1492 Tag DEBATE ON COLONIALISM, ‘EUROCENTRISM, AND HISTORY J. M. Blaut with contributions by ‘Andre Gunder Frank ‘Samir Amin Robert A. Dodgshon Ronen Palan Africa World Press, Inc. _Contents Foreword Peter J. Tasior Fourteen Ninety-two LM. Blaut Fourteen ninety-two Onee Again Andre Gunder Frank On Jim Blaut’s Fourteen Ninety-two! smi Amin ‘The Role of Burope in the Early Modera World Systom: Parasitic or Generative? Robert A. Dodgshan ‘The European Miracle of Capital Accumulation R-Palan Response to Comments by Amin, Dedgshon, Frank, and Palan. LM. Blast Index st 85, 9 109 120Foreword: A Debate on the Significance of 1492 Peter J. Taylor University of weastle upon Tyne Introduction ‘Some published debates work, others don't, This one belongs firmly in the former category. The journal Poitea! Geography has published a variety of publie debates in recent years of which the one reproduced here is the Iat- fest. The format used isa simple one. There isa main paper by dim Blaut which strongly expresses a controversial the ss, There are four commentators, two of whom are broad. ly sympathetic tothe thesis (Gunder Frank and Samir ‘Amin) and two who disagree with i (Bob Dedgshon and Ronen Palan. Finally Blau is given the opportunity to comment on the commentators "There are two main reasons why this debate aso uc cess. Firat there isthe quality of the contributions bbe prepared tobe persuaded by some quite contrary pos tions! Second the question being debated sa very big one ‘with ervcial implications forhow we view the world ee ive jn. It is for this reason that, as editor of Politica! Geography, Tam delighted that thi partealar debate is reachinga larger audience than the ofefonadas ofthe os. nal. The main protagonist Jim Blast has asked me to contribute this short introduction tothe republication and T decided to accept only could add some value tothe pro ‘uct. Obviously it would be inappropriate for me to jon in the debate at this late stage, not to mention unfair to the ther contributors, but I thought it would be useful for readers iT attempted to place the debate into some sort af context. Ihave already stated that I believe the debate tobe an important one; itis now incumbent upon me to say why, All Historical Geography Is Myth Al history Uhat is worth reading is contested history. Any writer who thinks she or he has ‘settled’ some hi ‘orieal question is more interesting for what they repre: sent than for what they say. To me the phrase contested story initially rings to mind the battle of memoirs and autobiographies that often occurs between great men’ ty ing to ensure ther place for posterity. But there is much ‘more to historial debate than such purposive bias, Wallerstain (1988) has asserted that ll history is myth, [By thi he means that al historians bring to ther subject rattor a set of assumptions about how the world works Which determines the nature ofthe historia! knowledge ‘which they produce. Hence differen historians starting from difforent positions each produce their different ‘myths’ Wallerstein uses the vory strong word ‘myth to empha size hia distance from those who believe in th possibility of producing an ‘absolute tru In history the later are host represented by the Whig historians of the era of British hegemony who thought that they could eventual ly produce an ‘ultimate history’ when the Tast fact” was finally interpreted (Carr, 1961) There are two key chal- lenges to such thinking. The fist argues that all history isa dialogue between the past and the present where the contemporary concerns ofthe historians define the quas- tions asked ofthe past (Carr, 1961). Itean be nother way: ‘woare trapped in the present, Hence we now intorprt the Whig historical project with it emphasis on continuity ‘and progress culminating in Uhe present as acalobration, ‘and hence lgitimation, of the present. Now is made @ ‘special time "The second challenge argues that the postion an his torian starts from needs to be speciied much moro pre cisely than merely the present. Aa with other cultural pursuit, historians have been in the business of what Rana Kabbani (1988) calls ‘Zevise and rule. The present is the modem and the modern is place, the West-Here where the historian comes from — is made a ‘special place: There is « geographical dialogue between places, jost as inherently biassed asthe historin's one between, times, in all descriptions of our world (Taylor, 1993). In fact much geographical writing has boon more like a ge _raphical monologue as the ‘moderns’ have scripted the ‘premoderae’ in Keeping them in their place. Hence we can say thatall historical geography — understanding the timer and places of ar world — ita myth, Thedebate con Alucted her is above all about choosing between alterns: tivehistorieal geography myths itis about trying to think beyond the here and now. ‘The Greatest Ossian of Them All? ‘The controversial position tht Blaut proposes may be deqeribed as characterising moat worl story as great ‘Orion: The Ossian was an epic poem that purported to Shor that he fomering of adleval Calc eoltarcocorred Inthe Highlands of Scotland and wot Island as common 1y supposed (Trevor Roper, 1989) Te was an eighteenth century romantic nationalist forgery that was trying to induces rewnting of Celtic historical geography periph. tral region was being promoted to centre stage putting {te more lustrous rival in Oe shade. In sinilar manner Standard word histories can be characterized as making aria was unl fairly recently a rather peripheral art of‘loose ‘world-systom’, Burope, into a apecial place where progress is to be found. This not to say the world histo- ans have purposivaly frged the evidence asin the orig {nal Ossian, but the results of their less purposive bias hhave had the same effect except on 2 much grander sale. In their slightly different wavs, Blast, Frank and Amin ‘make Ossian-iype accusations; Dodgshon and Palan oubt, on somewhat different grounds, whether down- srading the special or wnique nature of Burope aids our Understanding of the modern world Tam not going to deseribe the five positions argued below any further than locating them inthe context just provided. What Tean promi the renders is avery rich Sebate and I would suggest that they would be hard put to find the equivalent concentration of ideas in any other publication of comparable length, Who Has Got the Best Myth? "This ia the question the reader is being invited to answer. But answering isnot just a matter of assembling the facts to decide. There i an important sense in which facts should be respected and not manipulated unfairly ‘but that snot the prime issue hore. Ie is mich more basic than that, Tt seems to me that neither side could put together ast offucts that would satisfy the other side they were proven wrong: ‘Tm sorry, you were right al long, We are in tho realm of interpretation and that ie encum- bered by thehistorographical aumptions described eat Tier. But you, the reader, carry such assumptions around in your head. Nobody reading this debate will come to it ‘san ‘intellectual blank you will have either celebrated for mourned the events of 1492 this year and that will indelibly mark your reading ofthe debate. Nevertheless itis always a rofreshing exercise to read other people's ‘myth even though reading your side's rebuttale is more reassuring. But where docs allthis subjectivity leave ua? There may ‘veo abeate truth but we do not want to be pushed ita tmestreme-tatt poston whereevery myth ita gd tu overy other and we ust pick the one hat ula, There re criteria for selecting between mtb Tuas odo with ‘that the slo purpose making her his coke. Ttitisaseblary choice then we mill eed to take partic tr aed tthe fa tame a at tnppea for us fo collet our tories lead us tour fet. Butourthore ar ltimately boat how oar weld works nd that polite Hence the erieia wed in hisdcbale tottlec a preferred myth wl be imately pols ormy put thkistory ino about the pastor een tne present but its prise reference ste fotre Tha was Uhemensageaf the cla Whig hstoren ut aa much new radical hifi Tele think eograpy i ot about fo {ign places, or even our home place, butt prime space ‘eleenc th whole world. Tat was the menage athe Sid imperialist geographies jst an much aa new radical igographies.lonecstorical geography and itemytbs are Stee ture ef the worl Tht the space me com {extof the debate presented hee References (Garr, E,H, (1961), What Is History? London: Penguin. Kablani, R, (1988), Burope’ Myth of Orient, London: Pandora "Tayler, P. J (199), Full circle, or new meaning for the lobal? In The Challenge For Geography (RJ. Johnston, Oxford: Blackwell Trevor Roper, H. (198), The invention otradition: The highland tradition in Scotland. In The Invention of ‘Tradition (E, Hobsbawm and T, Ranger, ods.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wallerstein, 1. (1989). Historical Cepitaliem, Landon versoFourteen Ninety-two J.M. Blaut sity of Minois ‘at Chicago Introduction Five hundred years have passed since Buropeans arrived in America yt wo still dnt fully realize how sig nificant that event sas for eltural evolution. 'am going to argue inthis essay thatthe date 1492 represents the brealepoint between to fundamentally different evol tionary epochs, The conquest of America beyins, andexplain, the rise of Burope It explain why capitalism rote to power in Europe, not elsewhere, and why capital lmreets pver inthe heir, nt ater Foren rinety-twe gave the world a center and a peshey. Before 1492, cultural evolution inthe Eastern Hemisphere was proceeding evenly across the landscape in Afi, Asia, and Europe a multitude of enters were volving out of (broadly) feudalism and toward ready) spitaliam. Many of hese regions in all thre continents ‘were at the same level of development and were pro ireasing at about the same rte nd (ast their modes of Production inthe same direction, They were fat evel Ineo axons in hemi wide never or proces af evolving capitalists, Burope was notin any W head of Aen and Asia in development or even in the preconditions for development ‘Aer 1492, Europeans came ts dominate the world nd hey dd oo brane 1492 inaugurated a et of world tonealproestes which gave to European protocpitalats aoa cal ad power odie eal in ther own region and begin the destruction of competing proto capitalist communities everywhere else By the endo Une 11th centry, ro hundred years ator 1492, capitalism or capitalists) had risen to take polities and scil control fa few Westera European countries, nd alia expan sion had decisively begun in fea and Asin. Europe waa "ow begining to dominate the world and toes the world Inlevel and pace of development. The world's landscapes wore now uneven. They have remained so ever sinc, ‘Nobody doubt tht the Gsawery and exploitation of ‘Ameria by Europeans had something to do with the iso and modernization of Europe. What Lam arguing here is ‘much stronger and much more radical thesis, The argue ‘nents radial ina east ur respect {ih Tedonies that Europeans had any advantage aver ‘Acana ond Asians prior to 1492 as regards te el onary processes leading twerd capitalism ond Imodersity. Modievl Burope was no more advanced or progressive than medieval Africa end medieval Asis, fand had na special potentialities —no unique gift of ‘atcnality or wenturesomencss! Fain at the same time asserting that colonialism, as a proves, lie a the heart (aat at tho periphery) of such trord-historieal transformations as the rso of capital {Sm and Europe, Capitaliem would (I suspect) have frrived in any case, but it would have arvived many Centuries later and it would not have seated itselin Europe alone (or first) had it not been for European, folontalien in Amerien. Later clonalism was eracial forthe later evolution of capitalism (a thesis I eannat pursue in this short essay) Colonisism, overall, has Een a eruil dimension of espitaliem from 1492 down to the present T am arguing that the economic exploitation of Americans in the 16th end 17th conturies was vastly tnore intensive, snd produced vastly more capital, than is generally recognized. The argument then moves to rope, and claims — fllowing somewhat the lead of tcarker writers like Ef. Hamilton (1929) and WP. Webb (1981) — that economic, racial, and political tMfects of ola! accorulation, principally in America, produced a mojor transformation of European society Pim parting eompany with thos traditional Marxists ‘who, like tracitonal conservatives, believe that the rise Ut capitalism is to be explained by proceses internal to Europe Strity speaking, there was no ‘transition from Feudalism to capitalism’ in Burope;thore was rather @ tharp break, a historical