Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, vol. 24 (2014) pp.

103–126
doi:10.1017/S0957423913000106 © 2014 Cambridge University Press

IBN BĀJJA ON TASAWWUR AND TASDĪQ:

˙ ˙
SCIENCE AND PSYCHOLOGY

MIQUEL FORCADA
Universidad de Barcelona, Gran Via de les Corts Catalanes 585,
Barcelona 08007, Spain
Email: mforcada@ub.edu

Abstract. As is well known, tasawwur and tasdīq, conceptualization and assent, are
˙
essential notions in the epistemology ˙
of Arabo-Islamic philosophy. Conceptualization
amounts to the definition of an object of knowledge, and assent to the recognition, via
some kind of reasoning, that this definition is true. One of the authors who dealt with
both topics in greatest depth was al-Fārābī, whose oeuvre exerted a profound influ-
ence on Ibn Bājja. This article analyzes the materials on tasawwur and tasdīq
found in Ibn Bājja’s notes regarding al-Fārābī’s writings on ˙logic and scientific ˙
method, namely the glosses to Kitāb al-Burhān. The analysis shows, on the one
hand, that he understood perfectly the importance of both terms in al-Fārābī’s con-
strual of Aristotle’s scientific method; and on the other, that he used them to deal
with human thought processes. Indeed, conceptualization and assent were essential
notions for Ibn Bājja, and underlie some of his best-known works.

Résumé. Il est bien connu que les notions de tasawwur (conceptualisation) et de tasdīq
˙
(assentiment) sont tout à fait centrales dans l’épistémologie ˙
de la philosophie arabo-
islamique. La “conceptualisation” désigne la définition d’un objet de connaissance, et
l’“assentiment” la reconnaissance de la véracité de la définition, par un raisonnement
d’un certain type. Parmi les auteurs ayant traité ces deux thèmes le plus en profondeur
figure al-Fārābī, qui a exercé sur Ibn Bājja une influence décisive. Cet article analyse
les passages relatifs à tasawwur et tasdīq dans les notes d’Ibn Bājja aux écrits de logi-
˙
que et de méthodologie scientifique ˙
d’al-Fārābī, en particulier ses gloses au Kitāb al-
Burhān. On montre ainsi qu’Ibn Bājja a parfaitement saisi l’importance de ces deux
termes dans la lecture farabienne de la méthode scientifique aristotélicienne, et qu’il
les a employés pour traiter de certaines activités mentales. En effet ces deux notions,
centrales chez Ibn Bājja, sont à la base de certaines de ses œuvres les plus fameuses.

1. INTRODUCTION1

As is well known, conceptualization (tasawwur) and assent (tasdīq)

are two of the most important topics in˙ the logic and epistemology
˙
of Arabo-Islamic philosophy. A pioneering analysis by Wolfson linked

1
The research for this paper has been funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science, “La
evolución de la ciencia en la sociedad de al-Andalus desde la Alta Edad Media al
pre-Renacimiento y su repercusión en las culturas europeas y árabes (siglos X–XV)”, ref.
FFI 2008–00234 Filo, and FFI2011–30092–C02–01.
104 MIQUEL FORCADA

both terms to Stoic epistemology and proposed that wαντασία λογική

and άξίομα were the origins of tasawwur and tasdīq respectively.2
Since then, a great many studies ˙have addressed˙ conceptualization
and assent in the Arabic commentaries of Aristotle’s Organon3 and
stressed their function of providing an epistemological basis for the
understanding of the definition and the syllogism.4 In this context,
conceptualization and assent have rightly been deemed to be the
‘organizing theme’ of al-Fārābī’s interpretation of the Aristotelian the-
ory of science.5
Ibn Bājja (d. 1139), the first philosopher of note in al-Andalus, used
these concepts profusely in a variety of works, taking al-Fārābī’s com-
ments on the terms as his starting point. The present paper will study
Ibn Bājja’s treatment of tasdīq and tasawwur by focusing on his works
˙
on logic, consisting of collections ˙
of notes (taʿālīq) in which he glossed
al-Fārābī’s commentaries and epitomes of Aristotle’s Organon and
Porphyry’s Isagoge.6 The study of these materials will broaden our
knowledge of, on the one hand, the reception of Levantine philosophy
in al-Andalus and, on the other, the foundations of Ibn Bājja’s epis-
temology, particularly in the field of the scientific method.

2
Harry A. Wolfson, “The terms tasawwur and tasdīq in Arabic philosophy and their Greek,
Latin and Hebrew equivalents”, in ˙ Isadore Twersky
˙ and George H. Williams (eds.), Studies
in the History and Philosophy of Religion, 2 vols. (Cambridge, MA, 1979), vol. 1, pp. 478–92,
487–90.
3
For this Farabian context, see Miriam S. Galston, Opinion and Knowledge in Fārābī’s
Understanding of Aristotle’s Philosophy, unpublished PhD thesis (Chicago, 1973),
pp. 204–10, Joep Lameer, Al-Fārābī and Aristotelian Syllogistics. Greek Theory and
Islamic Practice (Leiden et al., 1994), pp. 266ff. and 275ff., Deborah L. Black, Logic and
Aristotle’s Rhetoric in Medieval Arabic Philosophy (Leiden et al., 1990), pp. 71–8 passim;
“Knowledge (ʿilm) and certitude ( yaqīn) in al-Fārābī’s epistemology”, Arabic Sciences
and Philosophy, 16 (2006): 11–45; “Al-Fārābī on Meno’s paradox”, in Peter E. Adamson
(ed.), In the Age of al-Fārābī: Arabic Philosophy in the Fourth/Tenth Century (London,
2008), pp. 15–34. See also on Ibn Rushd, Charles E. Butterworth, “À propos du traité
al-Darūrī fī l-mantiq d’Averroès et les termes tasdīq et tasawwur qui y sont developpés”,
˙
in Gerhard ˙ and Jan A. Aersten (eds.), ˙Averroes ˙and the Aristotelian Tradition.
Endress
Sources, Constitution and Reception of the Philosophy of Ibn Rushd. 1126–1198).
Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Averroicum. Cologne, 1996 (Leiden et al., 1999),
pp. 163–71; on Ibn Sīnā, Miklós Maróth, “Tasawwur and Tasdīq”, in Simo Knuutila
et al. (eds.), Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval˙ Philosophy.˙ Proceedings of the VIII
International Congress of Medieval Philosophy, 2 vols. (Helsinki, 1990), vol. 2, pp. 265–74.
4
Black, Logic and Aristotle’s Rhetoric, p. 74.
5
I borrow the expression from Black, “Logic” in “Al-Fārābī”, Encyclopaedia Iranica, s.v.,
accessed at http://www.iranicaonline.org, last update January 24, 2012.
6
The article will be based on the notes by Ibn Bājja that present self-contained, coherent sec-
tions on conceptualization and assent. There are two editions of Ibn Bājja’s Taʿālīq: one is
by Majid Fakhry, who made an incomplete edition of Ibn Bājja’s notes to al-Fārābī’s
Burhān which appeared together with the edition of this latter treatise (al-Mantiq ʿinda
al-Fārābī: K. al-Burhān wa-K. Sharāʾit al-Yaqīn [Beirut, 1987]), and edited the ˙ other
works in a later volume (Taʿālīq Ibn Bājja˙ ʿalā Mantiq al-Fārābī [Beirut, 1994]). The
other edition is by Muhammad T. Dāneshpazūh (al-Mant ˙ iqiyyat li-al-Fārābī, 3rd vol.
[Qum, 1410/1989–90]). Both˙ editions will be contrasted with˙ MS Escorial 612 if necessary
for the sake of comprehension.
 IBN BĀJJA ON TASAWWUR AND TASDĪQ 105
˙ ˙
Inasmuch as al-Fārābī’s logic is Ibn Bājja’s main source for his under-
standing of tasdīq and tasawwur, perhaps indeed the only one, we
˙ a summary
should start with ˙ of the issue in the Second Master.

2. AL-FĀRĀBĪ ON TASAWWUR AND TASDĪQ: A SUMMARY

˙ ˙
Lameer coins a comprehensive definition of al-Fārābī’s tasawwur that
˙
is worth reproducing here because it also expresses Ibn Bājja’s essen-
tial understanding of the question:
tasawwur is equal to the act of understanding ( fahima, with the verbal noun
˙
fahm) a phrase (qawl) expressing a thing’s essence (dhāt), i.e. the act of
understanding the definition (hadd) that goes with a mental concept
˙
(maʿnā) or with the name (ism) designating such a concept.7
The kinds of conceptualization alluded to in this definition are: the
mere description of a thing (rasm), the comprehension of the word
that designates a thing (tasawwur anqas or mujmal) and the defi-
nition of a thing (tasawwur ˙ ˙
akmal, mulakhkhas or mufassal).
˙
Conceptualization by a thing’s name makes the essence ˙ ˙˙
of the thing
known in general terms, while conceptualization by definition
makes it known precisely and by its essential elements. According
to al-Fārābī, true conceptualizations are only possible if we know
that the thing exists, inasmuch as conceptualization accounts for an
essence and what does not exist has no essence.8 Consequently, con-
ceptualization provided by the understanding of a name does not
entail certitude, since it spans what exists and what does not exist.
Assent may easily be defined as the belief, via some kind of reason-
ing, that something is as we have conceptualized it.9 If the assented
conceptualization is not self-evident, our assent to any conceptualized
thing stems from applying a deduction to a previous conceptualiz-
ation, which entails a judgment of truth and falsehood.10 On the
one hand, there is something previously known to some extent; on
the other, there is a middle term that adds further knowledge to the
previous conceptualization. The quality of assent depends, therefore,
on the quality of the knowledge that this middle term provides. Thus,
assent may be classified according to the epistemic value of the pre-
mises into: that which affords only trust in our belief (rhetorical
assent), approximate certainty (dialectical assent) and certainty
(demonstrative assent). Assent may also be divided into definite

