UPDATES IN JURISPRUDENCE

PROF. ELMER T. RABUYA

(BAR 2017)
Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title

Based on Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act in relation

to Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, an
applicant for land registration must comply with the
following requirements:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-
in interest, has been in possession and occupation of
the property subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership;
Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title

4. The possession and occupation must have

taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier;
and
5. The property subject of the application must
be an agricultural land of the public domain.
[La Tondena, Inc. v. Republic, 765 SCRA 265
(2015)]
Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title

** The case of Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic

(2009) clarified that the June 12, 1945 reckoning
point refers to date of possession and not to date of
land classification as alienable and disposable.

**The court held that "the agricultural land subject

of the application needs only to be classified as
alienable and disposable as of the time of the
application, provided the applicant's possession
and occupation of the land dated back to June 12,
1945, or earlier.''
Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic (2009)
Applicable rules for application for original
registration under Sec. 14 (2), Property
Registration Decree, PD 1529:
1. Applicable period is 30 years, as required for
extraordinary prescription under Article 1137
of the Civil Code.
2. Under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, only
patrimonial properties of the State can be
acquired by way of acquisitive prescription.
Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic (2009)
3. Lands of the public domain, whether
declared alienable and disposable or not,
are property of public dominion and thus
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
For as long as the property belongs to the
State, although already classified as alienable
or disposable, it remains property of the
public dominion if when it is intended for
some public service or for the development
of the national wealth.
Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic (2009)
4. There must be an express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service
or the development of the national wealth or that the property
has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express
declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or
disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to
Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It
is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly
declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service
or for the development of the national wealth that the period of
acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall
be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law.
Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic (2013)
Classification of Lands Based on Ownership
Land, which is an immovable property, may be classified as
either of public dominion or of private ownership.
• Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is
intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without
being for public use, and is intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth.
• Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or
although of such character but no longer intended for
public use or for public service forms part of the
patrimonial property of the State.
• Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of
the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private
ownership if it belongs to a private individual.
Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic (2013)
Classification of Lands Based on Alienability
• The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification
under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural,
forest or timber, and mineral, but added national
parks.
• Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a
limit on the type of public land that may be
alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public
domain may be alienated; all other natural
resources may not be.
Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic (2013)
Classification of Lands Based on Alienability
• Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two
categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or
those classified as lands of private ownership under
Article 425 of the Civil Code, without limitation; and (b)
lands of the public domain, or the public lands as
provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation
that the lands must only be agricultural.
• Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber,
mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of
alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as
agricultural.
Caravan Travel & Tours Int’l, Inc. v. Abejar
(2016)
The Court harmonizes the requirements of Article 2180, in
relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and the so-called
registered-owner rule and prior conflicting rulings. Recall that
these rules appear to be in conflict when it comes to cases in
which the employer is also the registered owner of a vehicle.

• Article 2180 requires proof of two things: first, an

employment relationship between the driver and the
owner; and second, that the driver acted within the scope
of his or her assigned tasks.
• On the other hand, applying the registered-owner rule only
requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant-employer
is the registered owner of the vehicle.
Caravan Travel & Tours Int’l, Inc. v.
Abejar (2016)
• In Caravan, it was held that the appropriate approach in cases
where both the registered-owner rule and Article 2180 apply, is
that the plaintiff must first establish that the employer is the
registered owner of the vehicle in question. Once the plaintiff
successfully proves ownership, there arises a disputable
presumption that the requirements of Article 2180 have been
proven.
• As a consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to
show that no liability under Article 2180 has arisen. Once the
plaintiff successfully proves ownership, it is now up to defendant to
establish that it incurred no liability under Article 2180.
• This it can do by presenting proof of any of the following: first, that
it has no employment relationship with the driver; second, that the
driver acted outside the scope of his assigned tasks; or third, that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of the driver-employee.
Aquino v. Municipality of Malay,
Aklan (2014)
• While a hotel, in itself, cannot be considered as a
nuisance per se but only a nuisance per accidens
because it was build in the no build zone, nonetheless,
the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s
demolition because it failed to comply with the legal
requirements prior to construction.
• Under Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, mayors are
empowered to order the closure and removal of
illegally constructed establishments for failing to secure
the necessary permits. Given the presence of the
requirements under Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC,
whether the building constituted a nuisance per se or a
nuisance per accidens becomes immaterial.
Cruz v. Pandacan Hiker’s Club, Inc.
(2016)
• A basketball ring is not a nuisance per se that
is susceptible to a summary abatement. At
most, it is a nuisance per accidens. A
basketball ring, by itself, poses no immediate
harm or danger to anyone but is merely an
object of recreation. Neither is it, by its
nature, injurious to rights of property, of
health or of comfort of the community and,
thus, it may not be abated as a nuisance
without the benefit of a judicial hearing
Pilar Development Corp. v. Dumadag
(2013)
• The banks or rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout
their entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty
(20) meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their
margins, are subject to the easement of public use in the interest of recreation,
navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. (Easements For Public Use)

