conducted its own
investigation. Based on its findings, PGAGC
recommended petitioner’s dismissal for service.
The Office of the President, concurring with
the findings and adopting the recommendation of
the PGAGC, issued Administrative Order No. 12,
ordering petitioner’s dismissal from service with
forfeiture of all government benefits.
ISSUE:
Whether the earlier dismissal of similar cases before the
Ombudsman rendered the administrative case before the PCAGC
moot and academic.

RULING:
No. The earlier dismissal of similar cases before the
Ombudsman does not render the administrative case before the
PCAGC moot and academic.
The decision of the Ombudsman does not operate as res
judicata in the PCAGC case subject of this review. The doctrine of res
judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to
the exercise of administrative powers. Petitioner was investigated by
the Ombudsman for his possible criminal liability for the acquisition
of the Burbank property in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code.
 For the same alleged misconduct, petitioner,
as a presidential appointee, was investigated by
the PCAGC by virtue of the administrative power
and control of the President over him. As the
PCAGC's investigation of petitioner was
administrative in nature, the doctrine of res
judicata finds no application in the case at bar.
6. DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS

What is the common requirement of procedural due

process, whether in judicial or administrative
proceedings?

There is a common requirement of procedural due

process, whether in judicial or administrative proceedings, and
this is the element of NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO BE
HEARD. For as long therefore as the defendant, or anyone
similarly situated, is given a notice and an opportunity to be
heard, he cannot later on complain that he was declared in
default or that the decision has been rendered against him in his
absence, for he has already been notified and given the
opportunity to be heard.
What is procedural due process as
understood in administrative
proceedings?
For the Supreme Court to sustain the findings
of an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial
functions, such body must abide by the elementary
rules of due process. However, procedural due
process as understood in administrative proceedings
accepts of a more flexible standard as long as the
proceeding were undertaken in an atmosphere of
fairness and justice. (Valderama and Sons, Inc. vs.
Drilon, G.R. No.78212, January 22, 1999, First
Division, Gancayco J.)
How can an "atmosphere of fairness
and justice," as referred to in
Valderama and Sons, Inc. vs. Drilon be
attained?

The answer would still be to comply with the

cardinal rights to be observed in administrative
proceedings, as pronounced in Ang Tibay vs. CIR
(69 Phil. 635) as follows:
1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and
submit evidence in support thereof;

2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;

3. The decision must have something to support itself;

4. The evidence must be substantial;

5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing,

or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;

6. The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy and
not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision;

7. The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its

decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know
the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.
EXPLANATION OF EACH REQUISITE
FIRST REQUISITE: The right to a hearing
– The element of notice and opportunity to be
heard is part and parcel of due process, whether in
judicial or administrative proceedings. In the
absence of this element, there can be no fair play.
Is notice and hearing always necessary
in administrative determinations?

It is necessary only when some constitutional

rights is claimed to be invaded.
When is notice and hearing not necessary?
1. It is not necessary if the purpose of an administrative determination is
to decide whether a right or privilege which an applicant does not
possess shall be granted to him or withheld in the exercise of a
discretion vested by statute.
2. It is not also necessary if the power exercised is essentially
administrative or executive and not judicial or quasi-judicial, unless
otherwise required by law.
3. Even if the power exercised is quasi-judicial, notice or hearing may not
be necessary to due process of law if no personal or property rights are
involved.
4. When powers of determination and action of a quasi-judicial character
are given to officers entrusted with duties of local or municipal
administration by which not of the property, but the lives of
individuals, may be affected, and which, from their nature, must be
exercised without a prior hearing or notice to the parties who may be
affected. (42 Am. Jur., pp. 474-475)
What are the instances of valid
administrative determinations without
prior notice and hearing?
Nuisance per se may be the subject of summary
abatement. (Article 704 New Civil Code).
Permits to operate and maintain night clubs,
cabaret, massage parlors, discohouses, may be
revoked when found out to be used for immoral
activities or fronts of prostitution. (Darling Apt. Co.
vs. Springer, 137 ALR 803).
Preventive suspension of government employees
on account of graft cahrges. (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act).
SECOND REQUISITE: A tribunal must
consider the evidence presented - The right
of a party to present his own case and submit his
evidence to support thereof will be a useless right
if there is no corresponding duty on the part of
administrative tribunal to consider the same.
THIRD REQUISITE: The decision must have
something to support itself – A decision which does not
state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based, deprived not only the parties but also the practitioners ,
professors and students as to the factual and legal
considerations that guided the court, or even a quasi-judicial
tribunal, in reaching a decision. Decisions of courts and
administrative tribunals, particularly the decisions of the
Supreme Court, are discussed, scrutinized and cited by lawyers
and non-lawyers alike from time to time and in the years to
come. This goes on and on even at a time when those who wrote
them have banished from the broad face of the earth. Even
dissenting opinions in yesteryears are made as references for, in
several instances, they appear more convincing to the next
generation of lawyers, judges, professors, scholars and law
students.
FOURTH REQUISITE: The evidence must
be substantial – It is not enough that there is
an evidence to support a finding or conclusion,
but the evidence must be substantial. Substantial
evidence “is more than a mere scintilla”. It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
This is precisely the difference between an
administrative proceeding and a criminal case
where the evidence required is proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
What must be the reason for this rule?
The obvious purpose of this rule is to free
administrative bodies from the compulsion of
technical rules of evidence and procedure.
FIFTH REQUISITE: The decision must be
rendered on the basis of the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to
the parties affected - Any other evidence not
presented or disclosed during the proceedings
cannot be made the basis of the decision. They are
not known to the parties and neither are they
brought to the attention of the administrative
tribunal making the decision.
 It is sufficient, however, that administrative
findings of facts are supported by evidence. Such
finding will not be disturbed so long as they are
supported by substantial evidence, even if not
overwhelming or preponderant (Earth Minerals
Exploration, Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary,
Catalino Macaraig, G.R. No. 78569, February 11,
1991, 2nd Div., Paras, J.), and except when the former
have acted without or in excess with their jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion. (Biak na Bato
Mining Company vs. Tanco, Jr., G.R. No. 342670-68,
January 25, 1991, 2nd Div., Paras, J.).
SIXTH REQUISITE: The board or its judges
must act on its or their own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views
of a subordinate in arriving at a decision -
This means that the administrative officer who is
entrusted with the duty to decide a case, must be the
one to make a decision based on the factual findings
laid on his table and based on his own interpretation
of the law entrusted to him for implementation.
Necessarily, he cannot entrust the same to anyone in
his office for his determination and appreciation of
the facts of the case and of the law, involved is
certainly different from anyone in his staff.
SEVENTH REQUISITE: In all controversial
questions, the decision must be rendered in such
a manner that the parties to the proceeding can
know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decision rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it - It is a part and parcel
of fair play that the reasons involved, particularly the
reasons for the decision, should be stated clearly in the
decision so that the parties will know not only the factual
findings but also how the one making the decision
appreciates the totality of the circumstances involved in
the case and his own appreciation of what law applies to
the facts and the evidence presented before him.
7. REQUISITES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

What are the requisites before an administrative

decision may be subject of judicial review?

Before an administrative decision may be subject of

judicial review, the following requisites should be complied
with:
1) The administrative action has already been fully completed
and has therefore become final; (This is known as
Doctrine of Finality of Administrative Action)

2) The administrative remedies have been exhausted. (This is

known as the Doctrine of Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies)
How can a party appeal from a final
award, order or decision of an
administrative agency, board or
tribunal?
1. With respect to the decision, order/rulings of the
three independent commissions created under and
by virtue of 1987 Constitution, namely: (1) Civil
Service Commission; (2) Comelec; and (3)
Commission on Audit: The aggrieved party has to file a
petition for certiorari within thirty (30) days from receipt of
said decision, order of ruling. This petition is actually a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 and,
therefore, the ground or the issue to be brought to the
Supreme Court for decision is limited to grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or excess of
jurisdiction. (Art. IX, Section 7, 1987 Constitution)
2. With respect to Appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals
and Quasi-Judicial Agencies to the Court of Appeals:
Secs. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the Revised Rules of Court in the
Philippines, provides as follows:
"Sec. 1. Scope - This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments
or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards,
judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-
judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among
these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board
Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of
the President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security
Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks
and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration,
Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission,
Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657,
Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation
Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission,
Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments,
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary
arbitrators authorized by law.”
 "Sec. 2. Cases not covered - This Rule
shall not apply to judgments or final orders issued
under the Labor Code of the Philippines.”

