Impacts of Culture On Crew Interaction

CULTURAL VARIATION OF PERCEPTIONS OF CREW BEHAVIOUR IN
MULTI-PILOT AIRCRAFT
H.-J. Hrmann
P.U.F. | Le travail humain
2001/3 - Vol. 64
pages 247 268
ISSN 0041-1868
Article disponible en ligne l'adresse:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------http://www.cairn.info/revue-le-travail-humain-2001-3-page-247.htm
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pour citer cet article :

Hrmann H.-J., Cultural variation of perceptions of crew behaviour in multi-pilot aircraft ,
Le travail humain, 2001/3 Vol. 64, p. 247-268. DOI : 10.3917/th.643.0247
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Distribution lectronique Cairn.info pour P.U.F..

P.U.F.. Tous droits rservs pour tous pays.
La reproduction ou reprsentation de cet article, notamment par photocopie, n'est autorise que dans les limites des
conditions gnrales d'utilisation du site ou, le cas chant, des conditions gnrales de la licence souscrite par votre
tablissement. Toute autre reproduction ou reprsentation, en tout ou partie, sous quelque forme et de quelque manire que
ce soit, est interdite sauf accord pralable et crit de l'diteur, en dehors des cas prvus par la lgislation en vigueur en
France. Il est prcis que son stockage dans une base de donnes est galement interdit.
Document tlcharg depuis www.cairn.info - - - 204.13.42.194 - 24/08/2012 17h20. P.U.F.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EMPIRICAL STUDIES
RECHERCHES EMPIRIQUES
CULTURAL VARIATION OF PERCEPTIONS

OF CREW BEHAVIOUR
IN MULTI-PILOT AIRCRAFT*
by H.-J. H RMANN**
RSUM
Agissant comme dernire ligne de dfense, les pilotes de ligne doivent souvent contrer les
effets dltres sur la scurit lis aux pannes ou aux situations inattendues. Une coopration
au sein de lquipage est absolument ncessaire pour dtecter et traiter ces problmes avec toute
lefficacit requise dans le temps imparti. Toute la communaut aronautique saccorde sur ce
point, mais le dbat est nettement plus ouvert sur ce que doit tre une coopration idale, sur les
aptitudes mettre en jeu et sur ce quil convient denseigner dans la formation professionnelle.
Les effets culturels sont souvent voqus comme origine de ces diffrentes approches de rsolution
des problmes. Cest pourquoi une tude sur limpact culturel de lvaluation professionnelle de
la coopration au sein de lquipage a t ralise dans le cadre dun projet de recherche europen (DGXII) appel JARTEL (Joint Aviation Requirement Translation and Elaboration of
Legislation). 105 instructeurs europens, issus de 14 compagnies diffrentes reprsentant
12 nations, ont particip une valuation professionnelle sur vido dune srie de 8 scnarios
montrant un large ventail de comportements en vol dquipages professionnels. Les rsultats
ont t analyss en testant les hypothses de diffrences culturelles suggres par le travail de
Hofstede (1980, 1991), qui classe les cultures notamment en fonction du degr dautorit
(Power Distance) et de lindividualisme des acteurs. Les principaux rsultats ne vont pas dans
le sens dune sensibilit culturelle nationale. Les jugements des instructeurs des diffrents pays
sont relativement convergents. Les diffrences sont nettement plus marques entre compagnies
(dun mme pays) et entre instructeurs ayant des niveaux diffrents de matrise de langlais.
Des diffrences plus marques pourraient cependant exister avec des quipages de lEurope de
lEst. En rsum, les travaux raliss, mme sils sont encore affiner et confirmer par de
nouvelles tudes, montrent, dans ces mtiers de haute technologie, limportance relative de la
culture nationale par rapport aux effets importants de culture locale et dentreprise.
Mots cls: Gestion des ressources de lquipage, comptences non techniques, scurit
arienne.
** This study is part of the JARTEL project carried out under contract with the European
Commission, DG- TREN by Airbus, Alitalia, British Airways, DERA, DLR, IMASSA, NLR, Sofravia, and
University of Aberdeen.
** Hans-Jrgen Hrmann, German Aerospace Centre (DLR), Department of Aviation and
Space Psychology, Sportallee 54A, 22335 Hamburg, Germany.
E.mail: HJHoermann@compuserve.com.
Le Travail Humain, tome 64, no 3/2001, 247-268
DIFFRENCES CULTURELLES DANS LES PERCEPTIONS DU COMPORTEMENT DES

QUIPAGES DAVIONS PLUSIEURS PILOTES
248
H.-J. Hrmann
Investigations of accidents and incidents in aviation have repeatedly

identified effective crew behaviour as the crucial element for safe aircraft
operations. According to the model of accident causation developed by
J. Reason (1997) and Maurino, Reason, Johnston, and Lee (1995) latent
and active system failures can become overt and create a critical situation
by coincidence with missing or flawed system defences and specific
triggering factors in the environment. In such a scenario the pilots and
other crewmembers have to comply with their roles of being principal
actors in the final stage of a drama initiated by a fatal chain of hazardous
events. As the last line of defence their technical proficiency as well as
their non-technical skills to perform efficiently as a team become essential
for preventing damage or catastrophic loss of life and property. Hence,
systematic training of non-technical skills (NTS) in the form of Crew
Resource Management (CRM) courses has been recognised by the aviation
industry as an important complement or part of the pilots technical
proficiency training.
While, there is little disagreement about the general necessity and
contents of CRM training as such, controversies commence quickly if
detailed training syllabi, instruction methods or desired team behaviours
have to be determined. Views about good manners of co-operation or
leadership styles vary substantially between people, organisations, and
cultures. For example, driven by individual attitude patterns, company
policies, and cultural norms different practises emerge about how to use
authority with subordinates, how to treat conflicting opinions, how to
assess risks, or how to comply with checklists and procedures. Empirical
evidence is reported by Helmreich and his research group that the cockpit
is not a culture-free place (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Merritt, 1996).
National, organisational, and professional culture of crewmembers
manifest themselves in the airlines safety culture, which holds standards
and norms for safe crew behaviour. Presently, non-technical skills are still
neglected in evaluation and debriefing of the pilots performance in
regular check situations. Consequently, investigations of the effectiveness
of CRM-training programs as well as the systematic reinforcement of
desired individual behaviour patterns cannot be done adequately.
The area of NTS evaluation has become increasingly important in the
light of recent efforts by the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA ) to harmonise
requirements for aircrew licensing and training within Europe. While
the assessment of NTS is indicated in the present codes of the Joint
Aviation Requirements (JARs), the regulations do not give
recommendations on how NTS should be evaluated, and which NTS
should be included in that framework. Therefore, the JAA-Project
Advisory Group (JAA- PAG) tasked four research institutes (NLR
Amsterdam, DLR Hamburg, IMASSA Brtigny, and the University of
Aberdeen) in 1997 to develop a NTS assessment system that became
known as NOTECHS (van Avermaete & Kruijsen, 1998; Flin, Goeters,
I. INTRODUCTION
249
Hrmann, & Martin, 1998). The JARTEL (Joint Aviation Requirements