• When the developer of a subdivision filed an action for recovery of possession

against the occupants of a property designated as open space of the subdivision,
the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the property is within
the 3-meter legal easement of Mahabang Ilog Creek. The Court ruled that the 3-
meter strip/zone is public land. As to the issue of who is the proper party entitled
to institute a case with respect to the 3-meter strip/zone, the Court ruled that
both the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG and the local government,
may file an action depending on the purpose sought to be achieved. The former
shall be responsible in case of action for reversion under C.A. 141, while the latter
may also bring an action to enforce the relevant provisions of Republic Act No.
7279 (otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992).
Calimoso v. Roullo (2016)
• Whenever there are several tenements surrounding the dominant
estate, the right-of-way must be established on the tenement
where the distance to the public road or highway is shortest and
where the least damage would be caused. If these two criteria
(shortest distance and least damage) do not concur in a single
tenement, the Court have held in the past that the least prejudice
criterion must prevail over the shortest distance criterion.
• As between a right of way that would demolish a fence of strong
materials to provide ingress and egress to a public highway and
another right of way which although longer will only require a van
or vehicle to make a turn, the second alternative should be
preferred. [Quintanilla v. Abangan (2009)]
• As between a right of way that would destroy the wire fence and a
house and another right of way which although longer will only
traverse two vacant lots, the second alternative should be
preferred. [Calimoso v. Roullo (2016)]
Liwag v. Happy Glen Loop
Homeowners Association, Inc. (2012)
The water facility on a certain lot in a subdivision,
which is an encumbrance for the benefit of the
community, is continuous and apparent easement,
because it is used incessantly without human
intervention, and because it is continually kept in
view by the overhead water tank, which reveals its
use to the public. Since the facility was continuously
used for more than 30 years as the residents’ sole
source of water, it was held that an easement of
water facility has already been acquired through
prescription.
Quintos v. Nicolas (2014)
The co-owners filed an action for partition which was
dismissed by the trial court for failure of the parties and
counsel to appear. The judgment of dismissal became
final. Subsequently, some of the co-owners filed an action
against the other co-owners for quieting of title alleging
exclusion ownership thereof by prescription. The
defendants in the action for quieting of title filed a
counter-claim for partition. The parties who filed the
action for quieting of title alleged that the counter-claim
for partition is already barred by res judicata because the
dismissal of the action for partition was with prejudice.
Quintos v. Nicolas (2014)
On the issue of partition, the Court ruled that while the
dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute has the effect of
adjudication on the merits, and is necessarily understood to
be with prejudice to the filing of another action, such
dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of
Court cannot defeat the right of a co-owner to ask for
partition at any time, provided that there is no actual
adjudication of ownership of shares yet. The Court explained
that between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3
and the right granted to co-owners under Article 494 of the
Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To construe otherwise
would diminish the substantive right of a co-owner through
the promulgation of procedural rules.
Vda. de Figuracion v. Figuracion-
Gerilla (2013)
The act of some co-owners in effecting the
registration of the land only in their names did
not effectively repudiate the co-ownership
when they allowed the other co-owner to build
her house on the subject property without any
opposition from them. Such act constitutes an
implied recognition of the co-ownership which
in turn negates the presence of a clear notice of
repudiation to the ousted co-owner.
Sale of a concrete portion by co-
owner
• As held in Lopez v. Vda. De Cuaycong that the fact that an agreement
purported to sell a concrete portion of a co-owned property does not
render the sale void, for it is well-established that the binding force of a
contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so. .
“Quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest.” (When a
thing is of no force as I do it, it shall have as much force as it can have).
Consequently, whether the disposition involves an abstract or concrete
portion of the co-owned property, the sale remains validly executed. What
will be affected on the sale is only his proportionate share, subject to the
results of the partition. The co-owners who did not give their consent to
the sale stand to be unaffected by the alienation. [Cited in Vagilidad v.
Vagilidad, Jr., 507 SCRA 94 (2006) and Torres, Jr. v. Lapinid, 742 SCRA 646
(2014)]

• NOTE: The ruling in Cabrera v. Ysaac (2014), that a contract of sale which
purports to sell a specific or definite portion of unpartitioned land is null
and void ab initio, is an aberration.
Arambulo v. Nolasco (2014)
• A co-owner cannot abe forced to sell his share in the co-ownership by
invoking Article 491 of the Civil Code. While alienation of the thing by sale
of the property is an act of strict dominion and, therefore, an act of
alteration, it does not mean that a sale of commonly owned real property
is covered by the second paragraph of Article 491, such that if a co–owner
withholds consent to the sale, the courts, upon a showing of a clear
prejudice to the common interest, may, as adequate relief, order the grant
of the withheld consent.

