• Purpose of administrative law: the

protection of private rights. Its subject

matter is the nature & mode of
exercise of admin. power and the
system of relief vs. administrative
action.
• Function of administrative law: to
make the government machinery
work well & in an orderly manner.
• Origin of administrative law.
• Types of administrative bodies: (BQ)
~those offering some gratuity or privilege
~those seeking to carry on certain business
of government
~those performing business service for the
public
~those seeking to regulate business
affected w/public interest
~those seeking under police power to
regulate private business & individuals.
~to adjust individual controversies xxx
• Republic of the Philippines (or GRP)
refers to the corporate governmental entity
thru w/c the functions of government are
exercised throughout the PH, including the
various arms… while National
Government refers to the entire
machinery of the central government,
composed of the executive, legislative &
judicial departments as distinguished from
the different forms of local governments.
• Is Central Bank part of National
Government? (CB vs. Ablaza, 63 SCRA
431). Central Bank is a government
instrumentality created as an autonomous
body under RA 265 to administer the
monetary and banking system.
• Is the National Coconut Co. within the
term GRP? (Bacani vs. NACOCO, 100
Phil 468).
• Are GOCCs embraced in the term GRP?
 Instrumentality as defined in EO 292
• any agency of the National Gov't not integrated
w/in the department framework, vested with
special functions or jurisdiction by law & enjoying
operational autonomy, usually thru a charter.
• Status of the Manila International Airport
Authority: not a GOCC but an instrumentality of
the National Gov't vested with corporate powers
to perform efficiently its governmental functions.
When the law vests in the instrumentality
corporate powers, it does not become a
corporation but remains an instrumentality
exercising both corporate and governmental
powers (MIAA vs. CA, 495 SCRA 592).
• Following Sec. 2 of EO 292, the National
Power Corporation is an instrumentality of
govt; VM Rambuyong cannot appear as
counsel before any court in civil case vs.
LGU or instrumentality [NPC] Sec. 90 LGC
(Rep vs. Rambuyong, 632 SCRA 66).
• NPC is government instrumentality tasked
to undertake development of hydroelectric
generation of power & production of
electricity from other sources xxx to
improve quality of life of people pursuant
to the State policy in Art. ll Sec. 9 Const.
(Maceda vs. Macaraig, 197 SCRA 771).
• Status of Iron and Steel Authority - It was
created under PD 272 for a term of 5
years but extended for another 10 years
under EO 555 xxx; a non-incorporated
agency or instrumentality of the GRP.
When its statutory term expires, the
powers, duties & functions as well as
assets & liabilities of that agency revert
back to and are reassumed by the GRP
(ISA vs. CA, 249 SCRA 539).
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
• courts cannot & will not determine a
controversy involving a question w/in the
jurisdiction of an admin tribunal, especially
where the question demands the exercise
of sound admin discretion requiring
special knowledge…
• it applies whenever enforcement of a claim
requires resolution of an issue within the
special competence of administrative body
• 2 reasons for the doctrine
• The objective of the doctrine is to guide
the court in determining whether it should
refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until
an administrative agency has determined
some question or some aspect of some
question arising in the proceeding before
the court.
• DENR is responsible for enforcement of
forestry laws; forest products in custodia
legis cannot be subject of replevin before
the court vs. DENR. Respondent’s taking
cognizance of replevin suit constitutes
ignorance of law (Sagip Kalikasan vs.
Paderanga, 06/19/08). The enforcement of
forestry law & protection & management of
forest lands are w/in DENR’s jurisdiction.
• Authority of Bureau of Immigration to
decide deportation case & in the process
determine citizenship issue raised by the
deportee. Judicial intervention is enjoined
(Go, Sr. vs. Ramos, 598 SCRA 268).
• What is the exception to the primary
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Immigration
over deportation cases and where judicial
intervention is allowed?
*when the court itself believes that there is
substantial evidence supporting the
deportee’s claim of citizenship; or when
the evidence submitted by the deportee is
conclusive of his citizenship.
• Note: Citizenship proceedings are sui
generis, in that, unlike other cases, res
judicata does not generally obtain.
• The doctrine applies only whenever it
is the court and the administrative
agency which have concurrent
jurisdiction. The doctrine is
inapplicable where there is
concurrence of jurisdiction between
two disciplining authorities over a
case (ex. the CSC & the OMB), the
regular courts not being involved.
 Commission on the Settlement of Land
Problems (COSLAP) [EO 561]
• Authority of COSLAP to resolve land
disputes is limited only to those involving
public lands or those covered by specific
license from the government, i.e. pasture
lease agreements, timber concessions or
reservation grants.
• No jurisdiction over Gatdula’s complaint
vs. Machado for right of way, the property
being private. Lack of jurisdiction cannot
be cured by parties’ participation
(Machado v Gatdula & COSLAP, 2/16/10)
• Rule on primary jurisdiction applies only
where admin agency exercises quasi-
judicial or adjudicatory functions. Here,
RTC has jurisdiction over Sanchez’
complaint for damages vs. UST. He did
not violate rule vs. forum shopping when
he sought recourse with both CHED and
RTC. Sec. 8 of RA 7722 (Higher
Education Act of 1994) does not contain
any express grant to CHED of quasi-
judicial power (UST vs. Sanchez, 626
SCRA 127).
 HLURB (PD 957/PD 1344)
• Claims/cases over which the HLURB has
exclusive jurisdiction (Sec.1, PD 1344).
• specific performance w/damages for delivery of
title (CT Torres vs. Hibionada, 191 SCRA 268)
• reimbursement of expenses incurred by
homeowners in repairing their defective housing
units constructed by the developer (HLC Const.
vs. Emily Homes Homeowners, 411 SCRA 504)
• HLURB has authority to impose administrative
fines under Sec.38 PD 1344 but not criminal
penalties (Chua vs. Ang, 598 SCRA 321).
• HLURB is competent to award damages.
 HLURB
• Action to declare void a mortgage of lot
done in violation of PD 957 and annul a
foreclosure sale (Home Bankers vs. CA,
547 SCRA 167)
• Mere allegation of relationship between
subd. owner and lot buyer does not vest
automatic jurisdiction in HLURB. Decisive
element is the nature of the action as
enumerated in Sec. 1, PD 1344. [Transfer
of townhouse to 3rd party in violation of
contract to sell, not w/HLURB] (Cadimas
vs. Carrion, 567 SCRA 103)
• HLURB & not SEC has jurisdiction over
complaint vs. respondent under
receivership for specific performance re:
basic homeowners’ needs (Arranza vs. BF
Homes, 333 SCRA 800).
• There is no forum shopping where HL
Carlos (contractor) sues before HLURB to
enforce Contract to Purchase & files
another suit in court to collect money re:
unpaid billings from Construction Contract
(Marina Properties Corp. vs. CA, 294
SCRA 273).
Securities Regulation Code (RA 8799)
• RA 8799 amended PD 902-A and
transferred jurisdiction of SEC over intra-
corporate or partnership cases to the
courts.
• A criminal charge for violation of the code
is a specialized dispute that should first be
looked into by the SEC under doctrine of
primary jurisdiction and if it finds probable
cause, it should refer to the DOJ for PI
(SEC vs. Interport Resources Corp., 567
SCRA 365). SEC investigation interrupts
prescriptive period.
 Toll Regulatory Board (PD 1112)
• Remedy of the interested expressway user
who finds the toll rate adjustments to be
onerous, oppressive and exorbitant is to
file a petition for review of the adjusted toll
rates with TRB. The issue involves
question of facts xxx. TRB decision is
appealable w/in 10 days to the Office of
President.
(Padua vs. Ranada, 390 SCRA 664)
• PD 1112 in re to PD 1894 have invested TRB
w/sufficient power to grant a qualified person or
entity w/ authority to construct, maintain &
operate a toll facility & to issue the
corresponding toll operating permit or Toll
Operation Certificate (TOC).
• A special franchise directly emanating from
Congress is not necessary if the law already
specifically authorizes an admin body (like TRB,
LTFRB, NTC & PPA) to grant a franchise or to
award a contract. By law, TRB was given the
power to grant administrative franchise for toll
facility projects as well as impose and alter the
conditions in an appropriate contract (Francisco
vs. TRB, 10/19/10)
• After May 1, 2007 (expiration date of
franchise of PNCC over the NSLE), the
operation & maintenance of NLEX & other
subject tollways will no longer be founded
on PD 1113 or portions of PD 1894
(PNCC’s original franchise) but on a new
authorization, i.e. a TOC granted by TRB
under Sec. 3(a)&(e) of PD 1112.
• TRB cannot extend the administrative
franchise or authority that it granted for an
accumulated period exceeding 50 yrs. as
this is prohibited under Art. Xll, Sec. 11 of
‘87 Constitution.
• Distinction bet. fixing of initial toll rates and
fixing of periodic/interim or subsequent toll
rates: The hearing required under PD
1894 refers to notice & hearing for the
approval or denial of petitions for toll rate
adjustments – or the subsequent toll rates,
not to the fixing of initial toll rates w/c is
w/o necessity of hearing unless a
challenge on the initial toll rates fixed
ensues that public hearings are required
(Francisco vs. TRB, 633 SCRA 470).
 Quasi-Judicial Power
• express empowerment by law; merely
incidental and in aid of main function
• the action or discretion to investigate facts
and draw conclusions from them as basis
for their official action & to exercise
discretion of a judicial nature.
• involves: a) taking and evaluating
evidence; b) determining facts based upon
the evidence presented; and c) rendering
an order or decision supported by the facts
proved.
 Cases
• PCGG is a co-equal body of RTC. RTC
cannot restrain the PCGG (PCGG vs.
Judge Pena, 02/07/89).
• The action of the POEA to grant, deny,
suspend, or revoke a license of any
private placement agency is quasi-judicial.
POEA, on its own initiative, may conduct
the necessary proceeding for suspension
or cancellation of license of any private
placement agency on any of grounds
mentioned therein (Sanado vs. CA, 356
SCRA 546).
• Power of NTC to issue CPCN for
installation, operation & maintenance of
communication facilities & services and
determine the area of operation of
applicants for telecommunication services
(Eastern Telecom vs. Int’l Communication
Corp., 435 SCRA 55). The grant by NTC
to ICC to operate in areas covered by
petitioner is not a grave abuse of
discretion. NTC took into account ICC’s
technical & financial capabilities and policy
of healthy competition.
• A PI is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, and
DOJ is not a quasi-judicial agency when it
reviews findings of the prosecutor re
presence of probable cause (Balangauan
vs. CA, 562 CRA 186).
• A PI is not a quasi-judicial proceeding
since the prosecutor does not determine
guilt or innocence of accused. PI is merely
inquisitorial. Prosecutor cannot be said to
be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the
court that ultimately passes judgment on
the accused. A PI partakes of an
investigative or inquisitorial power for sole
aim of obtaining information on what future
action of judicial nature may be taken
(Bondoc vs. Tan Tiong Bio, 10/06/10).
