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CFA Level 1

Corporate Finance and Equity Investments


James Lam, M.Sc. CFA
December 28, 2011

Introduction to Corporate Finance


What is finance? What is the distinction between financial and real assets? What is corporate finance? What is the role of financial assets in corporate finance?

Week 1 Financial Markets and Financial How do firms finance their investments? Instruments flow, internal capital) Earnings (free cash


Equity capital (external public or private)  Debt capital (external)




Public and private capital Trading of public capital




New issues  Secondary trading

Equity Issues
First time a firm seeks public equity is called an initial public offering (IPO)


Primary issue: new equity is issued  Secondary issue: existing private equity is sold to outside investors (most privatisations take this form)  Legal and underwriting services provided by investment banks

Debt Issues
Bank loans not publicly traded Corporate Bonds traded actively in the secondary market

Debt capital and equity capital account for most of the firms financial capital

Definition of Debt
Fixed claim
Specifies what needs to be repaid to the investor and when  Default risk risk that the repayment plan is not fulfilled  Conversion options covenants that allow debt to be reclassified as equity


Definition of Equity
Residual claim
Does not specify a repayment plan  Repayment is defined as the residual: whatever is not claimed by other claim holders should go to the equity holders  Voting rights: Equity holders normally have a right to vote on important corporate decisions  Mergers, takeovers  Large investments  Board representation


Trends in Corporate Finance


Globalisation Deregulation Financial innovation Technological advances in the financial system Securitization

What you should take home


You should be able to
Understand the distinction between a fixed claim and a residual claim  List the main attributes of a debt claim  List the main attributes of an equity claim  Describe the ways in which firms raise funds for new investment  Describe the difference between private and public equity  Describe the difference between bank loans and corporate bonds


Readings
Grinblatt/Titman: Financial Markets and Corporate Strategy
Ch 1: overview of the process of raising capital for investment  Ch 2: overview of the process of raising debt capital  Ch 3: overview of the process of raising equity capital


Problems
1. 2.

Why do firms use underwriters when they issue new equity? In what ways do you think it matters that debt holders have a fixed claim when equity holders have not? In what ways do you think it matters that equity holders have voting rights when debt holders have not?

3.

Review problems
1. 2.

Invest 95 and sell for 102 what is the return? Invest 95 and sell for 102. Each transaction is charged a 1% trading commission what is the return? Invest 95 and sell for 102. You receive additional interest payments/dividends of 2 during the holding period. What is the return? Invest 95 and sell for 110 three years later what is the annual return on your investment? Invest 95 now and another 98 next year. In the following year you sell your investment for a total of 202. What is the annual return on your investment?

3.

4.

5.

Week 2: Valuing Financial Assets: Portfolio Tool box Tools portfolio return Expected
 

Portfolio variance  Covariance between the return on two assets

Optimal investment
Fair price of an asset means that the value equals the purchasing price  Even if prices are fair there are still ways of investing your money that is better than others


Risk Aversion


Investors demand compensation for including risk in their portfolio

Portfolio weights
A portfolio of financial assets can be represented in a number of ways


The number of shares held in the various stocks (e.g. 1000 shares in BT, 250 shares in Marks&Spencer etc.)

The dollar-value held in the various stocks (e.g. 2,500 in Lloyds Bank, 10,000 in Jarvis etc.)  As portfolio weights: the dollar-weight of the various stocks (e.g. if total portfolio is 100,000, then the portfolio weight of Lloyds is 0.025 and the portfolio weight of Jarvis is 0.1 etc.)

From portfolio weights to portfolio expected return and and variance of a portfolio we To determine the expected return variance
need to know
The portfolio weights  The expected return on the individual assets  The variance of the return on the individual assets
 

The covariance between the return on any pair of assets

Expectation, Variance and Covariance


Expected return (average return) is a location measure Variance of return is a spread measure Covariance is a measure of how the return of two assets are related (they can move in the same or opposite directions, or they can be uncorrelated) If the returns move in the same directions, covariance is positive, if the returns move in the opposite directions, covariance is negative, and if uncorrelated, covariance is zero

The input data for a portfolio ofexpected returns N N assets


N variances N(N-1)/2 covariances

Plus N portfolio weights

For FTSE100 there are therefore 100+100+100(99)/2 = 5150 data points that need to be estimated even before

Formulas
E ( rP ) ! wi E (ri )
i !1 N

Var (rP ) ! j !1 wi w j Cov (ri , rj )


N i !1 N

Var (rP ) ! wi2Var (ri )  2 wi w j Cov (ri , rj )


i !1 i j

Covariance and Correlation


Covariance is a measure of relatedness that depends on the unit of measurement, so if the return is measured as a percent (e.g. 10 percent) or as a desimal (e.g. 0.10) the covariance will be different Correlation is a measure of relatedness that is normalized to be independent of the unit of measurement

Covariance and Correlation

Cov( ri , rj ) ! V ij Var (ri ) Var (rj ) ! VijW iW j Correlation ! Vij ! Cov(ri , r j ) W iW j

The Mean-Standard Deviation Approach to Investment Risk averse investors dont like risk
Variance averse investors dont like risk that comes as variance This is not the same in general variance aversion is a special case of risk aversion

Portfolio theory takes the variance aversion approach which in practice means that we assume investors wish to maximize their expected return given a certain variance, or minimize their variance given a certain expected return

Mean-Standard Deviation for Two-Asset Investments


E (rP ) ! wE (r1 )  (1  w) E (r2 ) Var (rP ) ! w2Var (r1 )  (1  w) 2 Var (r2 )  2 w(1  w)Cov(r1 , r2 )

Portfolio Frontier

Mean-Std Dev for Portfolios of the Risk Free Asset and a Risky Asset
E ( rP ) ! wE ( r )  (1  w)rF ! rF  w( E (r )  rF ) Var (rP ) ! w2Var (r ) ! Var ( r ) w

Covariance as Marginal Variance


We can interpret the covariance between the return on a stock and the return on a portfolio as the stocks marginal variance That is, if we increase the stocks portfolio weight marginally, the portfolio variance will increase by approximately twice the stocks covariance with the portfolio

Algebraic proof
r ! rP  mri  mrF ! rP  m(ri  rF ) E ( r ) ! E (rP )  m( E (ri )  rF ) Var ( r ) ! Var ( rP )  m Var (ri )  2mCov(rP , ri )
2

dVar (r ) ! 2mVar ( ri )  2Cov(rP , ri ) dm dVar (r ) ! 2Cov (rP , ri ) dm m!0

What to take home


Understanding of expected values, variances, and covariances Understanding of expected return and variance for a portfolio Understanding of risk aversion and variance aversion Understanding of the portfolio frontier Appreciation of the linearity of expected return and standard deviation for portfolios consisting of the risk free asset and a risky portfolio

Readings
Chapter 4 in Grinblatt/Titman

Problems
1. 2.