unconformity, between medieval Europe and the Burope of the bourgenis revo Tution (or revolutions). That unconformity appears in the historia column joat in 1492. After 1492 we see tuddon, reveutionary change. There was no European, {ronsiton instil another sense. A transition toward topitalism and from s range of broad feudal and fe Alal-teibutary modes of production was indeed taking place before 1492, bat it was taking place on a hem Ephere-wide scale, All of the Marxist models whichtempt to dtcover causality within an ftra-Europesa system only — the decline af rural feudalism in Europe (Brenner, 1976, 1977, 1982 the rie of Evropean towns (Swecey, 1978) — are deficient because the real causal ty is hemisphere-wvide in extent and effec, Inthe following paragraphs I will present the reason- ing behind these prepositions. The plan of procedure i as follows. To begin with, Iwill ry to show that our magni icont legacy of Burupean historical scholarship docs not provide important evidence ayainst tho theory argued here because itis nat really comparative. Iwill show thatthe basic reason why we have accepted the idea of European historical superiority is Burocentriedifusionism, thus a ‘matter of methodology, ideslogy, and implicit theory, not empirical evidence. Nest, 1 will try to show that Europe ‘was at about the same level as Africa and Asia in 1492, ‘that a common proces of evolution toward capitalism was, cocearving in a network of regions cross the hemisphere This argument, stile preliminary to our main thesis (bt fn essential step in laying out the overall theory), wil be put forward in two brief discussions. First Twill very sketchily summarize and ertcie the views of a number of scholars who maintain that Europe was indeed more advanced and progressive than ather regions in the Middle Ages. Then I will sketch in the empirical basis for the ‘opposing theory, thatof evenness prior to 1492, here sua. ‘marizing prior reports (principally Blaut, 1976) We then arrive at the main argument, which is @ presentation of ‘empirical evidence that colonialism after 1402 led to the ‘atsive accumulation of eapital (and. protocepitalist power) in Europe, and t0 explains why Europe began its Selective rise and experienced, in the 17th century, ite political transformation, the bourgeois revolutions I the Course of this discussion Iwill show that the discovery of ‘America and the beginnings of eolonialism did not reflect fany superiority of Europe over Africa or Asia, bat rather Pallected the fact of location, Prior Questions ‘The Question of Evidence Libraries are fll ofschlarly studies which seem to sup port the historical propositions which [here reject, and {eo of them in particular: the theory that Europe held fsdvantages over Afriea and Asia in the period prior Lo 41492, andthe theory that the world outside of Buropehad little to do with cutaral evolution after 1492, and thus ‘that colonialism was aminor and unimportant process, an fffect nota cause, in world history from 1492 tothe pre tent. But existing historial scholarship does nat give much support to these theories, although this is not generally ‘realized. Most of Uhe support comes fram unrecognized, implicit beliefs which have not been tested empirically, beliefs which are mainly an inheritance from prior times ‘when scholars simply did not question the superiority of Europe and Buropeans Before we tura to our empirical argument itis important to demonstrate why this iss because no empirial argument presented in one short ‘essay ean otherwise soem ta have Une power to stand up ta theories which are almost universally accepted and are thought tobe supported with mountains of evidence gath- tered by generations of scholars "There is ofcource abundant historical evidenes for the Middle Ages that European society was evolving and changing in many ways, From the 10th century, the thanges tended to be ofthe sort that we ean eonneet lori tally with the genuine modernization which appeared ‘much ater: towns (in some periods and places) were grow ing larger and more powerful, feudal society was change {ngin distinet waye that oggest internal changer decay, long-distance trade on land and sea was becoming more intensive and extensive, and so on, All ofthis is clearly shown in the scholarly record But what docs i-imply for cultural evolution? And what doos tno imply? It does imply that a process af evolution toward somesort of new society, probably more or less capitalist in its ‘underlying mode of production, was underway in Europe Tt doos not tell us whether this evolutionary process was taking place only in Burope, Andt docs not provide ws with the eritical evidence wich we must have to decide why theevolutionary changes took place in Europe, for two res sons: firstly, eitical changes in Europe may have been caused hy historical events which took place outside of Europe, so the fate of European history may not contain the causes of evolutionary change; and secondly, for any postulated cause ofan evolutionary change in Barope, if the same process (or fact) ocurred outside of Europe bist did not, there, produce the tame eet as it did in Europe, wwe have good reason to doubt that this particular fact or process wae causally efficacious within Europe (Lam using Seommon-iense notion oft the nation which we use Pragmatically whenever we speak about causes and effects fn human affairs, whatever some philsophers may say in bjection ) ‘Ofcourse, none ofthis precludes the spinning of grand Ihstorical theories as to what caused evolutionary change in European society at any given period in history, before 1492 or after. My point is that such theories cannot be ‘proven; they donot rst inthe faccual evidence bt rather Ina prior beliefs sbout the causes of historical change. ‘The mountain of fctual evidence does not realy help ws tedecide whether causes are ezonomie or political, or ntel- leetual or technological, or whatever. Wercan weave these facta into almost any sore of explanatory model, But we cannot prove our cae. In sum, our great heritage of esre- fal, scholarly stadies about European history does nat, by Itself, provide evidence against any theory which clams that the causal forces which were at work in Europe were also at work elsewhere Diffusionism and Tunnel History ‘There one primordial reason why we donot doubt that Buropeans have taken the lead in history in all epochs before and after 1492, andithas litle to do with evidence It is a basic belief which we inherit from prior ages of thought and searely realize Uhat we hold: its an impic ithelie, not an explicit one, and itis olargea theory that {tis woven into all of our ideas about history, both with in Burope and without, This the theory, of uper- theo ry, called Burocentre difasionism (Blaut, 1977, 1987s), Diffustoniem is a complex dotrine, witha complex his- tory, but the essence is clea. It became codified around the middle ofthe 19th century ae part of the ideology of evolving capitalism in Europe, but more specifically because it gave powerful intellectual support to ealonal iam, Its basic propositions are the following: G) ieds natural and normal to find cultural evoktion pro- fretsing within Europe (2) The prime reason for cultural evolution within Europe fs some fee or factor whichis ultimataly intellectual br pirtaal, a source of inventiveness (dhe inventions being social aswell ss tachnologiel, rationality, inno tiveness, and virtue (@) Outside of Barope, cultural progress is not to be expect: ‘ed: the norm is stagnetion, ‘traditionalism and the like, (4) Progress outside of Europe reflects diffusion from Europe of traits (in the aggregate ‘civilization invent- ed in Burope. (6) The naturel form of interaction between Europe and rnon-Burope is transaction: the dfusion of sanovative ‘eas, valoes, and people from Europe to non-Europe the eounterdiffsion of material weelth, as just eon pensation, from non-Europe to Europe. Thre is also fifereat kind of counter di fusion, from periphery to tore, which consist of Uhings backward, atavisic, and ‘onclzed: Back magte, plagues, barbarians, Dracula, ton this being a natural consoquence af the fact that the periphery Is ancient, backward, and savage.) ‘Thus in estonce: Europe invents, others imitate; Europe ‘advances, thers follow (or they ae ed. Certainly the primary argument of difasionism isthesuperiority of Europeans over non-Buropeans, and the con ‘ception that history outside of Burope is made by the dif: fusion from Hurope of Buropeans and their intellectual fand moral inventions. But the iaternal, or ove, part of the model is rtial when wetry to analyze the ways (eel) Europeans theorize about their own history and their own sacety, past and present. This part of difasionism om: bines we doctrines derived fom dfusionist propositions ro, Land no, 2) which involve a kind of historical tunnel Yision, and so ean be called tunel history (Blau, 1987, chap. 7, and forthooming). The first doctrine declaros it ‘unnecessary to look outside of Europe fr the causes of his- {orieal changes in Europe (except of course deevvlizing changes ike barbarian invasions, pages, heresies, et). Historical reasoning thus looks back or down the tunnel oftime for the enuses of al important changes: ontside the tunnel isthe rockbound, changoles, traditional periph- ery, the non-European world. This becomes 2 definite ‘methodology in European medieval history. Prior gener ations of historians did not seriously look outside of Europe, except to. make invidious comparisons, If European historians today on some occasions try to be comparative, cross-cultural, in their efforts to explain Europe's medieval progress, the efforts almost invariably make use of older, colonialera Buropean analyses of nen: European history, and (unsurprisingly) reproduce the older diffustonist eas sbout such things as'Asiate stag nation, ‘African savagery’ and the lke, Crotura to this point below) So tunnel history persist. Tt persists even ormodern history: progress in the modern world is accom plished hy Europeans, wherever they may novt be setled, land by the entorprises putin place by Europeans. "The second doctrine is more subtle. Just as difasionism claims that itis the intellectsel and spiritual qualities of the Buropean which, difusing outward over the world, boring progress, 20 t claims that these qualities were Uhe ‘mainsprings of social evolution within Europe tele. Some ‘ualifcatons, however, are needed. Two centuries ago it was axiomatic that God and His church were the foun: {ainhead of progress. A Christian god of course will pot {od ideas inthe heads of Christiane, particularly those Christians who worship Him in the right way, and He wil Tead His people forward to civilization. Gradually this explicit doctrine became implicit, and Christian pans were themselves seen asthe souress af innov- aliveideas and hence evolutionary change, for reasons not Cosually grounded in foith, Not until Marx did we have a theory of cultural evolution which defintely placed the prime cause ofehange outside the heads of Buropeans, but {he habit of explaining evolutionary change by reference taanautonomows realm of xdeas or ideology of supposedly rational and moral innovation, remains dominant even {day because ideologica-level causation is stil, ast was when Mare and Engels criticized it in The German [Hdeotogy, the best rationalization for elitist socal theory (arxand Engels, 1876). Inany event, today the favoured theories explaining the so-called ‘European miracle’ are theories sbout Europeans ‘rationality, innovativeness’, fand the rest. This holds true even for theories which {round themselves in supposedly non-ideologiea! Tact, notably technological determinism and social-structural determinism. Technology may have caused socal change in Medieval Europe but it was the inventiveness of the Europeans that caused the technology, Likewise social structures, which also had tobe invented ‘The Question of Alternative Theories Complementing difusionism is a second external or non-evidentiary source of persuasiveness for the theories ‘which discover European superiority inthe Middle Ages ‘and later, This inthe absence frm historians’ usual de ‘ouree of any competing theory. As we well know from our Aoctrines about the methodology of social scionce, itis very 4ifcut to eriicze, or even gain a perspective on, one the ‘ory unless you have in mind anather, alternative theory (theory cannot simply be ‘confronted with the facts)‘Thereis no shortage of such alternative theories about the rise of Burope and capitalism, before and after 1492. One {the theory offered here: thateapitaism and modernity ‘were evolving in parts of