• UP Board is empowered to withdraw
conferment of degree founded on fraud
(UP Board of Regents vs. CA, 313 SCRA
404).
• Constitution grants CHR the power to
investigate all forms of human rights
violations involving civil & political rights,
but it does not include power to adjudicate.
Fact-finding is not adjudication (Carino vs.
CHR, 204 SCRA 483; 2001 BQ).
• No quasi-judicial powers have been
vested in the Phil. Truth Commission
(PTC). It cannot adjudicate rights of
persons who come before it. Quasi-judicial
powers involve the power to hear and
determine questions of facts to w/c the
legislative policy is to apply and to decide
in accordance with the standards set by
law in administering the same law
(Biraogo vs. PTC, 637 SCRA 78).
• While the term ‘adjudicatory’ appears, the
IAD-ODESLA cannot try & resolve cases,
its authority being limited to the conduct of
investigations, preparation of reports &
submission of recommendations. The IAD-
ODESLA is fact-finding & recommendatory
body to the President, not having power to
settle controversies & adjudicate cases
(Pichay vs. Ochoa, 7/24/12). His authority
to issue EO 13 (abolishing PAGC under
EO 12 by GMA) & set IAD-ODESLA as his
fact-finding investigator is based on power
of control to ensure enforcement of laws.
• Comelec did not exercise its quasi-judicial
functions, nor violated petitioner’s right to due
process, when it motu proprio issued Res.
9613 cancelling his CoC as it did not assume
jurisdiction over any pending petition or
resolve any election case b4 it. It merely
performed its legal duty to cancel CoC of one
suffering from accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification to run xxx by virtue of final
judgment, even w/o a petition under OEC or
under Sec. 40 of LGC. This is an exercise of
its administrative power. Comelec is duty
bound to enforce/administer laws re conduct
of election (Jalosjos Jr v. Comelec, 10/9/12).
Distinction bet. administrative power
& quasi-judicial power
• Administrative power is concerned with the
work of applying policies/enforcing orders
as determined by proper gov’tal organs
(Ople vs. Torres, 293 SCRA 150; Cipriano
vs. Comelec, 08/10/2004). It doesn’t entail
an opportunity to be heard, weighing of
evidence, & decision thereon. Quasi-
judicial function applies to the action,
discretion etc. of admin officers/ bodies
who are required to investigate facts xxx
(Romeo Jalosjos vs Comelec, 6/18/2013).
 Forum Shopping
• It exists when, as a result of an adverse
opinion in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable opinion (other than by appeal or
certiorari) in another, or when he institutes
two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause, on the
gamble that one or the other court would
make a favorable disposition.
 Rule vs. Forum Shopping
• applies to quasi-judicial proceedings.
• test of violation: a) where the elements of litis
pendenti are present; or b)where final judgment
in one case will amount to res judicata in the
other.
• requirement to file certificate of non-forum
shopping, although not jurisdictional, is
mandatory; if not complied, summary dismissal
is warranted.
• certification signed by counsel alone is defective,
unless clothed with special authority.
 Cases

• Appellate court finds merit or

compelling reason for non-
compliance with the rule
(Ombudsman vs. Valera, 471 SCRA
719).
• OMB decision dismissing criminal
case vs. DPWH RD Montemayor
does not operate as res judicata in
PAGC admin case vs. him for ill-
gotten wealth (Montemayor vs.
Bundalian, 405 SCRA 264).
 Cases
• General rule: certificate must be signed by all
plaintiffs in a case; exception: they have
common interest or filed the case as a
collective, raising only one common cause of
action or defense (HLC vs. Emily Homes
Homeowners Assn., 411 SCRA 504)
• Rule is not applicable to agency not
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function
(Cabarrus vs. Bernas, 279 SCRA 388) or the
cases do not raise identical causes of action
(Velasquez vs. Hernandez, 437 SCRA 358)
• No forum shopping since CHED is w/o quasi-
judicial power and cannot make any
disposition of the case (UST vs. Sanchez,
626 SCRA 127)
• In administrative cases involving the
concurrent jurisdiction of two or more
disciplining authorities, the body in which the
complaint is filed first, and which takes
cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction
to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising
concurrent jurisdiction. When complainants
first filed the complaint in OMB, jurisdiction
was already vested on the OMB & could no
longer be transferred to the SB by virtue of a
subsequent complaint by the same
complainants (Ombudsman vs. Rodriguez,
625 SCRA 299)
 Quasi-Legislative Power
• A relaxation of principle of separation…
• Requirements for validity of rules
• If issued in excess of rule making
authority, no binding effect upon the
courts; treated as mere administrative
interpretations of the law.
• Mere absence of implementing rules
cannot effectively invalidate provisions of
law, where a reasonable construction may
be given.
• Statute authorizing Pres. to suspend
operation of law upon happening of act…
 3 categories of rules that may be
promulgated by admin bodies
• Those intended to supply details of
legislation
• Those intended to interpret or construe the
particular law being enforced.
• Those intended to determine some fact or
state of things upon which the
enforcement of the act shall depend
ex. emergency powers that may be
granted to Chief Executive.
• Requisites for validity of administrative
rules and regulations
1. Must be germane to the objects &
purposes of the law
2. Conform to the standards that the law
prescribes
3. Must be reasonable
4. Must be related solely to carrying into
effects the general provisions of the law.
 Cases
• Rev. Memo Circular 7-85 (change of prescriptive
period on claims of excess quarterly income tax
payments) inconsistent with the NIRC; no vested
rights arising from wrong construction of law
(Philbank vs. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 302 SCRA 241).
• AO 308 providing for adoption of a national
computerized identification reference system is
unconstitutional. Its establishment requires a
delicate adjustment of various contending state
policies, the primacy of national security etc. It
deals w/a subject that should be covered by law
(Ople vs. Torres, 293 SCRA 141).
• LBC of DBM setting a maximum limit to
additional allowances to be given by LGU to
national government officials is invalid bec. it
goes beyond the law. Sec. 458 of LGC allows
the grant “when the finances of the LGU
allow.” It doesn’t authorize setting a definite
maximum limit to additional allowances
(Dadole vs. COA, 393 SCRA 272).
• The rules promulgated by the SC for payment
of legal fees cannot be modified by a law
granting exemption from legal fees (In Re
Exemption from Payment of Court & Sheriff’s
Fees of Duly Registered Cooperatives, 668
SCRA 1).
• PRC resolution prohibiting attendance in
accountancy review classes is not valid. It
violates examinees’ right to liberty & the
academic freedom of schools (Lupangco
vs. CA, 160 SCRA 848).
• MECS Order phasing out Spanish is valid
(Confederacion National vs. Quisumbing,
26 January 1988).
• Board of Examiners for Nursing regulation
for period inspection is valid (Sand vs.
Abad Santos Educational Inst., 18 July
1980).
• Prior to RMC 37-93, Hope, Champion &
More cigarettes of the Fortune Tobacco
were local brands; but w/its issuance, they
were categorized as foreign brands, thus
subjecting them to increased ad valorem
tax of 55%. In so doing, the BIR not simply
interpreted the law but legislated under its
quasi-legislative authority disregarding
legal requirements. The due observance
of requirements of notice, of hearing and
of publication should not have been
ignored (BIR Commissioner vs. CA, 261
SCRA 236).
• Revenue issuance empowering the BIR
Commissioner to update classification of
cigarette brands every 2 years is not
valid. Nowhere in NIRC is such authority
granted to BIR (British American Tobacco
vs. Camacho, 562 SCRA 519).
• HDMF BOT (1995) Amendments to IRR
providing both provident/retirement and
housing benefits is not valid as it amended
RA 7742 (Romulo & Mabanta vs. HDMF,
333 SCRA 777).
• Creation of new AFP Anti-Graft Board thru
PCGG issuance is not in accord with EO 1
(Republic vs. Migrino, 189 SCRA 300).
• Rule-making power of admin body is a
delegated legislative power w/c it may not
use either to abridge the authority given it
by Congress or the Constitution or to
enlarge its power beyond the scope
intended. The SSS, in promulgating Res.
56 w/c provides a supplementary pension/
retirement plan in violation of the Teves
Retirement Law (Sec. 28 of CA 186 as
amended by RA 4968), cannot in guise of
rule-making, legislate or amend laws or
render them nugatory. Res. 56 is void & of
no effect (Conte vs. COA, 264 SCRA 20).
• Note: The Teves Retirement Law (RA
4968) bars the creation of any insurance
or retirement plan – other than the GSIS –
for government employees to prevent the
undue and inequitous proliferation of such
plans.
• While GSIS has authority to create a financial
scheme, it is limited only to those availing of
early retirement due to reorganization in
GSIS but are not yet qualified for either
optional or compulsory retirement. The
Retirement Financial Plan (RFP) adopted by
GSIS Board is void as it is not an early
retirement scheme but is a form of reward for
an employee’s loyalty and lengthy service in
order to help him enjoy the remaining years
of his life. The RFP is a supplementary
retirement plan prohibited by the Teves
Retirement Law (GSIS vs. COA, 10/19/2011).
• The COA issued circulars lifting pre-audit
of transactions of national government,
GOCCs and LGUs. Petitioner argued that
under Sec. 2, Art lX-D of Const. [xxx may
adopt such measures, including temporary
or special pre-audit, as are necessary],
pre-audit could not be lifted.
Held: There is nothing in proviso that
requires COA to conduct pre-audit of
all government transactions and for all
government agencies (De la Llana vs.
Chairperson, COA, 665 SCRA 176).
• Mere absence of implementing rules
cannot invalidate law. That Full Disclosure
Rules was promulgated by SEC only on
07/24/96 while Revised Securities Act was
approved on 02/23/82 does not render
ineffective the law where it contains
sufficient standards and an unmistakable
intent and where a reasonable
construction may be given (SEC vs.
Interport Corp., 567 SCRA 354).
• 2 kinds of administrative issuances :
subordinate legislative power
(legislative rule) and interpretative
regulation (interpretative rule): The first
one is designed to implement law by
providing its details. It must be published.
Whereas, an interpretative regulation is
designed to provide guidelines to the law,
w/c the admin agency is in charge of
enforcing. It need not be published.
(Commission of Internal Revenue vs.
Lhuiller Pawnshop, 406 SCRA 178).
• EO 420 directing all gov’t agencies to adopt
unified multi-purpose ID system does not
usurp legislative power. 2 ways to achieve
unified ID system, intended to reduce cost &
ensure greater convenience. 1) Heads of
gov’t entities can enter into MOA to adopt a
uniform ID format to make systems uniform.
This is purely admin matter. Uniform format
results in substantial savings, greater
efficiency, & optimum compatibility; and 2)
President, pursuant to her power of control,
can direct thru exec./admin order the gov’t
entities under Exec. Dept to adopt uniform ID
format. This power is self-executing (KMU vs.
Dir. General, 487 SCRA 623).