• Instead, the applicable law is Article 493 of the Civil Code, which clearly
establishes that each co–owner shall have full ownership of his part and of
its fruits and benefits. That part which ideally belongs to them, or their
mental portion, may be disposed of as they please, independent of the
decision of their co–owners. Insofar as the sale of co–owned properties is
concerned, there is no common interest that may be prejudiced should
one or more of the co–owners refuse to sell the co–owned property.
Cruz v. Catapang (2008)
The construction of a house on the co-owned
property is an act of dominion. Therefore, it is an
alteration falling under Article 491 of the Civil Code.
As such, when only one of the co-owners gave his
consent to a third person to construct a house on
the co-owned property, the other co-owners can
successfully maintain an action for ejectment and
the consent of only one co-owner will not warrant
the dismissal of the complaint for forcible entry
filed against the builder.
Redemption of co-owned property
• The one who redeemed the co-owned proeprty had the right to be
reimbursed for the redemption price and until reimbursed, holds a
lien upon the subject property for the amount due. [Cabales v. CA,
531 SCRA 691 (2007) ]
• The failure of the other co-owners to reimburse the amounts
advanced by the one who redeemed in payment of the loan does
not entitle the latter to claim full ownership of the co-owned
property. It only gives him the right to claim reimbursement for the
amounts he advanced in behalf of the co-ownership. Such advance
payments are in the nature of necessary expenses for the
preservation of the co-ownership. Article 488 of the Civil Code
provides that necessary expenses may be incurred by one co-
owner, subject to his right to collect reimbursement from the
remaining co-owners. Until reimbursed, he holds a lien upon the
subject property for the amount he advanced. [Taghoy v. Tigol, Jr.,
626 SCRA 341 (2010)
Basbas v. Sayson (2011)
The Court pointed out that even just one of the co-
owners, by himself alone, can bring an action for the
recovery of the co-owned property, even through an
action for revival of judgment, because the enforcement
of the judgment would result in such recovery of
property. Thus, it is not necessary in said action that all of
the parties, in whose favor the case for partition was
adjudged, be made plaintiffs to the action for revival of
judgment. Any which one of said prevailing parties, who
had an interest in the enforcement of the decision, may
file the complaint for revival of judgment, even just by
himself.
Requisites of Article 461, NCC
If indeed a property was the former bed of a river or creek that
changed its course and passed through the property of the
claimant (owner whose land is occupied by the new course),
then, pursuant to Article 461, the ownership of the old bed left
to dry by the change of course was automatically acquired by the
claimant. Before such a conclusion can be reached, the fact of
natural abandonment of the old course must be shown, that is, it
must be proven that the river or creek indeed changed its course
without artificial or man-made intervention. Thus, the claimant
must prove three key elements by clear and convincing evidence.
These are: (1) the old course of the river or creek, (2) the new
course of the river or creek, and (3) the change of course of the
river or creek from the old location to the new location by
natural occurrence. [Galang v. Reyes (2012)]
Second option Under Art. 448, NCC
• In the event that the seller elects to sell the
lot, the price must be fixed at the “prevailing
market value.” The reckoning period for
valuing the property in case the landowner
exercised his rights in accordance with Article
448 shall be at the time the landowner
elected his choice. [Department of Education
v. Casibang (2016); Vda. de Roxas v. Our Lady’s
Foundation, Inc., 692 SCRA 578 (2013), Tuatis
v. Escol (2009)]
Art. 448; Rosales v. Castelltort (2005)
From the time the good faith of the possessor ceases, the
payment of reasonable rent should accordingly commence at
that time since he can no longer avail of the rights provided
under the law for builders in good faith.

• The payment of rentals should continue until the

landowner serves notice of its option upon the builder and
the court; that is, if such option is for the landowner to
appropriate the improvements and/or structures.
• If the option chosen by petitioners is compulsory sale,
however, the payment of rent should continue up to the
actual transfer of ownership.
Art. 448; Landowner must choose
Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to
him, nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose one. He
cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the building to
remove the building from the land without first exercising
either option. It is only if the owner chooses to sell his land,
and the builder or planter fails to purchase it where its
value is not more than the value of the improvements, that
the owner may remove the improvements from the land.
The owner is entitled to such remotion only when, after
having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay
for the same. [Torbela v. Rosario, 661 SCRA 633 (2011);
Benedicto v. Flores, 632 SCRA 446 (2010); Arangote v.
Maglunob, 579 SCRA 620 (2009)]
Narvaez v. Alciso (2009)
• Article 448 is inapplicable in cases involving contracts of sale with right
of repurchase; it is inapplicable when the owner of the land is the
builder, sower, or planter. If for example, the vendee a retro introduced
improvements on the subject property prior to the repurchase, Article
448 will not apply because it will be absurd to compel him to buy the
land which he owns.

• In a sale with right of repurchase, the applicable provisions are Articles

1606 and 1616 of the Civil Code, not Article 448. Under Article 1616,
the vendor a retro may exercise his right of redemption by paying the
vendee a retro (1) the price of the sale, (2) the expenses of the
contract, (3) legitimate payments made by reason of the sale, and (4)
the necessary and useful expenses made on the thing sold. Useful
expenses include improvements which augment the value of the land.
Art. 448 and possessor by mere
tolerance
• In the recent case Department of Education v. Casibang
(2016), the Court considered the Department of Education
a builder in good faith despite being a mere possessor by
tolerance because the landowner permitted the
construction of building and improvements to conduct
classes on his property.

• In Feliciano v. Zaldivar (2006), the Court applied Article 448

even if the possession by the builder was by mere tolerance
because the Court found the parties mutually in bad faith
considering that the landowner did not lift a finger to
prevent the construction of the house despite knowledge
thereof.
Community Cagayan, Inc. v. Nanol
(2012)
• As a general rule, Article 448 on builders in good faith does not
apply where there is a contractual relation between the parties. But
in Communities Cagayan, Inc. case, where there exists a contract to
sell between the parties, the Court also applied Article 448 even if
the builders do not have a claim of title over the property since
ownership still remains with the seller.

• In said case, the Court ruled that respondent-spouses were builders

in good faith because no evidence was presented to show that
petitioner opposed or objected to the improvements introduced by
the respondent-spouses. The Court further ruled that the petitioner
could be presumed to have consented to the improvements being
constructed because being a subdivision developer, petitioner must
have given the respondent-spouses permits to commence and
undertake the construction.
Expanded concept of builder in good
faith
In some special cases, the Court applied Article 448 of the Civil Code
beyond the recognized and limited definition of good faith, e.g., cases
where the builders knew that they were not the owners of the land but
they constructed improvements on the land of another with the consent
of the owner. In those cases, the Court found that the owners knew and
approved of the construction of improvements on the property. Hence,
the ruled therein that the structures were built in good faith, even though
the builders knew that they were constructing the improvement on land
owned by another.