"Sec. 3. Where to appeal - An Appeal

under this Rule may be taken to the Court of
Appeals within the period and in the man herein
provided, whether the appeal involves questions
of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law."
 “Sec. 4. Period of appeal - The appeal shall be
taken within 15 days from notice of the award, judgment,
final order or resolution, or from the date of its last
publication, if publication is required by law for its
effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new
trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the
governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1)
motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon proper
motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket
fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the
Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen
(15) days only within which to file the petition for review.
No further extension shall be granted except for the most
compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15)
days."
 "Sec. 5. How appeal taken - Appeal shall be
taken by filing a verified petition for review in seven (7)
legible copies with the Court of Appeals, with proof of
service of a copy thereof on the adverse party and on the
court or agency a quo. The original copy of the petition
intended for the Court of Appeals shall be indicated as
such by the petitioner.
Upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall
pay to the clerk of court of the Court of Appeals the
docketing and other lawful fees and deposit the sum of
P500.00 for costs. Exemption from payment of docketing
and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs may be
granted by the Court of Appeals upon a verified motion
setting forth valid grounds therefor. If the Court of Appeals
denies the motion, the petitioner shall pay the docketing
and other lawful fees and deposit for costs within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the denial."
3. Regarding appeal by certiorari to the
Supreme Court: Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides as
follows: Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme
Court. - A Party desiring to appeal by certiorari
from a judgment or final order or resolution of
the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever
authorized by law, may file with the Supreme
Court a verified petition for review on certiorari.
The petition shall raise only questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth.
What question can be raised in an
appeal by certiorari to the Supreme
Court?
Only questions of law may be raised in the
petition and must be distinctly set forth. If no record
on appeal has been filed in the Court of Appeals, the
Clerk of the Supreme Court, upon admission of the
petition, shall demand from the Court of Appeals the
elevation of the whole record of the case.
Is this mode of appeal different from
certiorari as a special civil action
under Rule 65?

An appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court

under Rule 45 is different from the special action
of certioriari under Rule 65.
What is the difference?
APPEAL BY CERTIORARI SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR
UNDER RULE 45 CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65
1. The petition is based on 1. The Petition raises the issues as
questions of law which the to whether the lower court acted
appellant desires the appellate without or in excess of
court to resolve. jurisdiction or with grave abuse
2. Involves the review of the of discretion.
judgment, award, or final order 2. May be directed against an
on the merits. interlocutory order of the court
3. Must be made within the prior to appeal from the
reglementary period for appeal. judgment or where is there not
4. Stays with the judgment, award, appeal or other plain, speedy or
or order appealed from. adequate remedy.
5. Petitioner and respondent are the 3. May be filed not less than sixty
original parties to the action, and (60) from notice of the judgment
the lower court or quasi-judicial order or resolution sought to be
agency is not to be impleaded. assailed.
6. Prior filing of a motion for 4. Does not stay the challenged proceeding
reconsideration is not required (Sec. unless a writ of preliminary injunction or
1, Rule 45) a temporary restraining order shall have
been issued.
7. The appellate court is in the exercise
5. The parties are the aggrieved party
of its appellate jurisdiction and against the lower court or quasi-judicial
power of review. agency and the prevailing parties, who
thereby respectively become the
petitioner and respondents.
6. A motion for reconsideration is a
condition precedent (Villa-Rey Transit
vs. Belo, L-18957, April 23, 1963).
7. The Higher court exercises original
jurisdiction under its power of control
and supervision over the proceedings of
lower courts. (In Re: Petition for
Assistance in the Liquidation of the
Rural Bank of Bokod vs. BIR, G.R. No.
158261, December 18, 2006, citing the
case of Paa vs. CA
Can a petition be categorized as a petition
under Rules 65 and 45 of the Rules of Court?

No and neither may a petitioner or

petitioners delegate upon the court the task of
determining which rule the petition should fall.
The Supreme Court ruled that under Circular No.
2-90, wrong or inappropriate mode of appeal
merits an outright dismissal.
(See Ibañez vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 540)
In an appeal by certiorari under Rule
45, only questions of law may be raised.
What is the reason for this?
The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. The
resolution of factual issues is the function of lower
courts, whose findings on these matters are received
with respect and are in fact binding on the Supreme
Court subject to certain exceptions.
(FNCB vs. Estavillo, G.R. No. 93394, December 20,
1990, 192 SCRA 514; Universal Motors vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-47432, January 27, 1992)
Distinguish questions of law from
questions of facts.
QUESTIONS OF LAW
If the facts are established or
admitted, their legal effect is a
question of law for the court to
determine.
There is a question of law in a given
case when the doubt or difference
arises as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts. (Ramos vs.
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I.,
19 SCRA 289)
QUESTIONS OF FACTS
A question of fact arises when there
is a conflict in testimony. The
question must be resolved by the
court. No question of fact exists if
only one conclusion is possible from
the facts established.
There is a question of fact when the
doubt or difference arises as to the
truth or the falsehood of alleged
facts. (Ramos vs. Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Co. of the P.I., 19 SCRA
289)
What is the test of whether a question is
one of law or of fact?
Whether the appellate court can determine
the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating
the evidence, in which case, it is a question of
law; otherwise, it is a question of fact.
(Crisostomo vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 164787, January
31, 2006; Velayo-Fong vs. Spouses Velayo, G.R.
155488, December 6, 2006; L&L Lawrence
Footwear, Inc. vs. PCI Leasing and Finance
Corp., G.R. No. 160531, August 30, 2005).
Is the finding of negligence a question
of law or of fact?
The finding of negligence is a question of
fact. In the same vein, whether one acted in good
faith or in bad faith is a question of fact. Hence,
they are not proper subjects of the Supreme
Court's discretionary power of judicial review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which is
concerned solely with questions of law. (PNB vs.
Campos, G.R. No. 167270, Jun 30, 2006)
What are the exceptions to
conclusiveness of facts?
1. When the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculations surmises or conjecture;
2. When the interference made is manifestly
absurd, mistaken or impossible;
3. When there is grave abuse of discretion;
4. When the judgment is premised on a
misapprehension of facts;
5. When the findings of facts are conflicting;
6. When the Court of Appeals in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellants and
appellees;
7. When the findings of fact are contrary to those of the
trial court;
8. When the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
9. When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners‘ main and reply briefs are not disputed by
respondents; and
10. When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record. (Ontimare vs.
Elep, G.R. No. 159224, January 20, 2006; Citibank vs.
Sabeniano, G.R. No. 156132, October 16, 2006)
Within what period can a party appeal
by a certiorari from a judgment of the
Court of Appeals?
The petition shall be filed within 15 days from notice
of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed
from, or of the denial of the petitioner’s motion for new
trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of
the judgment. On motion duly filed and served, with full
payment of the docket and other lawful fees and the
deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary
period, the Supreme Court may, for justifiable reasons,
grant an extension of 30 days only within to file the
petition. (Section 2, Rule 45, Appeal by certiorari to the
Supreme Court, Comments on the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended)
Besides the foregoing reliefs and remedies,
what is the general relief that may also be
availed of under the 1987 Constitution?
General relief, when proper, may also be availed of
under the provisions of Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution, which provides as follows: "The judicial power
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
( NOTE: New definition of judicial power as
well as the case of Manila Prince Hotel vs.
GSIS, Manila Hotel Corporation, et al., G.R.
No. 122156 has already been discussed in
Chapter VI.)
What are the most common remedies
available to an aggrieved party with respect
to a decision or order of administrative
agencies and offices?
The common remedies are the following:
1. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, Section 1
of the New Rules of Court.
2. A petition for prohibition may also be filed under Section 2,
Rule 65 of the New Rules of Court.
3. A petition for mandamus may also be filed under Rule 65,
Section 3 of the New Rules of Court.
4. A quo-warranto proceeding may also be filed under Section
1, Rule 66 of the New Rules of Court.
5. Petition for habeas corpus may also be filed under Section
1, Rule 102 of the New Rules of Court.
V. OTHER ANCILLIARY PRINCIPLES OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
What are the other principles of
administrative law?
They are the following:
1. Administrative agencies are not bound by the technical
rules of evidence and procedure.
2. The findings of facts of administrative bodies are
binding to the courts if they are supported by
substantial evidence.
3. Administrative bodies can resolve questions of law in
the exercise of their quasi-judicial function but (a) the
same is only an incident to their primary power of
regulation and to perform executive duties; and (b)
their resolution is subject to judicial review.
4. Requisites for validity of administrative rules and
regulations.
5. Requisites for validity of administrative
regulations with penal sanctions.
6. Legal force and effects of administrative rules
and regulations.
7. Legal effects of duly executed acts of an
administrative body.
8. “Republic of the Philippines” and “National
Government" are not interchangeable.
BRIEF EXPLANATION OF
EACH PRINCIPLE

1. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES ARE

NOT BOUND BY THE TECHNICAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE AND
PROCEDURE
 Administrative agencies charged with the task of
adjudicating contested cases are necessarily involved in
exercising functions which are judicial in nature. This does not
mean, however, that they are bound to observe the technical
rules of evidence and procedure observed by the regular courts
of justice.