• Following the leakage in 2006 nursing exam,
Pres. GMA replaced the members of Board
of Nursing and issued EO 566 w/c
authorized the CHED to supervise the
operation of all review centers. Said EO is
invalid and a usurpation of legislative
function. The mandate of CHED under RA
7722 extends only to public/private
institutions of higher learning & degree-
granting programs in post-secondary
educational institutions, but not over review
centers. A review center is not an institution
of higher learning (Review Center vs. Exec.
Sec., 583 SCRA 428).
 Fiscal Autonomy
• entails freedom from outside control and
limitations, other than those provided by law; full
flexibility to allocate & utilize resources with
wisdom & dispatch; recognizes the power to
levy, assess and collect fees, fix compensation
rates not exceeding the highest rates authorized
by law and allocate and disburse such sums as
may be provided by law or prescribe by them in
the discharge of their functions; formulate and
implement their organizational structure and
compensation of their personnel.
• It is a constitutional grant, not a tag obtainable
by membership.
• While the agencies enjoying fiscal
autonomy are authorized to formulate and
implement the organizational structure of
their respective offices and determine the
compensation of their personnel, such
authority is not absolute and must be
exercised within the parameters of the
Unified Position Classification and
Compensation System (UPCCS) under
RA 6758.
• While members of the CFAG are authorized
to formulate & implement organizational
structure of their respective offices &
determine the compensation of their
personnel, such authority is not absolute &
must be exercised w/in the parameters of the
Unified Position Classification&Compensation
System under RA 6758 administered by the
DBM. Thus, CHR cannot lawfully implement
an upgrading & reclassification of positions
w/o DBM imprimatur. The upgrading/creation
of FMO and PAO in CHR was not authorized
by any law. The 1998 GA Act did not give
authority (CHREA vs. CHR, 444 SCRA 300).
• CHR has a certain degree of fiscal
autonomy thru the privilege of having its
approved annual appropriations released
automatically and regularly, but not fiscal
autonomy in its extensive sense like using
their appropriations to effect changes in
their organizational structure & their
savings for certain official purposes
(CHREA vs. CHR, 496 SCRA 227).
• Funds for agencies enjoying fiscal
autonomy should be automatically &
regularly released, and not conditioned on
the “no report, no release” DBM policy.
The withholding of P5.8M (of P285.6M) for
FY 2002 by the DBM, allegedly due to
revenue shortfall, is unconstitutional (CSC
vs. DBM, 22 July 2005). Even granting
there is revenue shortfall, these agencies
should be given priority. The exception is
where “total revenue collections are so low
that they are not sufficient to cover the
total appropriations for all entities vested
with fiscal autonomy.”
 Concept of Independence of
Constitutional Bodies
• The independence enjoyed by OMB and
the Const’l Commissions shares certain
characteristics – they do not owe their
existence to any act of Congress, but are
created by the Constitution itself; they also
all enjoy fiscal autonomy. These bodies
are intended by framers to be insulated
from political pressure and independent
from executive control or supervision or
any form of political influence (Gonzales v.
OP; Sulit v. Ochoa, 01/28/2014).
• Re: the SC resolution creating positions of Chief
Judicial Staff Officer (SG 25) & Supervising
Judicial Staff Officer (SG 23), the DBM has no
authority to downgrade such SC positions/salary
grades. The DBM authority extends only to
“calling the attention of the SC” on its
perceived erroneous application of budgetary
laws & rules. The SC may then amend or modify
its resolution as its discretion may dictate under
the law. Here, DBM encroached on SC’s fiscal
autonomy and supervision of court personnel,
hence, unconstitutional (Re: Clarifying &
Strengthening the Organizational Structure &
Administrative Set-up of the Philippine Judicial
Academy, 481 SCRA 1).
• Sec. 39 of GSIS law (RA 8291), exempting
it from “all taxes, assessments, fees,
charges or duties of all kinds,” cannot
operate to exempt GSIS from payment of
legal fees. SC under ‘87 Const. has sole
authority to promulgate rules re pleading,
practice & procedure in all courts. Any
exemption from payment of legal fees
granted by Congress to GOCCs & LGUs
will necessarily reduce the JDF and SAJF,
thus impairing the SC’s guaranteed fiscal
autonomy & erodes its independence
(GSIS vs. Heirs of Caballero, 10/04/10).
• COA found that there was underpayment when
retired SC Justices purchased from SC the cars
assigned to them during incumbency because in
computing appraised value of the cars, Property
Div. of SC used CFAG Joint Reso 35 dtd April
1997 in accord w/SC Reso rather than the
formula in COA Memo 98-569-A of Aug. 5,1998.
Held: Under guarantees of fiscal autonomy &
independence, SC decide the terms, conditions &
restrictions of the grant of privileges/benefits to
court officials/personnel. Use of formula in CFAF
Joint Reso is part of SC exercise of discretionary
authority to determine the manner the retirement
privileges/benefits can be availed of (In re COA
Computation xxx, 676 SCRA 579).
Which of the following violates the judiciary’s
fiscal autonomy?
a) An item in 2011 General Appropriations Act
allowing P13.5B to the judiciary, the same as last
year’s allocation but 50% less than the SC
proposal;
b) A letter of the DBM Secretary to the Chief of the
Budget Office of the SC requesting for data on the
Judicial Development Fund from 2005 up to the
present;
c) The President veto of an item in 2011 GAA
allocating P900M as a supplemental fund for
retired members of the judiciary;
d) A COA circular requiring all government offices to
submit post-procurement report at the end of each
fiscal year.
 Power to issue subpoena
• Admin agencies have no inherent power to
require attendance of witnesses, but they
may be given by law the power to issue
subpoena xxx
• Sec. 13 & 37, Ch. 3, Bk. Vll, EO 292:
admin bodies are now authorized to
require attendance of witnesses, or
production of records xxx. Authority to take
testimony or receive evidence includes the
power to administer oath, summon
witnesses and issue subpoenas.
• administrative subpoena distinguished
from judicial subpoena
• A subpoena may be enforced if the inquiry
is within the authority of the agency, the
demand is not too indefinite and the
information is reasonably relevant
(Evangelista vs. Jarencio, 68 SCRA 99).
 Power to punish contempt
• It should be clearly defined and granted by
law and its penalty determined.
• EO 292 states that unless otherwise
provided by law, the agency may, in case
of disobedience, invoke the aid of RTC to
punish contumacy or refusal as contempt.
• It is limited to making effective the power
to elicit testimony and it cannot be
exercised in furtherance of administrative
functions; this limitation derives from its
nature being inherently judicial & the need
to preserve order in judicial proceedings.
• RA 6770 gives the Office of the
Ombudsman the power to punish for
contempt in accordance w/ Rules of Court.
Petitioners’ argument that they cannot be
held liable for contempt because their
refusal arose out of an administrative –
rather than judicial – proceeding before
the OMB is w/o merit. Whether petitioners’
refusal to follow the OMB orders
constitutes defiance is for respondent to
determine after appropriate hearing
(Lastimosa vs. Vasquez, 06 April 1995).
• If a person refuses to respond to the OMB
or his Deputy’s subpoena, or refuses to be
examined, or engages in obstructive
conduct, the OMB or his deputy shall issue
an order directing the person to appear
before him to show cause why he should
not be punished for contempt. The
contempt proceedings shall be conducted
pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of
Court (Sec. 32(3), RA 6770).
• Delay or refusal to comply w/OMB referral
or directive is ground for admin disciplinary
action xxx(Sec. 26(4), RA 6770).
 Implementing Rules or
Interpretative Policies
• Admin bodies have authority to interpret at
first instance the laws they are to execute.
• Interpretations are not binding upon courts
but have force/ effect of law and entitled to
great respect.
• general policy is to sustain the decision of
administrative bodies on basis of
separation of powers and their presumed
knowledgeability and expertise.
• abrogation of previous acts or rulings of
predecessor in office.
• Requisites for validity of admin rules and
regulations (Tanada vs. Tuvera, 146
SCRA 446)
-must be issued under authority of laws
-must be within the scope & purview of
the law
-must be reasonable
-must be published
• Art. 2, CC as repealed by EO 200
• What need to be published?
*When the issuances are of general
applicability, publication is necessary as
a requirement of due process.
• The SEC violated due process when it denied
the public prior knowledge of SEC 1990
Circular removing the filing fee ceilings
provided for in SEC 1986 Circular. The 1990
SEC Circular was not yet effective during the
time PICOP filed its request in 2002 to extend
its corporate existence as the SEC filed said
Circular w/ UP Law Center only in 2004. The
OP and the CA were correct in declaring that
the applicable filing fee payable by PICOP is
P100T as computed under the 1986 Circular,
instead of P12M SEC assessment under the
1990 Circular (SEC vs. PICOP, 566 SCRA
453) .
 Cases
• EO 79 providing for compulsory membership in
GSIS of qualified reserve AFP officers like Gen.
Asuncion is effective 15 days after its
publication in OG on 12/22/86 (GSIS vs. COA,
301 SCRA 736).
• DBM Circular disallowing payment of
allowances is of no force & effect due to
absence of publication in OG or newspaper
xxx. That it was reissued & submitted for
publication in OG does not cure the defect and
retroact to the time of disallowance in audit.
Publication is a condition precedent to
effectivity of a law (Phil. International Trading
vs. COA, 309 SCRA 177).
• POEA Circular not filed with the National
Administrative Register cannot be used as
basis for imposition of administrative
sanctions and is ineffective and may not
be enforced; a requisite under Secs. 3 & 4,
Bk Vll, EO 292 (Philsa International
Placement Corp. vs. Labor Secretary, 356
SCRA 174). That it is addressed to
specific group, i.e. private employment
agencies, does not exclude it from
publication requirement.
• Rules imposing a penalty as authorized by
the law itself must be filed & registered w/
UP Law Center (Secs. 3 & 4, Bk. Vll, EO
292).
• OMB-DOJ Joint Circular 95-01 is merely
internal bet. the DOJ & the OMB, outlining the
authority & responsibilities among prosecutors in
conduct of PI. Said circular does not regulate the
conduct of persons or the public in general, nor
does it contain any penal provision or prescribe
a mandatory act. Hence, it need not be
published (Honasan vs. DOJ Panel, 4/13/04).
Note: superseded by OMB-DOJ MOA dated
3/29/12
• What need not be published?
*Interpretative regulations and those merely
internal in nature, i.e regulating only the
personnel of the agency and not the public.
*LOIs issued by administrative superiors
concerning rules to be followed by subordinates
• The 1978 NTC Rules ought to apply in the
grant of provisional authority to BayanTel
despite filing of 1993 Revised Rules with
UP Law Center. The 1993 NTC RR should
have been published in OG or newspaper
of general circulation before it can take
effect. Filing of the 1993 NTC RR w/ U.P.
Law Center is not the operative act that
gives the RR force & effect. The National
Admin Register is merely a bulletin of
codified rules… (Republic vs. Express
Telecom, 373 SCRA 317).
