ogst100008_Zadakbar 22/07/11 17:35 Page 521

Oil & Gas Science and Technology – Rev. IFP Energies nouvelles, Vol. 66 (2011), No. 3, pp. 521-530
Copyright © 2011, IFP Energies nouvelles
DOI: 10.2516/ogst/2010027

Risk Analysis of Flare Flame-out Condition

in a Gas Process Facility
O. Zadakbar1*, R. Abbassi1, F. Khan1, K. Karimpour2, M. Golshani2 and A. Vatani3
1 Faculty of Engineering & Applied Science, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John’s, NL, A1B 3X5 - Canada
2 Nargan Consulting Engineers, Tehran - Iran
3 Institute of Petroleum Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, University of Tehran, Tehran - Iran
e-mail: o.zadakbar@mun.ca - rabbassi@mun.ca - fikhan@mun.ca - k.karimpour@nargan.com - m.golshani@nargan.com - avatani@ut.ac.ir

* Corresponding author

Résumé — Analyse des risques des conditions d’extinction de torche au sein d’une installation de
traitement de gaz — Le torchage est un procédé courant d’élimination des gaz résiduaires inflammables
dans les industries de traitement. L’extinction de la torche (par décollage ou soufflage de flamme)
provoque souvent une émission de vapeurs toxiques. Ces gaz toxiques libérés peuvent présenter des
effets dangereux sur le milieu environnant. Pour étudier l’effet d’une exposition par inhalation de ces gaz
toxiques sur la santé, cet article croise les quatre étapes de la démarche de l’EPA (Environmental
Protection Agency, Agence de protection de l’environnement) avec les données d’exploitation afin de
quantifier le risque sanitaire cancérologique et non cancérologique. Dans le cadre de l’estimation
d’exposition, une modélisation de dispersion des gaz utilisant AERMOD et UDM-PHAST est évaluée
dans deux configurations différentes de torchage normal et d’extinction de torche à l’occasion de
conditions climatiques particulières dans la région du Khangiran. L’article propose également des
recommandations destinées à éviter les conditions d’une extinction de flamme de torche.

Abstract — Risk Analysis of Flare Flame-out Condition in a Gas Process Facility — Flaring is a
common method of disposal of flammable waste gases in the downstream industries. Flare flame out
(flame lift-off or blow-outs) often occurs causing toxic vapors to discharge. The toxic gases released
may have hazardous effects on the surrounding environment. To study the effect of inhalation
exposure of these toxic gases on human health, the four steps of the EPA (Environmental Protection
Agency) framework with the field data to quantify the cancer and non-cancer health risks are
integrated in this paper. As a part of exposure assessment, gas dispersion modeling using AERMOD
and UDM-PHAST is applied in two different conditions of normal flaring and flare flame out during
a particular climate condition in Khangiran region. Recommendations to avoid flare flame out
conditions are also presented here.
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522 Oil & Gas Science and Technology – Rev. IFP Energies nouvelles, Vol. 66 (2011), No. 3

INTRODUCTION conventional flare will never operate above 95% of

Refinery flares are used for the safe disposal of flammable
waste gases from emergency process upsets as well as for
start-up, shut-down and turnaround operations. Flaring could
release large quantities of SO2 and CO into the atmosphere.
The magnitude of emissions resulted from flaring process in
Iran is not clear, as many refineries do not have flare moni-
toring and emissions recording procedures in place. Thus,
there is a concern about the potential underestimation of
reported emissions released during flaring processes [1].
In the downwind plume of sour gas flares, SO2 and H2S
exist, in addition to a wide spectrum of sulfur-containing
chemicals and the range of unburned hydrocarbons. An
annual exposure greater than 4 μg/m3 H2S is associated with
spontaneous abortion in humans and animals [2]. The odor
threshold of H2S is approximately 7 μg/m3, which is less than
the critical concentration. An acceptable daily intake of
1.8 μg/m3 H2S has been presented [3].
Combustion efficiency of a flare is severely affected by
wind. Regardless of the regulatory stricture imposed, a
efficiency except in wind speed of about less than 2 kmph
[4]. Reduced combustion efficiency must be regarded possi-
ble in any operation with flaring. Simultaneous low combus-
tion efficiency causes release of unburned gas. That
includes hydrogen sulfide with sour gas flares.
Public health concerns about gas flaring have existed for
many years in different regions near natural gas facilities.
Some of these concerns are related to potential long term
cumulative health effects on humans from exposure to haz-
ardous chemical concentrations released during incomplete
combustion of flare gases [5]. Environmental Risk Assessment
(ERA) evaluates the nature and likelihood of the adverse
effects on human health and ecosystems due to the environ-
mental changes [6]. Implementing the four steps of EPA
(Environmental Protection Agency) framework of risk
assessment process with chemical concentrations during flare
flame out and normal flaring demonstrated in Figure 1, lead
to evaluate the effects of these concentrations emitted due to
the flare gases on the human health [7].

