Helicopter

Risk Mitigation

International
Association of
Oil and Gas
Producers
Formerly E & P Forum

Presentation to Regional IHST Meeting in New Delhi, 12 June 2006

By Bob Sheffield, representing OGP’s Aviation Subcommittee
 Overview

• The current problem and the goal for improvement

• What’s been proven already
• What remains to achieve the goal
• Justifying the necessary risk mitigation measures
• Conclusions and summing up
 Three Main Points
• The risk of flying in a helicopter is an order of
magnitude greater than in an airliner– we have a
problem
• Helicopter safety can be improved significantly – we
can fix it:
– Proven risk mitigations are available for helicopters.
– We need new helicopters built to the latest design
standards.
• To be effective at lowest possible cost requires a
combined effort from:
– Regulators
– Manufacturers
– Operators
– Their customers - we need your help
 Oversight and Safety Go Hand In Hand
• The best safety records come from those operations
where either regulatory oversight or corporate care is
highest.
• Corporate care is more expensive and less effective
when the operators serve customers with different
standards.
• If everyone in the industry (manufacturers, operators,
regulators, and their customers) works together to
implement the known, cost-effective solutions, these
risk mitigations will be more effective and less costly.
 Oversight and Air Safety Performance
Currently Vary Greatly with
the Type of Operation
Fatal Accidents/million hrs
• Commercial airline 0.6
• Commuter airline 2.0
• Offshore helicopter transportation 6.4
• Helicopter support for seismic operations 23.0

… and across operators within a given type of operation

 While airline safety trends
are improving,

Helicopter safety trends are

getting worse.

GOM Offshore Accident Rate/100K Hours with 3 Year Moving Average

4.00
3.50
3.00
We know we have a 2.50

problem, and we are

2.00
1.50

confident that we
1.00
0.50

know how to fix it.

0.00

Accidents 3 year moving average)

While this chart shows helicopter accident rates for the U.S. Gulf of Mexico (GOM) the same
trend holds worldwide – the rate is getting worse.
 Opportunities for Safety Improvements
• The airline industry has made significant improvements in its safety record
over the last 30 yrs through the introduction of:
– Damage tolerant design; system redundancy; improved
reliability/crashworthiness
– Modern flight simulators
– Engine and vibration monitoring systems to identify incipient failures
– Safety Management Systems and Quality Assurance to reduce human
errors
– Flight data monitoring programs (FOQA)
– Disciplined take-off and landing profiles (e.g. stabilised approach)
– EGPWS/TAWS; TCAS
• All of these are available today for helicopter operations and are being
implemented in some parts of the helicopter industry.
• However some helicopter industry segments have adopted few of these
measures.
• We need to apply all these risk reduction measures to all helicopter
operations.
 The Helicopter Safety Goal

• OGP Safety Commitment: “The individual risk

per period of flying exposure for an individual
flying on OGP contracted business should be
no greater than on the average global airline.”
• This goal coincides with IHST’s goal of
reducing the current helicopter accident rate
by 80%.
• This presentation will show you how this goal
can be achieved.
 Overview

• The current problem and the goal for improvement

• What’s been proven already
• What remains to achieve the goal
• Justifying the necessary risk mitigation measures
• Conclusions and summing up
 Shell Group Fatality Distribution - 1992

40
In 1992, aircraft accidents
35 5 year average were the second most
1992 common cause of Shell
30
Group fatalities.
25

20

15

10

0
Road Aircraft Fire / Fall Falling Drowning Other Crush Electrical Assault
Exposion Object
 Shell Aircraft Responded With:
• Development of safety targets and focussed programme
• Shell Group Standards for Aircraft Operations
– Aviation Safety Management System (SMS)
– Aircraft performance standards
– Pilot, maintenance and passenger training
– Equipment fit – items that could have prevented half the GoM fatalities since
1992
– Quality-based maintenance
• Approval of aircraft operators and aircraft types
• More than $1.5million on a range of research programmes
– Health & Usage Monitoring Systems (HUMS)
– Helicopter Operations Monitoring Program (HOMP)
– Underwater escapability trials that led to Helicopter Underwater Escape
Training (HUET)
– Safety management and safety case concept for aircraft operators
– Mathematical modelling of enhanced Performance Class 2
• Influenced industry and regulatory bodies via
– OGP, UKOOA, EHOC, CAA, FAA, NTSB, FSF/IFA, IAGSA, HAI, HSAC
 Resultant Shell Fatal Accident Rate
STRATEGIC
SAFETY TARGETS

Audit/ Safety System Research Standards Industry

Advice Support Airworthiness - Human Development Influence
Factors - Secondary Safety

Safety Performance
20

Air Contractors
Fatal Accident Rate per million flying hrs

15.1
13.2
16

13.7
5 Year Moving Average
11.3
12

Log. (5 Year Moving Average)

5.8 Target
Target
8

2000
5 2005 Target
4 4 4 2008
2.9 2
4

2
0 0
0

90-94
91-95
92-96
93-97
94-98
95-99

97-01
98-02
99-03
00-04
96-00

01-05

Target '08
 Despite this Improvement,
the Industry Trend in 2003 was Unacceptable
• International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (1998 –
2003)
Average 2003
Accident rate (per million flying hrs) 17.8 34.7
Fatal accident rate (per million flying 6.4 11.6
hrs)
Accidents per year 16.5 33
Fatalities per year 23.7 51

• If the 2003 rate applied to typical major oil company contracts:

– Almost 3 accidents per year
– One fatal accident every 13 months
– Unacceptable
• Cost? Lives; Material; Reputation
• Concerns? Duty of care; Litigation; Corporate liability; Insurance
premiums
 Shell Aircraft Analysed Accident Data to
Evaluate Potential Risk Mitigations
• OGP published data on offshore accidents – GOM and Worldwide
• NASA/TM – 2000-209579 – US Civil Helicopter Accidents 1963 – 1997
• Individual NTSB/AAIB Accident Reports
• Annual Business Turbine Accident Review 1993 through 2003 – Breiling
Associates
• Design Reviews
• FAA Final Rules – 14CFR Parts 27 and 29 and associated NPRMs
– Amendments 12 through 47 (Part 29)
– Amendments 11 though 40 (Part 27)
• Type Certificate Data Sheets for offshore helicopters
• Design certification reviews with Sikorsky and Eurocopter specialists on
S76 and AS332
• CAA Paper 2003/1 – Helicopter Tail Rotor Failures
• UKCAA MORs for S76 and AS332
• SINTEF Helicopter Safety Study 2 – Dec 99
OGP Offshore Accident Causes 1995-2003 (121 Total)

Fuel Quality Mid Air

Control 5%
2% Total
Unknown Technical
2% 31%

Passenger Weather
/HLO Related, Not
Training & CFITW
Pilot
Control 8%
Procedure
2%
50%
OGP Offshore Accident Causes 1995-2003
Technical Related (31% of Total)

Component
Failure
54%

Engine
Related
46%
OGP Offshore Accident Causes 1995-2003
Component Failure - Technical Related

Unknown
10% Bird Strike,
Main Rotor or Damage to
Transmission Control Rods
Component 5%
30%
Other
Equipment
Failure
Tail Rotor 10%
Failure
45%
 CAA – HUMS Cost Benefit Analysis

CAA Data: Distribution of arisings Main Rotor

System
Tail Rotor
System

Rotor Planetary System

Brake

Oil Cooler

Failure
Evident
Success
Engine to Gearbox Tail Rotor
Drive
gearbox

• HUMS can detect 69% of mechanical defects in critical rotating parts before failure.
• Identifying incipient failures before they are manifest prevents in-flight failures and
accidents.
 Risk Mitigation – Technical Failures
• Improved design requirements (FAR 27/29)
• Quality Assurance (QA) in Maintenance (enhanced Part 135)
• Duplicate inspections (Required Inspection Item)
• Enhanced training
– Human factors training for maintenance staff
– Flight simulator training/CRM/LOFT pilot training for emergency procedures
• Vibration & Health and Engine Monitoring Systems such as
HUMS/VHM/EVMS
• Shell and others in the oil industry have:
– Funded early development of HUMS in North Sea
– Supported research to enhance analysis of HUMS data
– Committed to the installation of HUMS/VHM/EVMS systems
– Accepted costs of such systems and developed a minimum specification
for HUMS/VHM/EVMS
– Recognised the need for minimum system management and serviceability
requirement (FAA AC29-2C MG15, CAP693 + OGP Aircraft Mgmt. Guide)
>10
~2
Technical Failures

Pre and
Post
HUMS:
From
about
eight per
million
flying
hours
to only
one
technical
accident
cause in
nine
years.
 HOMP/FOQA Management Process

HOMP
Flight data OPERATOR:
Data Replay,
Analysis and
Verification
Changes to
Changes to HOMP,
Procedures, Investigations
Manuals, HOMP
Training SAFETY OFFICER: MANAGER
etc. Review Meeting (PILOT):
Assessment

Reporting of
Trend information
to Management
and Staff Confidential
Crew Feedback
• 45% to 65% of all accidents involve human error.
• HOMP enables trend analysis and problem identification before they result in accidents.
• HOMP can help assure compliance with standard operating procedures; e.g., take-off
and landing profile compliance.
• HOMP can help assess training effectiveness and troubleshoot operational problems.
 Risk Mitigation – Pilot Human Factors
• Flight simulator training in LOFT scenarios emphasising CRM
• Improved aircraft performance and disciplined helideck take-off
and landing profiles to standardised helidecks
• Enhanced management controls within a structured safety
management system, including improved helideck management,
adequate weather forecasting and communications
• Defensive aids such as EGPWS (or AVAD) and TCAS
• Helicopter Operations Monitoring Programme (HOMP)
• Shell and others in the oil industry have :
– Funded initial HOMP feasibility studies and development in UK
– Deployed HOMP on UK North Sea operations on AS332L and S76A++
– Committed to the installation of HOMP systems on contracted helicopters
– Accepted the costs of such systems and are developing a minimum specification
– Recognised the need for minimum system management and serviceability
requirement (CAP 739 and CAA Papers 2002/02 and 2004/12)
– Strongly endorsed initiatives of the ICAO HTSG to add HOMP to ICAO Annex 6 as
a Recommended Practice for all helicopters equipped with flight data recorders
 In Sum - What Have We Learned?
• Essential Pre-requisites for Safe Operations
– Safety culture supported by Quality and Safety Management systems
• Equipment fit
– Appropriate to the operation
– HUMS/EGPWS/TCAS and cabin egress modifications
• Pilot procedures
– Helicopter Flight Data Monitoring (HFDM, also known as HOMP or FOQA)
– Flight simulator training in LOFT scenarios emphasising CRM
– Helideck performance profiles
• Helideck management
– Helicopter Landing Officer and Helideck Assistant training
– Helideck procedures
• System failure management
– HUMS/VHM/EVMS
– Engine monitoring
– Flight Simulator training
• Human error in maintenance
– Human factors training
– Duplicate inspections/RIIs
– HUMS/VHM/EVMS
• All these items are addressed in OGP’s Aircraft Management Guide, and will mitigate
risk, but they are unlikely to achieve the long term safety goal.
 Overview

