SECURITY REGIMES

by Robert Jervis
Security vs. Non-security
Dilemma
Prisoner’s Dilemma Dynamics
• Security issues often involve greater competitiveness than do those
involving economics
• Offensive and defensive security motives often lead to the same
behavior
• Stakes in the security realm are higher than in non-security areas
• Detecting what others are doing and measuring one's own security
are difficult
Forming Security Regimes
• Great powers must establish it
• The actors must believe that others share the value they place on
mutual security and cooperation
• Actors must not pursue expansion
• War and individualistic pursuit of security must be seen as costly
The Concert of Europe
1815 - 1823
The Regime as a Cause of National Behavior
• The expectation that the Concert could continue to function helped
maintain it through the operation of familiar self-fulfilling dynamics
• The greater opposition it was expected to foster against attempts
forcibly to change the status quo
• Norm of reciprocity
• Developing a limited degree of institutionalization
DEMISE OF THE REGIME
The Balance of Power
Is it also a regime?
Security in the Postwar Era
• Rules of Conduct Between States
• Different Perceptions of Security
• Different Perspectives
 CONCLUSION
Where lies the demand for security regimes?
NATO
• NATO today is a strategic security and defense hub designed to project
military and partnership power worldwide and stabilize Europe’s security
periphery.

• The fundamental mission of today’s Alliance is as it ever was: to

safeguard the freedom and security of its member nations through
political and security means founded upon the values of democracy,
liberty, rule of law and the peaceful resolution of disputes.

• NATO acts as avital strategic and regional stabilizer enabling and

supporting diplomacy through robust military capabilities.
• NATO is constructed around achieving four politico strategic
objectives:

1. The transformation of Alliance militaries to cope with a rapidly-

changing strategic environment
2. The expansion of operations and missions, both in pursuit of
stability and to counter terrorism
3. The adaptation of NATO forces to cope with the challenges posed
by terrorism, failed states and the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and opening them to new partners, both civil and
military
4. The further development of a working partnership with the EU.
NATO 101
• NATO has 28 members: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey,
the United Kingdom and the United States.
• 41 partners, either seeking membership or a security relationship
with NATO.
• They are organized in four separate groupings: the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council, the Mediterranean Dialog, the Istanbul
Cooperation Initiative (ICI) and the so-called Partners across the
Globe.
• NATO also has partnership agreements with the UN, the EU and the
OSCE.
• The Alliance operates from two major sites: the political center at
NATO Headquarters in Zaventem, on the outskirts of Brussels; and the
military center known as Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers
Europe (SHAPE), some 52 km or 33 miles from Brussels, at Mons,
Belgium.
• The North Atlantic Council (NAC) remains the chief political body with
powers of decision.
• Defense Policy and Planning Committee (DPPC) – Most senior
committee supporting the NAC. DPPC is responsible for military
transformation, defense capabilities, agency reform, common-funded
acquisition and missile defense, and oversees the NATO Defense
Planning Process (DPP).
• Military Committee is undertaken by military representatives (or Mil Reps),
acting on behalf of national CHODs.
- The Military Committee oversees the International Military Staff and the
Supreme Allied Commanders: SACEUR, who oversees Allied Command
Operations (ACO), and SACT, Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation,
who, as his name suggests, oversees Allied Command Transformation
(ACT), which is based in Norfolk, Virginia.
- The Military Committee recommends to civilian political decision-makers
steps that should be taken for the military security of the Alliance and is
NATO’s oldest permanent body.
• The senior political figure in the Alliance is the secretary-general, who is
always a European. The current holder of the post is the Norwegian Jens
Stoltenberg, who took up his post in October 2014.
- The job of the secretary-general is to prepare the work of the NAC in his
capacity as vice-chairman of the NAC, and to act as interface between the
permanent representatives and the NATO staff.
• There are five other principal officials: the director of the Private
Office, the secretary of the Council, the NATO spokesman, the
director of Policy Planning and the director of NATO Office of Security.
• ACO and ACT are supported, inter alia, by the Joint Warfare Center,
the Joint Force Training Center and the Joint Analysis and Lessons
Learned Center.
• These two strategic commands are in turn supported by several
subordinate, deployable commands that act as the military center of
gravity of Alliance forces during campaigns and operations.
• Parliamentary oversight is provided by the NATO Parliamentary
Assembly (NATO PA—formerly the North Atlantic Assembly). In
addition to the Parliamentary Assembly, Atlantic Treaty Associations
(ATAs) were created on 18 June 1954 to enable voluntary and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) to support the work of the
Alliance.
 NATO transformation
• Transformation is the stuff of today’s NATO as the Alliance struggles to close the strategy, capability
and affordability gap and the need for Alliance armed forces to generate contextually-relevant
military effect and effective cooperation to ensure transatlantic military interoperability by
generating a twenty-first-century force.