The reason for this is because administrative tribunals

are expected to adjudicate cases expeditiously and without
unnecessary delay. The main function of administrative
agencies is primarily to enforce the law entrusted to them for
implementation. The exercise of quasi-judicial power is only
incidental to their main function of enforcing the law.
 AL-AMANAH ISLAMIC INVESTMENT
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CIVIL
SERVICE
COMMISSION, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 100599, APRIL 8, 1992

The Civil Service Commission is free from the

rigidity of certain procedural requirements.
FACTS:
The investigating committee found Malbun guilty of neglect
of duty and imposed the penalty of forced registration without
prejudice to reinstatement.
The Merit Systems Protection Board agreed with the
investigating committee's findings that there is no proof that
Malbun tolerated the anomalies nor is there any showing that he
has benefited directly or indirectly from the transactions to the
detriment of the Bank, and is therefore presumed to have acted in
good faith.
The Civil Service Commission found Malbun guilty not only
of "gross neglect of duty" which is a less grave offense under Civil
Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 8, 1970, but also
of “Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the best interest
of the Service,” which are grave offenses under the said
Memorandum Circular.
 Philippines Al-Almanah Bank moved to reconsider
the said finding of the Civil Service Commission and urged
that the previous conviction of Malbun in 1979, for
"Neglect of Duty" and subsequent suspension from the
service, should be considered in determining the proper
penalty against Malbun. The Bank contends that the
proper penalty should be dismissal.
The Civil Service Commission refused, however, to
consider the prior conviction of Malbun on the ground that
this is not a newly discovered evidence and that the Bank
in the exercise of its reasonable diligence could have
discovered and produced the document during the hearing
conducted or could have presented the same in its appeal
to the Merit Systems Protection Board as well as in the
Commission.
ISSUE:
Is the said contention of Civil Service Commission correct?

HELD:
No. The prior conviction should have been considered by the
Commission in imposing the proper penalty on Malbun, although it
was presented only in the bank's motion for reconsideration or for new
trial.
Malbun's prior conviction in 1979 is not a newly discovered
evidence but "forgotten evidence.” It already existed or was already
available before or during the trial which was known and obtainable
by the bank and could have been presented were it not for the
oversight or forgetfulness of Malbun. Therefore, applying rigid
technical rules, such document is not admissible as evidence against
Malbun.
However, administrative agencies like the Civil Service
Commission exercising quasi-judicial functions are free from the
rigidity of certain procedural requirements. Therefore, the
Commission should have admitted the document showing the prior
conviction of Malbun, considering that it is a public document and
within the judicial notice of the Commission.
2. THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE
BODIES ARE BINDING TO THE COURTS IF
THEY ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE

In Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 99357,

January 27, 1992), the Supreme Court ruled as follows:

1. Factual findings of administrative agencies are accorded

not only respect but finality, because of the special knowledge and
expertise gained by these quasi-judicial tribunals from handling
specific matters falling under their jurisdiction.

2. Courts cannot take cognizance of such factual issues.

3. In reviewing administrative decisions, the reviewing court

cannot re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence.
 4. The findings of fact must be respected, as long as they are
supported by substantial evidence.

"Factual findings of administrative bodies should be accorded

not only respect but even finality if they are supported by
substantial evidence even if not overwhelming or
preponderant.”
(Casa Realty Filipino vs. Office of the President)
“The factual findings of the Ombudsman are conclusive on the
parties absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion. The findings
of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not
only respect but even finality.”
(Sesbreno vs. Ala, et al., G.R. No. 95393, and Sesbreno vs. Cahig, et
al., G.R. No. 103471, May 5, 1992, En Banc, Paras, J.)
 “Administrative decisions on matters within the jurisdiction
of the executive department can only be set aside on proof of gross
abuse of jurisdiction, fraud or error of law. There being no motion
for its reconsideration, the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources became final on July 3, 1959, 30 days from
receipt by the parties of the copies of the decision.”
(Heirs of Proceso Bautista vs. Barza, G.R. No. 79167, May 7, 1992,
Third Division, Romero, J.)

“Factual findings of administrative agencies are accorded

not only respect but also even finality if they are supported by
substantial evidence. However, deviation from this rule must be
made when the administrative agency clearly misappreciated the
facts. In the present case, the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals are at variance with those of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources (DANR). Petitioners have not sufficiently
proved that the findings of fact of the
 "Court of Appeals are totally devoid of support
in the records, or that they are so glaringly
erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion.
Wherefore, the findings of fact made by the Court of
Appeals are conclusive and binding on this Court
even if contrary to those of the DANR, so long as such
findings are supported by the records or based on
substantial evidence. (Mendizabel vs. Apao, G.R. No.
143185, February 20, 2006)
NOTE: The Court of Appeals held that the evidence
presented by respondents ‘tend to disprove the
factual findings of administrative bodies.'
3. ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES CAN RESOLVE
QUESTIONS OF LAW IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR
QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION BUT (A) THE SAME IS
ONLY AN INCIDENT TO THEIR PRIMARY POWER
OF REGULATION AND TO PERFORM EXECUTIVE
DUTIES; AND (B) THEIR RESOLUTION IS SUBJECT
TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

In the exercise of quasi-judicial functions,

administrative agencies are necessarily involved in the
resolution of contested cases brought to their determination.
On matters involving questions of law, the authority vested
in administrative agencies is merely to interpret the law
entrusted to them for implementation. But such
interpretation, however, is only incidental to their primary
power of regulation and to perform executive duties. More
than this, the resolution is subject to judicial review.
 This means that an administrative action or
decision may be disturbed or set aside by the
judicial department if there is an error of law, or
abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either
the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment.
(Peralta vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No.
95832, May 10, 1992, En Banc, Padilla, J.)
 Before an administrative determination may be
subject of judicial review, it is required, however:

1. That the administrative action has already been fully

completed and has become final; and
2. That all the administrative remedies have been
exhausted.

The first requirement is what is known and

referred to as the Principle of Finality of
Administrative Requirement and the second
requirement is what is known and referred to as the
Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.
REVIEW OF DECISIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES
Decisions of administrative agencies may be subject to
review by any court specified by the statute, or in the absence
thereof, it is subject to review by any court of competent
jurisdiction in accordance with the provision on venue of the
Rules of Court. (Board of Commissioners vs. Judge Capulong,
G.R. No. 95612, May 31, 1991)

Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 did not intend to raise all quasi-
judicial bodies to the same level or rank of the Regional Trial
Court except those specifically provided for under the law. As
the Bureau of Immigration is not of equal rank as the Regional
Trial Court, its decisions may be appealable to, and may be
reviewed through a special civil action for certiorari by the
Regional Trial Court. (Sec. 2[1], Batas Pambansa Blg. 129).
4. REQUISITES FOR VALIDITY OF
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES AND
REGULATIONS
Already discussed. Just remember the important points, as
discussed earlier, thus:

1. Requisites of a valid administrative regulation

2. Requirement as to publication of all laws as a condition for

their effectivity

3. Requisites for validity of administrative regulations with

penal sanctions
4. Cases:
Old Cases:
a) People vs. Maceren (79 SCRA 450)
b) Metropolitan Traffic Command vs.
Gonong (187 SCRA 432)
c) Bautista vs. Junio (127 SCRA 239)
d) Agustin vs. Edu (88 SCRA 195)
e) Tablarin vs. Gutierrez (152 SCRA
730)

