HAZOP STUDY

What Is HazOp?

How To HazOp?

HAZARD

OPERABILITY

HAZOP

HAZARDS
Fire

Hazard Hazard Release Accident

Explosion Toxic Major

OPERABILITY
Production Equipment Quality Pollution

Loss / Delay Breakdown

Control Problem Problem

 Safety

Review Checklist Analysis What-If Analysis Hazard &Operability Analysis Failure Modes & Effects Analysis Fault Tree Analysis Cause Consequence Analysis

HAZARD EVALUATION TECHNIQUES

HAZOP STUDY TECHNIQUE

Originated

by ICI, UK, about 30 years ago Successfully used by many Companies worldwide Flexible procedure adapted to different types of plants

HAZOP STUDY

A systematic method in which process hazards and potential operating problems are identified using a series of guide words to investigate process deviations.

Defined by American Institute of Chemical Engineers

HAZOP STUDY
Defined by British Chemical Industry Safety Council

Application of a formal systematic critical examination to the process and engineering intentions of the facilities to assess the hazard potential of maloperation or malfunction of individual item of equipment and consequential effects on the facility as a whole.
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HAZOP STUDY
Guide-words are applied to various aspects of design

intent, i.e. process parameters, to develop meaningful

deviations. A team of engineers attempts to determine whether the consequences of the deviation from design intent are significant, and whether the existing safeguards

(hardware or procedures) are adequate.

HAZOP STUDY
> >

Tool for Identifying Hidden Hazards & Operabilty Problems. Study by Multi-Disciplinary Team.

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Structured but Creative Approach.

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HAZOP STUDY TEAM

>

Team Leader

>
>

Operation / Production
Maintenance

>
> >

Safety
Design / Engineering

Instrumentation / Electrical / Mechanical

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HAZOPS DISCUSSIONS

Creative Discussion

Brain Storming
Focussed

Knowledgeable
Free and Full Participation Effective & Efficient (Software & Communication Systems)
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MORE ABOUT HAZOPS

HazOp study is a systematic and powerful

technique for identifying hidden hazards and

operability problems in the plant system.

It is conducted by a team of persons having

knowledge in the different aspects of the

system.

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MORE ABOUT HAZOPS

The technique is designed to stimulate

creative brainstorming by the team

members to create synthetic experience of hazards and operability problems. This is achieved by systematically studying successive small elements of the plant.

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MORE ABOUT HAZOPS

Whereas a safety audit through check-

lists relies on past experience,

HazOp study is a predictive approach

involving structured brain-storming

to look for deviations from the design intent.

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DOCUMENTS FOR HAZOPS

O&M Manuals (Process Description, Start-up/ Shut-down/ Emergency Procedures) Process Flow / P&I / Interlock Diagrams Equipment Specifications Layout Diagrams Safety Manual / MSDS

All Documents Current & Up-dated (with Details of Modifications)

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NODE
Line or Equipment taken one at a time for the HazOp study. Example:
>
> >

Inlet Line to Reactor

Overhead Separator

Naphtha Tank

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PARAMETER
Parameter is an aspect of the process that describes it

Physically,

Chemically, or
In terms of what is happening.

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PARAMETER
Specific Parameters:
>

Pressure, Temperature, Flow, Level, Composition, Phase, ...

General Parameters:
>

Maintenance, Start-up, Reaction Step, ...

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DESIGN INTENT
Design Intent refers to the limits of the parameter within which the system is intended to operate safely.
> > >

Pressure: Min. (-) 5 mm WG; Max. 2 bar Temperature: Min. (-) 10 C; Max. 120 C Level: Min. 10 %; Max. 70 %

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DEVIATION
Parameter + Guide Word

Deviation

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GUIDE WORDS
Commonly Used Guide Words:
No More Less = Negation = Quantitative Increase = Quantitative Decrease

As Well As

= Something Additional

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GUIDE WORDS
Commonly Used Guide Words (contd.):
Part Of Reverse Other Than = Incomplete = Opposite = Something Else

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DEVIATION
Parameter: FLOW Deviation More Flow Less Flow No Flow Design Intent: 20 - 60 m3/hr

Guide Word
More Less No

Reverse

Reverse Flow

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DEVIATION
Parameter: TEMPERATURE Deviations Higher Temperature Lower Temperature Design Intent: 120 - 140 C

Guide Word
More Less No

Reverse

- Deviation not meaningful

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DEVIATION
Parameter: COMPOSITION Deviation Higher Concentration Lower Concentration Impurity

Design Intent: 50 - 60 % Concentration of A

Guide Word
More Less As

Well As

Other

Than

Some other material

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DEVIATION
Parameter: PHASE Deviation Two phase (e.g. flashing, solid precipitation) Other phase (e.g. vapour instead of liquid)

Design Intent: Liquid Phase

Guide Word
As

Well As Than

Other

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CAUSES
All possible causes for the Deviation are to be listed by the HazOps Team. Examples: Deviation: Causes: More Flow

1. Control valve open more (malfunction)

2. Multiple pumps in operation. 3. Increase in density. 4. Reduced back pressure.
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CAUSES
More Examples:

Deviation:
Causes:

Higher Pressure

1. Downstream valve throttled / line blocked. 2. Higher speed of pump / compressor. 3. Higher pressure of steam in reboiler.