and Translation Elaboration of Legislation) project was born out of the
NOTECHS project, with the aim of assessing the usability and the reliabilty
of a set of behavioural markers established in NOTECHS through both
experimental and operational evaluation. Non-Technical Skills can be
considered as those skills referring to all pilots attitudes and behaviours in the
cockpit not directly related to aircraft control, system management, and
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) (van Avermaete & Kruijsen,
1998, p. 15). Classic examples of NTS are labelled as co-operation,
communication, team building, conflict solving, error management,
workload management, decision making, attention, or assertiveness.
Based on a review of the most influential behavioural marker systems
currently in use in Europe and in the United States, as well as associated
relevant research findings, the NOTECHS consortium decomposed NTS into
two Categories for social skills (Co-operation, Leadership & Managerial
Skills) and two Categories for cognitive skills (Situation Awareness,
Decision Making). Based on the observation of crew behaviour, NTS
evaluations can be conducted on levels of increasing generality, which are
shown in Table 1: distinct behaviour sequences, related skill Elements, or
summarising skill Categories. Respective ratings by the instructor pilot
finally lead to behaviour reinforcement or to recommendations for further
training.
As Europe is a multi-cultural environment, the issue of cultural
differences and their impact on flight crew behaviour, and hence nontechnical skills, is fundamental to the JARTEL project. In fact this project is
in line with recent trends in the scientific literature on Industrial and
Organisational Psychology to consider culture as a critical variable for the
generalisability of models and concepts for different countries (see
Gelfand, 2000). The influence of culture on pilots behaviour has been
widely reported (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Helmreich & Wilhelm,
1997; Johnston, 1993; Maurino, 1994; Meshkati 1996; Phelan, 1994).
CRM training programmes developed in one country and then exported to
another have often proven less effectiveness (Yamamori, 1987). While
difficult to identify, cultural factors are considered to have an important
influence on pilots behaviour. Indeed Meshkati (1996) believes that
operators culturally driven habits are a more potent predictor of
behaviour than their intentions, and hence they need to be taken into
consideration for the assessment of any tool for evaluating pilots skills.
Therefore, within the JARTEL project the NOTECHS method and its
behavioural marker system was tested for cultural robustness and validity
in a number of different cultural regions in Europe.
One of the main difficulties when people start discussions about
culture is that the term itself is open to broad definition. For the purpose
of this study culture is defined as the norms, attitudes, values, and practices
that members of a nation, organisation, profession, or other group of people
share (FAA HF Team, 1996, p. 117). Since culture is transmitted through
all sorts of interpersonal interactions it becomes an important factor in
CRM which is based on interactions among crew members. Culture as the
shared way of life of a group of people (Berry, Portinga, Segall, & Dasen,
Cultural variation of perceptions of crew behaviour
250
H.-J. Hrmann
TABLE 1
Non-technical skills (NOTECHS) framework: Categories and Elements
Categories
Elements
Behaviours (Examples)
Co-operation
Team building and maintaining
establish atmosphere for

open communication and
participation
give personal feedback
offer assistance
keep calm in conflicts
advocate own position
Considering others
Supporting others
Conflict solving
Leadership and
Use of authority / assertiveness
Managerial Skills
ensure SOP compliance
Maintaining standards
Planning and co-ordinating
take command if situation

requires
allocate enough time to

complete tasks
Workload management
Situation Awareness
Decision Making
System awareness
monitor and report changes

in system states
Environmental awareness
Anticipation awareness of time
contact outside resources

when necessary
identify possible future

problems
Problem definition / diagnosis
gather information and

identify problem
Option generation
state alternative courses of

action
Risk assessment / option choice
consider possible risks for
Outcome review
courses of action
check outcome against plan
Le cadre thorique des habilets non techniques (NOTECHS) :

catgories et lments
251
1992, p. 1) influences how we communicate with each other, how we

delegate or accept orders from others, how different opinions are
negotiated, how decisions are made, and so on. While safety and
efficiency of flight operation are universally accepted as desired outcomes
of CRM, the behaviour patterns that lead to these outcomes might vary
substantially with cultural norms. Even within the European aviation
community it is uncertain whether the cultural variety can be accounted
for in a single codex for safe crew behaviour.
In order to examine whether the NOTECHS method can be regarded as an
appropriate tool for the evaluation of non-technical skills in the different
European JAA member states, an extensive literature review was carried out
during the first phase of the JARTEL project (Hrmann, Fletcher, & Goeters,
1998). The aim was to identify stable and meaningful dimensions of cultural
differences and to locate cultural clusters with similar norms and values
related to crew behaviour. Initially, three relevant studies were found, which
describe dimensions of national cultural variation in Europe or beyond.
They are mainly based on reported work-related values of male employees
(Hofstede, 1980, 1991; Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Smith, Duggan,
& Trompenaar, 1996). Empirical evidence is provided in these studies that
national cultures vary along three general dimensions related to the
interactive processes within working groups, such as flight crews:
Individualism vs. Collectivism, Power Distance, and Uncertainty Avoidance. Hofstede defines these dimensions as follows:
Individualism-Collectivism (IND ) refers to the relation between the
individual and the group. In individualist societies (like Great Britain or
Scandinavia) personal choices and achievements are favoured over
continuing membership to a specific group. Implications of behaviour are
seen only in a narrowly defined area of personal costs and benefits
(Helmreich & Merritt, 1998). On the opposite end of this scale are the
collectivist societies (like Portugal or Turkey) where group membership is
foremost and people form, and are part of, strong cohesive groups which
take precedence over individual goals. When being embedded in such a
group, open conflicts are avoided, in case of disagreement solidarity
striving and harmony become important.
Power Distance (PD) is defined by Hofstede as the extent to which the
less powerful members within a culture expect and accept that power is
distributed unequally (1991, p. 28). On the individual level power
distance can be seen in terms of the amount of respect and deference
between superiors and subordinates. In countries with lower power
distance (like Denmark or Ireland) subordinates feel less dependent on
high rank colleagues. They prefer consultation and, if necessary,
contradiction. In countries with higher power distance (like France or
ex.Yugoslavia), there is considerable dependence of subordinates on
superiors, and subordinates are unlikely to approach or question their
superiors directly (Merritt, 1996).
Uncertainty Avoidance (UA ) can be defined as the extent to which
members of a culture tend to feel threatened by uncertain or ambiguous
situations (Hofstede, 1991). An emotional need to resolve ambiguity
quickly and to leave as little as possible room to chance is seen as a
252
H.-J. Hrmann
common behaviour attribute in countries with high uncertainty avoidance