Europe, Africa, and Asia in the same general way and atthe same rate up tothe moment ‘when the conquest of America gave Burope its fist advan tage, and thet the rse of Europe, and of capitalism with in Burope, therealer was the vectorial reeultant ofthese initial conditions, the iflowingof power from colonialism, and derivative intra European effects ‘Bat there are numerous ther theories denying the idea of the ‘Buropean miracle, For instance, iis argued by ‘some Marxists that, in the 17th eontury, Buropeans had 4 vory minor advantage in terms of procestes tending toward the rise of capitalism, an advantage which other societieshad held in prior times— think ofa fot-ace with frat one, then another runner taking the lead — but rom the moment the bourgesisie gained definitive contral in northwestern Europe, o oer bourgensie anywhere ele, ‘nuld gain such contro, given th explosively rapid growth ‘and the power ofapitalism, even nits preindtral form. Tn second theory, Europe managed ta break out of the hemisphere-vide pettorn of feudalism because of ite peripheral position and rather backward character, which ‘gave its feudal socity (and elass relations) a peculiar Instability and hence led toa more rapid dissolution of few alism and rise of eapitalism. (See Amin, 1976, 1985.) In ‘third theory, Buropeans had one special cultaral char: ‘acteristic indicating, nt modernity or eivilizatio or pro iressiveness, but savagery: a propensity, not shared by ‘ther Bastorn Hemisphere societies, to attack, conquer, enslave, and rob other people, Uhos to rss’ by predation (This view is held by a number of very anti-European ‘scholars, You will notice that its the ‘European miracle? theory inverted.) Still other theories could be listed. So ‘there are alternatives tothe theory of Burope’s primacy. ‘And the known facts fit these alternatives jst as well or badly) they do the theeries of European superiority Before Fourteen Ninety-Two ‘The European Miracle The first claim which Tmake in this essay is that Burope dna no advantage over other regions prior to 1492, Thave argued this eponfc case elsewhere, and the argument wil be briefly summarized below. However, the opposing the- ‘ony isso widely argued that itis best ta begin with a bret sketch of some ofthe better-known modern theories which fssert that medieval Europe ws already in terms of ul tural evolution, the leader among world cultures. My pur pose in presenting thee mink-ertiques especially and ‘only to show that this paint af view isnot selFevidently ‘convincing: nothing more can be attempted, given the im: tations of a short essa. think i unlikely that any Buropean writer of tho 18th century doubted the historical superiority of Europe. Perhaps Marx and Engels came closest to doing $0 Rejecting ideological eve theories ofhistarcal causation, they speculated that Europe was the fest civilization to faojuire class modes of production boease of its natural fenvironment, Asia was dy; therefore Asian farming peo ples had to rely on irrigation; therefore it became neces ‘ary for them to accept an overarching command structure ‘which would alloste water and maintain waterworks, 2 Special ort of power stracbure which was not truly a class state, The farming villages remained classless. The plit- {cal authority was not a genuine ruling (and aecurmolat ing) lass, So there was no class strogule — the Marxian motor of progress — and sceordingly no evolution into Slave, feudal and capitalist modes of production. Soe Marx, 1975; Engels, 1979, Engels probably abandoned this view and the atsociated idea of an ‘Asiatic Mode of Prodition’, i the 1880s. See Engels, 1970.) In tropical regions nature was tao lavish to encourage socal devel ‘pment (Mars, 1976: 512), Barope won, #0 to speak, by ‘default. What is most important shout this incorrect f= ‘mulation is the face that it does not posit an ancient and‘ongoing superiority of Buropean culture or the Buropean ‘mind. ‘Mest ofthe later Marxists and Neo-Marsists, perhaps because they were unwilling to credit Buropeans with cal- ‘ral or ideological or environmental or racial superiority yet had no strong alternative theory, tended to avoid the problem of explaining Europe's apparent historical prior fy (See, eg, the essays in Hilton, 1976) Notable excop- tions in this regard are Amin (1976, 1985), whote views ‘we noted previously, and Abu-Lughod (1987-88, 1989), ‘who argues that many parts of Europe, Asia, and Afi ‘were at comparable ave of development the 13th een: tury otable in a different sense are the views of Perry Anderson and Robert Brenner, whose theories are wide: Iyapproved by non-Maraist social thinkers beeause they seem to argue to the conclusion that Marat theory is rot really diferent from Non-Marxist theory in its ‘pproach tothe question of the rise of Burope and ofeap- italian, and no less friendly to Eurocentric diffusions (See Anderson, 19748, 1974b; Brenner, 1976, 1977, 1982, 1986.) Anderson's formulation is quite close to that of Weber (infra) in its argument that Ruropeans of classi cal and feudal times wore uniquely rational and analy fea, and that the feudal superstructure (not the economy trelase struggle) wos the primary force guiding medieval Europe's unique dovelopment. Brenner's theory, which is highly iaduential (seo, eg, Corbridge, 1986; Hall 1985; Bacchler et al., 1988), is not at all complicated Cass struggle between serfs and lords, influenced by depopulation, led to the decline of feudalism in north: western Europe, Brenner does not mention non-Europe ‘and scarcely mentions southern Europe.) In most parts ‘of northwestern Europe, the peasants won this lass Struggle and became in essence petty landowners, now fatified with their bucolie existence and unwilling to Tnnovate, Only in England did the lords maintain their vip on the land; peasants thus remained tenants. The peasantry then became differentiated, producing a class ‘of landless labourers anda rising clas of larger tenant farmers, wealthy enough torent substantial holdings and forced (oeause they had to pay rent) to commercialize, innovate technologically, and thus become capitalists. (Brenner thinks that serfs, lords, and landowning peas: ants did not innovate, and that towns, even English towns, had only a minor role in the vise of capitalism.) English yeoman-tenant-farmers, therefore, were the founders of capitalism. Stated differently: capitalism trose because English peasants lat the lass struggle In reality, peasants were not predominantly landovn- fers in the other countries ofthe region capitalism grew ‘more rapidly in and near the towns then in the rural ‘countryside; and the technological innovativeness which [Brenner attributes to 14th-l6th century English farm cers really occurred much later toe late to fit nto his the- fry. More importantly, commercial farming and indeed ‘urban protocapitalism were developing during this per ‘odin southern Europe and (a T wil argu) in other on tinente. Brenner's theory is simply wrong. Its popslarity is due principally to two things. First, put forward as a Marxist view, grounded in class struggle, it proves tobe, ‘on inspection, « theory that is feirly standard, if some. ‘what rural in bias, It seems to follows that class-strug ile theories Tead to conventional conclusions. And econdly, Brenner uses his theory (1977-77-92) o attack the unpopular ‘Third-Worldist” perspectives of depen: dency theory, underdevelopment theory, and in partiew lar Sweeay, Prank, and Wallerstein, who argue that European colonialism had much todo with the later rise of capitalism. (See Frank, 1967; Wallerstein, 1974.) Brenner is a thoroughgoing Buracentric tunnel histori- fan: non-Europe had.no important role in social evolu tion at any historieal peri. Unaware that colonialism Involves capitalist relations of production — see below he claims thatthe extrs-European world merely had com rmereal effects on Burope, whereas tho rise of capital{sm was in no way a product of commerce: it took place {n the countryside of Bngland and reflected class strug- ale, not trade. (See critiques of Brenner by R. Hilton, P. Groot and D. Parker, H. Wander, E. Lefty Ladurie, G Bois, JP. Cooper, and others collected in Aston and Philpin, 1986, S00 Torras, 1980; Hoyle, 1990.) Certainly the most influential theory in our contary is that of Max Weber, Weber's theory is built up in layers. ‘The primary layers conception of Europeans as having been uniquely rational’ throughout history. Whether or sot this attribute of superior rationality rests in turn, on ‘Amore base layer of racial superiority is not made clear {On racial inBuences, ee Weber, 1951: 230-32, 379; 1958: ‘3031; 1967: 387; 1981: 379). Such a view was indeed dom: inant in mainstream Buropesn thought in Weber’ time. ‘Weber, however, considered non-European Caucasians 8 well at non-Caueasians to have inferior rationality. But Ihe didnot offer a clear explanation for the superior ratio nality of Europeans, nor even a clear definition of ‘ality(See Leith, 1982-41-62; Freund, 1969. See Weber, O51. 1-82 for an exhaustive lst of the ways in which Buropeans are uniquely rational.) European rationality, in urn, underlay and explained the unigue dynamism of great range of European social institutions laut forth- Coming). The role of religion was considered crucial, although it appears that Weber considered different reli tions tobe either more o less rational, hence gave causal primacy to rationality. Other traits and institutions are then viewed mainly as products of rational thought (era: cially including valuation), sometimes in direct causality, Sometimes via religion (as when Confucianism i blamed for some negative traits ofthe Chinese and Christianity is crodited for some positive traits of Europeans: see Weber, 1961: 226-49), although Weber waa neither sim- plistic or deterministic, and gave carefl attention eo homie and even geographic factors as well as. the ‘eologiallevel ones, The moat important outcomes of superior European rationality, sometimes expressed through religion, and modified in ways Thave mentioned, fare these: urbanization processes in Europe which favour ‘economic development in contrast to those of non-Europe which are not dynamic, however grand they may be in teale; landholding systems in Europe which point toward private property and toward capitalism in contrast onon: EBraropean land systems in which the holders only atom- porary occupant, granted land on condition of service; and overnmental systems, such as bureaucracy, in Burope, ‘which are efficient, rational, and progresive,ualike non. Buropean systems which are rigd and stagnant, Weber is probably the most important and briliznt modern ana |yst of socal phenomena in general and European society in particular, bot his theories about European superior ty over other civilizations are unfounded. The ‘rational ty which is claimed to underlie ather facts is purely a theoretical construct, which Weber defends ancedotaly Example: ‘The typical distrust of Uhe Chinese for one ‘another is confirmed by all observers I stands in sharp fontrast othe trast and honesty of the [Purtansy: Weber, 1951: 282.) Europeans, throughout history, have not dis played more intelligence, virtue, and innovativeness than ‘on-Buropeans. If pre-1492 urbanization is fairly com: pared, epoch for epoch, Europe does not stand out! the Weberian image of medieval Buropean cities as uniquely fro, uniquely progressive, ote. is invalid See Brenner, 1976, Blaut, 1976; GS. Hamilton, 1985.) Feudal land: holding eystemns included both service and property like ‘tenure both in Europe and in non-Burope. The rational politcal nstittions of Burope are results, not causes, of ‘odernization. And so forth. In sum: Weber's views of non Europe were mainly a codification of typical turn-o-the century difasionist prejudices, myths, and half-truths bout non-Europeans. They prove no European superior Sty for pre-modern epochs ’As geographers we are (for ou sins) familiar with anoth cer kind of argument sbout the superiority of Europeans, fan argument grounded in what seem to be the hard factsofenvironment, technology, demography, and the like, in ooming contrast to ideologicallovel theories ike those of (typical) Weber. In Rittrs time, the Buropean environ ent was considered superior because God made it 0. ‘Some historians ofmore recent times, however, invoke the environment as an independent material cause. [Northwestern Burope has a climate favouring ‘human ‘energy’ and agriculture (Jones, 198: 7,47). (This is ol fashioned environmentalism) Is oils are uniquely fertile (Mann, 1986; Hall, 1985). (Mfore environmentalism.) Its indented coastline, capes and bays, favour