7
Lameer, Al-Fārābī, p. 266.
8
Galston, Opinion and Knowledge, pp. 203–4.
9
Al-Fārābī, K. al-Burhān, p. 20, 3–9, particularly ls. 4–5. Cf. moreover Black, Logic and
Aristotle’s Rhetoric, p. 73, where assent is said to be “in some way the epistemological
counterpart of apophantic discourse”.
10
Al-Fārābī, K. al-Burhān, p. 84, 19 to end.
106 MIQUEL FORCADA

(muhassal), which leads to certainty through a demonstrative syllo-

gism,˙ and
˙ ˙ indefinite (ghayr muhassal), which cannot attain certainty.
˙ ˙ ˙ knowledge or to absolute, scien-
So, one may assent either to variable
tific knowledge. For this reason, ultimate assent giving certainty
requires not only that one knows that something cannot be otherwise,
but also the awareness of this knowledge,11 which is attained once the
demonstrative method has been fully implemented. Thus, science
leads to complete assent through demonstrative syllogism. As
Galston noted, the relationship between conceptualization and assent
is complex because the first kind (tasawwur anqas or mujmal, “imper-
˙ is the “pathway
fect” or “general”) of conceptualization ˙ to assent”, and
the second kind (tasawwur akmal or “perfect”), as the most complete
˙
kind of cognition, follows assent and represents its completion.12
Ibn Bājja’s best achieved synthesis of what al-Fārābī says about concep-
tualization and assent appears in the notes on the latter’s K. al-Burhān:13
[I] Conceptualization, in sum, is the attainment of the totality of the issue
which is outside the soul inasmuch as it is signified by its name, with no judg-
ment about it at all. Assent consists of considering the issue as judged by
some judgment. For this reason, assent always exists when which of the
two judgments applies to it [the issue] is sought; conceptualization, when
what it is and what thing it is are sought. It is clear that, with this question
“what it is” and others of the same kind, no assertive or negative judgment
about the issue is pretended, as in the case of two contraries; rather, what
is sought is the quiddity of the issue, abstracted from any judgment. This
meaning is the first and the simpler.

3. CONCEPTUALIZATION AND ASSENT ACCORDING

TO IBN BĀJJA: A FIRST APPROACH

Just as K. al-Burhān contains a great deal of information on

al-Fārābī’s understanding of the two terms, Ibn Bājja’s glosses to
this epitome are also the best source for a survey of his thought.
Nonetheless, since Ibn Bājja glossed this book with prior knowledge
of al-Fārābī’s other logical treatises, there are further influences: he
notes at the beginning of his glosses to al-Fārābī’s Burhān that the
latter “turned to Īsāghūjī for conceptualization and to al-Qiyās and
al-Tahlīl for assent”;14 in his glosses to al-Fusūl al-Khamsa, he
˙
considers the section of this treatise which deals˙ with the anterior
and the posterior as an essential tool for the comprehension of both

11
Black, “Knowledge (ʿilm)”, p. 44.
12
Galston, Opinion and Knowledge, p. 210.
13
Ibn Bājja, T. K. al-Burhān, ed. Fakhry, p. 107, 12–18; ed. Dāneshpazūh, p. 296, 3–9.
14
Ibn Bājja, T. K. al-Burhān, ed. Fakhry, p. 107 i.f./ ed. Dāneshpazūh, p. 296. Cf. below, sec-
tion 5.
 IBN BĀJJA ON TASAWWUR AND TASDĪQ 107
˙ ˙
terms.15 Because of the relationship between conceptualization and
definition, the huge number of glosses to the Farabian treatises
devoted to predication (namely epitomes to Isagoge and Categories)
contain a wealth of references to conceptualization, though materials
on assent are less frequent. In this context, Ibn Bājja’s notes on
al-Fārābī’s introductory works on logic provide us with materials on
both concepts which, despite seeming somewhat rough and confused,
represent a preliminary step towards better comprehension and expo-
sition of the issue. One of the best examples of these preparatory
reflections appears in the gloss of a fragment by al-Fārābī about defi-
nition and description borrowed from al-Fusūl al-Khamsa, which
D. M. Dunlop translated as follows:16 ˙
[II] The definition is a statement of which the composition is restrictive,17
explaining the meaning signified by some name,18 by means of the things
by which the meaning subsists. The description is a statement of which
the composition is restrictive, explaining the meaning signified by a name,
by means of the things by which the meaning does not subsist, or rather
by its conditions or by the things whose subsisting depends on the meaning.
Ibn Bājja’s notes may be translated as follows:19
[III] (1) The definition is the statement that explains perfectly the quiddity
<established by the subsisting>20 of the thing, while the description explains

15
Ibn Bājja, Taʿālīq ʿalā al-Fusūl al-Khamsa li-al-Fārābī, ed. Fakhry, p. 69/ed. Dāneshpazūh,
p. 123 apud al-Fārābī, ˙al-Fusūl al-Khamsa, ed. Donald P. Dunlop, “Al-Fārābī’s
Introductory Sections on Logic”,˙ The Islamic Quarterly, 2 (1955): 264–82, pp. 268–9.
Al-Fārābī mentions five kinds of anteriority: in time, by nature, in precedence, in perfection
and as cause of existence; Ibn Bājja adds two other kinds that al-Fārābī mentions in
K. al-Burhān, pp. 39–41: anteriority in knowledge and anteriority in existence. On these
grounds, Ibn Bājja’s argument runs as follows: to conceptualize a thing as perfectly as poss-
ible, one should take into account the elements that best explain its essence, differentiating
them from those that only explain accidental or less essential features, the latter being pos-
terior as cause and less perfect as characteristics of this thing. As for assent, Ibn Bājja says
that the usefulness of distinguishing between anterior and posterior consists of the possi-
bility of discerning to which kind of proposition one assents: either undisputable knowl-
edge or what is commonly accepted or what is given by tradition. Thus, memorizing the
concepts is easier because the mind remembers better what is well arranged. Ibn Bājja’s
argument borrows also from al-Fārābī’s thought on the premises of syllogism (al-Fārābī,
K. al-Burhān, p. 23); on this question, see below, section 5, and also Miquel Forcada,
“Ibn Bājja on medicine and medical experience”, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 21
(2011): 111–48, pp. 126–34 and the bibliography mentioned.
16
Al-Fārābī, Al-Fusūl al-Khamsa, ed. and trans. Dunlop, pp. 274, 1–10/281–2.
17 ˙
“Restrictive composition” (tarkīb taqyīd): composite expressions in which an adjective spe-
cifies the properties or attributes of a noun, such as “the white man”; the adjective is said to
be a “condition” imposed over the name (cf. al-Fārābī, K. al-Īsāghūjī ay al-madkhal, ed. and
trans. Dunlop, “Al-Fārābī’s Eisagoge”, The Islamic Quarterly, 3[1956]: 117–38, pp. 119, 14–
18/128).
18
Or. “bi-ismin mā”. Dunlop omits “some” but the comprehension of Ibn Bājja’s gloss requires it.
19
Ibn Bājja, T. Īsāghūjī, ed. Fakhry, pp. 39, 19–40, 2/ ed. Dāneshpazūh, pp. 29–30. The div-
ision into sections in this text and the others that will appear in the present paper is mine.
20
This sentence, “al-muqawwama bi-qiwām” is not given in Fakhry’s edition.
108 MIQUEL FORCADA

the thing with elements that are external to it. Both have a restrictive com-
position and are employed in order to convey the conceptualization of the
thing to the soul, the definition for its conceptualization with its quiddity
and perfectly, and the description without its quiddity and imperfectly. In
much the same way as assent can only have a declaratory composition, con-
ceptualization can only have a conditional composition.

(2) His phrase “by some name” might mean that the thing is [signified by] a
name21 whose quiddity may correspond with every one of a set of different
names. Definition and description coincide in signification to the name,
except for the fact that the name signifies [the thing] generally and definition
and description in detail. For this reason, he stipulated “by some name” in
order not to describe the thing or to define it according to one of the names
that could be applied to it, and thus [the thing] could be taken according to
another name, both being different. An example of this is “point” and
“limit of the line”. The geometers use both as if they were one and the
same thing, though a “point” is something that has no parts, therefore
described without reference to any relation, and “limit of the line” is some-
thing related to a line.

(3) His phrase “by means of the things by which the meaning subsists”,
intends the things from which its quiddity [of the meaning] follows necess-
arily and by which this latter subsists, such as “snub-nosedness” in a nose,
or “pair” in number and so on, and these are what are named “essential acci-
dents” in K. al-Burhān.

(4) And “by its conditions” [al-Fārābī] means that which does not subsist by
means of its quiddity, and from which its quiddity does not follow necess-
arily, such as redness and whiteness in dress and other similar separate acci-
dents which are not properties.