Variance: Prove that E(x-E(x))2=Ex2-(E(x))2 Covariance: Prove that E(x-E(x))(y-E(y))=Exy-E(x)E(y) Take a time series of returns 0.05, -0.03, 0.10, 0.04, -0.10, 0.20. Estimate the expected return and the variance of return.

3.

Week 3: FromMarket Line Mean-Variance to the CAPM Capital




Finding the market portfolio

Two-fund Separation


Optimal diversification  Market vs idiosyncratic risk

CAPM expected returns relationship


Expected return on assets depend on their covariance (i.e. their relatedness) with the market portfolio  Estimating beta risk


Capital Market Line


The line that goes through the risk free asset and the tangency portfolio Identification?


Maximization procedure  Simplifying trick, the excess return on any asset divided by its covariance with the tangency portfolio, is constant

Maximization programme to find the Capital Market Line of risky assets We can identify the frontier portfolios
Consider investments consisting of the risk free asset and a frontier portfolio these are represented by straight lines For the frontier portfolio that is the tangency portfolio, the angle of the straight line is the steepest

Capital Market Line cont..


E ( rT )  rF Var (rT )

max
w

E (rT ) ! wE (rA )  (1  w) E (rB ) Var (rT ) ! w 2Var (rA )  2w(1  w)Cov( rA , rB )  (1  w) 2Var (rB ) w( E (rA )  E (rB ))  ( E ( rB )  rF ) max w Var (rT )

Capital Market Line cont..


The maximization programme normally leads to a fairly complicated equation with two risky assets we get a quadratic equation to solve In the class exercises you will be asked to have a go at such a problem

Simplifying trick: finding the Capital Market Line return on all risky assets and the risk free We know the expected
return The difference between the two is called the excess return for the asset The excess return, divided by its covariance with the tangency portfolio, is always constant

Capital Market Line

Cov (ri , rT ) ! w1Cov(r1 , ri )  w2Cov(r2 , ri )  .  wiVar (ri )  .  wN Cov (rN , ri ) Cov (ri , rT ) ! E (ri )  rF w1Var (r1 )  .  wN Cov(rN , r1 ) ! E (r1 )  rF w1Cov(r1 , r2 )  .  wN Cov (rN , r2 ) ! E (r2 )  rF

/ w1Cov(r1 , rN )  .  wNVar (rN ) ! E (rN )  rF

Example

.002 .001 0 Var/Cov ! .001 .002 .001 0 .001 .002

.15 - .06 Excess Return ! .17 - .06 .17  .06

Example cont..
.002w1  .001w2  0 w3 ! .15  .06 .001w1  .002w2  .001w3 ! .17  .06 0w1  .001w2  .002 w3 ! .17  .06 w1 ! 40 w2 ! 10 w3 ! 50 w1 ! .4, w2 ! .1, w3 ! .5

CAPM: Risk and Return


Since the excess return divided by the covariance with the tangency portfolio is constant across assets, we can derive important relationships between risk and return The covariance with the tangency portfolio is, if solved for the tangency portfolio itself, equal to the variance of the tangency portfolio

Risk and Return

E ( ri )  rF ! constant Cov (ri , rT ) E (rT )  rF ! constant Var (rT ) E ( ri )  rF E (rT  rF ) ! Cov (ri , rT ) Var (rT ) Cov (ri , rT ) E (rT )  rF E (ri ) ! rF  Var (rT ) E (ri ) ! rF  F i E (rT )  rF

Security Market Line


The expected return of securities is linear in their beta-factors In the (beta,expected return) plane, the line crossing through (0,rF) and (1,E(rT)) is called the security market line

Properties of betas
Beta is linear: the beta of a portfolio of securities equals the portfolio-weighted average of the betas of the individual securities An implication is that the beta of the assets of the company equals the value-weighted beta of the liabilities of the company

Tracking portfolios
A portfolio tracks another perfectly if the difference in the returns of the portfolios is a constant (possibly zero) Imperfect tracking: A portfolio consisting of a weight (1-b) in the risk free asset and a weight b in the tangency portfolio tracks a stock with beta =b, because the two should have the same expected return

Tracking Errors
The two investments should have the same expected return, which implies that the tracking error has zero expectation and zero value Of course, investors do not like risk so they choose to hold the tracking portfolio instead of the stock Because such diversification is free of cost, the tracking error is also free of cost (i.e. it has zero value)

Estimating the risk free return


For risk free return use government bond or government bill data (long or short term instruments backed by the government) The return offered on such instruments is a good proxy for the actual risk free return Alternative, use the average return of a zero-beta risky stock, or the intercept with the y-axis if no zero-beta stock exists

Estimating market risk premia


Estimate the long-run average return on a broad stock market index and subtract the risk free rate Both the average stock market index return and the risk free return change over time The change in the difference is more volatile than the changes in the individual time series. Therefore, estimate the long-run average index return first. Do not estimate the difference between the market return and the risk free rate directly

Beta estimation
A raw beta estimate can be obtained from historical covariance and variance estimates (or by a regression) Average beta is one (this is the beta of the market index) If the raw estimate exceeds (is below) one, we know there is a possibility that the raw beta is an overestimate (underestimate) Raw beta estimates should be adjusted i.e. they should be pulled down if they are above one or be bumped up if they are below one. There are ways of optimally adjust beta estimates

Beta Adjustment
Bloomberg adjustment


Adjusted beta = .66 times Unadjusted beta + .34 times One

Rosenberg adjustment


Adjustment also incorporates fundamental variables (industry variables, company characteristics such as size, etc..)

Also betas are adjusted sometimes to take into account infrequent trading problems

What to take home


Two-fund separation Capital Market Line vs Security Market Line Risk-Return relationships Tracking portfolio Parameter estimation: problems and current practice

Readings
Grinblatt/Titman ch 5

Problems
What is the tracking portfolio for a real asset? How would you estimate the beta of the assets of a firm that has traded debt and equity? How would you estimate the beta of a company that has never traded?

Week 4: From CAPM to Arbitrage Pricing Theory the valuation approach into Main purpose is to extend
more advanced and flexible valuation models CAPM can be thought of as a one-factor model (returns are determined by movements in the market portfolio only) but has important empirical problems (systematic deviations from predictions) APT extends to multi-factor pricing that can mitigate some of the CAPMs empirical problems

Risk Decomposition
The Market Model
 

One-factor (the return on the market portfolio)

Related to the CAPM model  The regression estimates of the market model generates raw beta-estimates for the CAPM

Risk Decomposition
Systematic (market) risk: asset risk that is explained by market movements  Unsystematic (diversifiable, idiosyncratic) risk: asset risk that cannot be explained by market movements


Market model regression


rit ! E i  F i rMt  I it E i ! (1  F i ) rF cov(rit , rMt ) Fi ! var(rMt ) cov(I it , rMt ) ! 0

Risk Decomposition

var(rit ) ! total risk var(F i rMt ) ! F var(rMt ) ! market risk


2 i

var(I it ) ! idiosyncratic risk var(rit ) ! F var(rMt )  var(I it )


