KURODA v JALANDONI
Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the
Facts:
Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the
Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines during the Japanese
occupation, was charged before the Philippine Military Commission of
war crimes. He questioned the constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that
created the National War Crimes Office and prescribed rules on the
trial of accused war criminals. He contended the Philippines is not a
signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering
Land Warfare and therefore he is charged of crimes not based on law,
national and international.
Issue:
W/N E.O. 68 was valid and constitutional?
Held:
Yes.
Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that –
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the nation.
In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international
law of the present day including the Hague Convention the Geneva
Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence
established by the United Nation all those person military or civilian
who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of
aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses
consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and
customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable
therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and enforcement of
Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in
conformity with the generally accepted and policies of international law
which are part of the our Constitution.
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no
jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed in violation of the Hague
Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is
not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It
cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and
generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules
and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations the United
State and Japan who were signatories to the two Convention. Such
rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if
the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying
them for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive
in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle
of international law as contained in treaties to which our government
may have been or shall be a signatory.
PETITIONER ORGANIZATION v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Facts:
In 1976 President Marcos enacted P.D. 961, the Coconut Industry
Code, which consolidated and codified existing laws relating to the
coconut industry. The Code provided that surpluses from the CCS
Fund and the CID Fund collections, not used for replanting and other
authorized purposes, were to be invested by acquiring shares of stock
of corporations, including the San Miguel Corporation (SMC),
engaged in undertakings related to the coconut and palm oil
industries. UCPB was to make such investments and equitably
distribute these for free to coconut farmers. These investments
constituted the Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF). P.D. 961
also provided that the coconut levy funds (coco-levy funds) shall be
owned by the coconut farmers in their private capacities.
Issue:
W/N appropriating public funds violate substantive due process?
Held:
Yes.
The coco-levy funds were raised pursuant to law to support a proper
governmental purpose. They were raised with the use of the police
and taxing powers of the State for the benefit of the coconut industry
and its farmers in general. The Court has also recently declared that
the coco-levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can only be used
for public purpose.

In COCOFED v. Republic, the Court held as unconstitutional Section
2 of P.D. 755 for “effectively authorizing the PCA to utilize portions of
the CCS Fund to pay the financial commitment of the farmers to
acquire UCPB and to deposit portions of the CCS Fund levies with
UCPB interest free. And as there also provided, the CCS Fund, CID
Fund and like levies that PCA is authorized to collect shall be
considered as non-special or fiduciary funds to be transferred to the
general fund of the Government, meaning they shall be deemed
private funds.”
Section 2 of P.D. 755, Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 961, and Article III,
Section 5 of P.D. 1468 completely ignore the fact that coco-levy funds
are public funds raised through taxation. And since taxes could be
exacted only for a public purpose, they cannot be declared private
properties of individuals although such individuals fall within a distinct
group of persons.
But the assailed provisions, which removed the coco-levy funds from
the general funds of the government and declared them private
properties of coconut farmers, do not appear to have a color of social
justice for their purpose. The declarations do not distinguish between
wealthy coconut farmers and the impoverished ones. Consequently,
such declarations are void since they appropriate public funds for
private purpose and, therefore, violate the citizens’ right to substantive
due process.
PHARMACEUTICAL v. DOH
Facts:
President Cory Aquino, by virtue of legislative power given to her by
the Freedom Constitution, issued EO 51 also known as the Milk Code.
The Milk Code seeks to give effect to Article 11 of the International
Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICBMS) which is a code
adopted by World Health Assembly.
WHA adopted several resolutions regarding support, promotion and
protection of breastfeeding. WHA also adopted that nutrition and
health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. Philippines
ratified International Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1990. Art
24 of which states that the State should take appropriate measures to
diminish infant and child mortality and that the society should be
informed regarding the advantages of breastfeeding.
On 2006, DOH issued and AO or the Revised IRR which prohibits
advertising, marketing and promoting breastmilk substitutes.
Petitioners, who are manufacturers of breastmilk substitutes, filed a
petition on the ground that the AO is unconstitutional.
