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DROIT INTERNATIONAL
Summary:
Each and every one of us has spoken the word terrorism. But what does it mean? Despite the
fact that its a very old phenomenon, there is no definition of terrorism at the international level. This
legal black hole has enabled the United Nations Security Council in the aftermath of the 11
September 2001 attacks to adopt resolutions urging States to combat terrorism by all means. This
hard-line approach was fraught with consequences on the protection of international human rights at
both national and international level.
The aim of this article is to demonstrate that, so as to that the difference between terrorism and
counterterrorism be merely a matter of perspective, it is of the utmost importance that the
international community clearly and unequivocally define terrorism and counterterrorism all the while
reasserting their intertwinement with human rights.
the real thing but which to everyone else looks more like the same old
used cup, perhaps re-decorated in a slightly original way1
Human rights are not a luxury only for good times. They must be upheld
always, including in times of terror and insecurity2
Osama Bin Laden was killed on 13 May 2011 in Pakistan by American forces.
He is the man at the origin of the event that marked the beginning of the 21st century
and who brought terrorism to the forefront of international attention, making the
word terrorism part of our everyday vocabulary. Yet, even though everyone has
been listening to, speaking about or reading the word terrorism on a daily basis for
over a decade now, no one really knows what it means. Journalists, by labeling
regular criminal acts or even acts that are lawful under international humanitarian law
as terrorist, cast further shadow on this already elusive phenomenon.
Terrorism however, is not a new phenomenon. Its origin can be traced back to
Antiquity, when the Zealots during the first century and the Hashshashins from the
11th to the 13th century murdered their enemies and spread fear to achieve their goals3.
Scholars agree that modern terrorism was born during La Terreur, the period of the
French Revolution between mid 1793 and July 1794 when the ruling Jacobin faction,
headed by Robespierre, executed anyone considered a threat to their regime. As a
result, the first meaning of the word terrorism as recorded by the Acadmie
Franaise in 1798, was system or rule of terror4. Terrorism is thus a widely used
term, multifaceted in reach and scope, so much so that even the international
community has not agreed on a fully functional comprehensive definition of
terrorism yet.
This legal black hole led to the international War on terror subsequent to the
11 September 2001 attacks being waged in a way that was disruptive to human rights.
This human rights-abusive international War on terror was launched by the United
Nations Security Council (SC) on the impulse of the United States with SC Res 13685
and 13736, which recognized that acts of terrorism were threat[s] to international
peace and security that needed to be fought by all means, including military
intervention through the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense. The
gravity of the threat posed by terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11 was no excuse for the
international community to part from public international law because it was
considered inconvenient. The deviation of the boundary between law enforcement
1
RJOI 2013 n 16
and armed conflict while dealing with terrorism has had lots of consequences as
regards human rights protection7. It has been made possible by the absence of an
internationally recognized and binding definition of terrorism, despite the
international communitys efforts since 19378.
So as to avoid that the difference between terrorism and counterterrorism be
merely a matter of perspective, it is of the utmost importance that the international
community clearly and unequivocally define terrorism and counterterrorism all the
while reasserting their intertwinement with human rights.
A study of the theoretical approach to defining terrorism (I) is interesting
because not only does it highlights the intertwinement of terrorism and human rights,
but also because it sets the framework for a study of the shortcomings of legal
definitions of terrorism (II).
For commentaries on this shift from the law-enforcement to the armed conflict paradigms, see F. MGRET,
War? Legal Semantics and the Move to Violence , EJIL 2002, vol.13, n 2, p. 361-399 ; S.
SCHORLEMER, Human Rights: Substantive and Institutional Implications of the War Against Terrorism ,
EJIL 2003, vol. 14, n 2, p. 265-282 ; J. FITZPATRICK, Speaking Law to Power : The war Against
Terrorism and Human Rights , EJIL 2003, vol. 14, p. 241-264 ; A. CASSESE, Terrorism is Also Disrupting
Some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law , EJIL 2001, vol.12, n 5, p. 993-1001.
8
See infra, part II-B.
9
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23
March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR), emphasis added.
3
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Schmidt and Jongman in 1988 referenced 109 definitions of terrorism10. The first
thing that comes to mind is the important number of definitions that have been
cataloged in 1988. Levitt in 1986 commented: The search for a legal definition of
terrorism in some ways resembles the quest for the Holy Grail: periodically, eager
souls set out, full of purpose, energy and self-confidence, to succeed where so many
others before have tried and failed11.
As a matter of fact, legally defining terrorism is far from being an easy task.
Even though everyone has a vague idea of what terrorism is, one has much trouble
outlining what it is exactly. There is no question whether the 9/11 attacks against the
United States of America were terrorist attacks; yet fully grasping the notion
terrorism is very difficult.
1/ Inductive vs. deductive definition
Levitt identified two different ways of defining terrorism: the deductive
method and the inductive method. On the one hand, deductive definitions of
terrorism have three elements: (1) a substantive element (enumeration of deeds
considered acts of terrorism), (2) the intent element (explicit mention that the act was
intended) and (3) the jurisdictional element (towards whom the terrorist act is
directed)12. On the other hand, the inductive method relies upon a relatively precise
description of the conduct constituting the substantive element and omits the political
intent element that characterized the deductive approach13. In other words, while
inductive definitions aim at defining what a terrorist act is, deductive definitions try
to answer the broader question of what terrorism is. The substantive element almost
always refers to the use of violence and force. In their 1988 study, Schmidt and
Jongman found that violence and force appear in 83.5% of the 109 definitions of
terrorism, being by far the most recurrent theme14. The international community has
endorsed the inductive method by focusing merely on the substantive and
jurisdictional element. This resulted in the adoption of sectoral conventions on
terrorism.
To this date there are thirteen sectoral international conventions on terrorism
focusing on specific acts of terrorism,15 among which the 1973 Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons,
10
A. SCHMIDT, A.J. JONGMAN, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases,
Theories and Literature, New Brunswick, Transaction books, 1988, p. 5-6.
11
G. LEVITT, Is Terrorism Worth Defining? , ONULR 1986, vol. 13, p. 97.
12
Amongst the documents having adopted a deductive definition of terrorism, Levitt cites the 1937 League
of Nations Convention for the Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism and the 1972 U.S. Draft Convention
on Terrorism.
13
Id. p. 109
14
A. SCHMIDT, A.J. JONGMAN, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases,
Theories and Literature, New Brunswick, Transaction books, 1988, p. 5-6.
