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Comité de rédaction
Raïa Zaïmova, rédacteur en chef, Institut d’Études balkaniques & Centre de Thracologie
(Институт за балканистика с Център по тракология – ИБЦТ, София)
Fikret Adanır, Université Sabancı (Sabancı Üniversitesi, Istanbul), Ivo Banac, Université
Yale (Yale University, Connecticut), Stanoje Bojanin, Institut d’Études byzantines, Belgrade
(Византолошки институт САНУ, Београд), Ulf Brunnbauer, Université de Ratisbonne
(Universität Regensburg), Nathalie Clayer, CNRS; EHESS, Paris, Nadia Danova, Académie
bulgare des Sciences (БАН, София), Raymond Detrez, Université de Gand (Universitеit
Gent), Rossitsa Gradeva, Institut d’Études balkaniques & Centre de Thracologie (ИБЦТ,
София), Francesco Guida, Université de Rome III (Università degli Studi di Roma Tre),
Wolfgang Höpken, Université de Leipzig (Universität Leipzig), Ivan Ilchev, Université
de Sofia (СУ „Св. Климент Охридски“), Pascalis Kitromilidis, Université d’Athènes
(Εθνικόν και Καποδιστριακόν Πανεπιστήμιον Αθηνών), Alexandre Kostov, Institut d’Études
balkaniques & Centre de Thracologie (ИБЦТ, София), Ana Lalaj, Centre d’Études
albanaises (Qendra e Studimeve Albanologjike, Tirana), Dobrinka Parusheva, Université
de Plovdiv; Institut d’Études balkaniques & Centre de Thracologie (ПУ „Паисий
Хилендарски“; ИБЦТ, София), Roumiana Preshlenova, Institut d’Études balkaniques &
Centre de Thracologie (ИБЦТ, София), Ljubodrag P. Ristic, Institut d’Études balkaniques,
Belgrade (Балканолошки институт САНУ, Београд), Liliana Simeonova, Institut
d’Études balkaniques & Centre de Thracologie (ИБЦТ, София), Elena Siupiur, Institut
d’Études Sud-Est Européennes, Bucarest (Institutul de Studii Sud-Est Europene, Academia
Română, Bucureşti), Vassilka Tăpkova-Zaïmova, Académie bulgare des Sciences (БАН,
София), Maria Todorova, Université de l’Illinois (University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign), Galina Valtchinova, Université de Toulouse II
Malamir Spassov, secrétaire scientifique du Comité de rédaction, Institut d’Études
balkaniques & Centre de Thracologie (ИБЦТ, София)
Мargarita Serafimova, coordinatrice de la revue, Institut d’Études balkaniques & Centre
de Thracologie (ИБЦТ, София)

ÉTUDES BALKANIQUES
• Revue trimestrielle éditée par l’Institut d’Études balkaniques &
Centre de Thracologie (Académie bulgare des Sciences)
• Adresse : 45, rue Moskovska, Sofia 1000, BULGARIE
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Mise en page : FABER
ISSN 0324-1645
© Institut d’Études balkaniques & Centre de Thracologie
2017
 ACADÉMIE BULGARE DES SCIENCES
INSTITUT D’ÉTUDES BALKANIQUES & CENTRE DE THRACOLOGIE

ÉTUDES BALKANIQUES
LІІІ / 4

Politics and Society in Bulgaria and Romania

in the 20th Century

Guest Editor Alexandre Kostov

Sofia ∙ 2017
Ce numéro de la revue est publié avec l’aide financière
du Fonds « Recherches scientifiques »
(Ministère de l’éducation et de la science de Bulgarie)

This issue is published with the financial support

of the National Research Fund
(Bulgarian Ministry of Education and Science)
 ISSN 0324 – 1645

ÉTUDES BALKANIQUES
Sofia ∙ 2017 ∙ LІІІ ◆ 4
ACADÉMIE BULGARE DES SCIENCES
INSTITUT D’ÉTUDES BALKANIQUES & CENTRE DE THRACOLOGIE

Sommaire

Alexandre KOSTOV, Editor’s Notes....................................................................... 593

Cristina DIAC, An Obvious Nonstarter: the Popular Front
in Eastern Europe.......................................................................................................595
Blagovest NJAGULOV, Loyalties under Strain: The Dobrudja “Mahzar”
of 1940...................................................................................................................... 650
Aneta MIHAYLOVA, The Paris Peace Conference of 1946
and the Redrafting of Borders in Europe: The Bitter Experience
of Two Former German Satellites........................................................................ 666
Dobrinka PARUSHEVA, Coping With Housing Crisis: Post-World Wars’
Experience in Bulgaria........................................................................................... 689
Alexandre KOSTOV, The Trade Relations of China with Bulgaria
and Romania in the East-European Context (1950 – 1978)......................... 705
Florin-Răzvan MIHAI, The Soviet Communist Party, Its Eastern Satellites
and the International Communist Movement. A Comparative Study
of the Bulgarian and Romanian Communist Parties (1964 – 1989)........... 729
Ana-Maria CĂTĂNUŞ, “Living in truth”. Narratives of Romanian Dissent
in the 1970s and 1980s.......................................................................................... 753
 ÉTUDES BALKANIQUES, LІІІ, 2017, 4

Dear readers,

I have the pleasure to introduce to you a special issue of our journal

“Etudes balkaniques”. Ever since its establishment more than half a century
ago, the Institute of Balkan Studies (merged with the Centre of Thracology
in 2010) has been developing research cooperation with similar institutions
in the region and beyond. The outcome of these activities is dozens of confer-
ences and joint publications.
Along with its traditional long-standing partners, the Institute of Balkan
Studies and Centre of Thracology has established new contacts. In 2015, a
team from the Institute started a research project with the National Institute
for the Study of Totalitarianism with the Romanian Academy on the topic
“Politics and Society in Bulgaria and Romania in the 20th century”.
This collaboration with the Romanian colleagues resulted in investiga-
tions in archives and libraries in both countries, work meetings and devel-
oping articles and studies. We had a problem, compiling this issue, because
we needed to choose only a few of all the interesting and important research
papers written. In the end, due to volume limitations, we selected the works
of seven authors.
Along with the project framework, reflected in its title, in most of the
articles, presented in this issue, other similarities can be found, related mostly
to the history of Bulgaria and Romania, together or separately, before or af-
ter 1945. Furthermore, their comparative nature is clearly visible – two-sided,
Balkan or Eastern-European. The topics are relatively equally distributed be-
tween domestic social and political aspects on one hand, and issues of foreign
policy and international relations, on the other. The authors have had freedom
of choice of the topic and its presentation and the texts, included in the issue,
reflect fully their personal view.
We hope that the articles will be of interest not only for the specialists, but
for a wider audience as well.
Enjoy reading!