commerce. (Archipelago, rivers, canals, and snindented coats are {inno way inferior, nor wasland transport 1000 years ago) Recent historians also repreduce the ld myth about Asian aridity, deducing therefrom irrigation-based societies, thus Oriental despotism (nowadays described asa propen. sity toward the “imperial state) and eultaral stagnation (Witfogel, 1957; Jones, 1981; Hall, 1985; Mann, 1988). But most farming regions of Asia are not at all arid, And Teappears that most of the recent arguments positing and explaining the ‘Baropean miracle’ have a definite, if fot always clesrly stated, logical structure. European superiority of mind, rationality, the major independent and primary cause. Europe's superior environment is the ‘minor independent cause, invoked hy many (perhaps mest) historians but not given vory much weight. Bach histor fan then points to one or several or (usually) many European cultural qualitios, atone or or more historical periods, which are explained, explicitly or implicitly, as products of European rationality or environment, and then fre asserted tobe the elective causes, the motors, which, propelled Europe into a more rapid social evalition than, hhon-Europe. There are many ‘miracle theories, difering {nthe parts ofelture chosen at eatte and the time-per ‘odand place) chosen aa venue. Sometimes the same argu mentstructure is used with negative assertions about ‘non-European cultural qualities. The popular word now is “blockages. No longer claiming that non-European soc ‘ties are absolutely stagnant, and absolutoly lacking in the potential to develop, historians now assert that such- fand-euch a cultural feature blocked developmentin sch fand-such a society. (Peshaps just an improvement in hrasing.) By way’ of conehoding this brief discussion of ‘miracle’ theories, Iwill give afew examples of formal: tions which have this strucare of argument. ‘Tynn White, Jr. (1962) has pat forward the strongest ‘modern argument that Buropean technology explains Burope’s unique medieval progres. On close inspection, the argument is not about technology but about rational ‘tg: Buropeans are uniguely inventive (White, 1968) Rather magically a numberof crucial technological inno vations are supposed to have popped up in early medieval borthern Europe, and then to have propelied that region into rapid modernization, Three of the most crucial traits fre the heavy plough, the threefield system, and the horsecollar. The heavy plough is assigned, by White, a tentative central-Buropean origin in the Oth century, then iffased quickly throughout northwestern Burope, and ‘doce much to account for the burating vitality of the Carolingian realm’ (White, 1962:54) Adoption ofthe trait Jed to a socal revolution in northern Burope. It forced peasants to Tearn cooperative endeavor. It was crucial to {he rise of manorialism (p. 44). It produced a profound ‘change in the ‘attitude tomard nature’ and towerd prop ‘erty (p.58). In fact, the heavy plough definitely was ert ‘alin opening up large regions of heavy, wet sol, thus in ‘enlarging ealtivated acreage. But Une heavy plough, with ‘teams of upta24 oxen, wasn use in northern India before the time of Christ (Kosambi, 1969; Panilekar, 1959). In Europe it reflected either diffesion o relatively minor adaptation oflighterplough-technology, long used in drier parts of Europe, Moreover, all of the causal arguments from plough to social change can be reversod: the evalu- tion of fendalism led to an immense demand for more eul- tivated acreage, and this led to an adaptation of ploughtechnology such that hesvy-til regions could now be cul tivated, The technology i effet, not eause, and Europeans ‘re not displayed as uniquely inventive and thus unique ly progressive. White's arguments concerning the three field system and the horse-collar deserve roughly the same responce Blaut forthooming), as do al ofthe other tech ‘ological traits discussed by White (1962), most of which ‘ther difsed into Europe from elaowhere or were evolved {ncommon among many cultures in many regions. White's explanation for the supposed sniquely inventive charac {er of Buropeans is quite Weberian. Buropean inventive- ness is attributed basically to ‘the Judeo-Christian {eloology’ and to Western Christianity. The former under Ties the Exropean’s unique faith in perpetual progres (White, 1968! 85), which becomes a fith in technology ‘The latter produces'an Occidental, voluntarist realization ‘of the Christian dogma of man's transcendence of, and Fighifel mastery over, nature..(Thore is no) spirit in ‘ature’ (p. 90), Nature is tol. But medieval Europeans tended nat to belive in progress: Gd's world was ereat fd perfect and entire. This belie is not anciont but mod: tern; White is simply telescoping history. And medieval Buropeans did not separate man from nature: they believedin the plenum, the great chain ofbeing, the pros- ‘ence of God in all things. Moreover, Eastern Christianity fand non-Christian doctrines have parallels with the ‘Western ones, This is not an explanation Inthe 1980s a namber of works appeared which strong ly defended the historical superiority of Burope and the ‘Basie diffusioist thesis that non-Europe always lagged in history. The most widely-discassed of these works it Erie Jones’ book The European Miracle (Jones, 1981). ‘Jones, an economic historian, assembles essentially al of the traditional arguments for Barope’s historical supers ority, including some (ike Europes ‘climatic energy’) ‘which have been definitively refuted, and adds to those a ‘umber of coloialera mths about the cultaral and pay= Chologieal inability of noa-Buropean societies to modern. 102 19 {e. Jones basic arguments are the following: (G1) Burope'senviruament is superar to As (2) Buropeans are rational, others are nt (8) Ava result oftheir superior rationally, Europeans con trol thoie population, and so accumulate wealth and resources, whereas others donot. ‘The argument is doveloped in a series of steps. Firs, Jones invokes environmentaliem to make various spar tu claims about the superiority of the European envi ronment, about Asa'sargity and Une consequent Oriental ‘espotiam, “authoritarianism, ‘pliial infantilism (p10) fete. Neat, hestatesas fact the emplotaly speculative claim that ancient northern European society had qualities favouring progress and population control and so set ‘Buropeans on their permanent course af development. The claim is that lack of irrigated agriculture (the root of (Oriental despotism) and rustic forest life led to individu lism, love of freedom, and aggressiveness thus @ unique psychology, and als to the favouring ofthe naclear fam fly, Only speculation leads one from known evidence about settlement patterns to the conelusion that early Buropeans hed a special partiality toward nuclear families, Jones confuses ettlement, household, and kinship.) Jones sim ply asserts that the north-European post Neolithic nuclear family became a permanent (and unique) European trait snd permitted Buropeans — in contrast to Asians — to ‘void the Malthusian curse of overpopulation. (ere he repeats the myth of early modernization theory that ‘nuclear families somehow lead toa‘preference for goods rather than for children’ p. 12.) There is no reason to believe that anciont European cultures had any qualities Ltniquely favouring historisl change: this is merely one ofthe classi Buropean prejudices ‘Jones then proceeds to explain the rise of capitalism, ‘Thisrefleted environmental factors, ancient cultural fac- tors, and also particular medieval outcomes. Jones repeats White's arguments shout technologieal inventiveness Europe was a uniquely Snventive society (p. 227 ). Be nd Africascera, He constructs a theory tothe effet that Europe's ‘environmental diversity produced a pattcrn of separate mall states, the embryos of the modern nation-states, Whereas Asia's supposedly uniform landscapes favoured (long with irrigation) the imperial form of government. ‘Tones (also see Hall, 1985) claims that empires stifle oxo ‘omic development, although he gives no reason other than the saw about Oriental despotism and the false pie- ture of Asian landscapes (which are as diversified asthe European). Hisbasicargumont-form is: capitalism and no empire in Europe, no capitalism and empire in Asia, ergo fempire blocks capitalism, ‘Tne final stop i to thow that Asia and Africa had no potential whatever for development. Jones calls this ‘the comparative method (p. 158) but iti really just a string ofegative statements about Africa and Asia. Afia is dis posed of witha few naly comments. Tn Afi, man adapt fed himself to nature. felt part ofthe ecosystem..not above ftand superior (p. 158) Africans did not know the wheel, made no contribution to world civilization. Etcetera ‘Asians do not have the capacity fr logical thought (pp. 161-3). They have a ‘servile spirit, a Tove of luxury’ (p. 167, There is much thievery, senscless warfare, obscu: ‘antiom, and general irrationality, particulary in matters ‘of sexual behaviour. ({in Asia] population was permitted to grow without. deliberate retraint..Seemingly, copa: lation was preferred above commodities p15.) Jones co: cludes that such societies could not progress in history Development ‘would have been supermiraculeus(p. 238). Tack the space to review other recent efforts ofthis aor toprovethat there wasa'European miraclé and toexplain it. Brief mention should however be made of eerain argu- ‘ments put forward by John A. Hall (1985, 1988) and ‘Michael Mana (1986, 1988). (See Blaut 1989, Both Hall ‘and Mann adopt the major arguments of Weber, White, ‘and Jones, including the aridity-irrigation-despotim for. ‘mala, then add speci arguments of their own. Mana thinks that ancient Buropeans acquired a pecliarly demo: cratic, individualistic, progressive culture, with power dis: persed widely instead of being concentrated despoticaly, because, among other things, they adopted (and presum- ably invented) iron-working in agriculture, iron being ‘widely available to the individual peazant (but we do not know where iron metallurgy was invented and iron-work {ng was adopted rather quickly from Chinato West Afeiea). He also posits a teleological tendency of Europeans to ‘march northwestward, cloaring marvelously fertile land as they proceed, eventually reaching the sea and, with peculiar venturesomeness, expanding across the world. Tike Weber and White, he gives a major rolein this march to Western Christianity, claiming that it gave West Buropoans historical advantages over pooples with other religions Hall prefers to emphasize Europeans’ uniquely progressive polities along with Europeans’ uniquely ratio zal demographiebehaviour the relative continence ofthe European family Hal, 1985: 131), In Indi, caste hebbled state development, India didnot have plitial history 76. India had no sense of brotherhood Hall, 1988: 28.) Jn China, empire prevented progress. The Islamic realm ‘was mainly a zone of tribal nomads with e fanatical ide- ‘logy and only unstable polities. Europe had an impli. ly modern organic) state from very early. None ofthis equlres comment ‘The new uropean miracle literature exemplified by ‘the works of Jones, Mann, and Hall should be seen in per spective. Tn recent deeades a reaction to Burocentric his: tory has emerged, a kind of Third-Worldist revisionicm, with notable contributions by J, Abu-Laghod, H. Ala, 8 Amin, M. Bernal, A Cabral, J. Cockeroft,B. Davidson, AG. Frank, C. Furtado, B, Galeano, I. Habib, CLLR. ‘James, M. Moreno Fraginals, J. Needham, W. Rodney, 2. ‘Suid, RS, Sharma, R. Thapar, 1, Wallerstein, B, Williams, and many other European and non-European writers. tense that Eurocentric historians basiealy ignored this revisioniem for some time, then, i the 19708, ean avig- brous counterattack. Although the revisionists had not yetfocused on pre-1492 European history, it was evident that the counterattack would have t strengthen the founda tion axiom that Burope has been the evolutionary leader among world civilizations since far back in history, long before 1482, proving that non-Europe has not contributed Signifieantly to European or world history, and that non: ‘Burope's underdevelopment resulted from its owa histor. {eal failings (stagnation, blocked development), not from Buropean colonialism. This isthe new wave of diffusion ist tunnel history Landscapes of Even Development ‘Was Europe more advanced in level or rate of develop ment than Asia snd Africa in the late Middle Ages? The evidence which I will now summarize suggests that this Was not the ease. (See Blast, 1976, 1987b, 1989a,) The major modes of produetion which were widespread in Europe were also widespread