Hazard identification
– Gathering and analyzing of data
in the flare flameout
– Identifying Chemical of Potential
Concern (CPC) in these data

Exposure Assessment Dose-Response Assessment

– Identifying different potential – Collecting qualitative and
exposure pathways for flare quantitative toxicity information
emissions – Determining appropriate
– Estimating contaminant intakes toxicity values
for pathways
– Identifying exposed populations
on the flare emissions pathway

Risk characterization
– Characterizing potential for
adverse effects to occur
1. Estimating cancer risk
2. Estimating non-cancer
hazard quotients
– Summarizing risk information

Figure 1
ERA methodology for evaluating the human health risk of the flare emissions.
ogst100008_Zadakbar 22/07/11 17:35 Page 523
O Zadakbar et al. / Risk Analysis of Flare Flame-out Condition in a Gas Process Facility
Risk-based evaluation of chemical concentrations during
normal flaring as well as flare flame out via a case study in
the Khangiran gas process facility (Sarakhs-Iran) is consid-
ered in this paper. Recommendations for precluding the
flame out conditions are also presented.
1 ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT
1.1 Site Specification
The Shahid Hashemi-Nejad (Khangiran) natural gas process
facility is one of the most important gas process facilities,
located in northeastern Iran in an open inhabitable range land,
semi arid and dusty with windblown sand (Fig. 2). The feed
gas is supplied from the Mozdouran gas fields. This gas
process facility consists of 5 sour gas treating unit, 3 dehydra-
tion units, 3 sulfur recovery units, 2 distillation units, 2 stabi-
lizer units and 14 additional units related to other services [8].
The wind direction in the Khangiran vicinity is from
northwest to southeast. This condition occurs in the Khangiran
gas process facility for 90% of a year. For the remainder of
the year, the wind direction changes, and the wind blows from
southeast to northwest [10]. This means that for about 10% of
the year, personnel are in danger of inhaling more toxic
gases. During this period, the personnel are exposed to an
unacceptable amount of toxic gases which could affect their
health. Wind roses were used to give a succinct view of how
wind speed and direction are typically distributed and to
Figure 2
Khangiran gas process facility and surrounding areas [9].
523
determine the direction of the prevailing wind in the vicinity
of Khangiran. During 10% of the year, the wind direction is
160 degrees [10], which causes the wind to carry toxic gases
to the personnel dormitory. This dormitory is located 1050
meters away from the flare stack and it is 200 meters in
length. The release time was considered to be 1 h.
1.2 Hazard Identification
The toxic gases considered during the release time (1 h) has
been studied and calculated for two flaring conditions:
– Flare flame out, in which the concern gas is H2S;
– Normal flaring, in which the concern gas is SO2.
H2S (Hydrogen Sulfide) is an extremely hazardous and
toxic compound. H2S is colorless and flammable which can
be identified by its characteristic rotten egg odor. Low con-
centrations of 20-150 ppm H2S cause irritation of the eyes,
slightly higher concentrations may cause irritation of the
upper respiratory tract, and if exposure is prolonged, pul-
monary edema may result. The irritant action has been
explained on the basis that H2S combines with the alkali pre-
sent in moist surface tissues to form sodium sulfide, a caustic
[11]. As the concentration approaches 100 ppm, odor
becomes impressible due to olfactory fatigue. At these levels,
the gas disrupts cellular respiration and may cause profound
respiratory depression as well as cardiac dysrhythmias [12].
A high concentration of 200 ppm is extremely hazardous and
can immediately be life threatening [13]. Inhalation of
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524 Oil & Gas Science and Technology – Rev. IFP Energies nouvelles, Vol. 66 (2011), No. 3
500 ppm for 30 minutes produces headache, dizziness,
excitement, staggering, and gastroenteric disorders, followed
in some cases by bronchitis or bronchial pneumonia.
Concentrations above 600 ppm can be fatal within 30 min-
utes through respiratory paralyses [14].
Furthermore, SO2 is a colorless gas which smells like
burnt matches. It can be oxidized to sulphur trioxide, which
in the presence of water vapor is readily transformed to sul-
phuric acid mist. SO2 with acute exposure of 5 ppm may
cause dryness of nose and throat and a miserable increase in
resistance to bronchial air flow. SO2 increasing up to 6 to
8 ppm causes a decrease in tidal respiration volume.
Sneezing, cough & eye irritation occur at 10 ppm. SO2 con-
centration of 20 ppm may cause Bronchospasm and 50 ppm
