FUEL SYSTEM SAFETY

Presented by: Tony Heather

Slide 1

Objectives

To satisfy the training requirement for National Authorities outlined in EASA Decision Papers:

2007/001/R (Part M) 2007/002/R (Part 145)

2007/003/R (Part 66)

Slide 2

Training Matrix (Part M)

Organisation Continuing Airworthiness Management Organisations Personnel Any personnel required by M.A.706 except the Accountable Manager of the continuing airworthiness management organisation. The airworthiness review staff as required by M.A.707. Quality manager as required by M.A.712 Management, inspectors and auditors. Level of knowledge 2 Continuing Training Yes

CAMO

Not required

NAA

Not required

Slide 3

Training Matrix (Part 145)

Organisation

Personnel

Level of knowledge 2

Continuing Training Yes

Aircraft and component maintenance organisations

Personnel in aircraft and component shop maintenance organisations involved in maintenance task planning, all personnel carrying maintenance tasks on aircraft or components classified as Fuel Tank Safety items, support staff and certifying staff

Aircraft and component maintenance organisations

Management, quality assurance personnel and auditors, personnel in charge of stores, and any personnel not directly involved in maintenance activities as required by the organisation Management, inspectors and Auditors.

Not required

NAA

Not required

Slide 4

Training Matrix (Part 66)

Organisation

Personnel

Level of knowledge 2

Continuing Training Yes

Part-66 licence holders in a continuing airworthiness management organisation

The airworthiness review staff as required by M.A.707.

Part-66 licence holders in aircraft and component maintenance organisations

Maintenance organisation support and certifying staff

Yes

Slide 5

Level 1 (Familiarisation)Training
The attendant should, after the completion of the training:

1.
2.

be familiar with the basic elements of the fuel tank safety issues.
be able to give a simple description of the historical background and the elements requiring a safety consideration, using common words and showing examples of non conformities. be able to use typical terms.

3.

The familiarisation training should include a presentation of bulletins/notices, short videos or CD material, poster campaigns, etc.
Slide 6

Level 2 (Detailed) Training

The attendant should, after the completion of the training: 1. Know the history and the theoretical and practical elements of the subject, have an overview of Special Federal Aviation Regulations (SFARs) from 14 CFR SFAR 88 of the FAA and of JAA Temporary Guidance Leaflet TGL 47, be able to give a detailed description of the concept of Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations CDCCL, Airworthiness Limitations Items (ALI) and using theoretical fundamentals and specific examples,

Slide 7

Level 2 Training cont..

2. have the capacity to combine and apply the separate elements of knowledge in a logical and comprehensive manner. have detailed information on how the above items affect the aircraft in the scope of the activity of the organisation or in the fleet. understand and carry out activities with the use of manufacturer and regulatory authority data providing instructions on design and maintenance, such as Service Bulletins, Airworthiness Directives, Aircraft Maintenance Manual, Component Maintenance Manual etc.

3.

4.

Slide 8

Level 2 Training cont

use easily the manufacturers documentation from various sources and apply corrective action where appropriate. identify the components or parts or the aircraft subject to FTS from the manufacturers documentation, plan the action or apply a Service Bulletin and an Airworthiness Directive.

5. 6.

Slide 9

So here we go with the level 1 Training..

Slide 10

How this all started off

17th July 1996, B747-131, Registration N93119

Flt No TWA 800, departed JFK (20.19 local time)

11 minutes into the flight at 13,700ft near Long Island NY This happened:

Slide 11

NTSB Initial Report Executive Summary:

Contributing factors to the accident were the design and certification concept that fuel tank explosions could be prevented solely by precluding all ignition sources and the design and certification of the Boeing 747 with heat sources located beneath the CWT with no means to reduce the heat transferred into the CWT or to render the fuel vapor in the tank nonflammable. The safety issues in this report focus on fuel tank flammability, fuel tank ignition sources, design and certification standards, and the maintenance and aging of aircraft systems. Safety recommendations concerning these issues are addressed to the Federal Aviation Administration.
Slide 12

Background

The two NTSB safety recommendations led to two separate internationally supported initiatives:
1. Fuel

Tank Safety Review Systems Review (wiring)

2. Ageing

This presentation focuses on Fuel System Safety

Slide 13

Fuel Tank Safety Background

ARAC Flammability Reduction Study

SFAR NPRM

Manila 1990 1991 1992

1993

New York
1994
1995 1996 1997 1998

SFAR 88 Assessment SFAR 88 Implementation Bangkok

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 +

NTSB recommendations

Industry Fuel NGS Systems Development Safety ARAC FAA Task to Industry Program Inerting based on NTSB Study Recommendations

Industry and Regulatory consensus: Reducing flammability would provide major benefit to enhancing fuel tank safety

Slide 14

Manila - Philippine Air Lines B737-300, 1990

The centre fuel tank exploded while the aircraft was taxiing for departure. 8 of the 113 passengers were killed. The airline had fitted logo lights after delivery which involved additional wires to be passed through vapour seals in the fuel tanks. The NTSB recommended to the FAA that an AD be issued requiring inspections of the fuel boost pumps, float switch and wiring looms as signs of chafing had been found. The FAA declined to issue the AD.

