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 Assessing and Applying
Petroleum Engineering Data
From the 2010 Macondo Blowout
J.A. (John) Turley
Marathon Oil Company—Retired

Society of Petroleum Engineers

Distinguished Lecturer Program
www.spe.org/dl
2
©JA Turley
 MACONDO—THE PLAN

• Drill an Exploration Well in the Gulf of Mexico

(Mississippi Canyon Block 252)
• Spud October 2009
• Depth: Approximately 20,000 ft (6,100 m)
• Water: Approximately 5,000 ft (1,525 m)
• Target: Geological structure (called Macondo)
• Target Depth: Below 17,000 ft (5,200 m)

3
©JA Turley
 9-7/8 liner near
17,000 ft
Drilled another 1000 ft
and discovered . . .
. . . A high-pressure
stringer that needed
heavy mud (14.2-ppg)
. . . A number of lost
circulation zones
. . . About 200 ft of pay
from 18,000 to 18,200 ft
. . . Total depth 18,360 ft
4
©JA Turley
 After evaluating
discovery:
Completed well with
single string of
9-7/8 x 7 in.
production casing
Float collar installed
near 18,155 ft
Used Class-H lead cement,
plus nitrified cement,
plus Class-H cement in
180-ft shoe track
Rat hole, 56 ft of mud
5
©JA Turley
 AFTER THE CASING AND CEMENT JOB,
TEMPORARY ABANDONMENT WOULD INCLUDE:

1 Prepare well for testing and

the rig for abandonment
2 Positive and negative pressure tests—
remediate as necessary
3 Install Lockdown Seal Ring
4 Set and test cement plug
5 Displace riser with seawater
6 Pull BOPs and Riser
7 Release Rig 6
©JA Turley
 AFTER THE CASING AND CEMENT JOB,
TEMPORARY ABANDONMENT WOULD INCLUDE:

1 Prepare well for testing and

the rig for abandonment
2 Positive and negative pressure tests—
remediate as necessary
3 Install Lockdown Seal Ring
4 Set and test cement plug
5 Displace riser with seawater

THE WELL BLEW OUT

7
©JA Turley
Float collar: (1) possible
mechanical damage, and
(2) pump rate of 4-bpm
fell short of 6-bpm
required for conversion
Shoe-track and
annular cement
likely compromised by
gravity segregation with
rat-hole mud
These early STATIC LEAK
problems were invisible
to personnel on the rig
8
©JA Turley
 April 20: Rig, Riser, and
BOP* are in place. Entire
well is full of necessary
heavy mud
April 21: Rig, Riser, and
BOP are gone. At least
5,000 ft of heavy mud
replaced by seawater
Negative Pressure Test
(NPT) is a simulation
designed to ensure heavy
mud from riser can be
replaced by seawater
* BOP = Blowout preventer 9
©JA Turley
Minimum acceptable
NPT is at 5,000 ft;
i.e., through 5,000-ft
kill line,
(shown in blue)
Alternative NPT
through drillpipe (DP)
at 8,367 ft. This NPT
(called NPT-1) was
elected for Macondo.
Note cement plug
10
©JA Turley
Pressure at Surface Negative-pressure test
DPP BOP
2,400 psi
(NPT-1) with seawater to
closed
8,367 ft developed
2,400-psi backpressure
Bleed
DPP to After closing BOP, bled
zero for trapped pressure to zero
30 minutes (to create 1,400-psi
0
Time underbalance)
BHP But pressures observed
Pressure at TD

13,500 psi
during bleed-off were
12,500-psi
declared anomalous, and
reservoir
NPT-1 was aborted.
1,400-psi Testing reverted to kill
underbalance line—called NPT-2
11
©JA Turley
Pressure at Surface NPT-2 with seawater in
BOP
kill line would have
closed
developed 1,450-psi
DPP
1,450 psi backpressure
Bleed kill
line to Bleeding the trapped
zero for pressure to zero would
30 minutes have created 450-psi
0
Time underbalance
BHP
When the kill-line
Pressure at TD

13,500 psi
12,500-psi pressure for NPT-2 was
reservoir bled to zero for
450-psi 30 minutes, the well
underbalance was declared secure.
12
©JA Turley
 BP Internal Investigation
8 September 2010—Page 88
Mudlogging
chart shows
pressure data
NPT-1
from NPT-1
NPT-2 (green), which
was aborted,
and from NPT-2
(blue), which
showed well to
be secure
13
©JA Turley
 1 Inflow data (leak
NPT-1 plus dynamic flow)
4
2 Pressure build-
3
up curve (well
2 flowing into closed
wellbore)
1
3 Pressure spikes
(casing hanger
lifting in csg head )
4 SIDPP* 1,400 psi
(measure of
underbalance)
*SIDPP: Shut-in 14
Drillpipe Pressure ©JA Turley
London SPE 24/11/15
 5 Missing 450-psi
kill-line kick
NPT-2
6 Injectivity profile,
5
7
pumping seawater
down wellbore (at
6 ~450 psi), through
LCM, into formation
7 Shut-in kill line
for 30 minutes at
zero-psi, as measure
of wellbore security