15
For the list of those conventions, see
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/DB.aspx?path=DB/studies/page2_en.xml&menu=MTDSG.
RJOI 2013 n 16
including Diplomatic Agents, the 2005 International Convention for the Suppression
of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, or the 1997 International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings. Art.1.1 of the aforementioned 1973 Convention
is the jurisdictional element referred to by Levitt, as it states against whom the
terrorist act in question (i.e. crime against internationally protected persons) is
directed, and Art.2.1 describes the offenses considered as terrorist crimes. Likewise,
Articles 2 of the 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of
Nuclear Terrorism and of the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorist Bombings set forth the offenses targeted in the conventions16.
Violence is once again present in both conventions against terrorism, validating
Schmidt and Jongmans study. As a matter of fact, all of the thirteen international
conventions on terrorism listed by the United Nations connect terrorism with the use
or threat of use of force and violence 17 . By thus focusing on violence as an
outstanding feature of terrorism, this approach enables States to find consensus by
avoiding the political aspect of terrorism. The important advantage of the inductive
method is that it avoids political conflict over basic definitional principles [],
permitting textual agreement to be reached18.
2/ Prominence of motive
John Dugard19 considered in 1974 that an ideal definition of terrorism should
expressly state that motive is irrelevant in determining whether an act of terrorism
has been committed20. What mattered by then and throughout the 1970s was the
nature of the act, and who the targets were. Most scholars have now shifted position
on the issue, considering that a workable definition of terrorism should comprise the
motive element. The absence of the motive element in international conventions is, as
mentioned earlier, due to the need to reach consensus. States did not however discard
deductive definitions of terrorism, as many of them use such definitions at the
national level21.
16
Art. 2-1 of both conventions reads Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this convention
if that person [].
17
See for example Art. 2.1.a of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism : Possesses radioactive material or makes or possesses a device:
(i) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or
(ii) With the intent to cause substantial damage to property or to the environment.
18
A. SCHMIDT, A.J. JONGMAN, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases,
Theories and Literature, New Brunswick, Transaction books, 1988, p. 102.
19
Currently a South African professor of international law, John Dugard has served as Judge ad hoc on the
International Court of Justice and as a Special Rapporteur for both the former United Nation Commission on
Human Rights and the International Law Commission.
20
J. DUGARD, International Terrorism: Problems of Definition , RIIA 1974, vol. 50, n 1, p. 80.
21
Some national definitions of terrorism will be studied in Part II-A. The United States 1978 Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (codified and amended at 50 USC 1801, 1982) is a perfect example of
deductive method. Paragraph 1 makes up the substantive element, paragraph 2 the intent element and
paragraph 3 the jurisdictional element.
5
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Boaz Ganor considers that including the motive element in the definition of
terrorism is of prime importance22, as a violent activity against civilians that has no
political aim is, at most, an act of criminal delinquency, a felony, or simply an act of
insanity unrelated to terrorism 23 . As for the author of Defining Terrorism in
International Law, he uses the phrase public motive instead of political aim in his
definition of terrorism: a terrorist act is committed not only where it has a political
purpose, but wherever there is a public motive, aim, objective, or purpose broadly
defined: political, ideological, religious, ethnic or philosophical24.
The use of public motive better fits terrorism in the sense that terrorists resort
to terrorism not only to gain political power, but also to achieve other goals like
imposing their ideology upon a population. The question of motive is one of the
reasons for which the adoption of a universally recognized definition of terrorism has
been stalled for years, despite the United Nations continuous efforts to elaborate the
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism since 199625.
3/ Types of terrorism
Scholars have identified three different kinds of terrorism, depending on
whether it is sponsored (b) or performed by a State (a) or a sub-State entity (c).
a/ State terrorism
Most of the scholarly work on terrorism deals with what the former Special
Rapporteur to the Commission on Human Rights calls sub-State terrorism, and so
do conventions on terrorism, eluding the question of State terrorism. Nonetheless
the first occurrence of terrorism was organized by the State26.
The 2001 report of the Commission on Human Rights gives examples of
regimes of terror, amongst which the Stalinist regime in the Soviet Union between
1929 and 1946, and Hitlers Nazi Germany that orchestrated the genocide of the
Jews and Gypsies and the mass slaughter of Slavic people between 1933 and 194527.
According to the Special Rapporteur, regimes of terror are characterized by such
actions as the kidnapping and assassination of political opponent of the government
22
Boaz Ganor was the founder of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (I.C.T.) in 1996. Located
in Israel, the ICT is an independent think tank providing expertise in terrorism, counter-terrorism,
homeland security, threat vulnerability and risk assessment, intelligence analysis and national security and
defense policy: http://www.ict.org.il/AboutICT/AboutUs/tabid/55/Default.aspx, accessed on Apr. 12, 2011.
23
B. GANOR, Defining Terrorism: Is One Mans Terrorist Another Mans Freedom Fighter? , PPR 2002,
vol. 3, n 4, p. 294.
24
B. SAUL, Defining Terrorism in International Law, Oxford Monographs in International Law, 2006, p. 61.
25
See Part II-B for more information on the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism.
26
UNCHR (Sub-Commission), Report by Special Rapporteur Kalliopi K. KOUFA on Terrorism and Human
Rights , UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/31 (2001).
27
Id. para. 42.
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28
Id. para.43
R.S. CLINE, A. YONAH, Terrorism as State Sponsored Covert Warfare, Hero Books, 1986, p. 164, qtd. in
Countering State-Sponsored Terrorism, ICT Papers, 2007, n 1, available at
http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/701/currentpage/34/Default.aspx
30
Ganor actually distinguishes three different kinds of State-sponsored terrorism. We shall however only
bring up two of those categories, since the difference he sets forth between States operating terrorism and
States perpetrating terrorism is minimal.
31
This appellation is also employed by the U.S. Department of Defense, in Joint Publication 3-07.2,
Antiterrorism, April 2006, p. 35.
32
B. GANOR, Defining Terrorism: Is One Mans Terrorist Another Mans Freedom Fighter? , PPR 2002,
vol. 3, n 4, p. 299.
33
United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, Chapter 3: State Sponsors of
Terrorism, 2010, p. 191-196, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/141114.pdf
34
Ibid.