• RA 3531 authorizes SEC to collect filing
fees for amendments extending corporate
existence. SEC MC # 1 imposing a filing
fee of 1/10 of 1% of AC plus 20% thereof
[or P1.2M on GMA] for amendments
extending corporate existence is not a
mere interpretation or an internal rule. The
MC is invalid as it was not published in OG
or newspaper, nor filed w/Office of
National Administrative Register of UPLC.
It needs to be published as it implements
mandate of RA 3531 and it affects public
(SEC vs. GMA Network, 575 SCRA 113).
 Requirements of Admin Due Process
1. Impartial tribunal
*Fabella vs. CA, 282 SCRA 256
2. Due notice and hearing or opportunity to be
heard
*Emin vs. De Leon, 378 SCRA 143
*Alcala vs. School Principal Villar, 11/18/03
3. Procedure consistent w/essentials of fair trial
4. Proceedings should be conducted to give
opportunity for court to determine whether
applicable rule of law & procedure were
observed.
• CSC has no original jurisdiction over an
admin case vs. a public school teacher as
jurisdiction is lodged with the Investigating
Committee under Sec. 9 of RA 4670. Still,
the SC affirmed dismissal from service of
petitioner for dishonesty (for faking CS
eligibilities of certain teachers for a fee) as
he was sufficiently afforded due process
by CSC. He answered the charges &
participated in hearings. He is barred
under principle of estoppel by laches to
impugn CSC jurisdiction (Emin vs. De
Leon, 378 SCRA 143).
• School Principal Villar is barred under
principle of estoppel by laches from
assailing the jurisdiction of OMB since his
right to procedural due process was
properly observed. Not only did he file his
CA and MR from decision dismissing him
for dishonesty, he also participated in
hearings conducted by OMB-VIS & was
given the opportunity to cross-examine
witnesses vs. him (Alcala vs. Villar,
11/18/03).
• By virtue of RA 4670, original jurisdiction
belongs to the school superintendent.
Jurisdiction is a matter of law. And a
subsequent openness by the OMB to
transfer the case to its office, despite the
acquiescence of the DECS RO6, will not
divest the DECS of jurisdiction already
acquired. It is not lost upon instance of the
parties but continues until the case is
terminated (OMB vs. Estandarte, 521
SCRA 155).
• RA 6770 recognizes the existence of some
“proper disciplinary authorities” i.e. Investig.
Committee of the DepEd. Sec. 23 directs
that OMB may refer certain complaints to
proper disciplinary authority for institution of
appropriate admin proceedings vs. erring
public officer. Thus, admin disciplinary
authority of the OMB over a public school
teacher is not exclusive but concurrent with
DepEd (OMB vs. OIC Principal Medrano,
569 SCRA 749). While OMB should have
desisted xxx but a decision had been
rendered, he is barred to assail OMB
jurisdiction in an MR.
• While OMB has concurrent administrative
disciplinary authority with the DECS over
public school teachers, Sec. 23 of RA
6770 provides that the OMB may refer a
complaint to the proper disciplinary
authority. Under the circumstances
obtaining herein, it is more prudent for
petitioner to have referred the complaint to
the DECS as it is in a better position to
serve the interest of justice. Respondent is
a public school teacher and covered by
RA 4670 (OMB vs. Delijero, 634 SCRA
135).
• Note: RA 4670 does not confer exclusive
jurisdiction to DepEd nor prescribe an
exclusive procedure in administrative
investigation involving public school
teachers. The 1987 Constitution cannot be
restricted by RA 4670 which is of earlier
enactment. Sec. 9 of RA 4670 refers only
to specific procedure to be followed by
DepEd in administrative investigation
(OMB vs. Masing, 542 SCRA 253).
Due Process in Admin Proceedings
• What it includes: 1) right to actual or
constructive notice to the institution of
proceedings; 2) real opportunity to be heard
personally or with counsel, to present
evidence; 3) impartial tribunal vested with
competent jurisdiction; and 4) finding by said
tribunal w/c is supported by substantial
evidence submitted during the hearing or
contained in the record or made known to
parties affected.
• A decision rendered in disregard of
fundamental right to due process is void for
lack of jurisdiction (Garcia vs. Molina, 627
SCRA 541)
• While GSIS Act gives Gen. Mgr. the authority
to discipline GSIS personnel, this must be in
accord w/CS rules. Under CSC Unified
Rules, upon receipt of complaint sufficient in
form & substance, disciplining authority shall
require person to submit CA or comment
under oath. The PI must be done prior to
issuance of formal charge. The filing by
petitioner of formal charges vs. respondents
without complying with mandated PI or
giving them opportunity to comment violated
their right to due process. Formal charges are
void & may be assailed anytime (Garcia vs.
Attys. Molina & Velasco, 627 SCRA 541).
 Cases on admin due process
• No denial of due process when CSC acted
as investigator, complainant, prosecutor
and judge (Gilda Cruz & Mun. Treas.
Zenaida Paitum vs. CSC, 370 SCRA 650).
• GSIS as complainant, prosecutor and
judge (Garcia vs. Molina, 627 SCRA 540)
• Reviewing Officer should not be same
officer whose decision is under review.
Decision of Sec. of Natural Resources was
set aside as it concerned his own decision
as Director of Mines (Zambales Mining vs.
CA, 94 SCRA 261).
• Petitioners were not denied due process
by the fact that CSC acted as investigator,
complainant, prosecutor and judge. CSC
is mandated to hear & decide admin cases
instituted by it or instituted before it directly
or on appeal. CSC is still impartial judge
so long as its decision was based on
substantial findings (Cruz vs. CSC, 370
SCRA 650). [Mun. Treas. Zenaida Paitum
took CS Prof. Exam on behalf of Cruz].
 Distinction between Sec. 12 and Sec.
47 of EO 292
• Sec. 12 refers to CSC authority to institute
directly and motu proprio admin cases
of dishonesty & falsification, intended to
administer CS system & protect its
integrity by removing from list of eligibles
those who falsified their qualifications;
Sec. 47 refers to the ordinary disciplinary
proceedings intended to discipline a
bona fide member of the system (CSC vs.
Albao, 472 SCRA 548). [EA Albao stated
in PDS he passed Elec. Engr. Exam].
• Labor Arbiter Aquino whose decision is
subject of appeal is the reviewing officer
as Commissioner of NLRC (Singson vs.
NLRC, 274 SCRA 358)
• OMB committed grave abuse of discretion
when he participated in reinvestigation of
graft case vs. PNB VP Tejano despite his
earlier participation in PI as SP (Tejano vs.
Desierto, 462 SCRA 568).
• NTC order reviving archived application of
BayanTel w/o notice to oppositor is not
denial of procedural due process (Rep. vs.
Express Telecom, 373 SCRA 319).
• Administrative proceedings are not exempt
from fundamental procedural principles,
such as right to due process. Respondent
must be duly informed of charge vs. him &
he cannot be convicted of a crime with w/c
he was not charged (CSC vs. Lucas, 301
SCRA 560).
• Essence of due process is the opportunity
to be heard or seek a reconsideration of the
ruling complained of.
• Procedural vs. substantive due process
~method or manner by w/c law is enforced
~ law itself is fair, reasonable & just
• The designation of the offense
with which a person is charged in
an administrative case is not
controlling, and one may be found
guilty of another offense where
the substance of the allegations
and evidence presented
sufficiently prove one’s guilt (Dr.
Zenaida Pia vs. Margarito
Gervacio, GR 172334, 6/5/13).
Procedural vs. substantive due process
• Procedural due process refers to the method
or manner by w/c the law is enforced, while
substantive due process requires that the law
itself – not merely the procedures by which the
law is enforced – is fair, reasonable and just.
• As applied to tenurial protection accorded to a
civil servant, procedural due process requires
that the dismissal be effected only after notice
& hearing, while substantive due process
requires, among others, that the dismissal be
for legal cause.
• There is no denial of due process when on
her filing a MR from the decision
reprimanding her, she was given
opportunity to be heard but she refused to
file pleading (Ruivivar vs. Omb., 565
SCRA 325)
• Unverified complaint filed w/ CHED is not
the complaint w/in purview of EO 292. It
merely commences FFI. The formal
charge of the CHED Legal Office vs.
Gaoiran constituted the complaint re:
mauling incident (Gaoiran vs. Alcala &
Castillejo, 444 SCRA 420).
• One may be heard not solely by verbal
presentation but also thru pleadings in
admin proceedings. Technical rules of
procedure & evidence are not strictly
applied (Concerned MWSS Officials vs.
Vasquez, 240 SCRA 502).
• Due process in administrative context does
not require trial-type proceedings similar to
those in courts (UP Board of Regents vs.
CA, 313 SCRA 404).
• Service of summons or order on OSG is
indispensable ingredient of due process
(NPC vs. NLRC, 272 SCRA 707).
• Where a party appears by counsel in an
action in court or administrative body, all
notices required to be given must be
served to the counsel and not to the client.
Notice to counsel is notice to client
(Lincoln Gerard, Inc. vs. NLRC, 7/23/90).
• Notice to any one of the several counsels
on record is notice to all and such notice
starts the time running for appeal despite
that the other counsel on record has not
received a copy of the decision (PPA vs.
Sargasso Const., 435 SCRA 512).
• The right to appeal is. not a natural right
nor part of due process; it is merely a
statutory privilege, exercisable only in the
manner & in accordance with law (Alba vs.
Nitorreda, 254 SCRA 753).
• Assistance of counsel is not an absolute
requirement in administrative inquiry.
Here, petitioner waived her right to
assistance of counsel and freely
acknowledged her wrongdoing (Ampong
vs. CSC, 563 SCRA 294).
• A party in an admin inquiry may or may not be
assisted by counsel, regardless of nature of
charges & of respondent’s capacity to
represent himself, and no duty rests on such
body to furnish the person investigated
w/counsel.
• Respondent has option of engaging the
services of counsel or not. Right to counsel is
not imperative because admin inquiry is
conducted merely to determine whether the
facts merit disciplinary measures vs. erring
public officers, with the purpose of maintaining
the dignity of the government service (DAR
RD Lumiqued vs. Exevea, 282 SCRA 125).
• Negligence of counsel binds the client
(Maquilan vs. Maquilan, 524 SCRA 166);
the only exception is when negligence of
counsel is gross, reckless & inexcusable
that the client is deprived of his day in
court (Razon vs. Pp, 525 SCRA 284).
• Jurisdiction acquired at time of filing is not
lost by cessation in office of respondent
during pendency of his admin case. The
body retains its jurisdiction either to
pronounce him innocent of the charges or
declare him guilty thereof (Perez vs.
Abiera, 62 SCRA 302).
• Although the rule is that the death of
respondent in admin case does not
preclude a finding of admin liability, there
are 3 exceptions to this rule: 1st, when
respondent has not been heard and
continuation of proceedings would deny
him of his right to due process; 2nd where
exceptional circumstances exist in the
case leading to equitable & humanitarian
reasons; and 3rd when the kind of penalty
imposed would render the proceedings
useless (Mercado vs. Salcedo, 10/16/09).