(5) Also in the phrase “by means of the things by which the meaning sub-
sists”, he meant by “subsisting” the cause of its being, i.e. that these [things]
are the cause of its being. Likewise, he referred to description with the
phrase “by means of the things by which the meaning does not subsist”,
because the accidents are not the cause of the being of the concept, but
quite the opposite.
Ibn Bājja does not aim to simplify what al-Fārābī says, which is
clear enough in an example that appears immediately after the text
II quoted above. He rather aims to complement it with cross-
references to other logical works by al-Fārābī, at the cost of
introducing complicated issues that might mislead the reader who
is not familiar with logic. When Ibn Bājja specifies in §1 that “assent
can only have a declaratory composition” and “conceptualization can
only have a conditional composition”, it is implied that the reader

21
I.e.: a concrete name that corresponds to a concrete definition.
 IBN BĀJJA ON TASAWWUR AND TASDĪQ 109
˙ ˙
knows what al-Fārābī says about composite expressions (alfāz murak-
kaba) some lines above in Fusūl and in the epitome of Isagoge. ˙ 22 The
˙
reader will thus realize that: on the one hand, conceptualization
entails our mental capacity to express syntagmas of the kind “the
rational animal”, in which the adjective restricts the sense of the sub-
stantive and is moreover a condition for this substantive to express
the essential meaning of “man”; and on the other hand, assent is a
declaratory phrase which affirms that, actually, a man is a rational
animal. In §2, Ibn Bājja takes considerable trouble to explain the
expression “bi-ismin mā” – on the implicit grounds of what
al-Fārābī mentions in the epitome of Isagoge23 –, just to say that sev-
eral definitions may correspond to a name, yet only one is necessarily
true in a concrete situation. Moreover, the reader must also know
what “simple expressions” (alfāz mufrada) are according to
˙ Bājja expands thoroughly on
al-Fārābī.24 In the whole excerpt, Ibn
the key-concept qiwām (subsisting), in order to explain that the
most complete conceptualization must gather the essential elements
that make up a meaning. Although the author only refers to the sec-
tion of K. al-Burhān in which al-Fārābī deals with “essential predi-
cates” and “essential accidents”,25 he may be bearing in mind K.
al-Hurūf as well.26
˙
22
Al-Fārābī, al-Fusūl al-Khamsa, pp. 273, 9ff/281, 10ff; K. al-Īsāghūjī ay al-madkhal,
˙ “The definition is equal to the thing defined in extension, as when
pp. 119, 14–18/128:
we say ‘every man is a rational animal’ and ‘every rational animal is man’, and similarly
the description in regard to the thing described. The definition of every meaning which
has a name and a definition is equal in signification to the name, and both of them indicate
the quiddity of the thing, except that the name indicates the meaning of the thing and its
quiddity in sum (mujmalan), not in detail and clearly explained, while the definition indi-
cates its meaning and quiddity clearly explained and in detail, with the things which con-
stitute it.”
23
Al-Fārābī, K. al-Īsāghūjī, pp. 127, 14–17/137–8. There is a second gloss of this expression in
another collection of notes devoted to al-Fārābī’s Isagoge (T. K. Īsāghūjī, ed. Fakhry, pp. 52,
21–53, 17/ed. Dāneshpazūh, p. 41), where Ibn Bājja specifies that, from any concept, one
may predicate expressions which are either more general, equal or more specific. This
note seems to borrow from two loci: on the one hand, al-Farābī’s Isagoge (pp. 123, §10
i.f.–§10, 13/133, dealing with the definition that expresses a species which is equal to
and more general than the definiendum); on the other hand, a lost sentence from
al-Fārābī’s K. al-Burhān that, according to Ibn Bājja’s T. K. al-Burhān (ed. Fakhry,
pp. 142 i.f.–143, 1/ed. Dāneshpazūh, p. 333) said: “In this, there is a difference according
to what is remembered [from it] and according to what it is possible [to do with it]. What
is conceptualized from all this as equal is more perfect than what is conceptualized more
generally or more specifically” (cf. below, ns. 28 and 32).
24
“Simple expressions” span, according to al-Fārābī’s al-Fusūl al-khamsa (pp. 269–70/278),
name (ism), particle (ada) and the syntagma consisting˙ of a name and a verb, which
expresses the time in which meaning exists (kalima, “vocable” according to Dunlop’s
trans.).
25
Al-Fārābī, K. al-Burhān, pp. 28–32; cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 73a36ff. On both con-
cepts according to Ibn Rushd, see Rüdiger Arnzen, On Aristotle’s “Metaphysics” (Berlin and
New York, 2010), pp. 127 and 219.
26
Al-Fārābī, K. al-Hurūf, ed. Muhsin Mahdī, 2nd edn (Beirut, 1990), pp. 100–1, §§ 66–67:
what makes a thing˙ subsist is its
˙ matter, its form, or both at the same time; or else, that
110 MIQUEL FORCADA

4. CONCEPTUALIZATION IN IBN BĀJJA’S TAʿĀLĪQ ʿALĀ K. AL-BURHĀN

Ibn Bājja’s most significant and coherent exposés on tasdīq and

tasawwur appear in his glosses of al-Fārābī’s K. al-Burhān.˙ This cir-
˙
cumstance may be attributed to the importance that both notions
have in the understanding of Aristotle’s scientific method, and also
to the fact that, according to Ibn Bājja’s own intellectual autobiogra-
phy,27 this was probably the last treatise of al-Fārābī’s logic that
the Saragossan Master discussed.
Of the several excerpts on conceptualization that this treatise con-
tains, there are two which deserve particular attention. One stems
from the lost sentence of al-Fārābī’s Burhān alluded to above,28
which states that the conceptualization that is equal to the thing is
more perfect than those conceptualizations that are more general or
more particular. Ibn Bājja explains here somewhat didactically the
difference between general and detailed conceptualization. Take, for
instance, what the concept “peppercorn” signifies. It may be defined
as a grain whose form is spherical, its color, black and its surface,
rugged. In a general conceptualization, the mind recognizes the
unity of the meaning, yet it does not grasp either the “detailed plural-
ity” (kathra mufassala) of the concept or the fact that this plurality of
˙˙
characteristics entails a further plurality (al-kathra, fīhi, kathra).29 In
its turn, the detailed conceptualization given by the definition con-
sists of conceptualizing deliberately the thing that is unique with
the unity that singles it out from other similar things, but under-
standing at the same time that the thing is made up of a plurality
of characteristics that may be, in turn, grasped individually.
The second excerpt is a long gloss of another sentence of al-Fārābī’s
Burhān which contains Ibn Bājja’s most successful commentary on
conceptualization and deals in passing with assent. For this reason,
I will translate it fully despite its length:30

by which a thing subsists are the elements out of whose composition appears the quiddity
of a thing. We will see below that the term is understood by Ibn Bājja as referring to the
formal cause. It is worth noting that K. al-Hurūf is an important reference in several trea-
tises by Ibn Bājja and is explicitly quoted ˙ in his notes on al-Fārābī’s on Categories,
T. K. al-Maqūlāt, p. 109.
27
Ibn Bājja, epistle to Abū Jaʿfar b. Hasdāy, ed. Jamal al-Dīn al-ʿAlawī, Rasāʾil falsafiyya
˙
li-Ibn Bājja (Beirut-Casablanca, 1983), p. 79, 3–5.
28
Ibn Bājja, T. K. al-Burhān, ed. Fakhry, p. 142 i.f. ff/ed. Dāneshpazūh, pp. 333 ff. Cf. above,
n. 23.
29
Though not explained here, Ibn Bājja refers to the plurality of causes that make up any
concept.
30
Ibn Bājja, T. K. al-Burhān, ed. Dāneshpazūh, pp. 375, 18–377, 15. This part of the treatise
is not edited by Fakhry. I translate the excerpt following the edition and the only MS which
contains it, Escorial 612.
 IBN BĀJJA ON TASAWWUR AND TASDĪQ 111
˙ ˙
[IV] (1) “The most imperfect conceptualizations are those that result from the
simple expressions that signify the thing and what is similar to them”.31
Conceptualization consists of the attainment of the universal thing in the
genus, described by some description, in much the same way as the act of
imagining consists of apprehending the particular thing described with
some description. This description might be either a simple expression
that signifies the thing or what follows the condition of being singular; or a
proposition that signifies all the parts [or] some part of it [the thing]. It is
the compound proposition that has a conditional composition, the proposition
whose structure does not contain some parts that are a judgment and others
that are judged. [Al-Fārābī] named here the simple expression with which
the thing is described “definition” in general. Every one of these [conceptual-
izations] may be more general, more specific or equivalent [in relation to the
conceptualized thing], yet all of them give some knowledge about the thing.32

(2) The most imperfect is what the simple expressions give. In this situation
he is everyone who learns some science and does not understand the concepts
signified by these expressions, but possesses the conceptualization that this
expression signifies that meaning. In this case, there is still a more imperfect
[state], which consists of not conceptualizing by means of an equivalent
expression the meaning that an equivalent expression signifies, but that
[this concept] is conceptualized by means of an expression which is more gen-
eral or more specific. For example: [the case of who] knows of the concept
“man” only that it is signified by the expression “animal”, and of the term
“animal” knows only that it is signified by the concept “man”.

