STRATEGIC DOCTRINE THEN AND NOW

NUCLEAR WEAPON AS INSDTRUMENT

OF COMPELLENCE AND DETERENCE
Strategic Doctrine during America’s
Atomic Monopoly, 1945–1949

• Why did the America use the bomb?

- To end the war in the shortest possible time
and to avoid the enormous losses of human life
- To impress Soviet leaders with the awesome power
of its new weapon and America’s willingness to
exploit the advantages it now gave them
Regardless of its true motivations, the use of weapons of mass
destruction against Japan marked the beginning of an era in
which the instruments of war would be used not as means to
military ends, but instead for the psychological purpose of
molding others’ behavior
During the period of America’s atomic monopoly, the concept of
compellence (Schelling 1966) described the new American view of nuclear
weapons: they would not be used to fight but rather to get others to do
what they might not otherwise do.

Thus nuclear weapons became instruments of coercive diplomacy, the

ultimate means of forceful persuasion (George 1992)
 Strategic Doctrine under Conditions
of Nuclear Superiority, 1949–1960

• The monopoly on atomic weapons the United States once enjoyed gave way to
superiority in 1949.

• Massive retaliation became the strategic doctrine determined to convince

America’s adversaries it was both willing and able to carry out its threat

• The doctrine grew out of the Eisenhower administration’s simultaneous impulses

to save money

• Men no longer debate whether armaments are a symptom or cause oftension.

The mere existence of modern weapons—ten million times more powerful.
Strategic Doctrine in Transition 1961–1992

From Compellence to Deterrence

Deterrence means discouraging an adversary from using force by

convincing the adversary that the costs of such action outweigh the
potential gains.

Based on the principle of mutual assured destruction (MAD),

described the superpowers’ strategic relationship. A ‘‘balance of
terror’’ based on the military potential. ‘‘is like a gun with two
barrels, of which one points ahead and the other points back at the
gun’s holder,’’ writes Jonathan Schell (1984)
From Countervalue to Counterforce

It became clear that the Soviets had an arsenal roughly

equivalent to that of the United State

Like massive retaliation, the principle of assured destruction rested on the belief
that deterrence could be realized by directing nuclear weapons at targets
believed to be of greatest value to an adversary, namely, its population and
industrial centers

The countervalue targeting doctrine joined the civilian and industrial centers of
both Cold War adversaries in a mutual hostage relationship.
 Strategic Doctrine for a New Era
Late in 1997, and with little ceremony, Bill Clinton signed a new
Presidential Decision Directive redefining existing nuclear weapons policy
and strategy. The product of a Nuclear Posture Review begun years earlier, it
replaced the last presidential guidance on the use of nuclear weapons in war,
which Ronald Reagan had approved in 1981. That document anticipated that
nuclear war would be protracted, that the president should have a menu of
nuclear options from which to pick, and that limited nuclear exchanges might
permit pauses during which negotiations could occur

The debate has been reinvigorated with discussions of terrorism, chemical

and biological weapons of mass destruction, the seeming ease with which
some states can now develop nuclear arms, and controlling their spread.
POWER AND PRINCIPLE: IN
PURSUIT OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST

• The world has changed dramatically in the past two decades, but the
means of American foreign policy captured in the themes of military
might and interventionism remain durable patterns
• though the reelection of George W. Bush in November 2004 may
solidify a direction for some time to come. Beyond the overarching
commitment to the war on terror, to many people the United States is
still the dominant power in a unipolar world at the dawn of a new
American century. This conviction calls out for a policy of primacy

• Will primacy carry the day beyond Bush?