Slide 15

Bangkok - Thai Airways B737-400, 2001

The flight was being prepared by 5 cabin crew members and 3 ground staff members for a flight to Chiang Mai. The Thai Prime Minister was one of the 149 passengers waiting to board the plane. 27 minutes before scheduled departure time, a fire erupted in the cabin, killing a flight attendant and injuring 6 others. The fire was put out in an hour, but by then the aircraft had been gutted. Subsequent investigation discovered that the centre tanks pumps had been left running when tank was dry.

Slide 16

Common Factors to the 3 CWT Explosions

Aircraft parked on ramp for some considerable time with high ambient temperature (+900F) Centre Wing Tank empty Air-conditioning Packs running for some time.

Slide 17

The Fire Triangle

Prevent fuel system accidents through ignition source elimination and flammability reduction

Ignition

Oxygen

Fuel Vapor

Slide 18

Fuel Tank Flammability Exposure Worldwide Fleet Average

Main Tanks 2-4%

Tail Tanks 2-5%

Body Tanks
Pressurized <5% Un-pressurized >20%

Heated Center Wing Tank 15-30%

Un-heated Center Wing Tanks 2-6%

Slide 19

Flammability Exposure
Flammability Envelope vs. Ignition Energy, Flash Point and O2 Level
Flammability Envelope vs. Ignition Energy, Flash Point and O2 Level

50 40
Altitude 1000's ft.

50

80o F OAT

LFL

40
Altitude 1000's ft.
UFL

40o F OAT

LFL

UFL

30 20 10 0 -50 0 50 100 150 200

Temperature Deg F
Heated CWT Profile

30 20 10 0 -50 0 50 100 150 200

Temperature Deg F
Heated CWT Profile

Unheated Wing Tank Profile

Unheated Wing Tank Profile

80o F Airport outside air temperature (OAT) 90 minute ground pack operation (~36oF CWT temperature increase, ~18oF for 30min) 20.9% Oxygen content 120 Flash point fuel

40o F Airport outside air temperature 90 minute ground pack operation (~45oF CWT temperature increase, ~22oF for 30min) 20.9% Oxygen content 120 Flash point fuel

CWT Exposure reduces with OAT, but typically is not eliminated

Slide 20

World Fleet Fuel Tank Explosion Rate

0.5

Accidents Per Million Departures

0.4

Current World Fleet Explosion Rate = 16 explosions in 415 million flights 3.9E-8 per flight (10 Year rolling average) Note: 737-777 rate = 3E-8 per flight (10 Year rolling average)

0.3

0.2

0.1

0.0 1959 1963 1967 1971 1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999

Year

Fuel tank event history is stabilizing at approximately 10-8

Slide 21

ARAC Fleet Fuel Tank Safety Assessment

10 9 8

ARAC ~10E-8

Cumulative Accidents

7 6 5
Bangkok

4 3
Manila

New York

2 1 0

10E-9 Extremely improbable not anticipated to occur in the life of the fleet

1990

1995

2000

2005
Year

2010

2015

2020

Systemic Change Needed

Slide 22

FAA develop SFAR 88 JAA develop JAA Policy interim policy INT/POL/25/12 SFAR & INT/POL call for all TC and STC holders accomplish the following tasks: Conduct a safety review of the fuel tank system to determine that the design meets the requirements of FAR/JAR 25.901 and FAR/JAR 25.981(a) and (b). Develop all maintenance and inspection instructions required to maintain the design features of the fuel system that preclude the existence or development of an ignition source within the fuel tank.
Slide 23

Cont

Prepare and submit a report (or reports) to the FAA/JAA for approval/acceptance containing the following:

Substantiation of each airplane fuel tank system component design,

Identification of all necessary design changes needed to meet the requirements of FAR 25.901 and 25.981(a) and (b), and All maintenance and inspection instructions required to maintain the design features of the fuel system that preclude the existence or development of an ignition source within the fuel tank throughout the operational life of the airplane.

Slide 24

European NAA Actions

Due to the prevailing JAA system at the time: CAA implemented JAA Policy with AN 55 (followed by Generic Requirement GR No. 12 in CAA CAP 747). This has now been withdrawn.