4. Less flow of cooling water in condenser.

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CAUSES
More Examples: Deviation: Causes: 1. Downstream valve throttled / line blocked. 2. Pump suction strainer fouled / impeller worn out. 3. Outflow thro safety valve (malfunction). 4. Leakage through heat exchanger tubes.
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Less Flow

CONSEQUENSES
List the Consequences of each of the Causes (assuming there are no Safeguards). Examples of Consequences:
>
>

Leakage / Toxic Dispersion

Fire / Explosion Hazard (Pool fire, Jet fire, Flash fire, BLEVE, Vapour cloud explosion)
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CONSEQUENSES
More examples of Consequences:
>
> > >

Accident / injury
Equipment / property damage Production / material loss Quality control problem

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Safeguards protect integrity of the system when deviations may lead to conditions beyond design intentions. Types of Safeguards: Passive / Inherently Safe. Active. Procedural.
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SAFEGUARDS

SAFEGUARDS
Inherently Safe / Passive Safeguards:
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>

Design for max. pressure / temperature

Limited temperature of heating medium

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> >

Limited inventory
Containment

Less toxic material used

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SAFEGUARDS
Active Safeguards:
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>

Monitoring Instruments / Alarms

Interlocks

>
> >

Emergency Relief
Inert Blanket / Purge

Automatic Deluge System

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SAFEGUARDS
Procedural Safeguards:
>
>

Check Lists
O&M Manuals / SOP

>
>

Manual Isolation
Testing / Analysis

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SAFEGUARDS
American Inst. of Chemical Engineers (AIChE)

- Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS)

Publications useful for HazOp Study:
Guidelines Design

for Hazard Evaluation Procedures for Engineering Design for Process Safety

Solutions for Process Equipment Failure

Guidelines

Guidelines

Safety

for Preventing Human Error in Process

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SAFEGUARDS
HazOp Study Team has to examine each safeguard critically to Ensure its reliability Identify conditions under which the safeguard may not be effective

Ensure fail-safe conditions

Ensure adequate redundancy
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SAFEGUARDS
Safeguard

should be commensurate with Level of Risk

= (Probability of Occurrence) x (Severity of Consequence)

Risk

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SAFEGUARDS
High Risk Design for Reducing Risk Install Safety Device High Cost; Function May Be Hindered Needs Maintenance

Install Warning Device May Not Be Heeded Special Procedures Low Risk May Not Be Followed

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PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE
A B C D Likely to Occur Soon Probably Will Occur in Time May Occur in Time Unlikely to Occur
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SEVERITY OF CONSEQUENCE
I II III IV Catastrophic Fatality or Total System Destruction Critical Serious Injury or Major Property Damage Marginal Minor Injury or Property Damage Negligible Little or No Damage

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RISK RANKING
Probability Level A B 1 2 3 4 C 2 3 4 5 D 3 4 5 6

Severity Level

I II III IV

1 1 2 3

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HAZOP STUDY PROCEDURE

SELECT LINE/ SECTION; EXPLAIN FUNCTION APPLY GUIDE WORD / PARAMETER FOR MEANINGFUL DEVIATION
NO

EXAMINE POSSIBLE CAUSES EXAMINE CONSEQUENCES EXAMINE SAFEGUARDS DETECT HAZARDS AGREE ON ACTION, IF ANY RECORD FINDINGS ALL DEVIATIONS COVERED? IS LINE / SECTION COMPLETE?

NO

MARK LINE / SECTION COMPLETED

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PLANT / SECTION
NODE-1 NODE-2 NODE-3

Parameter-1 + Guide Words = Deviations [Causes/ Consequences/ Safeguards] Recommendations Parameter-2 + Guide Words = Deviations [Causes/ Consequences/ Safeguards] Recommendations ACTION PLAN
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HAZOPS WORK SHEET

COMPANY: XYZ CHEMICALS NODE: 1 - INLET TO SEPARATOR DEVIATION: MORE PRESSURE INTENTION: Minimum 10; Design 17 kg/cm2g
Cause 1. VALVE CLOSED. 2. THERMAL EXPANSION. Consequence Safeguard Recommendation CHECK LINE RATING. PROVIDE THERMAL RELIEF VALVE.

PLANT: ABC

LINE SUBJECT KICK-BACK TO FULL PUMP VALVE. PRESSURE FLANGE LEAK.

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HAZOP STUDY

Can be carried out during all stages engineering, operation & revamp. Not a substitute for design review.

HazOp study recommendations need separate engineering design before implementation.

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HAZOP STUDY

Line by line analysis of the plant. Members to participate effectively. No member to dominate.

All members views to be considered.

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Thorough Analysis Possible

HAZOP STUDY BENEFITS

Team Approach Leads to Greater Commitment by All Departments

Useful for Training

Easy to Update for Modifications etc.

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