2 i

APT: The arbitrage principle behind!factor models r a b f


~ ~ i i i

w ri  (1  w) rj ! w(ai  bi f )  (1  w)(a j  b j f ) Set wbi  (1  w)b j ! 0 which has solution w ! bj


~

bj b j  bi

bj ~ rj ! risk free ! rF ri  1  b b b j  bi j i

APT: Factor pricing


bj a j ! rF ai  1  b b b j  bi j i b j ai  bi a j ! b j rF  bi rF bj ai  rF a j  rF ! ! constant ! P bi bj E ( ri ) ! ai ! rF  bi P For CAPM, P ! E (rM )  rF

Multi-factor models

K - factor model E (ri ) ! rF  bi1P1  bi 2 P2  .  biK PK rit ! ai  bi1 f1t  bi 2 f 2t  .  biK f Kt  I it


~ ~ ~ ~ ~

We do not know what thebe evaluated statistically using a method called factor Can factors are!
analysis The output generates portfolios associated with each factor

Can use firm characteristics or macroeconomic variables as proxies for the factors

Factor betas
The betas determine the assets sensitivity to the factors A high loading on factor number 2 means that the asset is particularly sensitive to risks associated with factor 2

Factor models extends into portfolio analysis since the factor betas of portfolio is just the value-weighted average factor beta for the individual assets in the portfolio

Factor models: computing the variance-covariance structure structure Recall that computing the variance-covariance
requires a large number of estimates For N assets, N variance estimates and N(N-1)/2 covariance estimates N=100, 100 variance estimates and 100(99)/2 = 4950 covariance estimates Using the market model, we can work out the covariance structure from the beta estimates, i.e. from the N beta estimates

Covariance structure estimation


ri ! ai  bi f  I i cov(ri , rj ) ! cov(bi f  I i , b j f  I j ) ! bi b j var( f )  bi cov( f , I j )  b j cov( f , I i )  cov(I i , I j ) ! bi b j var( f )
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Variance estimation
var(r i ) ! bi2 var( f )  var(I i )
~ ~ ~

Tracking Portfolio
Objective: to design a portfolio that has certain factor betas (or factor loadings) Why? The use of tracking portfolios are many


Risk management: if the company is subject to risks beyond its control, e.g. currency risk, it may create a tracking portfolio that offsets the risk Capital allocation: the company may wish to allocate capital to investments that yield a greater return than their tracking portfolio and to reduce its exposure to investments that yield a smaller return than their tracking portfolio

Designing a Tracking Portfolio


First, determine the number of relevant factors (guesswork, statistical analysis) Second, determine the factor betas of the investment you wish to track (statistical analysis, comparison with existing traded companies) Third, gather a collection of different assets with known factor loadings Forth, calibrate your portfolio such that the portfolio factor beta equals the target factor beta for each factor

Example - factor tracking portfolio, target betas 1 and 2 Two


for factor 1 and 2 respectively Three assets with factor beta 1, 3, 1.5 for factor 1 and - 4, 2, 0 for factor 2 Calibration : x1  x2  x3 ! 1 x1  3x2  1.5 x3 ! 1  4 x1  2 x2 ! 2 Output : x1 ! 0.1, x2 ! 0.3, x3 ! 0.8

Applying Pricing Theory


Use pricing models to investment analysis (optimal investment strategies in financial markets diversification) Use pricing models to calibrate investments (design of tracking portfolios) Use pricing models as a benchmark for real investment (comparing real investment returns to the return on tracking portfolios)

Readings
Chapter 6 in Grinblatt/Titman

Problem
There are three relevant factors driving asset returns
The factor structure of the debt of the company is (0.01, 0,0)  The factor structure of the equity of the company is (2,5,1)  The company consists of 1/3 debt and 2/3 equity


What is the factor structure of the companys real assets (investments)?

Week 5: Investment Analysis the casepricing technology to real investment analysis Apply of Risk Free Projects
Net Present Value Rule Complications


Sunk cost  Opportunity cost EVA and IRR

Fisher Separation
With different tastes, why should investors agree on investment policy?
 

Long-term vs short term Risky vs Risk free

Fisher separation
 

Agreement is optimal regardless of taste

Net present value rule: Invest in all projects that cost less than the value of the projects tracking portfolio  NPV = PV(future investment) Investment cost

Ingredients
Cash flows of our investment Investment cost Discount rates (if risk free projects use a risk free discount rate)

Present Value = sum of discounted Cash flows cash flows : C , C ,- , C


1 2 T

Tracking portfolios : C1 C1 grows to (1  r ) (1  r ) ! C1 in year 1 (1  r) C2 C2 (1  r ) 2 ! C2 in year 2 grows to (1  r ) 2 (1  r) 2 etc... Present value ! sum of the value of tracking portfolios ! C1 C2 C3  .  (1  r ) (1  r ) 2 (1  r )T

Net Present Value

C1 C2 CT NPV !  I 0   .  2 T 1  r (1  r ) (1  r )

NPV and Arbitrage


Adopt the project when it has positive NPV is equivalent to making money through arbitrage Cash flows : 20,40,10,30 40 10 30 NPV ! 20    ! 34.94 2 3 1.05 1.05 1.05 Equivalent to undertaking the project, buying a bond paying 40 in period 1, selling a bond paying 10 in period 2, buying a bond paying 30 in period 3.

Value Additivity of NPVs


Project A has NPVA Project B has NPVB Project A  B (i.e. the combined cash flows of the two projects) has net present value : NPV A B ! NPV A  NPVB

Mutually Exclusive Projects


This is an either-or situation you can invest in project A or you can invest in project B, but you cannot invest in both at the same time Both projects may have positive NPV so are worthwhile on their own Either-or situations often arise naturally. For instance, all timing decisions are mutually exclusive. You can invest now or you can invest in the future, but you cannot invest both now and in the future.

Which project to choose when they are mutually exclusive the net present value of The choice criterion is to maximize
investment. Therefore, if you have two or more mutually exclusive projects to choose from you should choose the one with the most positive NPV.

Capital Constraints
There are situations in which you may have more projects with positive NPV available than you have funds for investment i.e. you have a budget constraint Then the choice criterion is to invest in the projects that offer the greatest profitability index

Profitability Index

Present Value cash flow PV Investment cost  I 0 Net present value NPV ! PV  I 0 PV Profitability Index PI ! I0

Example A : PV Project

! 10m, I A ! 8m

Project B : PVB ! 100m, I B ! 90m Project C : PVC ! 1000m, I C ! 950m What is the optimal investment policy if the projects are independent? What is the optimal investment policy if the projects are mutually exclusive? Total investment budget B ! 100m. What is the optimal investment policy subject to staying within budget?