New Cases:
a) MMDA vs. Dante Garin, G.R. No. 130230,
April 15, 2005
VI. IS THERE A RELIEF FROM WITHIN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY ITSELF?
 Unless otherwise provided by law or executive
order, an action or decision of lower administrative
authorities may be appealed to, or reviewed by, higher
administrative authorities or superiors like the
Department Head (EO 292, Book VII, Chapter 4,
Section 19), or to the Commission or Board en banc (e.g.
National Labor Relations Commission, Securities and
Exchange Commission, National Telecommunications
Commission). In fact, an appeal need not be filed at
once. A motion for reconsideration may suffice to obtain
desired changes in the decision so long as no rights have
vested in the meantime and so long as they have not
passed beyond the control of the administrative
authorities.
 A resolution therefore of a labor arbiter, is
reviewable by any of the divisions of the National
Labor Relations Commission, and thereafter,
whoever is the aggrieved party may appeal the
decision to the Commission En Banc. The
hierarchy of authorities within the framework of
the National Labor Relations Commission ends
here. The decision of the Commission En Banc is
now appealable to the Court of Appeals, not to the
Supreme Court, unlike before.
 EXAMPLE:

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT/DECISION
GREETINGS:
You are hereby notified that on ___________,
JUDGMENT/DECISION, copy attached, was rendered in
the above-entitled case.
Under Article 232 of the Labor Code (as amended by
R.A. No. 6715) and pertinent provisions of the Revised
Rules of the NLRC, no motion for reconsideration from
said judgment shall be entertained, but only an appeal, a
notice of memorandum thereof, in 5 typewritten copies
must be filed before the Labor Arbiter or the Executive
Labor Arbiter of this Office within 10 calendar days upon
receipt thereof.
 An appeal shall be deemed perfected only upon the
payment of an appeal fee. PROVIDED, that in case of judgment
involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be
perfected only upon the posting of cash or surety bond issued
by a reputable and duly accredited bonding company, an
amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment
appealed from.
The decision of the Labor Arbiters reinstating a
dismissed employee, in so far as the reinstatement is
concerned shall immediately be executory, even pending
appeal. The same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his
dismissal or separation, at the option of the employer, merely
reinstated in the payroll.
Quezon City, Philippines, ______________.

_______________________
Labor Arbitration Officer
VII. RELIEF AFTER RESOLUTION OF THE
HIGHEST LEVEL OF AUTHORITY IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY CONCERNED
What relief is available as against an
action or decision of an administrative
bureau, agency, or office?

It depends. If the law that created the said administrative

bureau, agency or office provides for an appeal as well as the
procedure and the requisites for taking that appeal, the specific
relief or reliefs provided for in the law itself can be obtained. If the
law does not provide for an appeal, or for judicial relief or review,
the questioned decision can nevertheless be the subject of judicial
review under Rule 65 of the New Rules of Court on the ground of
lack or jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
What is required prior to judicial
review of an administrative decision?

1. That the administrative action has already

been completed; and
2. That all the administrative remedies have been
exhausted.
Is compliance with the said requirements
absolute?
No. The said requirements need not be complied with
in the following instances:

1. When the question involved is purely legal, or

where the questioned act is patently illegal,
arbitrary or oppresive (Kilusang Bayan sa
Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong
Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa, et al. vs.
Dominguez, G.R. No. 85439; Bunye, et al. vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 91927, January 13,
1992);
2. When there is an urgent need for judicial
intervention (Aquino vs. Luntok, 184 SCRA 177);

3. When the administrative body is in estoppel (Tan

vs. Veterans Backpay Commission, 105 Phil. 377);

4. When the claim involved is small (Cipriano vs.

Marcelino, 43 SCRA 291);

5. When irreparable damage will be suffered (De

Lara vs. Plaribel, 14 SCRA 269);
6. When there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy (National Development Co. vs. Collector
of Customs, 9 SCRA 429);

7. When strong public interest is involved (Arrow

Transportation Corp. vs. Board of
Transportation, 63 SCRA 193); and

8. When the subject of controversy is private land

(Morcoso vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96605,
May 8, 1992).
Can the reviewing court re-examine the
sufficiency of the evidence and receive
additional evidence that was not submitted
to the administrative agency concerned?

As a rule, factual findings of administrative agencies

will not be disturbed by the courts except in the following
cases: (Ang Tibay vs. CIR, supra; Alejandro vs. Court of
Appeals, 191 SCRA 700; Nestle Philippines, Inc. vs. Court
of Appeals, 203 SCRA 504 [1991])
1. When it is not supported by substantial
evidence;
2. When it is vitiated by fraud, imposition or
collusion;
3. When the procedure which led to the
factual findings is irregular;
4. When palpable errors are committed;
5. When abuse of discretion, arbitrariness or
capriciousness is manifest.
What are the other matters that may
not be interfered with by the courts?
1. Purely administrative and discretionary functions may not
be interfered by the courts except if an agency or official
concerned has acted arbitrarily and with grave abuse of
discretion. (Beautifont vs. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 481
[1988]). Example: Power granted to LTFRB to grant
provisional increase in transportation fares.

2. Appeal to the courts will not lie from an interlocutory order.

Example: Order of NLRC to set a motion for execution for
hearing by the Labor Arbiter a quo.
Assuming that an order is
interlocutory, is there a relief that is
available to a party aggrieved by the
said kind of order?
Yes, a special civil action for certiorari is
available if the administrative agency, board or
tribunal concerned acted without jurisdiction, in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion, or if petitioner's right to due process is
disregarded. (Philippine Airlines vs. Civil
Aeronautic Board, 20 SCRA 727 [1967])
 PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. VS. CIVIL
AERONAUTICS BOARD
20 SCRA 727
FACTS:
Philippine Airlines questioned the provisional permit to
operate four aircrafts on the following grounds: (1) alleged
violation of due process for failure to hear its evidence; (2)
alleged absence of factual basis for granting said provisional
permit; (3) there is no public need; (4) documents to support
legality of the grant were not disclosed to it. CAB countered that
petitioner was notified about the hearing and it was represented
during the hearing when the proposed service and feasibility of
operations were subject of discussion and debate. CAB and
private respondent claimed that the promised grant is
interlocutory.
ISSUE:
Is PAL's petition for certiorari tenable? Is there abuse of
discretion in granting the said provisional permit to operate
four aircrafts?

HELD:
PAL's petition for certiorari was sustained as a special
civil action which allows an aggrieved party to complain against
any tribunal, board or officer exercising functions judicial in
character without or in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of
discretion.
The claim, however, that there was violation of due
process was not sustained for there was notice and hearing.
Besides, CAB has the power to issue, deny, amend, revise, alter,
modify, cancel, suspend or revoke, in whole or in part the
temporary permit it has issued.
VIII. APPEAL FROM, OR REVIEW OF
ORDERS, ACTIONS AND DECISIONS OF THE
DIFFERENT EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS,
BUREAUS AND OFFICES
 OLD CASES

PHILIPPINE MERCHANT MARINE

SCHOOL, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 112844, JUNE 2, 1995
61 SCAD 720

(As long as the parties were given opportunity to

be heard before the judgment was rendered, the
demands of due process were sufficiently met)
FACTS:

Despite prior disapproval of petitioner's request for

renewal of permit to operate, the DECS Inter-Agency
Technical Committee (IATCOM) recommended the grant
of permit to the school in 1987, provided that it improves
its buildings, laboratory and library facilities before the
start of school year 1987-1988. Petitioner continued to fail
to improve itself in 1988.
In 1989, the TPME (DECS Technical Panel for
Maritime Education) recommended the gradual phase-out
of the courses in Bachelor of Science in Marine Education
and eventual closure should the school fail to meet
minimum standards.
 On August 8, 1989, despite another inspection, the
inspection team reiterated the recommendation for the
gradual phase-out of the school and for the non-
acceptance of freshman beginning SY 1990-1991. DECS
approved and implemented the recommendation and
accordingly issued the phase-out order. Petitioner moved
for reconsideration. When motion was denied, it appealed
to the Office of the President. While the appeal was
pending, DECS issued a closure order dated August 27,
1991, effective the second semester of SY 1991-1992.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of said order of
closure. While the said motion for reconsideration was
pending in the DECS, the Office of the President dismissed
the appeal filed earlier. Again, petitioner moved for the
reconsideration but the same was denied.
 Due to the denial, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals on the following grounds: (1)
There was violation of due process because the basis for
affirmance of the DECS phase-out and closure orders was not
sufficiently disclosed; (2) that it had presented incontrovertible
proof that it had introduced substantial improvements on its
facilities for the past two and a half years.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition as well as the
subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Hence, a petition for certiorari was filed by the
petitioner to the Supreme Court faulting the Court of Appeals
in not setting aside the questioned resolution which was
allegedly rendered without due process since it is not fully
afforded opportunity to present evidence, and was not
sufficiently informed of the basis for the closure orders which
were not yet final and executory.
ISSUE:
Was there a violation of due process? Is the closure order valid?
Is the basis of the affirmance of the DECS' phase-out and closure
orders disclosed to the petitioner?