Respondents claim that the Milk Code gives effect to ICMBS which
states that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk
substitutes. Respondents also claim that ICMBS is part of the law of
the land, therefore DOH may implement the RIRR. 1987 Constitution
states that international law can be part of domestic law through:
1) Transformation ­ 2⁄3 vote of Senate
2) Incorporation - combination of established practice on the
part of the States and opinion as to law or necessity because it was a
legal obligation.
Petitioner said that ICMBS is not binding but a form of
recommendation. Petitioner suggested that ICMBS is a soft law,
therefore not binding norms, principles and practices that influence
state behavior.
Issue:
W/N ICBMS and WHA Resolutions are part of the law of the land
Held:
Only ICBMS became part law of the land because of transformation
by local legislation in the Milk Code (EO 51). WHA Resolutions may
constitute as a “soft­law” or non­binding norms, principles and
practices that influence state behavior.
Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation
pursuant to Art 7 Sec 21 of the Consti. ICMS and WHA Resolutions
are not treaties as they have not been concurred by at least 2⁄3 of
Senate, but ICMBS was transformed into domestic law through local
legislation which is the Milk Code. It is the Milk Code that has the force
and effect of law and not ICMBS.
WHA being a soft law include recommendations which are generally
not binding but carry moral and political weight as they constitute the
judgment on health issue of the collective membership of the highest
international body on the field of health. WHA Resolutions providing
for exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months, continued breastfeeding
up to 24 months, and absolutely prohibiting advertisements and
promotions of breastmilk substitutes have not been adopted as
domestic law.
ESPINA v ZAMORA
Facts:
The case at bar deals with the question of constitutionality of Retail
Trade Liberalization Act of 2000 Republic Act 8762) which was signed
by President Joseph Estrada on March 7, 2000.
Unlike its predecessor Republic Act 1180, which absolutely prohibits
foreign nationals from engaging in retail trade business in the
Philippines, the questioned law allows the said foreign trade placing
them under 4 categories. The petitioners filed a case assailing the
constitutionality of R.A. 8762 as it is a clear violation of Section 9, 19
and 20 of Article II of the Constitution. The petitioners stressed that
the presence of foreign nationals would result in alien control and
monopoly of the retail trade.
On the other hand, the respondents contended that the petitioners
have no legal standing to file the petition. Aside from that, the
Constitution mandates the mere regulation but not the prohibition of
foreign investments in the country.
Issue:
W/N R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional.
Held:
No.
The Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000 is not unconstitutional.
The Court emphasized that the petitioners indeed has no legal
standing to file the petition as there is no clear showing that the
implementation of R.A. 8762 prejudices the petitioners or inflicts
damage on them, either as taxpayers or as legislators. Legal standing
is one of the requisites necessary before one could validly attack the
constitutionality of a certain law. Legal standing implies that one must
have personal and substantial interest in that he has suffered or will
suffer direct injury as a result of the passage of that law.
Also, Section 9, 19 and 20 of Article II are not self- executing by nature,
thus, are not judicially demandable. The said sections in Article II
highlight the necessity of having a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs.
However, the objective of the provisions is to simply prohibit foreign
powers or interests from maneuvering our economic policies and
ensure that Filipinos are given preference in all areas of development.
With the assailed provision, Filipinos continue to have the right to
engage in the kind of retail business which the law in question has
permitted the entry of foreign investors.
The Legislative acknowledges that indeed it is integral to primarily
promote the welfare of Filipino investors as mandated by the
Constitution. Nonetheless, it is equally important that holistic
economic growth must be assured for the overall development of our
country’s trade industry. This can be done by allowing entry of foreign
investors that will be allowed to engage in businesses regulated by the
provisions of R.A. 8762.