(like Greece or Portugal). This translates into levels of stress and the
desire for predictability through adherence to written or unwritten rules.
In an attempt to group European countries on these dimensions, five
different cultural clusters were identified in the JARTEL project with
characteristic profiles on IND, PD and UA as shown in Table 2. Data for the
often-neglected East European countries could be supplemented recently
from two further cross-cultural surveys that included Russia (Bollinger,
1994; Naumov & Puffer, 2000).
TABLE 2
Cultural cluster
Cluster 1: Scandinavia
ID high, PD low, UA low
"Marker" countries
Sweden, Norway, Denmark
Cluster 2: North West Europe

ID high, PD medium, UA medium
UK, The Netherlands, Germany
Cluster 3: South Central Europe

ID medium, PD high, UA high
Spain, Italy, France
Cluster 4: South Peripheral Europe

ID low, PD high, UA high
Turkey, Portugal, Greece
Cluster 5: East Europe

ID medium, PD high, UA high
Russia, Poland, Hungary
This attempted culture mapping certainly contains some shortcomings

mainly due to inconsistent results between studies or distinct national
subcultures (e.g., Belgium, Switzerland). Possible discrepancies were tried
to resolve by giving higher weight to Helmreich and Merritts (1998)
study as their data was also drawn from a population of pilots. For the
purpose of the JARTEL experiment the derived typology was regarded as
the best approximation towards an a-priori clustering of cultures in
Europe. It is assumed that pilots from countries within one cluster have
more cultural values in common than pilots from different clusters.
However, without further empirical evidence the proposed classification
does not claim being the appropriate concept for other studies. From the
viewpoint of the JARTEL consortium sufficient amount of cultural variation
for testing the cultural robustness of the NOTECHS system is provided, if
each of the five clusters is represented by at least one marker country.
Apart from national culture, organisational culture might also
influence the views on ideal CRM-related behaviour. In order to gain
more experience concerning the impact and significance of organisational
factors on crew standards, each cultural cluster was represented by two
Clusters of national culture in Europe

Grappes de cultures nationales en Europe
253
different company types: a national flag carrier and a smaller regional

airline. Alternative classifications that position airlines instead of countries
on any of the dimensions for national or organisational culture could not
be found in the sifted published literature. Since too detailed information
on the companies management or training philosophies could be
threatening for the participating airlines, it was decided to accept this
fairly rough split into national flag carriers and smaller regional airlines as
a second independent factor besides national culture for variations in
evaluations of CRM behaviour.
In the light of expected European requirements on the evaluation of
NTS, the proposed NOTECHS system should be robust against differences
in national culture. This means that different nations are expected to have
equivalent standards for assessing crew behaviour. To test this assumption, it was decided to recruit an approximately equal number of
instructor pilots from larger and smaller airlines in each of the five
clusters. The experimental sessions were carried out in classrooms using
video scenarios filmed in a Boeing 757 simulator at British Airways (BA).
After certain written material study and a half-day briefing, all participating instructors rated eight scenarios that show typical examples of
crew interaction and problem-solving in the cockpit. Several questionnaires were also completed by the participants, to provide statistical
data on their background, cultural grouping, experience, and attitudes
towards their profession. If significant differences in understanding CRM
concepts across cultures did exist, NTS-evaluations in a sample of
instructors should vary in relation to their cultural background. On the
other side, differences between types of organisations are acceptable as
long as they are not diminishing safety aspects. More details about the
experimental protocol can be found in Delsart (2000).
II. METHOD
Prior to carrying out the experiment, it was necessary to develop the
training videos to be used in the experiment, and to establish a method for
calculating an expert benchmark or reference to calibrate each scenario on
the four NOTECHS Categories.
II. 1. DESIGN
OF THE VIDEO SCENARIOS
The scenarios to be used in the experiment were filmed in a Boeing

757 simulator, with the Captain and the First Officer (F/O) played by
British and Italian pilots. Air traffic controllers and cabin attendants
were played by BA employees. Language of conversation was English
throughout all films. Eight scenarios were used in the main experiment,
chosen from fifteen that were filmed. The scenarios were designed by BA
and DERA specialists to demonstrate a range of realistic situations showing
good and poor practice across the NOTECHS Categories. A set of design
H.-J. Hrmann
references was produced for each scenario stipulating the levels of NTS
that the pilot actors were supposed to illustrate. Extreme examples of
behaviour represented in a merely cartoon-like style were avoided. A brief
outline of the eight scenarios used in the experimental sessions is given
below:
(1) Descent- the F/O is flying. A passenger problem is reported by the
cabin crew. The action centres around the Captain allowing himself
to be distracted by secondary events and not monitoring the F/Os
actions. The altitude bust that concludes the sequence is the direct
technical consequence of the F/O mis-setting the cleared flight level,
but the Captains behaviour precipitates the error.
(2) In cruise over Brussels- 170 miles to destination London Heathrow.
After suffering an engine fire, the Captain decides to continue to destination against the good advice of the F/O to land as soon as possible.
(3) Crew carrying out pre-departure checks. The F/O is unfamiliar with
the airfield and receives little or no support from the experienced
Captain. The F/O remains confused.
(4) Top of descent- an electrical failure occurs. Problem well handled by
both pilots working as a team.
(5) Approach and landing in very gusty conditions. The Captain is very
supportive of the underconfident F/O and achieves a very positive
result after good training input.
(6) A night approach in the mountains. Captain decides to carry out a
visual approach through high terrain and triggers a ground proximity
warning because of disorientation. F/O takes control and prevents an
accident.
(7) An automatic approach in instrument weather conditions (CAT III).
Very good standard operation. An example of a typical everyday flight
deck activity with both pilots contributing to a safe outcome.
(8) Joining the holding-pattern awaiting snow-clearance. The Captain
persuades the F/O that they should carry out a visual approach with
an illegally excessive tail-wind for commercial reasons. The F/O
points out to the Captain that he disagrees with his decision.
A training video was also produced that contained an introduction to
the project background and the NOTECHS method. It gave explanations
and definitions of the concept of Elements and Categories followed by
short video examples of NTS behaviours. After each brief scene, pauses
were given to facilitate discussions. For further practice in using the
method two more complex scenarios were actually rated at all levels.
II. 2. R EFERENCE
RATING
A set of reference data was required for the analyses in order to

examine rater accuracy. Two independent groups of pilots (three from
British Airways and five from Lufthansa) with thorough experience in the
instruction of Line-Oriented Flight Training and NTS evaluation assessed
the eight test scenarios. Each group came up with a consensus rating for
each of the Categories and Pass/Fail judgements.
254
255
In the minority of cases where the British Airways and Lufthansa

