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D'ÉPISTÉMOLOGIE
Publication du Groupe de Recherche en Épistémologie Comparée
Directeur: Robert Nadeau
Département de philosophie
Université du Québec à Montréal

The Basic Logic of Action

Daniel Vanderveken

e
Cahier nº 9907 258 numéro

http://www.philo.uqam.ca
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Dépôt légal – 2e trimestre 1999

Bibliothèque Nationale du Québec
Bibliothèque Nationale du Canada
ISSN 0228-7080
ISBN 2-89449-058-5

© 1999 Daniel Vanderveken

2
 THE BASIC LOGIC OF ACTION

Daniel Vanderveken

Département de philosophie
Université du Québec, Trois-Rivières
Canada G9A 5H7

Daniel_Vanderveken@uqtr.uquebec.ca

I am grateful to Elias Alves, Francisco E.F. de Aragãon, Nuel Belnap, Brahim Chaib-Draa, Hans
Kamp, J-Nicolas Kaufmann, André Leclerc, Ken MacQueen, Michel Paquette, John Searle, Philippe de
Rouilhan, Candida Jaci de Sousa Melo, Ricardo Sousa Silvestre and Denis Vernant for their critical remarks.
I also thank the Fonds FCAR pour l'aide et la recherche au Québec, the Brasilian C.N.P.Q. and the Social
Sciences and Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Councils of Canada for grants that have supported
this research.

3
4
 The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the logic of action by analyzing the logical form
of propositions representing actions. I will only consider here individual actions that a single agent
performs at one moment. Examples of such actions are intended body movements like raising the
arm, some effects of these movements in the world and elementary illocutionary acts such as
assertions and questions which are performed at one moment of utterance. Individual actions
performed at one moment are part of all other kinds of action that agents can perform. They are part
of collective actions like shaking hands which are perform jointly by several agents and of higher
level actions like driving a car which last during an interval of several moments of time.
In my ideal language, propositions representing actions are of the canonical form: individual
agent a does that A (or acts so as to bring about that A), where that A is a proposition representing
what the agent does (the content of his action). In order to formulate my logic of action, I will
attempt to answer general philosophical questions: Do we always intend to perform the actions that
we carry out? If not, what is the logical form of proper intentional actions? What are their success
conditions? And what are the logical relations that exist between our intentional and unintentional
actions? Some types of action commit the agent to performing other types of action. For example, it
is not possible to stand up without moving. What are the basic laws governing agentive
commitment? In particular, how can an agent perform certain actions by way of performing other
actions? Are all actions performed by an agent at a moment generated by a single basic intentional
action of that agent at that moment? What are the different kinds of generation of actions and how
can we explicate them?
Furthermore, what kind of theory of truth do we need in the logic of action? By way of
performing actions agents bring about facts in the world. They make true propositions representing
these facts. How are success and truth related? What are the laws of identity for types and tokens of
action? Which predications do we make in expressing propositions representing actions? What is
the nature of their attributes? How do we determine in thought their truth conditions? What kinds of
valid inferences are we able to make from and to propositions representing courses of action ? In
particular, how are they logically related by strong, analytic and strict implication?
The structure of this paper is the following. I will first make philosophical remarks regarding
the nature of actions and propositions representing actions. I will formulate basic criteria of
adequacy for the theory of action and I will try to explicate the intrinsic intentionality of action. In
order to analyze agentive propositions I will further develop predicative propositional logic. Unlike

5
classical propositional logic, predicative propositional logic takes into consideration the acts of
predication that we make in expressing propositions in order to explicate their structure of
constituents and the way in which we understand their truth conditions.1 On the basis of these
considerations I will critize and further develop Chellas [1992]' and Belnap [1991-2]'s classical
logic of agency. I will formulate the ideal ideographic object language of a more comprehensive
logic of individual action containing a logic of attempt. I will also present the model-theoretical
semantics and the axiomatic system of that new logic. Finally, in the last section, I will state
important valid laws governing actions and action generation. The present logic of action is a first
step. I will study later the logical form of collective and higher level actions. I will also integrate
the logic of action in illocutionary logic.

1. PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

In contemporary philosophy of action2, philosophers are mainly concerned with intentional

actions. Intentional actions are actions that agents attempt to perform in the world. So intentional
actions contain a simultaneous intention in action. However, our intentional actions have unintented
effects in the world. Thus in shooting intentionally in a certain direction an agent might
unintentionally kill someone. From a logical point of view, the proposition that Oedipus killed
Laïus is true if Oedipus acted so as to cause Laïus’ death no matter whether he did that on purpose
or not. So the logic of action has to consider intentional as well as unintentional actions in its theory
of truth. For using verbs of action in declarative sentences, we can make true reports of
unintentional actions. I will formulate a logic of action where intentional actions are primary as in
contemporary philosophy of action. In my view, any action that an agent performs unintentionally
could in principle be intentional. Moreover any unintentional action of an agent is an effect of
intentional actions of that agent. However, not all unintended effects of intentional actions are the
contents of unintentional actions. But only those that are historically contingent and that the agent
could attempt to perform. So many events which happen to us in our life are not really actions.
As Belnap [1988,1991] pointed out, action, branching time and historic modalities are
logically related. There is the liberty of voluntary action. Our intentional actions are not fully

1
See Vanderveken [1990-91], 1995, 1997, 1999, forthcoming
2
See Searle [1983], Goldman [1970] and Bratman [1987].

6
determined. Whenever we do something, we could have done otherwise. We could have tried to do
something else. Moreover, our present actions could have many different incompatible effects. So it
is preferable to work out a logic of action that is compatible with indeterminism. According to
indeterminism, several incompatible moments of time might follow the same moment in the future
of the world. So in branching time any moment of time can belong to several histories representing
possible courses of the world with the same past and present but different historic continuations of
that moment. As is the case for future propositions, the truth of propositions representing courses of
actions is relative to both moments of time and histories representing possible courses of the world.
In classical philosophical logic (whether modal3, temporal4, intensional5, agentive6 or
epistemic), propositions are usually reduced following Carnap [1956] to their truth conditions. So
strictly equivalent propositions (which are true in the same circumstances7) are identified. However
it is clear that strictly equivalent propositions are not substituable salva veritate within the scope of
verbs of action and attitudes. Whenever Oedipus acts so as to bring about that Laïus is dead, he
does not eo ipso act so as to bring about that Laïus is dead and identical with himself. In order to
act intentionally an agent must have in mind the success conditions of his action. He must know
what he is trying to do. Moreover, in my view, he cannot do what he could not intend to do. Human
agents are minimally rational. They never intend to perform actions of bringing about a fact that
they know to be unpreventable. Oedipus could not act so as to bring about that Laïus be identical
with himself. For he knows that this is necessarily the case no matter what he would do. Similarly
we cannot act so as to bring about something in the past. For we cannot intend to have done
something. So the propositional content conditions of intentions are success conditions of actions.
Any content of a successful action must satisfy these propositional content conditions.
From a philosophical point of view, then, we need a criterion of propositional identity
stronger than strict equivalence in the logic of action. We cannot identify, as it is commonly done
in classical logics of action, each proposition with the set of circumstances in which it is true. We
need to consider the structure of constituents of propositions in order to analyze adequately
intentional actions. Laïus is Oedipus’ father. So by way of killing Laïus Oedipus eo ipso killed his

3
See R. Barcan Marcus [1993] and S. Kripke [1963] .
4
See Prior [1967], Thomason [1984], Belnap [1992].
5
See R. Montague [1974].
6
See the special issue on action of Studia Logica in 1992.
7
This notion of circumstance is due to D. Kaplan [1979]. Circumstances can be possible worlds, moments of time,
possibles contexts of use, etc. depending on the logic under consideration. In the logic of branching time, circumstances

7
father. However he did not know then that Laïus was his father. So he did not intentionally kill his
father when he killed Laïus. In order to account for such facts, I will proceed here to a finer
analysis in terms of predication8 of the logical type of propositions. My first purpose is to enable
propositional logic to distinguish the contents of intentional actions which are different. My second
purpose is to enable the logic of action to formalize adequately the laws of agentive commitment.
As I [1990-91, 1995,1997] have pointed out repeatedly, we make acts of reference and of
predication in expressing propositions. So all kinds of propositions have a more complex logical
structure than truth conditions. First, they have propositional constituents: concepts which serve to
refer and attributes (properties or relations) which are predicated. They are composed from atomic
propositions which predicate attributes of objects of reference under concepts9. By definition, an
atomic proposition is true in a circumstance when the objects which fall under its concepts have the
attribute that it predicates to them in that very circumstance. Strictly equivalent propositions
composed from different atomic propositions are by nature different. We have to make different
acts of predication in order to have them in mind. So the proposition that the king of Thebes is dead
is different from the proposition that he is dead and that he is identical with himself.
Moreover, in understanding the truth conditions of propositions we do not determine their
truth value in different circumstances, as logicians influenced by Carnap wrongly believe. Rather,
we determine that their truth in a circumstance is compatible with certain possible truth conditions
of their atomic propositions and incompatible with all others. Thus in understanding an elementary
proposition we know that it is true in a circumstance if and only if its unique atomic proposition is
true in that circumstance. But we do not eo ipso know whether it is true or false in that very
circumstance. We can refer to an object under a concept without knowing which object falls under
that concept. We can predicate a property of an object without knowing whether that object has that
property. From a cognitive point of view, atomic propositions have many possible truth conditions:
they can be true in all circumstances, they can be true in one circumstance and false in all others,
they can be true in two circumstances and false in all others, and so on. From a logical point of
view, possible truth conditions are functions which associate with each circumstance under
consideration a certain truth value. So if n is the number of circumstances taken into consideration

are pairs of moments of time and histories.