(3) The most perfect conceptualizations of the expressions [. . .]33 and the con-
ceptualization of some meaning which is signified by a simple expression
generally. In this case there is also an imperfection, which consists of concep-
tualizing the meaning more generally or more specifically. The general con-
ceptualization of a meaning is the conceptualization of the thing that the
name signifies according to what makes this name well-known (mashhūr),
which consists of a conceptualization of the meaning inasmuch as it is one.
The mind cannot observe in the thing the characteristics that, if the thing
was apprehended together with them, could be in the mind equal to it [the
thing] and [the thing] would be specified by them. Undoubtedly, in the act
of general conceptualization, there is in the soul some signal (ʿalāma)34 by

31
Al-Fārābī, K. al-Burhān, p. 44, 2–3.
32
This sentence alludes to al-Fārābī’s lost sentence of the Burhān mentioned above in ns. 23
and 28.
33
Difficult words in the text (p. 376, 12). The editor renders the whole sentence as: akmal
tasawwurāt al-alfāz ʿalā baʿdihā ʿan [al-jzw] (sic). The manuscript (Escorial 612, fol. 96r,
˙ may be read as akmal
12) ˙ tas˙awwurāt al-alfāz ʿalā naqsihā ʿan al-hudūd, although the sen-
tence has little sense for me.˙ Be as it may, it seems
˙ ˙
that˙ the problematic words stem from a
sentence in al-Fārābī’s K. al-Burhān (p. 45, 3), which says: “the most complete [conceptu-
alizations] are those that result from definitions” (akmaluhā mā awqaʿathu al-hudūd). It is
thus possible that the copyist missed some words. ˙
34
ʿAlāma, as “mental signals”, is also a term borrowed from al-Fārābī’s works. In K. al-Alfāz
al-mustaʿmala fī al-mantiq, ed. Muhsin Mahdī (Beirut, 1968), p. 88, it is said that a thing is˙
˙ ˙
112 MIQUEL FORCADA

which we distinguish [the thing conceived] generally, but the mind takes no
particular consideration of it. When we conceive generally the meaning that
the expression “man” designates, there is for it a signal by which we dis-
tinguish in the mind the meaning “man” when we hear this expression. In
most cases, this signal is made up by the form (shakl) and the model
(takhtīt) of a man, and this happens in the person who is sighted, for the
blind,˙ when
˙ he hears this expression, can only differentiate in his mind the
sound of the word. The same occurs in our conceptualization of an animal
by what signifies a name, because there is for it a signal in our souls that
might be either equal or more particular. As for what it is equal to, this is
such as our saying “the meaning of being moved by another is that another
moves you”, or such as our abstraction in the mind of a particular animal
that occupies the place of the universal. This general conceptualization is
the most imperfect of the conceptualizations.

(4) The detailed conceptualization of a thing consists of conceiving it by the

signals that single it out and by its existence. Abū Nasr [al-Fārābī] applied
the term definition to this in his treatise. This kind˙ of conceptualization
has more imperfect and more perfect modalities. The more perfect ones con-
sist of the conceptualization of a thing by the causes of its existence that are
equal to it. The most perfect of these conceptualizations occurs when the
causes are in the thing, such as the conceptualization of the thing regarding
its form in its matter, as in the case of our conceptualization of the man as
corporeal, “self-nourishing”, sensitive and rational, and this is what is
named definition absolutely. More imperfect than this is our conceptualiz-
ation of the thing by the causes that are external to it, such as our conceptu-
alization of the thing by its agent and its finality, as happens in conceiving
the thing “chair” as the thing that the carpenter crafts and in which one
sits for ritual ablution. Even more imperfect than this is that we conceive
the thing by the things which are external to its essence, though equal to it.35

(5) In this question of conceptualization and assent, the thing becomes what
is sought (matlūb),36 and this is the cognition in which ignorance preceded
the search of ˙its knowledge; for we do not seek the knowledge of a thing
until we know it imperfectly and [then] we search for perfect knowledge of it.

represented in the mind by a sign which may be: the name, a definition or description,
something similar, a property or an accident, a particular or a universal. This paragraph
is mentioned in Ibn Bājja’s T. K. al-Burhān (ed. Dāneshpazūh, p. 378, 11), as a quote
from “another book by al-Fārābī”. In K. al-Hurūf, pp. 172–3, § 171, when dealing with
imperfect conceptualization, al-Fārābī speaks ˙ of the accidents as signals of the thing
which are conceptualized generally by means of its name. He also mentions specifically
the conceptualization of man via the shape of a man as an example of general
conceptualization.
35
Allusion to a conceptualization by means of “description”. It is worth noting that, according
to al-Fārābī’s Isagoge (pp. 127/137), whereas definition expresses a definition made out of
genus plus differentiae, description contains genus plus property or accident.
36
Matlūb is usually rendered as “problem” and I will employ this translation below in dealing
˙ assent.
with
 IBN BĀJJA ON TASAWWUR AND TASDĪQ 113
˙ ˙
Although the Saragossan Master departs little from the essential
notions of the Second Master, he specifies further the latter’s positions.
Ibn Bājja broadens the focus by including interesting psychological
nuances which contribute, on the one hand, to define more precisely
the classes of conceptualization, particularly for the case of the concep-
tualization of some notion together with its causes; and, on the other, to
explain better the characteristics of these classes and their inter-
relations. Tasawwur is divided into, on the one hand, less perfect and
more perfect ˙and, on the other, general and detailed. The first category
is qualitative inasmuch as it corresponds to the precision of the mean-
ing that is grasped; the second is quantitative because it depends on a
number of characteristics with which the meaning is grasped. The com-
bination of the two categorizations gives the following table:

1. General and 1. General conceptualization given by the name

imperfect or a simple expression of the kind “Zayd is
conceptualization eating”. It is an imperfect way of knowing the
universals, which most resembles the
apprehension of the particulars by the
imagination. It entails the general grasping of a
meaning in two ways:

1.1. Intuitive meanings which are grasped via a

general form that our immediate experience
associates with a concept
1.2. Abstract meanings poorly understood on the
basis of some preceding knowledge

2. Detailed yet Detailed conceptualization given by a

imperfect description which conveys the non-essential
conceptualization characteristics of the thing represented by the
meaning

3. Detailed and Detailed conceptualization obtained through a

more perfect definition that contains some of the causes that
conceptualization explain the quiddity of the thing, as represented
by the meaning

4. Detailed and Detailed conceptualization obtained through a

perfect definition that contains all the causes, namely
conceptualization matter and form.

The preceding classification is one of the foundations, and not the

least of them, of Ibn Bājja’s future approaches to epistemology. It is
not difficult to recognize it as the skeleton of the three-tier division
of intelligibles and people that appears in a well-known passage of
114 MIQUEL FORCADA

Ibn Bājja’s Ittisāl al-ʿaql bi-al-insān,37 in which the author deals with
Plato’s allegory˙ of the cave.38 Humankind might be divided into the
following three classes according to their capacity of knowing, which
parallel three sorts of universals:
1. The level of common people that attains a sort of preliminary,
undifferentiated, universal which most resembles the percepts
of the imagination, whereby the corresponding intelligibles
are considerably embedded in matter.39 These basic universals
correspond to the general conceptualization furnished by the
name (1) or to a detailed conceptualization provided by a
description (2), which is said elsewhere to correspond to the
definitions employed in dialectic.40 Actually, this latter class
seems to be a bridge of sorts between this level and the next.
2. The level of the men of science, which, according to Ittisāl is
˙
similar to the first level, insofar as one who speculates in things
“related to learning” deals with “imperfect intelligibles”. The
reason of their imperfection is that they are still embedded in
matter, they do not exist as we conceive them, and their images
and intelligibles might be false because we either ignore some
elements of their being or because we only know some of
them through sensations that replace the object to which the
intelligible refers. This is the case of any knowledge acquired
by learning, particularly in the case of geometry, because it
deals with universals which do not exist in the real world.41
Ibn Bājja keeps on saying that the intelligibles of physics
partake of the same condition of those of the mathematics,
and the only difference lies in the ontological superiority
of physical objects, which exist in reality. The universals
spanned in this category may correspond to several classes of

37
Ibn Bājja, Ittisāl al-ʿaql bi-al-insān, ed. M. Fakhry, Rasāʾil Ibn Bājja al-ilāhiyya (Beirut,
˙ Obviously, the well-known implications in ethics of this scale of knowers
1968), pp. 164ff.
and knowledge are beyond the scope of the present paper.
38
It is worth remembering that, whereas Ibn Bājja wrote on logic at the beginning of his
career, he composed Ittisāl in his maturity.
39 ˙
This expression, which refers to the ontology of intelligibles and universals, may be trans-
lated into the logical and epistemological language of Posterior Analytics (II.19), according
to the Aristotelian doctrine of abstraction, as follows. The process by which one attains a
universal comprises a first inductive moment, when one scrutinizes the particulars of
the real world. Within that frame, our percepts of the experiential data are “the matter”
in which the pure knowledge of a thing is embedded. At a second, illuminative moment,
the nous makes us realize the universal concepts in the data picked up in the first stage.
Thus, the nous strips off pure knowledge from matter; the more perfect our knowledge
about something is, the least embedded in matter its corresponding universal (or intelligi-
ble or conceptualization) will be. We will discuss this issue further below.
40
Ibn Bājja, T. K. al-Burhān, ed. Fakhry, p. 149, last paragraph/ed. Dāneshpazūh, p. 340.
41
The problems in Ibn Bājja’s thought about mathematical entities will be discussed in a
forthcoming paper.
 IBN BĀJJA ON TASAWWUR AND TASDĪQ 115
˙ ˙
conceptualizations described above: the abstract notions poorly
known by means of a name (1.1.2.),42 the rough descriptions and
the perfect conceptualizations given by a definition that does
not contain a full explanation.
3. The level of the “happy few who see the thing in itself”,43 in
which Ibn Bājja places people like Hermes and Aristotle. This
level is attained by the physicist (philosopher) who is able to
abstract completely from matter the ideas embedded in the
thing. This universal that expresses the thing “seen in itself”
is obviously the meaning conveyed by the most perfect defi-
nition, and thus perfectly conceptualized.
A similar argument would hold for other short tracts on psychology
and noetic attributed to Ibn Bājja, such as Kalām fī irtiyād fī
tasawwur al-quwwa al-mutakhayyila wa-al-nātiqa, al-fitar al-fāʾiqa ˙
˙ ˙ ˙
wa-tarātub al-maʿrīfī or Kalām [fī al-maʿrifa al-nazariyya wa-al-
˙
kamāl al-insānī] aw fī al-ittisāl bi-al-ʿaql al-faʿʿāl. However, since
˙
his authorship of these treatises has been questioned on reasonably
good grounds,44 I will not go into this question. The most interesting
points for our present purposes are: first, that Ibn Bājja’s understand-
ing of conceptualization is embedded in Aristotle’s theory of scientific
method, as understood by al-Fārābī; second, that Ibn Bājja is well
aware that al-Fārābī noticed that a strict interpretation of scientific
method would entail the paradox that scientific demonstration
could only apply to eternal and immaterial beings,45 and thus the
physical, mutable world could not be the object of science; and third,
that scientific activity is a gradual process of refining and redefining
knowledge. All these issues will be further discussed immediately
below.