[Aquino v. Aguilar, 760 SCRA 444 (2015) and Community Cagayan, Inc. v.
Nanol, 685 SCRA 453 (2012); see also Automat Realty and Development
Corp. v. Dela Cruz, Sr., 737 SCRA 395 (2014) and Department of Education
v. Casibang, 782 SCRA 326 (2016)]
Art. 437; Republic v. Rural Bank of
Kabacan, Inc (2012)
In an expropriation case, the Court uphold the CA ruling
which deleted the inclusion of the value of the excavated
soil in the payment for just compensation because there
is no legal basis to separate the value of the excavated
soil from that of the expropriated properties. The Court,
citing Article 437 of the Civil Code and the case of
National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim (2007), explained
that in the context of expropriation proceedings, the soil
has no value separate from that of the expropriated
land and that just compensation ordinarily refers to the
value of the land to compensate for what the owner
actually loses
Manila Electric Company v. The City Assessor (2015);
Capitol Wireless, Inc. v. Provincial Treasurer of
Batangas (2016)
• As between the Civil Code, a general law governing
property and property relations, and the Local
Government Code, a special law granting local
government units the power to impose real property
tax, the latter prevails for the purpose of determining
which property is subject to real property tax.
• Submarine or undersea communications cables are
akin to electric transmission lines which this Court has
recently declared in Manila Electric Company v. City
Assessor and City Treasurer of Lucena City, as "no
longer exempted from real property tax" and may
qualify as "machinery" subject to real property tax
under the Local Government Code.
 Morales v. Olondriz (2016)
On preterition:
• The decedent's will evidently omitted
Francisco Olondriz as an heir, legatee, or
devisee. As the decedent's illegitimate son,
Francisco is a compulsory heir in the direct
line. Unless Morales could show otherwise,
Francisco's omission from the will leads to the
conclusion of his preterition.
 Morales v. Olondriz (2016)
On conduct of probate:
• The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the scope of
the court's inquiry is limited to questions on the extrinsic
validity of the will; the probate court will only determine the
will's formal validity and due execution. However, this rule is
not inflexible and absolute. It is not beyond the probate
court's jurisdiction to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the
will when so warranted by exceptional circumstances. When
practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of
the will be passed upon even before it is probated, the
probate court should meet the issue.
Morales v. Olondriz (2016)
The decedent's will does not contain specific
legacies or devices and Francisco's preterition
annulled the institution of heirs. The annulment
effectively caused the total abrogation of the will,
resulting in total intestacy of the inheritance. The
decedent's will, no matter how valid it may appear
extrinsically, is null and void. The conduct of
separate proceedings to determine the intrinsic
validity of its testamentary provisions would be
superfluous. Thus, we cannot attribute error - much
less grave abuse of discretion - on the RTC for
ordering the case to proceed intestate.
Hacbang v. Alo (2015)
• Ownership over the inheritance passes to the
heirs at the precise moment of death - not at
the time the heirs are declared, nor at the
time of the partition, nor at the distribution
of the properties. There is no interruption
between the end of the decedent's
ownership and the start of the
heir/legatee/devisee's ownership.
Hacbang v. Alo (2015)
• For intestate heirs, this means that they are
immediately entitled to their hereditary
shares in the estate even though they may not
be entitled to any particular properties yet.
For legatees and devisees granted specific
properties, this means that they acquire
ownership over the legacies and devises at
that immediate moment without prejudice to
the legitimes of compulsory heirs.
Lee v. Tambago (2008)
• A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of
the will in question shows that this particular
requirement was neither strictly nor substantially
complied with. For one, there was the
conspicuous absence of a notation of the
residence certificates of the notarial witnesses
Noynay and Grajo in the acknowledgment.
Similarly, the notation of the testators old
residence certificate in the same
acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law.
These omissions by respondent invalidated the
will.
Samaniego-Celada v. Abena (2008)
Anent the contestants submission that the
will is fatally defective for the reason that its
attestation clause states that the will is
composed of three (3) pages while in truth
and in fact, the will consists of two (2) pages
only because the attestation is not a part of
the notarial will, the same is not accurate.
Samaniego-Celada v. Abena (2008)
• While it is true that the attestation clause is not a part of
the will, the court, after examining the totality of the will,
is of the considered opinion that error in the number of
pages of the will as stated in the attestation clause is not
material to invalidate the subject will. It must be noted
that the subject instrument is consecutively lettered with
pages A, B, and C which is a sufficient safeguard from the
possibility of an omission of some of the pages. The error
must have been brought about by the honest belief that
the will is the whole instrument consisting of three (3)
pages inclusive of the attestation clause and the
acknowledgement. The position of the court is in
consonance with the doctrine of liberal interpretation
enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code
Lopez v. Lopez (2012)
• While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for
defects in the form of the attestation clause, Richard
likewise failed in this respect. The statement in the
Acknowledgment portion of the subject last will and
testament that it "consists of 7 pages including the
page on which the ratification and acknowledgment
are written" cannot be deemed substantial
compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages
including its acknowledgment which discrepancy
cannot be explained by mere examination of the will
itself but through the presentation of evidence
aliunde.
Echavez v. Dozen Construction and
Development Corp. (2010)
• As the CA correctly found, the purported attestation
clause embodied in the Acknowledgment portion
does not contain the number of pages on which the
deed was written. The exception to this rule in
Singson v. Florentino and Taboada v. Hon.
Rosal,cannot be applied to the present case, as the
facts of this case are not similar with those of Singson
and Taboada. In those cases, the Court found that
although the attestation clause failed to state the
number of pages upon which the will was written, the
number of pages was stated in one portion of the
will. This is not the factual situation in the present
case.
Echavez v. Dozen Construction and
Development Corp. (2010)
• Even granting that the Acknowledgment embodies what
the attestation clause requires, we are not prepared to
hold that an attestation clause and an acknowledgment
can be merged in one statement. That the requirements
of attestation and acknowledgment are embodied in two
separate provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 805 and 806,
respectively) indicates that the law contemplates two
distinct acts that serve different purposes. An
acknowledgment is made by one executing a deed,
declaring before a competent officer or court that the deed
or act is his own. On the other hand, the attestation of a
will refers to the act of the instrumental witnesses
themselves who certify to the execution of the instrument
before them and to the manner of its execution.
Seangio v. Reyes (2006)
• Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across
as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the
formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is
written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself.
An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced
from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not
make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s property,
the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of
disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance
results in the disposition of the property of the testator
Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the
absence of Alfredo.
• Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be
given effect. [
Testate Estate of Late AlipioAbada v.
Abaja (2005)
• There is no statutory requirement to state in
the will itself that the testator knew the
language or dialect used in the will.[25] This is
a matter that a party may establish by proof
aliunde.
Heirs of Policarpio M. Ureta, Sr. v.
Heirs of Liberato M. Ureta (2011)
• Preterition is thus a concept of testamentary
succession and requires a will. In the case at
bench, there is no will involved. Therefore,
preterition cannot apply.
Palaganas v. Palaganas (2011)
• Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills
executed by foreigners abroad although the
same have not as yet been probated and
allowed in the countries of their execution. A
foreign will can be given legal effects in our
jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states
that the will of an alien who is abroad produces
effect in the Philippines if made in accordance
with the formalities prescribed by the law of the
place where he resides, or according to the
formalities observed in his country.
Del Rosario v. Ferrer (2010)
• The trial court cannot be faulted for passing
upon, in a petition for probate of what was
initially supposed to be a donation mortis
causa, the validity of the document as a
donation inter vivos and the nullity of one of
the donors subsequent assignment of his
rights and interests in the property. The Court
has held before that the rule on probate is not
inflexible and absolute
Orendain, Jr. v. Trusteeship of the Estate of
Dona Margarita Rodriguez (2009)
• The creation of a perpetual trust for the
administration of her properties and the
income accruing therefrom, for specified
beneficiaries is not invalid.
• The trust is upheld, but only insofar as the first
twenty-year period is concerned. The
perpetual prohibition against alienation was
valid only for twenty (20) years.
Arado v. Alcoran (2015)
• As certified in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate
Court [182 SCRA427,438 (1990)], the right of
representation is not available to illegitimate
descendants of legitimate children in the
inheritance of a legitimate grandparent.
CIR v. Primetown Property Group, Inc. (2007)
CIR vs. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc (2010)
Co v. New Prosperity Plastic Products (2014)