IBP v ZAMORA
Facts:
Due to the increasing crime rate in Manila (kidnapping, robberies,
carnapping), President Erap in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP
and Marines to conduct a joint visibility patrols for crime prevention
and suppression. The Secretary of National Defense, Chief of Staff of
AFP, and the Chief of PNP and Secretary of Interior and Local
Government were tasked to execute and implement the said directive
The PNP chief, through police chief superintendent Aglipay,
formulated a Letter of Instruction 02/2000 (LOI), which detailed the
patrols called Task Force Tulungan under the leadership of the Police
Chief of Manila. President Erap confirmed his previous directive in a
Memorandum addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP
Chief. He wanted to improve the peace and order through more
effective crime prevention programs that included increased police
patrols.
President Erap invoked his powers as Commander-in-chief (Art. VII
sec. 18) and directed the AFP and PNP to coordinate with each other.
He also stated that the services of the Marines will only be temporary
until there’s improvement.
The petitioners in the case at bar filed a petition to annul the said LOI
02/2000 with the following argument:
1.) There is no emergency situation in Manila that would justify
the deployment of soldiers for law enforcement work. Hence, the
said deployment is in derogation of ART. II sec. 3
Issue:
W/N the deployment of soldiers for law enforcement work violates the
civilian supremacy clause of Art. II Sec. 3 of the Constitution?
Held:
No.
The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of
military assets for civilian law enforcement. It is evident in the LOI that
the Marines have a limited participation and it is the PNP which is
actually in charge of the patrols at all times. The Metro Manila Police
Chief is actually the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint
visibility patrols. Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or
orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures. It is their responsibility
to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. With the
following facts, it cannot be argued that the military authority is
supreme over civilian authority. The Marines are merely assisting the
police force. The real authority is lodged with the PNP. Lastly, there
have been plenty of activities in the Philippines where military aid is
rendered: elections, administration of Red Cross, relief and rescue
ops, conducts of licensure exams, etc.
BAYAN v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Facts:
On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and United States Forged a
Military Bases Agreement which allowed the use of installations in the
Philippine territory by United States personnel. On August 30, 1951,
the Mutual Defense Treaty was signed where US and Phil. agreed to
respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces,
public vessel, and aircraft.
In 1991, the Philippines and US negotiated in the possible extension
of the military bases agreement since it was expiring. On August of
that year, the Senate rejected the RP- US Treaty of Friendship, which
is the treaty that would have extended the duration of military bases in
Phil. The expiration of the treaty held in abeyance the joint military
exercise between the two countries though the 1951 defense treaty
was still active.
In 1997, US Defense Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt
Campbell and Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino, Jr.
exchanged notes regarding the possible elements of the Visiting
Forces Agreement (VFA). In 1998, President Fidel V. Ramos
approved the VFA together with the US Ambassador Thomas
Hubbard. President Joseph Estrada also ratified the treaty during the
same year through the Sec of Foreign Affairs Exec. Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora. Sec. Zamora sent the treaty to the Senate for concurrence
pursuant to Article 21 of the Constitution (No treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least
two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate). The Committee on
Foreign Relations headed by Rodolfo Biazon held joint public hearings
and consider it for recommendation. The treaty was numbered as
Resolution number 443. In May 27, 1999, the Resolution number 443
was approved by the Senate by a two-thirds (2/3) vote. It entered into
force on June 1.
Issue:
1. W/N the VFA is governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII
or of Section 25. Article XVIII of the Constitution?
2. W/N the US senate need to ratify the treaty with the Philippines or
mere signature of the President is enough?

Held:
1. Article 21: “No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members
of the Senate.” Article 25: “After the expiration of the 1991 treaty of
RP-US concerning Military, the Phil except under treaty duly
concurred by the Senate and when the Congress so requires, ratified
by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum
held for that purpose and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.”
Article 21 deals with (1) treaties or international agreements in general
and (2) applies to variety of treaty or international agreements. On the
other hand, Article 25 deals with treaties which involve the presence
of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. In this
case, Article 25 is applied since it is a treaty concerning the military.
Article 21 will determine the number of votes required, which is two-
thirds or not less than 16 (Senate is composed of 24 members). The
16 number will not be reduced despite absence of other senators since
it refers to the Senate as a whole. Lex specialis derogant generali
means that where there is a statute of a particular enactment and also
a general one which, in its most comprehensive sense, would include
what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be
operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only
such cases within its general language which are not within the
provision of the particular enactment.