Example cont. : Profitability indexes


10 ! 1.25 8 100 ! 1.1111 PI B ! 90 1000 ! 1.0526 PI C ! 950 Invest in A first, then B and C. PI A ! Optimal mix : All of A (using 8 of 100 budget) plus all of B (using additional 90 of budget, leaving 2 to invest in C) plus 2 ! 0.2105% of C 950 2 Total NPV : (10  8)  (100  90)  (1000  950) ! 12.11 950

Economic Value Added


EVA is a profitability measure that has become widely used in corporations initially to replace accounting earnings or profit measures Accounting measures do not always measure economic performance (depreciation cost, for instance, is not a cash flow and should not be included in project evaluation) Accounting measures are therefore not directly consistent with NPV Economic Value Added is consistent with NPV

EVA: Definition
Three components
Cash flow  Change in asset base  Economic return on assets


EVA(t) = Ct + (It It-1) rIt-1 EVA(t) = Ct + It (1+r)It-1 Discounted sum of EVA(t) = Net Present Value

EVA, cont.
Investment of 100 The first year cash flow is 50 The second year cash flow is 150 Discount rate is 10% Assets are depreciated by 50% in the first year and by 100% in the second year.

NPV = -100 + 50/1.1+150/1.12=69.42

EVA, cont.
EVA(0) = -100(cash flow)+(100-0)(change in assets)0(0.1)(economic cost of initial assets) = 0 EVA(1)=50(cash flow)+(50-100)(change in assets)100(0.1)(economic cost of initial assets) = -10 EVA(2)=150(cash flow)+(0-50)(change in assets50(0.1)(economic cost of initial assets)= 95

Discounted EVA = EVA(0)+EVA(1)/1.1+EVA(2)/1.12 = 69.42 = NPV

IRR: Internal Rate of Return


Often managers base investment decision on the IRR instead of the NPV The rule is: if IRR is greater than the discount rate (i.e. the cost of capital) then adopt the project In many cases this leads to the same investment decision, as IRR is greater than the discount rate only if the NPV is positive In other cases this is not true however, so to be safe always use NPV or EVA calculations

IRR
C1 C2 CT  .  NPV !  I 0  2 T 1  r (1  r ) (1  r ) C1 C2 CT  .  0 ! I0  2 1  IRR (1  IRR) (1  IRR)T

Example
Investment cost = 100 First years cash flow = 150 Discount rate 10%

NPV = -100+150/1.1=36.36 IRR: 0=-100+150/(1+IRR) yields 50%

Projects that have the cash flow profile of a loan cost = 150 Investment
Next years cash flow = -100 Discount rate = 10%

NPV = 150 100/1.1 = 59.09

IRR: 0 = 150 100/(1+IRR) yields a negative IRR of -

Problems with IRR


IRR criterion is sensitive to the type of cash flow (asset or liability?) IRR is not unique in general (for T period projects there can be up to T different IRRs) IRR is not appropriate for mutually exclusive projects as small projects with high IRR and small NPV might then be preferred to large projects with low IRR and large NPV

IRR and mutually exclusive projects


Discount rate 2% Project A: -10, -16, +30 Project B: -10, 2, 11

NPV(A) = 3.149 NPV(B) = 2.534

Important points
Fisher separation NPV definition NPV with mutually exclusive projects (either-or) NPV with budget constraints EVA and NPV IRR IRR pitfalls

Readings
Grinblatt/Titman chapter 10

Test for next week:


Readings chapter 4, 5, 6 and 10 Important formulas
CAPM: exp return = risk free plus risk adjustment  Beta-factor: covariance/variance  Factor models: exp return = risk free plus risk adjustment


Risk free real investments


NPV rule  Profitability Index  EVA  IRR


Very important formulas


CAPM : E (r ) ! rF  F ( E (rM )  rF ) Cov(r,rM ) Beta : F ! Var (rM ) Factor models : E (r ) ! rF  F1P1  .  F K PK (where P denotes risk premium) C1 CT Net present value : NPV !  I 0  .  T 1 r (1  r )

Sample test questions


1.

The risk free return is 5% and the market index has an average return of 12%. What is the expected return for an asset with beta 1.5? An investment costs 100,000 and offers a cash flow of 50,000 in year 1 and 150,000 in year 2. The discount rate is 5%. What is the net present value of the investment? Should you adopt the investment? Explain. In a two-factor market, the factor betas of asset A are 1 and 0, and the factor betas of asset B are 0 and 1, respectively. The risk free return is 5%, and the average return on asset A and B are 10% and 15%, respectively. What are the risk premia associated with factor 1 and 2?

2.

3.

Week 6: Investing in Risky Projects


Applying the CAPM and APT in the capital budgeting process Key problem: estimating the cost of capital for risky projects
Applying CAPM and APT  Using comparison firms  The dividend discount model


Risk Adjusted Discounting

Compute the expected future cash flow (we do not know exactly what we' ll get) E (Ct ) in period t Compute the beta risk associated with this cash flow (the beta is the covariance of the return with the market return, over the variance of the market return F Compute the expected market return of the cash flow r ! rF  F ( E (rM  rF ) E (Ct ) Discount : PV ( E (Ct )) ! (1  r )t

Fundamental problem: Estimating the beta for traded equity are easy to estimate we simply Betas factor
regress equity returns on the index return, and possibly adjust to take into account estimation error (e.g. Bloomberg adjustment) Betas for projects are much more difficult to estimate as there simply does not exist a trading history Possible solution: use comparison firms (firms we imagine has similar risk profile to the project in question)

Using comparison firms


Asset base needs to be sufficiently similar to the planned investment We need to adjust for leverage effects (the comparison firm may have debt)


In general, it is only the equity beta of the comparison firm we can estimate but we are really interested in the asset beta  The more the firm borrows, the higher the equity beta (even though the asset beta remains the same)

Adjusting forvalue - weighted sum of debt and equity Asset beta ! leverage
beta D E F A ! FD  FE V V V ! DE D F E ! F A  (F A  F D ) E Estimated equity beta equals the asset beta plus a leverage term

Example Value assets 100, value debt 40, and value equity 60.
Estimated equity beta 1.5 Estimated debt beta 0 40 1.5 ! F A  ( F A  0) 60 1.5 implies F A ! ! 0. 9 40 1 60

Implementing risk adjusted A project has the average beta of Church' s Chicken, discounting with Wendy's. The equity betas of these comparison firms McDonald's and
three companies are 0.75, 1.00, and 1.08 respectively. The debt and equity values of these companies are 0.004 and 0.096 (Church' s Chicken), 2.300 and 7.700 (McDonalds) and 0.210 and 0.790 (Wendy's), respectively, and the beta of the debt of these companes is assumed equal to zero. The asset betas are Church' s Chicken 0.72 ! McDonalds 0.77 ! 0.096 0.75 0.100

7.7 1.00 10 0.79 Wendy's 0.85 ! 1.08 1.0

Cont
0.72  0.77  0.85 Average beta ! project beta ! 0.78 ! 3 Risk free rate 4% and market risk premium 8.4%. Cost of capital (discount rate) for the project is 0.1055 ! 0.04  0.78(0.084)

Applying APT
The APT model estimates the cost of capital by a factor model, so present values are given by E (Ct ) PV ( E (Ct )) ! t (1  rF  F1P1  .  F K PK )

APT and CAPM vs Alternative methods the APT and CAPM models is that they require A drawback with
a number of estimates: the risk free rate of return, the beta factor(s), the market risk premium and the factor risk premia. It can in some circumstances be better to work with simpler model. The dividend growth model is an alternative to the APT and CAPM.

