MEDIA, RELIGION and POPULAR CULTURE:
f ro m e x t r a o r d i n a r y t o e x t r a - o r d i n a r y
The Commodification of Religious Clothes Through
The Social Media: The Identity Crisis on Youth
Muslim Female in Urban Indonesia
Yusar MULJADJI, Bintarsih SEKARNINGRUM and R.A. Tachya MUHAMMAD,
Universitas Padjadjaran, Indonesia
Abstract
This paper is endeavor to describe the com-
modification of Islamic symbols such clothes
especially veil (jilbab/hijab/niqab) in social media
which embedded in economics institution. This
commodification is not only in term of material things
but also attached to it the game of words were used
to impress the sacred for the social media users.
The ethno-virtual method was constructed to gain the
world view of the Indonesia urban youth who
attracted to this commodification and constructing the
economic-political religious movement which brings
the benefits for the clothes producers. The virtual
ethnography methods also very helpful to gain the
comprehension of the youth social network and their
meaning network. We found that many young people
who are the social media users experienced the
consumerism as their identity crisis. The identity
crisis lead them to “the new truth” in which they were
not experienced before. The “new truth” is the
Islamic-wahhabism doctrines which forced youth
female wear the Arabic clothes or wear veil as define
as hijab syar’i. Through the social media, the youth
could not distinguish the sacred as well as the
profane. The youth female became less tolerant and
often easily perceive the other female who were not
wearing the veil as the infidels. From these findings,
we argue that to avoid the larger conflict within
the society can be operates by developing the
comprehension of the multiculturalism awareness
through the social media.
Keywords
Commodification, Clothes, Social Media, Youth
Muslim, Female.
Resume
Cet article s’efforce de décrire la marchandisation
des symboles islamiques tels que les voiles (jilbab /
hijab / niqab) dans les médias sociaux intégrés dans
une institution économique. Cette marchandisation
n’est pas seulement en termes de choses matérielles
mais aussi attachée à elle le jeu de mots a été utilisé
pour impressionner le sacré pour les utilisateurs de
médias sociaux. La méthode ethno-virtuelle a été
construite pour obtenir la vision du monde de la
jeunesse urbaine indonésienne qui a attiré à cette
marchandisation et la construction du mouvement
religieux politico-économique qui apporte les avantages
Jurnalism ºi comunicare * Anul XII, nr. 2-3, 2017
pour les producteurs de vêtements. Les méthodes
d’ethnographie virtuelle sont également très utiles
pour comprendre le réseau social des jeunes et leur
réseau de sens. Nous avons constaté que de nombreux
jeunes qui sont les utilisateurs des médias sociaux ont
connu le consumérisme comme leur crise d’identité.
La crise identitaire les conduit à « la nouvelle vérité »
dans laquelle ils n’étaient pas expérimentés
auparavant. La « nouvelle vérité » est les doctrines
islamo-wahhabites qui ont forcé les jeunes femmes
à porter les vêtements arabes ou à porter le voile
comme défini comme hijab syar’i. À travers les
médias sociaux, la jeunesse ne pouvait pas distinguer
le sacré aussi bien que le profane. La jeune femme est
devenue moins tolérante et perçoit souvent facilement
l’autre femme qui ne portait pas le voile comme
infidèle. À partir de ces résultats, nous soutenons que
pour éviter un conflit plus important au sein de la
société, il est possible de développer la compréhension
de la sensibilisation au multiculturalisme à travers
les médias sociaux.
53
MEDIA, RELIGION and POPULAR CULTURE:
f ro m e x t r a o r d i n a r y t o e x t r a - o r d i n a r y
Mots-clés
Commodification, vêtements, médias sociaux,
jeunes musulmans, femmes.
