Quantum Cryptography

Presented by:-

ANUPAM GUPTA ECE, Roll-24

CONTENTS
MOTIVATION INVENTORS FUNDAMENTAL BB84 PROTOCOL DETECTING EAVESDROPPING PROS & CONS CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS FUTURE PROSPECTS CONCLUSION

Motivation

Age of Information
Information is valuable Protecting that Information

Quantum Security Benefits

Provably Secure Evidence of Tampering

INVENTION
of The BB84 QKD protocol
THE INVENTORS

Fundamentals
Measurement causes perturbation No Cloning Theorem Thus, measuring the qubit in the wrong basis destroys the information.

a z e r t

a z e r t u i p q s d f g h j k l m w x c v s z

a z e r t

f g h j k l m w x

g h j k l m w x c v b / s z

a z e r t y u i o p q s d f g h j k l m w x c v b n ? . / s

a z e r t

a z e r t y u

u i i o o p q q p q s s q s d d s d f f f f d f g g g g g f g h h h h h g h j j j j j j k k k k k k l l l l l l m m m m m x m Has the w w w c w w ability w to create qubits v x x x x x x in two orthogonal bases c c c c c b c v v v v n v b b b ? b n n n . n ? ? ? / ? z . s . / z / s

a z e r t y u i o p

a z e r t y u i o p q s d

a z e r t y u i o p

BB84 PROTOCOL
u i o p q s d f g h j k l m w x n ? . / s z g h j k l m w x c

a z e r t y u

a z e r t

Alice

a z e r t y u i o p q s d f g h j k l

a z e r t y

a z e r t

a z e R q s d

a z e r t y

Bob
f g h j k l m w . / s z

g h j k l m w x c v b n ? . / s z

SET UP

a z e r t y u i o p q s d f g h j k l m w x c v b n ? . / s

a z e r t y u i o p q s d f g h j k l m w x

a z e r t y u i o p q s d f g h j k l m w x c z

a a a a a a a z z z z z z z e e e e e e e r r r r r r r t t t t t t t y y yability y y y Has the y to u u u u u u u measure i i i i i qubits ini i those o o o o o two bases. o o p p p p p p p q q q q q q q s s s s s s s d d d d d d f f f f f f g g g g g g h h h h h h j j j j j j k k k k k l l l l l m m m m m w w w w x x x b c c c n v v v ? ? . b . . / n / / s ? s s z / z z s z 12

a z e r t y u i o p q S b n ? . / s z

a z e r t y u i o p q s d f g h j k l m w

BB84 PROTOCOL
Alice
Encodes her information randomly in one of the two bases

For example,
Basis A Basis B 0= 0 --= 0 /= 1 |= 1

BB84 PROTOCOL

Alice prepares 16 bits

BAABAABAAAABBBBA
in the above bases

Thus the following states are sent to Bob:

-/0|/0-0/0/-||-0

0101100010101100

15

BB84 PROTOCOL
Alices bits
0101100010101100

Alices bases BAABAABAAAABBBBA States sent

-/0|/0-0/0/-||-0

Bobs bases ABAABAAABABBBBAB Bobs results /|00|0-0-0|-||/Then Alice and Bob compare their measurement bases, not the results, via a public channel.
16

17

BB84 PROTOCOL
Bob receives the stream of qubits and measures each one in a random basis:

ABAABAAABABBBBAB
So he gets, **0**0*0*0*-||** Then Alice and Bob compare their measurement bases, not the results, via a public channel.
18

BB84 PROTOCOL

So Bob and Alice are left with 7 useable bits out of 16

_ _ 0 _ _ 0 _ 0 _ 0_ 0 1 1 _ _

These bits will be the shared key they use for encryption.

BB84 PROTOCOL

Now enter Eve She wants to spy on Alice and Bob. So she intercepts the bit stream from Alice, measures it, and prepares a new bit stream to Bob based on her measurements So how do we know when Eve is being nosy? Well Eve doesnt know what bases to measure in, so she would have to measure randomly and 50% of the time she will be wrong Eve is found in the errors!

WHY ???

Detecting eavesdropping
When Alice and Bob need to test for eavesdropping

By randomly selecting a number of bits from the key and compute its error rate

Error rate < Emax assume no eavesdropping

Error rate > Emax assume eavesdropping (or the channel is unexpectedly noisy) Alice and Bob should then discard the whole key and start over

Pros & Cons

Secure
Availability
vulnerable to DOS keys cant keep up with plaintext Nearly Impossible to steal Detect if someone is listening

Distance Limitations

Current State of Affairs

Current fiber- QC providers -: Commercial Commercial Demonstrated free-space link: 10 km basedquantum key distance id Quantique, Geneva Switzerland. MagiQ km record: 200 Technologies, NY City distribution NEC Tokyo (Takesue et al) exist products
QinetiQ

Future Prospects

Ground-to-satellite, satellite-to-satellite links General improvement with evolving qubit-handling techniques, new detector technologies

CONCLUSION
The ability to detect eavesdropping ensures secure exchange of the key The use of one-time-pads ensures security Equipment can only be used over short distances Equipment is complex and expensive

Thank you for your attention