• The current problem and the goal for

improvement
• What’s been proven already
• What remains to achieve the goal
• Justifying the necessary risk mitigation
measures
• Conclusions and summing up
 All But The Latest Helicopters
Have Significant Design Gaps
• “Most important issues would be to improve helicopter design and
continuous airworthiness” - SINTEF
• “The evidence that tail rotors were … not meeting the spirit of
airworthiness requirements, was stark and compelling” – UK CAA
• “ ..This means that the helicopter is not considered airworthy without
HUMS installed and in function.” – Norwegian Committee for Review of
Helicopter Safety
• Typical aircraft in common use today - AS-332 Super Puma, Bell 412, and S-
76 were designed to requirements that are now over 25 years old
• Latest design requirements offer:
– Improved performance with one engine inoperative
– Redundant systems with flaw tolerance
– Fail safe designs
– Digital flight management systems to reduce pilot workload, improve situational
awareness, and help cope with emergencies
– Crashworthy airframe, fuel cells, and passenger/crew seats
 Old Cars & Vans

• How many of you are driving vehicles like these with:

– No seat belts or shoulder harnesses
– No anti-skid braking system (ABS)
– No airbags
– Low power engines with normally aspirated carburettors
• How many companies would use such vehicles to transport their
workers?
 Old Helicopters

• Yet many helicopter operations still use aircraft such as B212 and AS350
that were designed in a similar era (1960/70’s) and to equivalent safety
standards.
• Whilst certification standards for new design aircraft have changed, these
models have continued to be built to old certification standards under
“grandfather rights.”
 Design Requirements and Airworthiness
• Latest design requirements offer:
– Improved performance with one engine inoperative
– Redundant systems with flaw tolerance
– Fail safe designs
– Digital flight management systems to reduce pilot workload, improve
situational awareness, and help cope with emergencies
– Crashworthy airframe, fuel cells, and passenger/crew seats

• FAR29/27 design requirements were reviewed to determine:

– How design requirements have changed over the years
– Potential safety improvements offered
– How far short of the ideal requirements are the helicopters in current use
– What impact this has on the achieved safety record of these types
 Type Certification Basis
Model FAR 27/29 AL Except Plus Date
AS350B 1 - 10 Oct 77

EC155B 1 - 40 AL 29-38 (Occupant Dec 00

Protection)
29.952/562/631/561/571/785/
901/903/963/973/975/1305
S-76A 1 – 11; parts of 12, 29.173 Equiv Safety Jan 79
13 Findings
S-76C+ 1 – 11; parts of 12, 29.173 Equiv Safety Apr 91
13, 24, 26, 30, 34 Findings
Bell 212 1 – 2: parts of 3, 12 Oct 70

Bell 412EP 1 – 2; parts of 3, 6, Oct 94

12, 14, 15, 16, 17,
21, 24, 25, 26, 31, 32
AS332L/L1 1 – 16 29.397 Rotor brake Nov 87

AS332L2 1 – 16 29.397 Rotor brake HIRF May 93

30 sec contingency

FAR 29 is now at AL 47
 Key Design Improvements
• FAR 29.67 Climb: One engine inoperative Amendment 29-26 (Oct 88)
– New continuous OEI rating
• FAR 29.547/29.917 Main & Tail Rotor Drive System Amendment 29-40
(Aug 96)
– Design assessment and failure analysis of Rotor/drive system
• FAR 29.571 Fatigue Evaluation of Structure Amendment 29-28 (Nov 89)
– Tolerance to flaws and damage
• FAR 29.610 Lightning and static electricity protection Amendment 29-40 (Aug 96)
– Improved protection
• FAR 29.863 Flammable fluid fire protection Amendment 29-17 (Dec 78)
– New requirements
• FAR 29. 901/903 Engines Amendment 29-36 (Jan 96)
– Design consideration of effects of uncontained engine rotor burst
– Containment and redundancy of key flight essential systems in the burst zone
• FAR 29.1309 Equipment, Systems and Installations Amendment 29-24 (Dec 84)
– Safety analysis with consideration of system interactions and multiple failures
• FAR 29.1529 Instructions for continued airworthiness Amendment 29-20 (Oct 80)
– Requires substantiation via lightning tests
 New Types

EC 135 Agusta Bell 139

EC 225

Sikorsky S92
 Overview

• The current problem and the goal for

improvement
• What’s been proven already
• What remains to achieve the goal
• Justifying the necessary risk mitigation
measures
• Conclusions and summing up
 To Quantify the Potential Safety Benefit of New Design Types
Together with the Best Operating Practices, Shell Aircraft Focused on
a 2002 NASA Study of Accident Causes for Twin Engine Helicopters

In flight Collision

Loss of Control

Other ops

Loss of Power

Main Rotor

Tail Rotor

Other airframe

Rotor contact -person

. Misc/other

We used the Dec 2000 NASA study as our baseline for accident causes
 Accident Analysis – NASA Data for Generic Twin
0.65
1 Pilot related (in air) %