causes extreme discomfort, but no injury in less than a 30
minute exposure. Finally, inhalation of 1000 ppm more than
10 minutes causes death [15]. The Concentrations of H2S and
SO2 in two different conditions considered in this modeling
scenario can be seen in Table 1. It is assumed that H2S is
completely oxidized during normal flaring.
TABLE 1
Concentrations of H2S and SO2 in two different conditions
considered in this modeling scenario [8]
Conditions Concerns Release rate
Flare flame out H2S 100.63 kmole/h
Normal flaring SO2 100.63 kmole/h
1.3 Exposure Assessment
There has been a significant increase in awareness of envi-
ronmental issues in recent years and there is a great concern
among people over how their health is affected by environ-
mental factors. Exposure assessment includes estimating the
dose or concentration of the contaminant taken in by human
or ecological receptors per unit of time. Characterization of
the exposure setting, identification of exposure pathways and
quantification of exposure are different steps in exposure
assessment.
Gas dispersion modeling helps to predict the ground level
concentration and deposition of air pollutants. One of the key
elements of an effective dispersion modeling study is to
choose an appropriate tool to match the scale of impact and
complexity of a particular discharge [16].
In medium-complex atmospheric and topographical con-
ditions as existed in the vicinity of Khangiran, Gaussian-
plume models can be used to produce reliable results. In
more complex atmospheric and topographical conditions,
advanced puff or particle models may be required to achieve
a comparable degree of accuracy [16-17]. Furthermore,
plume models are usually applicable to near field within
10 km from the source calculations. It is not wise to assume
the meteorology will be the same greater than 10 km away as
at the source [17-18]. Since the distance between the speci-
fied location (personnel dormitory), which should be consid-
ered as the critical point during flare flame out, from the flare
stack is 1 km, the plume model would be the proper model in
comparison with puff model.
1.3.1 Contaminants Transport Modeling using AERMOD
There are some Gaussian plume dispersion models such as
AERMOD, ISCST3, AUSPLUME and CTDMPLUS.
AERMOD is the most common Gaussian plume dispersion
model which is recommended to use [16-18]. AERMOD was
developed in 1995, reviewed in 1998 and formally proposed
by the USEPA as a replacement for ISCST3 in 2000 [18-19].
AERMOD is a near field, steady state guideline model. It
uses boundary layer similarity theory to define turbulence
and dispersion coefficients as a continuum, rather than as a
discrete set of stability classes. Also, dispersion coefficients
for unstable conditions are non-Gaussian, to represent the
high concentrations that can be observed close to a stack
under convective conditions [20]. The modeling system con-
sists of AERMOD, as the main program, and AERMET and
AERMAP as two pre-processors. AERMET is used to calcu-
late boundary layer parameters. The meteorological interface
uses these parameters to generate profiles of the needed
meteorological variables. It passes all meteorological obser-
vations to AERMOD. In addition, AERMAP characterizes
the terrain, and generates receptor grids for the dispersion
model [16]. BREEZE® AERMOD [21] was used to model
gas dispersion during flare flame out in the present study.
This model is an air quality modeling system used to support
both regulatory and non-regulatory modeling requirements
worldwide.
1.3.2 Contaminants Transport Modeling
using UDM - PHAST
DNV PHAST [22] as a comprehensive hazard analysis
software tool is also used for gas dispersion modeling to
corroborate AERMOD results. PHAST uses a proprietary
dispersion model called the Unified Dispersion Model (UDM).
It was formulated as a similarity model in which concentra-
tion and other variables are assumed to have a predefined
profile. It also assumes generalized Gaussian profiles.
Entrainment and spreading are calculated from a numerical
(Runge-Kutta-Milne) solution to differential equations for
mass, momentum and heat transfer between the cloud and its
environment [23]. The UDM is formulated as an integral
model. A set of differential equations is integrated to give the
key variables as a function of distance or time. A number of
algebraic equations are then solved to obtain other variables
describing the dispersing cloud. The set of differential equa-
tions are basically the same for instantaneous and continuous
releases, although they are integrated with respect to time at
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O Zadakbar et al. / Risk Analysis of Flare Flame-out Condition in a Gas Process Facility 525