HELD:
Before the DECS issued the phase-out and closure orders,
petitioner was duly notified, warned and given several opportunities to
correct its deficiencies and to comply with pertinent orders and
regulations. Petitioner has gone all the way up to the Office of the
President to seek a reversal of the phase-out and closure orders. There
is thus no reason to complain of lack of opportunity to explain its side
as well as to comply with the alleged deficiencies (Board of Medical
Education vs. Alfonso, 176 SCRA 304 (1989]). As long as the parties
were given opportunity to be heard before the judgment was rendered,
the demands of due process were sufficiently met (Lindo vs.
COMELEC, 194 SCRA 25). It should also be noted that petitioner
herein repeatedly sought reconsideration of the various orders of
respondent DECS and its motion were duly considered by respondent
DECS to the extent of allowing and granting its request for re-
inspection of its premises.
 The phase-out and closure orders were based not only on
petitioner's deficiencies as a maritime institution but also on its
continued operation without the requisite authorization for the DECS
and acceptance of freshman students in blatant violation of the latter's
order and/or persistent warnings not to do so. Verily, there are
sufficient grounds to uphold the phase-out and closure orders of the
DECS which were issued conformably with Sec. 28 of the Education
Act of 1982.
In the case at bench, it is not the function of this Court nor any
other court for that matter - X X X to review the decisions and order of
the Secretary on the issue of whether or not an educational institution
meets the standards required for permission to operate and to
continue operating as such. On this question, no Court has the power
or prerogative to substitute its opinion for that of the Secretary.
Indeed, it is obviously not expected that any court would have the
competence to do so.
ILOCOS SUR ELECTRIC CORPORATION,
INC. VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION
G.R. NO. 106161, FEBRUARY 1, 1995
58 SCAD 679

(Under Section 10 of P.D. No. 269, as amended by

P.D. No. 1645, the National Electrification Administration
has no power to hear and decide termination cases of
employees in electric corporations.
That authority is vested in the Labor Arbiter.)
FACTS:

Engr. Egdon Sabio, Manager of the Engineering

Department of the Ilocos Sur Electric Cooperative (ISECO)
was dismissed on July 1, 1989, by virtue of ISECO's Bond
Resolution No. 63, S. 1989, dated July 19, 1989. He was
placed under preventive suspension without pay effective
July 1, 1989.
Engr. Sabio filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
with damages against petitioner in the Department of
Labor. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Engr. Sabio and
ordered ISECO to reinstate the latter with full backwages.
ISECO appealed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether NLRC has jurisdiction over the case of
Engr. Sabio. Whether the Board of Directors of ISECO
dismissed Engr. Sabio in accordance with law.

HELD:
Under Section 10 of P.D. No. 269, as amended by
P.D. No. 1645 only the power of supervisions and control
over electric cooperatives and other borrowers, supervised
or controlled, is given to the NEA. There is nothing in said
law which provides that the NEA administration has the
power to hear and decide termination of employees in
electric cooperatives. That authority is vested in the Labor
Arbiter.
The dismissal arose from a purely labor dispute
which falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC.
 CONCERNED OFFICIALS OF THE
METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS SYSTEM
(MWSS) VS. VASQUEZ, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 109113, JANUARY 25, 1995,
58 SCAD 409
(The decision to accept or reject a bid and award contracts
is vested in the government agencies entrusted with that function.
Neither the Court, nor Congress, nor the Ombudsman should
interfere in the exercise of said discretion which is a policy
decision, unless it is apparent that it is used as a shield to a
fraudulent award.)
FACTS:
MWSS published its invitation for pre-qualification and
bids. Fourteen (14) contractors submitted applications to the
Awards Committee for Construction Services and Technical
Equipment (PBAC-CSTE). After evaluation, only 11 were pre-
qualified to bid.
Meanwhile, between February 10 and March 24, 1992,
former MWSS Administrator Luis Sison, issued 6 addenda to
the biding documents that embodied some suggestions of
respondent Philippine Large Diameter Pressure Pipes
Manufacturer's Association (PLDPPMA).
After the 3 lowest bidders for Project APM-01 and APM-
02 were known, PBAC-CSTE recommended the rejection of all
bids and to conduct a re-bidding because of ambiguity of
Addendum No. 6 of the bidding documents, lack of provision of
maintenance/repair materials for bidders who opted to use
fiberglass reinforced pipes, and the use for a further review of
the pipe design by the consultant, NJS.
 Finally, on June, 1992, PBAC-CSTE submitted to bid
evaluation report. It recommended the second lowest but
complying bidder, FF Cruz and Co., Inc. for APM-01.
Meanwhile, on April 7, 1992, PLDPPMA, private
respondent, through its President, filed a letter-complaint
with the Office of the Ombudsman protesting the public
bidding on APM-01 and APM-02, charging that there was
an "apparent plan” on the part of MWSS to favor suppliers
of fiberglass pipes, and urging the Ombudsman to
investigate the complaint and hold in abeyance the award
of the contracts.
The Ombudsman, in its order dated October 19,
1992, directed the Board of Trustees of MWSS to set aside
the recommendation of PBAC-CSTE. MWSS moved for
reconsideration but it was denied.
ISSUE:
Can the Ombudsman interfere in the adjudicative
responsibility of the MWSS Board of Trustees?

HELD:
The MWSS, a government-owned and controlled corporation
created by law through R.A. No. 6234, is charged with the
construction, maintenance and operation of waterworks system to
insure an uninterrupted and adequate supply and distribution of
potable water. It is the agency that should be in the best position to
evaluate the feasibility of the projection of the bidders and to decide
which bid is compatible with its development plans. The exercise of
this discretion is a policy decision that necessitates, among other
things, prior inquiry, investigation, comparison, evaluation, and
deliberation - matters that can best be discharged by it. MWSS has
passed Resolution No. 32-93 to likewise show its approval of the
technical specification for fiberglass. All these should deserve
weight.
NOTE: This affirms the decision of the
Supreme Court in Razon, Inc. vs. PPA (151
SCRA 233), thus:

"x x x we have said that neither this Court nor

congress and now perhaps the Ombudsman, could be
expected to have the time and technical expertise to
look into matters of this nature. While we cannot go
so far as to say, MWSS would have the monopoly of
technical know-how in the waterworks system, by
the very nature of its functions, however, it obviously
must enjoy the advantage over other agencies on the
subject at hand.”
 Likewise, this affirms the decision in Felipe
Ysmael, Jr. and Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive
Secretary (190 SCRA 673)
The decision in Bureau Veritas vs. Office of the
President is emphatic. The Supreme Court said: "The
discretion to accept or reject a bid and award
contracts is vested in the Government agencies
entrusted with that function. The discretion given to
the authorities on this matter is of such wide latitude
that the Courts will not interfere therewith, unless it
is used as a shield to a fraudulent award."
 SECRETARY OF HEALTH, ET AL. VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 112243, FEBRUARY 23, 1995,
59 SCAD 270

(Jurisdiction once acquired by a court over a case

remains with it until the full termination of the case,
unless the law provides the contrary.)
FACTS:
For gross misconduct and dishonesty, Fe Siballuca,
Administrative Officer III of the Provincial Health of Cagayan,
was placed under a 90 day preventive suspension. She instituted
an action to nullify the said order of suspension claiming that
when the New Local Government Code took effect on January 1,
1992, the Secretary of Health had lost his disciplinary power and
authority over her, considering that such power of the provincial
Health Office is now vested in the Provincial Governor.
The Secretary of Health moved to dismiss the action and
to quash the temporary restraining order obtained and opposed
the issuance of a preliminary injunction, contending that the
private respondent had failed to exhaust administrative
remedies and that the New Local Government Code did not
divest him of his disciplinary jurisdiction over the private
respondent.
 The trial court ruled in favor of Siballuca and
issued an order for execution of judgment.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but was
denied. They filed a Notice of Appeal with the court a
quo and moved to stay execution of the asserted
decision. Both were denied.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 in the Court of Appeals but
the same was dismissed on the ground that the
petition could not be a substitute for a lost appeal.
ISSUE:
Is the decision of the Court of Appeals correct?