1. Introduction
Fashion is a sign that could indicate the identity of
the subject. At least, this implied in the phrase famous
of Eco as quoted by Barnard (2011) who said,
“I speak through my clothes.” It is implied that the
clothes we wear makes a statement about the
existence of human being. At the existence of humans,
people who would interpret that our appearance
conveys a message. This points to the statement that
brings us to the communication aspects of the clothes
we wear in everyday life (Barnard, 2011). Every
fashion contains values that communicate through
what is appears. In many ways, fashion is a form of
group or individualistic expression to distinguish
themselves from others.
Clothing is one of those phenomena of everyday
life which contains its own meaning for certain
activities and also performing the role as a cultural
display. It also has a meaning that clothes are linked
with identity, such gender. According to Twigg
Jurnalism ºi comunicare * Anul XII, nr. 2-3, 2017
(2009), identity and the way we dress are closely
interlinked. As the relation between clothing and
identity, the most prominent issue today is the hijab
phenomenon of increasingly complex dimension,
covering the relationship with the sacred then shifted
into profane in Muslim world. Furthermore, we will
emphasis the dynamics of the hijab in its correlations
with its sacred thing shifting to the profane and shift
again into sacred then forming as a force to judge
others who do not use hijab.
Hijab has a massive connection with the Muslim.
According to Mir-Hosseini (2011), hijab by the
classical jurist view as an obligation of Muslim
women to cover the whole part of their bodies
except their hands and faces in public and in the
presence of unrelated men. In the Muslim context,
wearing the hijab for Muslim female is often viewed
as the mandatory obligation to prevent them from
the lustful action and to show the obedience to God.
Most sources indicate that the use of hijab is derived
from Chapter Al-Ahzab (33) verse 59 of the
Qur’an. A detailed definition of the hijab is found in
Chapter An-Nur (24) verse 31 of the Quran, where it
54
is directly prescribed for Muslim women (Harun,
2016).
The most obvious identification of the Muslim
woman is certainly the covering of the head and often
the whole body with a veil. The first and foremost
meaning of the concept hijab is literally a veil or
partition, the veil that separates humankind, or the
world, from God (Jardim and Vorster, 2003). It has
meaning that the hijab related to the sacred. The term
veil and hijab are often used interchangeably, but the
hijab has an Islamic significance that distinguishes it
from the veil (Ruby, 2006). According to Ruby
(2006), veil is often perceived in the west as a head-
covering, does not reveal the intricacies of the
practice. Furthermore, the term hijab encompasses
women’s attitude, and studies have found that a vial
feature of the hijab is modest behavior (Ruby, 2006).
For many clothes linked with several institution,
such politics, religion, and economic, the hijab
discourse taking an ultimate interest from many
researcher rather than other clothes related to religion.
Haddad (2007) viewed hijab as icon in respond of the
struggle against Islamophobia post 9/11 in America.
Haddad (2007: 254) examines that hijab has become
the symbol of authenticity and pride. Research on
Muslim women’s perspectives in the United States
and other Western countries suggest some perceived
positive functions that Muslim women wear the hijab
to reflect a Muslim identity, for social reinforcement
from friends and family, to gain esteem or respect and
a sense of religious duty (Abu-Loghod, 2002, Ali,
2005; Bouma and Brace-Govan, 2000; Ruby, 2006;
Williams and Vashi, 2007). Commonly, in Indonesia
the word hijab refers to a complexion of some Islamic
clothing, but meaning often was not consistent. There
are some who define hijab as veil and there are define
it as a complete clothing which cover the whole women
body. Despite to the inconsistent meaning, hijab is
oriented in meaning as Muslim women clothing.
In the global neoliberal economic system, things
are left to market mechanisms. Religious institutions
are no exception affected by the economic system, at
least on material items of religious identity apart from
values. This is what makes religious items binding
with the economic system and interesting to be
studied in depth. Relating with the hijab, at certain
stages, hijab was experience a shifting value, from
a sacred value to an exchange values. Leads by the
market mechanism, the hijab then embedded on
the economic institution or market and price.