8
For a short general philosophical presentation of my logic of propositions, see D. Vanderveken [1991], [1995], [1999]
and «Modality in the Logic of Propositions » and “What is the Logical Form of a Proposition?” [forthcoming]
9
In my propositional logic, two atomic propositions are identical when they have the same propositional constituents

8
in an interpretation, there are 2n different possible truth conditions to consider in that interpretation.
Among all possible truth conditions of an atomic proposition there are of course its actual truth
conditions, which give as value the truth in a circumstance if and only if the objects which fall
under its concepts satisfy its attribute in that circumstance. Objects of reference have properties and
stand in relations in each circumstance. Atomic propositions have therefore a well determined truth
value in any circumstance given the extension of their attribute and concepts and the order of their
predication. But we are not omniscient. Our objects of reference could have many other properties
and stand in many other relations. So in our use and comprehension of language we consider a lot
of possible truth conditions of expressed atomic propositions and not only their actual truth
conditions, as Carnap advocated. In understanding an elementary proposition, we in general only
know that its truth in a circumstance is compatible with all and only the possible truth conditions of
its atomic proposition under which that atomic proposition is true in that very circumstance.
There are few propositions that we know a priori to be true (or false). The truth of most
propositions is compatible with various possible ways in which objects could be. Think of most
disjunctions, past and future propositions, historic possibilities, etc. For example, in order that the
proposition that Laïus was wounded be true in a given circumstance, it is sufficient that Laïus be
wounded in at least one previous circumstance. So the truth of that temporal proposition in any
circumstance is compatible with a lot of possible truth conditions of the atomic proposition which
predicates of Laïus the property of being wounded.
As Wittgenstein pointed out in the Tractatus, they are two limit cases of propositions:
tautologies that we know a priori to be necessarily true and contradictions that we know a priori to
be necessarily false by virtue of linguistic competence. In my conception of truth, tautologies are
propositions whose truth in any circumstance is compatible with all possible truth conditions of
their atomic propositions. And contradictions are propositions whose truth in any circumstance is
not compatible with any possible truth condition of their atomic propositions.
When the truth of two propositions is compatible with different possible truth conditions of
their atomic propositions, these propositions do not have the same cognitive values. We do not
understand in the same way their truth conditions even when they are strictly equivalent and have
the same atomic propositions. This is why we need in philosophical logic a finer theory of truth
than Carnap’s explication of truth conditions. So we have to distinguish in philosophical logic

(the same attribute and objects under concepts) and the same truth conditions (they are true in the same circumstances).

9
universally true (and false) propositions - that are true (and false) in all circumstances - from
tautologies (and contradictions) composed of the same atomic propositions. Consider the
elementary proposition that whales are fishes and the contradictory proposition that whales are and
are not fishes. They are both composed from the same atomic proposition which predicate of
whales the property of being fishes. And they are also strictly equivalent: they are false in all
circumstances. However it is clear that these two propositions have different cognitive values. We
all know a priori that the contradictory proposition is false but we might believe that the
elementary proposition is true. It was an historic discovery that whales are mammals. Unlike
traditional logic, my logic of truth explains easily such a cognitive difference in terms of
predication. The truth of these propositions is not compatible with the same possible truth
conditions of their single atomic proposition. On the one hand, the truth of the contradiction is not
compatible with any possible truth condition of its atomic proposition. We know that by virtue of
competence. So we cannot believe it. On the other hand, a lot of possible truth conditions of the
same atomic proposition are compatible with the truth of the elementary proposition in any
circumstance. So we can believe that whales are fishes. And we can try to do impossible things on
the basis of that false belief.
In my approach, propositions have then two distinct (but logically related) features. First,
they are composed of a finite positive number of atomic propositions. Second, their truth in each
circumstance is compatible with a unique set of possible truth conditions of their atomic
propositions. The main objective of the theory of truth is to define inductively that unique set for
each proposition and circumstance. In the philosophical tradition from Aristotle to Tarski, the truth
of a proposition is based on its correspondence with reality. In order that a proposition be true in a
circumstance, the things which fall under its concepts in that circumstance must be as that
proposition represents them in that very circumstance. Otherwise, there would be no
correspondence. So a proposition is by definition true in a circumstance in predicative
propositional logic if and only if the actual truth conditions of all its atomic propositions are
compatible with the truth of that proposition in that very circumstance. As we will see, we can
derive from that concise definition all the classical laws of the theory of truth.
In order to analyze in terms of predication the logical form of propositions representing
actions, I will proceed on the basis of the following principles:

10
 1. As regards constituent atomic propositions
Unlike truth functions, modal, temporal and agentive operations on propositions enrich the
set of their atomic propositions. So we make modal and temporal predications in expressing modal
and temporal propositions. For example, in asserting that it is necessary that the pope not make
mistakes we predicate of him the modal property of infallibility, which is the necessitation of the
property of not making mistakes. Similarly, in asserting that the Giants will win we predicate of
them the temporal property of being future winners. We also make new modal, temporal and
agentive predications in expressing propositions representing courses of action. Thus in asserting
that someone is making the hostages free we predicate of an agent the property of freeing hostages,
which is an agentive property. Similarly in asserting that Al Gore is a candidate for an election, we
predicate of him the agentive property of making an attempt to be elected. Prefixes like "en" serve
to compose agentive predicates in English. Thus to enable is to make able and to enrich is to make
rich. (More on modal, temporal and agentive attributes later.)

2. As regards truth conditions

As I said earlier, in order to analyze the truth conditions of agentive propositions we need to
consider both moments of time and histories. In the logic of branching time, a moment is a possible
state of the world at a certain instant and the temporal relation of anteriority / posteriority between
moments is partial rather than linear because of indeterminism. On the one hand, there is a single
causal route to the past: each moment m is preceded by at most one past moment m'. And all
moments are historically connected: any two distinct moments have a common historical ancestor
in their past. On the other hand, there are multiple future routes: several incompatible moments
might follow upon a given moment. For facts, events or actions occurring at a moment can have
incompatible future effects. Consequently, the set of moments of time has the formal structure of a
tree-like frame which can be represented as follows:

m7 m8 m9 m10 m11 m12 m13 m14 m15

11
 m3 m4 m5 m6

m1 m2

m0

A maximal chain h of moments of time is called a history. It represents a possible course of

history of our world. The truth at a moment of a future proposition depends on which historical
continuation h of that moment is under consideration. Like Belnap [1994] I do not believe that
there is a distinguished history, the Thin Red Line, that represents the one and only actual course of
history of all of our world. So I will say that the future proposition that it will be the case that A (in
symbols Will:A) is true at a moment m according to a history h when the proposition that A is true
at a moment m' posterior to m according to that very history.10
Given the causal ordering relation, some histories h and h' are undivided at certain moments
m; they have the same present and past at these moments. In that case, moment m and all moments
m' anterior to that moment belong to both histories h and h' . The relation of having the same
present and past at a moment m (in symbols ≅m ) is an equivalence relation which partitions the set
of histories to which m belongs into a family of exhaustive and pairwise disjoint subsets, each of
which keeps undivided histories at the next moment together. Each set of histories in the partition is
an elementary immediate possibility after m . If there is only one such subset in the partition, the
moment m is deterministic. Otherwise, it is undeterministic.
Two moments of time are simultaneous in my terminology when they are preceded by the
same past moments. For example, moments m7 , m8 and m9 are simultaneous in the last figure.
Simultaneous moments belong to the same instant. Thanks to instants, branching logic can analyze
important modal notions such as historic necessity (in the sense of now unpreventability)11 and

10
According to the actualist point of view (that Occam was the first to advocate). the future proposition WillA is rather
true at a moment m if and only if the proposition that A is true at a moment m' posterior to m according to the particular
history that represents the actual historic continuation of that moment. See Belnap [1994]’s arguments against
actualism.
11
As Prior [1967] says, now unpreventable are “those outside our power to make true or false”

12
historic possibility. Consider the proposition that it is then necessary that A (in symbols □A) in the
sense that it could not have been otherwise than A: it is true at a moment m according a history h in
branching logic when the proposition that A is true at all moments m' simultaneous with m

according to the histories h' to which they belong. Whenever □A is true at a moment m, A
represents a fact that is inevitable at that moment.
Some histories are related with respect to agents and simultaneous moments of time by
virtue of the actions of these agents. So are histories which are compatible with all the actions
that an agent a performs at a moment m. They are all, as Chellas [1992] says, "under the control of
- or responsive to the actions of" agent a at that moment m. As Belnap and Perloff [1990,1992]
pointed out, the relation of compatibility with actions is an equivalence relation between histories
which satisfies important clauses such as the historical relevance condition. If two histories are
compatible with all the actions that agent a performs at moment m , they have the same past at that
moment. The possible effects so to speak of the actions of an agent at a moment are limited to those
that are possible outcomes of the way the world has been up to that moment. By hypothesis, all
histories h to which a moment m belongs, are responsive to all actions of all agents at that moment.
So are other histories h’ with the same past where these actions have had other effects. And the
relation of compatibility with actions is symmetric and transitive.
Thanks to the new compatibility relation, the logic of action can analyze the proposition that
A is true given what agent a does (in symbols ∆aA). It is true at a moment m according to a history
h 12 when the proposition that A is true at all simultaneous moments m' according to all histories h'
compatible with the actions of agent a at m. Chellas [1992] tends to identify the very notion of
action with the normal modal operation corresponding to ∆. However any proposition of the form
∆aA is true whenever A is historically necessary. But it is quite clear that no agent could act so as
to bring about an inevitable fact. Inevitable facts exist no matter what we do. So, as Belnap pointed
out, in order that the proposition that an agent a see to it that A (in symbols [a stit:A] be true, we
have to require furthermore that it is not then necessary that A.
In spite of its sophistication, Belnap's logical analysis of action leads to problems. On one
hand, Belnap has the merits of taking seriously into consideration the temporal and causative order

12
In the logic of branching time and action, circumstances are pairs of a moment of time m and history h where m ∈ h.
So when I say that a proposition is true at a moment m according to a history h, I always assume that m belongs to h.