groups showed discrepant ratings, the design reference was consulted to
determine the appropriate rating. The design reference was the behaviour
specification from the original script that the pilot actors in the scenarios
were supposed to demonstrate.
II. 3. PARTICIPANTS
Fifteen experiment sessions were run involving 105 male instructor
pilots from 14 different airlines across Europe. However, one pilot did not
take part in the evaluation of the test scenarios, and another only
completed the score forms for scenarios 1 to 4. To test the national
cultural robustness of the NOTECHS method the instructor pilots were
recruited from companies located in five different cultural clusters
identified in Europe. In addition, it was decided to recruit an
approximately equal number of instructor pilots from major and from
smaller, regional-sized companies to examine effects of the organisational
culture on the NOTECHS method (see Table 3).
TABLE 3
Number of participating instructor pilots
in the different cultural clusters
Cultural cluster
1. Scandinavia
Company type
1A Large company
1B Smaller company
2. North West Europe
2A Large company
2B Smaller company
3. South Central Europe
3A Large company
3B Smaller company
4. South Peripheral Europe 4A Large company
4B Smaller company
5. Eastern Europe
5A Large company
5B Smaller company
No. of pilots
9
10
10
11
11
19
6
10
12
7
II. 4. PROCEDURE
Groups of raters recruited from one company participated in the
experiment during a full day standardised session. All participants were
already briefed about the background of the experiment and about the
NOTECHS method by written material distributed in advance.
After arriving, the raters received a short introduction to the JARTEL
experiment and were asked to fill in a background questionnaire to gather
data about their professional background- such as age, nationality, flying
experience (flying hours), exposure to different kinds of CRM training (yesno), experience with NTS evaluation (yes-no), and English language
proficiency (1=poor, 2=moderate, 3=good). Besides the company type
Effectifs des pilotes instructeurs participants

selon les diffrentes grappes culturelles
H.-J. Hrmann
other aspects of organisational culture were also included in this

questionnaire. For example, whether the company regularly provides
reports on Human Factors (HF) issues (yes-no). A short form of the Flight
Management Attitudes Questionnaire (FMAQ, Helmreich & Merritt,
1998) was administered to tap Hofstedes dimensions of Power Distance,
Individualism, and Uncertainty Avoidance. On the country level
Hofstedes computational method was used to derive these scores. On the
individual level the FMAQ-scale Command Responsibility was used as
an attitude measure towards unequal distribution of power in the cockpit.
Low scores on this scale reflect less distance between the Captain and his
crew. Communication is openly initiated in both directions. High scores
are related to high Power Distance with less communication initiated by
junior crew and greater unquestioned reliance on the Captain (Helmreich
& Merritt, 1998, p. 77).
The raters then received training in the NOTECHS method and
instructions for using the method during the experiment. This briefing
was carried out in a controlled manner using the training video described
above and an interactive question and answer session. A number of points
were discussed and clarified, ranging from the need to observe both pilots
throughout the scenarios and not to over-concentrate on the Captains
behaviour, to the importance of treating each actor as a different
character, if he appeared in more than one scenario. It was also pointed
out that the raters should try, where possible, to disregard their own
company procedures and rules when judging the behaviours in the videos.
Where a breach of an Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) was intended
to be significant it would be mentioned by the actors in some direct way.
At the end of the training video, raters further practised using the
NOTECHS system to rate two more complex scenarios.
In the afternoon session, the eight test scenarios were shown. The
participants rated the Element, Category, and Pass/Fail levels for both the
Captain and F/O after each scenario. It was decided to use a five-point
rating scale at the Elements and Category level to allow the raters
to distinguish between different gradations of NTS qualities (1=very poor,
2=poor, 3=acceptable, 4=good, 5=very good). However, from the pure
licensing point of view a crewmembers performance is either acceptable
or unacceptable. Therefore, additionally a two-point pass/fail scale was
used in the experiment, but is not included in this study. Not observed
ratings were allowed on each scale level in case of absence of behaviour
that was not relevant to a particular situation and therefore not seen. The
average inter-rater reliability was estimated to be .76 at the category level
(OConnor, Hrmann, Flin, Lodge, & Goeters, in press).
At the end of each experimental session, the raters filled in an
Evaluation Questionnaire, which contained 16 multiple-choice and
open questions about their opinion on the NOTECHS system and the
experimental method. Last, open discussions were conducted for debriefing on general feelings, to achieve knowledge on the context and
collect qualitative data for the understanding of the results.
All rating and questionnaire data were coded and arranged into a
database by the University of Aberdeen in Scotland.
256
257
The distribution of the background variables within and between the

five cultural clusters is shown in Table 4.
Before looking at differences between the NTS-ratings across the
cultural clusters, the rater groups were compared on the basis of relevant
background information, such as flying experience, language proficiency,
CRM experience, etc. If, in addition to their cultural background, the
national clusters differ on further not directly culture related aspects, then
between-group differences cannot be attributed to culture alone. For
ordinal and categorical data (items 4 to 11) the effects were tested for
significance with the c2 statistic, while analysis of variance (ANOVA ) was
used for age, flying hours and the FMAQ-scales.
As can be seen in Table 4 the pilots were comparable across the
cultural clusters on items related to general pilot experience (No. 1 to 3)
as well as to their general exposure to Human Factors issues and CRM
training (No. 4 to 8). In these two item groups only one effect was
significant (No. 8). The five clusters did not deviate significantly with
respect to experience as participant in different types of CRM training.
However, there were significant differences for culture related variables
(English proficiency and Command Responsibility) and activities as CRM
instructor (No. 9 and 10). The raters in NW Europe had clearly more preexperience with NTS evaluation than the others. 91% participants in
cluster 2 mentioned that they were familiar with NTS evaluations before
the JARTEL experiment. They had also received more training as CRM
instructors (81%).
Analyses of the FMAQ scales led to another interesting finding. While
all pilots seemed pretty much homogeneous in regard to Individualism
(No. 13) and Uncertainty Avoidance (No. 14), significant differences on
the Command-Responsibility scale were found. According to Helmreich
and Merritt (1998) the Command scale comes closest to Hofstedes
dimension of Power Distance. Apparently, the raters in SC Europe and EA
Europe favoured stronger leaders as Captains than the others. The
preferred authority gradient in the cockpit seemed to be slightly steeper in
these clusters than in Scandinavia, NW Europe, or SP Europe. However, it
must be emphasised that the clusters are probably not entirely
representative for the culture they tap or for a certain airline. On the other
side these results support to some degree the suggested a-priori clusters.
The differences in IND, though not significant, showed some
correspondence with the expectations in Table 2. Merritt (1996) found
similar results in her dissertation study. Command Responsibility was the
strongest determinant of differences among airline pilots, whereas scores
for IND and UA were higher and more homogeneous in a pilot population
than in Hofstedes original sample.
The next stage of analysis led to the comparison of the NTS evaluations
between the cultural clusters. For each of the four NOTECHS Categories
sixteen ANOVA s were conducted (2 crewmembers (Captain and First
III. RESULTS
258
H.-J. Hrmann
TABLE 4
Cluster means of background variables and FMAQ scales across the cultural clusters.
Percentages are related to the proportion of affirmative answers for the respective item
(n.s. =not significant, * =significant at 5% level, ** =significant at 1% level)
Moyennes des variables de base par grappe culturelle et chelles FMAQ selon la grappe culturelle.
Les pourcentages correspondent aux proportions de rponses affirmatives aux items respectifs
(n.s. =non significatif, * =significatif au seuil de 5%, ** =significatif au seuil de 1%)
Cluster 1
Scandinavia
Cluster 2
NW Europe
Cluster 3
SC Europe
Cluster 4
SP Europe
Cluster 5
EA Europe
Significance
General pilot experience

