industries in which firms have competitors but do not face so much competition that they are price takers. Types of Imperfectly Competitive Markets Oligopoly Only a few sellers, each offering a similar or identical product to the others. Monopolistic Competition Many firms selling products that are similar but not identical. Characteristics of an Oligopoly Market
Few sellers offering similar or identical
products Interdependent firms They are best off cooperating and acting like a monopolist by producing a small quantity of output and charging a price above marginal cost. Markets With Only a Few Sellers
Because of there being few sellers, the key
features of oligopoly are the interdependence between firms and the resulting tension between cooperation and self-interest. A Duopoly Example: Demand Schedule for Water Quantity Price Total Revenue 0 $120 $ 0 10 110 1,100 20 100 2,000 30 90 2,700 40 80 3,200 50 70 3,500 60 60 3,600 70 50 3,500 80 40 3,200 90 30 2,700 100 20 2,000 110 10 1,100 120 0 0 A Duopoly Example: Price and Quantity Supplied
The socially efficient quantity of water is
120 gallons, but a monopolist would produce only 60 gallons of water. So what outcome then could be expected from duopolists? Competition, Monopolies, and Cartels The duopolists may agree on a monopoly outcome. Collusion The two firms may agree on the quantity to produce and the price to charge. Cartel The two firms may join together and act in unison. Jack’s TR, MR and profit Joint given Jill’s expected output market decisions Case 1 Case 2 demand making Jill sells 30 units Jill sells 40 units Jack’s Jack’s Jack’s Jack’s Jack’s Jack’s P Q TR MR residual TR MR residual TR MR demand demand 120 0 0 0 0 0 0 110 10 1100 110 0 0 0 0 100 20 2000 90 0 0 0 0 90 30 2700 70 0 0 0 0 80 40 3200 50 10 800 80 0 0 70 50 3500 30 20 1400 60 10 700 70 60 60 3600 10 30 1800 40 20 1200 50 50 70 3500 -10 40 2000 20 30 1500 30 40 80 3200 -30 50 2000 0 40 1600 10 30 90 2700 -50 60 1800 -20 50 1500 -10 20 100 2000 -70 70 1400 -40 60 1200 -30 10 110 1100 -90 80 800 -60 70 700 -50 0 120 0 -110 90 0 -80 80 0 -70
To simplify the analysis, suppose that each producer must make
ten unit increments in output produced. Jill’s TR, MR and profit Joint given Jill’s expected output market decisions Case 1 Case 2 demand making Jack sells 30 units Jack sells 40 units Jill’s Jill’s Jill’s Jill’s Jill’s Jill’s P Q TR MR residual TR MR residual TR MR demand demand 120 0 0 0 0 0 0 110 10 1100 110 0 0 0 0 100 20 2000 90 0 0 0 0 90 30 2700 70 0 0 0 0 80 40 3200 50 10 800 80 0 0 70 50 3500 30 20 1400 60 10 700 70 60 60 3600 10 30 1800 40 20 1200 50 50 70 3500 -10 40 2000 20 30 1500 30 40 80 3200 -30 50 2000 0 40 1600 10 30 90 2700 -50 60 1800 -20 50 1500 -10 20 100 2000 -70 70 1400 -40 60 1200 -30 10 110 1100 -90 80 800 -60 70 700 -50 0 120 0 -110 90 0 -80 80 0 -70 The Equilibrium for an Oligopoly A Nash equilibrium is a situation in which economic actors, interacting with one another but making uncoordinated choices, each chooses its best strategy given the strategies that all the others have chosen.
In the above example, each producing 40 units is a
Nash Equilibrium. Pay-off matrix Jill’s quantity choice 40 units 30 units Jack’s 40 Jack $2,000 quantity units $1,600 each Jill $1,500 choice 30 Jack $1,500 units Jill $2,000 $1,800 each
This is an example of the prisoners’ dilemma; the individuals
are unable to coordinate their decisions but the payoff each receives depends upon the choices made by both.
In general, game theory is the study of how people behave in
strategic situations (i.e., situations in which decisionmakers must consider how others might respond. A dominant strategy is one that is best for a player in a game regardless of the strategies chosen by the other players. Pay-off matrix Jill’s quantity choice 40 units 30 units Jack’s 40 Jack $2,000 quantity units $1,600 each Jill $1,500 choice 30 Jack $1,500 units Jill $2,000 $1,800 each
In this example, Jack and Jill each selling 40
units is the Nash equilibrium. Summary of Equilibrium for an Oligopoly Possible outcome if oligopoly firms pursue their own self-interests: Joint output is greater than the monopoly quantity but less than the competitive industry quantity. Market prices are lower than monopoly price but greater than competitive price. Total profits are less than the monopoly profit. Market demand Q0 = 30 Jill's Jill's P Q TR MR P residual TR MR demand 65 55 $3,575 11 65 25 $1,625 51 64 56 $3,584 9 64 26 $1,664 39 63 57 $3,591 7 63 27 $1,701 37 62 58 $3,596 5 62 28 $1,736 35 61 59 $3,599 3 61 29 $1,769 33 60 60 $3,600 1 60 30 $1,800 31 59 61 $3,599 -1 59 31 $1,829 29 58 62 $3,596 -3 58 32 $1,856 27 57 63 $3,591 -5 57 33 $1,881 25 56 64 $3,584 -7 56 34 $1,904 23 55 65 $3,575 -9 55 35 $1,925 21 54 66 $3,564 -11 54 36 $1,944 19