5. ASSENT, DEMONSTRATION AND SCIENCE

5.1. Assent and dialectic

Ibn Bājja’s most successful thinking on assent is found in the notes on
K. al-Burhān when he discusses al-Fārābī’s definition of conceptualiz-
ation and assent.46 Actually, there are two series of notes on the same

42
It is worth noting that both works concur in considering the notions acquired through
learning as imperfect.
43
Ibn Bājja, Ittisāl al-ʿaql bi-al-insān, p. 167 and ff.
44 ˙
See the arguments of the editor of these texts, ʿAlawī, in Rasāʾil falsafiyya, introd.
Discussion of whether ʿAlawī is always right or not when he rules out Ibn Bājja’s author-
ship is beyond the scope of the present paper.
45
Galston, Opinion and Knowledge, pp. 215–21.
46
Al-Fārābī, K. al-Burhān, p. 20, 3–9.
116 MIQUEL FORCADA

purpose47 that may be read complementarily.48 Though Ibn Bājja men-

tions the various kinds of assent surveyed above, he focuses in both
cases on perfect assent, influenced by, at least, three treatises by
al-Fārābī. Two are mentioned explicitly by Ibn Bājja at the beginning
of the two series of notes:49 K. al-Tahlīl50 and al-Qiyās;51 the third is
K. al-Jadal.52 The most enlightening˙ excerpt on assent in the whole
work appears in the first series of notes:53
[V] 1. [Al-Fārābī] said: “perfect assent is the certainty and perfect conceptu-
alization is the conceptualization of a thing, together with that which
explains its essence and characterizes it”, and so forth.54 In summary, assent
that is like summum genus consists of considering that an issue is outside the
mind while it is in the mind, according to what is said in K. al-Burhān. The
statement to which assent is applied cannot be but a judgment (qadiya),
because assent cannot be applied to something designated by a statement ˙
that has no declaratory composition.
2. Any judgment to which assent cannot be applied is a problem,55 and as
long as it remains thus, it would be the extreme of an opposition
(tanāqud), like our sentences “pleasure is a perfection or it is not”, or “justice
is better˙than love or is not better than love”. One cannot establish in the soul
one of the extremes of these statements and rule out the other unless [one of

47
Ibn Bājja, T. K. al-Burhān, ed. Fakhry, pp. 109–15 and 150 ff/ed. Dāneshpazūh, pp. 297 i.f.–
304 and 341 ff.
48
The two series of notes seem to correspond to two different readings that Ibn Bājja devoted
to K. al-Burhān. There is no way of knowing why Ibn Bājja discussed the same text twice,
nor the conditions under which these commentaries were written or dictated. The compari-
son between the two series suggests that both were written by the same author because
neither the main ideas, the style, the expressions employed nor the references vary essen-
tially. It is possible that the second series was written in an attempt to add further nuances
to what the author had said in the first series and to clarify it to some extent.
49
Ibn Bājja, T. K. al-Burhān, ed. Fakhry, pp. 109, 12 and 150, 14/ed. Dāneshpazūh, pp. 298
and 341.
50
It is the well-known Book on Analysis that Ibn Bājja glossed. Al-Fārābī comments on the
summary of Topics that appears in Prior Analytics and adds further nuances to this latter
treatise about the generation of premises (cf. Dominique Mallet, “Le Kitāb al-Tahlīl
d’al-Fārābī”, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 4 [1994]: 317–35). ˙
51
Probably al-Fārābī’s K. al-Mudkhal ilā al-qiyās, an introduction to Prior Analytics glossed
by Ibn Bājja (cf. Lameer, Al-Fārābī, pp. 18–19, and Fakhry, Taʿālīq Ibn Bājja, pp. 17–18).
As Lameer says, following Grignaschi, it is possible that the notes to this book attributed to
Ibn Bājja were actually written by one of his disciples. However, Lameer is not sure about
this. Grignaschi’s argument is that Ibn Bājja appears in the third person, but this does not
preclude his authorship since we know that he dictated some of his works.
52
It is al-Fārābī’s epitome of Topics. Although no specific gloss of this book by Ibn Bājja has
come down to us, significant similarities between it and Ibn Bājja’s T. K. al-Burhān on the
issue we are discussing here suggest that he was well aware of K. al-Jadal (cf. al-Fārābī,
K. al-Jadal, ed. Rafīq al-ʿAjam, al-Mantiq ʿinda al-Fārābī, 3rd vol. [Beirut, 1986], pp. 20 ff.).
53
Ibn Bājja, T. K. al-Burhān, ed. Fakhry, ˙ p. 109, 4–11/ed. Dāneshpazūh, p. 298, 1ff.
54
Al-Fārābī, K. al-Burhān, p. 20, 1–2.
55
“Problem” here renders matlūba (qadiya matlūba), a hypothetical proposition that should
be checked. ˙ ˙ ˙
 IBN BĀJJA ON TASAWWUR AND TASDĪQ 117
˙ ˙
these extremes] is submitted to the inquiry of a syllogism56 – and hence it
[the problem] is called wadʿ, either in the sense given in K. al-Tahlīl57 or
˙
in the sense of defining.58˙ In short, it [the establishment] is a voluntary
action – <and there is no name common to all these “establishments”
59

(iqrārāt)> –, which means that60 one of these two extremes is established

on the grounds of “something external” (wārid min khārij), which makes it
follow in the soul. This “establishment” (iqrār)61 is named the assent.
In §1, Ibn Bājja follows a line of interpretation similar to what we
have seen above in his notes on al-Fārābī’s introductory works on
logic (cf. above texts II-III). In §2, Ibn Bājja expresses the crux of
his argument based on Aristotle’s Topics II. 1–2: assent is construed
as the establishment with certainty of something that, being imper-
fectly conceptualized, is considered a “problem” (matlūb; cf. above
˙
text IV §5). The solution of this problem stems from applying a judg-
ment of truth and falsity to the possible characteristics of the thing.
The essential element of this judgment, the middle term that binds
together a subject and a predicate, is called by Ibn Bājja the wārid
min khārij, the “something external”, according to an expression bor-
rowed from al-Fārābī’s epitome of Topics (K. al-Jadal), on the purpose
of the premises and syllogisms of dialectics. To al-Fārābī, the
dialectical premises are “what is commonly accepted” or “notorious”
(mashhūr) among people, namely the people whose opinion is particu-
larly respected, like scientists and philosophers; in K. al-Jadal,62
al-Fārābī says that “the notoriety that appears in the soul” (al-shuhra
al-wārida fī al-nafs) connects the subject and the predicate of a dialec-
tical premise, producing thereby the soul’s assent to what is
affirmed.63 Thus, for Ibn Bājja, the wārid min khārij is knowledge