1. Age
48
47
46
43
46
n.s.
2. Military flying
hours
1168
1020
1253
700
n.s.
3. Total flying hours
11442
11301
9449
9844
9237
n.s.
4. CRM: Conflict
Management
5. CRM:
Decision making
6. CRM: Group
dynamics
7. CRM: Stress
management
8. Airline providding regular HF
reports
58%
67%
53%
56%
89%
n.s.
68%
76%
67%
63%
90%
n.s.
58%
76%
47%
40%
78%
n.s.
58%
62%
47%
63%
89%
n.s.
37%
86%
67%
81%
47%
**
32%
91%
10%
25%
5%
**
42%
81%
73%
56%
11%
**
2.8
2.7
2.0
2.3
2.3
**
22
22
40
24
39
**
138
127
133
114
137
n.s.
39
43
38
45
29
n.s.
Direct experience as CRM instructor

9. Experience with
NTS-Evaluations
10. Training as
HF/CRM Instructor
Culture related variables
11. English
Proficiency
12. FMAQ. Command
Responsibility (PD)
13. FMAQ.
Individualism (IND)
14. FMAQ.
Uncertainty Avoidance (UA)
Exposure to Human Factors issues and CRM training
259
TABLE 5
Percentage of significant main effects in one- and two-factorial
Pourcentages des effets principaux significatifs
dans les analyses de la variance un et deux facteurs
Independent Factors
A. National culture (NC)
Effects for Factor A

55%
A. Company type
9%
A. HF reports
11%
A.
B.
A.
B.
A.
B.
A.
B.
A.
B.
54%
National culture
Company type
National culture
HF reports
National culture
NTS-experience
National culture
FMAQ Command-scale
National culture
English Language
ANOVA s
Effects for Factor B
11%
54%
13%
36%
20%
25%
41%
23%
52%
Officer) and 8 scenarios). With national culture in form of the five clusters
as the independent factor more than half of the main effects (55% out of
64 analyses) were statistically significant (see Table 5). Compared to
national culture the effects of variables tapping organisational culture were
negligible. Only 9% of the main effects of company size and 11% of the
main effects for the provision of Human Factors reports were significant.
These results seemed to indicate that national culture determines the
evaluations of CRM behaviour to a high degree. However, as was said
above, this factor was confounded with other variables that should be
balanced before conclusions about cultural differences can be drawn.
To receive an estimate for the actual cultural effects on the NOTECHS
ratings, two-factorial analyses were conducted which combine national
culture with additional variables as shown in Table 5. Company type,
provision of HF reports, NTS-rating experience, and English proficiency
were entered together with national culture in two-factorial ANOVA s, while
the FMAQ Command-scale was utilised as a continuous covariate in the
ANOVA with national culture as second independent variable. If the
variation of the NTS-ratings is balanced for differences in these five
additional factors, the direct impact of cultural differences on the ratings
can be estimated more adequately. As shown by the percentages in
Table 5 cultural effects were reduced from 55% to only 23-25% in
the 2.factorial AN(C)OVAs. Especially, attitudes towards the command
responsibility of the Captain and English language proficiency were
significant sources of variance between the five clusters.
Relative to Reference Rating
1,5
1
0,82
0,67
0,35
0,71
0,69
0,78
0,73
0,71
0,62
0,61
0,57
0,51
0,5
0,66
0,54
0,47
0,66
0,49
0,29 0,28
0,22
0
Co-operation
Leadership & Manag.

Skills
Scandin
NW Euro
Situation Awareness
SC Euro
SP Euro
Decision Making
EA Euro
FIG. 1. Absolute deviation scores for Captains over the eight scenarios
1,5
1
0,69
0,5
0,50
0,35 0,37
0,52
0,51 0,53
0,48 0,50 0,50
0,43
0,28
0,33
0,32 0,32
0,25
0,19
0,15 0,12
0,00
0
Co-operation
Leadership & Manag.

Skills
Scandin
NW Euro
Situation Awareness
SC Euro
SP Euro
EA Euro
FIG . 2. Absolute deviation scores for F/Os over the eight scenarios
Scores en cart absolu pour les co-pilotes sur les huit scnarios
Decision Making
Scores en cart absolu pour les commandants sur les huit scnarios
261
0,5
0,44
0,40
0,26
0,09
0,06
0,03
0
-0,09
0,39
0,30
0,06
-0,08
-0,11
0,00
-0,09
-0,25
-0,35
-0,40 -0,38 -0,42
-0,5
-0,61
-1
Co-operation
Leadership & Manag.

Skills
Scandin
NW Euro
Situation Awareness
SC Euro
SP Euro
Decision Making
EA Euro
FIG. 3. Relative deviation scores for Captains over the eight scenarios
Scores en cart relatif pour les commandants sur les huit scnarios
In order to illustrate the quantity and direction of cultural differences

the within-cluster means for each Category and crewmember position
were compared with the reference ratings. Figures 1 and 2 show the
absolute differences between the participants ratings for Captains and F/
Os and the reference for the respective Categories aggregated over the
eight scenarios. These two charts give an impression of how large or small
the cultural effects actually were. As all deviations were within the range
of plus/minus 1 grade on the rating scale, this finding confirms that the
accuracy of all ratings in general was quite substantial (OConnor et al., in
press). For the Captains, ratings of Co-operation had the smallest
deviation from the reference, for the F/Os Decision Making had the
smallest deviation scores. Across the five clusters instructors from NW
Europe and Scandinavia came closest to the reference ratings (see
Table 6). The NTS-evaluations for the F/Os were even more accurately
related to the reference than those for the Captains.
In Figures 3 and 4 the direction of potential cultural effects is shown.
The values are the relative deviation scores (average differences between
cluster means and reference rating) for Captains and F/Os over the eight
scenarios. A negative value corresponds to a general trend to be more
strict with the respective NTS-skills in comparison to the reference
(underestimation), a positive value corresponds to overestimation.
Looking at Figure 3 for the Captains, their Leadership skills appeared in a
positive light over all clusters, whereas Situation Awareness was seen more
262
H.-J. Hrmann
0,5
0,12
0,03
0,00
-0,02
-0,13
-0,21
-0,21 -0,23
-0,5
-0,49
-0,21 -0,23
-0,36
-0,43
-0,52
-0,44
-0,25
-0,19
-0,33
-0,33
Situation Awareness
Decision Making
-0,38
-1
Co-operation
Leadership & Manag.