• Sec. 31, Chapter VIII, Book I, 1987

Administrative Code impliedly repeals Art. 13,
NCC with respect to meaning of “years.”

• A “year” now means 12 calendar months.

Orion Savings Bank v. Suzuki (2014)

• Doctrine of processual presumption is also

referred to as “doctrine of presumed identity
approach” in private international law.
• All matters affecting real property, including
legal capacity to acquire, is governed by lex rei
sitae.
• Property relations is governed by the national
law of the spouses.
Del Soccoro v. Van Wilsem (2014)

• Issue of obligation to give support by alien father

is governed by national law of the father.

• But even if the national law of the father neither

enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child
nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, said
foreign law cannot be applied in the Philippines
because it is contrary to a sound and established
policy of the forum.
Willaware Products Corporation vs. Jesichris
Manufacturing Corp. (2014)
• Concept of "unfair competition" under Article 28
of the NCC is very much broader than that
covered by intellectual property laws.

• In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it

must have two characteristics: (1) it must involve
an injury to a competitor or trade rival, and (2) it
must involve acts which are characterized as
"contrary to good conscience," or "shocking to
judicial sensibilities," or otherwise unlawful.
Continental Steel Manufacturing Corp. v.
Montano (2010)
• If issue is not the right of “unborn child,” no
need to determine the civil personality of
conceived child, like when the issue is the
right of parent under the CBA with employer.
• Civil Code did not define death.
• Death simply means cessation of life.
• Legitimacy attaches from the moment of
conception.
Determination of “sex” (legal
capacity)
Silverio v. Republic (2007)
 Sex is determined at birth by visual
examination of genitals.
 No law recognizing effects of sex
reassignment.
Republic v. Cagandahan (2008)
 But if doubt in genitals is due to abnormality
in body, choice of individual governs.
Effect of absence of love in marriage
Republic v. Albios (2013)
 Marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or
otherwise, such as convenience, companionship,
money, status, and title, provided that they comply
with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love is
not the only valid cause for marriage.
Republic v. Romero II (2016)
 The fact that the husband married his wife not out of
love, but out of reverence for the latter’s parents, does
not mean that he is psychologically incapacitated.
Instances where “no marriage to speak of”

Morigo v. People (2004)

 If what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage
contract by the parties, without the presence of the
solemnizing officer.
 Court acquitted accused of bigamy and ruled that Article
40, FC does not apply.

Republic v. Olaybar (2013)

 Involving a case of identity theft, the Court allowed the
correction of an entry in the civil registry by cancelling the
wife portion in the subject marriage contract without need
of a judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage, on the
ground that there was no marriage to speak of.
Requisites of Marriage Ceremony

Ronulo v. People (2014)

 The minimum requirements constituting a
marriage ceremony: first, there should be the
personal appearance of the contracting
parties before a solemnizing officer; and
second, their declaration in the presence of
not less than two witnesses that they take
each other as husband and wife.
3 Basic Legal Premises on Divorce: Bayot v. CA
(2008)
• Divorce obtained abroad by an alien married to a Philippine
national may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the
decree of divorce is valid according to the national law of
the foreigner.