13
of the world. His logic is compatible with science. But he neglects the intentionality of action. For
that reason, he does not succeed in formalizing adequately agentive commitment. First, in Belnap’s
logic, agents carry out too many actions at too many moments even when they do not exist . Any
contingent proposition which is true at all simultaneous moments according to all histories
compatible with the actions that an agent performs at moment m is the content of an action of that
agent at that moment (whenever he or she has made the corresponding possible choice at an
anterior moment)13. Furthermore, whenever a proposition that A strictly implies another
proposition that B, an agent a cannot see to it that A without eo ipso seeing to it that A ∧ B, even
when the proposition that B has nothing to do with what that agent is doing or trying to do at that
moment. So Belnap predicts too many agentive commitments.
It is better to try to work out a logic of action that takes into account the intentionality of
action. A fundamental principle of my logic is that any token of action could be intentional. Each
agent who performs an action at a moment could in principle have attempted to perform that action
at that moment. Moreover all actions of an agent are consequences of intentional actions of that
agent. As we will see, these principles are the key of an adequate explication of agentive
commitment. On my account, the logic of action must then incorporate a logic of attempt. So I
will enrich its ideal object language by introducing a new logical constant Tries: in order to express
propositions of the form: agent a attempts to bring about that A (in symbols a Tries:A). Unlike
prior intentions which are mental states that agents have, attempts are mental actions that agents
make. An attempt to do something contains an intention in action14. For to make an attempt is to do
something with the intention to do something else. For example, by raising the arm an agent can
make an attempt to greet someone. From a philosophical point of view, both intentions and
attempts have the same world-to-mind direction of fit. An intention is satisfied when it is carried
out, an attempt when it is successful. Each attempt is directed at a aim and serves a certain purpose.
It succeeds when that agent achieves his or her purpose. Otherwise it is a failure. This is why any
logic of intentional actions (e.g. illocutionary logic) has to contain a theory of their success
conditions.
As Searle pointed out, the successful performance of an intentional action requires more than

13
Belnap and Perloff speak of prior possible choices of agents and refer to von Neumann [1944]'s theory of games in
their logic of action. In my view, it is wrong to assume that any successful action of an agent is an action that that
agent had a prior intention to perform. So I have reformulated their first truth condition of proposition [a stit:A] by
considering intentions in action rather than prior intentions.

14
the truth of its content. In order that an agent succeed to bring about that A, it is not enough that he
or she try and that A be true. It is also necessary that A be true because of his or her attempt. The
agent does not succeed to do that A in case someone else did it.
Along these lines, I will explicate as follows the success conditions of intentional actions. An
agent a intentionally does that A (in symbols: δiaA) when firstly, that agent attempts to do that A
(a Tries:A), secondly, A is true given what he or she does (∆aA) and thirdly, it is not then necessary

that A (¬□A). As we will see, it follows from this explication that if δiaA then ∆a(a Tries:A) ⇔ A.
This is a first step in the explication of intentional causation.
No attempt is determined. There is the freedom of the will. From a philosophical point of
view, attempts are a special kind of action. On the one hand, all attempts are intentional actions.
An agent cannot make an attempt without intending to make that attempt. On the other hand, all
attempts are successful actions: no agent can fail to make the attempt that he or she is trying to
make. For in trying to make an attempt the agent eo ipso makes that very attempt. An attempt is
essentially a mental act. An agent who tries to make a movement could fail (he is paralyzed). But
he has at least mentally tried to make that movement. So he has had the corresponding intention in
action.
In order to analyze propositions of the form a Tries:A representing attempts of agents, I will
consider in each model of my logic of action the set containing all propositions that represent what
each agent attempts to do at each moment. From a philosophical point of view, important meaning
postulates like the freedom of the will and the minimal rationality of agents govern the nature of
attempts. Firstly, no agent can intend to bring about something that he or she knows to be necessary
or impossible. So tautologies and contradictions cannot represent the purposes of our attempts.
Secondly, each attempt is directed at a present or future purpose. No agent can attempt to do
something in the past. So propositions which represent the purposes of our attempts are true at the
moment of that attempt or at a later moment. And thirdly, the set of our purposes is not partially
closed under strict but under strong implication. A proposition P strongly implies another Q in my
theory of truth whenever firstly, that proposition has all the atomic propositions of Q and secondly,
all possible truth conditions of atomic propositions which are compatible with its truth at any
moment according to any history are also compatible with the truth of Q at that moment according

14
The notions of direction of fit and intention in action are explained in Searle [1983].

15
to that history. As I pointed out, knowledge is closed under strong implication. Whenever a
proposition P strongly implies another proposition Q, an agent cannot have it in mind without
knowing that if P then Q. For proposition P in that case is identical with the conjunction (P ∧ Q).
So he or she cannot try to do what P represents without also trying to do what Q represents (when
that is a possible purpose of an attempt).
On the basis of these considerations, I will explicate as follows the general notion of
(intentional or unintentional) action. I will say that an agent a acts so as to bring about that A (in
symbols δaA) at a moment m according to a history h in the following conditions: firstly it is true
that A given what agent a does at that moment according to that history (∆aA), secondly it is not

necessary that A at that moment (¬□A), thirdly agent a could attempt to bring about that A

(¬□¬a Tries:A), and fourthly he or she brings about that A by way of performing an intentional
action (more on this later).
Notice that the notions of success and failure are relative to intentional actions. By
definition, no agent can succeed or fail without making an attempt. So it is wrong to say that
unintentional actions are successful. An agent does not properly succeed to perform his or her
unintentional actions. It just happens that he or she performs them. As philosophers of action
pointed out, some of our actions, called basic actions, are by nature intentional. So are voluntary
body movements, meaningful utterances and illocutionary acts. In order to perform a basic action
an agent must make an attempt to perform it. Consequently, basic actions are always successful
when they are performed. Some intentional actions are more basic than others. For example,
successful illocutionary acts are performed by way of making utterances. Acts of communication
are made by way of performing illocutionary acts. Perlocutionary acts are effects of illocutionary
acts. I will say hereafter that an agent basically does A at a moment m when he or she performs at
that moment all his or her intentional actions by way of doing A. In my theory, all individual
actions that an agent performs at one moment are consequences of the unique action that he or she
basically performs at that moment. (That basic action is in general an attempt of body movement.)

II THE IDEAL OBJECT-LANGUAGE

The ideal object propositional language L of the logic of action is an extension of the

16
object-language of the minimal logic of propositions15 which contains the following syntactic
resources:

Vocabulary of L
The ideal object-language L contains in its lexicon:
(1) A series of individual variables
x,x',x’’’...,y,y',y’’’,... ranging for agents
(2) a series of propositional variables
p,p',p'',... , q,q’,q’’’,…ranging for propositions, and
(3) the syncategorematic expressions:

True , = , > , ∧ , □ , Tries: , ∆ , Will: , Was: , ¬ , ∀ , ( and ) .

Rules of formation of L
The set LP of propositional terms
Propositional variables are propositional terms. If AP and BP are propositional terms and x is

an individual variable, then ¬AP , □AP , Will:AP , Was:AP , x Tries:AP , ∆xAP and (AP ∧ BP ) are
new complex propositional terms.
Propositional variables express propositions (under assignments of values to their free

variables). ¬AP expresses the negation of the proposition expressed by AP . □AP expresses the
modal proposition that AP is then necessary (i.e. that it could not have been otherwise than AP).
Will:AP expresses the future proposition that it will be the case that AP . Was:AP expresses the past
proposition that it has been the case that AP . x Tries:AP expresses the proposition that agent x
attempts to do AP . ∆xAP expresses the proposition that AP is true given what agent x does.16 (AP ∧
BP ) expresses as usual the conjunction of the two propositions expressed by AP and BP .

The set L of sentences

The elementary sentences of L
If AP and BP are propositional terms then True(AP) , (AP > BP) and (AP = BP) are

15
D. Vanderveken [1991] [1995]
16
∆ is the logical constant of Chellas' [1992] logic of agency.

17
elementary sentences.
A sentence of the form True(AP) is true at a moment in a history under an assignment σ of
values to its variables when the proposition expressed by AP under that assignment is true at that
moment in that history. Sentence (AP > BP) is true at a moment in a history under an assignment σ
when the propositions expressed by AP and BP under assignment σ are such that the first has all
atomic propositions of the second. Sentence (AP = BP) is true under an assignment σ at a moment
in a history when the propositions expressed by AP and BP under σ are identical.
The complex sentences of L
If A and B are sentences and AP is a propositional term, x is an individual variable and v is

any variable then ¬A, □A, Will:A, Was:A, x Tries:True(AP), ∆xA. ∀vA and (A ∧ B) are new
complex sentences which are interpreted according to the meaning of their logical constants. So
∀vA means that all values of v satisfy A.

Rules of abbreviation
Parentheses will often be omitted according to the rule of the association to the left.
Disjunction: (A ∨ B) =df ¬(¬A ∧ ¬B) whenever A and B ∈ Lp or A and B ∈ L
Material implication: (A ⇒ B) =df ¬(A ∧ ¬B)
Material equivalence: (A ⇔ B) =df (A ⇒ B) ∧ (B ⇒ A)
Existential generalization: ∃vA =df ¬∀v ¬A
Unique existential generalization: ∃!vA =df ∃vA ∧ ∀v’([v’/v]A ⇒ v’ = v) where v’ does not
occur in A
Was-always:A =df ¬Was:¬A
Will-always:A =df ¬Will:¬A
Always: A =df Was-always:A ∧ A ∧ Will-always:A
Sometimes:A = Was:A ∨ A ∨ Will:A
Tautological(AP) =df AP = (AP ⇒ AP)

Historical possibility: ◊A =df ¬□¬A

Universal necessity: ■A =df Always: □A

Universal possibility: ♦A =df ¬■¬A

18
 Strict implication: A ∈ B =df (□ (A ⇒ B)

Analytic implication17: A → B =df (A > B ) ∧ A ∈ B

Strong implication: AP ! BP =df (AP > BP) ∧ Tautological (AP ⇒ BP)
Same atomic propositions: A <> B =df (AP > BP) ∧ (BP > AP)

Agency in the sense of Belnap: [x stit:AP] =df (∆xAP) ∧ ¬□AP

Intentional action: δiaAP =df (x Tries:AP) ∧ (∆xAP) ∧ (¬□Ap)

δi xAP means that agent x acts intentionally so as to bring about AP . So when δixAP is true,
agent x succeeds to do AP.