Prof. Dr. Alexandre KOSTOV

Director of Institute of Balkan Studies & Centre of Thracology

593
 ÉTUDES BALKANIQUES, LІІІ, 2017, 4

THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY, ITS EASTERN SATELLITES

AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT.
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE BULGARIAN
AND ROMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTIES
(1964 – 1989)

Florin-Răzvan Mihai
National Institute for the Study of Totalitarianism, Romanian Academy

Abstract: After the end of the Second World War, in Romania and Bulgaria there
were communist regimes loyal to the Soviet Union and to the General Secretary of
the CPSU, Joseph Stalin, so that premises were in place for “relations of friendship
and cooperation between the two parties and nations” in the name of “the unity of
the socialist countries and of the communist movement.” And this was actually true
until the mid-1960s, when the policy of the Romanian Communist Party towards
the USSR, the hegemonic ruler of this political system, began to change. Without
ever getting into an open conflict, the Romanian-Bulgarian ties were affected by
the situation, and as Romania continued its autonomous evolution amid the
other satellite-countries, disputes became more and more common. This study
endeavours to discuss the manner in which the positioning of both countries within
the international communist movement and vis-à-vis the Soviet regime and its
decisions influenced the relationships between the two countries.
Keywords: International Relations, Hegemony оf USSR, Balkans Geopolitics,
International Communist Movement, Satellite-Countries in Communist Political
System

The two nations, though separated by the Danube, have gone through
the same stages of modern history together, answering the same challenges –
the proximity of powerful empires, the unfolding of devastating world wars,
the establishment of similar political regimes. After 1990, they were accepted
together into the Euro-Atlantic structures. Before the establishment of the
communist regime, the two countries experienced some territorial disputes
over the possession of Southern Dobrudja. In the aftermath of the Second
World War, when a definitive solution to these disputes had been found, Sofia

729
730 Florin-Răzvan Mihai

and Bucharest seemed to enjoy a peaceful relationship. On both sides there

were communist regimes loyal to the Soviet Union and to the General Secre-
tary of the CPSU, Joseph Stalin, so that premises were in place for “fraternal
relations”, “relations of friendship and cooperation between the two parties
and nations” in the name of “the unity of the socialist countries and of the
communist movement”. And this was actually true until the mid-1960s, when
the policy of the Romanian Workers Party (renamed the Romanian Commu-
nist Party – RCP after 1965) towards the USSR, the hegemonic ruler of this
political system, began to change. Without ever getting into an open conflict,
the Romanian-Bulgarian ties were affected by the situation, and as Romania
continued its autonomous evolution amid the other satellite-countries, dis-
putes became more and more common.
This study endeavours to discuss the manner in which the positioning of
Romania and Bulgaria within the international communist movement and
vis-à-vis the Soviet regime and its decisions influenced the relationships be-
tween the two countries. I chose this particular period because it encapsu-
lates the orientation changes registered by the communist regime in Romania.
These changes were evidently marked by a party document made public in
1964, in which the Romanian communists stated their neutrality in the Sino-
Soviet ideological conflict, an act of betrayal in the eyes of the parties loyal to
Moscow. I base my discussion of these issues on various sources, among which
several completely new documents from the RPC archives (the Foreign Rela-
tions Section) as well as online documents made available by archives deemed
essential for the research of the complex post-Cold War phenomena  – the
digital archive of the Wilson Center, Parallel History Project on Cooperative
Security (PHP), Open Society Archives (OSA) – Radio Free Europe (RFE)/
Radio Liberty (RL) Background Reports, the party press and specialised lit-
erature available in international languages. The use of the Bulgarian Commu-
nist Party archives and of books published in the Bulgarian language would
certainly have rendered the present study more accurate, but their thorough
consultation remains a priority for me, in view of a more extensive paper on
the relations between the two parties.
First, I propose to review the Romanian-Russian and Romanian-Bulgari-
an ties, so that we may understand, on the one hand, the manner in which the
pre-war period influenced the collective unconscious, and on the other, the
past and present perception, north and south of the Danube, of the Russian
influence in the Balkans. Then, my analysis narrows down to the main crises
 The Soviet Communist Party, its Eastern Satellites and ... 731

of the communist world, with a special emphasis on the responses given by the
Romanian and Bulgarian communist leaders to major ideological challenges
such as the China – USSR conflict, the reforms set in motion by Dubček in
Czechoslovakia and the military intervention which followed, and the Neue
Ostpolitik of West Germany. Finally, in an effort to comprehend certain de-
cisions made by Ceauşescu and Zhivkov, I attempt an interpretation of the
material offered by the archives.

Russia, Big Brother and Hegemon

An increasingly active Russian presence in the Balkans was felt begin-
ning with the 19th century, in the context of the Russo-Turkish Wars and as a
continuation of the expansion Peter the Great was dreaming of. This resulted
in more substantial ties between the Danube Principalities and Russia. Mis-
trust shadowed this collaboration from the very start, especially because of the
1812 annexation of Bessarabia – a territory inhabited by Romanians – which
was subsequently subjected to a merciless process of Russification. In the sec-
ond half of the 19th century, the already existing tensions were exacerbated by
the war against Ottoman Turkey, which the Romanian historiography calls
The War of Independence. The military and political decisions made by the
Russian Empire during the conflict, as well as the manner in which the great
powers subsequently behaved at San Stefano (Romania’s banishment from the
peace talks, the Russians’ intention to accept southern Bessarabia as compen-
sation for the damages suffered at the hand of the Turks, or the Russian Army
crossing the territories of the Romanian principalities) only served to deepen
the Russophobe feeling within the Romanian elite.
This mistrust assumed acute proportions during the First World War,
when Romania pointed the finger at Russia for the collapse of the Eastern
Front, and then at the Bolshevik authorities for signing the Treaty of Brest-
Litovsk and for a gesture which was to have serious long-term consequences
for the Romanian collective unconscious, namely the confiscation of the na-
tional treasure, taken to Petrograd for safekeeping. During the interwar pe-
riod, the revisionist stance of the Soviet state towards the merger of Bessarabia
and Romania, and the direct support it gave to the communist movement,
which pleaded for self-determination bordering on complete separation of
the territories seen as forcefully annexed by Romania in 1918 (Bessarabia,
Northern Bukovina and Transylvania) only served to stoke the Russophobe
732 Florin-Răzvan Mihai