2. Ratification is an executive act undertaken by the head of state or
the government through which formal acceptance of the treaty is
proclaimed. The State may provide other means as when the State
may provide in its domestic legislation the process of ratification of a
treaty. The consent of the State to be bound by a treaty is expressed
by ratification when (a) the treaty provides for such ratification, (b) it is
otherwise established that the negotiating States agreed that
ratification should be required, (c) the representative of the State has
signed the treaty subject to ratification or (d) the intention of the State
to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears from the full powers of
its representative or was expressed during the negotiation. In our
jurisdiction, the power to ratify is in the President and NOT the
legislature. The Senate is there only to give or withhold its consent or
concurrence to the ratification.
Executive agreements in international law are binding as a treaty. A
treaty under the Vienna Convention is a written agreement between
two or more states and governed by international law. Whether
embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments,
and whatever its particular designation. Also, the names given in a
treaty are inconsequential as well. The name of the treaty whether it
is a protocol, agreement, pact, cordat, convention, declaration, etc.
are of no prejudice to the meanings given to them by the internal law
of the State.
Thus in the Philippines, we recognize the binding effects of executive
agreements. It is stated in the Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern
Sea Trading that the courts have long never questioned the validity of
executive agreements. Confirmed by long usage, the subject has
covered vast amounts of subject that the Congress never did question
as well. In the case of US, as well expressly recognize the validity and
constitutionality of executive agreements. The Philippines in the
Constitutional Commission stated that it will act on good faith to judge
that the country that is contracting with has done everything if they
said they have done everything for the said agreement to be
recognized.
Thus, the Philippines is bound now to the treaty and is bound by Article
II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution. It cannot plead that the Constitution as
an excuse for non- compliance with our obligations duties and
responsibilities under the international law and part of the community
of nations. Pacta sunt servanda (Every State has the duty to carry out
in good faith its obligations arising from treaties and other sources of
international law, and it may not invoke the provisions in its constitution
or its laws as an excuse for failure to perform this duty).
LIM v EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Facts:
The last “Balikatan” was held in 1995. This was due to the insufficiency
of any formal agreement relative to the treatment of US personnel
visiting the PH.
- In the meantime, the PH and the US agreed to hold joint exercises
on a reduced scale. PH and US concluded the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA) in 1999.
- Beginning Jan. 2002, personnel from the Armed Forces of US started
arriving in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the PH military,
in “Balikatan 02­1”.
- The said training was a simulation of joint military maneuvers
pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement
entered into by the PH and US in 1951.
­ On Feb. 7, 2002, the Senate conducted a hearing on the “Balikatan”
exercise where the Draft Terms of Reference(TOR) was presented. It
was later on approved after 5 days
- Under the TOR, the Exercise is said to be a mutual counter-terrorism
advising, assisting and training Exercise relative to Philippine efforts
against the ASG (Abu Sayyaf Group)
Issue:
W/N the Abu Sayyaf in Basilan constitute an external armed force that
has subject the Philippines to an armed external attack to warrant U.S.
military assistance under the MDT of 1951
Held:
All treaties and international agreements to which the Philippines is a
party, must be read in the context of the 1987 Constitution. The
present Constitution contains key provisions useful in determining the
extent to which foreign military troops are allowed in Philippine
territory. Thus, in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is
provided that:
- SEC. 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to
the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation,
and amity with all nations.
It must be established that neither the MDT nor VFA allow foreign
troops to engage in an offensive war on PH territory. The MDT
provides that the US may use force “for self­defense.” The fear of
petitioners is that the self-defense clause is hard to justify given that
the exercise is held near the Abu Sayyaf territory. However, the Court
believes that neither MDT nor the VFA allow foreign troops to engage
in an offensive war on Philippine territory. It believes that both
countries will follow its treaty obligation according to pacta sunt
servanda(“agreements must be kept”).