In flight collision with object 14.3

Airport/helipad/fence 5.7
Wire 4.3
Other-trees, brush, acft 4.3
Loss of control 14.6
Handling 6.3
Loss of reference/disorientation
3.0
System deficiency 2.3
Misc/undetermined 3.0
In flight collision with terrain 5.7
Weather 4.0
On ground/water collision with object
3.3
Hard landing 2.7
Mid air collision 2.0
Rollover/Noseover 1.3
Subtotal % 48.0%
2 Technical
Loss of engine power 13.0
Engine structure 5.0
Fuel system related 5.7
Other 2.3
Airframe component/system 29.5
Main rotor
Main rotor drive train
6.3
4.3
Main rotor control system 3.7
We listed these
Tail rotor 3.3
Tail rotor drive train 6.3
Tail rotor control system 2.3
causes with all the
Other airframe 3.3
Fire/explosion
Gear collapsed
Subtotal %
1.7
2.0
46.3%
detail available.
3 Other
Rotor contact -person 2.7
Misc/other 3.0
Subtotal % 5.7
 Risk Mitigation Measures

Assigned Effectiveness of mitigation measures % Key

DR Late FAR 29 50% DR Design requirements - late amendt FAR/JAR 29
DR/HQ Late FAR + HQ 60% DR/HQ Handling qualities/advanced cockpit design + late FAR 29
Training - 12 monthly Sim/CRM/LOFT 45% Training FFS level C/D + CRM + LOFT
HUMS Incl effective mgt 65% HUMS Health & Usage Monitoring System
SMS/QA/OC/Helideck Enhanced SMS/QA 55% SMS/QA/OC JAR Ops 3 /SMS/QA/CAP 437 helideck management
HOMP Incl effective mgt 50% HOMP Helicopter Operational Monitoring Programme
EGPWS/TCAS 75% EGPWS Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System
TCAS Traffic Alert & Collision Avoidance System
PC1/2e Incl 1D decks 65% PC1/2e Perf Class 1 or enhanced Perf Class 2
IW New design 50% IW Impact warning system
CRM Crew Resource Management
LOFT Line oriented flight training
SMS Safety Management System

As we analysed the accidents, we evaluated risk mitigation measures and a panel of

experts assigned potential effectiveness levels for each of these risk mitigation
measures against the applicable hazards
Mitigation Potential – NASA Data for Generic Twin
1 Pilot related (in air) % Level 1 MF1 Level 2 MF2 Level 3 MF3 Overall Accidents
Mitigation Mitigation Mitigation MF prevented
In flight collision with object 14.3 %
Airport/helipad/fence 5.7 IW 0.50 SMS/QA/OC 0.43 HOMP 0.38 0.82 4.65
Wire 4.3 EGPWS/TCAS 0.75 SMS/QA/OC 0.43 HOMP 0.38 0.91 3.94
Other-trees, brush, acft 4.3 EGPWS/TCAS 0.75 IW 0.43 Training 0.34 0.90 3.92
Loss of control 14.7
Handling 6.3 DR/HQ 0.60 HOMP 0.43 Training 0.34 0.85 5.37
Loss of reference/disorientation
3.0 Training 0.45 DR/HQ 0.51 HOMP 0.38 0.83 2.49
System deficiency 2.3 DR 0.50 HOMP 0.43 Training 0.34 0.81 1.89
Misc/undetermined 3.0 Training 0.45 HOMP 0.43 PC 1/2e 0.49 0.84 2.51
In flight collision with terrain 5.7 EGPWS/TCAS 0.75 HOMP 0.43 Training 0.34 0.90 5.12
Weather 4.0 Training 0.45 SMS/QA/OC 0.43 PC 1/2e 0.49 0.84 3.35
On ground/water collision with object
3.3 IW 0.50 SMS/QA/OC 0.43 Training 0.34 0.81 2.70
Hard landing 2.7 Training 0.45 PC 1/2e 0.55 DR/HQ 0.45 0.86 2.30
Mid air collision 2.0 EGPWS/TCAS 0.75 Training 0.38 HOMP 0.38 0.90 1.81
Rollover/Noseover 1.3 HOMP 0.50 DR/HQ 0.51 Training 0.34 0.84 1.11
Subtotal % 48.0 % 0.00 41.16
2 Technical
Loss of engine power 13.0
Engine structure 5.0 DR 0.50 PC 1/2e 0.55 HUMS 0.49 0.89 4.43
Fuel system related 5.7 PC 1/2e 0.65 DR 0.43 SMS/QA/OC 0.38 0.87 4.95
Other 2.3 PC 1/2e 0.65 DR 0.43 HUMS 0.49 0.90 2.09
Airframe component/system 29.6
Main rotor 6.3 DR 0.50 HUMS 0.55 SMS/QA/OC 0.38 0.86 5.44
Main rotor drive train 4.3 DR 0.50 HUMS 0.55 Training 0.34 0.85 3.69
Main rotor control system 3.7 DR 0.50 HUMS 0.55 Training 0.34 0.85 3.12
Tail rotor 3.3 DR/HQ 0.60 HUMS 0.55 SMS/QA/OC 0.38 0.89 2.96
Tail rotor drive train 6.3 DR/HQ 0.60 HUMS 0.55 Training 0.34 0.88 5.58
Tail rotor control system 2.3 DR/HQ 0.60 HUMS 0.55 Training 0.34 0.88 2.05
Other airframe 3.3 DR 0.50 SMS/QA/OC 0.43 Training 0.34 0.81 2.70
Fire/explosion 1.7 DR 0.50 SMS/QA/OC 0.43 Training 0.34 0.81 1.34
Gear collapsed 2.0 DR 0.50 SMS/QA/OC 0.43 Training 0.34 0.81 1.62
Subtotal % 46.3 % 38.36
3 Other
Rotor contact -person 2.7 SMS/QA/OC 0.50 SMS/QA/OC 0.43 Training 0.34 0.81 2.16
Misc/other 3.0 HOMP 0.50 Training 0.38 SMS/QA/OC 0.38 0.81 2.42
Subtotal % 5.7 % 4.58
Factor 0.85 Factor 0.75
Total accidents prevented (= % effectivity of mitigation measures) 84.10