The embedded of the hijab with the economic
institution in term of the marketing of hijab was
previously examined (Jones, 2007; Gokariksel and
Secor, 2009, Beta, 2014; Hassim, 2014, Harun, 2016).
On the other hand, anxieties in cultivating more
bohemian and inclusive Muslim society saw a series
of capitalist ventures that reversed the media flows
from the East to West. Evidence from a Thomson
Reuters 2014-2015 report suggest that Muslim
fashion is growing rapidly with USD 266 billion spent
on clothing and footwear. Indonesia is one of the
countries which become the largest Muslim clothing
market in the world. According to the data from State
of The Global Islamic Economy 2013 from Thomson
Reuters (2015), the total Muslim market reaches $266
billion for clothes and footwear, is predicted to rise to
$484 billion in 2019.Indonesia ranked the second for
Muslim clothing market after Turkey.
In other hand, according to the Indonesian Central
Bureau of Statistics Republic Indonesia (2016),
approximately 207 million were Muslim, with sex
ratio 101.02 male per 100 female. Refers to the
Indonesian sex ratio on its population, at least there
are 103,914,000 Muslim male and 103,086,000
Muslim female. From that number of Muslim Female,
the market share of hijab fashion in Indonesia is quite
large. It is not exaggeration if Indonesia define as
the center of world hijab industry and emerging the
Islamic cultural industry in a series of images,
practices, knowledge, and commodities which
marketed to Muslim Women (Gokariksel dan
McLarney, 2010: 2). It lead to the commodification of
hijab (Hassan, 2009; Barkin, 2014; Beta, 2014;
Fakhruroji and Rojiati, 2017).
The latter revealed that the appearance of
contemporary, stylish veiling by female Muslim
bodies in mainstream media sparked a radicalization
in the representation of Islamic modesty. Largely
influenced by market forces and consumer trends,
reformation of the hijab as a cultural identity is fused
with Western paradigms that blur the lines between
protecting Muslim women from the male gaze and
increasing her opacity for public display.
Muslim women who wear the hijab actively
participate in the public sphere around the world.
They were doctors, lawyers, and government
officials, among others. The majority of Muslim
countries now embrace “Islamic cosmopolitanism,”
which allows Muslim women to express their
individuality through the latest fashion trend with
MEDIA, RELIGION and POPULAR CULTURE:
f ro m e x t r a o r d i n a r y t o e x t r a - o r d i n a r y
a variety of styles, accessories, and bold colors
despite having to conform to covered dressing (Potts,
2009). Muslim women who dress fashionable and/or
design fashionable clothes, while orienting towards
what is being prescribed by their religion in terms of
dress (Blommaert & Varis, 2015). According to Ghani
(2011, in Harun, 2016), Muslim women nowadays
have more fashion and style choices than ever before,
in accordance with the rise of Muslim fashion media,
blogs, designers, and retailers. Wilson (2015, in
Harun, 2016), conclude that the trend of hijab fashion
went as far as offering loose clothes by connecting
communities locally by producing hijab fashion that
stick with Muslim culture terms and extend these
offering globally to eagerly awaiting Muslims
consumers around the world.
Göle (2000; in Hassim, 2014: 429) argued that
this is a resistance to religious conservatism where
Muslim women are more inclined towards
“cosmopolitanism” offered in contemporary hijab
styles. Female modesty is susceptible to transnational
flows of the modern hijab shaped by a variety of
themes, merchandise and communication techno-
logies that stray from true practice of Islam as
compared to traditionalist “Wahabbism” ideology
(Hassim, 2014: 429).