Failure: x fails to do AP =df (x Tries:AP) ∧ ((¬∆xAP) ∨ □Ap)

Action (intentional or not):δxAP =df(∆xAP) ∧ ¬(AP ∧ (◊x Tries:AP) ∧ ∃p(δixp ∧ ∆x(p ⇒ AP))

Non trivial action circumstances: x Acts in situation AP =df ∃p (δxp) ∧ (∆xAP) ∧ ¬□AP
Doing something with a certain purpose:
δx AP with the purpose Bp =df (δixAP) ∧ x Tries:(AP ⇒ BP )
Refraining: x Refrains from doing AP =df δix¬δxAP
The basic action of an agent:
x basically does AP =df δixAP ∧ ∀p (δixp ⇔ (∆x (x Tries AP ⇒ p))

Strong agentive commitment: AP!Bp =df ∀x ■ (δxAP ⇒ δxBP)

Identity of agents: x = y =df (∆xAP = ∆yAP)

In my ideal object language, propositions representing a course of action of an agent are of

18
the canonical form δxAp. Any proposition of the form δxAp is agentive for the agent a in the
sense that it represents an action of that agent, no matter whether Ap is itself agentive for x or not.
So the sentence “Oedipus killed Laïus” represents an action of Oedipus. For it can be paraphrased
as “ Oedipus acted so as to bring about that Laïus is dead”. What agent x does is represented by AP
in δxAP. From an ontological point of view, the content of an action can be a state of affairs, an
event or even an action.

17
The notion of analytic implication is due to W.T. Parry [1933] and [1972]. See also K. Fine [1986].

19
 III THE FORMAL SEMANTICS

A standard model for L is an sevenuple M of the form < Time , Agent, Attempt, Action, Atom,

Val, ∥∥ >, where

(1) Time is a non empty set whose elements m, m',... are moments which represent possible
states of the world at certain instants. ≤ is a partial order on the set Time representing the causal
ordering relation or the temporal relation of anteriority / posteriority. m < m' means that moment
m is in the past of moment m' and that moment m' is in the future of possibilities of m. In a model,
several incompatible moments might all follow upon a given moment. Two moments of time m and
m' are simultaneous (in symbols: m ≈ m’) when they are preceded by the same past moments. To
each set of simultaneous moments corresponds a unique instant which is the instant of these
moments. So any pair of simultaneous moments m and m' represent two possible states in which
things could be at a certain instant.
By definition, < is subject to historical connection and no downward branching. Thus any
two distinct moments m and m' have a common historical ancestor: some moment m''' such that m'''
< m and m''' < m'. Moreover, the past is unique: if there is a moment m'' such that m < m'' and m' <
m'' then either m = m' or m < m' or m' < m .
Consequently, (Time , =) is a tree-like frame. A maximal chain h of moments of Time is
called a history. It represents a possible course of history of our world. Let History be the set of all
histories. Two histories h and h' are undivided at a moment m when they have the same present and
past at these moments. In symbols, h ≅t h' in model M when, for all moments t' ≤ t, t' ∈ h and t' ∈ h'.
The relation of having the same present and past at a moment m is an equivalence relation which
partitions the set History(m) of histories to which m belongs into a family of exhaustive and pairwise
disjoint subsets, each of which keeps undivided histories at the next moment together.
(2) Agent is a non empty set of possible agents.
(3) Atom is an infinite set whose elements are atomic propositions. In the present logic,

18
The terminology is due to Belnap & Perloff [1990].

20
atomic propositions are undefined. However one can define their formal nature using the modal
theory of types. As I [1991] have explained earlier, an atomic proposition ua predicates an attribute
Rn in a certain order of n objects under concepts.19
P[Atom] is an upper modal temporal and agentive semi lattice containing finite sets of
atomic propositions which is closed under union ∪, a unary modal and temporal operation * and,
for each agent a, a specific unary operation ⊕a satisfying the following conditions:
First, for any Γa ⊆ Atom , Γa ⊆*(Γa) and for any Γ1 and Γ2 ⊆ Atom , *(Γ
Γ1 ∪ Γ2) = *(Γ
Γ1) ∪
Γ2) and **(Γ
(Γ Γ1).20
Γ1) = *(Γ
Second, for any Γa ⊆ Atom , ⊕a(Γ
Γa) ⊇ *(Γ
Γa) and any Γ1 and Γ2 ⊆ Atom, ⊕a(Γ
Γ1 ∪ Γ2) = ⊕aΓ1
∪ ⊕aΓ2 and ⊕a⊕aΓ1 = ⊕aΓ1.21
All the elements of P (Atom) are finite sets of atomic propositions from which expressible
propositions can be composed.
(4) Val is the set of all functions val from Atom into P(Time x History) which are valuations
of atomic propositions. When m,h ∈ val(u ), m ∈ h. Each function val assign possible truth
conditions to atomic propositions. m,h ∈ val(ua) means that the atomic proposition is true at
moment m according to history h under that valuation. There is a distinguished valuation valM ∈
Val determining the truth conditions that atomic propositions have in the reality under the model M.
So, for any atomic proposition ua , valM(ua) is the set of all pairs of moments and histories where
that atomic proposition is true according to the model M.

19
From a logical point of view, a (first order extensional) attribute R of degree n is a function from Time x History
into 2 U where 2 = {1,0} and U is the set of individuals. For any u1 ,...,u n ∈ U, < u1 ,...,u n > ∈ R (t,h) means that the
objects u1 ,...,u n possess the attribute R in that order at moment t according to history h. Whenever t ∉ h , R (t,h) =
∅. So an atomic proposition predicating attribute R of the objects which fall under individual concepts c1 ,...,cn in
that order is a pair of the form <{R , c1 ,...,cn } , {(t,h) / < c1 (t,h),...,cn (t,h)> ∈ R (t,h)}> .
20
Suppose the set Γ ⊆ Ua contains an atomic proposition ua predicating an attribute R in a certain order of n objects
under concepts. In a propositional logic with attributes, the new set *(Γ) contains three new atomic propositions
predicating respectively the historic necessitation □R , the temporal futurization WillR and pastization WasR of that
attribute of the same objects in the same order. These modal and temporal attributes have the following extensions:
For any u1 ,...,u n ∈ U, < u1 ,...,u n > ∈ □R (t,h) iff < u1 ,...,u n > ∈ R (t',h') for all moments t' simultaneous with t and
histories h' such that t' ∈ h' . Moreover, < u1 ,...,u n > ∈ Will: R (t,h) iff, for at least one t' > t, < u1 ,...,u n > ∈ R (t',h) .
And similarly for Was:R (t,h) except that t' < t..
21
Suppose the set Γ ⊆ Ua contains an atomic proposition ua predicating an attribute R in a certain order of n objects
under concepts. Then the set ⊕a(Γ) contains in addition to the three elements of *(Γ) two new atomic propositions
saying that these objects have that attribute given what agent a does and what he or she attempts to do. Such new

21
 (5) The Cartesian product Up = P [Atom] x P (Val)Time x History is the set of all propositions
which are expressible in L according to M. The first term, [P] , of a proposition P represents the set
of its atomic propositions. And its second term, P, its truth conditions. So for each moment m
and history h, where m ∈ h, Pm,h is the set containing all assignments of possible truth conditions
to atomic propositions which are compatible with the truth of proposition P at the moment m
according to the history h.
By definition, a proposition P is true at a moment m according to a history h under the model
M when all its atomic propositions have in that model truth conditions which are compatible with its
truth at that moment according to that history; that is to say when there is a valuation f ∈Pm,h
such that, for all atomic propositions ua ∈ [P], f(ua) = valM(ua). A proposition P is a tautology
when, for all m and h, Pm,h = Val and a contradiction when Pm,h = Ø. A proposition P is past
with respect to a moment m* when for some proposition Q, Pm,h = " Qm’,h for all moments
m '< m*

m’ anterior to m*. The conjunction of propositions P and Q is the proposition (P ∧ Q) such that [P
∧Q] = [P] ∪ [Q] and P∧Qm,h = Pm,h ∩ Qm,h .

(6) Attempt is a function from Agent x Time x History into P (Up) which gives as value, for each
agent a, moment m and history h, the set of all propositions that agent a attempts to make true at
that moment according to that history under the model M. For each agent a and proposition P there
is the proposition that agent a Tries: P where [a Tries: P] = ⊕a {P} anda Tries: Pm,h = {f ∈ Val /
for all atomic propositions ua ∈ ⊕a {P}, (f(ua) = valM(ua) if and only if P ∈ Attempt(a,m,h))}.
Attempt satisfies the following clauses:
All attempts are moment determined. If P ∈ Attempt(a,m,h) then, for any history h’ to which
m belongs, P ∈ Attempt(a,m,h’).
Attempts are intentional actions. P ∈ Attempt(a,m,h) if and only if a Tries P ∈
Attempt(a,m,h).
The minimal rationality22 of the agent: Attempt(a,m,h) is a finite set of propositions which

atomic propositions predicate agentive attributes of degree n +1 of a and these objects in the same order.
22
In my view, agents are not perfectly rational. They are not omniscient. They do not even know all necessary
propositions. They can believe in the truth of impossible propositions. They can also believe a proposition without
believing all logical consequences of that proposition. Moreover agents are finite. So they can only make a finite
number of attempts at each moment.