29
RJOI 2013 n 16
organization35. In the end, the main difference between State terrorism and Stateperpetrated terrorism stands in the location of said act: at home on its own population
for State terrorism, or on foreign soil for State-perpetrated terrorism.
c/ Sub-State terrorism
Sub-State terrorism is carried out by private actors, as opposed to the public
actors in State terrorism. Sub-state terrorism fosters on publicity for its cause, while
State-sponsored terrorism avoids it. The U.S. Department of Defense calls it nonState-supported terrorism, namely a terrorist group that operates autonomously,
receiving no significant support from any government36. Nevertheless, the number
of affiliates to a group does not matter, since even a single individual can take part in
sub-State terrorism. From then on when the word terrorism will be used in this
article, the reader shall understand sub-State terrorism.
B.- Substantial approach
The 1999 preliminary report of the Commission on Human Rights entitled
Terrorism and human rights noted that [l]ittle, if any, attention has been given to
the link between terrorism and human rights37. Yet, this link is undeniable since the
very essence of terrorism is to jeopardize human rights. Numerous international
instruments aiming at the protection of human rights exist;38 this allows human rights
to exist by themselves, thus entitling States to protect a right that has acquired the
character of customary norm of international law, without necessarily being a party to
a treaty.
A customary norm of international law emerges when a provision has
generated a rule which has passed into the general corpus of international law, and
is now accepted as such by the opinio juris and has become binding even for
countries which have never, and do not, become parties to a given Convention39.
Such norms are recognized by Art.38 para.1 of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice. Nevertheless, a customary norm of international law cannot serve as a
legitimization for human rights violations, as Art.5 para.2 of the 1966 International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provides40 : There shall be no
restriction upon or derogation from any of the fundamental human rights recognized
or existing in any State Party to the present Covenant pursuant to law, conventions,
35
Joint Publication 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, United States Department of Defense 2006, p. 35, available at
http://file.wikileaks.info/leak/us-antiterrorism-jp3-07-2-2006.pdf
36
Ibid.
37
UNCHR (Sub-Commission), Report by Special Rapporteur Kalliopi K. KOUFA on Terrorism and Human
Rights , UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/27 (1999), cons. 16.
38
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/
39
M.K. SINHA, Implementation of Basic Human Rights, Delhi, Manak Publications, 2002, p. 28.
40
Art 5 para. 2 of the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) is
almost identical to this article and meaning, only the wording is different.
RJOI 2013 n 16
regulations or custom on the pretext that the present Covenant does not recognize
such rights or that it recognizes them to a lesser extent41. This paragraph entails the
supremacy of human rights since, would a customary human right enter in conflict
with any other customary norm, the customary human right would prevail.
Individuals are not subjects of general international law; therefore the
International Bill of Rights and the core Human Rights Treaties do not legally bind
them. Art. 10 of the United Nation Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of
Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally
Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms provides: No one shall
participate, by act or by failure to act where required, in violating human rights and
fundamental freedoms and no one shall be subjected to punishment or adverse action
of any kind for refusing to do so42. The vocabulary used in this article is clearly
addressed to individuals who have an obligation even though that obligation is not
legal as individuals are not subjects of international law to abstain from
participating in human rights and fundamental freedom violations. Common Art.5,
para.1 of the ICCPR and ICESCR, which is very similar to Art.30of the UDHR43,
stipulates: [n]othing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any
State, group or person44 any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act
aimed at the destruction of any of the rights or freedoms recognized herein, or at
their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the present Covenant.
While the aforementioned Declaration pertains to soft law, Art. 5 is part of
the internationally recognized Covenant, which is a step further towards a
customarization of the individual responsibility through international human rights
instruments. There is an international individual liability as regards the most serious
crimes established by the International Criminal Court (ICC)45. The ICC however is
to be used in complement with national criminal jurisdictions, which means that
States have a duty to enforce human rights and prosecute any violator through their
own jurisdictions.
It is therefore relevant to study human rights violations by terrorists in the light
of the international human rights instruments because of the drip-down effect and
41
Emphasis added.
Emphasis added.
43
Art. 19 of the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to
Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms UN Doc
A/RES/53/144 (1999) is identical to art.30 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10
December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR).
44
Emphasis added.
45
Art. 5 of the Rome Statute establishing the ICC provides: The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to
the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in
accordance with this Statute with respect to the following crimes:
(a) The crime of genocide;
(b) The Crimes against humanity;
(c) War crimes;
(d) The crime of aggression.
42
RJOI 2013 n 16
46
M.K. SINHA, Respect of Human Rights in Time of State of Emergency: International and National
Perspectives , IJIL, 2007, vol. 47, p. 226.
47
UNHRC, General Comment 29 on Article 4, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001).
48
Id., para.1.
49
Ibid.
50
Articles 6, 7, 8(1) and (2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 respectively ; M.K. SINHA, Respect of Human Rights in
Time of State of Emergency: International and National Perspectives , IJIL, 2007, vol. 47, p.p. 228-229.
51
Art.15 (1) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Rome,
4.XI.1950) provides: In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High
Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its
other obligations under international law.
52
Art. 27(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights (22 November 1969) provides: In time of war,
public danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence or security of a State Party, it may take
measures derogating from its obligations under the present Convention to the extent and for the period of
time strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent
with its other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination on the ground of race,
color, sex, language, religion, or social origin.
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10
53
Art. 53 of the Vienna Convention on Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980)
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, 1969, p. 331.
54
M.K. SINHA, Implementation of Basic Human Rights, Delhi, Manak Publications, 2002, p. 28.
55
UNHRC, General Comment 29 on Article 4, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001), para.13 (a).
56
Id. para. 13 (b) to (e).
57
Id. para.15.
58
C. BASSIOUNI, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes , LCP, 1996, vol. 59, n
4, p. 65.
59
Ibid.
60
UN Doc A/RES/53/144 (1999)
11
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61
62
RJOI 2013 n 16
12
Emphasis added.
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (adopted
10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987), UNGA Res 39/46.
69
Id. Art.1 para.1
70
Ibid.
71
Art.7 para.2 (e) provides: Torture means the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control of the accused; except that torture
shall not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions.
72
Ibid.
73
Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb is a terrorist organization independent from the mother Al-Qaida.
Nonetheless, it pledged allegiance to Osama Bin Laden. Its area of influence spreads from Mauritania to the
Chad, encompassing by Mali, Algeria, Niger and Nigeria.