In context of the Muslim consumer culture, it
Jurnalism ºi comunicare * Anul XII, nr. 2-3, 2017
signified that the hijab has shifting from its sacred
function become profane. In regard to the focus of this
article, furthermore, the concept of traditionalist
Wahhabism has infiltrated to the Muslim consumer
culture, endeavor to restore the hijab to its original
premise as a sacred one. Furthermore, it becomes their
propaganda tool aimed at young people to use hijab as
a Muslim identity and show their obedience to
religious rules rigidly. Hijab then also becomes a tool
for youth Muslim women to judge the other Muslim
women who do not use hijab. As Bunt (2009)
believes that the internet has changed Islamic
practices, in Indonesia, the social media is the arena
of judgmental action from the young Wahhabism
towards Muslim women who do not wear hijab,
mostly in Facebook.
In regards to distinguish the radicals/wahhabist
women and the moderate Islam women, there several
main difference with the two opposite group. We can
identified them by their appereances, such as wearing
a specific veil defined as hijab syar’i or not,
intolerance to the different or not, or exclusive group
or inclusive group. As in table 1 below.
55
MEDIA, RELIGION and POPULAR CULTURE:
f ro m e x t r a o r d i n a r y t o e x t r a - o r d i n a r y
Table 1 – The Opposite Criteria of the Radical/Wahhabist Women
and the Moderate Islam Women
This article has research question that how the
process of the commodification of hijab lead to its
dialectical from sacred to profane then return to
sacral and become the tools for judgment the others?
To answer our research question, we have analyzed
the six parts of significant items: 1) participant
profile; 2) commodification of hijab; 3) the role of
social media; 4) identity crises; 5) the social mobility,
and 6) judgmental action of the youth Muslim female
to the other Muslim women.
For the purpose to gain the comprehension of the
Indonesian Muslim youth who joined the Islamic
radical group related to the media, we were doing the
virtual ethnography (Hine, 2000), involving ourselves
in Facebook where the commodification of the hijab
lead to the dialectical form of sacred-profan-sacred
Jurnalism ºi comunicare * Anul XII, nr. 2-3, 2017
and also their arena of conflict between fellow
Muslim women. As Kozinets (2010) noted, we
observe these phenomena in participant cultural
context. This research endeavor to comprehend the
dynamic event related to the commodification of
hijab related to the participants identity crises.
The participants represents as the radicals categorized
Table 2 – Participant’s Profile of The Radical/Wahhabist
56
as: 1) youth; 2) Indonesian; 3) Muslim women; and
4) wear hijab syar’i. In opposite the participant
represent We observe 8 females aged 18-21 which
categorized as the radicals and 6 females aged 16-21
which categorized as the opposite. We were also
involve in three fan pages of Indonesian Islamic
radical group which the most dominant to propagate
the hijab and also involve in group discussion. As a
comparison, we also join the moderate Islam as the
opposite fan page to gain the clarity of “social media
battlefield” in Facebook.
2. Participants Profile
The participants of this research were aged from
18-21, divided into 8 participants from radical Islam
and 6 participants from the moderate Islam. Both of
groups of the participant are female, having
connection with us on Facebook. From these 12
young people, all of them are the college students
from medical, pharmacy, social science, political
science, and natural science.

The table 2 above shown that the economic
status have no correlation with their orientation to
become the radical Islam. In other hand, there are
consistent with Yusar (2016) that the radicals
commonly the student of science students with the
exception on participant number 2 and number 7.
All of this group wear hijab syar’i which can be seen
both in their profile pictures on Facebook, photograph
postings on Facebook, and their daily life. In campus
life, they are they are classified as active students in
politics space in their university such in students
organization and Islamic religion organization.
Table 3 – Participant’s Profile of Moderate Islam
From the table 3 above shown that the all
participants who categorized as the moderate Muslim
were middle class. Van Klinken (2010, in Azca, 2013)
noted that the middle class mostly were less attention
to the political party. It seem consistent with the all of
the participants above with exception on participant
number 6. No one of them were form science students
but coming from social science, communication
studies, art and humanities, and linguistic. Two out
of six are not wear hijab and that can be seen both in
their profile pictures on Facebook, photograph
postings on Facebook, and their daily life. The other
four are female who wear hijab but not syar’i type.
