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What-if Analysis

Should be used for relatively


uncomplicated processes

The number of what-if questions


may be made and varied depending
on the brainstorming session of the
analysis team
Checklist Analysis
Much more rigid procedure than
the what-if brainstorming method
Develops a standard checklist
Used for each step of the process

The number of checklist questions


are limited only by the knowledge,
experience, background, and
creativeness of the preparer
Combines What-if and
Checklist Analysis
Much more broad-based hazard
assessment technique than the
what-if brainstorming method

Initial Phase: What-if Brainstorming


Next Phase: Standardized Checklist
Analysis
Hazard and Operability
Analysis (HAZOP)
Systematic study of each process
element
Requires a thorough examination of
process-flow diagrams, and piping
and instrumentation diagrams
Requires analysis on deviations of
process operating parameters
Suited to complex process and
facilities
Evaluate the consequences of
Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis (FMEA)
Begins with the listing of all of the
equipment and process components

Most applicable to projects that are


well into the design phase
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
Begins with a graphic diagram of all
sequences of events that could
result in an incident, accident or
exposure
Uses logic and event symbols
Fairly complicated analysis
Requires significantly more time
and effort than other more broad-
based approaches
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
Hazard Analysis Technique

• Best during design, start-up, and


normal plant operations
Personnel Motivation and
Training
The personnel are vital to the safe
operation of the operating facility
Training are required to both
formal and on-the-job trainees

Hazard Communication Standard


 Assist employees in becoming more
knowledgeable about chemical
hazards
Personnel Motivation and
Training
ERRORS
Play an important role in most
chemical accidents
Include
Personnel Motivation and
Training
REMEMBER:
The interface between the employee
and the process equipment should
be compatible
The alarm and information displays
should be user-friendly
Personnel Motivation and
Training
REMEMBER:
Process Control System should have
built-in redundancies that balance
the attributes associated with both
human and hardware control
No process control system should
ever rely totally on either human
or hardware control response.
Process and Plant
Modification and Change
MAIN REASON for Change:
o Quality Control and Assurance

Made by maintenance and operating


personnel
Changes must not result in deviations
that could lead to the facility to
operate outside safe operating limits
All changes should be identified and
reviewed
Incident Investigation and
Safety Audits
IMPORTANT to study (identify and
mitigate causes) near-miss
incidents
The facts and information developed
in audits are used to verify
compliance with regulatory
standards and management
practices
End of Presentation
Thank You for Listening

Ralph Dabao
Paolo Ella
Paolo Gil Ostrea
John Paul Relucio