HELD:
No. At the time of the commencement of the administrative
action, the operative laws are the Administrative Code of 1987 and
Executive Order No. 119. Under the said laws, the Secretary of Health
exercises control, direction and supervision over his subordinates,
which include private respondent. Consequently, since jurisdiction has
been acquired by the Secretary of Health over the person of private
respondent before the effectivity of the Local Government Code on
January 1, 1992, it continues until the final DISPOSITION of the
administrative case.
Jurisdiction once acquired by a court over a case remains with
it until the full termination of the case, unless a law provides the
contrary. Respondent, a civil servant, cannot use the courts of justice
as a shield to prevent the implementation of administrative sanctions
of executive agencies against erring public servants.
 NEW CASES

AMADORE VS. ROMULO

G.R. NO. 161608, AUGUST 9, 2005

(Only one motion for reconsideration is allowed to

be filed from a decision, resolution or order of the Office of
the President. A second motion for reconsideration is
allowed only in exceptionally meritorious cases.)
FACTS:

Petitioner Amadore, the Director of PAGASA entered into

a contract with Inter-Technical Pacific Philippines, Inc. (INTER
PAC) for the supply, delivery installation, testing and
commissioning of S-Band Weather Surveillance Radar System
and Other Related Equipment for Baguio and Tanay Radar
Stations. The contract was approved by then Secretary Padolina
of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST).
The concerned employees of the DOST reported the
rampant graft and corruption in the DOST. The charge of
entering into a contract manifestly and grossly disadvantageous
to the government was filed against petitioner, Director Ferraris
and Deputy Director Angeles. The PCAGC found them guilty
and recommended their dismissal from the service.
 Then Executive Secretary Romulo approved the
recommendation of the PCAGC and dismissed petitioner,
Deputy Director Ferraris and Deputy Director Angeles
from government service. They filed a motion for
reconsideration. The complaint against Deputy Director
Ferraris was dismissed, while Deputy Director Angeles was
suspended for six (6) months and petitioner's dismissal
from the service was affirmed.
An urgent motion to admit second motion for
reconsideration was filed by petitioner and Deputy
Director Angeles on the ground that they were unable to
present documents which, if admitted, would probably
alter the decision of the Office of the President. The second
motion for reconsideration was denied with finality.
ISSUE:
Whether a second motion for reconsideration for the
decision of the Office of the President is allowed.

RULING:
A second motion for reconsideration of the decision
of the Office of the President may only be allowed in
exceptionally meritorious cases. Administrative Order No.
18, Series of 1987, prescribes the rules and regulations
governing appeals to the Office of the President of the
Philippines. Section 7 and 9 read as follows:
 Sec. 7. Decision/resolutions/orders of the Office
of the President shall, except as otherwise provided
for by special laws, become final after the lapse of
fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the
parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is
filed within such period.
Only one motion for reconsideration by any one
party shall be allowed and entertained, save in
exceptionally meritorious cases.
Sec. 9. The Rules of Court shall apply in a
suppletory character whenever practicable.
 It is clear from Sec. 7 of Administrative Order
No. 18 that only one motion for reconsideration is
allowed to be filed from a decision, resolution or order
of the Office of the President. A second motion for
reconsideration is allowed only in exceptionally
meritorious cases.
In the case of petitioner, he, together with a co-
respondent, filed a second motion for reconsideration
claiming he will be presenting evidence that he was
not able to present during the hearings, which, if
admitted, will probably change the judgment.
 SGMC REALTY CORPORATION VS.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
G.R. NO. 126999, AUGUST 30, 2000

(Unless otherwise governed by special laws, an appeal to the

Office of the President shall be taken within thirty (30) days
from receipt by the aggrieved party of the
decision/resolution/order complained of or appealed from.)
FACTS:
Petitioners filed before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) a complaint for breach of contract,
violation of property rights and damages against private
respondents. Their complaint was dismissed.
Petitioners then filed a petition for review with the Board
of Commissioners of the HLURB. The petition was dismissed so
they filed an appeal with public respondent. Public respondent,
without delving into the merits of the case, dismissed the appeal
for being filed out of time and denied their motion for
reconsideration.
Alleging that public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding
that the period to appeal from the HLURB to the Office of the
President is fifteen (15) days and not thirty (30) days as
mandated in the 1994 Rules of Procedure adopted by the
HLURB, petitioners filed the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether public respondent committed grave
abuse of discretion in ruling that the reglementary
period within which to appeal the decision of
HLURB to public respondent is fifteen days.
RULING:
No. Public respondent did not commit grave
abuse of discretion.
Administrative Order No. 18, Series of 1987,
issued by public respondent reads:

“Section 1. Unless otherwise governed by

special laws, an appeal to the Office of the President
shall be taken within thirty (30) days from receipt by
the aggrieved party of the decision /resolution/order
complained of or appealed from.”
 The said thirty (30) day period mentioned
under Administrative Order No. 18 is subject to
the qualification that there are no other statutory
periods of appeal applicable. If there are special
laws governing particular cases which provide for
a shorter or longer reglementary period, the same
shall prevail over the thirty-period provided for in
the administrative order.
 Indeed, there are special laws that mandate a shorter
period of fifteen (15) days within which to appeal a case to
public respondent. First, Section 15 of PD No. 957 provides that
the decisions of the National Housing Authority (NHA) shall
become final and executor after the lapse of fifteen (15) days
from the date of receipt of the decision. Second, Section 2 of PD
No. 1344 states that decisions of the NHA shall become final
and executor after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of
its receipt. The latter decree provides that the decisions of NHA
are appealable only to the Office of the President. Further, we
note that the regulatory functions of the NHA relating to
housing and land development has been transferred to Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission, now known as the
HLURB. Thus, said presidential issuances providing for a
reglementary period of appeal of fifteen days apply in this case.
Accordingly, the period of appeal of thirty (30) days set forth in
Section 27 of HLURB 1994 Rules of Procedure no longer holds
true for being in conflict with the provisions of aforesaid
presidential decrees. For it is axiomatic that administrative
rules derive their validity from the statute that they are
intended to implement.
 CABRERA VS. LAPID
G.R. NO. 129098, DECEMBER 6, 2006

(Direct resort to the SC from a resolution or order

of the Ombudsman is not sanctioned by any rule
of procedure.)
FACTS:
Petitioner Amelia Cabrera accused named respondents
Manuel Lapid, Fernando Baltazar, Reynaldo F. Cabrera and
Superintendent Diony Ventura, respectively, in their capacities
of Governor of Pampanga, Mayor of Sasmuan, Pampanga, Vice-
Mayor of Sasmuan, Pampanga, and Superintendent of the PNP-
Region 3, Pampanga of violating Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act and Article 324 of the Revised Penal
Code.
In her Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman, petitioner stated that she entered into a lease
agreement with the Municipality of Sasmuan over a tract of land
for the purpose of devoting it to fishpond operations. According
to petitioner, she had spent approximately P5,000,000.00 for
its construction before the fishpond operations commenced in
August 1995. A month later, petitioner learned from newspaper
reports of the impending demolition of her fishpond as it was
purportedly illegal and blocked the flow of the Pasak River.
Thus, petitioner sent the fishpond administrator to dissuade
respondents from destroying her property.
 Despite pleas from petitioner, respondents ordered
the destruction of petitioner’s fishpond. The property was
demolished on 10 October 1995 by dynamite blasting.
Petitioner alleged that the demolition was purposely
carried out in the presence of media representatives and
other government officials to gain media mileage.
Petitioner imputed evident bad faith on respondents
Mayor Baltazar and Vice-Mayor Cabrera in allowing the
destruction of the fishpond despite their prior knowledge
of the existence of the lease agreement. She also charged
respondents Governor Lapid and Senior Superintendent
Ventura with gross inexcusable negligence for ordering the
destruction of the fishpond without first verifying its
legality.
 On 13 May 1996, the Ombudsman issued
assailed Resolution, dismissing petitioner’s complaint.
The dismissal was based on the declaration that the
fishpond was a nuisance per se and, thus, may be
abated by respondents in the exercise of the police
power of the State.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the
Resolution. In its May 21, 1997 Order, the
Ombudsman affirmed its earlier Resolution.
Petitioner elevated the matter to this Court via a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court to assail the Resolution and Order of
the Ombudsman.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner can resort directly to the Supreme Court from
a resolution or order of the Ombudsman.