Effectiveness of mitigation measures % Key

Risk mitigation measures applied to accident causes with 3 levels of diminishing efficacy.
Percentage of Accidents Reported in NASA Study
Preventable by Individual Mitigation Measures
Late FAR 29/Enhanced Handling

FFS Training + CRM/LOFT

OC/QA/SMS
Measures

HUMS/VHM
Seven Key
HOMP/FOQA Initiatives

Perf Class 1/2e

EGPWS/TCAS

Tail Rotor Impact Warning Requires development work

0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0

Percentage acidents prevented
 We Have Applied the Same
Methodology to Seismic Accidents
• Study looked at 57 reported seismic support accidents 1990 – 2005.
• Data and accident details taken from OGP, Transport Canada & U.S.
NTSB
• Summary:
– 52 single engine accidents (6 fatal)
– 5 twin engine accidents (2 fatal)
• Location:
– USA 44%
– Canada 32%
– S America 19%
– Rest of World 5%
• Seismic accident rate 114 per million flying hrs
• Seismic fatal accident rate 16 per million flying hrs
– For 2000 – 2004 Fatal accident rate 23 per million fly hrs
OGP Seismic Accidents 1990 - 2005
Other
5%
CFIT
2% Engine Failure
25%
Sling Load
16%
Tail Rotor
Obstacle strike 5%
14%
Component
Pilot Proc Failure
26% 7%
 Mitigation Measures
% Effectiveness of mitigation measures

Radalt/AVAD 0.5 Radar altimeter/Auto voice alerting

DR 0.5 Late FAR 27/29 design certification
2P 0.5 2 pilot operations
EM 0.5 Engine monitoring
VHM 0.6 Vibration Health Monitoring
HOMP 0.5 Helicopter Ops Monitoring Program/HFDM
TR/Training 0.45 Enhanced line training + annual simulator training
OC/QA 0.5 Enhanced Op controls, SMS, QA, site procedures
PC1/2 0.65 Twin engine helicopter
 Accident Mitigation Analysis

Overall accident mitigation achieved by applying each of the

Identified measures - 78.6%
 Percentage accidents prevented by individual mitigation measures

Rad Alt/Avad

HOMP

VHM

Engine monitoring

Twin engine (PC1/2)