attitude of the general population and of the political elite. A second occupa-
tion of Bessarabia by the Soviets, following the June 1940 ultimatum, which
then triggered an anti-Soviet military response on the part of Romania, a Nazi
Germany allied state, cut the last bridges between Romania and the Soviet
Union. At the end of the Second World War, which nevertheless found the
Romanians fighting alongside the Red Army troops – a consequence of the
reorientation occurred in 1944 – Romania lost a significant part of its pre-war
territory to its very allies. Backed by Moscow, the tiny Romanian communist
party seized the reins of power and the country was ushered into the Soviet
sphere of influence.
Until the end of the 1950s, notwithstanding the dissentions it had with
Tito’s Yugoslavia, Romania, led by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, counted as a
satellite-state loyal to the Soviet Union. After Stalin’s death, the political tur-
moil which engulfed the top echelons of the Soviet leadership and the fight
for power between the various factions convinced Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej
that a discrete distancing from the Kremlin was advisable. This policy, carried
out slowly and timidly, had several stages and a starting point in the requests
that the Soviet troops should leave Romania (1958), that the study of Russian
should be eliminated from the Romanian curriculum and institutions of cul-
ture, and that previously taboo issues should be approached (for instance, Karl
Marx’s volume “Notes on the Romanians – unpublished manuscripts”, which
had been kept secret by libraries and in which the author admitted to the
fact that Bessarabia belonged to Romania and criticised the territorial theft
of 1812)1. It all culminated in the declaration of independence adopted on
April 26th, 1964 (the official title of this document was Statement Regarding
the Position of the Romanian Workers Party on International Communist and
Workers’ Issues), which read “It is the exclusive right of every party to set its
own political line, its concrete objectives, and the ways and means to achieve
those objectives independently. [...] The relation of class forces in a particu-
lar country, the shifts in power, the fluctuating mood of the masses, and the
special internal and external conditions of a country are known by no one
more precisely and thoroughly than the Communist Party of the country
concerned”2. The document included several principles such as, the obser-
1 F.-R. Mihai, Amintiri despre ultima Consfătuire internaţională a partidelor comuniste
şi muncitoreşti, 5 – 17 iunie 1969, Arhivele Totalitarismului, 2010, N 1 – 2, p. 196 – 201.
2  Declarație cu privire la poziția Partidului Muncitoresc Român în problemele comu-

niste și muncitorești internaționale, Scînteia, 24 aprilie 1964.

 The Soviet Communist Party, its Eastern Satellites and ... 733

vance of one country’s national sovereignty and independence, the principle

of non-intervention in domestic issues, the mutual benefit and respect, the
recognition of national specificity, history, and the right of every party to
build its own path to communism.
It is common knowledge that there were disputes between Gheorghiu-
Dej and Nikita Khrushchev concerning the planned economic integration of
Eastern European countries, whose real aim was to consolidate Soviet political
influence in the region. The Romanian communists resisted this policy both
during the Gheorghiu-Dej period, and during that of his successor, Nicolae
Ceauşescu (General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party from 1965
to 1989)3.
By contrast, Bulgaria remained loyal to the Soviets until the fall of com-
munism, supporting them during the major crises of the international com-
munist and workers movement. Owing to this position of privilege, Bulgaria
was looked upon with deep suspicion by the other communist states4.
The Russian-Bulgarian friendship has some extremely complex aspects,
rooted in history, culture, religion, economy and politics5. In the collec-
tive memory of the Bulgarians, the role played by the Russians, the elder
brothers who helped them obtain their independence following the Treaty
of San Stefano, was an altogether positive one. Even if, towards the end of
the 19th century, Bulgarian society was painfully split between the Russo-
phobe and the Russophile factions – a state of affairs which covered mostly
Stambolov’s regency6  – the contribution made by the Russian liberals to
the drafting of the Tarnovo Constitution (1879) and the influence the Rus-
sophiles had in the country’s national assembly cannot be denied. This Rus-
sophile tendency was to be exhibited by the Bulgarian Communist Party as
3  On the role played by Ceauşescu in the 1960s, before he came to power, in rebutting
the Soviet economic integration theses, see my chapters „În centrul conflictelor din CAER”,
„Ceaușescu, vânător de agenți sovietici în România”, „Porumbelul păcii” și inamicul Moscov-
ei”, In: L. Betea, C. Diac, F.-R. Mihai, Ilarion Țin, Viața lui Ceaușescu, vol. 2, Fiul poporului,
Bucureşti, Adevărul Holding, 2012, p. 77 – 119.
4  S. Katsikas, Negotiating Diplomacy in the New Europe: Foreign Policy in Post-

Communist Bulgaria. London, I. B. Tauris, 2012, p. 30.

5  J. Elster, The Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism. Chicago, Universi-

ty of Chicago Press, 1996, p. 179.