 Cardinal Primary Rights in
Administrative Proceedings
1. Right to a hearing;
2. Tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
3. Decision must have something to support itself;
4. Decision is based on substantial evidence;
5. Decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at hearing, or at least contained in
the record & disclosed to the parties affected;
6. Board/judge must act on its own independent
consideration of law & facts of controversy, &
not simply accept views of subordinate.
7. Decision is rendered such that parties can
know various issues & reasons for decision.
 p.18
• Exercise of disciplining authority’s
prerogative requires prior independent
consideration of law & facts, & not simply
rely on dispositive portion of PCAGC
Reso. Her finding should contain factual
finding & legal assessment (DOH Sec. vs.
Camposano, 457 SCRA 440)
• Decision prepared by a SP Member is not
the Decision of SP. Voting following
deliberation xxx is not decision unless
embodied in opinion xxx (Malinao vs.
Reyes, 255 SCRA 616) cf Sec. 66 LGC
• Instances of admin determination
where notice and hearing are not
necessary.
1.Summary abatement of nuisance per se
2.Cancellation of passport by DFA
3.Summary proceedings of distraint & levy
of property of delinquent taxpayer
4.Preventive suspension
5.Grant of provisional authority for increased
rates, or to engage in particular line of
business.
• There is nothing irregular that theTRB
Resolution No. 2001-89 authorizing
provisional toll rate adjustment at Metro
Manila Skyway effective 01/01/02 was
signed by the TRB Exec. Director & four
Directors, none of whom personally
attended the hearing (Padua vs. Ranada,
390 SCRA 679).
 Right vs. self-incrimination
• Available in all kinds of proceedings
• Available only to natural persons and not
to a juridical person.
• Reason for exclusion of juridical persons
from no self-incriminatory rule is the need
for administrative bodies tasked by
legislature to see to the compliance with
law and public policy.
• The right vs. self-incrimination is not self-
executory or automatically operational, it
must be claimed at the appropriate time,
or else it may be deemed waived (Nacu
vs. CSC, 635 SCRA 766). PEZA
employee Nacu (who was charged with
dishonesty & grave misconduct for illegally
collecting fees) did not invoke her right vs.
self-incrimination at the time she was
asked to provide samples of her signature.
She is therefore deemed to have waived
such right.
 Doctrine of Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies
• Before a party can be allowed to seek
judicial intervention, he is to exhaust all
means of administrative redress available
under the law.
• 3 reasons for the doctrine
• A direct action in court w/o prior
exhaustion of administrative remedies,
when required, is premature, warranting its
dismissal on a motion to dismiss grounded
on lack of cause of action. The failure to
observe the doctrine does not affect the
jurisdiction of the court.
 Cases
• Doctrine is applicable only to acts in the
performance of a quasi-judicial, not rule-
making, function. Where what is assailed
is the validity of IRR issued by the National
Government Center Admin Committee
pursuant to its quasi-legislative power
under RA 9207, on the ground that it is not
germane to the object & purpose of the
law, the regular court has jurisdiction to
pass upon the same (Holy Spirit
Homeowners Assn. vs. Defensor, 497
SCRA 582).
• MR must first be filed under NLRC Rules
of Procedure before special civil action for
certiorari under 65 of Rules of Court may
be availed of (Sunshine Transp. vs. NLRC,
254 SCRA 51).
• Action to recover forestry products under
DENR custody shall be directed to that
agency and not the courts thru a complaint
for replevin & damages. Actions of BFD
Director are subject to review by DENR
Secretary (Task Force Sagip Kalikasan vs.
Judge Paderanga, 19 June 2008).
 Sec. 8, PD 705 as amended
states that -
1. All actions and decisions of the Bureau of
Forest Development (now LMB) Director
are subject to review by the DENR
Secretary;
2. The decisions of DENR Secretary are
appealable to the President; and
3. Courts cannot review the decisions of the
DENR Secretary except thru a special
civil action for certiorari or prohibition.
 Distinction bet. Doctrine of Primary
Jurisdiction & Doctrine of Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies
• Both deal with the proper relationships
between courts and administrative bodies.
• Exhaustion applies where the claim is
originally cognizable in the first instance by
the administrative body alone, while
primary jurisdiction applies where the case
is within the concurrent jurisdiction of the
court & administrative agency but the case
requires determination of some technical
or factual matter xxx.
 Cases
• Increase in water rates by LWD is subject to
review & approval by LWUA. After LWUA
reviews the rate established by a LWD, a
water concessionaire may appeal the same
to the NWRB whose decision may then be
appealed to Office of the President (Merida
Water Dist. vs. Bacarro, 567 SCRA 204)
• Third party claim before the court was for
recovery of possession & injunction, but it
was in essence an action questioning the
validity of levy in the labor case vs. Green
Mountain, hence, an incident of the labor
case. RTC cannot enjoin the NLRC
(Deltaventures Resources vs. Cabato, 327
SCRA 522).
• OSP is merely a component of OMB and
may only act under the supervision &
control of OMB (Ombudsman vs. Valera,
471 SCRA 717).
• The review as an act of supervision &
control by DOJ Secretary over fiscals finds
basis in this doctrine. He may thus affirm,
nullify, reverse or modify their rulings.
Mistakes, abuse or negligence by an
admin agency in the initial steps should be
corrected by higher admin authorities, and
not directly by the courts.
• RSP has administrative supervision, not
control, over CPs and PPs (RSP Aurillo
vs. Rabi, 392 SCRA 604).
• Protests regarding CARP implementation
are under exclusive jurisdiction of DAR
Secretary. The petition for certiorari by
Polo Coconut before CA asserting that the
PARO gravely abused his discretion in
placing Polo estate under the CARP will
not prosper until all remedies under
DARAB Rules have been exhausted (DAR
vs. PCPI, 564 SCRA 80).
• The complaint of Senior Engr. Ortizo for
prohibition & injunction should have been
dismissed. He should appeal the
reassignment order of RM to the NIA
Administrator & if necessary, to CSC
(Corsiga vs. Defensor, 391 SCRA 274).
• Extelcom violated the rule on exhaustion of
admin remedies when it went directly to
CA on a petition for certiorari & prohibition
from the NTC Order without first filing a
MR w/in 15 days pursuant to NTC Rules.
That the NTC Order became immediately
executory does not mean foreclosure of
remedy of filing MR (Rep. vs. Extelcom,
373 SCRA 321).
• Under Sec. 4 of Rule 43 of Rules of Court,
an appeal (thru petition for review before
CA), shall be taken w/in 15 days from the
date of the denial of the first and only MR
allowed. The filing of the second MR by
SEC before the OP did not the suspend
running of the period to file a petition for
review before the CA, w/c expired 15 days
after petitioner SEC received the OP
Resolution denying the first MR of the
SEC and upholding the position of PICOP.
The 2nd MR does not have any legal effect
(SEC vs. PICOP, 566 SCRA 451).
• Petitioner should have appealed the order
denying its motion to quash the writ of
execution re: monetary award of the DOLE
Reg. Director (in exercise of his visitorial &
enforcement powers) to the Labor
Secretary, instead of filing w/ CA a motion
for extension of time to file a petition for
review (Laguna CATV vs. Maraan, 392
SCRA 226).
• Submission of dispute to Lupon ng
Tagapamayapa for amicable settlement
under Sec. 408 LGC. If complainant fails
to comply w/this requirement, court may
dismiss the complaint (Berba vs. Pablo,
474 SCRA 686).
• TACC should have appealed the LLDA
Order, imposing penalty of P1.062M for its
pollutive wastewater discharge, to the
DENR Secretary in view of the transfer of
LLDA to DENR thru the Pollution
Adjudication Board for administrative
supervision under EO 149, before filing a
petition for certiorari in the CA under Rule
65 (The Condo Corp. vs. LLDA, 599
SCRA 453). On TACC’s offer to pay a
reduced fine, power to compromise claims
is vested w/COA under PD 1445 or
Congress [for more than 100T] under EO
292.
• In Prov. of Siquijor vs. COA (12/04/09), SC
dismissed petitioner’s petition for certiorari
to nullify decision of COA Region Vll – as
affirmed by COA Legal – disallowing the
grant of P20T Xmas bonus, for failure to
exhaust admin remedies. Petitioner having
failed to pursue an appeal w/ the
Commission Proper under COA Rules of
Procedure, the disallowance as ruled by
COA LAO-Local has become final &
executory. Remedy of certiorari may be
availed of only if there is no appeal, or
plain, speedy, adequate remedy xxx
 PD 242
• PD 242 dated 09 July 1973 is a general law
which provides for administrative settlement
or adjudication by the DOJ of disputes,
claims and controversies between or among
agencies of the government.
• But if the general law conflicts with a special
law (ex. PD 464 which deals specifically with
assessment and appraisal of real property for
purposes of taxation by LGUs), the special
law prevails.
 Distinction: Exhaustion of Admin
Remedies & Due Process
• Both embody linked & related principles.
• Exhaustion principle is based on the
perspective of the ruling tribunal, while due
process is considered from the viewpoint
of the litigating party against whom a ruling
was made.
• The commonality they share is in the
same opportunity that underlies both, i.e.
opportunity for the ruling tribunal to re-
examine its findings and opportunity for
the party to be heard.
 Cases where a prior MR is not
necessary
a. the order is a patent nullity, as where the
tribunal has no jurisdiction;
b. there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question & any further
delay would prejudice the interests of
Government or of the petitioner;
c. deprivation of due process & there is
urgency for relief;
d. issue is purely legal;
e. public interest is involved.
 Exceptions to the doctrine of
exhaustion of admin remedies
• Whether respondent’s transfer to the position
of Regional Director of PAO, which was
made w/o her consent, amounts to removal
without cause is a legal issue (Demaisip vs.
Bacal, 12/06/00).
• Whether the memo of ARMM Governor,
ordering the reinstatement of petitioner
already declared AWOL & dropped from the
rolls, was issued in excess of jurisdiction is a
legal question (Arimao vs. Taher, 498 SCRA
75).
• Whether or not the PNP Chief had
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
complaint filed by a private citizen vs. him
is a legal question (Lastimoso vs. Senior
Insp. Asayo, 06 March 2007) [PLEB]
• Where respondent is a dep’t secretary,
whose acts as alter ego of the President,
bear implied or assumed approval of the
latter(Quisumbing vs. Gumban, 193 SCRA
523) [Glan to Malapatan]
• Where the doctrine of qualified political
agency applies (Binamira vs. Garucho,
190 SCRA 154)
• Whether or not petitioner’s dismissal from
the service is the proper penalty for the
first offense of disgraceful & immoral
conduct is a question of law (Castro vs.
Gloria & Gutang, 363 SCRA 423)
• Where petitioner is not asking for the
reversal of the policies of PCST nor
demanding that she be allowed to take the
final exams (Regino vs. Pangasinan
Colleges of Science and Technology, 443
SCRA 56).