Two pilots

Late FAR27/29

Ops Controls, QA, SMS

Enhanced Training + sim

0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35

Percentage accidents prevented
 Risk Mitigation Options

25 7
OPTION A – Baseline NASA Accident Rate/million hrs
Fatal Accident Rate
FAR Part 135/Part 91 Twin Engine – Cost - $million per year (1000 hrs)
early FAR 29 6
OPTION B – Typical global offshore (OGP) 20
Baseline/early FAR 29 + Limited
5
SMS/QA and Ops Controls + part
HUMS + CRM, part simulator, LOFT
OPTION C – New aircraft – early/mid FAR 15 Variable depending
4
Option B + full SMS/QA + full HUMS + on procurement,
full simulator training + Perf Class finance and
depreciation policy
2 + HOMP + TCAS/EGPWS 3
10
OPTION D - New aircraft - late FAR 29
Option C + enhanced cockpit/HQ +
2
enhanced Perf Class 2/Class 1 +
Impact Warning System 5
1
Cost assumes no action taken to
reduce costs through efficiencies; e.g.,
smart procurement, higher utilisation, 0 0
sharing etc A B C D
Baseline Typical New Aircraft New Aircraft
NASA Current OGP early FAR - late FAR
 Proving That Risk Reduction Measures
are Justified
• Use the layered defence model in Microsoft Excel as a
predictive tool to calculate the incremental risk reduction
for a given measure.
• Apply the risk reduction in question to the expected
exposure; i.e., number of helicopters, flying hours per
year, and number of passengers per flight.
• Use the incremental cost to calculate the implied cost of
avoiding a fatality (ICAF) and the individual risk of fatality
per annum (IRPA).
• Compare these outcomes to your company’s risk
management guidelines; e.g., maximum ICAF of $50
million, maximum IRPA of 1 in 10,000.
 Example: Old vs. New Design
1 Pilot related (in air) % Level 1 Mitigation MF1 Level 2 MF2 Level 3 MF3 Overall Accidents 1 Pilot related (in air) % Level 1 Mitigation MF1 Level 2 MF2 Level 3 MF3 Overall Accidents
Mitigation Mitigation MF prevented Mitigation Mitigation MF prevented
In f l i g h t co l l i si o n w i th 14.3
o b j ect % In f l i g h t co l l i si o n w i th 14.3
o b j ect %
Airport/helipad/fence 5.7 IW 0 .0 0 SM S/ QA / OC 0 .4 3 HOM P 0 .3 8 0 .6 4 3 .6 3 Airport/helipad/fence 5.7 IW 0 .0 0 SM S/ QA / OC 0 .4 3 HOM P 0 .3 8 0 .6 4 3 .6 3
Wire 4.3 EGPW S/ TCA S 0 .7 5 SM S/ QA / OC 0 .4 3 HOM P 0 .3 8 0 .9 1 3 .9 4 Wire 4.3 EGPW S/ TCA S 0 .7 5 SM S/ QA / OC 0 .4 3 HOM P 0 .3 8 0 .9 1 3 .9 4
Other-trees, brush, acft 4.3 EGPW S/ TCA S 0 .7 5 IW 0 .0 0 Tr a i n i n g 0 .3 4 0 .8 3 3 .6 1 Other-trees, brush, acft 4.3 EGPW S/ TCA S 0 .7 5 IW 0 .0 0 Tr a i n i n g 0 .3 4 0 .8 3 3 .6 1
Lo ss o f co n tr o l 14.7 Lo ss o f co n tr o l 14.7
Handling 6.3 DR/ HQ 0 .0 0 HOM P 0 .4 3 Tr a i n i n g 0 .3 4 0 .6 2 3 .9 2 Handling 6.3 DR/ HQ 0 .6 0 HOM P 0 .4 3 Tr a i n i n g 0 .3 4 0 .8 5 5 .3 7
Loss of reference/disorientation 3.0 Tr a i n i n g 0 .4 5 DR/ HQ 0 .0 0 HOM P 0 .3 8 0 .6 6 1 .9 7 Loss of reference/disorientation 3.0 Tr a i n i n g 0 .4 5 DR/ HQ 0 .5 1 HOM P 0 .3 8 0 .8 3 2 .4 9
System deficiency 2.3 DR 0 .0 0 HOM P 0 .4 3 Tr a i n i n g 0 .3 4 0 .6 2 1 .4 4 System deficiency 2.3 DR 0 .5 0 HOM P 0 .4 3 Tr a i n i n g 0 .3 4 0 .8 1 1 .8 9
Misc/undetermined 3.0 Tr a i n i n g 0 .4 5 HOM P 0 .4 3 PC 1 / 2 e 0 .0 0 0 .6 8 2 .0 5 Misc/undetermined 3.0 Tr a i n i n g 0 .4 5 HOM P 0 .4 3 PC 1 / 2 e 0 .4 9 0 .8 4 2 .5 1
In f l i g h t co l l i si o n w i th ter
5.7 r aEGPW
in S/ TCA S 0 .7 5 HOM P 0 .4 3 Tr a i n i n g 0 .3 4 0 .9 0 5 .1 2 In f l i g h t co l l i si o n w i th ter
5.7 r aEGPW
in S/ TCA S 0 .7 5 HOM P 0 .4 3 Tr a i n i n g 0 .3 4 0 .9 0 5 .1 2
W ea th er 4.0 Tr a i n i n g 0 .4 5 SM S/ QA / OC 0 .4 3 PC 1 / 2 e 0 .0 0 0 .6 8 2 .7 4 W ea th er 4.0 Tr a i n i n g 0 .4 5 SM S/ QA / OC 0 .4 3 PC 1 / 2 e 0 .4 9 0 .8 4 3 .3 5