RULING:
Direct resort to the SC from a resolution or order of the
Ombudsman is not sanctioned by any rule of procedure.
Clearly, this is an appeal from the questioned issuances of the
Ombudsman. However, such direct resort to this Court from a resolution
or order of the Ombudsman is not sanctioned by any rule of procedure.
Neither can petitioner avail of Sec. 27 of RA No. 6770, otherwise
known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989. The provision allowed direct
appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the
Ombudsman to the Supreme Court. The right to appeal is granted only in
respect to orders or decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases.
The provision does not cover resolutions of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases. The provision does not cover resolutions of the
Ombudsman in criminal cases. More importantly, Sec 27 of RA No. 6770
insofar as it allowed a direct appeal to this Court was declared
unconstitutional in Fabian vs. Hon. Desierto (356 SCRA 787).
 However, an aggrieved party in criminal
actions is not without any recourse. Where grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction taints the findings of the
Ombudsman on the existence of probable cause,
the aggrieved party may file a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. The remedy from
resolutions of the Ombudsman in preliminary
investigations of criminal cases is a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45.
 But in this case, petitioner has taken the position
that the Ombudsman has decided questions of
substance contrary to law and the applicable decisions
of the Supreme Court. That is a ground under a Rule
45 petition. Indeed, from a reading of the assignment
of errors, it is clear that petitioner does not impute
grave abuse of discretion to the Ombudsman in
issuing the assailed Resolution and Order. Rather, she
merely questions his findings and conclusions. As
stated earlier, direct appeal to the Supreme Court via
a petition for review on certiorari is not sanctioned by
any rule of procedure. By availing of a wrong remedy,
the petition should be dismissed outright.
Should an order of preventive
suspension be nullified because the
Secretary of Health lost his
disciplinary power and authority when
the new Local Government Code took
effect on January 1, 1992?
No. The jurisdiction acquired by the
Secretary of Health before the effectivity of the
Local Government Code on January 1, 1992,
continues until the final disposition of the
administrative case.
THE MECHANICS OR THE MANNER OF
APPEALING THE DECISION OF THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT IS DIFFERENT
BECAUSE IT IS A CONSTITUTIONAL
BODY
Both under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, any decision,
order or ruling of the Commission on Audit may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days
from receipt of a copy thereof.
The same is true with respect to any decision, order or ruling of
the Commission on Elections and the Civil Service Commission.
(Orocio vs. Commission on Audit, et al., G.R. No. 75959, August 31,
1992; Manalansang vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 93500,
February 5, 1991; Villanueva vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
97071, February 27, 1992)
What is the relief available against
awards of ale lots issued by NHA?
An action to annul awards of sale of its lots
should first be filed in the National Housing
Authority. Thereafter, an appeal may be filed in
the Office of the President within thirty three (33)
days from receipt of the NHA decision awarding
the lot to another party. After which step, the
aggrieved party can go to the Courts under Rule
65. (Swan, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
97319; Swan, et al. vs. Abesamis, G.R. No.
101054, August 4, 1992)
The old case of Raymundo vs. PHHC
(114 SCRA 717)had this ruling:
“The power to dispose of the lands placed under the
administration of Philippine Homesite and Housing
Corporation is lodged in said body. There is no provision of law
authorizing courts to review decisions of respondent PHHC and
to take cognizance of actions to annul awards of sale or any
other actions made by it pursuant to the authority granted it by
law. If the courts are to take cognizance of cases involving errors
or abuse of power exercised by the respondent PHHC, the
remedy would be by means of an action for certiorari or
prohibition to set aside the orders of decisions of the respondent
PHHC, and not a direct action for specific performance as the
one instituted in this case. But this special civil action would not
lie unless there is an allegation of abuse of discretion of lack of
jurisdiction.
Can the courts interfere with the
Ombudsman's exercise of his
discretion to determine whether or
not to file an information against
an accused?
GENERAL RULE
The Ombudsman having authorized the Special
Prosecutor to investigate the charges, and we cannot
assume that the former acted without any justifiable cause,
the latter is and should, at this stage, be the proper
adjudicator of the question as to the existence of a case
warranting the filing of an information in court. To deny
said functionary of the opportunity to discharge such duty
through this prohibitory recourse, under the obtaining
circumstances herein before explained, would be violative
of settled rules of criminal procedure and would, in effect
grant an immunity against even an investigative
proceeding. (Sesbreno vs. Deputy Ombudsman, G.R. No.
97289, March 21, 1991; Tabaa-Candang vs. Vasquez, G.R.
No. 97127, March 21, 1991)
EXCEPTION
Except if there is a misapprehension of
justice and the courts have to step in to prevent
the respondents from using the iron arm of the
law to harass, oppress, and persecute a member of
the democratic opposition in the Philippines
against whom an information for subversion had
been filed. The petitioners, Fernando and Mison,
are by no means, opposition men who need to be
rescued from the “iron arm" of the law.
IX. METHODS OF REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
What are the methods of review of
administrative action?

The methods of review of administrative action

may be (1) Statutory or Non-Statutory; (2) Direct
or Collateral.
a) Statutory Methods - They are those that are
provided by a specific statutory provision. The
manner and extent of its exercise is therefore
governed by statutes.

b) Non-Statutory Methods - Are those methods

which are not expressly provided for by law. They
are resorted by courts on account of their inherent
power to review such proceedings and to decide
questions of jurisdiction and questions of law.
c) Direct Proceeding - This is a proceeding which
includes a petition for review or relief from a
judgment. The purpose of which is to seek relief other
than to set aside judgment, although it may involve an
attack on the judgment itself.

d) Collateral Attack - Through collateral attack, there

is an attempt to question in a subsequent proceeding,
the conclusiveness or validity of a prior administrative
decision on the ground that the decision of invalid for
lack of jurisdiction over the person, or over the subject
matter, or because the decision attacked was not the
act of the administrative body concerned which is
vested with the power to make the said determination.
STATUTORY METHODS
(They are available on account of a
specific law that allows it. If statutory
methods for review are available,
they are ordinarily exclusive, and the
use of non-statutory methods will not
likely be permitted.)
Example:
1. Judicial review of the decisions of the
Constitutional Commissions, those created under
Article IX(A), Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution
(Commission on Elections, Commission on Audit,
and Civil Service Commission)

"Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or

by law, any decision, order or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty
(30) days from receipt of a copy thereof."
2. Judicial Review of decisions and final orders
under the Labor Code of the Philippines

Judgments and final orders issued under the

Labor Code of the Philippines may only be brought to
the Supreme Court under Rule 65. The reliefs in Rule
65 are the following:

(a) Petition for Certiorari, Section 1, Rule 65

(b) Petition for Prohibition, Section 2, Rule 65
Within what period shall the petition
for certiorari be filed?

There is no rule which specifies the period

within which a petition for certiorari should be
filed. The yardstick to measure the timeliness of a
petition for certiorari is the reasonableness of the
duration of time that has expired from the
commission of the act complained of, up to the
institution of the proceedings to annul the same.
NOTE:

1. In San Juan vs. Cuento (G.R. No. 45063, April 15,

1988, 160 SCRA 277), it was held that an interval of 2
years is too long.
2. In Allied Leasing Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
(197 SCRA 71 [1991]).
3. In Claridad vs. Santos (120 SCRA 148), 99 days in
filing certiorari after receipt of denial of the motion for
reconsideration was considered as barred laches.
4. In People vs. Magallanes (G.R. No. 118013, 64 SCAD
968, October 11. 1995, citing Philec Workers Union vs.
Young, January 22, 1992), 3 months in filing
certiorari after receipt of the denial for the Motion for
Reconsideration was accepted.
5. The period has now been settled to 60 days.
NON-STATUTORY METHODS (If there is
no specific law granting review, relief
is obtained by means of the common
law remedies, or by the prerogative
writs of certiorari, mandamus, habeas
corpus, quo-warranto or
prohibition)
Example:
1. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65,
Section 1 of the New Rules of Court.
2. A petition for prohibition may also be filed under
Section 2, Rule 65 of the New Rules of Court.
3. A petition for mandamus may also be filed under
Rule 65, Section 3 of the New Rules of Court.
4. A quo-warranto proceeding may also be filed
under Section 1, Rule 66 of the New Rules of
Court.
5. Petition for habeas corpus may also be filed under
Section 1, Rule 102 of the New Rules of Court.
DIRECT PROCEEDING (Administrative
action is being questioned in a
subsequent proceeding on account of
lack of jurisdiction, grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. This also includes a
petition for review or a relief from
judgment.)
Example:
1. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65, Section 1 of the New Rules of Court
2. Appeal under Rule 43, Section 1 of the New
Rules of Court.
COLLATERAL ATTACK (The conclusiveness or
validity of a prior administrative decision is
being questioned on the ground that the
decision is invalid for lack of jurisdiction over
the person, or over the subject matter, or
because the decision attacked was not the act
of the administrative body concerned which is
vested with the power to make the said
determination).
Can the citizenship of an individual be
attacked in a collateral proceeding?

No. (Co vs. House of Representatives

Electoral Tribunal, 199 SCRA 692)
Is a certificate of title issued under an
administrative proceeding
indefeasible as a certificate of title
issued under a judicial registration
proceeding?