In campus life, they are not classified as active
students in campus politics space rather than became
a member of art group, sport, and involving them-
selves into various activities extra-campus, such as
volunteer.
MEDIA, RELIGION and POPULAR CULTURE:
f ro m e x t r a o r d i n a r y t o e x t r a - o r d i n a r y
3. Commodification of Hijab
The rise of Islamic scene in Indonesia can be
traced since the fall of the New Order regime in 1998.
The open democratic valves allow the Islamic groups
to actualize their groups, both traditional and
moderate or even the radical (Henley and Davidson,
2003; Woodward, 2011; Munip, 2012; Yusar, 2015;
Muljadji, 2016). Media outlets were largely freed to
acknowledge and represent the religious and ethnic
struggles that were gripping the country (Barkin, 2014).
Jurnalism ºi comunicare * Anul XII, nr. 2-3, 2017
The media industry had long been in the
business of appealing to moderate Muslim audience.
Considering the enormous market share of Indonesian
Muslims, the packaging of impressions is made in
such a way that can be easily accepted by the
audience. This leads to the formation of commercial
Islam. Commercial Islam describes media producers’
varying efforts to influence public discourse on
Islamic ways of being and redirect it away from
clerics, politicians and public intellectuals by trans-
forming it into forms that comport with consumption
(Barkin, 2014). As many more scholars concerned
with neoliberalism as the late capitalism have had
intersections with Islam, the complex issue focused
consumption, global capital flows, and mass-mediation
form what Weintraub (2011) describes forces in
shaping or influencing Muslim-oriented music,
film, and fashion in Indonesia, including the hijab.
57
MEDIA, RELIGION and POPULAR CULTURE:
f ro m e x t r a o r d i n a r y t o e x t r a - o r d i n a r y
The word hijab is culturally as well as historically,
comes from the Arabic terms and lexically meaning
curtains, barriers, and something which limit between
two things (Kuriata, 2016, Fakhruroji and Rojiati,
2017). According to Al-Guindi (2006:250), the hijab
is also translated as cap, wrap, curtain, veil, screens,
partitions, screens, walls or coverings. Meanwhile,
according to Mernissi (1999, in Fakhruroji and
Rojiati, 2017: 199) the term hijab has caused
controversy since the word “hijab” means dividers or
veils that convey the same to the word “curtain” in
English. There are a number of terms that have the
same meaning as the word hijab. In Arabic repertory
during the Prophet time, women’s clothing was
known in several terms, among others: khimar,
a special clothing that covers head; dir’, a special
clothing that covers body; niqab and burqa, special
clothing that covers the face area except the eyes;
idzar, seamless clothing that covers all body to the
toe; rida’, outer clothing that covers the upper body to
the toes; and the jilbab that covers the outside of the
head (Umar, 1996: 36-37, in Fakhruroji and Rojiati,
2017: 199). When a Muslim women wears a hijab, she
aims to cover her beauty from the sight of others
besides her husband and relatives. So, wearing hijab
is basically aimed at covering their aurat (part of
the body that forbidden to be seen) as one of the
Jurnalism ºi comunicare * Anul XII, nr. 2-3, 2017
fundamental teachings of Islam. It has means that
hijab is a sacred thing not only just clothes.
As the intersection of the neoliberal economic
system with the media and religion, term hijab in
Southeast Asia and especially in Indonesia is
becoming more famous or more commercial than the
other terms. Perhaps this is caused by the use of
the word hijab is more global. The popularity of
the term hijab in Indonesia is closely linked to the
emergence of a group of urban Muslim women from
the upper close those are Muslim fashion designers
called themselves as The Hijabers Community.