Dividend Discount Model


div1  S1 (1  r ) div2  S 2 , etc... S1 ! (1  r ) S0 !

div1 div2 div1 div1 (1  g ) S0 !  . !  . 2 2 (1  r ) (1  r ) (1  r ) (1  r ) div1 S0 ! rg r!g div1 ! growth in dividends dividend yield S0

What if comparison firms dont exist?


In general there is little we can do However, if there exist firms where one division is similar to our project we may be able to identify the relevant betas. For instance, if you want to estimate the beta of the network division of television companies you can use the fact that these divisions play a varying role in generating the asset beta for these companies

Network division example

General Electric : asset beta 0.99, 25% of value from network division, 75% from non - network divisions. Viacom : asset beta 0.78, 50% of value from network division, 50% from non - network divisions. If non network divisions are sufficiently similar, we know that F GE ! 0.25F Network  0.75F Non  network ! 0.99 FViacom ! 0.5F Network  0.5F Non  network ! 0.78

F Network ! 0.36

Pitfalls in using the comparison method not the same as firm betas: mature projects Project betas
generally lower beta than R&D projects etc Growth opportunities are usually the source of high betas: company value often significantly linked to future growth opportunities as opposed to current investments

Example
Investment cost 100,000 Annual running cost 5,000 for 5 years Expected revenue stream 50,000 for 5 years Beta-risk of revenue stream 1.2 Risk free return 5% Expected market return 12%

The discount rate for running costs : 5% (as the costs can be assumed risk free?) The discount rate for the revenue stream : 5%  1.2(12%  5%) ! 13.4% PV ! 5(1.05) 1  5(1.05)  2  5(1.05) 3  5(1.05)  4  5(1.05) 5  50(1.134) 1  50(1.134)  2  50(1.134) 3  50(1.134)  4  50(1.134) 5 ! 21.65  174.16 ! 152.51 NPV ! 100  152.51 ! 52.51 " 0 Therefore, adopt project.

Example cont

Comparison method, example


A firm with equity currently valued at 100,000 and outstanding debt worth 50,000 holds 25% cash and 75% of a risky asset on its balance sheet The equity beta is 1.5 You consider investing in a project very similar to the risky asset owned by this firm The risk free rate is 5% and the expected return on the market is 12% Work out the project beta and the cost of capital for your project

Comparison method cont0, and also assume Assume debt beta is very close to
that the cash balance has a beta close to 0 1.5 The total asset beta F A ! !1 50 1 100 Total asset beta F A ! 0.25(0)  0.75F RiskyAsset F RiskyAsset 1 ! ! 1.33 0.75

Cost of capital ! 5%  1.33(12% - 5%) ! 14.33%

Readings
Grinblatt & Titman chapter 11 I have not emphasized the certainty equivalent method

Week 7: Taxes and Financing


Irrelevance in the absence of transaction costs and taxes (Modigliani-Miller) Financing choices not neutral to taxation:
Level: corporate vs private tax rates  Timing: dividends can be deferred whereas interest payments on debt cannot


Modigliani-Miller
The operating cash flow is divided into two components
Cash flow to debt holders  Cash flow to equity holders


Fundamental question: Does it matter how the split is made? If it does we can create value also through financing choices (not only through investment choices)

MM cont
Modigliani-Miller proved that capital structure choices are irrelevant the split does not matter This proof rests on the absence of transaction costs of any kind: taxes, trading costs, and bankruptcy costs The proof of the MM theorem uses a no arbitrage argument financial markets do not admit free lunches, or trading strategies giving you a positive cash flow with no prior investment

MM cont
Consider two versions of the same firm one version is U for unlevered (with no debt) and the other version L for levered (with debt) The firms have otherwise the same operating cash flow X The unlevered firm has value VU and the levered firm value VL

MM cont
The fundamental question is whether VU and VL differ The cash flows of firm Us equity holders is simply X The cash flow of firm Ls debt holders is (1+r)D to the firms debt holders and X-(1+r)D to the firms equity holders, in total a cash flow of X also The value of L is the combined value of the debt and the equity

MM cont
Suppose VL is smaller than VU Then an investor can buy a 10% holding of Ls debt and a 10% holding of Ls equity, which entitles the investor to a 10% share in the total cash flow X. He would then go to the market and sell 10% of the cash flow X, which is valued at 10% of the value of U. This leaves him with zero future liability. His trading gains are 10% of the difference between VU and VL, which we have assumed is positive This cannot be possible in an arbitrage free market, so we can conclude that VL must be equal to or greater than VU

MM cont
Now suppose VU is smaller than VL An investor buys 10% of the cash flow X and sells 10% of a claim that promises the cash flow (1+r)D. The net cash flow is 10% of a claim that pays X-(1+r)D at maturity, which is priced at 10% of the equity in L The net future liability is zero, and the trading gains equal 10% of the difference between VL and VU, which we have assumed positive Again, this is not consistent with arbitrage free markets In conclusion, it must be the case that VU = VL and that capital structure is irrelevant

What about risky debt?


When the corporate debt contract is risky it may be difficult to find a synthetic corporate debt contract if a real one does not exist We must assume, therefore, that the markets are sufficiently complete in order to conclude that financing does not matter Complete market = a market where the dimensionality of the asset structure equals the dimensionality of the uncertainty structure If there are two states of nature (e.g. good and bad) then it suffices with two distinct assets to make the market complete

Bankruptcy costs
The Modigliani-Miller theorem also assumes that there are no deadweight costs of bankruptcy The debt holders may not get all their money back if the firm defaults, but this is not in itself enough to jeopardise the MM-theorem There must also be deadweight costs or liquidation costs (i.e. the value of the assets in default is less than the value of the assets as a going concern)

Taxes: Another important factor


The tax system is generally fairly complex with different tax rates for different individuals and institutions, and for different types of income Therefore, it may be scope for tax arbitrage profits in financing

After tax cash flow analysis


A constant after tax discount rate r Tax rate for personal income from debt tD Tax rate for personal income from equity tE Corporate tax rate tC Earnings before taxes and interest payments X Earnings before taxes (X kD) (k coupon rate, D nominal amount borrowed) After tax personal income from debt kD(1-tD) After tax earnings (X-kD)(1-tC)

Algebra
After tax cash flow from investor perspective C ! ( X  kD)(1  tC )(1  t E )  kD(1  t D ) (1  tC )(1  t E ) ! X (1  tC )(1  t E )  kD(1  t D )1  1  tD Discounted after tax cash flow X (1  tC )(1  t E ) kD(1  t D ) (1  tC )(1  t E ) 1   DC ! 1 r 1 r 1  tD ! Value unlevered firm discounted tax benefits