74
See this article about Michel Germaneaus assassination by AQIM: http://info.france2.fr/france/otageexecuteaqmi-assure-avoir-negocie-avec-paris-64296014.html
68
13
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which is caused by prolonged detention on death row thereby causing great mental
distress, raising a number of issues relating to Art. 775 of the ICCPR76. While at first
the HRC did not consider the death row phenomenon as a breach of Art. 777, it
eventually shifted position recognizing the possibility of regarding it as torture: It
now seems that the HRC accepts that detention in a death cell after the issue of a
warrant for execution does amount to a breach of article 7 if it is deemed
unreasonably long. [] The imminence of anticipated execution, and the consequent
increase in anxiety, distinguishes such instances from ordinary cases of the death
row phenomenon78.
c/ Freedom of thought, conscience and religion
This freedom is non-derogable and protected by Art.18 of the ICCPR, which
provides:
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of
his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice
and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have
or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order,
health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the
liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and
moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.
Terrorism, especially that practiced by extremist religious groups such as Aum
Shinrikyo 79 or more recently Islamist groups such as Al-Qaida jeopardize the
freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Extremist religious groups center their
rhetoric on religious differences and target people that do not share their religious
views, thus violating Art.18 of the ICCPR.
75
Art. 7 ICCPR provides: No one shall be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific
experimentation.
76
Y. MURTHY, Human Rights Handbook, New Delhi, Lexis Nexis, 2007, p. 28.
77
Barrett and Sutcliffe v Jamaica UN Doc CCPR/C/44/D/271/1988 (1992).
78
Pennant v Jamaica UN Doc CCPR/C/64/D/647/1995 (1998).
79
Aum Shinrikyo, also known as A.I.C. is a Japanese extremist religious group responsible for the March
1995 attack in several Tokyo subway trains, killing 12 people and causing up to 6,000 to seek medical
treatment. United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, p. 244-245.
RJOI 2013 n 16
14
UNHRC, General Comment 29 on Article 4, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001), para. 13(b).
81
The Ummah is the community of muslims.
82
Emphasis added.
83
Art. 20 provides:
1. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law.
2. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility
or violence shall be prohibited by law.
15
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willing, I will expel the Jews and the Christians out of the Arab Peninsula. Finally, a
violation of Art.19 ICCPR can be invoked, for Bin Laden did not abide by the duties
and responsibilities inherent to the freedom of opinion84.
84
Art. 19 provides:
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive
and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in
the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and
responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are
provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.
RJOI 2013 n 16
16
into positive law are only prima facie evidence of the law85. Title 18 (relative to
crimes and criminal procedure), whence the following definition of international is
extracted has been enacted into statutory law86 :
(1) the term international terrorism means activities that(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of
the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal
violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination,
or kidnapping; []
This definition is almost the same as the 1978 Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Acts, which made terrorism a criminal offence. There is some
confusion about the nature of terrorism, which is at once a criminal offense and an act
of war87. This shift is attributable to G.W. Bushs administration in response to the
events of 9/11 to fit the context of the War on Terror. When international terrorism
was a crime, the United States applied legal means as the primary tool to fight it88.
Since the shift from crime to act of war however, the United States has moved
away from reactive counter-terrorism law enforcement methods towards more
proactive techniques to fight international terrorism89.
The revised version of the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is a good
example of deductive definition, with subsection (1) containing the substantive
element, (2) the intent element, and (3) the jurisdictional element90. Yet, the original
substantive element was quite broad, leaving too much room to interpretation. This
has been corrected by subsequent additions to Chapter 113B, with 2332 entitled
Criminal penalties, providing a list of the offenses constituting terrorism.
85
http://www.gpo.gov/help/about_united_states_code.htm
Title 18, Part I, Chapter 113B, 2331.
87
The aforementioned legislation provides :
(4) the term act of war means any act occurring in the course of(a) declared war;
(b) armed conflict, whether or not war has been declared, between two or more nations; or
(c) armed conflict between military forces of any origin
88
T. RAIMO, Winning at the Expense of Law : The Ramifications of Expanding Counter-Terrorism Law
Enforcement Jurisdiction Overseas, AM.U.INTL.L.REV., 1999 p. 74, qtd. in, S. TIEFENBRUN S., A
Semiotic Approach to a Legal Definition of Terrorism, ILSA J., Intl & Comp. L., 2002, vol.9, p. 357.
89
Ibid.
90
G. LEVITT, Is Terrorism Worth Defining? , ONULR 1986, vol. 13, p. 104.
86
17
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91
The mission of the FBI is to protect and defend the United States against terrorist and foreign
intelligence threats, to uphold and enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and to provide leadership
and criminal justice services to federal, state, municipal, and international agencies and partners; and to
perform these responsibilities in a manner that is responsive to the needs of the public and is faithful to the
Constitution of the United States: http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/quick-facts.
92
For more information on the NCTC, see http://www.nctc.gov/about_us/about_nctc.html.
93
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report,
Executive Summary, available at http://www.c-span.org/pdf/911finalreportexecsum.pdf
94
For a complete list of the partner agencies, see http://www.nctc.gov/about_us/key_partners.html.
95
http://www.nctc.gov/about_us/about_nctc.html
96
It is noteworthy that Title 22 of the USC has not been enacted into positive law and as such, only is prima
facie evidence of the law.
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18
(d) Definitions
As used in this section(1) the term international terrorism means terrorism involving citizens or
the territory of more than 1 country;
(2) the term terrorism means premeditated, politically motivated violence
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine
agents; []
This overly broad definition of terrorism raises three issues as regards human
rights. First, the agencies relating to the aforementioned definition of terrorism are
left with the discretionary power to qualify anyone as a terrorist, depending on the
agencys needs on a case-by-case scenario, thus violating the principle of legality,
which can lead to human rights violations such as, inter alia, the prohibition of
discrimination based on race.
Second, the omission of the intent element can result in non-terrorist
organizations being labeled as terrorist97. According to the definition given by Title
22, if Greenpeace was to try and force a German tanker to stop off the coasts of
France and that accidentally said tanker would collide with the Greenpeace ship98,
breaching the tanker and resulting in an oil spill, Greenpeace would be considered an
international terrorist group. The violence would be politically motivated (raise
public awareness on the harmful effects of oil), perpetrated against noncombatant
targets (the tanker, a commerce ship, sometimes state-owned) by a subnational
group, in this case members of Greenpeace, a non-governmental organization
(NGO).