in the other continents, The calearal attributes which would tend tbe involved in ul tural evolution out of feudalism and toward capitalism ad ‘modernity were present in the main social formations of ‘Asia and Africa aswell as Burope in 1482. Ido not think itis necessary to insist upon a definite theory, Marxist or ‘on-Marxst, asta how and why feudalism decayed and tapitalism (and modernity) arose, in order to defend the thosis that the process, viewed at the continental scale, was going on evenly, not unewenly, across the medieval Old ‘World, The part of clture which seem to me ta be cen: tral tothe process, namely, forms and relations of pro Auction, urbanization, large-scale commerce and ‘commodity movement, and he ideas and socal structures ‘associated with economic and technological development, allseem tohave been present in many societies across the hhemisphere. Moreover, there seems to have been a single {nteroommunieating socal network, in which criss-cross diffusion eproed each new development widely across the hemisphere, leading to even, intbond of uneven develop sent. {have argued this thesis elsewhere, and will very briefly summarise it here. Perhaps half of the agriculturally settled portions of Africa, Asia and Burope had landlord dominated societies in which surplus was extracted from peasants, some of ‘whom (in all three continents) wore serfs, others fre ten: fans, The mode of production was feudal eee Blat, 1976). The European version of this mode of production had no special characteristics which would suggest more rapid ‘transformation into another modo of production. To give fs few examples: the European manorial system, some times considered a milestone on the road to private prop. erty and production, had parallels in China and India and ‘doubtless elsewhere (including sub-Seharan Afeiea), and fm any ease the integrated demesne had largely disap- peared in Western Europe. by the. 13th century (Choudhary, 1974; Elvin, 1973; Fei, 1958; Gopal, 1963: Isichei, 1985; Kea, 1882; Liceri, 1974; Mahalingam, 1951, ‘Sharma, 1965; A, Smith, 1971; Watson, 1983; Tung, 1965; ‘Yadava, 1974), Serfdom tended to decline in Europe from the 14th century, but medieval-peried tenancy based on ‘untied peasants was idespreadin South China and other places, and was sometimes (asin Fukien) associated with fommercial production of industrial producte (Rawski, 1972). The European feudal estate was nt closer to gen: tune cumlable private property (and eapital) than were ‘states in many other areas, including China and part of India, (The old generalization, popularized by Weber, that ‘Asian land ownership was based on service tenure while ‘the European was heritable private property is simply hi torially untrue, Service estate tended evelve with time into privately owned estates, service tenure was legally characteristic of feudal Europe as much as most other regions, and rotation of estates tended to reflect special Situations of politico-military instability. See Chandra, 1981; Chicherov, 1976; Elvin, 1973; Gopal, 1983; ‘Mahalingam, 1951; Sharma, 1995; Thapar, 1982.) The cash tenancy which replaced serfdom in some parts of ‘Western Biarope in the 14th and 15th century had closeparallels in other continents (Alavi, 1982; Chandra, 1981; Kea, 1982; Rawski, 1972; Yadava, 1966) And soon ‘Was feudalism collapsing in Burope more rapidly than clsowhere? Two common measures used to judge this Point are pessant unrest and urbanization (implicitly Fural-arbam migration). Peasant revolls seem to have ‘been widespread and intense in other continents (Parsons, 1970; Harrison, 1968). The movement to towne was fanything les intense in Europe in the Iter Middle ‘Ages than elsewhere, since urban population sil repre- ‘ented a mich lower percent of total popations than in many non-Burepean regions (perhape including sub- Saharan Africa: soe Niane 1984), lower even in classical feudal countries like France than in the Mediterranean countries of Europe. Doubtles, feudalism was eollaps- {ng or erambling, but chis was happening at relatively slow rate and was happening als elsewhere inthe hem Sphere (Alavi, 1982: Chandra, 1981; Chicherov, 1976; Elvin, 1978; Kea, 1982), 1 suspect that Marx and Engels were rightin seing the Aecline of the feudal mode of production and the rise of ‘apitaliem asa dual process involving eis in rural fe: Gal class relations and rise of towns and their non-feudal ‘lass procestes, But urbanization and the development fof urban economies was fully as advanced in parts of ‘Africa and Asia as it was in the most advanced parte of Europe. This applies to commerce, to the rise of a bour seoisie and working class to the attaining of wuicient ‘2utonomy to allow the development of logal and politica Systems appropriate to capitalism. There is af course the theory that European cities were somehow free while Asian cities were under the tight control of the sur rounding polity. The principal basis for this view is the ‘ideology of diffusionism which imagines that everything important in early Burope was imbued with freedom ‘while everything important in Asia (nat to mention Africa) was ground under “Oriental despotism’ until the Buropeans came and brought freedom. (Montesquiow and ‘Quesnay believed this, Marx believed it, Weber believed 58. Many believe it today) The so-called roe cities’ of cen tral Europe were hardly the norm and were no, ia most cases, crucial forthe rise of capitalism. The partial auton ‘omy of many mereantle-maritime port cities of Europe, from Italy ta the North Sea, was ofcourse a reality, and ‘usualy reflected either the dominancey the city ofr ‘mall polity (often a city-state) or the gradual ‘Sccommodation of feudal states to their urben sectors, ‘allowing the latter considerable atonomy because of eon siderations of profit or power. Butall ofthis held trae also in many cities of Afiea and Asia Small mercantile-mar- ‘time cities and city-states dotted the coasts ofthe Indian Ocean and the South China Seas like pearls on a string (as Gupta, 1967; Maleiev, 1984; Simkin, 1968). Within lange states, mutual accommodation between city and polity was very common (ax in Mughal India). And in gen- fra, itappeare that all af the progressive characteristics ff late-medieval urbanization in Burope were found atthe fame time in other pars of the hemisphere, ‘Tost before 1492 a slow transition toward eapitalism was taking place in many regions of Asia, Africa, and Europe, Ona three continents there were centers ofincp- fent capitalism, protocapitalism, most of them highly turbanived, and most of them seaports, Thete provocap- talist centers, primarily urban bat often with large hin terlands of commersalized agrienltare (Das Gupta, 1967; [Nagvi, 1968; Nicholas, 1967-68; Rawaks, 1973), bore var tous relationships tothe feudal landseapes against which they abuatted, Some were independent city-states, Some ‘were themselves small (and untesual feudal states-Some ‘rere wholly contained within larger feudal states but had Sufficient autonomy in matters relating to capitalist enter prise that the feudal overlordship did not serious cramp their tye, ‘The mereantile maritime, protocapitalist centers oftheastern Hemisphere wore connected tightly with one another in networks — ultimately a single network — ‘long which flowed material things, people, and ideas (Blaut, 1976; Abu-Lughod, 1989). The links had been forged over many centres: come were in place even in the days when China traded with Rome, By 1492, these centers were 60 closely interinked thatthe growth and ‘prosperity ofeach of them was highly dependent on that ‘of many others; ultimately, on all of them. By 1492, the enters had become, in many ways, little capitalist tock ties. They were seats of production as well as commodi- ty movement, They held ditinet populations of workers land bourgeoisie (or proto-bourgeoisie and the worker ‘capitalist relation was very ikely the dominant clas el tion, They had already developed most ofthe institutions ‘that we ind present in capitalist socety atthe time ofthe ‘bourgeois revolution or revolutions ofthe 17h century ‘They cannot be compared to industrial capitalist societies of the 19th centary, but then we have to romember that ‘capitalism in Europe went through a long pre-industrial ‘hase, and the deseriptions industrial eaptalism afer, ‘9y, 1800 cannot properly be used to characterize the pre industrial phase, The centers of 1492 were primarily ‘engaged in moving commodities produced in the sur ‘rounding feudal societies, bt this should not mislead us {nto thinking of them either as component parts of those societies or aa being somehow feudal themeelves, on the ‘model of the merchant communities which Nourished everywhere during the feudal perio. ‘The mall centers. wel asthe large were emitting and receiving eommodites, technologies, ideas a al sors, pe ple, in'@ continuous criss-crossing of diffusions (Blast, 1987. It isnot dfficul: to understand that, inspite of their eutural differences, thet distances from one anoth er their different political characteristic, their different aes, they were sharing a eammon process: the gradual ‘ae feapitalism within late feudal society. Thus tis not stall unreasonable to think of the landscape of rising cap italim as an even one, stretching from Burope to Africa fand Asia in pots and nodes, but everywhere atthe same level of development. ‘Explaining Fourteen Ninety-Two In 1492, as have seen, capitalism was slowly emerging and feudalism declining in many parts of Asia, Africa, and Burope. In that year there would have boen no reason ‘whatever to predict Uhat capitalism would teiumph in Europe, and would triumph only two centuries later. By ‘the tlumph ofeapitalinm' Tmean the rise of a bourgeoisie tounguestioned politcal power: the bourgeois revolutions. "This was really a evolutionary epech, oeeurring through ‘out many European countries at varying rates, but [will follow convention in dating it symbalically to 1688, the year of England's ‘Glorious Revolution. Tt should be Eraphacized that the capitalism which triumphed was not Sndustrial capitalism, How this pre-industrial eapitalism shouldbe conceptualized isa diffiult question because it {s something much larger Uhan the ‘merchant capital’ of ‘medieval times But the industrial revolution didnot ral Ty begin until the end of the 18th century, and those who foneeptualize the industrial revelation as simply a con tinuatio of thebourgecis revolution are noglecting a large block of history, inside and outside of Burope, "The explanation for the rise of capitalism to political power in Europe between 1492 and 1688 requires an {inderstanding of (1) the reasons why Europeans, not ‘Afficans and Asians, eached und conquered Americs, 2) ‘he reasons why the conquest was sccessful, and () the rect and indirect effects ofthe 16th-contury plunder of ‘American resources ard exploitation of American workers on the transformation of Europe, andof I 7dhcentury clo- tial and semieolonial European enterprise in Ameries, ‘Aftcn, and Asia onthe further transformation of Europe ‘and eventually the political triumph of capitalism inthebourgeois revolution, We will summarize each of these processes in turn Why America Was Conquered by Europeans and Not by Africans or Asians ‘One ofthe core myths of Burecentrie diffusionism eon- cerns the discovery af America Typically it goes something like this: Europeans, being more progressive, venture- ome, achievement oriented, and madera than Africans ‘and Asians in the late Mile Age, snd with sperior ch nology as well as a more advanced economy, went forth to ‘explore and conquer the world. And ao they set sail down, the African coast in the middle ofthe 15th century and out teroas the Atlanti to America in 1492. This myth is er €ial for difusionist ideology fortwo reasons: it explains the modern expansion of Europe in terms of internal, immanent forces, and it permits one to acknowledge that the conquest and its aftermath (Mexican mines, West Indian plantations, North American settler eolonies, ee) hhad significance fr European history without at the same time requiring one to give any eredit in that process to no Buropeans, TInreality, the Europeans were doing what everyone ese was doing woross the hemisphere-wide network of proto ‘capitalist, mereantile maritime centers, and Europeans hhad no special qualities or advantages, no peculiar ven- turesomeness, no peculiarly advanced maritime technol ‘ogy, or suchlike. What they did have was opportunity: @ ‘altar of locational advantagein the broad senso of aces ‘Sbility, "The point deserves to be put very strongly. Ifthe ‘Western Hemisphere had been mare