6  See chapter Stambolov, the Russophiles, and the Russophobes in Bulgaria, p. 7 – 80,

In: Roumen Daskalov, Debating the Past. Modern Bulgarian History: From Stambolov to
Zhivkov. Budapest, New York, Central European University Press, 2011.
734 Florin-Răzvan Mihai

well, in the period between the two world wars7, being justified historically
by the political and military alliances of those in power between 1914 and
1918 and between 1940 and 1944, who cast Bulgaria in the unwanted role
of a defeated state.
The Sovietization process found a fertile ground in the cultural, ethnic
and linguistic affinities of the two nations. But the economic factor must not
be overlooked either, since the economic component weighed heavily in the
fruitful Bulgarian-Soviet cooperation. Before the Second World War broke
out, Bulgaria’s economy was one of the most backward in Europe8, so that
the cooperation with the Soviet Union undoubtedly brought about economic
progress. Compared to its neighbour north of the Danube, in Bulgaria the
communist party had a certain political influence, being the second most im-
portant in Eastern Europe (except the CPSU) after that in Czechoslovakia.
It also benefited from the influence and personal prestige of an outstanding
figure – Georgi Dimitrov, General Secretary of the Comintern between 1934
and 1943. From 1948 onwards, economic exchanges focused almost exclu-
sively on the states from the communist bloc, the foreign trade peak (92 %)
being reached in 19519. COMECON provided the framework for the Bul-
garian-Soviet cooperation, but the USSR was by far Bulgaria’s most important
economic partner; many of the local products were exclusively destined and
especially designed for the Soviet market10.
Politically speaking, the Bulgarian-Soviet friendship reached such lev-
els that, at the plenary congress of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian
Communist Party (CC of BCP) on December 4th, 1963, and on Zhivkov’s
initiative, the delegates discussed the question of the unification of the two
states, or, more accurately, of Bulgaria’s becoming one of the Soviet republics.
The background of this proposal was economic, as proved by the years 1964
and 1973. The Soviets supplied Bulgaria with electricity, oil, raw material, and
their support was crucial in branches of the Bulgarian economy such as metal-

7 S. Ashley, Bulgaria: Between Loyalty and Nationalism, p. 111, In: J. Eyal (ed.), The
Warsaw Pact and the Balkans. Moscow‘s Southern Flank. New York, Palgrave Macmillan,
1989.
8  A. Zwass, The Economies of Eastern Europe In a Time of Change. London and Bas-

ingstoke, The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1984, p. 64.

9  Ibid. p. 67.
10  A. Braun, Small-State Security in the Balkans. London and Basingstoke, MacMillan

Press Ltd, 1983, p. 204.

 The Soviet Communist Party, its Eastern Satellites and ... 735

lurgy, nuclear energy or the electronics industry11. Soviet technology was also
of the utmost importance, and only later, towards the end of the 1980s, with
the Japanese and West-German input, did Bulgaria turn to other suppliers
of modern technology. One instance of technological dependence is repre-
sented by the use of Soviet know-how in the field of nuclear energy. Romania,
though being in a similar position, opted for Western partners – Canada and
the United States of America.
Of course, there is also a geopolitical explanation for Bulgaria’s depend-
ence on its powerful ally. In Soviet eyes, the geostrategic status of Bulgaria
gained prominence after the Yugoslav leader, Tito, went on an independ-
ent, separate road, and the Greek communist movement was permanently
defeated. With another of the southern neighbours – Turkey – becoming a
NATO member-state, Bulgaria became one of the essential pillars supporting
the southern flank of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact – WP),
whose interests the Soviets had to protect.

The Age of Crises – China, West-Germany, Czechoslovakia

After reviewing the evolution of the ties between the two communist re-
gimes and Moscow, I shall now proceed to analyse the behaviour of the two
countries during the tense moments which marked the international commu-
nist movement.
In 1965, Nicolae Ceauşescu became the leading figure of the Romani-
an communist regime, at a moment when his Bulgarian counterpart, Todor
Zhivkov had already been in power for twelve years. From the very beginning,
he took up and carried on his predecessor’s policy of gradual distancing from
the Soviet Union. In almost all matters regarding the international commu-
nist and workers movement, as well as in their relations with the democratic
countries in the West and with the military, economic and financial institu-
tions to which these belonged (NATO, the Common Market etc.), the Ro-
manian communists adopted positions which were either very different from,
or the total opposite of those held by their partners in the communist bloc.

11  I. Baewa, The day before the crash – Bulgarian‑Soviet relations in the nineteen eight-
ies, Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, 2014, Vol XLVII, p. 7, 11:
http://semper.pl/studiazdziejowrosji/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Baewa.pdf.  –
24.09.2017; see also Ashley, Bulgaria: Between Loyalty and Nationalism, p. 114.
736 Florin-Răzvan Mihai

The 1960s witnessed the first tensions between Romania and the Soviet Un-
ion concerning the collaboration with West Germany, which had adopted the
new eastern policy (Neue Ostpolitik), one which sought to establish normal re-
lations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democrat-
ic Republic. As early as 1967, and on its initiative, Romania had established
diplomatic ties with the West Germans, a move which aroused protests from
the East Germans and from the other communist leaders in Europe. “The Ger-
man question”, they argued, must be conceived in the general context of col-
lective security. During a meeting with Ceauşescu şi Ion Gheorghe Maurer, the
Romanian Prime Minister, Zhivkov admitted that Bulgaria was vulnerable on
its southern flank and needed the military alliance with the other communist
states in order to feel protected, should Greece and Turkey launch an attack12.
That raised the more general question of the role of the WP and the issue
of state sovereignty. The principles formulated as early as 1964  – sovereign
equality and non-interference in domestic affairs – which the Romanian com-
munists defended more and more ardently and obstinately, led to deeper and
deeper dissensions within the Warsaw Pact. Bulgaria’s fear that West Germany
may be arming itself is also visible in the debates occasioned by the signing of a
treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. A week after the reunion
of the WP member-states, which took place in Sofia on March 6th and 7th,
196813, the Bulgarian leaders criticised the position of the Romanian side in a
Plenum of the CC of the BCP: “The issue of nuclear nonproliferation should
be regarded as inseparable from the main task of the socialist countries of the
Warsaw Treaty: preventing the nuclear armament of West Germany, whose
ruling circles are striving for nuclear weapons in order to implement their cra-
zy plans to redraw the map of Europe. Thus, the socialist states must struggle
defiantly to eliminate the possibility of West Germany’s attaining access to
nuclear weapons in any form – directly or indirectly, or through a grouping
of countries. […] Regardless of their intents and wishes, the Romanian com-
rades’ approach lends support to the opponents of the Nuclear Nonprolif-
eration Treaty, including West Germany.” The tensions raised by the position
12 
Laurien Crump, The Warsaw Pact Reconsidered. International Relations in Eastern
Europe, 1955 – 1969, London and New York, Routledge, 2015, p. 148 – 149.
13  Draft Commentary on Romania’s Position at the PCC Meeting to the CC of the

