AUTOMATION

SCENARIO
May 10, 2010 National
and Local Elections
 Background
The Commission on Elections started its efforts at
modernizing or automating the electoral process way back in 1992
with Operation MODEX (Modernization and Excellence),
immediately after the first Synchronized National and Local
Elections (NLE).
1.The first try of an automated election system using the Optical
Mark Reader (OMR) technology in the 1996 Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Elections
2.The partial implementation in the ARMM provinces of the same
automated system in the 1998 National and Local Elections
3.The halted nationwide implementation of a centralized
automated counting system in 2004
4.The fully automated election system in the 2008 ARMM Elections
COMELEC continues to fulfill its mandate of conducting election
– be it manual or automated.

Source: www.comelec.gov.ph
 Background
For the coming 2010 elections, the COMELEC is set
to conduct the country’s first nationwide fully
automated elections – from counting of votes to
transmission and canvassing of election results.

Source: www.comelec.gov.ph
 Kinds of Technologies Considered
The following shows the kinds of technologies considered by the
Philippine inspection team during the 15-day inspection trip to the US in
October 1993:

1. Mechanical Leverage Machine - a voting machine, wherein a

voter would face or enter a cabinet-type booth to cast his vote. All
the names are already presented to the voter in the booth, and the
voter would just have to push a button corresponding to the name
of a candidate of his choice, and pull a mechanical lever afterwards.
His vote automatically gets counted.

2. Punch Card System - a voting device, wherein a voter is given a

ballot, with hole slots corresponding to the candidates' names, and
a puncher (similar to that used by our provincial bus conductors in
ticketing their passengers). To cast his vote, the voter has to punch a
hole corresponding to the name of the candidate of his choice. A
separate reader machine does the counting afterwards.

Source: www.comelec.gov.ph
 Kinds of Technologies Considered
3. Optical Mark Reader (OMR) - a ballot counting machine:
wherein a voter is given a ballot, with pre-printed candidates'
names, with corresponding ovals to shade or broken arrows to
connect. The votes in the shaded ballots would be scanned using
an OMR.

4. Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) Machine - a voting

machine wherein a voter is presented with a screen showing all
the names of the candidates, much like the locator screens in the
Glorietta Shopping Malls. To cast his vote, the voter has to touch
the name of the candidate of his choice on the screen, and his
vote automatically gets counted.

Source: www.comelec.gov.ph
Electronic Voting Machines
Used in other Countries
Australia (eVACS)
 Type: Bar code reader
authenticates ballots, which are
completed with a keypad.
 Usage: Eight of 80 polling places
voted with the Electronic Voting
and Counting System, or eVACS, in
the Australia Capital Territory.
 Addressing distrust: The
government specified that the
program's code be open source.
 Addressing multiple votes:
Voters sign in and receive a bar-
coded ballot that gives them one
vote.
 Still at issue: On intellectual-
property grounds, the company
that created eVACS, Software
Improvements, wants to restrict
the source code.
Source: http://news.cnet.com/Global-lessons-in-e-voting/2009-1008_3-5387540.html
 India (EVM)
 Type: Battery-powered electronic
device has buttons next to choices.
 Usage: The Electronic Voting
Machines, or EVMs, were used
countrywide in May for the
parliamentary elections by about
390 million people.
 Addressing distrust: The
simple-to-use machines are built to
address illiteracy and be
tamperproof. Vote data is stored in
nonremovable memory.
 Addressing multiple votes:
Each voter's finger is marked with
indelible ink.
 Still at issue: Questions remain
about the security of the devices
and the tabulator that collects
votes from the devices.
Source: http://news.cnet.com/Global-lessons-in-e-voting/2009-1008_3-5387540.html
 Venezuela (Smartmatic)
 Type: The integrated voting device
has a small touch screen and a
receipt printer.
 Usage: Almost the entire country
voted on the device for an Aug. 15
referendum on the ouster of
President Chavez.
 Addressing distrust: Paper
receipts were kept by polling
stations for random audits.
 Addressing multiple votes: A
voter's fingerprint is transmitted to
a national database, ensuring that
each person votes only once.
 Still at issue: The voting process
still lacks adequate checks on
system integrity.

Source: http://news.cnet.com/Global-lessons-in-e-voting/2009-1008_3-5387540.html
United States (Diebold, among others)
 Type: System has a touch screen
and, in some cases, a receipt
printer.
 Usage: An estimated 31 percent of
voters in the United States will use
the system in the November
presidential election.
 Addressing distrust: Easy-to-
use terminals include accessibility
features for the handicapped.
 Addressing multiple votes: A
chip card given to the voter
contains a key to allow only one
vote.
 Still at issue: Many questions
remain about device security and
the secrecy surrounding machine
development and certification.