Equilibrium
If there is a positive discounted tax benefit firms choose to borrow more, and investors with higher personal tax rate on debt income is encouraged to enter the market. This implies a reduction of tax benefits of borrowing. Reverse effect is there is a negative discounted tax benefit of borrowing In equilibrium, we expect the tax benefit from borrowing to be equal to zero This is the so-called Millers equilibrium described in Appendix 14A in the textbook

Preferred stock
Preferred stock: dividends on preferred stock are not tax deductible at the corporate level as are interest payments on debt This implies that corporate junior debt may be tax efficient relative to preferred stock However, the US tax code allows a 70% tax exclusion for preferred dividends paid to corporate holders, so the yield on preferred stock is often lower (before tax) than on junior debt even though the debt has seniority over the preferred stock

Investor conflicts?
Tax exempt equity holders prefer in general to reduce the borrowing of the firm so as to transfer income from debt repayments to dividend payments High-tax bracket investor prefer the opposite Often tax-exempt municipal bonds (or similar investments) offer yields that are greater than the after tax yield on corporate bonds for high-tax bracket investors Thus, the firm can give these investors an advantage by increasing the firms borrowing, as this frees capital that the investors can use to invest in tax-exempt municipal bonds

Inflation
We expect to see a one-to-one relationship between inflation and nominal interest rates - if inflation increases by one percentage point then so do nominal interest rates Higher inflation, therefore, leads to higher nominal borrowing costs that yield in turn greater tax deductions Therefore, the tax effect has greater bite in periods of high inflation

Empirical evidence
Do firms with greater taxable earnings borrow more?
No, but this may be because firms in general rarely issue equity  Firms that perform poorly, therefore, tend to accumulate debt to meet their investments


Tax code changes that affect the relative tax benefit of borrowing should have an impact on corporate financing
Yes, US tax reform of 1986 which reduced the tax benefits of other things than debt (such as depreciation rules and investment tax credits) gave rise to an increase in borrowing among firms most affected  The firms less affected did not increase their borrowing to the same extent


Taxes matter but dont explain everything

Readings
Grinblatt/Titman chapter 14, including the appendix 14.10 Are There Tax Advantages to Leasing not so relevant

Exercises
1.

A firm has assets valued at 100, and debt valued at 50. It plans to restructure its liability side by increasing its borrowing to 70 and paying a dividend of 20 to its shareholders. The debt has zero beta before and 0.001 beta after the recapitalization. The beta of the equity is 2 before the recapitalization.
a)

b) c) d)

What are the values of the equity before and after the recapitalization? What is the beta of the assets of the firm? What is the beta of the equity after recapitalization? The recapitalization has increased the beta of the debt (and therefore the cost of debt capital). Has it also increased the beta of the equity? Does this mean that the total cost of financing has increased? Explain.

Week 8: Taxes and Dividends


In frictionless markets dividends dont matter Why do firms nonetheless pay dividends? Taxes and dividends Stock returns and dividend yields what is the connection? Investment distortions caused by taxes in dividends

Cash flow to shareholders


Shareholders earn money through holding equity that earns a cash flow (such as dividends) and capital gains (which can be realized through selling stock) The cash distribution to shareholders is normally discretional the company can decide how much cash flow to give their shareholders Cash distribution comes in two forms dividend payments and share repurchase schemes Dividend payments do not affect the number of shares but will reduce the value of each share Share repurchases do normally not affect the value of each share but will reduce the number of shares outstanding

How much of earnings is cash flow to shareholders? the ratio of dividends to earnings Dividend payout ratio:
In the US, this ratio has declined from about 22% in 1980 to about 14% in 1998 Over the same period, the ratio of share repurchases to earnings increased from 3% to about 14% The total ratio of cash flow to earnings has been relatively stable at about 25% of earnings

Dividend yields
Dividend yield is the ratio of dividends per share over price per share Typical pattern is that high-tech growth firms have low dividend yield and dividend payout ratios (Microsoft paid its very first dividend this year) Stable, old economy companies such as mining, oil and manufacturing pay about half their earnings as dividends

What is the optimal dividend payout ratio? frictionless economy (no transaction costs, taxes, or Assumption:
other frictions) Investment policy unaffected by dividend payments Modigliani-Miller Dividend Irrelevance Theorem:


The choice between paying dividends and repurchasing shares is a matter of indifference to shareholders

Modigliani-Miller Irrelevance
Consider two identical equity financed firms, the only difference is dividend policy Firm 1 pays 10m as dividends Firm 2 repurchases stock worth 10m After the end of the year, the firms are worth X In the beginning each firm has 1m shares outstanding

MM cont
Each share eventually sells for X divided by the number of shares Firm 2 buys back 10m worth of stock If share price is p, and firm 2 buys back n shares, we know that pn=10m We also know that p=X/(1m-n) Suppose X = 150m Solving both equations gives us n = (10m1m)/(X+10m), so we get n = 62,500, and p = 150m/(1m-62,500) = 160 Firm 1: stock price is p = 150m/1m = 150, but each stock gives a dividend worth 10m/1m = 10, so the total value of each stock is 150+10 = 160 Since shareholders get the same cash flow eventually, the shares must sell at the same price initially, i.e. dividend policy does not matter

Taxes and cash distribution to shareholders Classical tax system


Dividends taxed as ordinary income and capital gains at a lower rate than ordinary income  Dividends are not tax deductible at corporate level, so dividends are also subject to corporate taxation


Imputation system
Dividends are taxed as ordinary income but investors get a partial tax credit for corporate taxes (to offset personal taxes)  Dividends are not tax deductible at corporate level


Systems that eliminate double taxation




Dividends are tax deductible at corporate level and taxed as ordinary income at investor level

Classical tax system


The classical tax system implies a tax disadvantage of dividend payments Dividend $100, 35% tax implies an immediate tax liability of $35 Share repurchase scheme: an investor sells $100 worth of shares. Suppose original cost was $76. This implies a taxable capital gain of $24. Taxed at 20%, this implies an immediate tax liability of $4.8 Share repurchase scheme much cheaper than paying dividends

Tax avoidance schemes


In theory, investors can often invest in a scheme that gives an immediate tax relief against a deferred future tax liability In practice, investors do not take advantage of these schemes but instead choose to pay taxes (or are unable to invest in tax avoidance schemes) on the received dividends The question is, therefore, why corporations continue to pay dividends when they are so tax inefficient

Dividend clienteles
Some investors do not pay taxes These investors will, everything else being equal, prefer high dividend yield firms to low dividend yield firms as they do not pay tax on the dividend Firms might adopt different dividend policies to attract different investor clienteles Empirical evidence suggests that investors portfolios have dividend yields that are related to their tax status (high tax bracket investors choose low dividend yield stocks and vice versa)

Dividend payments and stock returns


Do stocks with high dividend yield compensate investors for the tax disadvantage? Higher returns should then lead to lower values, reflecting the higher discount rates applied to future cash flows Research has focused on two returns effects
 