• Reckoning point is not the citizenship of the divorcing

parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad.

• Absolute divorce secured by a Filipino married to another

Filipino is contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality and shall not be recognized in this jurisdiction.
ART. 26, PAR. 2, FC

Republic v. Orbecido III (2005)

 In applying the provision of the second
paragraph of Article 26, the reckoning point is
not the citizenship of the parties at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.
ART. 26, PAR. 2, FC

Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas (2010)

 Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code while the
alien spouse can claim no right under said provision.
The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling
the doubts created by the divorce decree.

 The registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil

registry without the requisite judicial recognition is
patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.
ART. 26, PAR. 2, FC

Garcia v. Recio (2001) and Amor-Catalan v. CA (2006)

 Before the divorce decree can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as
a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign
law allowing it, which must be proved considering that
our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws..
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas (2010)
 The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be
made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of
special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or
right of a party or a particular fact.
ART. 26, PAR. 2, FC

Dacasin v. Dacasin (2010)

 Philippine courts will recognize the validity of an absolute
divorce obtained abroad, insofar as the foreign spouse is
concerned irrespective of who obtained the divorce,
provided such decree is valid according to the national law
of the foreigner.

San Luis v. San Luis (2007)

 There is no need to retroactively apply the provisions of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code because
there is sufficient jurisprudential basis to apply the rule
embodied in said law to absolute divorces obtained by the
foreign spouse prior to the effecivity of the Family Code.
ART. 34, FC.
Republic v. Dayot (2008) and De Castro v. Assidao-
De Castro (2008)
 Falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation,
where the parties have in truth fallen short of the
minimum five-year requirement, effectively
renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a
marriage license.
 The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered
as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of
marriage.
ART. 34, FC.
Santiago v. People (2015)
 The falsity of an affidavit of cohabitation
CANNOT be used as a defense in the crime of
bigamy, for it will be the height of absurdity
for the Court to allow the accused to use her
illegal act to escape criminal conviction.
Petition for Nullity vs. Rule 108
Barza v. City Civil Registrar, Himamaylan, Negros Occidental
(2009)
 Court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Republic v. Olaybar (2013)

 In case of identity theft, Court allowed the correction of the
certificate of marriage by cancelling the name of the
respondent in the wife portion thereof under Rule 108. It
was held that the respondent did not seek the nullification
of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of.
Personality to File Petition for Nullity
Juliano-Llave v. Republic (2011) and Fujiki v.
Marinay (2013)
 The rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the
husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage does not apply if the
reason behind the petition is bigamy.
 Or better yet, the rule refers to the husband or
the wife of the subsisting marriage because the
parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the
husband nor the wife under the law.
ART. 36, FC
Suazo v. Suazo (2010); Agraviador v. Agraviador (2010) and
Ting v. Velez-Ting (2009)
 The case of Ngo Te v. Yu Te did not abandon the Molina
guidelines.
 It simply suggested for the relaxation of its stringent
requirements.
Tenebro v. CA (2004)
 Even if 2nd marriage is void under Art. 36, crime of bigamy is
still committed because there is recognition written into
the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio,
may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal
consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy.
Art. 40, FC
Antone v. Beronilla (2010)
 Morigo v. People did not abandon Mercado v.
Tan. Mercado is still good law.
Jarillo v. People (2010) and Montanez v. Cipriano
(2012)
 Where 1st marriage is declared void under Art.
36, Court still applied Art. 40 even if 2nd marriage
was before FC. Court explained that Art. 40 may
be applied retroactively because it is a mere rule
of procedure.
Art. 41, FC
SSS v. Vda. De Bailon (2006)
 There are two ways of terminating the
subsequent marriage, to wit: (1) by the
recording of the affidavit of reappearance; or
(2) by a judicial declaration of dissolution or
termination of the subsequent marriage.
 Mere reappearance of absentee spouse does
not terminate marriage.
Art. 41, FC
Santos v. Santos (2014)
 If the presumptively dead spouse has not really been
absent and the judicial declaration of presumptive
death was obtained by fraud, the second is marriage is
void for being bigamous.

 A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if

it was contracted after a court declaration of
presumptive death, does not terminate the first
marriage because it lacks the requirement of a well-
founded belief that the spouse is already dead. Hence,
the second marriage is void for being bigamous.
Santos v. Santos (2014)
 If the presumptively dead spouse has not
really been absent and the judicial declaration
of presumptive death was obtained by fraud,
the remedy is not the filing of an affidavit of
reappearance but an action to annul the
judgment declaring him/her presumptively
dead.
Santos v. Santos (2014)
The Court reasoned out that if the presumptively dead spouse
is to be limited to the filing of an affidavit of reappearance as
his/her remedy, such remedy is not sufficient because: (1) it
carries with it an admission on the part of the first spouse that
his or her marriage to the present spouse was terminated
when he or she was declared absent or presumptively dead;
(2) if the subsequent marriage is terminated by mere
recording of the affidavit of reappearance, the children of the
subsequent marriage conceived before the termination shall
still be considered legitimate; (3) the property relations of the
spouse in the subsequent marriage will be the same as in
valid marriages; and (4) a judgment declaring presumptive
death is a defense against prosecution for bigamy.
Art. 41, FC
Manuel v. People (2005)
 Article 41 of the FC was enacted to harmonize
civil law and Article 349 of the RPC and to put
to rest the confusion spawned by the previous
rulings of the Court and comments of eminent
authorities on Criminal Law.
Absolute Community/Conjugal Partnership

Hapitan v. Lagradilla (2016)

 When a husband waives a court decision
declaring sale of conjugal property as void w/o
wife’s consent, waiver is invalid under Art. 89.