22
satisfy the propositional content conditions of thoughts with the world-to-mind direction of fit: it
does not contain any tautology, contradiction or past proposition with respect to moment m.
Moreover, if Attempt(a,m,h) contains two propositions P1 and P2 then it also contains their
conjunction (P1 ∧ P2). And whenever it contains a conjunction (P1 ∧ P2) it also contains the
conjuncts which satisfy previous propositional content conditions.
The propositional content of an attempt is temporally bound by the moment of that attempt.
An agent who attempts to make true a proposition at a moment attempts to make that proposition
true at that very moment: So if P ∈ Attempt(a,m,h) then, for all moments m', Pm’,h = P m,h.
The freedom of the will: It is not the case that P ∈ Attempt(a,m,h) for all h and m such that,
for a given moment m’, m is simultaneous with m’ and m ∈ h .
The freedom of agents. If a ≠ b then a Tries P ∉ Attempt(b,m,h).

(7) Action is a function from Agent x Time into the Cartesian product History x History.
When h,h' ∈ Actionma , history h' represents in the model M a possible state in which the world

could be at the instant of moment m given all the actions that agent a carries out at that moment
according to history h. So both histories h and h' are compatible with all the courses of action of
agent a at the instant of moment m. By definition, Actionma is subject to the following conditions:
It is an equivalence relation between histories.
The historical relevance condition: If h,h' ∈ Actionma then, for all m' < m , h ≅m' h'.

All the actions that an agent carries out at a certain instant are made in possible states of the
world with a common past.
No distinction between undivided histories. If h ≅m h' then h,h' ∈ Actionma .

Agents cannot do now what can only be done later.

The world goes on. There is at least one history h' such that h,h' ∈ Actionma and h,h' ∈

Actionmb for every two agents a and b.

All attempts are successful actions. Suppose h,h' ∈ Actionma , m' is simultaneous with m and

m’ ∈ h’. If P ∈ Attempt(a,m,h) then it is also the case that P ∈ Attempt(a,m’,h'). So each agent
make the same attempts at simultaneous moments in all histories which are compatible with his or
her actions at a given instant.

23
 (8) ∥ ∥ is an interpreting function which associates with each term under each possible
assignment of values to its free variables the semantic value of that term under that assignment in
model M. By a possible assignment of values to free variables I mean here any function σ from the
set of variables into the set Agent ∪ Up which associates with individual variables agents and with
propositional variables propositions.

By definition, for any individual variable v, σ(v) ∈ Agent and for any propositional variable

p, σ(p) ∈ Up.

The proposition ║Ap║σ expressed by a propositional term Ap ∈ Lp under an assignment σ in

the model M is a pair < [Ap]σ,|Ap|σ > belonging to the Cartesian product P [Content] x P (Val)Time x

. As I already explained, [Ap]σ is the set of atomic propositions of proposition ║Ap║σ. And
History

|Ap|σ represents the way in which we determine the truth conditions of that proposition. So |Ap| σm, h

is the set of all possible truth conditions assignments to atomic propositions which are compatible
with the truth of that proposition at moment m in history h.

║Ap║σ is defined inductively as follows:

(i) For any propositional variable p,║p║σ = σ(p)

(ii) [Bp ∧ Cp]σ = [Bp]σ ∪ [Cp]σ and |Ap ∧ Bp | σm, h . = |Ap| σm, h ∩ |Bp| σm, h .

(iii) [¬Bp]σ = [Bp]σ and |¬Bp| σm, h = Val - |Bp| σm, h .

(iv) [□Bp]σ = *[Bp]σ and |□Bp | σm, h = # {|Bp | σm ', h ' where m' ≈ m and m' ∈ h' .
m '.h '

(v) [Will:Bp]σ = *[Bp]σ and | Will:Ap| σm, h = " |Ap | σm ', h .

m'> m

(vi) [Was:Bp]σ = *[Bp]σ and |Was:Ap| σm, h = " |Ap | σm ', h

m '< m

xσ
(vii) [∆xBp]σ = ⊕ x
σ [Bp]σ and |(∆x(Bp) | σm, h = # |Ap| σm ', h ' where h,h' ∈ Actionsm
m '.h '
and m' ≈ m.
(viii) [x Tries:Bp] σ = [∆xBp] σ and |x Tries:Bp| σm, h = {f ∈ Val / for all atomic propositions ua

∈ [∆xBp] σ, f(ua) = valM(ua) if and only if P ∈ Attempt(a,m,h)}.

24
 The truth definition

We can define inductively as follows the truth conditions of sentences :

- A sentence of the form Ap = Bp is true at a moment m according to an history h under

assignment σ in model M if and only if ║Ap║σ = ║Bp║σ.

- A sentence of the form x Tries:True(Ap) is true at a moment m according to an history h

under σ in M if and only if ∥Ap∥σ ∈ Attempt(∥x∥σ,m,h).

- A sentence of the form True(Ap) is true at a moment m according to an history h under σ in
M if and only if there exists some f ∈ |Ap|σm,h such that for all ua ∈ [Ap] σ , f(ua) = valM(ua).23
- A sentence of the form (Ap > Bp) is true at a moment m according to an history h under
assignment σ in M if and only if [Bp]σ ⊆ [Ap]σ.
- A sentence ¬A is true at a moment m according to an history h under assignment σ in M if
and only if A is false at that moment m according to that history h under σ in M.
- A sentence (A ∧ B) is true at a moment m according to a history h under σ in M if and only
if both sentences A and B are true at moment m according to history h under σ in M.

- A sentence □A is true at a moment m according to a history h under σ in M if and only if

the sentence A is true under σ at all moments m’ simultaneous with m according to all histories h'
to which m' belong.
- A sentence Will:A is true at a moment m according to a history h under σ in M if and only if
the sentence A is true under σ at a moment m’ > m according to history h. (And similarly for Was:
A except that m’ < m.)
- A sentence ∆xA is true at a moment m according to an history h under σ in M if and only if
the sentence A is true under σ in M at all moments m’ simultaneous with m according to all histories
xσ
h' such that (h,h') ∈ Actionsm }.

- Finally, a sentence (∀vA) is true at a moment m according to an history h under assignment

23
This simple semantic clause is equivalent with classical truth postulates: So True(p) is true at moment m according to
σ
history h under assignment σ if and only if m,h ∈ valM(ua) where ua ∈ [p] . True(Will:Ap) is true at moment m in
history h under σ if and only if true(Ap) is true under σ at a moment m' > m in history h' . And similarly for other
propositions.

25
σ in M if and only if the sentence A is true at m according to h in M under all assignments σ’ which
differ at most from σ by the fact that σ’(v) ≠ σ(v).

Definition of validity
A sentence A of L is valid or logically true (in symbols: ╞ A) if and only if it is true at all
moments according to all histories and under all assignments in all standard models M of L.

IV A COMPLETE AXIOMATIC SYSTEM

I conjecture that all and only the valid sentences of our logic of action are provable in the
following axiomatic system S.

The axioms of S are all the instances in L of the following axiom schemas :

Classical truth functional logic

(T1) Tautological ( Ap ⇒ (Bp ⇒ Ap ))

(T2) Tautological ((AP ⇒ (Bp ⇒ Cp )) ⇒ ((AP ⇒ Bp ) ⇒ (Ap ⇒ Cp )))
(T3) Tautological ((¬Ap ⇒ ¬Bp ) ⇒ (Bp ⇒ Ap ))

S5 Modal logic

(T4) Tautological (□Ap ⇒ Ap )

(T5) Tautological ((□(Ap ⇒ Bp ) ⇒ (□Ap ⇒ □Bp ))

(T6) Tautological (◊Ap ⇒ □◊Ap )

The axioms of the first-order predicate calculus

(∀1) ∀vA ⇒ [t/v]A where t is a term of the same type as v and t is free for v in A
(∀1) ∀v (A ⇒ B) ⇒ (A ⇒ ∀vB) where v is any variable which is not a free variable of A

The axioms for identity

26
(I1) Ap = Ap
(I2) (Ap = Bp ) ⇒ C ⇔ C* where C* is like C except that an occurrence of Bp may replace
an occurrence of Ap with the proviso that Bp is free for the occurrence of Ap that it replaces.

The axiom of propositional identity

(I3) (Ap ! Bp ∧ Bp ! Ap ) ⇒ Ap = Bp

Branching time logic

(TL1) Tautological (Will-always:(Ap ⇒ Bp ) ⇒ (Will-always:Ap ⇒ Will-always:Bp ))

(TL2) Tautological (Was-always:(Ap ⇒ Bp ) ⇒ (Was-always:(Ap ⇒ Was-always:Bp ))
(TL3) Tautological (Ap ⇒ Was-always: Will:Ap )
(TL4) Tautological (Ap ⇒ Will-always: Was:Ap )
(TL7) Tautological (Was:Ap ⇒ Will-always:Was:Ap )
(TL8) Tautological (Will:Ap ⇒ Will-always:( Will:Ap ∨ Ap ∨ Was:Ap)
(TL9) Tautological (Was:Ap ⇒ Was-always (Will:Ap ∨ Ap ∨ Was:Ap)

Historic modality with time

(MT1) Tautological (Was:(□Ap ∧ Will-always:Bp ) ∧ Was-always:¬(Bp ∧ ◊Cp)) ⇒ ( □Will-

always:Dp ∧ Was:Cp ⇒ Was:(Ap ∧ (Cp ∨ Was:Cp) ∧ Will-always: (Cp ⇒ Will-always:

Dp)))
(MT2) Tautological (Was-always:(Ap ∧ Was-always:¬(Bp ∧ ◊Cp) ∧ Will:(Bp ∧ Ap ∧ ◊Dp ))

∧ Was:( □Ep ∧ Will-always:Bp )) ⇒ □(Will-always:Qp ⇒ Was:(Ep ∧ Will-always: (Cp ⇒

Will-always:(Dp ⇒ Will-always:Qp)))) 24

Normal Chellas' logic for ∆

(C1) Tautological (∆xAp ⇒ Ap )

(C2) Tautological (∆x(Ap ∧ Bp ) ⇒ (∆xAp ∧ ∆xBp ))
(C3) Tautological ((∆xAp ∧ ∆xBp ) ⇒ ∆x(Ap ∧ Bp ))