All JAA TC & STC Holders have complied with the unsafe condition identification and proposed corrective actions

Slide 25

SFAR 88 Safety Assessment Items Identification

Yes

Unsafe Condition (See Appendix B for Process)

No

1.0 Unsafe Condition

2.0 No Unsafe Condition

1.1

2.1

Mandatory Corrective Action

(14 CFR part 39)

Maintenance Instruction Development

(resulting ICA required to be implemented into existing fuel system maintenance programs per ops rules)

1.2 Design Modifications

1.3 Operational Procedures

1.4 Airworthiness Limitation Item (ALI)

2.2 Post MSG ICA Maintenance Task Development (EZAP)

2.3 Pre MSG TC/STC Holders Recommended Maintenance Tasks (EZAP)

2.5 No Action

1.21 Interim Actions Associated with Design Modification (if Required)

1.41 Configuration Management (CDCCL)

1.42 Maintenance & Inspection Instructions

2.21 Update MRB Report

2.31 Approved Maintenance Program Document

2.4 Recommended Standard Practices

Examples of where the required ALI and ICA information should be placed

3.1 Introduction of fuel system ALIs & CDCCLs into Airworthiness Limitation Section

3.2 Standard Practices Manual

3.3 Maintenance Planning Document & MRBR

3.4 Highlight in AMM task accomplishment instruction

3.5 Service Bulletin

Slide 26

FAA /JAA(EASA) require TC / STC Holder review aircraft with - +30 seats or +7500lb payload (FAR 121 operator aircraft discriminant) Reviews completed by all JAA/EASA, FAA, Transport Canada, CTA Brazil affected TC & STC Holders

Design changes required to address unsafe condition will be mandated by AD, for example:

Airworthiness Limitation Items (ALI) Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL) Modifications FM Limitations
Slide 27

CDCCL

Critical Design Configuration Control Limitation Features of System Design that require their integrity to be maintained in order to ensure that unsafe conditions do not develop in the fuel system throughout the service life of the aircraft must be retained during modification, repair or maintenance..

Slide 28

ALI & CDCCL will be listed in a uniquely referenced TC & STC Holder Fuel Airworthiness Limitations Section of ICAW.

MPD Chapter 9 MM Chapter 5 TCDS

Operator responsible for continuing compliance and management

Slide 29

FSS Tasks developed from MRB process will be assigned a Failure Effect Category (FEC) 8.

Tasks must be uniquely referenced and identifiable as FSS tasks

The management of FSS tasks are subject to certain rules:

Cannot be deleted or changed without EASA approval Must be subject to a (competent authority) approved procedure for escalation

Slide 30

Inspections (ALI) and modifications are aligned with existing MPD tank entry requirements could be a problem with escalated or equalised programmes CAA MOR data shows 16% maintenance error level in B747 ATA 28/73 MOR over 20 year period

Airworthiness / maintenance management, inspectors and mechanics at aircraft and component level will require awareness and training
NAA Surveyor/Inspectors will require training

Slide 31

Management of CDCCL will be a challenge for operators (during scheduled maintenance, modification, repair)

e.g.

FQIS wiring segregation and repair Fuel pump configuration

Bonding features

Issues for maintenance contractors including line maintenance and workshops

Significant issues during modification and repair includes non fuel-tank systems

Slide 32

ADs addressing ignition source suppression started to be issued from mid-2004 Long lead times on many ADs July 2006, EASA have issued ADs (for those aircraft they are responsible for) mandating the adoption of Fuel Airworthiness Limitations document into the approved maintenance programme.

Slide 33

Lessons learned not necessarily un-safe condition

Inspection Standards (perhaps different standards applied) Maintenance Procedures (need to include: fuel tank safety awareness, HF elements, MEM etc) Fuel Tank Close-up (effective final inspections) Operational Procedures (i.e. dry tanks, boost pump running etc) MM Information (precautions & warnings) MMEL (i.e. dispatch criteria)

Changes to documentation should lead to review of training

Slide 34

Flammability Reduction Means

Slide 35

Flammability Reduction Means (FRM) concept introduced at late stage by FAA (circa 2004)

JAA (EASA) agree with concept not yet agreed on implementation (retrofit or production cut in) or applicability criteria (high flammability criteria, hot day conditions etc.)
Boeing applied for certification of Nitrogen Generation System (NGS) for B737, B747 NGS application being jointly investigated by FAA and EASA

Slide 36

Nitrogen Generation System Simple Schematic

NGS
System Status / Indication

External Inputs
System Control

Float Valve

Ram Cooling Flow via Existing ECS Scoop Flow On/Off Contro l

Center Fuel Tank

T Ozone Converte r Heat Exchang er Filter

High Flow Descent Control Valve Air Separation Module NEA to Tank

Bleed Flow

NEA Nitrogen Enriched Air OEA Oxygen Enriched Air

Cooling flow and Oxygen Exhaust Overboard

Waste OEA to Cooling Exhaust

Witness Drain / Test Port

Slide 37

Air Separation Module Hollow Fibre Membrane Technology

N2

O2, CO2, H2O

O2 CO2 H2O Air

N2

ASM used in gas generation industry 20+ years

Slide 38

FAA issued NPRM November 2005 which included Flammability Reduction Means (FRM), the final rule is due to be issued November 2007. EASA position on Flammability Reduction outlined in Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA). Accessible on EASA website: http://www.easa.eu.int/doc/Events/fueltanksafety_240620 05/easa_fueltanksafety_24062005_ria_issue_1.pdf

Slide 39

Cont

Boeing / Airbus held operator seminars on SFAR 88 & JAA (EASA) policy

EASA held industry workshop in Cologne 24th June 2005 and 6/7th February 2006.
EASA and FAA are still in discussion on the harmonisation of FRM.

Slide 40