first and then with respect to distance. The same differential The inhalation rates were received from USEPA [24] for
equations apply throughout all phases of dispersion [22]. Gas two different conditions of slow and fast activity levels. For
dispersion modeling was done for the flare flame out as well the average condition, the workers spend 12 hours inside the
as normal flaring in this study with following considerations site, and in the worst case they may spend the entire day
which can be seen in Table 2 and Table 3 (the stack diameter within the site. Some of the workers are not at the site during
is 1.5 m and the stack length is 50 m). weekends, which is 96 days of the entire year. The average
exposure duration was estimated for 70 years for a lifetime
cancerous effect [24]. The dose received by a human due to
TABLE 2
inhalation of each metal (carcinogens intake) is calculated by
Compositions of flare stream in flare header [8] the following equation:
Compositions Mole flow (kmol/h) Molar percent (%) Cair * Inhalation rate * Exposure time * Frequency (1)
Intake =
Methane 1059.40 87.42 Body weight * Averaging time
Ethane 5.66 0.46

Propane 1.28 0.10 1.4 Dose-Response Assessment

I-Butane 0.37 0.03 Dose-response assessment is one of the steps of the risk
N-Butane 0.61 0.05 assessment process that connects the likelihood and severity
N-Pentane 0.34 0.02
of damage on human health from exposures to different lev-
els of risk agents. The reference concentration (RFC) is used
N-Hexane 0.27 0.02 to assess inhalation risks, where concentration refers to levels
Carbon dioxide 2.68 0.22 of contaminants in the air. For carcinogens, the slope of this
Hydrogen Sulfide 100.63 8.34
straight line between dose and response, called the Slope
Factor (SF) or cancer slope factor is used to estimate the risk
Nitrogen 40.50 3.34
at exposure levels. The RFCs and SFs used in this modeling
scenario are presented in Table 5.
TABLE 3
Ambient air characteristics [10] TABLE 5
Reference doses and carcinogenic slope factors for chemicals
Characteristics Value of concern [25-26]
Ambient temperature 25°C
Reference Carcinogenic
Ambient pressure 1 atm Chemical concentration Slope Factor
components
Day-time insolation Moderate (720 143 cal/m2s) (mg/m3) (mg/kg/day)-1
H2S 0.002 0.021
1.3.3 Exposure Factors SO2 0.078 ---

Following the chemical concentrations estimated based on

two models (AERMOD and PHAST), which have similar Previous investigations by NTP (National Toxicology
results, the exposure factors for two different scenarios (aver- Program), OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health
age and worst case conditions) were considered as shown in Administration), or ACGIH (American Conference of
Table 4. Governmental Industrial Hygienists) did not classify SO2
as a carcinogenic substance. Therefore, the non-carcinogenic
risk is only considered for SO2 in this scenario.
TABLE 4
Exposure factors in two different scenarios [24]
1.5 Risk Characterization
Factors Average Worst case

Inhalation rate (m3/h) 0.72 3.06

By integrating exposure assessment and toxicity assessment,
which are discussed previously, the probability of negative
Exposure time (h/event) 12 24 effects is assumed. As sufficient information is available
Exposure frequently (events/yr) 269 365 in the literatures to determine the toxicological benchmark
Exposure duration (yr) carcinogenic 70 70
(RFC and SF are available for the specific component),
the quotient method for calculating the final risk value is
Body (wt/kg) 70 70 used [27].
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526 Oil & Gas Science and Technology – Rev. IFP Energies nouvelles, Vol. 66 (2011), No. 3