On g r o u n d / w a ter co l l i si 3.3o n IW
w i th o b j ect 0 .0 0 SM S/ QA / OC 0 .4 3 Tr a i n i n g 0 .3 4 0 .6 2 2 .0 6 On g r o u n d / w a ter co l l i si 3.3o n IW
w i th o b j ect 0 .0 0 SM S/ QA / OC 0 .4 3 Tr a i n i n g 0 .3 4 0 .6 2 2 .0 6
Ha r d l a n d i n g 2.7 Tr a i n i n g 0 .4 5 PC 1 / 2 e 0 .0 0 DR/ HQ 0 .0 0 0 .4 5 1 .2 0 Ha r d l a n d i n g 2.7 Tr a i n i n g 0 .4 5 PC 1 / 2 e 0 .5 5 DR/ HQ 0 .4 5 0 .8 6 2 .3 0
M i d a i r co l l i si o n 2.0 EGPW S/ TCA S 0 .7 5 Tr a i n i n g 0 .3 8 HOM P 0 .3 8 0 .9 0 1 .8 1 M i d a i r co l l i si o n 2.0 EGPW S/ TCA S 0 .7 5 Tr a i n i n g 0 .3 8 HOM P 0 .3 8 0 .9 0 1 .8 1
Ro l l o ver / N o seo ver 1.3 HOM P 0 .5 0 DR/ HQ 0 .0 0 Tr a i n i n g 0 .3 4 0 .6 7 0 .8 9 Ro l l o ver / N o seo ver 1.3 HOM P 0 .5 0 DR/ HQ 0 .5 1 Tr a i n i n g 0 .3 4 0 .8 4 1 .1 1
Subtotal % 48.0 % 0 .0 0 34.38 Subtotal % 48.0 % 0 .0 0 39.20
2 Technical 2 Technical
Lo ss o f en g i n e p o w er 13.0 Lo ss o f en g i n e p o w er 13.0
Engine structure 5.0 DR 0 .0 0 PC 1 / 2 e 0 .0 0 HUM S 0 .4 9 0 .4 9 2 .4 4 Engine structure 5.0 DR 0 .5 0 PC 1 / 2 e 0 .5 5 HUM S 0 .4 9 0 .8 9 4 .4 3
Fuel system related 5.7 PC 1 / 2 e 0 .0 0 DR 0 .0 0 SM S/ QA / OC 0 .3 8 0 .3 8 2 .1 3 Fuel system related 5.7 PC 1 / 2 e 0 .6 5 DR 0 .4 3 SM S/ QA / OC 0 .3 8 0 .8 7 4 .9 5
Other 2.3 PC 1 / 2 e 0 .0 0 DR 0 .0 0 HUM S 0 .4 9 0 .4 9 1 .1 4 Other 2.3 PC 1 / 2 e 0 .6 5 DR 0 .4 3 HUM S 0 .4 9 0 .9 0 2 .0 9
A i r f r a m e co m p o n en t/ sy stem
29.6 A i r f r a m e co m p o n en t/ sy stem
29.6
Main rotor 6.3 DR 0 .0 0 HUM S 0 .5 5 SM S/ QA / OC 0 .3 8 0 .7 2 4 .5 6 Main rotor 6.3 DR 0 .5 0 HUM S 0 .5 5 SM S/ QA / OC 0 .3 8 0 .8 6 5 .4 4
Main rotor drive train 4.3 DR 0 .0 0 HUM S 0 .5 5 Tr a i n i n g 0 .3 4 0 .7 0 3 .0 5 Main rotor drive train 4.3 DR 0 .5 0 HUM S 0 .5 5 Tr a i n i n g 0 .3 4 0 .8 5 3 .6 9
Main rotor control system 3.7 DR 0 .0 0 HUM S 0 .5 5 Tr a i n i n g 0 .3 4 0 .7 0 2 .5 8 Main rotor control system 3.7 DR 0 .5 0 HUM S 0 .5 5 Tr a i n i n g 0 .3 4 0 .8 5 3 .1 2
Tail rotor 3.3 DR/ HQ 0 .0 0 HUM S 0 .5 5 SM S/ QA / OC 0 .3 8 0 .7 2 2 .4 0 Tail rotor 3.3 DR/ HQ 0 .6 0 HUM S 0 .5 5 SM S/ QA / OC 0 .3 8 0 .8 9 2 .9 6
Tail rotor drive train 6.3 DR/ HQ 0 .0 0 HUM S 0 .5 5 Tr a i n i n g 0 .3 4 0 .7 0 4 .4 5 Tail rotor drive train 6.3 DR/ HQ 0 .6 0 HUM S 0 .5 5 Tr a i n i n g 0 .3 4 0 .8 8 5 .5 8
Tail rotor control system 2.3 DR/ HQ 0 .0 0 HUM S 0 .5 5 Tr a i n i n g 0 .3 4 0 .7 0 1 .6 4 Tail rotor control system 2.3 DR/ HQ 0 .6 0 HUM S 0 .5 5 Tr a i n i n g 0 .3 4 0 .8 8 2 .0 5
Other airframe 3.3 DR 0 .0 0 SM S/ QA / OC 0 .4 3 Tr a i n i n g 0 .3 4 0 .6 2 2 .0 6 Other airframe 3.3 DR 0 .5 0 SM S/ QA / OC 0 .4 3 Tr a i n i n g 0 .3 4 0 .8 1 2 .7 0
Fire/explosion 1.7 DR 0 .0 0 SM S/ QA / OC 0 .4 3 Tr a i n i n g 0 .3 4 0 .6 2 1 .0 3 Fire/explosion 1.7 DR 0 .5 0 SM S/ QA / OC 0 .4 3 Tr a i n i n g 0 .3 4 0 .8 1 1 .3 4
Gear collapsed 2.0 DR 0 .0 0 SM S/ QA / OC 0 .4 3 Tr a i n i n g 0 .3 4 0 .6 2 1 .2 4 Gear collapsed 2.0 DR 0 .5 0 SM S/ QA / OC 0 .4 3 Tr a i n i n g 0 .3 4 0 .8 1 1 .6 2
Subtotal % 46.3 % 27.46 Subtotal % 46.3 % 38.36
3 Other 3 Other
Rotor contact -person 2.7 SM S/ QA / OC 0 .5 0 SM S/ QA / OC 0 .4 3 Tr a i n i n g 0 .3 4 0 .8 1 2 .1 6 Rotor contact -person 2.7 SM S/ QA / OC 0 .5 0 SM S/ QA / OC 0 .4 3 Tr a i n i n g 0 .3 4 0 .8 1 2 .1 6
Misc/other 3.0 HOM P 0 .5 0 Tr a i n i n g 0 .3 8 SM S/ QA / OC 0 .3 8 0 .8 1 2 .4 2 Misc/other 3.0 HOM P 0 .5 0 Tr a i n i n g 0 .3 8 SM S/ QA / OC 0 .3 8 0 .8 1 2 .4 2
Subtotal % 5.7 % 4.58 Subtotal % 5.7 % 4.58
Factor 0.85 Factor 0.75 Factor 0.85 Factor 0.75
Total accidents prevented (= % effectivity of mitigation measures) 66.43 Total accidents prevented (= % effectivity of mitigation measures) 82.14