Bulgarian Communist Party Plenary Meeting’, 6 March 1968, PHP, 8, Diplomatic Archive,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sofia, Opis 32, File 30, http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/lory1.ethz.
ch/collections/colltopic3f56.html?lng=en&id=17988&navinfo=14465 – 25.09.2017).
 The Soviet Communist Party, its Eastern Satellites and ... 737

of the Warsaw Pact member-states regarding West Germany added to those

already weakening the international communist movement from within. A
breach in the “monolith unity” the communists boasted about in the age of
the Comintern had already been made.
Even greater friction was caused within the WP by the Romania – China
rapprochement, which began as early as the Gheorghiu-Dej regime. In the
context of the de-Stalinization process, the two sides concluded that the idea
of a unique centre of power in the communist world had become obsolete.
First Gheorghiu-Dej and then Ceauşescu developed excellent relations with
Mao Zedong, which allowed them to become a communication vessel be-
tween, on the one hand, Beijing and the communist countries loyal to the
Soviets, and on the other, between Beijing and the capitalist states (Ceauşescu,
for instance, played an important role as secret negotiator between the Ameri-
cans and the Chinese in the 1970s). Later on, the Romanian support for Mao’s
regime materialized in the decisive stance taken by the Romanian Communist
Party at the international conferences of the communist and workers political
organizations, opposing any attempt at a public condemnation of the Chinese
as revisionists.
This explains why at the Crimea meeting, held in August 1971, immedi-
ately after Nicolae Ceauşescu’s return from his Asian tour (China and Mon-
golia) during which he again took the opportunity to criticise the invasion
of Czechoslovakia, after further criticising Ceauşescu for opening diplomatic
ties with West Germany, Zhivkov told the other participants that “the West
sees Mao and Ceauşescu as twins” and that Romania was the advocate of the
Chinese in the Balkans14.
Ceausescu opposed the Soviet plans to fight ideologically against the Chi-
nese, he remained neutral in this quarrel, and moreover he manifested sym-
pathy towards the Chinese. Every meeting with Todor Zhivkov he asked for
negotiation, understanding, a “profound insight on the matter”, with “no at-
tacks and no rush decisions”15. It was clear from the first meetings that there
were huge clashes between their visions: Ceausescu opposed the existence of
a communist centre and was in favour of independence and sovereignty (in a

14  Larry L. Watts, Ferește-mă, Doamne, de prieteni... Războiul clandestin al Blocului

Sovietic cu România. București, RAO Publishing, p. 544.
15  Arhivele Naționale ale României (ANR), Fond Comitetul Central al Partidului

Comunist Român (CC al PCR) – Secția Relații Externe, dosar 83/1967, 3.

738 Florin-Răzvan Mihai

sort of way he advocated and continued the policy of polycentrism of Italian

communist leader Togliatti), but Zhivkov was very active in the international
arena to back the Soviets against the Chinese, guided by the idea and the ne-
cessity of unity of international Communist tactics.
Bulgaria was a bitter enemy of China, Zhivkov calling the Chinese policy
“an anti-Soviet line, a line whose aim is to bring disunity to the world revo-
lutionary movement”16. There were “divisions in matters of principle, both
theoretical and practical” between the two countries, because of which the
Bulgarians promised to “unmask” the Chinese publicly, whenever the oppor-
tunity presented itself17. Despite all his efforts, Ceauşescu did not manage to
turn the Bulgarians around in what concerned the Sino-Soviet conflict, this
being a clear sign that Sofia accepted the Soviet hegemony as fact.
But the tensions in the communist bloc truly came to a head on the night
between 20th and 21st August 1968, when some of the WP countries invad-
ed the territory of Czechoslovakia, in an attempt to change the Dubček re-
formist regime by force. Even though the Bulgarians participated only with a
battalion of elite troops, the political gesture as such spoke more eloquently
than any concrete military support. Zhivkov was very worried and personally
monitored what was happening in Czechoslovakia, so closely, in fact, that the
diplomatic correspondence with Prague passed through his hands first. Before
the intervention, the Warsaw Pact countries had met five times in order to
analyse the situation in Czechoslovakia. The Bulgarian representatives attend-
ed all five reunions. On March 6th/ 7th, 1968, Zhivkov had given Brezhnev
and Kosygin assurances that Bulgaria would grant military support to any act
directed against Czechoslovakia, being actually the first to circulate an idea
which the Soviets found so appealing18. And during a Plenum of the Central
Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, the Romanians were harshly
criticised for their “counterrevolutionary, anti-Soviet” position. The Bulgar-
ians went so far as to threaten “measures to reinstate order in Czechoslovakia
and in Romania”19. The Romanians, on the other hand, refused to help the
invading troops in any way, adding harsh and unequivocal public criticism of
16 Idem, dosar 56/1970, f. 102. In 1972, Mladenov claimed that Bulgaria was worried
by “China’s behaviour, [by] their staunch anti-Sovietism”. Idem, dosar 159/1972, 20.
17  Idem, dosar 77/1974, 22.
18  G. Bischof, S. Karner, P. Ruggenthaler (eds), The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact

Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Lexington Books, 2010, p. 7.

19  Watts, Ferește-mă, Doamne, de prieteni, p. 258, 367.
 The Soviet Communist Party, its Eastern Satellites and ... 739

the intervention against the Dubček regime. In the following years, the con-
tacts between Romania and Bulgaria diminished, the Romanian communists
becoming personae non gratae for a while.
But relations were gradually resumed, especially since the situation in
Czechoslovakia had “normalized”20, and the two sides began debating the is-
sue of regional cooperation more and more seriously.