accessible, say, t0 ‘South Indian conte than to Buropean centers, then very likely India would have become the home of capitalism, the ate of the bourgeois revolution, and the ruler of the world, "In the late Middle Ager, long-distance oceanic voyag- ing was being undertaken by mereantile-maritime com- ‘munities everywhore. In tho 15th contury, Africans were sailing to India, Indians to Aftica, Arabs toChina, Chinose to Africa, and so on (Chaudhuri, 1985; Simkin, 1968) ‘Much of this voyaging was across open ocean and much of itinvolved exploration, Two non-European examples are well-known: Cheng Ho's voyages to India and Africa between 1417 and 1433, and an Indian voyage around the Cape of Good Hope and apparently some 2000 miles west ‘ward into the Atlantic in ¢1420 Giles, 1872; Ma Huan, 1970; Panikksr, 1959). In this period, the radii of travel ‘wore bocoming longer, asa funetion ofthe general eval: tion of protocaptallam, the expansion of trade, and the evelopment of maritime technology. Maritime technolo {p differed from region to region but no ane region could be considered to have superiority in any sense implying evolutionary advantoge (Lewis, 1973;Needham, 1971, vl 4,part3). (There isa widely held but mistaken belief that Chinese imperial policy prevented merchants from engag- ing in seaborne trade during the late 16th and early 16th centuries, On this matter see Pureell, 1965; So, 1975; ‘Wiethoft, 1963. I dieeuss theese in Blast, 1976, note 17) Certainly the growth of Europe's commercial economy led to the Portuguese and Spanish voyages of discovery. But the essence ofthe process was a mattor ofeatching up with Asian and African provocapitalit. communities by Buropean communities which were at the margin of the system and were emerging from a period of downturn rel live tother parts ofthe system, Iberian Christian states ‘wore in confit with Maghreb states and European mor chant communities wore having commercial difficulties both there and in the eastern Mediterranean, The open: ing of a tea-route to West African gold mining regions, ‘long sailing route known since antiquity and wing mar ‘time technology known to non-Buropeans as well as Europeans, was obvious strategy. By the late 15th cent ry the radi of travel had lengthened so that a sea route {2 India wae found to be feasible (with piloting help fom Afiean and Indion sailors). The leap aeross the Atlantic {in 1492 was certainly one ofthe great adventures ofhuman ae‘story, But it has to be seen ina context of thared tech: nological and goographical knowledge, high potential for commercial sucess, and other factor which place tin & hhemispherie perspective, as something that could have been undertaken by non-Europeans just as easily as by Buropeans, Buropeans had one advantage. America was vastly more accessible from Iberian ports than from any extra Buropean mereantile-maritime centers which had the capacity for long-distance sea voyages. Accessibility was inparta matter of sailing distance, Sofala was some 3000 niles farther than the Canary Islands (Columbus! jump: Sngeoff point) and more than 4000 miles farther from any densely populated coast with attractive possibilities for {ade or plunder. The distance from China to America's northwest coast was even greater, and greater sil othe ich societies of Mexieo. "To all ofthis we must add the ting conditions on these various routea, Salling rom the Tian Ocean into Uhe Atlantic one tails against prevail: ing winds. The North Pacific is somewhat stormy and winds are aot reliable. From the Canaries to the West Indies, onthe other hand, there Blow th trade winds, ad the return voyage ie made northward ino Uhe westelies, Obviously an explorer does not have this information at hhand at the time of the voyage into unknown seas (although the extent of the goographical knowledge pos- sessed by Atlantic fishing communities in the 15th ce ‘ny remaina an unanswered and inteiguing question, and the navigational stratogies employed customarily by Teerian sailors going to and from the Atlantic islands would have been similar ta those employed by Columbus fn erasing the Atlantic: a matter of utiiaing the easter lies outward and westertes homeward). Te point here is ‘tatter of probabilities, Overall itis vastly more proba Dlethat an Iberian ship would elfect a passage to America than would an Aftiean or Asian ship in the late 15th een tury, and, even ifsuch a voyage were made, itis vastly ‘more probable that Colembue landfill in the West Indies ‘would initiate historical consequences than would have been the case for an African ship reaching Brazil or a ‘Chinese ship reaching California. is this environmentalism? There is no more environ ‘mentalism here than there is in, aay, some statement bout the effect of elfilds on societies ofthe Middle Pas, Tam atsertng only the environmental conditions which support and hinder long-distance cceanie travel. In any tase, if the choice were between an environmentalistic texplanation and one that claimed fendamental superior ity of one group overall others, as Eurocentric diffusion fam doce, woald we not settle fr environmentalism? ‘Before we leave this topic, there remain two important questions, First, why did not West Afticans discover ‘America since they were even closer tot than the Tberians ‘were? The answer seems tobe that mereentil, protocap, Italist centers in West and Central Africa ware not oF tented to commerce by son (as were those of East Aftiea) "The great long-distance trade route lod across the Suda tothe Nile and the Middle Bast, across the Sahara to the Maghreb and the Mediterranean, ete. Sea trade existed all ‘slong the western coast, hut apparently it was net impor tant given that civilizations were mainly inland and trad ing partners lay northward and eastward ee Devisse and bib, 1984). Second, why didnot the trading ctes ofthe Maghreb discover America? This region (as thn Khaldun noted not long before) was in a politcal and commereial Slump, In 1492 it was under pressure from the Tberians fand the Turks, Just at that historical conjuncture, this Fegion lacked a eapacity for major longdistance oceanic voyaging Why the Conquest Was Successful ‘America became significant in the rise of Burope, and the rise of capitalism, soon after the fist contact in 1492. Immediately a process bogon, and explosively enlarged, involving the destruction of American states and cviliza tons, the plunder of precious metals, the exploitation oflabour, and the occupation of American lands by Europeans. fweare to understand the impact ofall ofthis ‘on Burope (and capitalism), wo have to understand how ‘occurred and why ithappened so quickly; why, in word, the conquest was succesful, "There isa second erucal reason why we need to under stand theeausality ofthe conquest. A non-diffasioniet his. tory starts all causal arguments with the working hypothesis that Europeans were not superior to non: Europeans, This leads first to a recognition that Europeans in 1492 had no special advantage over Asians and Africans, ideological, social, or material. But it demands that we make the same working hypothesis ‘about Western Hemisphere communities. Why, then, did Europeans discover America instoad of Americans dis: ‘overing Burope (or Africa or Asia)? And why, after the frat contact, did Europeans conquer the American evi: Tizations instead of being defeated and driven from America's shores? The working hypothesis of eultral un formitarisnism (Blast, 19578) here confronts the diff: sionit tendency to diemias the peoples of America as primitive and in any cae irelevant ‘There were several immediate reasons why American civilizations suecumbed, but one ofthese reasons is of paramount importance and may pethaps be a sufficient fause in and of itself, This isthe massive depopulation caused by the pandemics of Eastern Hemisphere disease introduced tothe Ameriens hy Buropeans (Crosby, 1972; Denevan, 1978). A second factor was the considerable advantage which Ruropeans had in military technology, ‘bat this advantage has tobe kept in perspective. The tech nological gap wes not so grest that it could by itself bring military victory — after the initial battles — against ‘American armies which were much larger and would Sooner or later have adopted the enemy's technology. ‘None ofthis happened hoeause the Americans were dying in epidemics, apparently even before the battles were joined. Probably 80% ofthe population ofhighland Mexico succumbed during the 16th century; the majority of ‘deaths occurred early enough to assist the political con ‘auest (Borah and Cook, 1972). Parallel processes took place in other parts of the hemisphere, especially where there were major concentrations of population, these in ‘mort cases being areas ofstate organization and high ev ilieaton, Perhaps three quarters of the entire population of the Americas was wiped out during that eentary ‘Millions died battle with theSpaniards and Portuguese ‘and in slave-labour centers sich as the mines of Mexico ‘and Peru, but much greater numbers died in epidemics, fand this was the reason why organized resistance to the conquest wae rapidly overcome in most (oot all) areas ‘Both the lower level of military technology among Western Hemisphere peoples and the suscoptbilty of American populations to Eastern Hemisphere diseases can be explained in fairly straightforward eultural-volution: ‘ty terms, elthough evidenee bearing on the matter is ger- rally indirect, The Western Hemisphere was not occupied bby humans until very Ite inthe Paleolithic period: prob- ably not before 20,000 B.P. The immigrants did not pos ‘sess agriculture, The earliest migrations preceded the ‘gricultural revolution in the Eastern Hemisphere; in fddition, the tource area for Uhe migrations, northeast frm Siberia, is generally to cold for agriculture, even for present-day agriculture, and we would not expect ta find that theso cultures were experimenting with incipient ‘agriculture 20,000 years oreo ago although some low-at- tude cultures were doing 80. Migrants to America were paleolthic hunters, gatherers, fishers, and sheifishers. ‘They came in small numbers and spread throughout both [North and South Ameria, Only after some millennia had ‘passed was the stock of resourees for hunting, fishing, [guthering, and shellshing under any significant pressure from humans: one assumes that population growth was slow but — this is of course speculative — that popul tion growth eventually did reach the point where condi tions were favourable ton agricultural revolution. Tn theEastern Hemisphere the agrcultual revolution seems to ‘have oouurred(as a qualitative change) roughly 10-12,000 ‘years ago. Inthe Western Hemisphere that print may have been reached peehaps 4,000 yearslater. Thereafter, cl. tural evolution in the Western Hemisphere proceeded along lines somewhat parallel to those of Eastern Hemisphere evolution: the develoment of agricultaral societis, of classes, of coremonialcenter, cities, feudal clase structures, and incipient merchant capitalism, It Seems that the Western Hemisphere eocieties were clos ing the gap. But in 1492, military chology inthe most advanced and powerful states wasstll well behind that fof Bastern Hemisphere states. Hence the superiority of Cortés armies over Moctoruma'sand Pierre's ver the Inca’s. (When Cortés frst arrivel at Tenochtitlan the Anteca were already dying in zreat numbers fom European diseases which, apparenty, had been carried by ‘American traders from Cuba to Mexico, Likewise, the Theas were succumbing to these dseases before Pizarro arrived. See Crosby, 1972) "The susceptibility of American yopulations to Eastern Hoemisphore diseases, and the contoquent devastation of ‘American settlements, collapse of states, and defeat and subjugation by the Buropeans, isexplained within the fame. general model. Small popslations entered the ‘Americas and probably bore with tem ony a small sub- fet of the diseases which exited in the astern Hemisphere at the time of their desatare, They came, ‘addition fom a rather folate, thinly populated pat of the hemisphere, and a part which having cold climate, ‘would have lacked some diseases haracteristic of warm ‘egions. Perhaps more important i Uhe history ofthe dis eases themaolves. Many diseases stem tohave originated orbecome epidemiological signifiant during oraer Une tgriultural revolution, and tohaveecoogical connections toagricaltre,land-management snd settlement changes associated with agricultural and lter urbanized commu- nti. Inthe Rastera Hemisphere humanity entered these cologal situations afler the initial migrations to the ‘Westerr Hemisphere, hence the migrants would not have carried