Expected FAR = 2.35 per Expected FAR = 1.25 per

million flying hours million flying hours
 ICAF and IRPA

• ICAF = Incremental Cost per Annum divided by

the Incremental Lives Saved per Annum
– Incremental Lives Saved per Annum = (Incremental
Reduction in Fatal Accident Rate) * (Flying Hours per
Annum) * (Average Number of Occupants) * (Average
Percentage of Occupants Killed in Fatal Accidents)
• IRPA = (Fatal Accident Rate) * (Individual Flying
Hours per Annum) * (Average Percentage of
Occupants Killed in Fatal Accidents)
 Overview

• The current problem and the goal for improvement

• What’s been proven already
• What remains to achieve the goal
• Justifying the necessary risk mitigation measures
• Conclusions and summing up
 How To Achieve the Air Safety Goal
• Customers must commit to the goal and contract for higher standards.
• Manufacturers must support HUMS/VHM/EVMS, the latest design standards
(FAR 29 - 47) and provide affordable solutions for legacy aircraft.
• Operators must adopt proven global best practices as their minimum
standard
• Regulators must support proven global best practices.
• All stakeholders must support these initiatives:
– Transition to new aircraft built to the latest design standards on new contracts.
– Require annual training in flight simulators to practice crew coordination during
emergency procedures.
– Equip all helicopters with Vibration & Health and Engine Monitoring Systems such
as HUMS/VHM/EVMS
– Require operators to implement quality and safety management systems.
– Require operators to implement HFDM (HOMP).
– Require operators to fly profiles that minimize the risks of engine failure.
– Equip all helicopters with EGPWS or TAWS and TCAS
 We have many imperatives to make these
improvements!
• Respect for people – the disparity between helicopter
safety and airline safety

• ALARP – we know what can be done and that the cost

is not disproportionate to the benefits to be gained
• The Ford Pinto story
• The “Red Face” test
• Good business sense – safer operations will attract
more customers.
 Here Is The Difference the OGP Can
Make
• 10 year accident record for offshore helicopter operations
– Fatal accident rate – 6.4 per 1 million hrs
– 51 fatal accidents
– 250 fatalities
• 10 year accident record for offshore helicopter operations
– Fatal accident rate – 2.0 per 1 million hrs – Average commuter
airline
– 18 fatal accidents and North Sea
helicopters
– 78 fatalities Lives saved - 172
• 10 year accident record for offshore helicopter operations
– Fatal accident rate – 1.0 per 1 million hrs – Average global
airline*
– 9 fatal accidents
– 39 fatalities Lives saved - 211
• Please join the IHST and contribute your knowledge
and data to the process.
• Please “raise the bar” for all helicopter operators.
– Helicopter operators who want to make these
improvements suffer from competition from the low cost
operators who barely meet standards.
• Support IHST goal of reducing helicopter accidents
by 80% and by implementing the risk reduction
measures featured in this presentation.
– Use the process I’ve described to identify the most
effective risk reduction measures for your business.
– Use the quantitative risk assessments tools I’ve described
to justify these measures.
Questions?
 Accident Mitigation - Training
• Land support pilots typically receive only 1- 2 hrs training per year, which
includes annual check rides. Minimum regulatory requirements.
• Few companies provide dedicated operational line training (e.g. for long
line, helirig operations).
• Simulator training is very rarely undertaken by land support pilots.
• Most operations are conducted single pilot in complex aircraft.
• The ability of a single pilot to respond successfully to an emergency,
whilst simultaneously conducting vertical lift ops is limited.
• Many emergencies can only be effectively trained for in a simulator.
• Simulators or flight training devices (FTD) are available for most
helicopter types (S76, B212), but not readily available for many of the
numerous light helicopter types (AS350, B206).
• Simulator training should focus on line orientated flight training and crew
resource management/pilot decision making.
 Accident Mitigation -
Operational Controls, SMS, QA.
• An effective safety management system that systematically
identifies and assesses the hazards associated with a
specific operation and identifies controls to manage those
hazards.
• Well defined operational procedures that include the controls
identified above and would include:
– Operational controls to manage pilot fatigue and crew duty hours.
– Oversight of maintenance and control of deferred defects.
– Weather minimums related to the task, including emergency
response.
• A quality assurance program that checks that the controls
are in place and working.
• The implementation of SMS, QA and company procedures at
remote sites is a challenge - what procedures do you have
in place to assure this?
 Accident Mitigation -
Twin Engine

• Engine failures account for 25% of seismic accidents

• Single engine passenger flights should only be flown over
terrain that allows a safe forced landing in the event of an
engine failure.
• Forested areas and mountainous terrain does not allow this,
but is often the environment in which seismic and
geophysical ops take place.
 Accident Mitigation -
Engine and Vibration Health Monitoring
• First generation HUMS has been proven to detect 69% of
mechanical defects in critical rotating parts before failure.
Later generation systems are more effective.
• Engine monitoring systems and HUMS are now available for
all aircraft types and are becoming widely accepted within
the helicopter industry. The more enlightened helicopter
manufacturers are fitting them as standard to new designs.
• However, no seismic, geophysical operators have yet
equipped with HUMS.
• HUMS not only provides a safety benefit, but also delivers
cost savings through pre-emptive maintenance, component
life management and reduced down time.
 Accident Mitigation -
Two Pilot
Other
5%
•Over 56% of the accidents are
CFIT directly related to pilot human factor
2% Engine Failure
Sling Load
25% issues.
16%

Obstacle strike 5%
•Seismic and geophysical support
Tail Rotor

14%
Component operations are pilot intensive, with
Failure
Pilot Proc
26% 7% short legs and many landings/take
offs or lifts, often into confined
areas.
• Pilot fatigue issues are exacerbated by environmental factors and living
conditions.
• Monitoring of engine and aircraft instruments is very limited during hi line
and vertical lift ops.
• Emergency require flying of the aircraft and taking immediate actions.
• 2 pilots = 2 sets of eyes + 4 hands + 2 brains.
• Operational impact of the weight penalties of the additional pilot can be
offset by the longer crew duty days.