• Taking into consideration that petition is
filed by a non-lawyer who claims that
poverty denied him the services of a
lawyer, the SC may set aside the
requirement of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and resolve to go
direct to the merits of the petition (Sabello
vs. DECS, 12/26/89).
• There is nothing left to be done except to
seek court action (Sta. Maria vs. Lopez, 31
SCRA 639).
• There is estoppel on the part of the party
invoking it.
• There is unreasonable delay of official
action that will irreparably prejudice the
complainant.
• There is no plain, adequate and speedy
remedy except court action.
• The land in question is private.
• The amount is too small so as to make the
rule impractical.
• There is nothing left to be done except
court action.
 Doctrine of Qualified Political
Agency
• In the absence of a constitutional proviso or
statute to the contrary, official acts of a dep’t
secretary are deemed acts of the President
unless disapproved or reprobated by the
latter. Except where the Const. or law
requires that he acts in person, multifarious
functions are performed by dep’t heads.
• Recognizes the existence of a single
executive, all executive organizations are
adjuncts of Exec. Department and the heads
of these departments are agents of the Chief
Executive.
• The Exec. Secretary has the authority to
reverse the Decision of the Director which
has been affirmed by the Department
Secretary.
• Doctrine is not applicable to the Office of
the Ombudsman (Perez vs.
Sandiganbayan, 503 SCRA 254).
• The authority of the DENR technical team
which conducted the survey emanated
from the Special Order issued by the
DENR Secretary, the alter ego of the
President. His acts are presumed to be the
acts of the President, unless repudiated by
the latter (Province of Camarines Norte vs.
Province of Quezon & Mun. of Calauag,
367 SCRA 91).
• Department Secretaries cannot delegate their
duties as members of NPB, much less their
power to vote & approve board resolutions
(NPC Drivers and Mechanics Assn. vs. NPC,
503 SCRA 138).
• DENR Secretary’s Order transferring the
regional office from Cotabato City to
Koronadal City is deemed the President’s act.
As Executive head, Pres.under Art. Vll Sec.
17 has continuing authority to reorganize any
agency of Exec. branch. This power may be
delegated to his cabinet members under
doctrine of qualified political agency (DENR
Sec. vs. DENR Employees,409 SCRA 359).
 Principle of Presidential Power of
Control
• President’s power over the executive branch
of government, including all executive officers
xxx (Sec. 17, Art. Vll).
• Power to alter, modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate had done in the
performance of his duties & to substitute the
judgment of the former with that of the latter.
• Reorganization of DOH under EO 102: not a
usurpation of legislative power. EO 292 gives
continuing authority to the President to
reorganize the admin structure of the OP
(Tondo Medical Center Employees Assn. vs.
CA, 527 SCRA 748).
• The President has the power to reorganize
the offices and agencies in the executive
department in line with his constitutionally
granted power of control and by virtue of a
valid delegation of the legislative power to
reorganize executive offices under existing
statutes (Banda vs. Ermita, 618 SCRA
448).
• President can exercise executive power motu
proprio and can supplant decision or act of the
subordinate with his own. When the President
ordered the development of housing project
(Smokey Mountain) with reclamation work,
making the DENR part of the implementing
committee, the required authorization of DENR
to reclaim land is deemed satisfied. The ultimate
power over alienable and disposable public
lands is reposed in the President and not the
DENR Secretary. To still require DENR
authorization on Smokey Mountain would be a
derogation of Pres.’s powers as head of Exec.
Branch (Chavez vs. NHA, 530 SCRA 241).
• The creation of the Phil. Truth Commission
(PTC) is not justified by the Pres.’s power of
control. The power of control (to alter, modify
or nullify) is different from power to create
public offices – the former is inherent in the
Executive, while the latter finds basis from
either a valid delegation from Congress, or his
inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.
PTC’s creation is justified under Sec. 17, Art.
Vll imposing on President the duty to ensure
that laws are faithfully executed (Biraogo vs.
PTC, 637 SCRA 78). Note: PTC is not borne
out of restructuring of the O.P. since PTC is
not part of the O.P. structure prior to EO No. 1.
 Does the Pres. have authority to
reorganize the Exec. Dep’t?
• Although gen. rule is power to abolish a
public office is lodged w/legislature (unless
created by Const. itself), the exception is
that as far as agencies/offices in the Exec.
Dep’t. are concerned, the Pres.’s power
of control may justify him to inactive the
functions of a particular office, or a law
may grant him broad authority to carry out
organizational measures (Buklod ng
Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora, 360 SCRA
726).
• Also, under Sec. 31, Bk. lll of EO 292,
“The Pres. in order to achieve simplicity,
economy & efficiency shall have
continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the O.P.” For
this purpose, he may transfer functions of
other Dep’ts or Agencies to the O.P.
(Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora,
360 SCRA 718). The EIIB is a bureau
attached to the Dep’t of Finance. It falls
under the Office of the President. (Buklod
vs. Zamora)
• Rationale of this continuing authority: OP
is nerve center of Exec. Branch. To remain
effective & efficient, OP must be capable
of being shaped & reshaped by Pres. in
the manner he deems fit to carry out his
policies/directives. OP is command post of
the Pres.(Domingo vs. Zamora, 2/6/03).
Since EO 81 (transferring sports activities
of DECS to PSC) is based on Pres.’s
continuing authority under EO 292, EO 81
is a valid exercise of the President’s
delegated power to reorganize the O.P.
 President’s Power of General
Supervision
• ensuring that laws are faithfully executed,
or the subordinate acts within the law
• not incompatible with power to discipline
which includes power to investigate
• Jurisdiction over admin disciplinary cases
vs. elective local officials lodged in two
authorities: Disciplining Authority and
Investigating Authority
• Distinguishing power of control from power
of supervision: the latter is the power of
mere oversight over LGUs; checking
whether LGU or its officers perform their
duties as provided by law and whether the
rules are followed. He cannot lay down the
rules for the doing of the act. If rules are
not observed, the superior may order the
work done or redone to conform to
prescribed rules but he cannot prescribe
his own manner for the doing of the act.
(Bito-onon vs. Fernandez, 350 SCRA 732)
• President’s power of general supervision
extends to the Liga ng mga Barangay. The
representatives of the Liga sit in an ex officio
capacity at the municipal, city & provincial
sanggunians. Liga is the vehicle thru w/c the
barangay participates in enactment of
ordinances (Bito-Onon vs. Fernandez, 350
SCRA 732).
• The Liga ng mga Barangay is not subject to
control by Chief Executive or his alter ego.
The acts of the DILG in nullifying results of
Liga elections & appointing Rayos as Pres. of
Liga-Caloocan went beyond supervision
(David vs. Paredes, 439 SCRA 130).
 Review of Admin Decisions
• General rule: Factual findings are not subject to
judicial review & must be accorded not only
utmost respect but finality as long as decisions
are supported xxx
• Exceptions:
~misappreciation of facts; not supported by
substantial evidence; when so warranted, there
may be judicial review; findings are vitiated by
fraud, imposition or collusion; procedure is
irregular; palpable or serious errors have been
committed; grave abuse of discretion,
arbitrarines or capriciousness is manifest
 Cases
• Factual finding of DARAB w/c relied on
certification by MARO that petitioner is a
tenant is not conclusive on courts.
Tenancy is not purely a factual relationship
but also a legal relationship (Bautista vs.
Araneta, 326 SCRA 234).
• Classification of public land is a function of
the Director of LMB and his decision when
approved by DENR Sec. as to question of
fact is conclusive & not subject to judicial
review (Rep. vs. Imperial, 303 SCRA 127)
• The calibration of evidence to assess
whether a prima facie graft case exists vs.
private respondents is a question of fact
(Samson vs. Ombudsman, 439 SCRA
325). Mandamus will lie to compel an
officer to perform a ministerial duty but not
to compel the performance of a
discretionary act requiring the exercise of
judgment, as in determining whether or not
probable cause exists vs. them.
• Fabian vs. Agustin, 14 February 2003
(conflicting factual findings)
• The issue of whether or not petitioner is an
alter ego of Milagros Matuguina, the losing
party in the MNR case, is one of fact, and
should be threshed out in said admin
proceedings & not in prohibition
proceedings in court (Matuguina Wood
Products vs. CA, 263 SCRA 508).
 When may courts review
administrative decisions?
o determine constitutionality of a law, treaty
or order
o determine jurisdiction of admin body
o determine any other question of law
o determine question of fact when
necessary to determine either a
constitutional or jurisdictional issue, the
commission of abuse of authority, or error
of law.
• All errors or decisions of admin bodies
involving questions of law are subject to
judicial review under Sec. 5 (2e), Art. Vlll
of Constitution.
• Principle that only questions of law shall
be raised in an appeal by petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 admits
of exceptions, namely:
1. findings are grounded entirely on
speculations or conjectures;
2. inference made is manifestly mistaken;
3. there is grave abuse of discretion;
4. judgment is based on misappreciation of
facts;
5. findings of facts are conflicting;
6. findings are conclusions w/o citation of
specific evidence on w/c they are based;
7. factual findings are premised on supposed
absence of evidence but contradicted by
evidence on record (Bernaldo vs. OMB, 562
SCRA 60). Here, the OMB decision
suspending Bernaldo for 9 mos. (as affirmed
by CA) was not supported by substantial
evidence. SC granted her petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45.
• Evidentiary or factual matters are not proper
grounds in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Such petition will prosper only if there is showing
of grave abuse of discretion or an act w/o or in
excess of jurisdiction of admin tribunal.
• Requisites for petition for certiorari to proper:
Petitioner TACC must show that -
a. LLDA acted w/o or in excess of its jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion; and
b. there is no appeal or a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The plain & adequate remedy is a MR of the
assailed decision (Alexandra Condo. Corp. vs.
LLDA, 599 SCRA 455).
• Mixed questions of facts and law are
subject to judicial review (Doctrine of
Assimilation of Facts). This doctrine states
that when a finding of fact is so intimately
involved and dependent upon a question
of law, the court will, in order to resolve the
question of law, examine the factual
setting including the evidence adduced
thereto. The more important issue, which
is of law, assimilates the facts.
• The PEA decision to dismiss petitioners
from the service, upon recommendation of
PAGC as approved by the President after
due proceedings, should have been
appealed to the CSC under EO 292. From
CSC, it can be elevated to the CA via a
petition for review under Rule 43. From
there, it can be appealed to the SC thru a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 (Lacson vs. PEA, 5/30/11). Petitioners
chose wrong remedy by appealing under
Rule 65 their dismissal by the PEA to the
CA instead of CSC. As their dismissal has
become final & executory, S.C. no longer
has power to review & act.
• Difference bet. Rule 45 petition (Petition
for Review on Certiorari) and a Rule 65
petition (Petition for Certiorari): A Rule 65
petition is an original action that dwells on
jurisdictional errors of whether a lower
court/tribunal acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. A Rule 45 petition is a mode of
appeal which centers on the review of a
judgment, final order or award rendered by
a lower court/tribunal involving purely
questions of law.