Ex-dividend day behaviour of stock prices Whether cross-sectional dividend yield differences affect expected returns

Ex-dividend day price drop


If you buy the stock on the day before the ex-dividend day, you are entitled to the future value of the stock and the current dividend payment If you buy the stock on the ex-dividend day, you are entitled only to the future value of the stock The stock price should, therefore, drop on the ex-dividend day to reflect the dividend payment

Empirical results from the 1960s indicate that the ex-dividend day price drop is about 77.7% of the dividend payment on average, but was higher (90%) for dividend payments greater than 5% of the stock price, and lower (50%) for the smallest dividends. These results indicate a tax effect (investors discount a tax rate of around 22.3% on dividends), and a clientele effect (investors with different tax rates hold portfolios with different dividend yields)

Ex-dividend day cont


Transaction cost argument


Consider buying a stock at $20 before the ex-div day, receive a $1 dividend, then sell the stock for $19.20. This yields $1 taxable profits and $(20-19.20) = $0.80 tax deductible losses. The net profit is $0.20 less taxes, but it is still arbitrage profits. The stock needs to drop by the full amount to preclude arbitrage profits. If there is a $0.10 per share transaction cost, the investor receives taxable profits of $1 in dividends, and incur $0.80 in tax deductible losses. The net profit is $0.20, but the investor must also pay $0.10 in transaction costs, so the net profit is only $0.10 less taxes. If the stock drops to $19.10, therefore, there are no arbitrage profits to be made. If the dividend payment is only $0.40, the necessary price drop is $0.30 to prevent arbitrage profits. That is, the price drop is greater for high dividend yielding stocks in percentage terms (as the clientele effect predicts).

Price drop less than the dividend payment is also observed in countries that do not have a classical tax system, suggesting this is not a tax driven phenomenon at all

Cross-sectional relation between dividendare moreand stock returns gains, If dividends yield heavily taxed than capital
the expected return must be greater for high dividend yield stocks. Empirically, stocks with high dividend yields have higher returns, but the relationship is not straightforward The relationship is U-shaped, with zero dividend yield stocks have higher expected return than stocks with low dividend yield, but for stocks paying dividends, the expected return increases with the dividend yield

How dividend taxes affect financing and investment decisions Marginal tax rate of 50%
Company has a choice between paying $1m in dividends or retain the earnings Retained earnings yield 6% after corporate taxes (alternative II) Dividends yield 7% before personal taxes in corporate bonds (alternative I) Alternative I yields $500,000 to invest at 7%, which after tax yields $17,500 per year Alternative II yields $60,000 in extra dividend payments per year, which yields $30,000 after tax to the investor If you are a zero tax payer, however, alternative I yields $1,000,000 to invest at 7%, which equals $70,000, and alternative II only $60,000 in additional dividends per year. Investors with different tax rates are likely to disagree with regard to the dividend policy the firm should pursue

The general principle


Investors prefer retained earnings if (1-corporate tax rate) x (pretax return internally at corporate level) > (after tax return at investor level) This has implications for investment policy as well


Tax-exempt and tax-paying investors agree on externally funded projects but may disagree on internally funded ones (tax exempt investors require higher return on internal investment than tax-paying investors)

Readings
Grinblatt/Titman chapter 15

Exercises
1.

A stock trades at 100p per share (prior to ex-dividend day) and the firm will pay a dividend of 10p per share.
a)

b)

c)

d)

e)

Work out the ex-dividend day price if investors pay 40% tax on dividends and the ex-dividend day price equals the initial price less after-tax dividend payment Work out the minimum transaction cost per share that prevents taxarbitrage by a tax-paying investor Suppose the dividend payment was 50p per share. What is your answer to a) and b) now? Suppose the actual transaction cost is 2p per share. What are the arbitrage free price drops in a) and c) above now? What are the implied tax rates on dividends in d)?

Week 9: Managerial Incentives and Corporate Finance Manager shareholder conflicts




Occidental Petroleum and founder/CEO Armand Hammer case in the textbook  Maxwell Communications and Robert Maxwell

How such conflicts affect investment, financing, and ownership structure How such conflicts can be mitigated by executive compensation schemes

Separation of ownership and control


The separation of ownership and control is beneficial in terms of diversification and optimal investment while keeping a stable management team in control of the firm But it can be harmful if the management team is more interested in pursuing their own interest as opposed to their shareholders interests In what way do their interests differ?
Managers represent investors, customers, suppliers, and employees not just investors  Managers get utility from non-financial benefits such as status, perks, jobsecurity etc and are willing to spend corporate resources on these even though they are likely to be negative NPV projects


Factors that determine the managershareholder conflictby the manager Proportions of stock owned
Managerial entrenchment and lack of means to control managers
Diffuse ownership structure (no individual manager benefits enough to take action)  Proxy fights (shareholder revolt at general meeting) are very expensive and difficult to organize


Bonus schemes not performance sensitive enough Changes in corporate governance have made managers more accountable in recent years

Ownership structure
Ownership structure is on the whole more concentrated than we would expect (CAPM advocates diversification), particularly outside the US/UK Ownership concentration a response to weak legal protection of shareholders interests UK/US have the strongest protection and the most diffuse ownership structure

Managers tend to keep a significant ownership stake in firms where the incentive conflict with the shareholders is the greatest In many internet IPOs, the managers kept a large share of their holding in order to get a higher price in the IPO (lock in clauses) Eg. Lastminute.com Martha Lane-Fox and Brent Hoberman (founders Hoberman still manager) were still large owners after IPO and were prevented from selling their share for a given time period after the IPO Firms with higher concentration of management ownership have higher market values relative to their book values, provided management share is not too big. If it gets above 5%, managers become entrenched which allows them to pursue own interests more

How managers distort investment decisions investments that fit the managers expertise Managers prefer


Makes him (her) more indispensable

Investments in visible/fun industries




Raising the managers external profile (and his potential future job opportunities and wages)

Investments that pay off early




Financial success in the short run can increase bonus, reduce the risk of losing job, increase the possibility of raising more capital

Investments that reduce risk and increase the scope of the firm


To avoid bankruptcy the manager seeks relatively safe investments and may take a portfolio approach to investments

Capital structure and managerial control likely to prefer equity to debt because they are Managers are
interested in minimizing the probability of default Shareholders may, therefore, prefer debt financing as debt is a good way to discipline managers (the fear of losing job is a good motivator) Empirical investigations show there is a positive relationship between leverage and
Percentage of executive pay tied to performance  Percentage of equity owned by managers  Percentage of investment bankers on the board of directors  Percentage of equity owned by large individual investors


Debt is a good way to curb overinvestment Debt engages often a bank who is a good monitor of management

Executive compensation
The problem of incentivizing managers is often called a principal-agent problem
Tenant farmer works the land of a land-owner. If compensated too much in terms of output, the tenant farmer must bear all the risk influencing output (weather etc). If compensated too little in terms of output, the tenant farmer doesnt put in the required effort.  Compensation is a matter of balancing the two concerns: Called the problem of designing the optimal incentive contract  Effort (input) cannot be observed, otherwise compensation could be tied to effort instead of output  Design objective is to minimize the agency costs of delegated control