Source: http://news.cnet.com/Global-lessons-in-e-voting/2009-1008_3-5387540.html
Philippines (Smartmatic)
 Type: Bar code reader,
scans ballots, with built-in
printer
 Addressing distrust:
Examination and Testing
of Equipment or Device of
the AES and Opening of
the Source Code for
Review
 Addressing multiple
votes: Each voter's finger
is marked with indelible
ink.
 Project Specifications
• Component 1: PAPER-BASED AUTOMATED ELECTION
SYSTEM (AES)

Component 1-A : Election Management System (EMS)

Component 1-B : Precinct-Count Optical Scan (PCOS)
Component 1-C : Counting/Consolidation System (CCS)

• Component 2: PROVISION FOR ELECTRONIC

TRANSMISSION USING PUBLIC TELECOMMUNICATION
NETWORKS

• Component 3: OVERALL PROJECT MANAGEMENT

STATISTICS

• Estimated 47,000,000 registered voters

• 44,009,069 registered voters - as of April 20, 2009 ERB Hearing
• 58,327 registration records cancelled by reason of death
• 1,246,272 registration records deactivated
• Last ERB Hearing on November 16, 2009
• 80 Provinces
• 1,631 cities and municipalities
• 320,415 Established Precincts (estimate)
• 80,136 Clustered Precincts (estimate)
• 37,884 Polling Centers (estimate)
• 82,200 PCOS Machines
• 80,136 PCOS Machines for distribution to clustered precincts
Board of Election Inspectors

• One (1) BEI for every clustered precinct

• Three regular members
– Chairman
– Delivers ballot to voter

– Poll Clerk
– Third Member
• Support Staff
– Depends on number of precincts clustered
– To assist Poll Clerk and Third Member in managing
– List of Voters with Voting Records

– Book of Voters
Board of Election Inspectors

No. of Precincts No. of Support Total no. of

Clustered Staff personnel
(BEI + Support
Staff)
1 none 3
2 none 3
3 1 4
4 2 5
5 3 6
Establishing Identity of Voter

 LIST OF VOTERS
WITH VOTING
RECORDS
 Photograph
Establishing Identity of Voter
Establishing Identity of Voter

 If identity cannot be established through photograph

 Compare signatures
 Use Book of Voters
 Contains applications for registration
• Includes specimen signature of voter
 Other methods to challenge identity
Official Ballots

 Pre-printed
names of
candidates
 300 candidates
can be
accommodated
 150 names per side
of ballot
Official Ballots

 Ovals opposite names of  Shade oval opposite

candidate name of chosen
candidate
PCOS Precinct Count Optical Scan

• One unit per clustered

precinct
• Voter personally feeds
ballot into machine
• Ballot can be fed at any
orientation
• Ballot scanned both
sides simultaneously
TESTING & SEALING PROCEDURES
At least three days before election day

 Public shall accomplish test ballots

 Ballots shall be manually counted and election returns
accomplished
 Same set of ballots that was manually counted shall be fed
into the counting machine
 Manual count shall be compared with the print-out of
the election returns
 If public is satisfied that the manual count is the same as
the automated count, the print-out and manually
prepared election returns shall be signed-off by the
witnesses
 TESTING & SEALING PROCEDURES
At least three days before election day

Machines shall be sealed without any connection

to transmission links
Public shall be allowed to secure the polling
places where the counting machines are installed
The only time that the counting machines shall be
opened is on election day in the presence of
watchers
Voting

 Voting period
 7:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.
Unless there are voters waiting for their turn to
vote
 Poll Clerk lists down names voters queuing

 Poll Clerk calls voter to cast ballot

 Voter who fails to appear after being called twice

shall not longer be allowed to vote
 Precinct set up

At least 10 voters can cast ballot at any one time

Voting

 Before voting starts

 Show that ballot box is
empty
Transparent plastic
 Turn on and initialize
PCOS
 Print “Zero Report”

To show that there is

no entry/vote in
machine’s memory
Counting

• At close of polls
– Perform close function
• To prevent additional
ballots from being
inserted
– After close function, PCOS
automatically
• Starts counting process
• Prints election returns
after completion of
automated count
– Eight (8) copies
Counting

 Insert transmission cable

 After printing first eight (8) copies of ER
To eliminate doubts that the PCOS can be
manipulated remotely
 Perform electronic transmission function
 Print additional twenty-two (22) copies of ER
 Automatically performed by PCOS after
completion of transmission
Canvassing/Consolidation

• Electronically transmitted results

– Used as basis for canvassing/consolidation and
proclamation of winning candidates for
• City/municipal officials
• Provincial officials
• Members, House of Representatives
• Senators and Party-list
– Congress will also receive electronically transmitted
results
• Constitution authorized the Congress to promulgate
rules for canvassing of results for President and Vice-
President
Congress COMELEC
National Manual System
Board of
Canvassers
Physical
transport of Canvassing
Prov. COC