56
The following sentence between dashes might be understood in my opinion as a parenthe-
tical sentence that Ibn Bājja includes as a footnote of sorts.
57
“Hypothesis”, in the sense of problem that one seeks to solve; cf. al-Fārābī, K. al-Tahlīl, ed.
Dāneshpazūh, al-Mantiqiyyāt li-al-Fārābī, vol. 1 (Qum, 1408/1987–8), p. 229. ˙
58
In the MS Escorial 612, fol. 73r, 17, aw ʿalā jihati al-taʿdīd, “or in the sense of enumerat-
ing”. Though the two editions read also taʿdīd, this syntagma seems to me to make more
sense if the last word is replaced by tahdīd. According to al-Fārābī’s K. al-Jadal, p. 74,
one of the meanings of wadʿ is tahdīd, “the˙ action of defining or positing”, i.e. positing a
wadʿ understood as “thesis” ˙ that ˙affirms a predicate about a subject expressing thereby
˙
a definition.
59
The following sentence between angle brackets appears in brackets in Fakhry’s as a poss-
ible addition. I’m inclined to think that it must be understood as the last clause of the long
parenthetical sentence that the author has started some words before.
60
Or. aw yutaqarrara ahadu al-tarafayni. . . In my interpretation of the excerpt, this sentence
introduced by aw plus ˙ subjunctive
˙ is connected with the preceding clause “unless [one of
these extremes] is submitted to the search of reasoning”, as an explanation.
61
In Fakhry’s ed. amr. Iqrār, which makes more sense, appears in Dāneshpazūh edition
(p. 298, 10) and in MS Escorial 612 (fol. 73r, 19).
62
Al-Fārābī, K. al-Jadal, p. 3, 8–17.
63
Or put another way, we assent to the affirmation that pleasure is perfection because this is
what Zayd states, and we believe that it is Zayd who understands best these questions.
118 MIQUEL FORCADA

exterior to the dilemma that appears in the soul as a middle term that
allows a syllogism to be set. This syllogism will definitely establish
whether a or b hold true for the subject and the inquirer will assent
to that conclusion, by means of which he will reach a better conceptu-
alization of the subject.
The exterior middle term appears in four ways, which Ibn Bājja spe-
cifies further in the second series of notes.64 It may be either knowl-
edge furnished by sense perception, by what an unqualified person
says, by a syllogism that connects two propositions by means of
what is “notorious” or by primary intelligibles. Ibn Bājja reproduces
the Aristotelian/Farabian scheme of four classes of syllogistic pre-
mises: knowledge given by the tradition (maqbūlāt), sense percep-
tions (mahsūsāt), commonly accepted knowledge (mashhūrāt) and
˙
primary intelligibles (ma ʿ qūlāt uwal). Most obviously, perfect assent,
the assent that provides certainty, is brought about by the last two
premises,65 whereas approximate assent follows from the other pre-
mises. Because of its essential role in the process of reaching perfect
conceptualization and assent, Ibn Bājja expands considerably on pri-
mary intelligibles in this section, which is an essential and yet not the
sole reference to his thought on the question. However, the question of
Ibn Bājja’s treatment of the indisputable premises of scientific demon-
stration lies outside the scope of the present paper.66
Concerning tasdīq, the gist of excerpt V under analysis is Ibn Bājja’s
clear formulation ˙ of al-Fārābī’s contention that dialectic is an essen-
tial prerequisite for attaining any kind of knowledge and most par-
ticularly scientific knowledge,67 in the sense that it furnishes the
contradictory propositions which are the very starting point of scien-
tific investigation,68 at least in disciplines whose object of study is
embedded in materiality and so it has contradictory characteristics.69

64
Ibn Bājja, T. K. al-Burhān, ed. Fakhry, pp. 152, 13–156, 19/ed. Dāneshpazūh, pp. 343–8.
The continuation of excerpt V, as well as being intrinsically obscure due to Ibn Bājja’s well-
known style, is poorly edited in both versions. Since this is not the place for a thorough revi-
sion of the wording of this part of the text, I will omit it from my study.
65
Ibid., ed. Fakhry, p. 151, i.f./ed. Dāneshpazūh, p. 342.
66
For a preliminary approach, see Forcada, Ética e ideología de la ciencia. El médico filósofo
en al-Andalus (siglos X-XII) (Almería, 2011), pp. 250–2.
67
Galston, Opinion and Knowledge, pp. 234ff. based mainly on al-Fārābī’s K. al-Jadal and K.
al-Burhān. Al-Fārābī and Ibn Bājja echo Topics I. 4, which states that scientific inquiry
only starts when we posit a problem which is a yes-or-no question; cf. on this question
from a general perspective Jaakko Hintikka, Analyses of Aristotle (New York, 2004), pp.
157–9.
68
Al-Fārābī, K. al-Jadal, p. 34, 4–17; K. al-Burhān, p. 94, 6–14.
69
This means all theoretical disciplines with the exception of arithmetic and geometry
(al-Fārābī, K. al-Jadal, pp. 32–4, K. al-Burhān, pp. 68–9 passim; cf. moreover Galston,
Opinion and Knowledge, pp. 232–6). This problem is addressed particularly in the works
in which Ibn Bājja deals with the premises of mathematical disciplines, namely Kalām
fī al-hayʾa, ed. Salīm Yāfūt, “Ibn Bājja wa-ʿilm al-falak al-batlīmūsī”, Dirasāt fī taʾrīkh
˙
 IBN BĀJJA ON TASAWWUR AND TASDĪQ 119
˙ ˙
5.2. Assent and demonstration
It is worth stressing that the text V above seem explains that Ibn
Bājja espouses the essential features of al-Fārābī’s construal of
Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics:70 science is a process that starts as a
dialectical controversy about some subject; continues as an inquiry
into the subject under study which is essentially empiric; then, it fur-
nishes middle terms that are the causes by which some predicate
applies to the subject;71 finally, it culminates in a demonstrative syl-
logism, preferably of the Barbara type, which formalizes the research
done for the purposes of sound exposition, teaching and, first and fore-
most, proving that the reasoning has provided us with certainty. The
essential elements of this understanding of scientific method are well
summarized in a paragraph of Ibn Bājja’s al-Qawl fī al-quwwa
al-nātiqa (“Discourse on the rational faculty”):72
˙
[VI] By the same token, we must study why primary and certain assent
(al-tasdīq al-yaqīnī al-awwal) is not perfected in the rational faculty except
˙
by scrutinizing (bi-al-tasaffuh) [the particular instances], whether we notice
˙
it or not, from which the˙primary premises exist; and how we may judge what
is endless by a small number of elements. Likewise, [we must study] that
demonstrative certainty and, in general, any assent that is not primary
stem from syllogism and that the most perfect form of the instruments of
reasoning is the first mode of the first figure [of the syllogism], and why
this is so.
Following Aristotle, the demonstrations admitted by al-Fārābī in
scientific knowledge are of three kinds:73 that which affords knowl-
edge a) of the existence of a thing under study (demonstratio quia);
b) of its cause (demonstratio propter quid); c) of both existence and
cause, which is called burhān mutlaq, “absolute demonstration”
(demonstratio simpliciter). Though a ˙thorough study of the problems
of demonstration is outside the scope of the present paper, it is
worth mentioning that Ibn Bājja states explicitly the relationship of
these three demonstrations with conceptualization and assent.74 In
addition, Ibn Bājja’s Ta ʿ ālīq contain several examples and reflections

al-ʿulūm wa-al-ibistīmūlūjya (Rabat, 1996), pp. 65–73, 66–7 and K. al-Hayawān, ed.
Jawwād al-ʿImmāratī (Casablanca and Beirut, 2002), pp. 65–7. ˙
70
Galston, Opinion and Knowledge, pp. 210–54; see also M. Galston, “Al-Fārābī on Aristotle’s
theory of demonstration”, Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism, ed. Parviz Morewedge
(New York, 1981), pp. 23–34.
71
Ibn Bājja addresses this question in his super-commentary on Galen’s commentary on
Hippocrates’ Aphorisms, ed. Forcada, Ética e ideología de la ciencia, pp. 380–2.
72
Ibn Bājja, al-Qawl fī al-quwwa al-nātiqa, ed. Muhammad Alūzādah et al., Dafātir majmūʿa
˙
al-bahth fī al-falsafa al-islāmiyya (Fes, 1999), p.˙ 232, 3–8.
73 ˙
Al-Fārābī, K. al-Burhān, pp. 26–7 passim; cf. Galston, Opinion and Knowledge, pp. 217–21.
74
Ibn Bājja, T. K. al-Burhān, ed. Fakhry, p. 122, 14–15/ed. Dāneshpazūh, p. 311.
120 MIQUEL FORCADA

that connect tasdīq understood as a solution of a problem and the

˙
demonstratio quia, whose main purpose is to prove the existence of
something which is prior in being to its effects, posterior in being
yet prior in knowledge.75 In this context, the solution of the problem
stems from an induction which is formalized in an inductive syllo-
gism,76 for not in vain al-Fārābī says about induction that it is “the
investigation of things included within some matter in order to
show the truth of some judgment about this matter by denial or affir-
mation”;77 and in K. al-Tahlīl, he speaks of the method of “division”
˙
(taqsīm) for solving problems, which is actually an inductive pro-
78
cess. In dealing with this method, Ibn Bājja explains, with an
example relevant for scientific knowledge, how we can solve one of
these problems which are the starting point for a better conceptualiz-
ation of some issue known in general terms and for our assent to it.
The question is whether fever is an unnatural heat or not.79 The pro-
blem is solved through the investigation of the existence of unnatural
heat in any kind of fever known to us. Once it is found in all the par-
ticular instances, we can conclude and explain in terms of a deductive
syllogism that fever is an unnatural heat, obtaining thereby a defi-
nition of fever as “unnatural heat”. In spite of being a partial defi-
nition inasmuch as it lacks the majority of causes, it yields a genus
and a differentia and says something significant for science about
the essence of fever, which opens the scope of a previous and general
conceptualization of the term as an unqualified heat. Our