Flores v. Lindo (2011)

 When wife mortgaged conjugal property w/o
husband consent, mortgage is void. But
subsequent execution of SPA by husband
authorizing wife to mortgage the same is
perfection of the continuing offer.
Absolute Community/Conjugal Partnership:
Art. 103 and 130, FC
Domingo v. Molina (2016)
 Where death and sale took place prior to FC, Art. 130
cannot be applied retroactively because vested rights will
be prejudiced. Sale is valid but will only affect the ideal
share of selling co-owner.

Heirs of Go, Sr. v. Servacio (2011) ** Bersamin

 Where death was prior to FC but sale was during effectivity
of FC, Court ruled that sale is not void if said portion has
not yet been allocated by judicial or extrajudicial partition
to another heir of the deceased spouse. . Sale is valid but
will only affect the ideal share of selling co-owner.
Absolute Community/Conjugal Partnership

Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, Sr. (2012)

 Property of regime of a marriage celebrated
under the Civil Code w/o marriage settlement
is conjugal partnership. And said regime is not
automatically converted into absolute
community upon effectivity of FC. Article 75
does not apply retroactively even if no vested
rights are prejudiced.
Absolute Community/Conjugal Partnership:
Presumption of Conjugality
Dela Pena v. Avila (2012)
 When the property is registered in the name of only
one spouse and there is no showing as to when the
property was acquired by same spouse, this is an
indication that the property belongs exclusively to the
said spouse.

 If the property is registered in the name of one of the

spouses, with a description that he or she “is married
to” the other spouse, the same is merely descriptive of
the civil status of the registered owner.
Absolute Community/Conjugal Partnership:
Presumption of Conjugality
Matthews v. Taylor (2009)
 Even if the property was acquired during the
marriage, the presumption in favor of
conjugality cannot be applied with respect to
private lands if one of the spouses is an alien
for this will be in violation of Section 7, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
aliens from acquiring private lands in the
Philippines.
Absolute Community/Conjugal Partnership:
Obligations
Dewara v. Lamela (2011) and Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, Sr.
(2012)
 Article 122 of the Family Code allows payment of
criminal indemnities even prior to the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership, so long as the responsibilities
enumerated in Article 121 have been covered. The
Court explained that such is not altogether unfair since
Article 122 of the Family Code states that “at the time
of liquidation of the partnership, such (offending)
spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the
purposes above-mentioned.”
Absolute Community/Conjugal Partnership:
Good Faith of Buyer
Bautista v. Silva (2006); Ravina v. Villa-Abrille (2009)
and Aggabao v. Parulan (2010)*
* Bersamin case.
 The buyers of conjugal property must observe
two kinds of requisite diligence, namely: (a) the
diligence in verifying the validity of the title
covering the property; and (b) the diligence in
inquiring into the authority of the transacting
spouse to sell conjugal property in behalf of the
other spouse.
Property Regime of Void Marriages

1) Property regime of a void marriage under Art.

36 is that provided in Article 147. [Mercado-Fehr
v. Fehr (2003) and Dino v. Dino (2011).

2) Property regime of void marriage under Art.

40 is either absolute community, conjugal
partnership, or even complete separation. [Dino
v. Dino (2011)]
Property Regime of Void Marriages
Dino v. Dino (2011)
 If the subsequent marriage is void by reason of non-compliance with Article 40
(but the prior marriage is indeed void ab initio), the property relations of the
parties to the subsequent marriage may either absolute community or conjugal
partnership of gains, as the case may be, unless the parties agree to a complete
separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage.

 Sec. 19(1) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which requires the liquidation, partition and
distribution of properties prior to the issuance of decree of nullity of the marriage
applies only to a void marriage under Article 40 of the Family Code when said rule
mentions of “decree of absolute nullity” and not to a marriage declared void by
reason of psychological incapacity.

 In the latter case, since the applicable property regime is that provided in Article
147 of the Family Code, the declaration of nullity can already be made even
without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties because it is not
necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for
declaration of nullity of marriage.
Family Home
Eulogio v. Bell, Sr. (2015)
 If the increase in value is by reason of an involuntary
improvement, like the conversion into a residential area or
the establishment of roads and other facilities, the one
establishing the family home should not be punished by
making his home liable to creditors.
 To warrant, therefore, the execution sale of the family
home under Article 160, the following facts are required to
be established: (1) there was an increase in its actual value;
(2) the increase resulted from voluntary improvements on
the property introduced by the persons constituting the
family home, its owners or any of its beneficiaries; and (3)
the increased actual value exceeded the maximum allowed
under Article 157.
Family Home
Cabang v. Basay (2009)
 It cannot be established on property held in co-ownership with third
persons. However, it can be established partly on community property, or
conjugal property and partly on the exclusive property of either spouse
with the consent of the latter. If constituted by an unmarried head of a
family, where there is no communal or conjugal property existing, it can be
constituted only on his or her own property.