The data from Table 5 are used to calculate the Hazard
Quotient (HQ) and the risk for carcinogens. The HQ is calcu-
lated from Equation (2), while the carcinogenic risk was
calculated from Equation (3).
HQ = Non-carcinogenic intake (mg/m3)/ (2)
Reference concentration (mg/m3)
Risk = Carcinogenic intake (mg/kg/day) ×
(3)
Cancer slope factor (mg/kg/day)-1
If the HQ is less than 1, it shows that the risk is slight and
little or no action is required. If the HQ is near 1, it shows
uncertainty in the risk estimate and additional data is
required. Finally, if the HQ is more than 1, it shows that the
risk is greater and regulatory action may be indicated [28]. A
single specified acceptable risk level, applicable for all car-
cinogens regulated by EPA is 10-6 (one death per million
people). Whenever the risk of carcinogenic substance exceeds
this value, it shows that the component has a carcinogenic
effect [27].
2 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Implementing the four steps of EPA framework, with the
contaminant concentrations released in two different conditions
of normal flaring and flare flame out (see Tab. 6) leads to the
following results.
TABLE 6
Application of AERMOD and UDM
for gas dispersion modeling in Khangiran
Model
Condition AERMOD UDM
Flare flame out H2S dispersion H2S dispersion
(impact area, restricted area)
Normal flaring - SO2 dispersion
2.1 Dispersion Modeling Results using AERMOD
Figure 3 illustrates gas dispersion due to flare flame out
condition in the study region. This figure shows that the
personnel dormitory is covered by a plume with a concentra-
tion of more than 500 ppm.
2.2 Dispersion Modeling Results using PHAST
To study the gas dispersion conditions, two areas have been
considered: the restricted and the impact area. The restricted
area is the area within the boundaries of the installation and
hence is under control of the company, either automatically
through appropriate systems or manually. The impact area is
the area that extended beyond the boundaries of the installa-
tion but is nevertheless affected permanently by normal

800 ppm
700 ppm
600 ppm
500 ppm
400 ppm
300 ppm
200 ppm

Figure 3
Gas dispersion due to flare flame out.
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O Zadakbar et al. / Risk Analysis of Flare Flame-out Condition in a Gas Process Facility
Figure 4
The maximum concentration of H2S within the restricted area.
operation of the facility or exceptionally by the consequences
of an emergency situation. The restricted area shall be always
contained inside the impacted area. The calculations have
been done for the worst flare gas stream containing 8 molar
percent H2S and hydrocarbon content of mostly methane.
The flare burning assumed to be complete, so the combustion
calculations have been done for the complete combustion
situations. The simulations have been done by PHAST
software. Results are shown in Figure 4-6.
The maximum concentration of H2S in the restricted area
has been illustrated in Figure 4. As shown in this figure, the
hazard distance for refinery employee inhalation is a circle
with a 1470 m radius. Therefore, in the particular climate
conditions in which the wind direction might be changed
toward the working area and dormitory, the flare flame out
would have the irremediable consequence and shall be con-
527
60 440.9 m2 @ 600 ppm
16 968.2 m2 @ 700 ppm
sidered. Also, the flare flame out in this condition would be
important for the public, as it is drawn in Figure 5. In Figure
6, the maximum concentration of SO2 dispersion for the
impact and the restricted area has been shown. As demon-
strated in this figure, the hazard distance for SO2 inhalation is
more than 12 000 m, which includes the entirety of the work-
ing area as well as the personnel dormitory. Therefore, the
continuous flaring in an emergency situation would endan-
ger the employee and it shall be considered during the
emergency response plan.
2.3 Risk Estimation
The concentrations of SO2 and H2S in two different condi-
tions of normal flaring and flare flame out are calculated, as
can be seen in Table 7.
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528 Oil & Gas Science and Technology – Rev. IFP Energies nouvelles, Vol. 66 (2011), No. 3

413 822 m2 @ 300 ppm

289 245 m2 @ 360 ppm
228 390 m2 @ 400 ppm
125 057 m2 @ 500 ppm

Figure 5
The maximum concentration of H2S within the impact area.

After finding the concentrations of these chemicals based
on two different conditions considered in this modeling sce-
nario, HQs are calculated to evaluate the hazardous effect of
SO2 in the normal flaring condition. As illustrated in Table 8,
the HQs in both areas (NF1 & NF2) are grater than the crite-
ria, which is 1. It shows the high non-carcinogenic risk of
inhaling SO2 in these areas.
Also, the values of HQs calculated based on the inhalation
of H2S in different areas (FFO1 to FFO4) in the flare flame
out condition are far above the criteria. This shows a great
risk of inhalation of H2S in the flare flame out condition.
Comparing the results of carcinogenic health risk with the
criteria (10-6) shows that, there is a great carcinogenic health
risk by inhaling H2S during flare flame out condition in both
scenarios (normal and worst case) considered in this study.
H2S release in the flare flame out condition can be so danger-
ous, that it could result in having the harmful effects on
human health. Therefore, the following recommendations
selected from previous investigations [29-31, 8] are neces-
sary to be considered for precluding the flare flame out and
limiting these hazardous conditions:
– Use of an automatic flame monitoring device to warn of
flameout conditions;
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O Zadakbar et al. / Risk Analysis of Flare Flame-out Condition in a Gas Process Facility 529