Yes, provided that the land covered by said certificate is a

disposable public land within the contemplation of the public
land law. (Ybañez vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
68291, March 6, 1991).
Can a decree of registration and the
certificate of title issued pursuant
thereto be attacked on the ground of
actual fraud in a collateral proceeding?

No, such attack must be direct and not through a

collateral proceeding. The validity of the certificate of
title in this regard can be threshed out only in an
action expressly filed for the purpose. (Ibid.)
X. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
CREATED BY THE
CONSTITUTION
What specifically are the guarantees
provided by the Constitution to said
commissions?
The Constitution provides for the following guarantees:

1. The Members of the Constitutional Commissions cannot be

removed from office except by impeachment. (Article XI, Section
2)

2. The powers conferred to each of the said Commissions cannot be

withdrawn or reduced by statute. (Article IX[B], [C], and [D])

3. The term of office of the Chairman and the Commissioners is

seven (7) years without re-appointment. (Ibid.)
4. Their term of office are staggered in order that the majority
of them may not be appointed by the same President. (Ibid.)
5. They may not be re-appointed or appointed in an acting
capacity. (Ibid.)
6. Their salaries are fixed by law and shall not be decreased
during their tenure. (Section 3, Article IX[A])
7. All the said commissions may promulgate its own
procedural rules. (Section 5, Ibid.)
8. All the said commissions may promulgate its own
procedural rules. (Section 6, Ibid.)
9. All the said commissions can appoint their own officials and
employees in accordance with law. (Section 4, Ibid.)
10. The Chairman and members of all the said commissions are
subject to certain disqualifications and inhibitions so they
will not be distracted from performing their duties and
functions. (Section 2, Ibid.)
11. All the said commissions are independent. (Section 1, Ibid.)
12. All the said commissions are created by the Constitution
and they may not be abolished by statute. (Section 1, Ibid.)
What is the mechanics of staggering
the terms?
Every two (2) years, the term of one
Commissioner expires leaving behind two
experienced Commissioners. If a vacancy occurs,
the commissioner so appointed to fill up the
vacancy shall serve only for the unexpired term of
the predecessor.
No member shall be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting
capacity?

The last sentence of Section 1(2), Article

IX[B] states: "In no case shall any member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.”

Under this rule, the President may not fill up a

vacancy by designating one of the Commissioners
a temporary Chairman.
 BRILLANTES VS. YORAC
192 SCRA 358

FACTS:
Commissioner Haydee Yorac, then an Associate
Commissioner of the Commission on Elections, was
designated by President Corazon C. Aquino as Acting
Chairperson of the Commission because the regular
chairman was appointed to another position in the
government. The petitioner challenged the
designation invoking the prohibition that "no member
may be appointed or designated in a temporary
capacity."
ISSUE:
Is the said designation valid?

HELD:
The Chairman and the Commissioners of the
Commission on Elections must be extended permanent
appointments by the President but such appointments
shall have the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. The President has no power to designate a
temporary Chairman. This prerogative may be exercised
by the members of the Commission on Elections for they
may, by a majority vote, designate one of them as
temporary chairman pending the appointment of a
permanent chairman by the President.
Within what period must a case or
matter be decided by each
commission?
Section 7, Article IX [A] answers this question, thus:

“Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of

all its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty
days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A
case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution
upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum
required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission
itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."
Who made the said decisions?
Decisions are made by the said commissions, not
by the individual members of said commissions.
REASON: The said constitutional commissions are
collegial bodies. The cases pending in said
commissions should, therefore, be decided "by a
majority vote of all its members and Section 7 fixes a
period of sixty (60) days from the date of its
submission within which to make that decision.“
Again, the sixty (60)-day period is counted from
the filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum
required by the Rules of the Commission or by the
Commission itself
How many days within which to file a
petition for certiorari?
The aggrieved party has to file a petition for certiorari
within thirty (30) days from receipt of said decision, order or
ruling. This petition is actually a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 and, therefore, the ground or the issue
to be brought to the Supreme Court for decision is limited to
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or
excess of jurisdiction.
There is lack of jurisdiction if the grave abuse of
discretion was done in a capricious or whimsical manner.
Excess of jurisdiction presupposes that the court has
jurisdiction but it has overstepped the permissible bounds in the
exercise thereof. (Galido vs. Comelec, 93 SCRA 78 [1991]);
Rivera vs. Comelec, 199 SCRA 178 [1991])
 It is now settled that in providing that the
decisions, orders or rulings of Comelec "may be
brought the Supreme Court on certiorari," the
Constitution in its Article IX[A], Section 7, means the
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65,
Section 1.
For this reason, the aggrieved party must first
file a motion for reconsideration before the petition
for certiorari is brought to the Supreme Court. (Reyes
vs. Regional Trial Court, et al., G.R. No. 108886, 61
SCAD 44, May 5, 1995)
REYES VS. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 108886, MAY 5, 1995
61 SCAD 44
FACTS:
After the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections, the
Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Aquiles U.
Reyes as the 8th winning candidate for the position of
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Nauja, Oriental
Mindoro.
Thereafter, Adolfo G. Comia, a candidate for the
same position, filed before the trial court an election
protest alleging that the Board of Canvassers had
committed a mistake in the mathematical computation of
the total number of votes garnered by petitioner.
 After the mistake was admitted and rectified, the
trial court annulled the proclamation of Reyes and
declared Comia as the duly elected winner.
Reyes filed a notice of appeal with the
COMELEC and also a petition for mandamus and
prohibition in the Court of Appeals.
The COMELEC's First Division dismissed Reyes'
appeal on the ground that he failed to pay the appeal
fee within the prescribed period and the Court of
Appeals dismissed his petition in view of his pending
appeal in the COMELEC citing Supreme Court
Circular No. 28-91 which prohibits the filing of
multiple petitions involving the same issues.
 Reyes then brought the present action. Reyes contends that
both the trial court and the COMELEC's First Division committed
a grave abuse discretion, the first, by assuming jurisdiction over
the election contest filed by Comia despite the fact that the case
was filed more than ten days after Reyes' proclamation, and the
second, i.e., the COMELEC's First Division, by dismissing Reyes'
appeal from the decision of the trial court for late payment of the
appeal fee.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. Reyes failed to
first file a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en
banc before filing his petition for certiorari before the Supreme
Court contrary to Article IX(A), Section 7 of the Constitution. It
likewise held that the COMELEC's First Division properly
dismissed Reyes' appeal from the decision of the trial court for his
failure to pay the appeal fee within the time for perfecting an
appeal.
 The Solicitor General, in behalf of the COMELEC,
raises a fundamental question. He contends that the filing
of the present petition, without Reyes first filing a motion
for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc, violates
Article IX, Section 7 of the Constitution because under this
provision only decisions of the COMELEC en banc may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.
HELD:

This is correct. It is now settled that providing that

the decisions, orders and rulings of COMELEC “may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari," the
Constitution in its Article IX(A), Section 7 means the
special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, Section 1
(Galido vs. COMELEC, 193 SCRA 78 (1991); Rivera vs.
COMELEC, 199 SCRA 178 [1991]). Since a basic condition
for bringing such action is that Reyes first file a motion for
reconsideration (Regalado, Remedial Law, pp. 459-460
(1998), it follows that Reyes' failure to file a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the First Division of the
COMELEC is fatal to present action.
 Reyes argues that this requirement may be
dispensed with because the only question raised in
his petition is a question of law. This is not
correct. The questions raised by Reyes involve the
interpretation of constitutional and statutory
provisions in the light of the facts of this case. The
questions tendered are, therefore, not pure
questions of law.
Moreover, that a motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC En Banc is required for the filing of a petition
for certiorari is clear from the provisions of Article IX(C),
Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution. Conformably to these
provisions of the Constitution, all election cases, including
pre-proclamation controversies, must be decided by the
COMELEC in Division. Should a party be dissatisfied with
the decision, he may file a motion for reconsideration
before the COMELEC En Banc. It is, therefore, the
decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC En Banc that is,
in accordance with Article IX(A), Section 7, may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.”
 Reyes also assails the decision of the trial court as
having been rendered without jurisdiction. He contends
that the election protest of Comia was filed more than 10
days after his (Reyes) proclamation. Reyes, however, is
estopped to raise this question now. He did not only
appeal from the decision of the trial court to the
COMELEC raising this question, but he also filed a petition
for mandamus and prohibition in the Court of Appeals.
Having decided on this course of action, he should not be
allowed to file the present petition just because he lost in
those cases.