75
In T. K. al-Burhān (ed. Fakhry, p. 120, 16–20 ff/ed. Dāneshpazūh, p. 309), Ibn Bājja deals
with demonstratio quia, positing that it consists of proving the existence of one of the
extremes of a dilemma in some detail (ʿalā al-tahsīl). The example, however, is about par-
˙˙
ticular knowledge: in order for us to ascertain whether this particular man has a cough
(understand a medically relevant cough and not a nervous or feigned one) or not, we
need a middle term, “he expectorates” (understand that medical experience says that
this is the sign of a real cough), from which we conclude the existence of a cough in this
patient. Immediately after, Ibn Bājja explains the demonstratio propter quid in much
the same way. Once the existence of cough is proved, we seek its cause through the follow-
ing reasoning: who suffers searing ache suffers pleurisy; this man has a searing pain;
therefore, this man suffers from pleurisy, which is the cause of the cough. In dealing
with “absolute demonstration”, Ibn Bājja seems unable to give an example of the same
nature and says instead: all houses in which there is a cooked meal have a kitchen; in
this house there is a cooked meal; therefore, in this house there is a kitchen; cooked
meal is the middle term that indicates that a kitchen will be found in that house, and,
at the same time, the reason for having a kitchen at home.
76
On al-Fārābī on induction and inductive syllogism, cf. Lameer, Al-Fārābī, pp. 133ff; cf. also
Galson, Opinion and Knowledge, pp. 75ff. with the caveats contained in Lameer’s thorough
study.
77
Al-Fārābī, K. al-Qiyās al-saghīr, ed. Dāneshpazūh, Al-Mantiqiyyāt li-l-Fārābī, vol. 1 (Qum,
˙ Nicholas Rescher, al-Farabi’s Short
1408/1987-8), p. 173; trans. ˙ Commentary on Aristotle’s
Prior Analytics (Pittsburgh, 1963), p. 88.
78
Al-Fārābī, K. al-Tahlīl, p. 230; cf. Aristotle, Topics, I.8 and 12.
79 ˙
Ibn Bājja, T. K. al-al-Tah līl, ed. Fakhry, p. 201, 9ff/ed. Dāneshpazūh, p. 238. The author
does not mention here˙ conceptualization and assent, but they are implied in his
arguments.
 IBN BĀJJA ON TASAWWUR AND TASDĪQ 121
˙ ˙
conceptualization is problematic as not only is it incomplete, but it
depends on a middle term whose universality is by no means unques-
tionable.80 Indeed, a demonstration of this kind does not deserve the
name demonstration but rather that of “proof” (dalīl, lit. a guidance
towards something),81 but it is nevertheless the unavoidable starting
point of good science and it would furnish universal knowledge pro-
vided that the empiric inquiry that it synthesizes moves from simple
induction to the Aristotelian epogôgê of Posterior Analytics II.19, ren-
dered as tajriba by al-Fārābī.82 By this token, Ibn Bājja says that the
most complete demonstration is that which gives as a conclusion a
perfect definition;83 and that, if it is true that the method of division,
as such, does not provide the essential causes on whose basis these
demonstrations and definitions are built, it is likewise true that
these essential causes are known to us when one applies division,84
intending that one has to look at the multifarious instances that are
synthesized by a universal to find something relevant about it. In
any case, Ibn Bājja understands certainty as knowing together with
the causes. Conceptualization and assent and its various kinds,
expounded in some detail above, explain the gradual task of scientific
research to move towards better comprehension, in which the last
degrees of certainty are a virtually unattainable goal, at least in
sciences other than arithmetic and geometry. Ibn Bājja painstakingly
states that, for the natural sciences – and likewise for the more phys-
ical branches of mathematical disciplines, such as astronomy –,
“absolute demonstrations” are extremely rare.85 Therefore, true and
perfect conceptualizations and assents are, too.

6. CONCEPTUALIZATION AND ASSENT WITHIN

A PSYCHOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Ibn Bājja understands, in much the same way as al-Fārābī and thanks
to him, that conceptualization and assent are the “organizing theme”
for understanding Aristotle’s theory of science. For this reason, he will

80
About al-Fārābī on the problem of induction, cf. Lameer, al-Fārābī, pp. 150 ff.; Ibn Bājja
deals with the issue in T. K. al-Tahlīl, ed. Fakhry, p. 219, 4 ff.
81
Al-Fārābī, K. al-Burhān, pp. 41 ff. ˙
82
On al-Fārābī’s tajriba, cf. Jules L. Janssens, “‘Experience’ (tajriba) in classical Arabic phil-
osophy (al-Fārābī-Avicenna)”, Quaestio, 4 (2004): 45–62, pp. 47–52; about Ibn Bājja,
Forcada, “Ibn Bājja on medicine”, pp. 126 ff.
83
Ibn Bājja, T. K. al-Burhān, p. 126, 5 ff. Ibn Bājja refers to the definition that only differs
from demonstration in the arrangement of the terms explained in Posterior Analytics
94a2 ff. Cf. on the same topic Ibn Bājja, Sharh al-āthār al-ʿulwiyya, ed. and trans. Paul
Lettink, Aristotle’s Meteorology and its Reception˙ in the Arab World (Leiden et al., 1998),
pp. 420/421 and n. 25 on the latter page.
84
Ibn Bājja, T. K al-Burhān, ed. Fakhry, p. 126, 9-10/ed. Dāneshpazūh, p. 316; cf. also Kalām
fī māhiya al-shawq al-tabīʿī, ed. ʿAlawī, Rasāʾil falsafiyya, p. 101, 9–10.
85 ˙ al-ʿulwiyya, pp. 418–22/419–23.
Ibn Bājja, Sharh al-āthār
˙
122 MIQUEL FORCADA

analyze thoroughly the couplet in his notes on al-Fārābī’s books and

commentaries on logic and scientific method and will enrich them
with notes that are often psychological in character; then he will
employ them consistently in several works on scientific matters
when he will deem it necessary to discuss method, mainly with regard
to premises. As for the mathematical disciplines such as arithmetic,
geometry and astronomy, the main references to assent and conceptu-
alization are found in Kalām fī al-hayʾa (“Discourse on astronomy”),
K. al-Hayawān (commentary on Aristotle’s De Animalibus), and the
epistle˙ addressed to Ibn al-Imām;86 regarding the natural sciences,
K. al-Kawn wa-al-fasād (commentary on Aristotle’s On Generation
and Corruption),87 Sharh al-āthār al-ʿulwiyya88 (commentary on
˙
Aristole’s Meteorology), Kalām fī al-mizāj (commentary on Galen’s
On Mixtures) 89 and Taʿālīq al-adwiya al-mufrada (notes about
Galen’s On Simple Drugs). Moreover, the couplet is likewise a key
concept in works which, though not devoted to science, deal with
the problem of acquiring primary premises such as Fī al-Wahda
wa-al-wāhid90 (“On the one and the unity”) and al-Qawl fī al-quwwa ˙
˙ 91
al-nātiqa (“Discourse on the rational faculty”). To a large extent,
though˙ the reflections on conceptualization and assent constitute a
solid base for one of the major projects of Ibn Bājja’s intellectual
life, namely the Aristotelization of scientific practice, learning and
research, yet the role of the famous couplet exceeds the limits of scien-
tific method.
As is well known, the commitment to good science and complete
knowledge is an essential aspect of Ibn Bājja’s thought on psychology
and ethics, which focuses on the ideal of theoretical life as the path
towards perfection and transcendence. Hence, it is hardly surprising
that conceptualization and assent are also key concepts in two of the
favorite subjects of the author: the psychology of rational thought and
the inextricable connection between rational thought and human
nature. Some sections of Fī al-Wahda wa-al-wāhid and al-Kawn
wa-al-fasād are good examples of the˙ employment ˙of the couplet for
analyzing the close interrelation of scientific method, psychology
and ethics, though this appears more distinctly than anywhere else
in his notes on K. al-Burhān. This work contains a long section that

86
As for the first two works, cf. above n. 69; as for the latter, cf. ʿAlawī’s ed., Rasāʾil falsafiyya,
pp. 88–96.
87
Avempace. Libro de la generación y corrupción, ed. Josep Puig Montada (Madrid, 1995),
pp. 34 ff.
88
Cf. n. 83 above and pp. 440 ff. of Lettink’s ed.
89
MS Ahlwardt 5060, fol. 82r.
90
Ed. ʿAlawī, Rasāʾil falsafiyya, pp. 140–9; cf. Forcada, Ética e ideología de la ciencia,
pp. 250–3.
91
Ibn Bājja, al-Qawl fī al-quwwa al-nātiqa, p. 232 passim.
˙
 IBN BĀJJA ON TASAWWUR AND TASDĪQ 123
˙ ˙
has also come down to us as an independent short tract entitled
Kalām fī māhiya al-shawq al-tabīʿī (“Discourse on what is natural
˙
desire”),92 although it is difficult to discern whether it has been
extracted from the glosses of K. al-Burhān or added to them.93 The
text expands some lines of al-Fārābī’s Burhān so as to give a full the-
ory of the human desire to understand, which starts in human posses-
sion of primary intelligibles in a fashion that Ibn Bājja, according to
al-Fārābī, calls “natural”, strongly suggesting its inborn character.
Although the discussion about the “natural character” of these cogni-
tions exceeds the scope of the present paper,94 Ibn Bājja takes it for
granted. Basing his argument on Aristotle’s maxim “natura nihil
facit frustra”, he says that, since these intelligibles actually do exist,
human thirst for knowledge is as natural as them. This necessity
for knowledge expresses itself in several “rational and natural
desires” (al-tashawwuqāt al-nazariyya al-tabī ʿ iyya),95 the first of
which is the search for “what is”˙ (mā huwa), ˙ defined as the “desire
for that by which this thing subsists” (mā bihi qiwām dhālika al-shayʾ),
i.e. the perfect conceptualization of a thing which entails the grasping
of its formal cause. Now, this knowledge may be given with or without
matter96 and in this latter case three further desires rise up: the
knowledge of “from what it is (ʿammādha huwa, encompassing the
search of matter and agent) and the knowledge of “for what” (li-mā,
the final cause). There is however a desire which is prior to these
four, which Ibn Bājja expresses with the interrogative particle hal,