• NATO’s transformational challenges can be thus summarized:

1. The volatility of the strategic environment and the need to make NATO more responsive against
diverse threats emerging from several places world-wide
2. The development of sufficient levels (military capacity) of relevant military capability
3. Improved interoperability between Alliance forces and those of partners
4. Generating the necessary national defence investments to make Alliance transformation possible
and realistic
5. Strengthening the military capacity of partners
6. Increasing collaboration with the African Union(AU), EU and UN
7. Completing the transition of the ISNF mission in Afghanistan to Operation Resolute Support
8. Consideration of transformation goods over the longer-term an the maintenance of momentum
to these ends.
• For NATO that will mean that almost all future operations will be robust,
extended and often far from Brussels.
• Two vital core Alliance functions: to act as the interoperability mechanism
with US forces at a very different level of military-technical capability; and to
provide a platform to project coalitions of Alliance members and partners
worldwide as and when the partners choose to act together.
• Peace Support Operations (PSOs) in particular must reflect a comprehensive
approach to security designed to bring together people and institutions which
in the past have tended, if not striven, to remain apart.
• One significant change is the development of civil-military cooperation
(CIMIC) and the forced cooperation of diverse people from diverse
backgrounds working together for the common good
The emerging strategic environment poses the
Alliance with six fundamental strategic challenges.
• First, the neat intellectual boundaries between crisis response
operations and warfighting are tending to merge, which demands
Alliance forces capable of operating effectively in all environments
and at all conflict levels.
• Second, the gap between the tasks being assigned to NATO forces and
available Alliance forces and resources is widening.
• Third, NATO forces must continually devise new ways of responding to
crises together before the security environment in any one theater
can be stabilized enough for peace support to begin properly.
• Fourth, with the virtual completion of the great age of NATO enlargement
the tragic events in Ukraine and around Europe’s periphery demonstrate
the need for NATO to refocus on its core defense role.
• Fifth, the PfP program needs to be projected and become more strategic.
• Sixth, NATO needs continually to adapt its transformation concept to
ensure a balance between doctrine—i.e. the way militaries go about their
business—and technology as a force multiplier.

• NATO Standardization Organization was founded in 1975 with the specific

role of validating the quality of NATO forces, structures and procedures to
enhance interoperability between the allies. Such certification needs to be
extended to Alliance partners..
• Three new truisms hold for such operations: the further the Alliance
goes the greater the need for local legitimacy; the more vital the
role of powerful regional actors; and logistics and support is vital for
such campaigns to sustain combat over time and distance.
• Credibility, legitimacy, capability and capacity are thus the four
interlocking pillars of a future NATO.
• Fail to understand that and, whilst NATO may not fail, it will look
increasingly like an old soldier and simply fade away.
• the rhetoric of transformation with its need for ever greater precision
during military strikes, ever further away from the target, with an ever
shorter time between identifying a target and destroying it (and ever
fewer troops) too often seems oddly out of place in many crises.
NATO’s strategic rehabilitation

• NATO Forces 2020

- which in turn means a new NATO relationship with strategy,
technology and a rapidly changing strategic security space.
• NATO will need to rediscover strategic unity of effort and purpose
built on the better development and application of military capability.
• Cohesion will be vital and the three elements of the Strategic Concept
remain central to NATO’s future orientation: collective defense, crisis
management and cooperative security.
NATO Forces 2020
• Reaffirming NATO’s core commitment: collective defense
• Establishing guidelines for operations outside Alliance borders
• Consultations to prevent or manage crises
• The need to participate in a Comprehensive Approach to complex contingencies
• Engaging with Russia
• Enlargement and maintaining the Open Door
• New capabilities for a new era (military transformation and reform)
• Nuclear weapons policy
• Missile defense
• Responding to the rising danger of cyber attacks
• Implementing military reforms to create a more agile Alliance
NATO today: strengths and weaknesses
• NATO remains the indispensable military interoperability mechanism
between the armed forces of Europe and North America.
• NATO standards built up over 60 years plus, represent a body of shared
military knowledge hitherto unknown, critical to interoperability and highly
attractive to potential partners.
• Equally, NATO cannot escape the contemporary political realities of the
transatlantic relationship of which it is a part, and even within Europe the
lack of a shared strategic culture poses a distinct threat to Alliance
cohesion.
• EU– NATO relations are in urgent need of improvement as there remains an
implicit level of destructive competition between the two organizations
over who does what, when, why, where, how and with what, which wastes
so much strategic energy.
Nato: The enduring Alliance?
NATO: Past, Present and Future