CALALANG v WILLIAMS
Facts:
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940,
resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn
vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period of
one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:
1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to
Dasmariñas from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm;
and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo
Street to Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940
recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works the adoption of thethemeasure proposed in
the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of
theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the
approval from the Secretary of the Public Works and Communication
to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of
and traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the
approval of the recommendations made by the Chairman of the
National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of
Public Works approved the recommendations on August 10,1940. The
Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have
enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a
consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and
pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment
not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
Issues:
1. W/N the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents
pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute
an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged
the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?
2) W/N the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to
insure the well-being and economic security of all the people?
Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon
and avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest and
convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly
was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It
was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a
menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the
promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the
general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and
with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subject
to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims
of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated.
Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority
because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be
made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into
slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of
liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.
2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor
atomism, nor anarchy,” but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice
in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all
the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated
to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society,
through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium
in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the
existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus
populi estsuprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of
the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups
as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with
the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting
health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the
greatest good to the greatest number.”
SERRANO v GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES
Facts:
Antonio Serrano was hired by Gallant Maritime Services and Marlow
Navigation. But on the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained
to accept a downgraded employment contract for the position of
Second Officer, upon the assurance and representation of Gallant and
Marlow that he would be made Chief Officer.
Gallant and Marlow did not deliver on their promise. Hence, Serrano
refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the
Philippines.
Serrano’s employment contract was for a period of 12 months but at
the time of his repatriation, he had served only two months and seven
days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine months and
twenty-three days. He filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for
constructive dismissal and for payment of salary for the whole
unexpired portion of his contract. The Labor Arbiter found that Serrano
was illegally dismissed and awarded him a lump-sum representing his
salary for three months of the unexpired portion of his contract of
employment.
Serrano appealed to the NLRC to question the constitutionality of the
last paragraph of Section 10, R.A. No. 8042. Serrano claimed that the
last clause of the law limited the OFWs entitlement in case of illegal
dismissal to their lump-sum salary either for the unexpired portion of
their employment contract “or for three months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less.” He argued that it impairs the OFWs
constitutional rights to negotiate in terms of their contract, deprives
them of equal protection and denies them due process.
The NLRC affirmed the decision but corrected the computation of the
salary. The Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC ruling but did not rule
on the constitutional issue raised by Serrano.
Issue:
1.) Is petitioner entitled to his monetary claim which is the lump-
sum salary for the entire unexpired portion of his 12-month
employment contract, and not just for a period of three months?
2.) Should petitioner’s overtime and leave pay form part of the
salary basis in the computation of his monetary award, because these
are fixed benefits that have been stipulated into his contract?
Held:
1.) Yes. Petitioner is awarded his salaries for the entire unexpired
portion of his employment contract consisting of nine months and 23
days computed at the rate of US$1,400.00 per month. The subject
clause “or for three months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less” in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act
No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional.
In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-
term employment who were illegally discharged were treated alike in
terms of the computation of their money claims: they were uniformly
entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their
contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the
adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an
unexpired portion of one year or more in their employment contract
have since been differently treated in that their money claims are
subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on
local workers with fixed-term employment.
The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect
classification in that, in the computation of the monetary benefits of
fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-
month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year
or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or
local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles
out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar
disadvantage.
The Court further holds that the subject clause violates petitioner's
right to substantive due process, for it deprives him of property,
consisting of monetary benefits, without any existing valid
governmental purpose. The subject clause being unconstitutional,
petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the entire unexpired period of
nine months and 23 days of his employment contract, pursuant to law
and jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.
2.) No. The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime
and leave pay. For seafarers like petitioner, DOLE Department Order
No. 33, series 1996, provides a Standard Employment Contract of
Seafarers, in which salary is understood as the basic wage, exclusive
of overtime, leave pay and other bonuses; whereas overtime pay is
compensation for all work “performed” in excess of the regular eight
hours, and holiday pay is compensation for any work “performed” on
designated rest days and holidays.
By the foregoing definition alone, there is no basis for the automatic
inclusion of overtime and holiday pay in the computation of petitioner's
monetary award; unless there is evidence that he performed work
during those periods.