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What-if Analysis

Should be used for relatively

uncomplicated processes

The number of what-if questions

may be made and varied depending
on the brainstorming session of the
analysis team
Checklist Analysis
Much more rigid procedure than
the what-if brainstorming method
Develops a standard checklist
Used for each step of the process

The number of checklist questions

are limited only by the knowledge,
experience, background, and
creativeness of the preparer
Combines What-if and
Checklist Analysis
Much more broad-based hazard
assessment technique than the
what-if brainstorming method

Initial Phase: What-if Brainstorming

Next Phase: Standardized Checklist
Hazard and Operability
Analysis (HAZOP)
Systematic study of each process
Requires a thorough examination of
process-flow diagrams, and piping
and instrumentation diagrams
Requires analysis on deviations of
process operating parameters
Suited to complex process and
Evaluate the consequences of
Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis (FMEA)
Begins with the listing of all of the
equipment and process components

Most applicable to projects that are

well into the design phase
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
Begins with a graphic diagram of all
sequences of events that could
result in an incident, accident or
Uses logic and event symbols
Fairly complicated analysis
Requires significantly more time
and effort than other more broad-
based approaches
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
Hazard Analysis Technique

• Best during design, start-up, and

normal plant operations
Personnel Motivation and
The personnel are vital to the safe
operation of the operating facility
Training are required to both
formal and on-the-job trainees

Hazard Communication Standard

 Assist employees in becoming more
knowledgeable about chemical
Personnel Motivation and
Play an important role in most
chemical accidents
Personnel Motivation and
The interface between the employee
and the process equipment should
be compatible
The alarm and information displays
should be user-friendly
Personnel Motivation and
Process Control System should have
built-in redundancies that balance
the attributes associated with both
human and hardware control
No process control system should
ever rely totally on either human
or hardware control response.
Process and Plant
Modification and Change
MAIN REASON for Change:
o Quality Control and Assurance

Made by maintenance and operating

Changes must not result in deviations
that could lead to the facility to
operate outside safe operating limits
All changes should be identified and
Incident Investigation and
Safety Audits
IMPORTANT to study (identify and
mitigate causes) near-miss
The facts and information developed
in audits are used to verify
compliance with regulatory
standards and management
End of Presentation
Thank You for Listening

Ralph Dabao
Paolo Ella
Paolo Gil Ostrea
John Paul Relucio