Arriola v. Arriola (2008)

 Even if the family home has passed by succession to the co-ownership of
the heirs, or has been willed to any one of them, this fact alone cannot
transform the family home into an ordinary property, much less dispel the
protection cast upon it by the law. The rights of the individual co-owner or
owner of the family home cannot subjugate the rights granted under
Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the family home.
Paternity and Filiation
Concepcion v. CA (2005)
 Court applied presumption of legitimacy to a
child of the bigamous marriage, that it is
presumed legitimate child of the valid
marriage.
Branza v. City Civil Registrar, Himamaylan,
Negros Occidental (2009)
 Issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked
collaterally.
Paternity and Filiation
Arado v. Alcoran (2015) ** Bersamin Case
 When there is a showing that the putative
father had a hand in the preparation of the
birth certificate, as when he was the one
caused the registration the child’s birth
certificate, the same is competent evidence
even if not signed by the father.
Paternity and Filiation
Dela Cruz v. Gracia (2009) and Aguilar v. Siasat (2015)
If there is admission of filiation in the handwritten instrument
but the same was not signed by the alleged parent, rules are:

• Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece

of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be
strict compliance with the requirement that the same must
be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
• Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied
by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that
the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made
and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is
merely corroborative of such other evidence.
Paternity and Filiation
Perla v. Baring (2012)
 The child offered the following testimony to prove his
illegitimate filiation with the putative father: (1) that
during their first encounter in 1994, the child called the
alleged father as “Papa” and kissed his hand while the
alleged father hugged him and promised to support
him; and (2) that his alleged Aunt treated him as a
relative and was good to him during his one-week stay
in her place. The Court ruled that such acts cannot be
considered as indications of child’s open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child.
Paternity and Filiation
Grande v. Antonio (2014)
 Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. No.
9255, gives illegitimate children the right to decide if
they want to use the surname of their father or not. It
is not the father or the mother who is granted by law
the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate
children. The use of the word "may" in the provision
readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is
under no compulsion to use the surname of his
illegitimate father. Hence, a father cannot compel the
use of his surname by his illegitimate children upon his
recognition of their filiation.
Adoption
Delgado Vda. de Dela Rosa v. Heirs of Marciana Rustia Vda.
de Damian (2006)
 Since adoption is essentially a juridical act, a ward (ampon),
without the benefit of formal (judicial adoption), is neither
a compulsory nor a legal heir .

IRR OF RA 9523:
Any of the following adoption proceedings in court does not
require a Certification Declaring a Child Legally Available for
Adoption: (1) adoption of an illegitimate child by any of
his/her biological parent; (2) adoption of a child by his/her
step-parent; or (3) adoption of a child by a relative within the
fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity.
Adoption
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim
and Michael Jude P. Lim (2009)
 The requirement of joint adoption by husband
and wife is mandatory. According to the Court,
the use of the word “shall” in Section 7 of the
DAA means that joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is mandatory.
Adoption
Castro v. Gregorio (2014)
 In the adoption by a spouse of his illegitimate
child, the consent of other spouse is mandatory.
 The other spouse and other legitimate children
must be personally notified through personal
service of summons and it is not enough that
they be deemed notified through constructive
service; otherwise, the court does not validly
acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings and the
decision of the court is null and void.
 The remedy of other spouse is annulment of
adoption decree.
Adoption
Foster Care Act of 2012
 In case of adoption of the foster child by the
designated foster parents, the trial custody
period may be partially waived to the extent of
the period equivalent to the period in which the
foster child has been under the foster care of the
foster parents; provided, that a harmonious
relationship exists between the foster child, the
foster parents, and, where applicable, the foster
family.
Adoption
Bartolome v. SSS (2014)
 When the adopter dies during the time that the
adopted is still a minor or incapacitated, the parental
authority of the biological parent is deemed to have
been restored. Considering that adoption is a personal
relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by
adoption, there shall be no one left to care for minor
adopted child if the adopter passed away, hence, the
parental authority of the biological parent should be
deemed to have been restored, applying by analogy
the provisions of Section 20 of the DAA.
Support
Lim v. Lim (2009)
 the obligation to provide legal support passes on to
ascendants not only upon default of the parents but
also for the latter’s inability to provide sufficient
support.
 The second option of giving support may not be availed
of when the wife and the minor children left the house
of the in-laws where they were then living when she
caught her husband in a “very compromising situation”
with the in-house midwife of the mother-in-law. It
amounts to moral obstacle.
Support
Mangonon v. CA (2006)
 The second option may not be availed of when the
relations between the parties were already strained
brought about by the filing of the suit for declaration of
legitimacy and support and the denial by the grandfather of
familial relationship with the grandchildren, which
amounted to legal and moral obstacle for the availment of
the second option according to the Court.
Lam v. Chua (2004)
 Any judgment granting support never becomes final and is
always subject to modification, depending upon the needs
of the child and capabilities of the parents to give support.
Parental Authority
Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto (2005) and Gamboa-
Hirsch v. CA (2007)
 The rule that no child under seven years of age
shall be separated from the mother is called the
“tender-age presumption.”
Dacasin v. Dacasin (2010)
 The statutory awarding of sole parental custody
to the mother under the second paragraph of
Article 213 of the Family Code is mandatory and
any agreement to the contrary is void.
Parental Authority
Becket v. Sarmiento, Jr. (2013)
 Custody, even if previously granted by a
competent court in favor of a parent, is not
permanent.
 Thus, in a very real sense, a judgment
involving the custody of a minor child cannot
be accorded the force and effect of res
judicata.
Funeral
Valino v. Adriano (2014)
 The wishes of the decedent with respect to his funeral are
not, however, absolute, as said wishes are limited by Article
305 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family
Code, and subject the same to those charged with the right
and duty to make the proper arrangements to bury the
remains of their loved-one. Thus, if the husband was
cohabiting with another woman at the time of his death
and expressly wished that he be buried in the family
mausoleum of the paramour against the wishes of his
legitimate family, said wish cannot prevail over the right
and duty of the loved ones under Article 305 of the Civil
Code to make the proper arrangements.