Skills
Scandin
NW Euro
SC Euro
SP Euro
EA Euro
FIG. 4. Relative deviation scores for F/Os over the eight scenarios
negatively than in the reference ratings. The F/Os NTS were generally seen
more critically by all raters, especially the social Categories Co-operation
and Leadership. Co-operation and Leadership skills of F/Os were seen less
positively in all clusters, whereas Situation Awareness and Decision
Making were underestimated only by raters from clusters 3, 4, and 5.
Raters from South Central and South Peripheral Europe as well as from
Eastern Europe were most critical about the F/Os NTS -skills (see Table 6).
An example may further illustrate the results. In the first video
scenario a rather directive Captain managed a medical problem with one
of the passengers, which was reported by a Senior Cabin Crew Member
during descent. The F/O as the flying pilot became overloaded with
additional tasks (like radio telephony) and dialled in a wrong altitude with
the Mode Control Panel. The Captain failed to monitor the F/Os actions
and an altitude violation resulted. The scenario ends with the Captain
criticising the F/O for his poor performance. The majority of raters from
SC Europe and EA Europe judged this altitude bust more as a problem of
the F/O, who made the error, while the Captains NTS were rated as
acceptable. On the other side, most raters from Scandinavia, NW Europe,
and also SP Europe evaluated the Captains Co-operation, Leadership and
Situation Awareness as well as the F/Os Leadership and Situation
Awareness with poor. The latter three clusters also had the lowest scores
in Command Responsibility. There seemed to be a relation between
Scores en cart relatif pour les co-pilotes sur les huit scnarios
263
TABLE 6
Average absolute and relative deviation scores against the reference ratings.
Absolute deviation scores show the average quantity of rater bias,
relative deviation scores show the direction of rater bias
Scores en cart moyen absolu et relatif compars aux valuations.
Les scores en cart absolu correspondent la moyenne du biais dvaluateur,
les scores en cart relatif montrent la direction du biais dvaluateur
Scandinavia
NW Europe
SC Europe
SP Europe
EA Europe
Absolute Deviation
Captains
F/Os
.57
.45
.64
.62
.60
.29
.29
.53
.43
.48
Relative Deviation
Captains
F/Os
.04
-.07
.01
-.17
.00
-.09
-.12
-.39
-.34
-.35
different views of the situation and Power Distance. Correlation

coefficients between the FMAQ-scale Command Responsibility and the
NTS evaluations were all highly significant for the Captains in scenario 1
but not for the F/Os. Coefficients varied between .18 (for Decision
Making) and .45 (for Situation Awareness) for the entire sample of
instructors. The average correlation was .34 for the Captains and .17 for
the F/Os. This means the NTS of the Captain were evaluated more
positively by instructors who scored higher on Command Responsibility.
Finally, some qualitative data are reported about the different views of
the instructors on the NOTECHS system and the conduct of the
experiment. In the Evaluation Questionnaire participants were asked to
give their opinions about the consistency and comprehensiveness of the
NOTECHS system, its usefulness and the applicability of the five-point
rating scale. With the c2 statistic no significant cultural differences were
detected in regard to any of these aspects. The division of non-technical
skills into four Categories and 15 Elements was accepted by most raters
and did not vary with cultural differences. The high number of raters
(88%) across all cultural clusters, who were equally satisfied with the four
Categories and 15 Elements of the NOTECHS system indicated that the
proposed decomposition of NTS had a high degree of cross-cultural
acceptance and usability.
IV. DISCUSSION
In the context of the task for JAA to harmonise requirements and
regulations for pilot licensing and training, national cultures and cultural
differences became troublesome entities. Europe is in a transitional
economic period. As in other fields of industrial and organisational
Cultural Cluster
H.-J. Hrmann
research (Gelfand, 2000; Pearce & Frese, 2000; Triandis, 2000) a need
for further cross-cultural studies, especially including East European
countries is also identified for the aviation industry. Efforts to establish
common standards for a European license have to take national
characteristics of different cultural regions into account. Attention was
drawn to cultural issues especially in the area of Multi-Crew Cooperation
and Crew Resource Management training (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998).
While in the 1980ies CRM was perceived as a set of culture-free principles
with quasi-universal validity for enhancing safety, evaluation studies in the
1990ies have shown that CRM training outside the culture comfort zone
of the trainees is less effective and accepted (Merritt, 1996). Whichever
way the issue is addressed, national culture has per definition a direct
impact on attitudes and values of individuals from any given culture.
Therefore, it was expected that instructors from different European
cultures would perceive crew behaviour in multi-pilot aircraft differently
and might assess what they have seen according to different standards.
To test the NOTECHS system for cultural robustness in Europe is one of
the central research questions of the JARTEL project. If the experiment did
reveal substantial disagreement about good or bad practice of flight crew
interaction and co-operation, the standards for NTS evaluation had to be
calibrated for cultural effects. With the proposed five-cluster model for
national culture as an independent factor we found 55% of the main
effects to be significant in a series of ANOVA s. However, a closer inspection
of the group mean scores revealed that the differences are only gradual, as
they preferably vary between the scale values of very poor and poor or
acceptable, good and very good. OConnor et al. (in press)
reported that 81% of all 105 participants in the JARTEL experiment match
the reference ratings if the five-point scale was collapsed to a dichotomous
acceptable versus unacceptable rating. This finding illustrates that not
much variation is left which could be accounted for by culture.
Most of the intercultural effects occurred for scenario 7, which was
supposed to show a clear standard performance of an automatic precision
approach in poor weather conditions. In this scenario the crewmembers
do not communicate with each other very intensively, because all actions
are thoroughly carried out in accordance to the procedures. However, to
completely grasp the situation, full comprehension of the English
conversation is crucial. When the self-assessed variable of English
language proficiency was combined with the cultural factor in twofactorial ANOVA s, all cultural effects disappeared for this scenario and
instead a number of main effects for language arose. In fact, differences in
English proficiency seem to be a prominent source of variance that is
almost as strong as the differences in national cultural. Only 23% of the
cultural effects remain significant when English language is entered as
another independent factor. Similarly, national culture seems to overlap
with prior NTS-evaluation experience of the instructor pilots and with
scores on the FMAQ-scale Command Responsibility. When included in the
analyses, these factors also reduce the number of cultural effects
substantially. While Command Responsibility is related to Hofstedes
dimension of Power Distance, which is in itself an aspect of cultural
264
265
differences, experience with NTS evaluation and language are factors that
can be influenced by training to level out different perceptions and
standards of crew behaviour. If NOTECHS were to be applied in the native
language of the instructor pilots, as will be the case in operational use, and
if a more intensive training period as in JARTEL was provided, cultural
effects with this evaluation method should almost disappear. A further
operational validation phase of the JARTEL project was recently started to
clarify among other aspects on the language issue of NOTECHS (Polo,
2000).
The remaining effects that were found here even after controlling
influences of the background variables are distributed rather unsystematically over categories, scenarios and crew position. In general, the
evaluations of the F/Os behaviour are seen more critically compared to the
reference ratings than that of the Captains, especially in clusters 3, 4,
and 5. In some scenarios a correlation was found between the NTS
evaluations for the Captains and the FMAQ-scale Command Responsibility.
Over all videos the average correlation is .18 for the Captains and .07 for
the F/Os and categories. As elaborated for the first scenario, participants
with higher scores on Command Responsibility (e.g., from South Central
and East Europe) seem to blame primarily the F/O, who made an error by
setting the wrong altitude. The Captains behaviour was perceived as
acceptable, though he created unnecessary strain through poor workload
management and also should have detected the error by timely monitoring.
Within the concept of CRM as error management strategy the Captains
behaviour should be seen unacceptable. From the high correlations
between Command Responsibility and the NTS evaluations of the Captain
in this scenario we conclude, that instructors with higher Power Distance
(like in cluster 3 and 5) tend to focus their NTS evaluations more on
obvious errors of the individual crewmember than on behaviour styles that
are centred around avoiding and detecting errors as well as mitigating
potential error consequences. However, this conclusion assumes that all
participants were in fact exposed to the same amount of CRM training as the
data in table 4 suggests.
Aspects of organisational culture have only a minor influence on
ratings with the NOTECHS method. Systematic effects either of company
size or of the regular availability of human factors reports on NTS
evaluations can be discounted. The expectation that organisational
culture would have a stronger impact on NOTECHS ratings than national
culture cannot be confirmed by the data of this study. Summarising the
analyses of effects of national and organisational culture, it can be
concluded, that the decomposition of NTS into Categories and Elements
as in the NOTECHS system has a high degree of cross-cultural acceptance.
Effects of national culture appear to be only marginal on the five-point
scales of the Category level. Provided that language proficiency of the
users was on an equal level and appropriate familiarisation took place, the
NOTECHS method in most aspects can be regarded as robust against
variations of national and organisational culture in Europe.
It is not the intention of this paper to disregard cultural influences on
crew interaction and teamwork in general. The available literature on
H.-J. Hrmann
cross-cultural research reports many counterexamples. Perhaps,