Last but not least, the most important difference between the definition of
terrorism of Title 18 USC and that of Title 22 USC is the shift from civilian
population to noncombatant targets. Considering terrorism as an act of war
rather than a mere crime is one of the most prominent example of the G.W. Bush
administrations toughened policy, which will have numerous consequences on
human rights, and especially International Humanitarian Law (IHL)99.
97
One might argue that premeditated equates with intended to. To the author of this article,
Premeditated means planned in advance, while intend means to have a plan, result or purpose in
your mind when you do something. While premeditated refers to the means, intend refers to the end.
98
Emphasis added.
99
For more information on the impacts of US counterterrorism on international human rights law, see T.
MERTUS, T. SAJJAD, Human Rights and Human Insecurity: The Contributions of US Counterterrorism ,
JHR 2008, vol. 7, p. 1-24 ; J. FITZPATRICK, Jurisdiction of Military Commissions and the ambiguous war
on terrorism, AJIL, 2002, vol. 96, p. 345-354 ; J. FITZPATRICK, Speaking Law to power: The war Against
Terrorism and Human Rights , EJIL, 2003, vol. 14, p. 241-264 ; D.A. MUNDIS, The Use of Military
Commissions to Prosecute Individuals Accused of Terrorist Acts , AJIL, 2002, vol. 96, p. 320-328.
19
RJOI 2013 n 16
http://www.defense.gov/about/
Art.2 section 2 para.1 of the Constitution of the United States.
102
Joint Publication 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, United States Department of Defense 2006, p. i.
103
Id. p. 224
104
Id. p. i.
105
Ibid.
106
Part II, Section 3, sub-section 1 of this act provides: Whoever with the intent to overawe the Government
as by law established or to strike terror in the people or any section of the people or to alienate any section
of the people or to adversely affect the harmony amongst different sections of the people does any act or
thing by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances or inflammable substances or fire-arms or
other lethal weapons or poisons or noxious gases or other chemicals or by any other substances (whether
101
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20
purpose was to tackle the Khalistan Movement. This act, despite the fact that it
contained a more detailed definition than the legislations studied above, has served as
ground for extensive violations of human rights107, which resulted in its repel in 1995.
TADA was replaced by the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) in 2002. POTAs
definition of terrorism is very similar to that of TADA. It contains a few additional
provisions along with a reference to the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
POTAs definition of terrorism is worth delving into because it is representative of
Indias stance on the issue. Chapter 2, Section 3, sub-section (1) of POTA provides:
(1) Whoever,(a) with intent to threaten the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of India
or to strike terror in the people or any section of the people does any act or thing by
using bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances or inflammable substances or
firearms or other lethal weapons or poisons or noxious gases or other chemicals or
by any other substances (whether biological or otherwise) of a hazardous nature or
by any other means whatsoever, in such a manner as to cause, or likely to cause,
death of, or injuries to any person or persons or loss of, or damage to, or destruction
of, property or disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life of the
community or causes damage or destruction of any property or equipment used or
intended to be used for the defense of India or in connection with any other purposes
of the Government of India, any State Government or any of their agencies, or
detains any person and threatens to kill or injure such person in order to compel the
Government or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act;
(b) is or continues to be a member of an association declared unlawful under
the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967), or voluntarily does an
act aiding or promoting in any manner the objects of such association and in either
case is in possession of any unlicensed firearms, ammunition, explosive or other
instrument or substance capable of causing mass destruction and commits any act
resulting in loss of human life or grievous injury to any person or causes significant
damage to any property, commits a terrorist act.
Explanation. -For the purposes of this sub-section, "a terrorist act" shall
include the act of raising funds intended for the purpose of terrorism.
Para. (a) of the POTA definition is almost identical with TADAs definition of
terrorism. The reference to the threat to the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty
of India reflects Indias long struggle against separatist groups. As a matter of fact,
biological or otherwise) of a hazardous nature in such a manner as to cause, or as is likely to cause, death
of, or injuries to, any person or persons or loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, property or disruption of
any supplies or services essential to the life of the community, or detains any person and threatens to kill or
injure such person in order to compel the Government or any other person to do or abstain from doing any
act, commits a terrorist act.
107
For a thorough study of POTAs impact on human rights protection, see P. VERMA, The Terror of POTA
and Other Security Legislations in India, New Delhi, Human Rights Law Network, 2004, 629 p.
21
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108
This article provides: Whoever forms, leads or actively participates in a terrorist organization shall be
sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than 10 years; other
participants shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years, criminal detention
or public surveillance.
Whoever, in addition to the crime mentioned in the preceding paragraph, commits other crimes of homicide,
explosion or kidnap shall be punished in accordance with the provisions on combined punishment for
several crimes.
RJOI 2013 n 16
22
terrorism. The lack of definition of terrorism thus infers that authorities are given the
discretionary power of charging anyone with a terrorist offence. As Amnesty
International puts it, there is concern that the provisions of Article 120 make it a
criminal offence to be a member, leader or organiser of a terrorist organization
even if the individual does not commit any other illegal act. The term terrorist
organisation is not defined in the law and could be interpreted as referring to
peaceful political opposition or religious groups109.
Amnesty Internationals fear that peaceful political opposition be considered
terrorist was legitimate: the people who were arrested because they were peacefully
demonstrating during the 2008 Olympics were charged under Art. 120 of the Chinese
Criminal Code.
b/ Syria
The Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism served as the basis for
the Syrian anti-terrorism legislation. The Arab Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorism defines terrorism as [a]ny act or threat of violence, whatever its motives
or purposes, that occurs in the advancement of an individual or collective criminal
agenda and seeking to sow panic among people, causing fear by harming them, or
placing their lives, liberty or security in danger, or seeking to cause damage to the
environment or to public or private installations or property or to occupying or
seizing them, or seeking to jeopardize national resources110.
This definition of terrorism is too far-reaching for three reasons. First of all,
violence is the only substantive element of the definition, which is just too vague to
be the only element of reference111. Secondly, violence can either be actual or
hypothetical, in the sense that even threat can serve as ground for convicting a
terrorist ([a]ny act or threat []). Finally, this definition clearly states that motive
is irrelevant (whatever its motives or purposes), which can result in any crime
being considered a terrorist attack.
State parties to the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism (ACST)
have been advocating on the international stage for a definition of terrorism that
would differentiate terrorism and fights for liberation. This has resulted in a radical
opposition between mostly, the western states on the one side and the Arabian
states on the other side, thus blocking the adoption of a comprehensive convention
on terrorism. Art.2 para.(a) of the ACST advocates for the acknowledgement of
109
Amnesty International, Peoples Republic of China: Chinas anti-terrorism legislation and repression in
the Xinjiang Uighur , available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA17/010/2002/en/feb1b2bbd873-11dd-9df8-936c90684588/asa170102002en.html.