27
 (C4) Tautological (□Ap ⇒ ∆aAp )

(C5) Tautological (∆xAp ⇒ ∆x∆xAp )

Laws for attempts

(A1) Tautological ((x Tries:AP ⇒ (Ap ⇒ Always:Ap )

(A2) x Tries: TrueAp ⇒ (¬Tautological Ap ∧ ¬ Tautological ¬Ap )
(A3) ¬ True(x Tries: Was:Ap)
(A4) Tautological (x Tries:Ap ∧ x Tries:Bp ) ⇒ (x Tries: (Ap ∧ Bp)
(A5) ((¬Tautological Bp ∧ ¬ Tautological ¬Bp ) ∧ ¬ ∃p (Bp = Was:p))⇒
(x Tries: True (Ap ∧ Bp) ⇒ (x Tries: TrueAp ⇒ x Tries: TrueBp ))
(A6) Tautological (x Tries:Ap ⇒ ∆x x Tries:Ap ))
(A7) Tautological (x Tries:Ap ⇔ x Tries: x Tries:Ap ))
(A8) x Tries: Ap ⇒ ∃p (x Tries: p ∧ ∀q ((x Tries: q) ⇒ p ! q )))

(A9) True(¬□x Tries:Ap)

(A10) (x Tries: y Tries:Ap) ⇒ x = y

General laws for tautologies

(T7) (Tautological (AP)) ⇒ A , where A is a sentence of the form of propositional term AP.25
(T8) Tautological (AP) ⇒ (Tautological (AP ⇒ BP) ⇒ Tautological (BP))

(T9) Tautological (AP) ⇒ Tautological (□AP)

(T10) Tautological (AP) ⇒ Tautological (Will:AP) And similarly for Was: and ∆
(T10) (p = q) ⇒ Tautological (Ap' ⇒ Ap ) , where Ap' differs at most from Ap by the fact
that an occurrence of variable p in Ap is replaced by an occurrence of q which is free for p.

Axioms for truth conditions

24
Axioms (MT1-2) are A. Zanardo [1985]’s axioms of local correspondence.
25
By definition, elementary sentences are of the form of elementary propositional terms. If A and B are of the same
form as Ap and Bp , then ¬A is of the form of ¬Ap , (A ∧ B) is of the form of (Ap ∧ Bp ) , !A is of the form of !Ap .
And similarly for Was: , Will: , Tries: and ∆.

28
(t1) True(¬Ap) ⇔ ¬True(Ap)
(t2) True(Ap ∧ Bp) ⇔ (True(AP) ∧ True(Bp))

(t3) True(□Ap) ⇔ □True(AP)

(t4) True(Will:Ap) ⇔ Will:True(AP)
(t5-t7) And similarly for Was:Ap , xTries:Ap and ∆aAp

Axioms for composition

(C1) Ap > Ap
(C2) (Ap > Bp ) ⇒ ((Bp > Cp ) ⇒ (Ap > Cp ))

(C3) (Ap > Bp ) ⇒ □ (Ap > Bp )

(C4) (Ap ∧ Bp ) > Ap
(C5) (Ap ∧ Bp ) > Bp
(C6) (Cp > Ap ) ⇒ ((Cp > Bp ) ⇒ (Cp > (Ap ∧ Bp )))
(C7) Ap < > ¬Ap

(C8) □Ap > Ap

(C9) □¬Ap < > □Ap

(C10) And similarly for ∆a

(C11) ( (Ap ∧ Bp ) < > ((Ap ∧ (Bp )
(C12) And similarly for ∆a

(C13) □□Ap < > □Ap

(C14) And similarly for ∆a

(C15) Will:Ap < > □Ap

(C16) Was:Ap < > □Ap

(C17) ∆aAp > !Ap

(C18) ∆xAp < > x Tries:Ap

The rules of inference of MPC are:

29
 The rule of Modus Ponens: From the sentences (A ⇒ B) and A infer B .
The generalization rule: From a theorem A infer ∀vA .

The necessitation rules: From a theorem A infer □A .

And similarly for ∆, Will-always: and Was-always:). From a theorem A infer Will-always:A,
Was-always:A and ∆aA.

V. VALID LAWS

Laws of composition
A proposition is composed from all the atomic propositions of its constituent propositions.
Thus ╞ Ap > p if p occurs in Ap.
All the different modal and temporal propositions of the form MAp have the same atomic

propositions. ╞ MAp > M’Ap , where M and M' are □, ¬□, □¬, ¬□¬, Will:¬ , Was: , Was:¬ ,
¬Will: or ¬Was: And similarly for agentive propositions, where M and M' are ∆, stit, Tries or δ
with or without ¬ before or after.
There is a law of distribution of the constituent atomic propositions of modal, temporal and
agentive propositions with respect to truth functions. ╞ M(A ∧ B ) < > (MA ∧ MB ). And
similarly for other binary truth functions.

Laws for tautologyhood

Modal like truth functional tautologyhood is stronger than logical necessity.

╞ Tautological (A ) ⇒ ■True(A). But it is not the case that ╞ ■True(Ap) ⇒ Tautological (Ap).
Necessarily true elementary propositions (e.g. that whales are mammals) are not tautological. There
is not a single tautological elementary proposition in the present logic of action where atomic
propositions are left unanalyzed. So for no p,╞ Tautological p.

Laws for tautological implication

Tautological implication remains finer than strict implication.
╞ Tautological (A ⇒ B ) ⇒ True(A ∈ B ) But the converse is not true. For example, the
elementary proposition that whales are fishes strictly implies the contradiction that they are and are

30
not fishes. But it does not tautologically imply that contradiction.
All the valid laws of material implication of S5 modal logic are valid laws of tautological
implication. Thus ╞ Tautological (Ap ⇒ Bp ) whenever ╞ (A ⇒ B ) in S5 modal logic and Ap and
Bp are respectively of the form of A and B. And similarly for ramified temporal logic.

Laws for strong implication

Strong implication is the strongest kind of propositional implication. Whenever a proposition
strongly implies another proposition, it is identical with its conjunction with that proposition.
So ╞ (A ! B ) ⇔ ((A ∧ B ) = A
There are two causes of failure of strong implication:
New atomic propositions: ╞ ¬(A > B ) ⇒ ¬(A ! B )
Failure of tautological implication: ╞ ¬ Tautological (A ⇒ B ) ⇒ ¬(A ! B )
A proposition P which implies strictly another proposition Q does not also strongly implies
that other proposition when Q is composed from other atomic propositions or when Q is false
under certain truth conditions assignments to atomic propositions under which P is true. From
a cognitive point of view, in the first case, it is possible to have in mind the first proposition P
without having in mind the second one Q. And in the second case, we do not necessarily know a
priori by virtue of linguistic competence that proposition P has more truth conditions than
proposition Q.
Unlike strict implication, strong implication is an equivalence relation. So Parry's analytic
implication, which is not anti-symmetric, is weaker than strong implication.

⊭(A → B ) ⇒ (A ! B ). For ⊭ ((A → B ) ⇒ Tautological (A ⇒ B ).

Paradoxical laws of the following kind do not hold for strong implication:

╞ ((□p ∨ ¬□p) → □p) ∨ (□p → (□p ∧ ¬□p)

Natural deduction All and only the valid laws of inference of modal and temporal logic
where the premises contain all atomic propositions of the conclusion are valid laws of strong
implication. This leads to the following system of natural deduction for strong implication:
The law of elimination of conjunction : ╞ (A ∧ B ) ! A and " (A ∧ B ) ! B
The law of elimination of disjunction : ╞ ((A ! C ) ∧ (B ! C )) ⇒ (A ∨ B ) ! C

31
Failure of the law of introduction of disjunction: ⊭ A ! (A ∨ B )
So strong implication is stronger than entailment in the sense of the logic of relevance. For the law
of introduction of disjunction holds for entailment.

Failure of the law of elimination of negation: ⊭ (A ∧ ¬A ) ! B

The law of elimination of material implication: ╞ (A ∧ (A ⇒ B ) ! B

The law of elimination of necessity : ╞ □A ! A

The law of elimination of always : ╞ AlwaysA ! A

The law of elimination of action : ╞ ∆xA ! A. And similarly for stit and δ.

The law of introduction of necessity : ╞ (A ! B ) ⇒ □A ! □B

The law of introduction of action : ╞ (A ! B ) ⇒ ∆xA ! ∆xB

And similarly for Will: ,Was: , ∆, stit, and δ .

Failure of the law of elimination of possibility : ⊭ ◊A ! B ⇒ A ! B

Failure of the law of introduction of possibility: ⊭ A ! ◊A

For A > ◊A . And similarly for Sometimes.

As in the minimal logic of propositions, strong implication is decidable. For ╞ A > B when
all terms for atomic propositions which occur in B also occur in A. Moreover, ╞ Tautological (A
⇒ B ) when semantic tableaux for (A ⇒ B ) close.26
The fact that strong implication is decidable confirms that knowledge is closed under strong
implication. Every speaker who fully understands two propositions knows a priori by virtue of his
apprehension of their logical form whether one strongly implies the other. Indeed, in case a
proposition P strongly implies another proposition Q, we cannot have in mind all the atomic
propositions of P without also having in mind those of Q. Furthermore, we cannot understand the
truth conditions of proposition P without understanding eo ipso that it implies Q . Indeed the truth
conditions of P are exactly those of P ∧ Q.

There is also a theorem of finiteness for strong implication:

26
My modal, temporal and action logics are all decidable.

32
Every proposition only strongly implies a finite number of other propositions. In particular, a
proposition strongly implies all and only the tautologies which are composed from its atomic
propositions. ╞ Tautological B ⇒ (A ! B ⇔ A > B )
Similarly, a contradiction strongly implies all and only the propositions composed from its atomic
propositions. ╞ Tautological ¬A ⇒ (A ! B ⇔ (A > B ))

Laws of propositional identity

Modal, temporal and agentive propositions are richer than modal, temporal and agentive

predications. In particular, it is not the case that ╞ (□A = p) for any propositional variable p. And
similarly for ∆, Will:, Was: , Tries: and δ. For modal, temporal and agentive propositions are
composed from several atomic propositions.
The failure of such a law is shown in language use. Properties such as being identical with
itself are possessed by all objects in all circumstances. These properties have the same extension as
their necessitation. But when we think that Oedipus is identical with himself, we do not eo ipso
think that it is necessary that he be identical with himself or that this is true given what we do.