with them these diseases, Later migrants may hhave dove ao although Uses again unlikely because they ‘me from a cold and isolated part of Asia). But we can fsssumethat the sparse selement, the hunting-gather ing-fshng-shellishing way off, and the absence of age culture settlements and urbanization in the Americas uring nany millennia, would have caused a disappear lance ofome of the Eastern Hemisphere diseases which hhad bees carried across to America by migrants. tr a time, tle American populations would have lost thelr Bhysolgical immunities to diseases no longer present in these ppulations, and they would of eourse lack immu: nities t diseases never before encountered, Its knawa, {thie ngard, that ter devastation was produced in the ‘Americ frm diseases to which Eastern Hemisphere pop ‘latioshad such high levels of immunity that they expe riencedsome ofthese diseases ax minor maladies only (Crosby 1972; Denevan, 1976: 5; Wachtel, 1984). ‘ene there is no nood to take seriously any longer the -varousmyths which explain the defeat ofthe Americans in term of imputed irrationality or superstitiousness oF any ofthe other classical, often racist, myths sbout ‘Amerion civilizations in 1492 (euch as he myth that Mexicais imagined Cortés to be god). The relatively ‘minor dffernce in technology between the two commu nities, ind the impact of Eastern Hemisphere diseases ‘upon Wstern Hemisphere communities, an be explained Ii tems of the settlement history of the Western Hemisfiere and its consequences.6 142 After Fourteen Ninety-Two Europe in Fourteen Nincty-Two Tn 1492, Buropean society was rather sluggishly mov. {ingot of eadalism and toward capitalism, Nothing in he landscape would suggest that a revolutionary transfor ‘mation was imminent, or even suggest thatthe social and economic changes taking place were very rapid. The frowth of the English woolen trade in the 16th century ‘was net (as it is often depicted) a sign of revolutionary ‘ennomie change: it was emplemented by adeetinein can Peting woolen industries elsewhere in Europe Miskimin, 1969) Rural growth in this century reflected mainly pop ‘lation reavery (in some areas) after the great plagues of the preceding century, and the commercialization of fagricaltare that was then taking place had been doing 0 {or some time (Abel, 980). Towne were growing, ut only slowly, and the urban population was sulla very small fraction of total populstion (except in Tealy and the Low ‘Countries, and smaller than twas in many non-European areas (de Vries, 1984; Appadorsi, 1896; Habib, 1963), ‘There were strong signs even of economic contracto instead of growth (Laper and Miskimin, 1961-62; C. ‘Smith, 1967). For Hodgett (1972: 212), the 200 year per ‘9d 1520-1520 was a period of downturn in the [Buropean] ‘sconomy asa whole. The Italian Renaissance, n economic term, dd not raise the Italian centers above the level of ‘many non-European centers, and it was notat all a toch nological revolution (Lopez, 1953; Thorndyke, 1943). All ‘ofthis needs tobe said by way ofseting the stage. Before 11492 thore was slow growth in Europe, perhaps even a dowen-turn, and certainly no revolution, ‘Within afew decades after 1482, the rate of growth and change speeded up dramatically, and Europe entered a period ofrapid development. Thereis no dispute about this fact, which is Geen in the known statistis relating to the 6thcentury prie revolution, urban growth, and much ‘more beside Braudel, 1967; de Vries, 1964: Fisher, 1983). Whats disputableisthe causal connection between these ‘explosive changos and the beginnings of economic exploits tion in America (and, significant but secondary, in fica fand Asia). There is agreement that the effect was pro- found, But did it truly generate qualitative transforma- tion in Europe's economy? Or did it merely modify a process already well underway? This question cannot be ‘Bnswered unless we break ou of the European historial tunnel and look st what was going on ia the Americas, ‘Asiacand Affi beteon 1492 and 1688, the symbole date for Europe's bourgenis revolution. Colonialism and Capitalism in the Sixteenth, and Seventeenth Centuries ‘nerprise n the Americas waa from the start. a mat ter of capital accumulation: of profit. No matter if some feudal traits were incorporated inlogal and land:-grasti- ng systems in the Americas, and iF the Iberian govern: ‘ents took a substantial share ofthe profits, The goa. of fall European groups involved in the enterprise was to ‘make maney. The leading group, almost everywhere, was th Buropean protocepitaliet class, not only merchante but falso industrialists and profi-orinted landlords, not only Thoriam but alo Tealian, Dutch, Baglish, Pench, German, ‘Austrian, and so on, This class community took the prof it from colonial enterprise and invested part of it in Europe, buying land and developing commercial agricul ture, developingindustres (like shipbuilding, sar ein- Ing, ce) associated with the growing colonial entorpr'se, developing profitable businessea in spheres of actisity ‘whieh gorved the growing European economy, building ‘urban structures, and the lke. Part of the profit was ploughed back into other colonial risk enterprise, in ‘America and in the new trading enterprises in southern Asa, Africa, and Une Levant. The most subtle aspect ofthe process was the simple inerease in purchases of el sortsbby merchants in all markets, European and extra European, growing out ofthe fact that these merchants now hed ineredible amounts of preious metals oF metal ‘based money’ at their command and ould ofer previous ly unheard-of prices, Perhaps half ofthe gold and silver Drought back from the Americas in the 16th century was contraband, hence available directly for ¢hiskkind of enter prise, but the remainder, after passing through the great Customs-houses, quickly entered circulation as the Terians paid out gold and clver for gooda and services. ‘Colonial enterprise n the 16th century prodaced exp tolina number of ways. One was gold and silver mining. ‘second was plantation agriceleuce, principally in Brasil ‘A third was the trade with Asiain spees, loth, and much ‘more. A fourth element was the profit returned to roropean houses from 4 variety of productive snd com: mercial enterprises in the Amerias, including profit on production for local usein Mesice, Peru, ete, profit on sale of goods imported from Europe, profit on many secondary texports from the Americas (leather, dyestufl, ete), prof {en land sales in the Americas, profit retarned to Europe by families and corporations holding land-grant in Mexico and othor areas. A fifth was slaving. Notice that mast of this is normal capital cumulation; ite of eis the mys- terious thing called ‘primitive accumulation’ (Marxists ‘eed to notice that surplus value from wage labour, not {to mention foreed labour, was involved inal of this, and that much ofit was value from production, not simpy fom trade.) Accumulation from these sources was massive Precious Metals, We noticefire the export of gold and. silver from the Western Hemisphere and its insertion ‘within the eixeuits ofan Old World hemispheric market ‘economy in which gold and silver already provide the com- ‘mon measure of value, directly or indirectly, in almast all ‘markets. The flow of procious metals began immediataly after the discovery of Americe, and by 1640 at least 180 tons of gold and 17,000 tons of silver are known to have reached Burope (BJ. Hamilton, 1984; Brading and Cross, 1972;Chaunu and Chaunu, 1966) —thereal figures must ‘be double or triple these amounts, since records wore poor for some areas and periods and since contraband was ‘immensely important. (Céspedes, 1974, Cross, 1983; MeAlister, 1984), Additional quantities of gold came from colonial activities in West and East Afrien (Magalhses: Godino, 1969) Ta the period 1561-1580 about 85% of the entire world's production of ilver came fom the Americas. ‘The simple quantity of gold end silver in cieulation in the Eastern Hemisphere economy as @ whole was pro- foundly affected: hemispheric silver stock may have been tripled and gold stack increased by 20% during the course ofthe lth century as # result of American ballon (Viens ‘Vives, 1969: 325), and the fat that much of the proxi ing stock must have been frozen in uses not perm director indirect conversion to money suggosts tome that ‘American bullion may have aa much as doubled the gold fand silver baso of money supply for the Eastern Hemisphere as a whole. Un Burope, the circulation of ‘metal coins increased eight-o ten-fold in the courso ofthe century: Vilar, 1976: 77, This process mast be seen in per- spective: itis money flowing constantly and in massive ‘amounts through Europe and from Brirope to Asia and ‘Africa (Atwell, 1982; Hasan, 1960), constantly replenished at the entry points (Seville, Antwerp, Gena, ete.) with ‘more American supplies, and constantly permitting those tbo hold eto offer better prices for all goods, a well as Tsbour and land, in all market, chan anyone elsohad ever been able to offer in prior times ‘The importance of thse ows of gold and silver is gen erally underestimated, mainly for threo reasons (apart from implicit difusionism) First, the proess i seen some- how as purely primitive aceamulation. But the metals were mined by workers and transported by workers, the ‘enterprise overall involved risk capital and all ofthe other familiar traits ofthe sorts of protocapitalist productive tenterprises which were characteristic that me hat it‘was partly state-controlled docs not alter this argument, ‘or does the fact that some of the labour was unfree), and ‘very major economic and socal systems were built around the mines themselves in Mexico, Pers, and other parts of ‘America. Secondly, the argument that precious metal flows significantly affected the European economy is ds ‘mlssed as monetarsrn The error in this charge is a fil. ‘re see the 16th-eontury economy in a geographical and socal context (and imputing toi the liquidity ofexchange and the relative lak of spatial frietion which charactor- {nes the capitalist economy of our own time: see Fisher, 1980), Two facts hore are basic. On the one hand, the pos session of precious metals was highly localized in space, European merchants, as «community, obtained it and set it in motion outward, tovard rural Europe and toward ‘markets outside of Purope. Oa the other hand, the supply ‘precious metals was essentially continuous, so that the ‘advantage held by Eoropean protocaptalists in terms of prices they could offer for commodities labour, and land Was persistently higher than the prices which cmpetitors ‘anywhere could offer. So the provoapitalist community very steadily undermined the competition in markets across the Eastern Hemisphere, within Europe and with ‘out, eventually gaining control of most international Seabornetradein most ofthe mercantile-maritime centers from Sofa to Calicut to Malacen, The penetration ofthese markets, the acquisition of trading bases, and the control fof afew amall but important producing areas (ike the Moluccas), was not a matter of European rationality or venturesomeness, but rather reflected the availability to Europeans of American gold and silver, transshipped through Lisbon, Acapuleo, te. A third sort of doubt about the importance of American gold and silver is associated with the critique of. Hamilton's classic theory that the precious metal supply produced un imbalance between fac: tore of production in the Buropean economy, produced thereby a windfall of profits, and thus in effect destab [sed the economy snd moved it toward capital (Hamilton, 1928). Hamilton was one ofthe few economic Ihstorians to perceive that American gold and silver was ‘a crucial, central eause of change in Hurope, although he ‘was partly wrong about the mechanisms which brought bout this change. The metals did not transform the ee tomy in-a direct way. Rather thy enriched the protocp italist class and thereby gave it the power to immensely fccelerate the transformation which was already uncor- ‘way —not only in Burope — toward capitalism asa pelt fecal and social system, and to prevent non-European capitalists from sharing in the process. American bullion hhastened the riso of capitalism and was erucal in the ‘roces by which it became centrated in Europe Plantations. The impact ofthe slave plantation sy tem on Europe's economy was felt mainly in the 17th en tury and thereafter. Bat part of the general undervalsing (ofthe significance af early eolonalism isa tendency not to notie thatthe plantation was of immense importance even in the 16th century. Moreover, the early history of the Atlantic sugar plantation