110
Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, adopted by the Council of Arab Ministers of the
Interior and the Council of Arab Ministers of Justice. Cairo, April 1998. Emphasis added.
111
The act referred to in the international conventions mentioned in Art.1 para.3 are also regarded as terrorist
offences, provided those conventions have been ratified by the States parties to the Arab Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorism.
23
RJOI 2013 n 16
fights for national liberation. It provides: All cases of struggle by whatever means,
including armed struggle, against foreign occupation and aggression for liberation
and self-determination, in accordance with the principles of international law, shall
not be regarded as an offence. This provision shall not apply to any act prejudicing
the territorial integrity of any Arab State.
The last sentence of this provision however, makes fights for national
liberation unlawful if they happen on a state party to the ACST. This sets a double
standard, allowing for violence as long as it is directed towards a non-Arabian State.
Bin Ladens Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the
Two Holy Places112 is lawful, whereas the Syrian populations struggle to free itself
from the authoritarian regime of Bachar El Assad is not.
4/ Protecting human rights
The European Unions definition of terrorism is particularly interesting
because it is the farthest-reaching regional effort towards the protection of human
rights while combating terrorism. The Council of the European Union has adopted
the Council Framework Decision on combating terrorism113 (CFDCT) to replace the
twenty-four year old European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 114 .
Framework decisions adopted by the Council of the European Union are binding
upon Member States and aim at harmonizing their laws and regulations115. The
CFDCT provid[es] a uniform legal framework for prosecuting terrorist acts,[]
institutes a common definition of terrorist offences, as well as rules of competence
and of legal cooperation between Member States for the prosecution of persons
having committed terrorist acts116.
Art.1 para.1 of the CFDCT is entitled Terrorist offences and fundamental
rights and principles117. This article being the first in the Framework Decision
112
O. BIN LADEN, Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places
, available at http://www.terrorismfiles.org/individuals/declaration_of_jihad1.html , visited on Feb. 25,
2011.
113
(2002/475/JHA) signed at Luxembourg on 13 June 2002.
114
European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, signed at Strasbourg on 27 January 1977,
available at http://conventions.coe.int/
115
Art. 34 (2)(b) TEU provides:
The Council shall take measures and promote cooperation, using the appropriate form and procedures as
set out in this title, contributing to the pursuit of the objectives of the Union. To that end, acting unanimously
on the initiative of any Member State or of the Commission, the Council may: []
(b) adopt framework decisions for the purpose of approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member
States. Framework decisions shall be binding upon the Member States as to the result to be achieved but
shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods. They shall not entail direct effect
[].
116
E. DUMITRIU, The E.U.s Definition of Terrorism: The Council Framework Decision on Combating
Terrorism, GLJ, 2004, vol. 5, n 5, p. 590.
117
Art. 1 para.1 provides:
RJOI 2013 n 16
24
Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the intentional acts referred to below
in points (a) to (i), as defined as offences under national law, which, given their nature or context, may
seriously damage a country or an international organisation where committed with the aim of:
- seriously intimidating a population, or
- unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any
act, or
- seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social
structures of a country or an international organisation,
shall be deemed to be terrorist offences:
(a) attacks upon a persons life which may cause death;
(b) attacks upon the physical integrity of a person;
(c) kidnapping or hostage taking;
(d) causing extensive destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure
facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or
private property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss;
(e) seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport;
(f) manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives or of nuclear,
biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into, and development of, biological and chemical
weapons;
(g) release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions the effect of which is to endanger
human life;
(h) interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource the
effect of which is to endanger human life;
(i) threatening to commit any of the acts listed in (a) to (h).
118
E. DUMITRIU, The E.U.s Definition of Terrorism: The Council Framework Decision on Combating
Terrorism, GLJ, 2004, vol. 5, n 5, p. 592.
25
RJOI 2013 n 16
terrorism so as to defend their own interests, it is interesting to see how they try to
define it in a way that it encompasses as many offenses as possible, either by having
a very short and imprecise definition (like Chinas) or by enabling any kind of
offence to fall within the range of terrorism (the Arab Convention for the Suppression
of Terrorism), giving way to human rights abuse.
B.- International regulations of terrorism stalled because of diverging national
interests
International instances have been dealing with the issue of terrorism for
decades. As early as 1937, the League of Nations adopted the Convention for the
Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism119 as a response to the assassination of King
Alexander of Yugoslavia and of the French foreign minister Louis Barthou by a
Croatian assassin in France on October 9, 1934120. However, this convention never
entered into force because States did not agree on a definition of terrorism. The
international communitys first attempt at defining terrorism thus failed because of
diverging national interests. As a consequence, the definition of terrorism remained a
prerogative of the States in order to avoid the politicization of the debate on the
international stage. This negative consensus resulted in the adoption of several
sectoral treaties determining what acts constituted terrorism.
In the meantime, the United Nations continued to work on the issue of
terrorism121. The General Assemblys Sixth (legal) Committee has long been working
on a Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism that would finally define terrorism (1).
As for the Security Council, its position on the issue has evolved positively, shifting
from a hard-line policy to a more human-rights friendly approach (2).
1/ The General Assemblys Sixth Committees unwavering will
In the 1990s, the United Nations (UN) adopted a number of documents
intended at setting international standards while dealing with international terrorism.
In the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism annexed to
Resolution 49/60122, the United Nations encouraged Member States to urgently
review the scope of the existing international legal provisions on the prevention,
repression and elimination of terrorism with the aim of ensuring that there is a
119
LN Doc. C.546(I).M.383(I)/1937.V
Encyclopedia Of World History: Crisis and Achievement 1900 to 1950, vol.V, Golson Books, 2008, p.
xxv.
121
For a detailed history of the United Nations work on terrorism until 1999, see UNCHR (SubCommission), Report by Special Rapporteur Kalliopi K. KOUFA on Terrorism and Human Rights , UN
Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/ no27 (1999), para. 6 to 15. For the history of international effort to deal with
terrorism between 1999 and 2001, see UNCHR (Sub-Commission), Report by Special Rapporteur Kalliopi
K. KOUFA on Terrorism and Human Rights , UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/31 (2001).
122
UN DOC A/RES/49/60 adopted at the 84th plenary meeting of the UNGA on 9 December 1994.