All the classical Boolean laws of idempotence, commutativity and associativity remain valid:
╞ A = (A ∧ A ); ╞ (A ∧ B ) = (B ∧ A ) and ╞ (A ∧ (B ∧ C )) = ((A ∧ B ) ∧ C ))
So are the laws of distributivity:
╞ ¬(A ∨ B ) = (¬A ∧ ¬B ); ╞ (A ∧ (B ∨ C )) = ((A ∧ B ) ∨ (A ∧ C ));

╞ (□ (A ∧ B ) = (□A ∧ □B )
And the laws of reduction:

╞ ¬¬A = A and╞ M□A = □A and ╞ M◊A = ◊A where M = □, □¬, ◊ or ◊¬

In particular, ╞ (A = ((A and ╞ ∆aA = ∆a∆aA. And similarly for stit, Tries: and δ.
Identical propositions need not be intensionally isomorphic in the sense of hyperintensional
logic27. As I have argued in [1990-91], intensional isomorphism is a too strong criterion of
propositional identity.
However, propositional identity requires more than co-entailment in the sense of the logic of

27
See Max J. Cresswell [1975].

33
relevance. For, it is not the case that ╞ A ! (A ∧ (A ∨ B ). As M. Dunn points out28 , it is
unfortunate that A and (A ∧ (A ∨ B ) co-entail each other. For most formulas of such forms are
not synonymous. In my view, co-entailment is not sufficient for synonymy because it allows for the
introduction of new predications. Strong equivalence which requires the same atomic propositions
is the way to a better analysis of synonymy.

Finally, strong equivalence is finer than Parry's analytic equivalence. ⊭ (□p) ⇒ (□p = (□p ∨

¬□p)) and ⊭ (¬□p) ⇒ (¬□p = (□p ∧ ¬□p)). Similarly, ⊭ ((p) ⇒ (δxp = (δxp ∧ ¬δxp)). But
such paradoxical laws hold for analytic equivalence .

Notice that the law of determinism does not hold in the logic of branching time. So ⊭ A ⇒

Was-always: □Will:A and ⊭(A ⇒ Was-always: □Will:A. Similarly, ⊭ Will:A ⇒ □Will:A.. But
we can derive new laws hold for historic modalities.29

╞ (Was: □Ap ⇒ □Was: □Ap ) and ╞ (□Will-always:Ap ⇒ Will-always: □Ap )

The present logic of action differs from Belnap's logic of agency. All actions can in principle
be intentional. ╞ δxAp ⇒ ◊x Tries:Ap . So a possible agent does not carry out any course of action
when he or she does not make any attempt. ╞ ¬∃p x Tries: p ⇒ ¬∃p δxp. Furthermore, the action
of bringing about something contains an action of bringing about something else only if it is
possible to attempt to do it. In particular, our mistakes and failures are not really actions that we
perform but rather events which happen to us. For we cannot really attempt to make a mistake or
fail.30 Paradoxical sentences of the form “I am trying not to try anything”, “I am doing nothing”, “I
am trying to fail” and “This very action is a failure” are logically false.
╞ ¬x Tries: ∀p ¬x Tries: p. ╞ ¬δx ∀p ¬ δx p .
╞ ¬∃p x Tries: (p ∧ (¬x Tries: p)) and ╞ ¬∃p δx (p ∧ (¬ δx p)).
Finally, any action is an effect or consequence of an intentional action. Oedipus might just
have wanted to wound slightly Laïus. In such a case his act of killing was unintentional. But it
remains an effect of his intentional act of wounding him. As I said earlier, by acting so as to bring

28
See his Philosophical Rumifications in Anderson et al [1992].
29
I thank Belnap for having drawn my attention to these laws.
30
According to Goldman [1970], there seems to be act properties like misspeaking, miscalculating, miscounting that
preclude intentionality. In my view, such properties are not really act properties. We “suffer” mistakes and failures.

34
about that A an agent does not eo ipso act so as to bring about any effect B of A. It is not the case

that ╞ (□ (A ⇒ B)) ⇒ (δxA ⇒ δxB ). For no agent can act so as to bring about something
which is inevitable. For example, by way of killing Laïus Oedipus moves invisible subatomic
particles in the air. However, that event is not an action. For he could not have done otherwise.

Consequently, ╞ ¬δx□A and ╞ ◊¬δxA.

There is a law of foundation for intentional action. An agent can only make a finite number
of intentional actions at a moment (Axiom A8). So all intentional actions that an agent performs he
or she performs by way of performing a unique basic intentional action. ╞ δixAp ⇒ (∃!p (δix p ∧
∀q (δix q ⇒ (p ! q))). Indeed ╞ δixAp ⇒ ∃!p (x basically does p ∧ (p ! Ap)). Two agents can
perform individual actions of the same type at the same moment (they can both drink beer). But
their basic individual intentional actions are always different. ╞ ¬(x = y) ⇒ (x basically does Ap ⇒
¬y basically does Ap). For they contain ultimately different individual movements of their own
bodies.
As I said earlier, all attempts are by nature successful intentional actions. This is shown in the
following laws: ╞ x Tries:A = δix Tries:A and ╞ x Tries:Ap) ⇒ ∃p (δix p ∧ δx p with the purpose Ap
). Furthermore, any action of an agent is an effect or a consequence of an intentional action of that
agent. Thus ╞ δxA ⇒ (∃p (x basically does p) ∧ ∆x(p ⇒ A)). So it is by way of trying to
perform his or her unique basic action that an agent performs at each moment all his or her other
actions.
Successful attempts to perform a basic action are simultaneous with the very performance of
that action. Thus an agent makes an intentional body movement at the very moment where he or
she tries to make it. We would need the indexical temporal connective Now in order to state fully
this law. In the present logic, we can only say that the content of an attempt is true at a particular
moment (Axiom A1) which is not anterior to the moment of that attempt (Axiom A3). An agent
cannot try to do something in the past. So he cannot change the past of this world. ╞ ¬δxWas:Ap .
However by trying to do something now an agent can try to do something in the future. So an agent
can change the future. For example, by making an accident an agent can cause the future death of a
victim.
Laws of action generation
By carrying out certain actions in certain situations agents carry out other actions. The

35
fundamental law of action generation is of the form:

╞ ∆x(A ⇒ B) ⇒ ((¬□B ∧ ◊x Tries:B) ⇒ (δxA ⇒ δxB )) (Law 1)

Consequently, ╞ □(A ⇒ B) ⇒ ((¬□B ∧ ◊x Tries:B) ⇒ (δxA ⇒ δxB )) (Law 2)

My logic of action explains why certain action tokens generate others (causally,
conventionally and simply) in the sense of Goldman [1970].
Causal generation: Sometimes by doing something at a moment an agent also does
something else for what he or she brings about causes an effect at that moment. For ex. by flipping
the switch an agent can turn on the light. By making a fire he or she can get burned . In such cases,
the first action causally generates the second. We can explain instances of causal generation in my
logic of action. In the case of causal generation, the agent x acts at a moment in a situation C (that
philosophers of action call a circumstance) where the premise ∆xC is true. For example, the
electricity is on when the agent flips the switch. In making the fire he or she touches something
very hot. These are circumstances C. In case what the agent brings about A is a cause of B , the

other premises: □ ((A ∧ C) ⇒ B), δxA and ¬□B are also true. So when agent x could attempt B,

(in symbols: ◊x Tries:B), one can conclude that agent x also does B by law 1 of agentive
commitment.
Conventional generation: Sometimes by doing A at a moment in a certain situation C an
agent does B at that moment because there is a rule (or a convention) according to which doing A
in that situation is also doing B. For example, by checkmating his opponent a player wins the game
of chess. In such cases, the first action conventionally generates the second. We can also explain
instances of conventional generation by law 1 of agentive commitment. When an agent x follows a

rule specifying that doing A in situation C counts as doing B, all the premises: δxA, ∆xC, (□ ((A ∧

C) ⇒ B), ¬□B and ◊a Tries:B are true. So one can also conclude that δaB by law 1.
Simple generation: Sometimes by doing something at a moment in a certain situation an
agent also does something else at that moment because the very performance of the first action in
that situation constitutes the performance of the second action. For example, by making a promise
that he does not intend to keep, a speaker lies. By asking “Can you pass the salt” in a dinner
situation where he needs salt a speaker can indirectly request salt. In such cases, the first action
simply generates the second in Goldman’s terminology. The law of strong agentive commitment

36
corresponding to simple generation is the following :

╞ (∆xC ∧ ¬!C ∧ ■((A ∧ C) ⇒ B) ∧ ¬□B ∧ ◊x Tries:B) ⇒ (δxA ⇒ δxB)31

Generation by augmentation: A special case of simple generation occurs when the
generated action strongly commits the agent to the generating action. For example, by putting one’s
hand on something one touches that thing. By begging very humbly from someone in power a
speaker makes a supplication. In such cases, the generating action is augmented by a certain way or
means or fact which is part of the circumstance C under which the agent acts. And it is not possible
to perform the generated action without performing the generating action. So in the case of
generation by augmentation the following law holds:

╞ (∆xC ∧ ¬□C ∧ ■((A ∧ C) ⇔ B) ∧ ¬□B ∧ ◊x Tries:B) ⇒ (δxA ⇔ δxB)32

As I said earlier, intentional agents are minimally rational. First, they never do (and even
attempt to do) something that they know to be necessary or impossible.
So ╞ (TautologicalA ∨ Tautological ¬A) ⇒ ¬δxA . But they can attempt without success to

do something necessary or impossible that they believe to be possible. So ⊭(□A ∨ □¬A) ⇒ ¬x

Tries: A . Moreover, agents cannot change (or even attempt to change) the past. ╞ ¬ δxWas:A
because ╞ ¬x Tries: Was:A.
Second, because agents are able to draw valid inferences corresponding to strong
implications, certain intentional actions strongly commit the agent to other intentional actions.
From a logical point of view, an action strongly commits an agent to another action when it is not
possible to perform the first at any moment without eo ipso performing the second at that moment.
Intentional action is restrictedly closed under strong implication: By acting intentionally so as to
bring about that A an agent also act intentionally so as to bring about that B when he could attempt
to do B, it is not then necessary that B and A strongly implies B. For in that case B cannot be
tautological, contradictory or past. And he or she then knows a priori that it is not possible to do A

31
In my view indirect speech acts are simply generated by the performance of literal speech act in contexts of utterance
where non literal success conditions are fulfilled in the conversational background. See Vanderveken [1997].
32
All performances of elementary illocutionary acts whose force F is stronger than a primitive force F* are generated
by augmentation from the very performance of an illocutionary act with that primitive force F* and the same
propositional content. In such cases of generation by augmentation, the generated illocutionary act of the form F(P)
strongly commits the speaker to the generating illocutionary act F*(P). See Vanderveken [1990-91] for strong
illocutionary commitment.