92
Ibn Bājja, T. K. al-Burhān, pp. 123, i.f.–127, 8; Dāneshpazūh’s ed., p. 315, 3 ff; Rasāʾil fal-
safiyya, pp. 97–102. Apart from minor variants, both sources contain the same text, which
needs to be re-edited, but this is not the brief of the present paper.
93
The text appears in T. K. al-Burhān naturally enough, when discussing the three classes of
demonstration, as a gloss on the four causes that these demonstrations must contain.
Nevertheless, since it is a self-contained text whose approach is psychological rather
than logical, one gets the impression that it was written independently. The question, how-
ever, is of little relevance because the text is by no means out of place in T. K. al-Burhān, a
patchwork of sorts where the materials are poorly structured.
94
For an approach to this issue, cf. Forcada, Ética e ideología de la ciencia, pp. 250–6. The
natural character of these cognitions is explained, among other places, in Ibn Bājja’s Fī
al-Wahda wa-al-wāhid. The author says here that the very first intelligibles (i.e. “concep-
˙
tualizations”) are the˙ categories, grasped in the simple things that a child may come across;
then, the mind begins to grow by formulating simple, primary judgments (“assents”) with
the faculty of reflection. Primary knowledge consists, therefore, of the sum of cognition that
someone accumulates in childhood, the result of a process of updating of a capacity that is
only potential at the very moment of birth and then goes on until intellectual maturity. It is
worth noting that these natural intelligibles, which are self-evident truths like “the whole
is greater than the part”, make up, together with the cognitions drawn from tajriba, the
stock of premises which yield certainty and are the basis of scientific method.
95
Ibn Bājja, Kalām fī māhiya al-shawq al-tabīʿī, ed. ʿAlawī, p. 97/ed. Fakhry, T. K. al-Burhān,
˙
p. 124. Cf. above text IV. Ibn Bājja’s indebtedness to al-Farābī is beyond question. Cf.,
besides the references already given, al-Fārābī’s Tahsīl al-saʿāda (Hyderabād, 1344/
1925–26), pp. 4–6. ˙˙
96
As a pure intelligible or as a cognition that must be abstracted from experiential data.
124 MIQUEL FORCADA

“does it exist?”, connecting thereby rational desire with the dialectic

approach to assent seen above.
It is possible to recognize in Kalām fī māhiya al-shawq al-tabīʿī
(therefore, in T. K. al-Burhān) a sketch of a substantial part of ˙ the
above-mentioned al-Qawl fī al-quwwa al-nātiqa, a short tract that
˙
complements Ibn Bājja’s commentary to Aristotle’s On the Soul.97
98
In al-Qawl, Ibn Bājja speaks of two functions in the human mind,
which correspond with what it is said in Kalām fī māhiya al-shawq
al-tabīʿī about the “two relations”:99 the first is the action of coining
˙
“singular meanings” (maʿānī mufrada), and the second is the action
of composing these meanings so as to express a judgment. Put another
way, Ibn Bājja speaks in both places about a “conceptualizing func-
tion” and an “assenting function”. Both functions are described in
Qawl in much the same way as Kalām fī māhiya al-shawq al-tabīʿī
(the first is as the matter for the second and prior in nature to ˙ it),
yet al-Qawl specifies that the second function correlates with the
reflective faculty (quwwa mufakkira), something which is only said
indirectly in Kalām. In much the same way as in this latter treatise,
al-Qawl says that certainty amounts to knowing, together with the
causes, specifying that the attainment of certainty is a faculty of the
rational intellect.100 Moreover, al-Qawl coincides with Kalām in
explaining this “rational desire” that characterizes the human con-
dition.101 On the other hand, al-Qawl102 expands on the subject mat-
ter and pure intelligibles that appear in Kalām. According to Qawl,
pure intelligibles may be interpreted as follows: the general conceptu-
alizations grasped without causes correspond with material intelligi-
bles still connected to particular instances; their causes are in a first
stage of thought outside the mind, therefore outside the concept which
is generally grasped. This part of the process is natural in the mind,
because it has stored since birth enough knowledge so as to conceive
a general idea about almost any existing being found in common
experience without noticing that it is performing a cognitive action.

97
On whether this tract was written independently or not, cf. the intro. to its ed., pp. 216–18.
98
Ibn Bājja, al-Qawl fī quwwa al-nātiqa, p. 223, 2–7.
99
Ibn Bājja, Kalām fī māhiya al-shawq ˙ al-tabīʿī, p. 100, 4 ff.: It has been explained that any
natural question brings to our minds two˙relationships. The first one is like matter and con-
sists of being something conceptualized absolutely. The second, something that exists in
conceptualization and cannot be found without it, is the assent: that this concept is
based on a concrete reference; that it [the concept] has an essence outside the mind by
which it exists, yet its existence will not be by means of that which is in the mind until
its subsistence and <existence> will be in the mind only; and that this composition
which belongs to it comes from the mind, for the latter is the cause of the composition,
and therefore the cause of its existence is not in its essence but outside it, as has been
explained in other places.
100
Ibn Bājja, al-Qawl fī quwwa al-nātiqa, p. 226, 7–12.
101
Ibid., pp. 226–7, 1; 232, 4 ff. ˙
102
Ibid., pp. 227, 6–230, 8.
 IBN BĀJJA ON TASAWWUR AND TASDĪQ 125
˙ ˙
Now, if the meaning corresponds to an existing being, the mind will be
able to reflect about it, finding the causes with which it is possible to
conceptualize the very essence of the thing. At this stage of the pro-
cess, the mind moves to a higher degree of comprehension, that of cer-
tainty, which would correlate with the formulation of a universal
concept abstracted from matter. This universal corresponds with a
definition that, at least, provides the causes and should ideally be a
demonstration of existence and cause. This second part of the process
is not as natural as the first because it entails a deliberate judgment
which is voluntary action. Notice moreover that, in Kalām, Ibn Bājja
speaks of the faculty of formulating judgments in terms of “acquired
capacity” (quwwa mustafāda), which belongs to the vocabulary of noe-
tic. Ibn Bājja’s reflections about conceptualization and assent are also
a preliminary step towards the works of his maturity such as Tadbīr
al-mutawahhid or Ittisāl al-ʿaql bi-al-Insān, where he will expound
˙ ˙ achieved˙ thoughts on ethics and noetic.
his most fully

7. CONCLUSIONS

In the process of understanding the Organon via al-Fārābī’s epitomes

and commentaries, Ibn Bājja became aware of the epistemological rel-
evance of tasdīq and tassawur. For this reason, he devoted several sec-
˙˙
tions of his notes on al-Fārābī’s works on logic to the issue. In his
study of tasdīq and tasawwur, Ibn Bājja tried to complement and clar-
˙
ify what al-Fārābī ˙ said with notions borrowed from the latter’s
had
works on logic, namely the ones which dealt particularly with the defi-
nition and the syllogism. Aware of the important role played by tasdīq
and tasawwur in al-Fārābī’s construal of the scientific method,˙ he
˙
paid particular attention to the perfect modalities of these notions,
which emerge via the implementation of scientific demonstration.
In spite of the sketchy, confused style of his “notes”, Ibn Bājja wrote
significant sections where he could offer himself and his disciples use-
ful insights into this famous dyad. Using several of al-Fārābī’s works
to gloss a few lines that the latter had written of the issue, Ibn Bājja’s
notes gave a more thorough account. His construal did not differ sub-
stantially from al-Fārābī’s conclusions, but on occasion he added some
personal remarks that improved on his source: the description of the
several modalities of conceptualization is more precise in Ibn Bājja
than in al-Fārābī (cf. text IV); equally, Ibn Bājja presents a clearer
explanation of how assent appears, ultimately, as a result of a reason-
ing that starts in a dialectical controversy (cf. text V).
However, Ibn Bājja’s importance with regard to tasdīq and tasaw-
wur lies less in what he said about them than in the˙ use he made ˙ of
them. His commentaries on these two concepts reveal how he gained
126 MIQUEL FORCADA

acquaintance with Aristotle’s scientific method via al-Fārābī.

Understanding that the goal of science was the attainment of perfect
conceptualization and assent, Ibn Bājja used both terms recurrently
in his commentaries on physics, astronomy and medicine; as a scien-
tist he undertook to find the most perfect conceptualization and
assent that he could in each discipline he addressed. In this way, he
gave birth to an Aristotelizing approach to science that fostered the
appearance of unusual and highly interesting treatises such as Ibn
Rushd’s K. al-Kulliyyāt fī al-tibb or al-Bitrūjī’s K. fī al-Hayʾa.
Tasdīq and tasawwur were ˙ also “organizing
˙ themes” for Ibn Bājja
˙ ˙
when he addressed the subject that most concerned him. In his
works on noetics and psychology, the Farabian notions about the
dyad appear recurrently and form the basis for the study of human
processes of thought. Our reading of the works that Ibn Bājja wrote
in his maturity would be poorer without a previous awareness of his
youthful writings on tasdīq and tasawwur.
˙ ˙

I wish to thank the anonymous referees of ASP for their helpful remarks that have
improved this article; and Prof. Joaquín Lomba for providing me with a copy of MS
Escorial 612.