15
©JA Turley
London SPE 24/11/15
 While overbalanced, as
head of mud in riser
decreases, the pumping
DPP* decreases
While underbalanced,
flowing O&G* pushes mud
up wellbore into drillpipe
annulus, which causes
pumping DPP to increase
During sheen test, with
pumps off, well continued
to flow, evidenced by
continually rising DPP
* DPP = drillpipe pressure 16
* O&G = oil and gas ©JA Turley
Flow filled 750-bbl* casing
plus portion of 1,500 bbl in
riser before O&G reached
bubble-point depth
With gas below bubble
point, rapid expansion
blew O&G through rig floor
& over the derrick.
Closed two BOPs (red), but
drillpipe compromised by
extreme flow rate and
falling blocks, which
allowed flow to continue
* bbl = barrels = 0.16m3 17
©JA Turley
 Tool joints and DP were
uplifted into closed BOPs.
Excess DP trapped between
closed BOPs was buckled,
which prevented closure of
the blind shear rams
In minutes:
•Explosions and fire
•11 deaths
•115 survivors evac’d rig
•Rig sank 1-1/2 days later
•Well flowed for 86 days
•Spilled almost 5MM bbls
of oil into Gulf of Mexico
18
©JA Turley
Factors evidenced by data that
CONTRIBUTED
to the Cause of the Blowout

• Rat Hole
• Float Collar
• Back-flowing well
• Unseen forensic data
• LCM in the BOP
• Simultaneous operations

19
©JA Turley
 Factors evidenced by data that
CAUSED
the Blowout

• Viable NPT results that confirmed a leak and the

well’s flow potential when underbalanced
• The lack of a primary cement-plug barrier
before seawater displacement
• Viable pump-pressure data that confirmed the
well flowed for an hour prior to the blowout
• Massive, unchecked well flow that ultimately
debilitated proper functioning of the BOPs
20
©JA Turley
 CONCLUSIONS:
• Macondo Blowout Evidence is defined by
basic petroleum-engineering concepts,
training, and responsibilities.
• Skilled application of such concepts,
would have made a difference on Macondo.
• Also helpful would have been industry
initiatives like: Drilling Process Safety, Human
Factors, Safety & Environmental Management
Systems, Real-time Data, etc.
• But . . .

21
©JA Turley
 CONCLUSIONS:
• Macondo Blowout Evidence is defined by
basic petroleum-engineering concepts,
training, and responsibilities.
• Skilled application of such concepts,
would have made a difference on Macondo.
• Also helpful would have been industry
initiatives like: Drilling Process Safety, Human
Factors, Safety & Environmental Management
Systems, Real-time Data, etc.
• But . . . How do we APPLY Macondo lessons to
future wells?
22
©JA Turley
 A well, from mob to demob,
from rig-up to rig-down,
is a sequence of processes . . .
with steps to be executed
as per the Plan

but when something

INTERRUPTS any PROCESS,
whatever’s broken needs to be fixed

23
©JA Turley
 Process Interruption Goal
 Process
• Running casing
• Testing BOPs
• Installing a wellhead
• Drilling to next casing point
• Testing Casing
 Interruption
• Any unplanned/unexpected result
 Goal
• Figure out what’s wrong & Fix it
24
©JA Turley
Process Interruption Example—

Drilling Ahead

Alarm Screams

Stop Drilling

Well Control

25
©JA Turley
Process Interruption Example—
Critical Data
Drilling Ahead About what
Interrupted
Alarm Screams the Process
of Drilling
Stop Drilling
Washout? Well Control? Bit failure?

Pack-off? Lost Circulation?

Other?

Remediate the Problem 26

©JA Turley
 If any process related to the well
is interrupted

The
PROCESS INTERRUPTION PROTOCOL
must be . . .

Stop the Process

Resolve the Interruptive Data
Remediate the Problem
27
©JA Turley
 Process Interruption Protocol—
Negative Pressure Test
 Process
• Run drillpipe
• Fill with seawater, close BOPs
• Bleed trapped pressure to zero, hold 30 min
 Interruption
• Pressure wouldn’t bleed, and made 15 bbl
 Protocol
• Stop the Process, Resolve Interruptive Data
(at the Yellow #1), Remediate the problem
28
©JA Turley
 1 Inflow data (leak
NPT-1 plus dynamic flow)
4
2 Pressure build-
3
up curve (well
2 flowing into closed
wellbore)
1
3 Pressure spikes
(wellhead lifting in
casing head )
4 SIDPP* 1,400 psi
(measure of
underbalance)
*SIDPP: Shut-in 29
Drillpipe Pressure
 Macondo—A Lesson Learned:
PROCESS INTERRUPTION PROTOCOL—
STOP the Process
RESOLVE the Interruptive Data
REMEDIATE the Problem

Applicability:
Wells worldwide, any process, deep or shallow,
onshore or offshore, design through abandonment
Goal
To minimize the chance of ever
losing control of another well. 30
©JA Turley
 The end

Fix the Problem

Not the Blame

31
©JA Turley
London SPE 24/11/15
 Q&A
Assessing and Applying
Petroleum Engineering Data
From the 2010 Macondo Blowout
By: J. A. (John) Turley

Only if we understand and care about the CAUSE of the 2010 Macondo blowout,
will we know why it should not have happened and why it should never happen again.

Website: JohnTurleyWriter.com
Technical paper —SPE-167970-MS
Book: THE SIMPLE TRUTH: BP’s Macondo Blowout

32
©JA Turley
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©JA Turley