37
without doing B. ╞ δixA⇒ ((A ! B ∧ ◊x Tries:B ∧ ¬□B) ⇒ δixB)). The same holds for

unintentional actions. Intentional actions commit the agent to many unintentional actions. ╞ δixA ∧

(∆x(A ⇒ B)) ∧ ¬□B ∧ ¬xTries:B ∧ ◊x Tries:B) ⇒ (δxB ∧ ¬δixB )). Some of them are
unexpected. We are not aware of all contingent effects which can follow from what we do.

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 Numéros disponibles/Still available
(Octobre/October 1999)

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Robert Nadeau: Karl Popper et la méthodologie économique: un profond malentendu (No 9309);
Jean-Guy Prévost et Jean-Pierre Beaud: How should occupations be classified? The Canadian model
and its British-American counterpart in the inter-war period (No 9311);
Daniel Vanderveken: A Complete Formulation of a Simple Logic of Elementary Illocutionary Acts (No 9312);
Daniel Vanderveken: La théorie des actes de discours et l’analyse de la conversation (No 9313);
Henri Atlan: Is Reality Rational? (No 9314);
Robert Nadeau: Sur la pluralité des mondes. À propos de Nelson Goodman (No 9315);
Pierre-Yves Bonin: Le libéralisme politique de Rawls (No 9316);
Claude Panaccio: Belief-Sentences: Outline of A Nominalist Approach (No 9317);
Stéphan D’Amour: Walter Gropius et le rationalisme constructiviste (No 9318);
Michael Bratman: Shared Intention and Mutual Obligation (No 9319);
Hugues Leblanc: Of A and B Being Logically Independent of Each Other and of Their Having
No Common Factual Content (No 9322);
Wenceslao J. González: Economic predictions and human activity. An analysis of prediction
in Economics from Action Theory (No 9323);

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Pierre-Yves Bonin: Les deux libéralismes de Charles Taylor, le Québec et le Canada (No 9325);
Richard Vallée: Do I Have To Believe What I Say? (No 9327);
Christian Brassac: Actes de langage et enchaînement conversationnel (No 9401);
Claude Panaccio: De la reconstruction en histoire de la philosophie (No 9403);
Richard Vallée: Talking About Oneself (No 9404);
Robert Nadeau: Trois approches pour renouveler l’enseignement des sciences (No 9405);
Robert Nadeau: Economics and Intentionality (No 9407);
Myriam Jezequel-Dubois: La communauté en question (No 9410);
Alfred R. Mele: Real Self-Deception (No 9412);
Paul Dumouchel: Voir et craindre un lion. Hobbes et la rationalité des passions (No 9413);
Jean-Pierre Cometti: Pragmatisme, politique et philosophie (No 9415);
Jean-Pierre Cometti: Le langage et l’ombre de la grammaire (No 9416);
Paul Dumouchel: De la tolérance (No 9417);
Jean-Pierre Cometti: Quelle rationalité ? Quelle modernité ? (No 9418);
Paul Dumouchel: Rationality and the Self-Organisation of Preferences (No 9419);
Chantale LaCasse & Don Ross: A Game Theoretic Critique of Economic Contractarianism (No 9420);
Christian Schmidt: Newcomb’s Problem : A Case of Pathological Rationality ? (No 9502);
Mufit Sabooglu: Hayek et l’ordre spontané (No 9503);
Jean-Paul Harpes: Plaidoyer en faveur d’une portion congrue de démocratie directe
et de démocratie modulée (No 9504);
Paul Dumouchel: Pinel’s Nosographie and the Status of Psychiatry (No 9505);
Ianick Marcil: La signification des anticipations rationnelles face à la dynamique de stabilité faible (No 9507);
Robert Nadeau: Disputing the Rhetoricist Creed (No 9508);
Paul Dumouchel: Le corps et la coordination sociale (No 9509);
Gilles Dostaler: La genèse de la pensée de Keynes (No 9510);
R. A. Cowan & Mario J. Rizzo: The Genetic-Causal Tradition and Modern Economic Theory (No 9602);
Claude Panaccio: Des signes dans l'intellect (No 9603);
Don Ross & Fred Bennett: The Possibility of Economic Objectivity (No 9605);
Paul Dumouchel: Persona: Reason & Representation in Hobbes's Political Philosophy (No 9606);
Shigeki Tominaga: Voice and Silence in the Public Space: The French Revolution
and the Problem of Secondary Groups (No 9607);
Paisley Livingston: Reconstruction, Rationalization, and Deconstruction (No 9608);
Richard Hudson: Rosenberg, Intentionality, and the ‘Joint Hypothesis Problem’ in Financial Economics (No
9609);
Claude Meidinger: Vertus artificielles et règles de justice chez Hume: une solution au dilemme du prisonnier
en termes de sentiments moraux (No 9610);
David Gauthier: Resolute Choice and Rational Deliberation: A Critique and a Defence (No 9611);
Pierre-Yves Bonin: Neutralité libérale et croissance économique (No 9612);
Paul Dumouchel: Exchange & Emotions (No 9613);
Robert Nadeau: The Theory of Spontaneous Order (No 9614);
Jean-Guy Prévost: Francis Walker’s Theory of Immigration and the Birth Rate:
An Early Twentieth-Century Demographic Controversy (No 9701);
Don Ross: The Early Darwinians, Natural Selection and Cognitive Science (No 9702);
Raimondo Cubeddu: The Critique of Max Weber in Mises’s Privatseminar (No 9703);
Jean Mathiot: Monnaie, macroéconomie et philosophie (No 9704);
Luciano Boi: Questions de géométrie et de phénoménologie husserliennes:
intuition spatiale, modes de la constitution et prégnances (No 9705);
Daniel Vanderveken: Formal Pragmatics and Non Literal Meaning (No 9706);
Robert Nadeau: Hayek’s Popperian Critique of the Keynesian Methodology (No 9707);
Louis Roy: Pour une interprétation large de la norme fondamentale-transcendantale de Hans Kelsen (No. 9708];
Marguerite Deslauriers: La radicale égalité féministe et l'histoire de la philosophie (No. 9709);
Claude Panaccio: Le nominalisme et les modalités (No. 9710);
Steven Horwitz: From The Sensory Order to the Liberal Order:Hayek's Non-rationalist Liberalism (No.9711);
Pierre Desrochers: A Geographical Perspective on Austrian Economics (No 9801);
Andrew Wayne: Bayesianism, Confirmation, and the Problem of Diverse Evidence (No. 9802);
Pierre-Yves Bonin: La justification politique de la liberté (No.9804);

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Josiane Boulad-Ayoub: Du débat des Lumières sur le luxe au système jacobin du maximum (No. 9805);
Jean-Christophe Merle: Des théories néolibérales contemporaines de la propriété comme alternative
au bien-être social (Nozick et Dworkin) (No. 9806);
Barbara Debays: De l’épistémologie au politique: l’unité de la pensée de Karl Popper (No. 9807);
Stéphane D’Amour: Planifier l’implanifiable: futur et conséquences non voulues en architecture (No. 9808);
Jean Eisenstaedt: La relativité générale: une révolution? (No. 9809) ;
François Blais: L’allocation universelle et la réconciliation de l’efficacité et de l’équité (No. 9901);
Michel Rosier: Max U versus Ad hoc (No. 9902);
Luc Faucher: Émotions fortes, constructionnisme faible et éliminativisme (No. 9903);
Claude Panaccio : La philosophie analytique et l’histoire de la philosophie (No. 9904);
Jean Robillard: L’analyse et l’enquête en sciences sociales : trois problèmes (No. 9905);
Don Ross: Philosophical aspects of the Hayek-Keynes debate on monetary policy and theory, 1925-1937 (No. 9906);
Daniel Vanderveken: The Basic Logic of Action (No. 9907).

Prix: individus (2,00$), institutions (5,00$). Frais de poste: 2,00$ l'unité.

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télécopieur: (514) 987-6721; courrier électronique : nadeau.robert@uqam.ca
Pour consulter, s'adresser au Centre de Documentation des Sciences Humaines ou encore à la Bibliothèque
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Internet: les numéros parus à compter de l’année 1996 sont également disponibles sur le site Internet du
département de philosophie de l'UQAM à l'adresse suivante : http://www.philo.uqam.ca

Prices: individuals ($2.00), institutions ($5.00). Mailing fee: $2.00 for each copy.
To order, please send your request to: Robert Nadeau, Department of Philosophy, University of Quebec in
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A copy of all published issue is also made available at UQAM’s central library (Hubert-Aquin Building, room A-
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Internet: beginning with 1996, all new issues are also placed on our WWW site at the following URL:
http://www.philo.uqam.ca

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