120
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26
123
27
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(ii) The activities of State armed forces in armed conflicts and in exercise of
their official duties
The question whether the activities of States armed forces should be exempted
from the scope of the convention or not was another source of discord. The activities
of State armed forces at stake are not only those during an armed conflict, but also
the activities in exercise of their official duties. IHL governs the activities of States
armed forces in armed conflict. As such, those activities should be excluded from the
scope of the Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism129. Making this distinction is a
great achievement for IHL in the sense that it maintains the lex specialis character of
this set of rules.
Human Rights law however is not really promoted by the Comprehensive
Convention on Terrorism. Indeed, as of 3 November 2010 the Working Group in
charge of drafting the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism has
adopted the view that the activities of State armed forces in exercise of their official
duties should not fall under the scope of the Comprehensive Convention inasmuch
as they are governed by other rules of international law130. State terrorism was thus
removed from the scope of the convention, while some delegations believed that the
definition of terrorism must necessarily cover acts of State-sponsored terrorism as
well as acts of State terrorism131. Other delegations however considered that while
State-sponsored terrorism could fall under the scope of the Convention, State
terrorism on the other hand fell under different legal norms, namely the UN
Charter132.
It should be pointed out that there are only two cautious mentions of
international human rights law in the Comprehensive Convention 133 , when this
convention would have been the perfect place to reassert the prevalence of human
rights.
(iii) The relationship between terrorism and anti-colonial and national
liberation movements
The debate surrounding the distinction between freedom fighters and
terrorists revolves around the phrase one mans terrorist is another mans
freedom fighter. This phrase typifies the subjective character of the definition of
terrorism. The attempts to entangle fights for national liberation and terrorism
129
28
originate mostly from the Arab world with the Arab Convention for the Suppression
of Terrorism (see supra). This standpoint however is older than that and can be traced
back to 1987 during the fifth Islamic summit meeting in Kuwait, which stated: The
conference reiterates its absolute faith in the need to distinguish the brutal and
unlawful terrorist activities perpetrated by individuals, by groups, or by states, from
the legitimate struggle of the oppressed and subjugated nations against foreign
occupation of any kind. This struggle is sanctioned by heavenly law, by human
values, and by international conventions134. One cannot read this statement without
linking it to the Palestinian struggle against the Israeli occupation. The Center for
Nonproliferation Studies has identified this issue (namely the relationship between
terrorism and anti-colonial and national liberation movements) as one of the factors
that dissuaded States from adopting a comprehensive approach on terrorism135.
Boaz Ganor extensively dealt with this issue in an article entitled Defining
Terrorism: Is One Mans Terrorist Another Mans Freedom Fighter? in which he
argues that an objective definition of terrorism is not only possible; it is also
indispensable to any serious attempt to combat terrorism136. The solution to prevent
this confusion according to the author of this article would be to operate a clear
distinction between guerilla fighters and terrorists by paralleling IHLs distinction
between military and civilian targets in war. As a matter of fact, Ganor considers that
the goal of terrorists and guerilla fighters is the same (i.e. attain public137 goals);
whereas the means to achieve that goal is different: The guerilla fighters targets are
military ones, while the terrorist deliberately targets civilians 138 . As such, the
legitimacy of the fight for national liberation does not matter and any organization
that targets civilians would be labeled terrorist. Guerilla fighters on the other hand
(lets take for example the Syrian rebels, or the Lybian National Transitional
Committee) would be considered as legitimate combatants protected by the Geneva
Conventions provided they respect the laws and rules of war. Bringing terrorists to
abide by the rules of war and respect the sacrosanct principle of distinction would be
a great achievement for Counter-Terrorism 139 . Ganors standpoint is very
interesting, in the sense that it could answer some delegations need that the
comprehensive convention need to distinguish[terrorism] from the legitimate
struggle of peoples in the exercise of their right to self- determination from foreign
occupation or colonial domination140.
134
AL-ANBAA, The Fifth Islamic Summit Convention Decisions, Kuwait, qtd. in B. GANOR, Defining
Terrorism: Is One Mans Terrorist Another Mans Freedom Fighter?, PPR, 2002, vol. 3, n 4. Emphasis
added.
135
The other two being (1) the legal definition of terrorism and (2) the activities of State armed forces in
armed conflicts and in exercise of their official duties.
136
B. GANOR, Defining Terrorism: Is One Mans Terrorist Another Mans Freedom Fighter?, PPR, 2002,
vol. 3, n 4, p. 288.
137
Public meaning political, ideological or religious.
138
B. GANOR, Defining Terrorism: Is One Mans Terrorist Another Mans Freedom Fighter?, PPR, 2002,
vol. 3, n 4, p. 288.
139
Id. p. 289
140
UN Doc A/63/100.
29
RJOI 2013 n 16
30
31
RJOI 2013 n 16
145
B. SAUL, Defining Terrorism in International Law, Oxford Monographs in International Law, 2006, p.
48.
146
The Counter Terrorism Center regularly issues reports that are available at
http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/ctitf/reportsandpubs.shtml.
147
B. SAUL, Defining Terrorism in International Law, Oxford Monographs in International Law, 2006, p 49.
148
UNSC Res 1373 (28 September 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1373.
RJOI 2013 n 16
32
Resolution, the only allusion to human rights is made in para. 3 (f) when the Security
Council [c]alls upon all States to [] take appropriate measures in conformity with
the relevant provisions of national and international law, including international
standards of human rights, before granting refugee status, for the purpose of
ensuring that the asylum-seeker has not planned facilitated or participated in the
commission of terrorist acts.
There is a strong discrepancy in terms of assertiveness between the Security
Councils mere Call[ing] upon States to take measures in conformity with
international human rights before granting refugee status on the one side and its
Deci[sion] that all States shall criminalize terrorism on the other side. This
illustrates that the protection of human rights was clearly the least of the SCs
preoccupations at the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001. The preamble
of SC Res 1373 Reaffirm[s] the need to combat by all means, in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused
by terrorist acts after (in order of appearance) Reaffirming the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence as recognized by the Charter of the United
Nations as reiterated in resolution 1368 (2001). The implications deriving from this
are manifold.