Regional cooperation
Plans for a Balkan federation – which would comprise the Balkan states
as well as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Greece – had existed since the days of
Joseph Stalin, at the beginning of 1948. But the opposition showed by the
Soviet leader, whom Dimitrov had failed to inform of his proposal21, together
with Tito’s policy of independence ruined any efforts in this direction.
There was also the Chivu Stoica Plan, the proposals from 1957 and 1959.
The Romanian prime minister sent notes to Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey
and Yugoslavia to suggest a conference to discuss their mutual problems and
the question of nuclear weapons (the Polish foreign minister Rapacki had the
same initiative in 1957 – the creation of a nuclear free-zone in Europe). But
Greece and Turkey turned down the proposal, although the USSR endorsed
the plan. Again in 1959 there was a Romanian proposal for a conference in
the Balkans, endorsed by Albania and Bulgaria but again rejected by Greece
and Turkey.
Zhivkov was obsessed by the idea of “economic integration”, a possibility
for Bulgaria to outrun the economic disparity between West and East: “We
need to intensify the economic integration of socialist countries and primarily
of COMECON countries”. In a certain way the idea gave Ceausescu shivers

20  The official term used in Czechoslavakia was normalizace, meaning the restoration of
a communist regime obedient to Moscow and opposing the reforms initiated by the former
Czechoslovak leader Dubček.
21  Stalin had rejected the plan because it represented a provocation for the West, at a

time when the communist regimes were not yet fully consolidated, and because he would
have much preferred a federation of states, which would also have solved their territorial
disputes (Romania  – Hungary, Czechoslovakia  – Poland). In fact, he wanted better con-
trol over the foreign policy of the two countries, so that they had as little room for ma-
neuver as possible. See V. Dimitrov, Stalin‘s Cold War. Soviet Foreign Policy, Democracy and
Communism in Bulgaria, 1941 – 48. London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2008, p. 176 – 177.
740 Florin-Răzvan Mihai

because reminded of Valev Plan22. Formally he told Zhivkov he agrees but it is

important “to find the ways for being advantageous for everybody”23 – and we
can read between the lines he was referring to the USSR.
Starting from 1970, Bulgaria had an active policy in the Balkans, and a
favorable attitude towards multilateral collaboration. In September 11 – 12th,
1970, there were two meetings Zhivkov – Ceausescu after three years, at Ruse
and Giurgiu (the last one took place in September-October 1967). Zhivkov
tried to reach an agreement with Tito (but still there was the Macedonian
issue24). At that moment USSR was interested in a détente in Europe in gen-
eral, to keep its influence in the Balkans and to weaken the southern flank of
NATO. And Bulgaria served perfectly as a pawn in this matter.
Ceausescu himself, in July 1972, at the National Conference of RCP, pro-
posed the demilitarization of the Balkan region, cooperation in every domain,
even the establishment of an institution to coordinate the economic collabo-
ration. It was a hot matter, because Zhivkov and Ceausescu did not mention it
in the official public statements during August-September 1972 meetings. Al-
though foreign minister Macovescu addressed the matter to Mladenov, again,
in December the same year, nothing happened25. A year ago, at the conference
of BCP, Zhivkov spoke about it in public, he even declared to be in favour of
a conference of government representatives in the Balkans about European
security. But then it was silence, so we can presume that USSR pressed him to
renounce his view. In the Balkans, Bulgaria was a very important factor for the
Soviet policy, which feared a multilateral agreement would diminish its influ-
ence and the capacity to take decisions. Instead, the bilateral diplomacy was
more effective and easier to control.
22 The project for the economic organisation of the communist countries in Eastern
and Central Europe, put forth in 1964 by the economist Emil Valev. According to his theory,
each country was supposed to specialise in a certain economic field. Romania, Bulgaria and
Hungary, for example, were to lay emphasis on the agricultural sector, whilst East Germany
and Czechoslovakia had to boost their industry. The Bulgarians accepted these proposals,
while the Romanians vehemently criticised them.
23  ANR, Fond CC al PCR – Secția Relații Externe, dosar 56/1970, 105.
24  Radio Free Europe (RFE), East Europe, Bulgaria/22, “Bulgaria’s Balkan Policy:

the Search for Rapprochment”, 1972 December 10th, http://storage.osaarchivum.org/

low/9f/27/9f2786be-aa4b – 4a65-be47 – 726099dd0ee2_l.pdf – 23.09.2017.
25  ANR, Fond CC al PCR  – Secția Relații Externe, dosar 87/1972, 110/1972,

159/1972; RFE, Eastern Europe/6, “Multilateral Co-operation in the Balkans: differences

of View Between Bucharest and Sofia”, 1973 Aprilie 5th, http://storage.osaarchivum.org/
low/76/59/7659236c-0f7b-43d1-be69-933cf08e4b1c_l.pdf – 23.09.2017.
 The Soviet Communist Party, its Eastern Satellites and ... 741

Romania insisted on an extended formula of collaboration, including

non-communist states such as Greece and Turkey, for an active policy in the
domain of European security, but Bulgaria pleaded for cooperation just with
COMECON states. Ceausescu dreamed of a vast cooperation in different
fields, such as culture, sport, economy, and after that of full debates and agree-
ments for demilitarization. When Zhivkov opposed the plan his argument
was: there are “socialist countries and capitalistic countries”, there are military
juntas we cannot collaborate and there is Albania. Zhivkov told Ceausescu
that, in “internationalist spirit”, he refused any negotiation with the Athens
government: “We will condemn any attack against the Soviet Union”26, he
told Ceausescu.
BCP is the messenger of the Soviet Union, pleading for unity of the in-
ternational communist and workers movement. In May 1974, before Helsinki
conference, Zhivkov asked Ceausescu to have the same position as others: “We
must defend our line, show unity, cohesion and this is the principal warranty
that the third phase of the conference will take place”. „The Albanese would
come [to the round table, for negotiations] if the Chinese would tell them”,
said the Bulgarian leader. But there was strong controversy with the Chinese:
“We will denounce whatever they do”. Every single moment Zhivkov tried to
get Ceausescu to his senses, to get him in line with the Soviet Union. He knew
there were huge differences between them about the “proletarian internation-
alism” and “coordination of plans” (“I don’t want to return to the times of
Comintern but in the new conditions we have to act together, to oppose the
organized force of imperialists” […]. “If we are not united, they [the Western
powers] will destroy us!”)27.
Zhivkov was aware that in the Balkans Bulgaria was somehow isolated,
in a strange position, in 1979 he said “there is a lot of information and opin-
ions that the People’s Republic of Bulgaria would be an obstacle for inaugurat-
ing good relations between the Balkan states”28. He reminded Ceausescu he
opposed every proposal for action in the Balkans without consulting WP.
In 1980 the topic was the same as we can see from the meeting between
Virgil Cazacu and Dimiter Stanishev, Central Committee secretaries, which
took place in April 1980. Stanishev informed his Romanian partner the

26  ANIC, fond CC al PCR – Secția Relații Externe, dosar 87/1972, 31.
27  Ibid. dosar 77/1974, 28v.
28  Ibid. dosar 20/1979, 18v.
742 Florin-Răzvan Mihai