 Immunities
• Admin bodies cannot grant criminal and
civil immunities to persons unless the law
explicitly confers such power
• PCGG under EO 14A may grant immunity
from criminal prosecution xxx
• Apply Art 2028, Civil Code: amicable
settlement in civil cases applicable to
PCGG cases
• OMB under Sec. 17 of RA 6770 may grant
immunity from criminal prosecution to any
person whose testimony xxx
 Three-fold Responsibility

• A public official may be held criminally,

civilly & administratively liable for violation
of duty or for a wrongful act or omission.
• Remedies may be invoked separately,
alternately, simultaneously or successively
• Rule: Administrative cases are
independent from criminal cases
Exception: Law expressly provides for prior
final administrative determination.
Example – In prosecution of ULP under
Labor Code, no criminal prosecution for
ULP can be filed w/o a final judgment in a
previous administrative proceeding.
• The dismissal by the CP of petitioner’s
criminal complaint vs. Fil-Estate for
violation of PD 957 in failing to construct &
deliver to petitioner the condo unit – on the
view that an administrative finding of
violation must first be obtained before
resort to criminal prosecution – is wrong.
Nothing in PD 957 expressly requires prior
administrative finding. Where the law is
silent on this matter, the fundamental rule
that the administrative case is independent
from criminal action fully applies (Chua vs.
Ang, 598 SCRA 232).
• Hierarchy of evidentiary values: Proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt is the
highest level, followed by clear &
convincing evidence, preponderance of
evidence and substantial evidence, in that
order (ERB vs. CA, 357 SCRA 30).
• A criminal prosecution will not constitute a
prejudicial question even if the same facts
are attendant in the admin proceedings
(Gatchalian Talents Pool vs. Naldoza, 315
SCRA 406)
• Absence of proof beyond reasonable
doubt case [re dismissal by RTC of
criminal case for estafa thru falsification]
does not mean an absence of any
evidence for there is another class of
evidence w/c, though insufficient to
establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, is
adequate in admin case (NIA Coordtr
Ocampo vs. Ombudsman, 322 SCRA 22).
• Administrative offenses do not prescribe
(Floria vs. Sunga , 368 SCRA 551)
• The dismissal of 2 criminal cases by the
Sandiganbayan and of several criminal
complaints by the Ombudsman did not
result in the absolution of the petitioner
from the administrative charges (Dr.
Melendres, Exec. Dir. of Lung Center of
Phil. vs. PAGC, 8/15/12).
• Sec. 20 of RA 6770 refers not to
prescription but the discretion given to the
OMB not to conduct the investigation if
filed after 1 yr. from occurrence xxx
• The object sought is not the punishment of
the officer but the improvement of public
service & preservation of public faith &
confidence. While complaint was filed by
FFIB of OMB only in Sept. 2000 or more
than 7 yrs. after commission (1992) of the
act, OMB may still investigate said
anonymous complaint filed in 1996
[despite Sec.20 RA 6770] (Omb. vs. BAC
Chair De Sahagun of Intramuros
Administration, 562 SCRA 123).
• The death or retirement of officer from the
service does not preclude a finding of
administrative liability to which he shall be
answerable. Jurisdiction over the admin
complaint was not lost by mere fact of
respondent Caube’s death during
pendency of the admin case. The tribunal
retains jurisdiction to pronounce him
innocent or guilty (Exec. Judge Loyao vs.
Clerk of Court Caube, 402 SCRA 33).
• Prevailing doctrine: Admin jurisdiction can
no longer be exercised by Ombudsman if
public officer has already separated from
the service prior to the filing of charges re
illegal transfer of tax credit certificates.
Andutan was no longer a public servant at
time the case was filed (Ombudsman vs.
Dep. Dir. Andutan, 07/27/11).
• Exception: When public officer resigned in
bad faith, or specifically, when resignation
was done in anticipation of charges
(P1.4M shortage) to be filed against her
(Pagano vs. Nazarro, 09/21/07).
• The withdrawal of a complaint or
desistance of complainant will not
automatically result to dismissal of admin
case. Complainant is a mere witness xxx.
• The tribunal has an interest apart from
complainant’s own in determining the truth
& when necessary, imposing sanctions vs.
erring employees.
• Rule on anonymous complaints: such
complaints do not always justify outright
dismissal, particularly when the allegations
may be easily verified and established by
other competent evidence.
• While a reelected official may no
longer be held administratively liable
for signing a questionable contract
before his reelection, this will not
prejudice the filing of any case other
than administrative vs. him (Garcia
vs. Mojica, 314 SCRA 207).
• Doctrine of Forgiveness cannot
benefit appointive officer seeking
elective office (Ombudsman vs.
Torres, 566 SCRA 365).
• Electorate’s condonation of prior admin
infractions of reelected official cannot be
extended to reappointed coterminous
employees. This does not violate right to
equal protection of law as there is no
disenfranchisement of electorate or
subversion of sovereign will to speak of, in
the case of reappointed coterminous
employees. Since petitioners hold appointive
posts, they cannot claim mandate of
electorate. Also, the unwarranted expansion
would provide civil servants w/ blanket
immunity from admin liability, spawning
abuse (Salumbides vs. OMB, 4/23/10).
Aggrieved Party who may appeal the
administrative decision
• Sec.39(a), PD 807: Appeals, where
allowable, shall be made by the party
adversely affected by the decision.
• CSC as aggrieved party may appeal the
CA decision to SC. By this ruling, SC
abandoned & overruled prior decisions
that the Civil Service Law does not
contemplate a review of decisions
exonerating public officers from
administrative charges (CSC vs.
Dacoycoy, 306 SCRA 426).
• CSC decides on appeal all administrative
disciplinary cases involving the imposition
of a penalty of suspension for more than
30 days, or a fine in an amount exceeding
30 days’ salary, demotion, transfer or
dismissal from service (Sec. 37 PD 807).
• A party may elevate a decision of CSC
before the CA thru petition for review
under Rule 43 of Revised Rules of Court.
• The Ombudsman has clear legal interest
to intervene in the petition for review on
certiorari before the CA (OMB vs. CT
Samaniego, 564 SCRA 569).
• Gen. Rule: Decisions of administrative
agencies have, upon their finality, the
binding effect of a final judgment w/in
purview of res judicata doctrine.
• Exceptions to the res judicata doctrine:
a. supervening events make it imperative
to modify a final judgment to harmonize it
with prevailing circumstances.
b. its application would sacrifice justice to
technicality.
c. parties involved waived it or do not
timely raised it as a defense.
d. issue of citizenship
 PNP
• Sec. 6, Art. XVl Const.: The State shall establish
& maintain one police force xxx
• Authority of the local chief executive is one of
operational supervision and control, i.e. power to
direct the employment & deployment of PNP
elements to ensure public safety and effective
maintenance of peace & order, except 30 days
immediately preceding & following any election
(Sec.62,RA 8551)
• Relationship bet. PNP and AFP: PNP shall, thru
info gathering & performance of its ordinary
police functions, support the AFP on matters
involving the suppression of insurgency (and
other serious threats to national security), except
where the President calls on the PNP to support
the AFP in combat operations.
• Power of PLEB to dismiss PNP members
upon citizen’s complaint under Sec. 42 of
RA 6975 is concurrent with PNP
Chief/regional directors under Sec. 45.
• Appellate jurisdiction of NAPOLCOM thru
NAB and RAB
• Appeals from decision of NAPOLCOM
should be with DILG and then with CSC.
• Criminal cases involving PNP members
are w/in exclusive jurisdiction of regular
courts. Courts-martial are not courts but
are instrumentalities of executive power.
• Regional Police Director has prerogative
to name the 5 eligibles for position of city
police chief (3 for provincial police chief)
from a pool of eligible officers screened by
the Senior Officers Promotion & Selection
Board of the PNP w/o interference from
local executives. The mayor has limited
power to select one from among the list of
eligibles as police chief (Andaya vs. RTC,
319 SCRA 696).
 AFP
• An Act Strengthening Civilian Supremacy over
the Military by Returning to Civil Courts the
Jurisdiction over Certain Offenses involving AFP
Members, Other Persons Subject to Military Law
(RA 7055)
• General Rule: AFP members & other persons
subject to military law, who commit crimes
penalized under RPC (like coup d’etat), other
special penal laws, or local ordinances shall be
tried by the proper civil court.
• Exception: Where the civil court, before
arraignment, has determined the offense
to be service connected, then the
offending soldier shall be tried by a
court martial.
• Exception to the exception: Where the
President, in the interest of justice, directs
before arraignment that any such crime
shall be tried by the proper civil court.
• Service-connected offenses are limited to
those defined in the Articles of War (CA
408), violations of which are triable by
courts martial. The delineation of
jurisdiction between civil courts and courts
martial over crimes committed by military
personnel is necessary to preserve the
peculiar nature of military justice system,
which is aimed at achieving the highest
form of discipline to ensure the highest
degree of military efficiency. The charge
vs. petitioners concerns their alleged
violation of their solemn oath to defend the
Constitution & the duly constituted
authorities, w/c is service-connected (Lt.
Gonzales et al vs. Abaya, 498 SCRA 446).
 OSG (PD 478; Bk lV, Admin Code)
• Gen. Rule: Solicitor General is the lawyer of
the government, its agencies & officials. He
represents a public official in all civil, criminal &
special proceedings, when such proceedings
arise from the latter’s acts in his official
capacity.
• Rule: Actions in the name of the RP or its
instrumentality, if not initiated by the Solicitor
General, will be summarily dismissed.
• Exceptions:
1. When the government office is adversely
affected by contrary stand of OSG (Orbos vs.
CSC, 12 Sept. 1990)
2. SolGen deputizes legal officers xxx (Sec. 35,
Ch. 123. Bk lV, EO 292)
• Gen. Rule: SolGen can represent a public
official in all civil, criminal and special
proceedings when such proceedings arise
from the latter’s acts in his official
capacity.
• Exception: Such official or agent is being
charged criminally or being sued civilly for
damages arising from a felony.
 Cases
• The mention of petitioner’s name in the
complaint for damages w/the RTC as Telcom
Director, arising from the alleged malicious
administrative suit vs. respondent Raymundo,
does not transform the action into one vs. him in
his official capacity (Dir. Pascual vs. Judge
Beltran, 505 SCRA 559).
• OSG cannot represent a public official at any
stage of a criminal case or in a civil case for
damages arising from a felony. A public official
sued in a criminal case is actually sued in his
personal capacity since the State can never be
the author of a wrongful act. Similarly, any
pecuniary liability an official may be held to
account in the civil suit is for his own account
(Urbano vs. Chavez & Co vs. Chavez, 183
SCRA 347).
• Assuming the PCGG has no authority to
file the petition for certiorari under Rule 65
assailing the dismissal by OMB of the graft
complaint vs. Cojuangco et al, its
unauthorized filing was ratified and the
defect was cured when the OSG signed as
co-counsel for the RP in its Consolidated
Reply (Republic vs. Desierto, 389 SCRA
452).