Performance based executive compensation$10m jet$1000the CEO $30,000valueinislost bonus with Jensen and Murphy (1990) found that a increase in firm associated a $3 increase in CEO bonus (a costs just
payments) Some disagreement about this result, as it may have underestimated the real sensitivity by ignoring longer term impact on bonus payments Substantial differences in pay-for-performance sensitivity across firms
 

Some explained by the agency costs of delegated control Some explained by the risk of the firm

Over time, the pay-for-performance sensitivity has been increasing Adoption of performance-based pay is generally a positive signal to the investors What about relative performance sensitivity (pay linked to the position of the company relative to the average for the industry)? Relative performance-pay is rarely observed, but can be costly to investors in terms of price wars and overly aggressive competition. Stock-based performance versus earnings-based performance. Stock based performance is much noisier than earnings-based performance, but in return earnings can be manipulated by the manager

Mergers, Spin-offs, Carve Outs


It may be easier to design an optimal compensation contract for a small, single-unit, firm than for a multi-divisional conglomerate Solution may be a spin-off (a division set up as an independent firm by distributing shares in the new firm to the existing investors) or a carve-out (do an IPO of the division and sell to new investors) Spin-offs and carve-outs are positive signals Mergers create the opposite effect, and in particular conglomerate mergers can be seen as a negative signal to investors as they affect managerial incentives negatively (conglomerate mergers are relatively rare now but were popular in the 1960s and 70s) Many spin-offs and carve-outs are reversing prior conglomerate mergers

Readings
Grinblatt/Titman chapter 18

Exercises
1.

The manager of a firm considers investing 1m of free cash flow (earnings currently held in a bank account) in a project that has private value 10,000 to the manager but NPV of -200,000 to the investors. What is the optimal decision for the manager if
a) b)

c)

He has fixed pay? He has in addition a bonus scheme where an increase of 1000 in the stock value leads to an increase of 10 to the manager? What is the optimal bonus scheme for the manager in this case?

Week 10: Information and Financial Decisionsmanagers have better information than Key premise:
investors What managers do, therefore, conveys information to the market Managers can
Distort accounts to manipulate the information flow  Reveal information through dividend policy, capital structure choice, and investment decisions


Empirical evidence: how stock prices react to various financial decisions

What can better informed individuals do? they act in a way that conveys their information Signals:


Difference between cheap talk and credible action  Signals need to be costly

Pooling: they act in a way that everybody else act in order not to reveal information


It is too expensive to send a signal

Manipulation
Actions: Investors overestimate the true cost of signalling  Reporting: Bad reports attract attention it may be easier to disguise bad outcomes by submitting an average report


Distortions to managerial incentives


Managers seek to maximize the share price The share price may, however, deviate from the intrinsic value (the full information price) Long term investors prefer that managers maximize the intrinsic value (which eventually transpires) Short term investors prefer that managers maximize the current share price (which may be distorted due to lack of information)

The conflict is, therefore, essentially one of short-termism versus long-termism

Why do managers care about the current or the managers may plan to sell private stock New issues share price?
Low prices attract bidders in takeovers Managerial compensation directly linked to stock price Customers or employees may flee the company if the stock price goes too low

Earnings manipulation
The same underlying profits can be reported in different ways as earnings
Depends on the choice of depreciation method  Choice of inventory valuation method (FIFO LIFO)  The estimates of the economic value of assets, the estimates of the cost of guarantees or warranties issued, the estimates of the pension liability of the firm, the discount rates used for valuation of leases and pensions etc.


There is a tendency to inflate reported earnings to increase the current stock price But managers may also find it useful sometimes to deflate reported earnings


For instance when the manager has just been hired  When applying for government subsidies or tariff protection against foreign competitors

Short-termism in investment
Bias towards short term projects because these makes it clear very quickly whether the investment is a good one Example:
  

Project A: yr 1 cash flow 40; yr 2-11 cash flow 80 per year; PV 840 Project B: yr 1 cash flow 60; yr 2-11 cash flow 50 per year; PV 560 Project C: yr 1 cash flow 40; yr 2-11 cash flow 40; PV 440

Investors think C is much more realistic than A or B If company chooses A, the stock price is close to 440 after yr 1 earnings are revealed, why? If company chooses B, the stock price is close to 560 after yr 1 earnings are revealed, why?

Company has a disincentive to choose the best project which is A because it is too similar to C in the first year

Dividends and Stock Repurchases: Announcement Effects normally increases the An announcement of a dividend increase
stock price by about 2% If a company announces it is to cut its dividend completely, the stock price decreases by about 9.5% Is paying dividends therefore a good decision?
Dividends may be a costly signal conveying information that is hidden from investors  Paying dividends is, in effect, a cost to the shareholders to ensure that current information is reflected in current prices  The alternative: long term savings in signalling costs against the cost of deviations between the current stock price and the intrinsic value of equity


Dividends and Investment Opportunities News may be




Increased cash flow  Increase in investment opportunities

An increase in dividends signals increased cash flow (as dividends then are more affordable) but is not consistent with an increase in investment opportunities (as they are then needed for investments) An increase/cut in dividends is, therefore, a more complex signal than is suggested in previous slides Empirical evidence suggests that cuts are viewed more favourably when the firms experience an increase in investment opportunities

Capital Structure and Information


Borrowing can also be thought of as a costly signal:
If mangers are convinced that future cash flow is high then the most credible way of communicating this information is to borrow  If the manager is lying, the firm is going to default on its debt liability and the manager will be out of a job


Firms with poor prospects find it hard to mimic the same borrowing decisions

Empirical Evidence
Event study methodology Leverage increasing transactions (debt-for-equity swaps) have positive stock price response Leverage neutral transactions (debt-for-debt) have zero response Leverage decreasings (equity-for-debt) have negative stock price response Security sales (equity, debt) have negative stock price response, and more so for equity than for debt Empirical evidence is consistent with information theories (this week) but is also consistent with incentive theories (last week)

Adverse Selection
Sick people tend to see health/life insurance as cheap consequently they will be over-represented in the group of buyers of this type of insurance Example: very expensive insurance that covers 100% of all costs or cheap insurance that covers only 80% of all costs


In this case the sick people might migrate to the expensive type of insurance and the healthy ones to the cheap type

This is called adverse selection buyers or sellers do not always select themselves randomly but rather according to their type This also plays a role in the sale of corporate securities

Managers have inside knowledge and at the same be expected to sell equity when the Corporation can time sell or buy corporate stock is overvalued and buy back equity when the stock securities
is undervalued This makes sell transactions a bad signal and buy transactions a good signal This makes equity a bad source of capital for new investment, since it must be sold at a discount to the current stock price (why?) Pecking-order theory: firms prefer retained earnings to external capital, and external debt to external equity, when financing investments

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