Notwithstanding the fact that the recognition of the right to individual or
collective self-defense as a response to the 9/11 attacks is debatable149, this placed the
fight against terrorism in the armed conflict paradigm regulated by international
humanitarian law (IHL)150. This resolution reasserts the need to comply with the
obligations derived from the United Nations Charter after reaffirming that terrorism
had to be fought by all means. Compliance with the UN Charter is thus not of
paramount importance anymore.
This literal study shows that at the time of the adoption of SC Res 1373 the
main objective was to fight terrorism by all means, even by means of fighting it in
an armed conflict paradigm. Then comes the recommendation to respect the UN
Charter, which has already been partially derogated from by the Security Councils
recognition of the right to individual and collective self-defense against the attacks of
9/11. Finally, deriving from the already diminished UN Charter comes the protection
of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as prescribed by Art.1 para.3 of the
149
For an idea of the issues at stake, see F. MGRET, War? Legal Semantics and the Move to Violence ,
EJIL, 2002, vol.13, n 2, p. 361-399 ; G. SITARAMAN, Counterinsurgency, the War on Terror, and the Laws
of War , VLR, 2009, vol. 95, n 7, p. 1745-1839 ; ICRC, How is the Term Armed Conflict defined in
International Humanitarian Law? , 2008, available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinionpaper-armed-conflict.pdf ; A. CONTE, B. GANOR, Legal and Policy Issues in Establishing an International
Framework for Human Rights Compliance When Countering Terrorism , IPICT, 2005, 44 p., available at
http://www.ict.org.il/Portals/0/Articles/20471-Ganor_Conte_Human_Rights.pdf
150
Numerous violations of IHL in the conduct of the War on Terror have been accounted for. See ICRC,
International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, 30/IC/07/8.4, 68 p.
33
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Charter outlining the purposes and principles of the United Nations151. After 9/11 the
main concern of the Security Council was to protect the security of States at the
expense of the protection of human rights, which was then considered a luxury no
one could afford.
b/ The Security Councils awakening
SC Res 1456 represents a turning point in the Security Councils fight against
terrorism. Adopted on January 20, 2003, it marks the moment when the SC realized
that the fight against terrorism could only be conducted in accordance with the UN
Charter of course, but also with the whole of international law. Para.6 of SC Res
1456 provides: States must ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism
comply with all their obligations under international law, and should adopt such
measures in accordance with international law, in particular international human
rights, refugee, and humanitarian law []152.
This resolution sparked off the transformation of the Counter Terrorism
Committee and resulted in the establishment of the Counter Terrorism Executive
Directorate (CTED) with SC Res 1535153. The CTED was mandated to liaise with the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)154 so
as to assist the Committee in its efforts to move towards a more pro-active policy on
human rights. As the leading UN entity on human rights [and thanks to its] unique
mandate provided by the international community to promote and protect all human
rights for all people 155, the OHCHRs partnership with the CTC was a welcome
addition for the cause of human rights while countering terrorism.
Before the creation of the OHCHR the principal mechanism and international
forum concerned with the promotion and protection of human rights at the United
Nations level was the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR),
established on 10 December 1946 at the first meeting of the United Nations Social
and Economic Council156. As early as 1996 (five years before 9/11 when terrorism
became the United Nations center of attention) the UNCHRs Sub-Commission on
151
Art. 1 para. 3 of the Charter of the United Nations provides that one of the purposes of the United Nations
is: [] To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social,
cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion [].
152
UNSC Res 1456 (20 January 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1456.
153
UNSC Res 1535 (26 March 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1535.
154
Presided by Navanethem Pillay, the OHCHR was established by the UNGA on 20 December 1993 and is
under the authority of the UN Secretariat.
155
OHCHR, Report 2010, p. 5, available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/ohchrreport2010/web_version/media/pdf/0_Whole_Report.pdf
156
The United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is responsible for promoting higher
standards of living, full employment, and economic and social progress; identifying solutions to
international economic, social and health problems; facilitating international cultural and educational
cooperation; and encouraging universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/about/
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34
157
UNCHR (Sub-Commission), Report by Special Rapporteur Kalliopi K. KOUFA on Terrorism and Human
Rights, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/31 (2001), para.1
158
UNCHR (Sub-Commission), Report by Special Rapporteur Kalliopi K. KOUFA on Terrorism and Human
Rights, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/27 (1999), para.43
159
UNCHR (Sub-Commission), Report by Special Rapporteur Kalliopi K. KOUFA on Terrorism and Human
Rights, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/31 (2001), para.1
160
OHCHR, Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, UN Doc
E/CN.4/RES/2005/80. Sections (a) to (e) of art.14 outline the mandate of the special rapporteur. They
provide that the special rapporteurs role is:
(a) To make concrete recommendations on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms while countering terrorism, including, at the request of States, for the provision of advisory
services or technical assistance on such matters;
(b) To gather, request, receive and exchange information and communications from and with all relevant
sources, including Governments, the individuals concerned, their families, their representatives and their
organizations, including through country visits, with the consent of the State concerned, on alleged
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, with special attention to
areas not covered by existing mandate holders;
(c) To identify, exchange and promote best practices on measures to counter terrorism that respect human
rights and fundamental freedoms;
(d) To work in close coordination with other special rapporteurs, special representatives, working groups
and independent experts of the Commission on Human Rights, the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights and other relevant United Nations bodies;
(e) To develop a regular dialogue and discuss possible areas of cooperation with all relevant actors,
including Governments, relevant United Nations bodies, specialized agencies and programmes, in particular
with the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the Security Council, the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime, human rights mandate.
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Security Council was partly responsible for that because it encouraged States to
toughen their anti-terrorism legislations and it gave them a free pass to do so by not
setting a framework respectful of international human rights and international
humanitarian law through its decision not to define terrorism.
Despite terrorism having slowly parted from the center of attention since the
economic crisis and the death of Osama Bin Laden, it is still a matter that cannot be
dealt with half-heartedly. If terrorism is such a concern, it is because it jeopardizes
the ideal that free human beings [enjoy] civil and political freedom and freedom
from fear []161. The legal uncertainty surrounding the notion of terrorism is such
that one cannot be sure that ones freedom from the fear of having ones rights
hindered via counterterrorism will be guaranteed. What is particularly true for States
like China and Syria also applies to international counterterrorism efforts. The
international community has to agree on a binding Comprehensive Convention on
Terrorism that stresses the importance of upholding human rights while countering
terrorism. It is essential because human-rights abusive counterterrorism operations
could be considered as State, State-sponsored or United Nations sponsored terrorism.
161
Preamble, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into
force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR), emphasis added.
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