Yugoslavs asked “the recognition of Macedonian minority presence in Bulgar-

ia and of Macedonian nation in Yugoslavia”. “We will not accept conditions in
the developing of our bilateral relations”29, said Stanishev, who declared that
there was not any Macedonian community in Bulgaria. The two secretaries
recognized the different position about the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan;
Romania asked the Soviets to leave and for negotiations between Afghanistan,
Pakistan and Iran, and for the independence of these countries. Naturally, the
Romanian communists did not participate in the conference held in Paris, in
1980, at the initiative of French and Polish communists, which endorsed the
Soviet invasion. Bulgarians too endorsed it; Romanians, Spanish and Italian
communists were against Soviet intervention. But Stanishev said: “It is not an
intervention and interference of Moscow, but a solution, help given in a criti-
cal moment for this country which chose its independent path by the will of
people”30, a fight against the counter-revolutionary forces.
In June 1980, the Balkans issue was approached again in the context of
missiles located in Turkey and Greece. Regarding this, Romania had a special
position. It did not matter that the missiles threatened the European USSR,
but the European peace in general. Ceausescu rejected the idea of a politi-
cal bloc in the Balkans but wanted instead “friendship relations of economic
and political collaboration”, in a nuclear free zone. It is interesting to remark
Zhivkov’s hostility towards Carter administration and the USA in general –
he emphasized the unemployment, inflation, recession: “This crisis was pro-
voked by imperialism”, but again Ceausescu had a different opinion: “The im-
perialists are not alone in this world. The socialist countries are also guilty”31.
In the beginning of 1980–1981 years, two issues preoccupied the com-
munist leaders: the events in Poland, where Solidarnosc union was more and
more influential (on this matter there was agreement between Zhivkov and
Ceausescu, they feared the events could aggravate and they also agreed that
there was a class confrontation) and arms race (Zhivkov accused Reagan ad-
ministration for the evil in the world: „they want us to be weak, to give the
last penny for weapons”32). Ceausescu himself was harsher on the Americans.
When he met Stanko Todorov, member of Politburo and president of the Na-

29  ANR, Fond CC al PCR – Secția Relații Externe, dosar 53/1980, 19.
30  Ibid. p. 45.
31  Ibid. dosar 81/1980, 37.
32  Ibid. dosar 5/1981, 29v.
 The Soviet Communist Party, its Eastern Satellites and ... 743

tional Assembly, in 1981, he criticized the arms race, the increase of military
budgets, and he accused the international financial institutions (“a new form
of exploitation and a variant of colonialism”33). But this was just an exception.
Usually, Ceausescu kept a balance and tried not to criticize the Americans
during meetings with Bulgarians. In October 1983, the Romanian-Bulgarian
frictions regarding arms race accentuated. Radio Sofia and Radio Bucharest
reciprocally censored each other, eliminating from the speeches of their presi-
dents what they did not agree with: the Bulgarians kept their attitude towards
American administration, in comparison, the Romanians were more inclined
to blame NATO and WP at the same time.
A late document discovered in the National Romanian Archives, a let-
ter by Zhivkov to Ceausescu, dated 1984, demonstrates the policy and tactics
used by the Bulgarians in the Balkans. Taking note about Greek PM Papan-
dreou’s statement in favour of demilitarizing the region34, Zhivkov agreed to
intensify the dialogue between the Balkan states but strictly about this matter
only. In the letter, he tried to convince Ceausescu to prepare a similar point of
view with the rest of communist states loyal to USSR: “I wouldn’t want our
partners and the bourgeois press to speculate about our positions, damaging
our mutual interests in the region and in Europe”35).

Perestroika and glasnost in the Balkans

The reforms put forth in the mid – 1980s by the new Secretary General
of the CPSU, Mikhail Gorbachev, which he hoped would revitalise the com-
munist system and bridge the economic gap between the Soviet Union and
Western democracies, put Romania and Bulgaria in a paradoxical situation.
From the start, Romania showed its opposition openly, claiming that the
socialism promoted by the Ceauşescu regime was “real socialism”, so that any
suggestion of economic and political change was rejected outright. In No-
vember 1986, while the communist leaders gathered in Moscow were being

33  Ibid. dosar 170/1981, 5v.

34  RFE, RAD Background Report/271 (Eastern Europe), “Do Ceausescu and Zhivkov
Disagree?”, 1983 December 2nd, http://storage.osaarchivum.org/low/3a/b1/3ab154bd-
12fa-4b6c-821b-f54f102d9364_l.pdf – 23.09.2017.
35  ANR, Fond CC al PCR  – Secția Relații Externe, dosar Nicolae Ceausescu 5B,

vol. 1, 76.
744 Florin-Răzvan Mihai

informed on the theories of the new CPSU Secretary General, Ceauşescu

was incensed to hear that the old theses on the coordination of the five-year
plans36 were about to make a come-back, introducing an international divi-
sion of labour reminiscent of Khrushchev’s initiatives. A few months later,
the Romanian party press completely ignored Gorbachev’s speech before the
Central Committee of the CPSU, a clear signal sent to Moscow by the local
authorities.
Of all the communist countries in Eastern and Central Europe, only Po-
land, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and East Germany showed hope in
the reforms put forth by Gorbachev37, albeit to different degrees. Zhivkov,
for instance, who was much more astute and pragmatic in this respect than
Ceauşescu, was delighted to hear about the economic reform, but made no
reference to a possible Soviet-style opening of Bulgarian society. The Bulgar-
ian newspapers praised the Soviet idea of perestroika, but only briefly referred
to glasnost and to the problems with the Turkish minority or the country’s
relations with Yugoslavia38. The very term glasnost was carefully avoided in
party documents, although the party newspaper Rabotnichesko Delo was for-
mally encouraged to be more critical of the local realities39. In March 1987,
Chudomir Aleksandrov, a member of the Politburo, told The Financial Times
that in his country “there is enough openness as it is”40.
In 1987, Todor Zhivkov chose to launch his own programme – “the con-
cept of July”41. The theses adopted by the Plenum of the CC of BCP in July
1987 were inspired by Soviet ideas, yet proclaimed “a new model of socialism”;
among others, it spoke of the decentralisation and reformation of the bank-
ing system. These were shortly followed by other measures, which favoured
private economic initiative.

