Challenges in ‘speaking to

power’ – should research

make recommendations?
 Remember for you are a
researcher first
• Not a consultant
• Not a social worker
• Not a politician
• Not a journalist

• Your primary task is to describe actual

change processes accurately and explain
why they are as they are.
 Setting the scene
• ‘One challenge inherent in applied research is transforming a practitioner’s
problem into a researchable problem’ (White, 2009: 30)
• ‘where critical debate in public is not an established convention, we should
avoid unwarranted assumptions about the accountability of publicly
processed information.’ (Mosse, 1994: 508)
• ‘what Pierre Bourdieu calls ‘officializing strategies’ whereby the particular
interests of key sections of the community (sic?) become identified with the
general interest.’ (Mosse, 1994: 509)
• ‘Ardener proposed that in any society there are dominant modes of
expression generated by a dominant structure. It is these articulations that
are heard and listened to’ (Mosse, 1994: 514)
• ‘The questions uppermost in villagers’ minds ... are ‘who are you, and what
is your interest in us?.’ (Mosse, 1994: 504)
• ‘These leaders, who ,, presented themselves as ‘community leaders’ to
outsiders .... in fact wielded less influence within the community than a
second type of leader, the traditional tribal leader or patel. ‘ (Mosse, 1994:
505)
 NEPAL IN THE 1970s
• All the global indicators suggested an economy in which
about half the population were in absolute poverty (not much
difference now but depends on which survey is used).
• Direct observations suggested many people saw themselves
in the middle of a ‘civil society’ in which they have a secure
cultural place.
• The poorest twenty percent were absolutely very poor,
insufficient food for a preferred Nepalese diet.
• Any political radicals faced ‘cat and mouse’ censorship and
repression.
• ‘Independent’ research with a Marxian worldview saw little
prospect of State-led development. Improvement was seen
as depending on ‘middle’ groups eventually challenging a
heavily aided, non-developmental State – happened relatively
peacefully in 1990.
 FIJI IN THE 1980s
• The global indicators suggested a middle income economy with very
little absolute poverty that had used a post-colonial independence
“honeymoon” well.
• Regular multi-party elections were fairly competed and a local mass
media was accessible to challenging ideas.
• There were less than ten percent of the population in deep relative
deprivation who could be easily raised above a ‘generously’
contextualised poverty line.
• But the big challenge was convincing people that ethnic cultural
difference was not the fundamental division in society –
opportunistically used by elite politicians from both ethnic groups to
block deliberation on social justice.
• But EU funded research could speak to power – e.g. removing
poverty through a tax financed welfare programme. A sovereign,
developmental State model.
• The rise and fall of the Fiji Labour Party and the role of external
interests in political de-stabilisation – and still the coups go on in a
society going nowhere.
 PAKISTAN IN THE 1990s
• The global indicators suggest a large number of the world’s poor
were in Pakistan. Using a livelihoods framework, there seemed to
be high underemployment in terms of time, productivity and
incomes.
• The society is also highly gendered to the acute disadvantage of
women, leaving them highly vulnerable to environmental and socio-
economic shocks.
• The State is highly militarised (even when under nominal civilian
rule) and is easily distracted from developmental activities by high
stake games in the global political order
• Male private sector employment in some globalised industries plus
large-scale international migration was very important in increasing
incomes in some areas of the country, but has done little in reducing
inequality or poverty.
• ‘Logical positivist’ primarily quantitative research for a UN agency
predicted an unsustainable economy ten years ahead. Conclusion:
‘enabling people to help themselves’, hinting at political instability as
the alternative.
 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AT THE TURN OF
THE MILLENNIUM
• Since the structural transformation of the global oil market in the
1970s, the United Arab Emirates had undergone massive changes,
notably in the creation of an ‘apparently’ globalised labour force
drawn from all over the world.
• The private sector macro-labour market appears to be global in that
it includes people from many countries (98% of the private sector
workforce), but de facto it is segmented in that most workplaces are
national or even more local micro-labour markets. This was a factor
in UAE nationals having little access to private sector employment
with a risk of ‘cultural’ disaffection.
• The formal/legal and non-formal/illegal labour market frontier was
shifting and demands for representation by ‘foreign’ labour were
increasing.
• The UAE government had political fears of loss of authority and was
moving towards increased restrictive regulation to improve the
“quality” of its labour force and create openings for nationals in the
private sector.
• Government funded research sought to improve UAE nationals
employment in a culturally sensitive fashion. Seen through a
‘resource curse’ lens, the prospects for radical change were seen as
very limited, ineffective authoritarianism as the most likely
government response.
 PALESTINE NOW
• A society that thinks middle income (judged by incomes
among the diaspora) but many people have lost virtually
all their local livelihoods.
• Over fifty years for many people being labelled as
refugees being fed by the UN system.
• Day to day deprivation of human rights – basic mobility
restrictions, loss of productive assets, no legal redress
for mental and physical abuse, detention without trial
with consequences for gender and inter-generational
relationships.
• Poverty as insecurity in day to day life, dependency on
‘aid’, and absence of collective freedom.
• World Bank financed impact evaluation (‘research’?) of a
NGO sectoral support project. Human rights worldview of
a well intentioned ‘sticking plaster’.
 SOUTH SUDAN NOW
• Emerging from twenty years of civil war (weapons widely available),
no international developmental indicators.
• All people met at village level live materially very simply but many
with strong local cultural systems (are they in poverty?) – some
culturally value high local mobility, others accept mobility as a
precaution in case of further violence.
• A relatively egalitarian society in material terms, “fuzzily” gendered
though women are structurally more vulnerable (despite increasing
bride prices).
• A sense of improvement and potential for environmentally and
culturally sustainable further development locally, though perhaps
over-optimistic about the long term returns from formal education.
• A government starting from virtually zero technical skills, but large
oil revenues. Real risks of further violence internally in the south
plus full military conflict with the north.
• Research for an INGO into local rural development interventions
found a mixed performance – challenges of moving from an
‘emergency’ relief to a ‘developmental’ mindset. Telling a story
rather than making recommendations.
Choices in ‘speaking to power’/’speaking to truth’?
1. Nepal – radical pessimism and waiting for a revolution
2. Fiji – a developmental State and poverty reduction
recommendations
3. Pakistan – a developmentally ‘failing’ State and a
conditional warning about the long term future
4. United Arab Emirates – a vulnerable State and
questioning growing authoritarianism
5. Palestine – a ‘non-State’ and recording injustice
6. South Sudan – a ‘non-State’ and improving very local
participatory, deliberative processes