 Ombudsman Constitutional
Mandate
• As protector of the people, OMB has the
power, function and duty to act promptly
on complaints filed in any form or manner
against public officials and to investigate
any act or omission of any public official
when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.
 Powers & Functions
• OMB under Sec. 12, Art. Xl Const. is
envisioned as “protector of the people” vs.
the inept, abusive, and corrupt in Gov’t; to
make the OMB an authority to directly
check and guard vs. the ills, abuses and
excesses of bureaucracy. As the OMB is
expected as an “activist watchman”, SC
has upheld its actions, though not squarely
falling under the broad powers granted it
by Const. and RA 6770, if these are
consistent w/law and Const. (Gonzales vs.
OP, GR 196231, 01/28/2014).
 Need for Prompt Action
• Delay of 3 years in PI violates accused’s
right to due process xxx (Tatad vs.
Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70)
• Constitutional right to speedy disposition of
cases extends to all parties in all cases & in
all proceedings, including judicial & quasi-
judicial hearings (Ombudsman vs. Jurado,
561 SCRA 135). No violation of due process
here. [FFI in 1992; admin case in 1997 and
decision in 1999 – 6 mos. suspension of
Customs employee for neglect of duty]
 OMB Jurisdiction
• Jurisdiction encompasses all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance & nonfeasance
committed by any officer during his tenure
of office.
• OMB is clothed w/authority to conduct PI &
to prosecute all criminal cases involving
public officers & employees, not only w/in
the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan, but
those w/in jurisdiction of regular courts (Uy
vs. Ombudsman, 03/20/01).
• OMB authority is shared or concurrent with
similarly authorized gov’t agencies (Sanchez
vs. Demetriou, 227 SCRA 637).
• DOJ is not precluded from investigating the
case, but if the case falls under exclusive
jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan, then OMB
may in exercise of its primary jurisdiction take
over at any stage the investigation of such
case (Honasan vs. DOJ Panel , 04/13/04).
• A money claim vs. a councilor is w/in
jurisdiction of court, not the OMB. If money
claim is vs. City Govt, claim is w/in jurisdiction
of SP (Orcullo vs. Gervacio, 314 SCRA 452).
• Under OMB-DOJ MOA dated 3/29/12
(w/c modifies Joint OMB-DOJ Circular of
10/05/95), OMB has primary jurisdiction in
conduct of PI & inquest over cases
cognizable by Sandiganbayan.
• Both have concurrent jurisdiction over
cases w/in jurisdiction of RTC/MTC; but
the office where such complaint is filed for
PI acquires jurisdiction to exclusion of the
other; provided that OMB may refer any
complaint to DOJ. Also, the prosecution of
cases investigated by OMB but referred to
DOJ for prosecution is under DOJ control.
 Who are not subject to OMB
Disciplinary Authority?
• Impeachable Officials
* In re: Raul M. Gonzales, 160 SCRA 771
• Members of Congress (Sec. 16, Art. Vl)
• OMB vs. Mojica, 452 SCRA 714
• Judiciary (Sec. 6, Art. Vlll)
* Maceda vs. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 46
* Caoibes vs. Alumbres, 07/19/01
* Fuentes vs. Ombudsman, 368 SCRA 36
* Garcia vs. Miro, 582 SCRA 127 (2009)
• Where a criminal complaint vs. a judge or
court employee arises from his administrative
duties, the OMB must defer action on said
complaint & refer the same to the SC for
determination whether said judge or
employee had acted w/in scope of his
administrative duties (Maceda vs. Vasquez,
221 SCRA 464).
• OMB has no jurisdiction to investigate the
alleged “undue delay in disposition of criminal
case” w/c involves determination whether
the judge acted in accord with Code of
Judicial Conduct (Dolalas vs. Ombudsman,
265 SCRA 819).
• The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all
cases against judges and court personnel
filed before it, referred to the SC for
determination as to whether an
administrative aspect is involved ( Caoibes
Jr. vs. Ombudsman, 361 SCRA 396).
• Before civil or criminal action vs. a judge for
violation of Art. 204 (Knowingly rendering
unjust judgment) & Art. 205 (Judgment Thru
Inexcusable Negligence or Gross Ignorance)
RPC can be entertained, there must be a
final & authoritative judicial declaration that
the decision is unjust (Fuentes vs. OMB).
• Criminal case filed vs. Judge Garcia was in
no way related to performance of his duties
as a judge. It is for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Homicide of RPC and thus OMB
had jurisdiction to conduct PI & file
information in court (Garcia vs. Miro, 582
SCRA 127).
 Cases on Preventive Suspension
• Meaning of phrase “under his authority” in
RA 6770: all officials under investigation
by his office regardless of the branch of
government in w/c they are employed
(Garcia vs. Mojica, 314 SCRA 207)
• 82 days PS cannot be credited to penalty
(Yabut vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 233
SCRA 311).
• W/o full-blown hearing & formal
presentation of evidence (Buenaseda vs.
Flavier, 226 SCRA 646)
• OMB vs. Valera, 471 SCRA 718
 Finality and Execution of Decision
• Decision is final, executory, unappealable
if respondent is acquitted, or penalty is
reprimand, suspension of not more than
one month, or fine equivalent to one
month salary. Sec. 27 is constitutional
(Alba vs. Nitorreda, 254 SCRA 753)
• All other cases, appeal to CA on verified
petition for review within 15 days (not to
SC on petition for certiorari under Sec. 27
RA 6670 w/c is unconstitutional).
• Remedy from OMB decision exonerating
respondent (LWUA Admtr. Reyes vs.
Belisario, 596 SCRA 31)
• OMB unappealable decisions are final &
executory, and they are: (1) respondent is
absolved of charge; (2) penalty is public
censure or reprimand; (3) suspension of
not more than 1 month; & (4) fine equiv. to
1 month’s salary.
• OMB appealable decisions are those w/c
fall outside said enumeration, and may be
appealed to CA under Rule 43 of Rules of
Court, w/in 15 days from receipt of written
notice of the decision or order denying the
MR (Villasenor & Mesa vs. Ombudsman
& Mayor Herbert Bautista, 6/4/14).
 Effect of Appeal on Decision
• An appeal shall not stop the decision from
being executory. In case penalty is
suspension or removal and respondent
wins the appeal, he shall be considered as
being under preventive suspension and he
shall be paid the salary (OMB Admin.
Order No. 17 dated 09/07/03).
• A decision of the Ombudsman shall be
executed as a matter of course. Failure or
refusal to comply with the OMB Order
shall be a ground for disciplinary action
(Sec 26 RA 6770).
• Villasenor’s filing of MR does not stay the
immediate implementation of Ombud’s
order of dismissal, since “a decision of the
Office of Ombudsman in administrative
cases shall be executed as a matter of
course” under Sec. 7, Rule lll of AO No. 07
(Omb. Rules of Procedure), as amended
by AO No. 17. No vested right would be
violated as he would be considered under
prev. suspension, and entitled to the
salary & emoluments he did not receive in
event he wins his eventual appeal
(Villasenor vs. Omb. & QC Mayor, 6/4/14).
[Manor Hotel fire]
Cases on Preliminary Investigation
• Petitioners may not compel OMB to order
production of documents if in his judgment
such documents are not necessary xxx
(Mamburao vs. OMB, 344 SCRA 818).
• Duterte vs. Sandiganbayan, 289 SCRA
721
• Garcia vs. Primo, 397 SCRA 41
• SC is not a trier of facts and as such
cannot review the evidence adduced by
parties before OMB on issue of absence
or presence of probable cause.
 Effect on OMB re COA’s Non-Finding
of Liability
• COA’s approval of a government official’s
disbursements only relates to the administrative
aspect of the matter of his accountability but it
does not foreclose the Ombudsman’s authority
to investigate and determine whether there is
a crime to be prosecuted for which such
official is answerable. While COA may regard
the official to have substantially complied with
it’s accounting rules, this fact is not sufficient to
dismiss the criminal case. (Aguinaldo vs.
Sandiganbayan, 265 SCRA 121)
• The fact that petitioners’ accounts and
vouchers had passed in audit is no ground
to enjoin the fiscal from conducting PI to
determine their criminal liability for
malversation (Ramos vs. Aquino). A
finding of probable cause does not derive
its veracity from the COA findings but from
the OMB’s independent determination.
Although the COA Report may aid the
OMB in conducting its PI, such report is
not a prerequisite (Dimayuga vs. OMB,
495 SCRA 461).
 Remedies from a probable cause
finding
• Only one MR or reinvestigation allowed within
five (5) days from notice, with leave of court
where information has already been filed in
court.
• Validity of information is not affected by lack
of notice of adverse resolution to the
respondent (Kuizon vs. Desierto, 354 SCRA
158).
• Filing of MR/reinvestigation does not prevent
the immediate filing of information in court
(Pecho vs. Sandiganbayan, 238 SCRA 116).
 Court of Appeals: No Authority Over
OMB Resolutions in Criminal Cases.
• The CA has jurisdiction over orders,
directives and decisions of the OMB in
administrative disciplinary cases only – it
cannot review the orders or decisions of
the Ombudsman in criminal or non-
administrative cases. Since the CA has no
jurisdiction over decisions of the
Ombudsman in criminal cases, its ruling
directing the withdrawal of the criminal
case filed by the Ombudsman before the
RTC against respondent POEA employee
Fung is void (Golangco vs. Fung, 504
SCRA 321).
 Forfeiture Proceedings for
ill-gotten wealth
• PCGG is empowered to bring proceedings
for forfeiture of property allegedly
unlawfully acquired before Feb. 25, 1986,
while power to investigate ill-gotten wealth
acquired after said date is vested in the
Ombudsman (Rep. vs. Sandiganbayan,
237 SCRA 242)
• The Ombudsman is without authority to
initiate forfeiture proceedings for recovery
of ill-gotten or unexplained wealth
amassed prior to 2/25/86. However, the
Ombudsman has authority to investigate
cases for forfeiture or recovery of such ill-
gotten wealth amassed even before said
date pursuant to his general investigatory
power under Sec. 15(1) of RA 6770
(Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, 625
SCRA 13)
 COA mandate
• Authority and duty to examine, audit and
settle all accounts pertaining to revenue &
receipts of, and expenditures or uses of
funds & property, owned or held in trust by
Gov’t (Art. lX D, Sec. 2 [1]).
• Promulgate rules for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures or uses of government funds
& property.
•Coverage of COA’s jurisdiction
•COA and Central Bank have concurrent
jurisdiction to examine and audit gov’t
banks, but COA audit prevails for 2 reasons
(COA is constitutionally mandated auditor &
CB has no power to allow or disallow
expenditures xxx).
•Entitlement of informer’s reward under
NIRC as determined by BIR and DOF,
although conclusive on the executive
agencies under PD 1445, is not binding on
COA (Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs.
COA, 218 SCRA 204)
Good Luck!!

End