Provincial SOVM/C

Board of
Canvassers Physical
transport

Mun./City COC

Municipal/City SOVP

Board of
Canvassers
Physical
transport

Election Returns
Precinct
Congress COMELEC
National Electronic
Board of
Canvassers
Physical
transport Transmission
Prov. COC

Provincial SOVM/C
Comelec Central
Board of
Back-up Server
Canvassers Physical Advance Results/
transport
Monitoring
Secured
Mun./City COC Public
Municipal/City SOVP Website
Board of
Canvassers Server for
Physical
transport Dominant
Majority/ Minority
Parties, Citizens
Election Returns Arm, KBP
Precinct Advance Results
SECURITY

 Security measures under a manual

election system still applicable
 Strengthen security through
automation
Password

PIN

Digital signatures

Encryption
SECURITY

 128-bit encryption
 2 128

2 = 4
2
• 29 = 512 • 216 = 65,536
2 = 8
3
• 210 = 1024 • 217 = 131,072
4
2 = 16 • 211 = 2048 • 218 = 262,144
5
2 = 32 • 212 = 4096 • 219 = 524,288
6
2 = 64 • 213 = 8192 • 220 = 1,048,576
7
2 = 128 • 214 = 16,384 • 221 = 2,097,152
8
2 = 256 • 215 = 32,768 • 222 = 4,194,304
SECURITY

 128-bit encryption

• 2 =
23 8,388,608
• 230 = 1,073,741,824
• 2 =
24 16,777,216
• 231 = 2,147,483,648
• 2 =
25 33,554,432
• 232 = 4,294,967,296
• 2 =
26 67,108,864
• 233 = 8,569,934,592
• 2 =
27 134,217,728
• 234 = 17,179,869,184
• 2 =
28 268,435,456
• 235 = 34,359,738,368
• 2 =
29 536,870,912
• 236 = 68,719,476,736
SECURITY

 128-bit encryption

• 237 = 137,438,953,472
38
•2 = 274,877,906,944
39
• 240 = 549,755,813,888
•2 = over One Trillion combinations
SECURITY

 128-bit encryption
 Same security system used by banks
 Random Encryption
 Temperature of machine

 Voltage

 Unique machine identity

 User identity

 No single/master decryption code

SECURITY
• Time needed to decrypt one precinct result will be
same amount of time needed to decrypt next
precinct result
• Transmission takes at most 2 minutes
• Copies for distribution
– 30 copies of election returns at the precinct level

– 30 copies of certificate of canvass at municipal

level
– 14 copies of certificate of canvass at provincial
level
SECURITY

 Audit Log
Activities

Time

Date
SECURITY

 Paper Ballot
 Ballot digital image
 Data storage device
 Transmitted results
 Hard copies of election results
FIELD TEST/S

 8 areas
2 for NCR
 2 each (1 urban/1 rural)

Luzon
Visayas
Mindanao
 To test system and transmission in the same
environment/conditions as on election day
CONTINUITY PLAN

 Types of Systems Breakdown

Failsto scan
Able to scan but fails to print ER

Able to print ER but fails to transmit

Able to transmit but fails to

consolidate
CONTINUITY PLAN

 Fails to scan
 Use spare PCOS
 Use PCOS of another precinct

Wait for other PCOS to complete process in its

precinct
Get PCOS and reconfigure for next precinct
Scan ballots
 If all PCOS fails

Manual counting
CONTINUITY PLAN

• Able to scan but fails to print ER

– Use spare PCOS
– Use PCOS of another precinct
• Wait for other PCOS to complete process in its
precinct
• Get PCOS and reconfigure for next precinct
• Use removable storage device of defective
PCOS and let replacement PCOS print ER
– If all PCOS fails
• Manual counting
CONTINUITY PLAN

• Able to print ER but fails to transmit

– Go to nearest precinct or polling center which has a
functioning transmission facility
– Use removable storage device of defective PCOS and
let the functioning facility transmit precinct results
– If all transmission facilities bog down
• Physically transport removable storage device to
canvassing site
– In the presence of watchers and security escorts
CONTINUITY PLAN

• Able to transmit but fails to consolidate

 Use consolidation/canvassing system (CCS) of
another municipality/province
 Use the removable storage device and let
functioning CCS consolidate the results
 Provide back-up canvassing through the Central
Server
 Print results and send the same to affected
board of canvassers
 Print results and constitute special board of
canvassers to take the place of the affected board
 Basic Elements of Elections

• Systems & Procedures

• People
– Misreading of ballots
– Vote-buying – Unreadable handwriting
– Coercion – Error
• Honest
– Intimidation • Deliberate

– Terrorism – Fraud
– Manufactured election
returns
– Tampering of election
results
Successful Implementation

 Vigilance of citizenry
 Cooperation
 Coordination
 Support
THANK YOU!