• (July 17, 2014) Malaysian Airlines Boeing 777 is flying high over the
eastern Ukrainian steppe close to the Russian border.
• NATO was founded to deal with big security
• NATO’s Bottom Line
• European defense irresponsibility
• Wales Summit should have answered five twenty-first century
questions
NATO’s Twenty-First-Century World
• Sixty-five years ago:
o NATO
o China
o Soviet Union
o United States
o Europe
o World
The Indivisible Alliance
• What must NATO do?
• Three traits to Chinese military modernization that must be of
concern to NATO planners.
o There is much emphasis on disruptive offensive electronic warfare and
electronic counter-measures aimed at the United States and its allies.
o China is constructing a navy clearly designed to deny the US navy entry to the
Sea of Japan.
o China’s defense spending is at least two to three times its officially declared
level.
Facing New Realities
• Alliance must go back to why it was formed.
o To ensure the political and physical integrity of its members.
• Alliance must be allowed to look forward and not be constrained by
the hierarchy within the West.
Using the Strategic Concept Properly
• NATO’s three core Alliance missions: collective defense, crisis
management and cooperative security.
o Having the political will to do something about them.
Enhanced NATO
• Article 5 of the Washington Treaty
• Greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territory
and our populations against attack.
• Opening NATO to all those who wish to join its strategic stabilization
role.
Making the NATO-EU Relationship Work
• The EU needs a strong NATO and NATO needs a strong EU.
o Being put in their place by forcing themselves to work effectively together.
• EU and NATO as the two leadership hubs of the West.
o Depending on the mission, location or the scale of the crisis, either US or EU
should take the initiative to lead.
Fighting Strategic Ambiguous warfare and
super-insurgencies
• Terrorism
• The need for relevant armed forces capable of managing broad threats in
alliance with strategic civil-military capabilities and capacities – a
comprehensive approach to security.
NATO: The Enduring Alliance
• NATO Readiness Action Plan
o It provides a coherent and comprehensive package of necessary measures to
respond to the changes in the security environment on NATO’s borders and further
afield.
• The world needs a strong West and the West needs a big NATO.
o If the West thinks big now about the big future it faces, then the Euro-Atlantic
community stands the best possible chance of saving the international system the
West itself created.
• Wales Declaration on the Transatlantic Bond of 5 September 2014 states:
“Today we reaffirm our continuing and unwavering commitment to
defend the population, sovereignty, and shared values of all Allies in North
America and Europe and to meet challenges and threats from wherever they
may emanate. With our decisions here in Wales the North Atlantic Alliance
will remain the bedrock of our collective defense.”
The Relevance of the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF) for
Regional Security in the Asia-
Pacific
Outline
• Structure
• Objectives and Instruments
• ARF’s Constraints
• Conclusion: Assess the relevance of ARF through answering: “Is the
ARF suited to foster regional security cooperation?”
Members of the ARF
• 10 ASEAN member states (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos,
Malaysia, Burma, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam)
• 10 ASEAN dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, China, the European
Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Russia and
the United States),
• ASEAN observer (Papua New Guinea), as well as the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, Mongolia, Pakistan, Timor-Leste,
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.
Arenas of ARF
• Track One- A formal intergovernmental process, in which official
representatives in their official capacity meet in an official
surrounding .
• Track Two- An informal academic sector where scientists, experts and
officials in their private capacity meet for discussions.
 Principles and Norms of the ARF
• The central position of ASEAN within the ARF is most clearly reflected in the norms on which
the ARF are based. The Chairman's Statement of the 1st ARF in 1994 builds upon the
principles of ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). This central
ASEAN document from 1976 in Article 2 demands "the following fundamental principles:
• Non-interference in domestic affairs
• a. Mutualrespectfortheindependence,sovereignty,equality,territorial integrity and national
identity of all nations;
• b. The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference,
subversion or coercion;
• c. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another;
• renunciation of the use of force
• d. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means;
• e. Renunciation of the threat or use of force;
• Cooperation
• f. Effective cooperation among themselves."
Objectives and Instruments of the ARF
• The Chairman's Statement at the 1st Foreign Ministers‘ Meeting defines the
general objective of the ARF as follows:
• Recognizing the need to develop a more predictable constructive pattern of
relationships for the Asia-Pacific region, the Meeting expressed its firm conviction to
continue to work towards the strengths and the enhancement of political and
security cooperation within the region as a means of ensuring lasting peace, stability,
and prosperity for the region and its peoples.
• The overall stability in the Asia-Pacific shall be enhanced by improving
bilateral and multilateral relations among the regional states. As a means
to that end the ARF increases issue-oriented intergovernmental
cooperation. The 2nd ARF in 1995 established the concept of a three stage
evolution of ARF objectives
• Stage 1: Confidence-Building
• Stage 2: Preventive Diplomacy (PD)
• Stage 3: Elaboration of Approaches to Conflicts
Stability and Participation
The ARF's Realizable Goals
• Increasing the Appeal of Security Cooperation
• Broadening and Deepening Security Cooperation
• Facilitating Common Perceptions
The ARF's Constraints/Lack of Performance
• Provision of Collective Security
• Direct Conflict Management
• Autonomous Action
Hypotheses for ARF’s Irrelevance
• The ASEAN Way Blocks Necessary Decisions
• The ASEAN Way Blocks the ARF's Evolution
Conclusion
• Assess the relevance of ARF through answering: “Is the ARF suited to
foster regional security cooperation?”