TABLE 7 Maximum concentration footprint

Concentrations of CPC in two different conditions considered 480
in this modeling scenario 430
380
Normal flaring 330
280
Area SO2 concentration (ppm) No. of employees in the area 230

Cloud width (m)

180
NF1* 2 200
130
NF2 5 220 80
30
Flare flame out -20
-70
Area H2S concentration (ppm) No. of employees in the area -120

FFO1** 300 170 -170

-220
FFO2 360 190 -270
-320
FFO3 400 200 -370
-420
FFO4 500 200
-470
* NF1: Normal Flaring area 1. ** FFO: Flare Flame Out area 1 -520

0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000
5500
6000
6500
7000
7500
8000
8500
9000
9500
10 000
10 500
11 000
11 500
12 000
12 500
13 000
Distance downwind (m)
TABLE 8
9.41214e+006 m2 @ 2 ppm 3.01958e+006 m2 @ 5 ppm
Calculating hazard quotients and cancer health risk for different scenario

Inhalation of SO2 in normal flaring

Figure 6
Area Hazard quotient
The maximum concentration of SO2 for impact and restricted
NF1 0.68e+2 areas.
NF2 1.71e+2
Inhalation of H2S in flare flame out
Hazard quotient Cancer health risk
Area Average Worst case refineries to recover flammable gases for reuse as fuel for
process heaters.
FFO1 2.12e+3 0.58 6.72
Zadakbar et al. proposed an FGRS for the Khangiran gas
FFO2 2.55e+5 0.69 8.07 facilities. It has a modular design and comprises three sepa-
FFO3 2.83e+5 0.77 8.95 rate and parallel trains capable of handling various gas loads
FFO4 3.54e+5 0.97 11.21
and compositions. Gas emissions will be decreased up to
70% by using such recovery system [1]. Thus it could be a
unique suggestion to reduce the hazardous consequences of
– Provision of a liquid Knock Out (KO) drum, which is flare flame out condition.
equipped with high level alarms to warn of an excessive
accumulation of liquid;
– Prevention of the introduction vapors into the system CONCLUSIONS
when it is not operational;
Flaring is the process of burning waste gases which creates
– Automate the ignition sequence using continuous pilot emissions such as sulfur oxides (SOx) and greenhouse gases
flame monitoring; (CO2 and CO). In certain conditions i.e. storm, heavy rain,
– Use direct electrical ignition of pilots with flame front strong wind, long serviced pilot, etc., flare may lose the
only as a back-up system to cover for electrical problems flame. Analysis of toxic effects of H2S during flare flame out
with inaccessible equipment; as well as analysis of toxic effects of SO2 which is released
– Use pilot burners specially adapted for high inert atmos- during normal flaring in Khangiran natural gas process facil-
pheres wherever high inert purge flows are likely; ity has been evaluated. Since there is a large amount of sour
– Use Flare Gas Recovery System (FGRS). Typically, the gas which is burnt off in the Khangiran, flare flame out, dur-
gas is recovered from a vent header feeding a flare. ing particular climate condition when wind blows from
Depending on flare gas composition, the recovered gas southeast to northwest, could have fatal effects on employees
may be recycled back into the process for its material inside the site and dormitory. Environmental Risk Assessment
value or used as fuel gas. FGRS is commonly used in is used as a tool to evaluate the hazardous effect of toxic
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530 Oil & Gas Science and Technology – Rev. IFP Energies nouvelles, Vol. 66 (2011), No. 3
gases on human health. The fate and transport of the contam-
inants (H2S and SO2) are modeled using AERMOD and
UDM. In medium-complex atmospheric and topographical
conditions, with relatively simple effects, as may be seen in
vicinity of Khangiran, Gaussian-plume models can produce
reliable results. Comparing the results of cancer and non-can-
cer risk values with the existing guidelines shows that the
employees are at risk of inhaling carcinogenic and non-car-
cinogenic contaminants. Both values of carcinogenic and
non-carcinogenic risk are much greater whenever the flare
flame out condition happens. Moreover, living with such a
condition for a long time leads to death. Therefore, evaluat-
ing the flare conditions regularly and assessing alternatives to
preclude the flare flame out is required.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support of
Qatar National Research Foundation (QNRF) under NPRP
grant, and the material support of Nargan Consulting
Engineers.
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Final manuscript received in September 2010
Published online in January 2011