commercial airline pilots are not prototypical members of their national
cultures. The professional culture of many airline pilots seems to bear
some unifying principles of cockpit work. Highest safety standards are a
common goal of all professional aircrews. Most of their flight related
activities are in accordance with SOP s, which are designed by a few aircraft
manufacturers and influential airlines. Furthermore, the training of many
European instructors and pilots takes place in a limited number of
training centres attached to or linked with only a few global players in this
training industry. Therefore standards and values of flight-related
activities are more homogeneous within the population of pilots.
Another important and even less researched issue is that of mixedcultural crews. With the coming European license for airtransport pilots,
in future it will become more commonplace to operate aircraft with
multicultural crews in the cockpit and in the cabin. Already some of the
larger carriers are basing parts of their flightcrews in different parts of the
world. Customers profit from cultural synergy if they can communicate
with flight attendants in their native language. Also communications with
local ground staff at the airports can be facilitated by crewmembers with
multicultural background. However, as the crew complement is often
changing from one flight to the next, the tasks of teambuilding and
maintaining can become more demanding. Communication barriers
could already arise when briefings have to be conducted in a second
language or when cultural constraints are mistreated by lack of respective
awareness, tolerance, or competence. In order to manage a flight safely
and efficiently the requirements for crew co-operation should be clearly
defined in advance. As long as safety is involved, every crewmember
should have the same concept of desired behaviours and actions. These
concepts of crew behaviours must be adequately trained, continuously
practised, and consequently assessed and reinforced throughout all levels
of the respective company. The NOTECHS system provides an applicable
framework of NTS behavioural markers, which has proven its reliability
and sensitivity to evaluate CRM-behaviour in a quasi-experimental study of
the JARTEL project. Cross-cultural comparisons have shown that the
assessment procedure, the material, and the standards are sufficiently
tolerant and robust in consideration of cultural influences on CRM
behaviours. In the next project phase of JARTEL the NOTECHS method
will be used in real operational settings of different airlines training
departments in order to further evaluate its practicability and shape this
methodology for its implementation in coming guidance material of JAA.
REFERENCES
Berry, J. W., Portinga, Y. H., Segall, M. H., & Dasen, P. R. (1992). Cross-cultural
psychology: Research and applications. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.
Bollinger, D. (1994). The four cornerstones and three pilars in the House of
Russia management system. Journal of Management Development, 13, 49-54.
266
267
Delsart, M. C. (2000). Non-technical skills assessment in pilot training: experimental