economy gives a revesing picture of the way in which the protocpitalist colonial fconomy was eroding the feudal economy Sugar planting ‘was not a new enterprise, sugar (contrary to myth) was ‘ot a rare commodity, and (also eontrary to myth) sugar planting was not an nsiifleant economic eurisity atthe Fringe of capitalist development. Commercial and feudal ceane sugar production was found. throughout the Mediterranean in the 16th century (Galloway, 1689; Deerr, 1949-50; if eane sugar was nolan important com- ‘modity in northern Europe this was because of ts pce, ‘as against that of sweeteners ke honey. Buropeans frst ‘moved the commercial plantation xystem oul into the ‘ewly-settled Atlantic islands from Madeira to So Tomé {and then vastly expanded production Ube Americas. Sut ‘Hhroughout the T6th centry the new plantations merely supplanted the older Mediverrancan sugar produ regions; tatal production for the Europe-Mediterransan‘market did not riso until later (Deer, 1948-50, vl. 1). This Was capitalist production displacing feudal production, "using the twin advantages of colonialism: empty land and cheap Iabour. No other industry was as significant asthe plantation system fr the rise ofeapitalism before the 19th century. Tn 1600 Brasil exported about $0,000 tons of sugar with ‘a gross sae value of £2, 000,000 Simonsen, 1944; Furtado, 1965). This is about double the tatal value ofall exports from England wo al ofthe world in that year Minchinton, 1869) Iwill be recalled Unat British exports in that pei ‘od, principally of wool, are sometimes considered paradig: rat fr the awakening, indeed the ise of early-medern Burope. Also in 1600, per capita earnings from sugar in Brazil for al of the population other Uhan Tadians, was bout equal to per eapita income in Britain later in that century (Edel, 1969). The rate of accumulation in the Brazilian plantation industry was so high at the end of he 16th century that it was able to gonerate enough capital to finance a doubling of its capecity every two years (Furtado, 1963), Eariyin the 17theontury, the Dutch pro tocepitalist community (which was heavily involved inthe Brazilian sugar enterprite), estimated that anal profit rates in the industry were 56%, totalling early £000,000. ‘The rae of profit was higher still atthe close ofthe 16th century, when production costs, including the cost of pur- ‘hasing slaves, amounted to only one-ith of income from ‘sugur sales (Furtado, 1963). These statistic should he seen against the background of an industry which was not ‘responding to some novel demand for some novel product in an already-rsing Burope, but was merely Gin essence) undercutting the precapitalist Mediterranean suger pro ducers of Spain taly, Bgypt te Sugar is ofcourse the conterpice ofthe plantation sys- tem down tothe lave 18th century. But other kinds ofl ‘ial production, mainly bt not only agricultural, and fully fas close to eaptalis as was the Branlian plantation sys- tem, were of some significance even before the end ofthe 16th century. There was for instance some direct produc tion ofspice in the Moluceas and some European involve ‘ment with Indian merchant eapitalistsin the organization ‘ot South Indian pepper production (Des Gupta, 1967; Raychauahur, 1962). Dyes, tobacco, and other commer cially valuable products were flowing from America to Bhrope. A very large agricultural economy existed in parts of America supplying fod, fiber, leather, ete, to the min- ing and other settlements. Immediately after 1492 (or before?) West Buropesn fishermen and whelors developed fan immense industry in Newfoundland and elaewhere on the North American coast ‘Toll ofthis mast be added the profits from ather esl nial und semi-colonial tivities in the Eastorn Hemisphere, The slave trade was highly profitable even in the 16th century. Buropean merchant capitalists of all nations profited greatly from the Lisbon trade with Asia fand Eset Afriea in textiles and particularly spices (the ‘Asian spices carried by the Portuguese and sold mainly rough Antwerp didnot replace the traditional “Mediterranean flow but rather added to it, hence provi ing a novel and important source of accumulation). There ‘was, in addition, considerable profit from the within-Asia {rade resulting from the domination of Tongrdistance ‘oeanie trade in East Africa, India and Southeast Asia bby Portugal (with participation also hy Spain and later Holland), Broadly speaking, however, accumulation derv- ing from Westera-HHemisphere colonial activities far out weighed that from Eastern activities, colonial and emi-colonial, in the 16th century. Overall, both the uan- titative signiieance, in that century of production and fradein colonial and semi-colonal areas andthe immense profitability of the enterprise, chat is, the rapid capital faceumulation which i fostered directly and (in Europe) Indirectly, add up toa significant vector force easily able tt iitite the process of transformation in Bxrope Effects. There seem tobe two particularly good waysto assess the real significance forthe vise of eapitalism of 16th century colonial production in Amerion and some other areas alongwith trading, pracy, and the like, in Asia ‘and Africa. One way is to trace the direct and indirect ‘effects of colonialism on European socity, looking for ‘movements of gods and capital, tracing labour ows into industries and regions stimlaled or erested by colonial enterprise, looking at the way urbanization flourished in those itis which were engaged in colonial (and more gen erally extra-European) enterprise or were closely con nected to it and tho like. This process overall would then be examined in relation to the tality of changes which vere taking place in Esropein that century, to determine whether, in Europe itself, changes clearly resulting from thedirec and indirect impact ofextra European aeivities were the prime movers for economic and social change, This task still remains undone, The second way’ it attempt to arrive at a global esleulation of the amount of labour {free and unfree) thst was employed in European enterprises in America, Africa, and Asia, along with the ‘amount of labour in Buropoitself which was employed in fctivities derived from extra-Buropean enterprise, and then to look at these quantities in relation tothe total labour market in Europe for etonomie aetivites that were connected tothe rise of capitalism. This task has notbeen done either; indeed, as far as Tow little research has ‘been done on 16th-century labour forees and labour mar Kets in American setlemen‘s or indeed in Burp. So the proposition which I am arguing here, concerning the sig- hifieanco of T6th century colonialism (and related extra European activities) forthe rise of eaptaliem in Europe, perhaps cannot be tosted as yet Stil, there are very suggestive indications, Some of these have boon mentioned already: matters of assessing ‘the quantities and values ofcolenial exports to Europe, We ‘ean alto spoculate about labour. One approach is through population. The population of Spain and Portugal in the ‘mid-6th eontury may have been about nine milion (De ‘Vries, 1984), Estimates of 6th-contury populations for the ‘Americas vary widely and there much controversy about population levels and ratesof decline (see Denevan, 1976), but forthe present, highly speculative, and essentially ‘methodological, argument, we ean ignore the controver ios and play with global estimates. The population of ‘Mexico at mideeatury may have been around six million, ‘population that was undergoing continuous delin fom Its preconquest level of perhaps 30 million down to one tenth ofthat figure (or perhaps los) in 1600 (Borah and Cook, 1972: 89). Populations in the Andean regio involved in mineral and textile production for the Spaniards may (speculating) have totalled five milion in ‘the late 16th century. Perhaps we ean ad an additional ‘bo million for the popwlation of other parts of Tbero ‘America Which wore within rogions of Buropean eontral ‘and presumably involved, more or lea, inthe Buropean: dominated economy. Let us, then, use a bll-park estimate ‘of 13 milion for the American population that was poten tally vielding surplus value to Europeans in the mid-to late 16th century. The population seems larger than Thera’. Granted, the comparison should be made with « larger part of Burope, certainly including the Low ‘Countries, which were intimately involved inthe exploits: tion of America (and Asia) at this period, along with parts ‘oftaly and other countries, Assume then a relevant pop ‘lation of 20 millon for Burope as against 13 milion for ‘America, [see no good resson to argue that the European populations were more centrally involved in the rise of cap. Ktalim than the American populations — that is, the 13 nillion people who we assume were in European domi- nated regions. It is likely that the proportion of the American population which was engaged in labour for Europeans, as wage work, as foreod labour including slave labour, and as the labour of farmers delivering goods at tribute or rent in kind, was no lower than the propertion tflberian people engaged in laboar for commercialized ace tore ofthe Spanish and Portuguese economy. The level ofexploitation for Indian labour must have been much igh- tr than that for Iberian labour because portions of the Indian labour free were worked literally to death inthis period (Newsom, 1985) — dopopulation was due in part to foreed labour — and ao the capital generated by each worker was very probably higher than that generated by ‘1 Buropean worker. (We need to remind ourselves again that we are dealing with a pre-industrial, basically ‘medieval economy in Burope. Werkers there didnot have higher productivity due to larger eaptal-labour ratios or higher technology.) We must add next the fet that the capital accumulated from the labour of Americans went directly to the economie sectors in Europe which were building capitalism, whoreas most workers und peasants in Burope were sil connected ta basically medieval sec- tors of the economy. Then we must add the labour of Africans and Asians. And finally, we must take into account the European workers, in Europe and elsewhere, ‘whose labour was part of or ied to the extra European economy. By this, adrttedly speculative, reasoning, tree tnd unfree workers n the colonial economy ofthe late 16th tentury were providing es much or mare surplus valve and faecumulated capital for Bropean protocapitaliem than were the workers of Burope ital. [Little is known about the American workforce in the 16th century, but, again, some speculations are posible. [Las Casas asserted that three million or more Indians had ‘een enslaved by the Spaniards in Middle America dur ing the first half ofthe 16th century, and this figure, onee Copr ef pp 100 to " here Cambie Ure sey ec Response to Comments by Amin, Dodgshon, Frank, and Palan J.M. Blaut Ihave few disagreements with Amin and Frank, so I vill comment frst on the Dodgshon and Palan eitiques Dodgshon ‘Dadgshon stata by asserting that I wrongly charge that historians argue consistently, teleologically, that Europe Jhas always and necessarily ben the most advanced civi- zation. Moat of the historians whom I dscassin the intro- SAAR Becanar it 4,124, 15, 6,70, seria =e (CaP st 0, 200105, 113,14 nis arr ‘ene pri tari com- er cempetan629 ‘Chane 94 (Chane H&P, 20 Coe Ho, 29 hice, 23,24 Chin 138 9 28 266, ‘oii 9,14 38 amie Gewese nen cohen 208, 6, 65, 208, ‘oneraliarin 22 ontotariem,124 arbre 812 Carl seeping too Gres i, 39 Bis Gupta, a. 25.48, ae Ve 95,3745, tepoanions6 evelopment even a0 sneer, ‘inn cso, 22,28, 12, iocnin, Breen, 408, ea 121 ein, 66 ‘Bo aia companig, 51 Bait gp 260,74 ‘olin 88 vin 23,24 ‘edogenous thors, 88 ‘Bape: meior 2 ‘amily, Buropean 39,21, 9, 710, Find 313 eitPrat nc er 884 ei te nit Stee Stee eS (HES an Frise eater ‘Tene, 16 18.20,65,86,97,66,0, | MeXeil Ws onan 18 21 _gvagraphy, xi, 18, 112 Judeo-Christian teleology, 18 | pees Peet, R114 ere chat ete i geen 74.8 Ghalonn, case eA le sscpecen ts ‘eee Senet, 28, ere, Di Imray peopel sor 22 Ber. 3,40 Sees Exava cil asanet Ra Fr a 9 tae ete acne a eee ier 33 Bink 38 ttl Ocgraphy i ome 342 cnet sehen cr, toe ier set pena titan are oan se atta, 787 iia 1 te, ct Keeani as Fem son ier teks ey eS ao Ticats 3 46,10 wee eae toa 2 toe Eoin | Seis RTs, tears Benita nn Soma oe ah 28 . ee etc lin. 38 Sas Son oan 06 tn Sst 43, Maghr, 990 | A ean so Saisie ‘naive, 19 Sibaingn 7 23 Ninh Amory, 28 omsacanee, 98 faa rey Seber tea wy | iia Sethi ptin ne Sueno ee ee Ireland, ix 108, 110 | Ossian, ix zoretationtsh boargeels, 116 tn 118 moire sien ae Tbe 2,25 er 2,65,66,0610, | onary, 29, ote. 2