36 L. Betea, F.-R. Mihai, I. Țiu, Viața lui Ceaușescu, vol. 3, Tiranul. Târgoviște, Editura
Cetatea de Scaun, 2015, p. 219.
37  Ch. Gati, Gorbachev and Eastern Europe, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1987, Vol 65,

N 5, p. 958 – 975.
38  Ibid. p. 963.
39  RFE, “Bulgaria. Situation report”, 24 July 1987, http://storage.osaarchivum.org/

low/d1/1a/d11aac86 – 3233 – 4e44 – 9379-ccf04306515f_l.pdf (Accessed 23 September

2017).
40  Ibid.
41  I. Baewa, The day before the crash, p. 14; Detrez, Historical Dictionary of Bulgaria,

second edition, Lanham, Maryland, The Scarecrow Press, Inc. 2006, p. 266.
 The Soviet Communist Party, its Eastern Satellites and ... 745

Thus, Sofia and Bucharest both adopted a critical position concerning the
transparency and social relaxation policy – glasnost – albeit in different man-
ners. The Romanians, on the one hand, made harsh statements in public and
in the party press; the Bulgarians, on the other, eluded the term as if it never
existed, an attitude they also put into practice. The national policy concern-
ing the Turkish minority and the Macedonian question (the Bulgarian case)
and the international criticism regarding the Hungarian minority and the or-
ganisation of villages on the urban model (the Romanian case) placed the two
regimes in the sphere of “xenophobic communism”42, to use a term employed
by the Western media.

Conclusions
The analysis of the Romanian-Bulgarian relations between 1964 and
1989 demonstrates how important and interdependent the Bulgarian-Soviet
cooperation actually was. In a context also favoured by the Pan-Slavic tradi-
tion, the Soviet Union used the Sofia regime to keep a firm foot in the Balkans
and to put constant pressure on NATO’s southern flank, Greece and Turkey
rejecting any regional initiative advanced by countries which did not acknowl-
edge their hegemony, notably Romania and Yugoslavia. Bulgaria was the
Soviets’ geopolitical and geostrategic pawn in this corner of the world. There
was, of course, some reciprocity to it, because by constantly invoking the ideal
of communist unity, the pragmatic politician that Todor Zhivkov was, man-
aged to obtain from the Soviet leaders in the Kremlin certain economic ad-
vantages in exchange for an equally solid loyalty43. Nicolae Ceauşescu, on the
other hand, no less pragmatic a statesman, also in search of economic favours,
chose another path  – that of cordial relations with the West (Federal Ger-

42  Shafir Michael, Xenophobic Communism. The Case of Bulgaria and Romania, The
World Today, 1989, Vol 45, N 12, p. 208 – 212.
43  Regarding the special relations between Bulgaria and the USSR, J.F. Brown – a jour-

nalist, analyst and the director (from 1978 until 1983) of Radio Free Europe, notes that:
“The question here is not about the link itself but about why the Bulgarian leaders have
acquiesced in making it so strong and at times appear to have clamoured to make it even
stronger.” His conclusion is that, in the Bulgarian case, it was less about doctrinal idealism,
and more about “calculation”. See J.F. Brown, Bulgaria, In: Martin McCauley and Stephen
Carter (eds.), Leadership and Succession in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China, Pal-
grave Macmillan, London, 1986, p. 150.
746 Florin-Răzvan Mihai

many, France, Spain, and Britain), as well as with states outside Europe, such
as the US, China and countries in the Middle East. But thus he risked his
position and that of his regime in a system which, since its very inception, laid
heavy stress on undisputed loyalty to the Soviet Union.
Political divisions, which eventually proved insurmountable, did not pre-
vent the two leaders from trying to influence each other44 – the Romanian
archives mention 22 high-level bilateral meetings between 1965 and 1980 –
or cooperate in certain economic fields. But it is equally true that, towards the
end of the 1980s, these meetings became more and more rare, further proof
that Nicolae Ceauşescu was avoided even by his communist counterparts. On
the long term, neither option gave the anticipated results, which demonstrates
that the economic and political faults were not of one leader or another, but
of the nonviable system.
If the opinions held by the Balkan leaders carried little weight at global
level, things are very different when it comes to the regional impact of the talks
between Ceauşescu and Zhivkov. The constant lobbying for an economic and
political agreement between the Balkan countries, started by Ceauşescu and
Tito, who was a staunch believer in the non-aligned movement, were purpose-
fully sabotaged by the clever Bulgarian leader45. The discussions carried out in
Sofia and Bucharest are the key to understanding the political game played in
such a strategically important part of Europe, especially during the Cold War.

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 The Soviet Communist Party, its Eastern Satellites and ... 749

Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej visit in Bulgaria, March-April 1957.

From left to right: Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Chivu Stoica, Petre Borilă,
Leonte Răutu, Todor Zhivkov.

Romanian delegation for United Nations XVth session, September-October 1960.

From left to right: Antonín Josef Novotný, Todor Zhivkov,
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev.
750 Florin-Răzvan Mihai

Todor Zhivkov’s visit in Romania, October 1965, 22 – 23 –

Chivu Stoica, Ceaușescu, Zhivkov.

Nicolae and Elena Ceaușescu official visit in Bulgaria, October 1970.

Arrival in Sofia.
 The Soviet Communist Party, its Eastern Satellites and ... 751

Nicolae and Elena Ceaușescu official visit in Bulgaria, Plovdiv, October 1970.

Todor Zhivkov hunting together with Nicolae Ceaușescu in Romania,

December 1985, 20 – 22.
752 Florin-Răzvan Mihai

The Meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders, Berlin, May 1987, 27:

János Kádár, Gustáv Husák, Erich Honecker, Mikhail Gorbachev,
Nicolae Ceaușescu, Wojciech Jaruzelski, Todor Zhivkov

Credit : Arhivele Naționale ale României (Romanian National Archives)

 ÉTUDES BALKANIQUES
Fondée en 1964

La revue trimestrielle est publiée par l’Institut d’Études balkaniques &

Centre de Thracologie (Académie bulgare des Sciences).
Elle propose des articles conceptuels et des travaux d’exploration dans le
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Sa structure comprend également des études interdisciplinaires qui
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les plus divers, ainsi que dans leurs rapports avec les aires plus larges : européenne
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774