plan of the JAR-TEL study. Paper presented at the 24th European Association of
Aviation Psychology Conference. Crieff, Scotland, September.
Federal Aviation Administration (1996). Federal Aviation Human Factors Team
Report on: The interfaces between flightcrews and modern flight deck systems.
Washington: DC Federal Aviation Administration.
Flin, R., Goeters, K.-M., Hrmann, H.-J., & Martin, L. (1998). A generic structure of nontechnical skills for training and assessment. Paper presented at the
23rd European Association of Aviation Psychology Conference. Vienna, Austria,
September.
Gelfand, M. J. (2000). Cross-cultural industrial and organisational psychology:
Introduction to the special issue. Applied Psychology, 49, 29-31.
Helmreich, R. L., & Merritt, A. C. (1998). Culture at work in aviation and medicine: National, organizational and professional influences. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
Helmreich, R. L., & Wilhelm, J. A. (1997). CRM and culture: national, professional,
organizational, safety. Paper presented at the 9th Aviation Psychology Symposium.
Columbus, OH : April.
Hofstede, G. (1980). Cultures consequences: International differences in work related
values. Beverly Hills, CA : Sage.
Hofstede, G. (1991). Cultures and organisations: Softwares of the mind. London:
McGraw-Hill.
Hrmann, H.-J., Fletcher, G., & Goeters, K.-M (1998). Synthesis of cultural aspects
and their influences on crew behaviour. JAR TEL WP 1: Final report (Report, DG VII.
JAR TEL/DLR & DERA /WPR/1/03). Paris: Sofravia.
Johnston, N. (1993). CRM: Cross-cultural perspectives. In E. L. Wiener, B. Kanki,
& R. L. Helmreich (Eds.), Crew resource management (pp. 367-398). San
Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Maurino, D. E. (1994). Crosscultural perspectives in human factors training: Lessons from the ICAO Human Factors Program. International Journal of Aviation
Psychology, 4, 173-181.
Maurino, D. E., Reason, J. T., Johnston, A. N., & Lee, R. B. (1995). Beyond aviation human factors. Aldershot, UK : Avebury Aviation.
Merritt, A. C. (1996). National culture and work attitudes in commercial aviation: A
cross-cultural investigation. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of
Texas, Austin, TX.
Meshkati, N. (1996). Cultural factors influencing safety need to be addressed in
design and operation of technology. ICAO Journal, 51, 17-28.
Naumov, A. I., & Puffer, S. M. (2000). Measuring Russian culture using Hofstedes dimensions. Applied Psychology, 49, 709-718.
OConnor, P., Hrmann, H.-J., Flin, R., Lodge, M., & Goeters, K.-M. (in press).
Developing a method for evaluating crew resource management skills: A european perspective. International Journal of Aviation Psychology.
Pearce, J. L., & Frese, M. (2000). Introduction to the special issue on transitional
economies in Eastern Europe. Applied Psychology, 49, 613-618.
Phelan, P. (1994). Cultivating safety. Flight International, 146, 22-24.
Polo, L. (2000). Practicability of NOTECHS in regular airline training. Paper presented at the 24th European Association of Aviation Psychology Conference. Crieff,
Scotland, September.
Reason, J. (1997). Managing the risks of organisational accidents. Aldershot, UK:
Ashgate.
Smith, P. B., Duggan, S., & Trompenaars, F. (1996). National culture and the
values of organisational employees. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 27,
231-264.
Triandis, H. C. (2000). Cross-cultural I/O Psychology at the end of the millennium. Applied Psychology, 49, 222-226.
268
H.-J. Hrmann
van Avermaete, J. A. G., & Kruijsen, E. A. C. (1998). The evaluation of nontechnical skills of multi-pilot aircrew in relation to the JAR -FCL requirements
(Report: NLR- CR-98443). Amsterdam: EC NOTECHS project.
Yamamori, H. (1987). Optimum culture in the cockpit. In H. W. Orlady
& H. C. Foushee (Eds.) Cockpit Resource Management Training, NASA Conference: Publication 2455. (pp. 75-87). Moffett Field, CA : NASA Ames Research
Centre.
SUMMARY
As the last line of defence pilots in commercial aviation often have to counteract effects
of unexpected system flaws that could endanger the safety of a given flight. In order to timely
detect and mitigate consequences of latent or active failures, effective team behaviour of the
crew members is an indispensable condition. While this fact is generally agreed in the aviation
community, there seems to be a wide range of concepts how crews should interact most
effectively. Within the framework of the European project JARTEL the cultural robustness of
evaluations of crew behaviour was examined. 105 instructor pilots from 14 different airlines
representing 12 European countries participated in this project. The instructors evaluations of
crew behaviours in eight video scenarios will be compared in relation to cultural differences on
Hofstedes dimensions of Power Distance and Individualism.
Key words: Crew Resource Management, Non-Technical Skills, Cultural Effects,
Aviation Safety.
Paper received: October 2000.

Accepted in modified form: April 2001.

Impacts of Culture On Crew Interaction

Transféré par

Informations du document

Titre original

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Impacts of Culture On Crew Interaction

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

CULTURAL VARIATION OF PERCEPTIONS OF CREW BEHAVIOUR IN

Article disponible en ligne l'adresse:

Pour citer cet article :

Distribution lectronique Cairn.info pour P.U.F..

Document tlcharg depuis www.cairn.info - - - 204.13.42.194 - 24/08/2012 17h20. P.U.F.

Document tlcharg depuis www.cairn.info - - - 204.13.42.194 - 24/08/2012 17h20. P.U.F.

CULTURAL VARIATION OF PERCEPTIONS

Document tlcharg depuis www.cairn.info - - - 204.13.42.194 - 24/08/2012 17h20. P.U.F.

Document tlcharg depuis www.cairn.info - - - 204.13.42.194 - 24/08/2012 17h20. P.U.F.

DIFFRENCES CULTURELLES DANS LES PERCEPTIONS DU COMPORTEMENT DES

Document tlcharg depuis www.cairn.info - - - 204.13.42.194 - 24/08/2012 17h20. P.U.F.

Investigations of accidents and incidents in aviation have repeatedly

Document tlcharg depuis www.cairn.info - - - 204.13.42.194 - 24/08/2012 17h20. P.U.F.

Document tlcharg depuis www.cairn.info - - - 204.13.42.194 - 24/08/2012 17h20. P.U.F.

Hrmann, & Martin, 1998). The JARTEL (Joint Aviation Requirements

Document tlcharg depuis www.cairn.info - - - 204.13.42.194 - 24/08/2012 17h20. P.U.F.

Cultural variation of perceptions of crew behaviour

Team building and maintaining

establish atmosphere for

give personal feedback

keep calm in conflicts

advocate own position

Use of authority / assertiveness

Document tlcharg depuis www.cairn.info - - - 204.13.42.194 - 24/08/2012 17h20. P.U.F.

ensure SOP compliance

Planning and co-ordinating

take command if situation

allocate enough time to

monitor and report changes

Anticipation awareness of time

contact outside resources

identify possible future

Problem definition / diagnosis

gather information and

state alternative courses of

Risk assessment / option choice

consider possible risks for

check outcome against plan

Document tlcharg depuis www.cairn.info - - - 204.13.42.194 - 24/08/2012 17h20. P.U.F.

Le cadre thorique des habilets non techniques (NOTECHS) :

Document tlcharg depuis www.cairn.info - - - 204.13.42.194 - 24/08/2012 17h20. P.U.F.

1992, p. 1) influences how we communicate with each other, how we

Document tlcharg depuis www.cairn.info - - - 204.13.42.194 - 24/08/2012 17h20. P.U.F.

Cultural variation of perceptions of crew behaviour

common behaviour attribute in countries with high uncertainty avoidance

Document tlcharg depuis www.cairn.info - - - 204.13.42.194 - 24/08/2012 17h20. P.U.F.

Cluster 2: North West Europe

UK, The Netherlands, Germany

Cluster 3: South Central Europe

Spain, Italy, France

Cluster 4: South Peripheral Europe

Turkey, Portugal, Greece

Cluster 5: East Europe

Russia, Poland, Hungary

This attempted culture mapping certainly contains some shortcomings

Document tlcharg depuis www.cairn.info - - - 204.13.42.194 - 24/08/2012 17h20. P.U.F.

Clusters of national culture in Europe

Document tlcharg depuis www.cairn.info - - - 204.13.42.194 - 24/08/2012 17h20. P.U.F.

different company types: a national flag carrier and a smaller regional

OF THE VIDEO SCENARIOS

The scenarios to be used in the experiment were filmed in a Boeing

Document tlcharg depuis www.cairn.info - - - 204.13.42.194 - 24/08/2012 17h20. P.U.F.

Cultural variation of perceptions of crew behaviour