According to Fakhruroji (2015: 443), the Hijabers
Community had a main role in improving the image
of hijab socially. As the development, the Hijabers
Community then expands its influence to some other
big cities in Indonesia, such Jakarta, Surabaya and
Bandung. One of the main characteristics that can be
identified from this community members were always
recreate to show hijab with the latest model, both in
colors and designs. Also, they usually applied several
additional accessories to certain hijab with aim to
beautify it. This hijab style has indicated a significant
58
change of the meaning of covering aurat which was
associated with theological aspects. Through this kind
of hijab styles, they can cover their aurat as part of
Islamic taught but still able to show how to be
fashionable with the latest trends. By using the
principles of hijab as introduced in this community,
members became very creative in creating new styles
and modern trends, unique and stylish hijab.
However, this community is not only sharing
information related to new hijab designs but also
held a number of social and religious activities.
The presence of a new style in covering aurat has
opened up new opportunities in urban Muslim identity
construction. Through Hijabers Community, they
improve the new rules of Islamic dress in manner and
prove that Muslim dress will actually make their
appearance become more attractive. As the urban
community is part of modern society, the urban
Muslim women has better chance to construct their
identity as a part modern society which actually
seen their identity as something that deals with
relationships, engagement with other people. As Hall
(2003, in Yusar, 2015) later confirmed that the identity
of modern society is not a given, but the process of
production that was never finish, always reconstructed
through signification or representation system. Thus,
identity is a social construct that culturally never
been stable and always changes (Castells, 1997).
The Hijabers Community were creating new narratives
about the hijab that is more fashionable and reproduce
the style through the signification and representation
system follows the market share.
The Hijabers Community is also not only show
new construction in the dress which was based on
religious values but also indicates the emergence of
a new middle class that consists of a young female
group with religious identity inherently (Fakhruroji
and Rojiati, 2017). Through this new identity,
the image of hijab then not only be viewed in a
functionally-normative way as a type of clothing that
fit the religious norms, but the image of hijab has been
transformed into a fashion that figures the taste and
marks the class and social-economy identities, as
Hassan (2011) points out on the symbols of faith gave
thus become commoditized as markers of social status
or identity. Therefore, hijab is not only express
religious orders but also as part of the modern lifestyle
which is stylish and fashionable.
New new habitus was form in wearing hijab.
Of course, refers to Bourdieu (in the field of

neoliberal system, the Hijabers Community’s capital
creating the habitus of capitalism in Islam that lead
to the emergence exchanges values to the hijab.
This exchange values involving the price on the
commodity. At this context, the hijab endorsed by
the Hijabers Community having has a very high price
that can only be reached by the upper middle class.
It signifies that there an expanding spiritual market-
place rather than following the religious rule. As Shirazi
(2016) argue that hijab then is not authentically
created toward the religious honor and sentiment but
rather the profit driven.
At this commodification scenes, there was a third
parties who take advantage of the situation over the
high price of hijab offered by the hijab producers who
are endorsed by The Hijabers Community. To provide
opportunities for those who want to wear the hijab, as
the radical Wahhabi agents perceive this neoliberal
condition as the open opportunity to selling their
ideology via hijab industry. The Wahhabi groups then
operating their strategies entering the business selling
hijab at an affordable price. This is not just for the
profit but also done as one of the recruitment process
in terms of Wahhabism ideology.
Associated with the all of participant profile of the
radical group were categorized as lower class and
middle class and still dependent to their parents,
the hijab offered by the Hijabers Community is not
affordable by them. So the, cheaper hijab offered by
the radical group might be as a safety valve for the
participants to be able to wear a fashionable and syar’i
hijab. Of course with a much different material
quality. The Wahhabi agents were gain the benefit of
this scenes. Firstly, they would be able to raise their
fund for their efforts in the struggle for ideology.
Secondly, they have new candidates to be recruited
into their group.
In other hand, we could perceive that the Wahhabi
doing the capitalistic action. Its contrast to what many
researchers argued that the Wahhabism were the
opposite towards the capitalist. In term of the
commodification of hijab, the Wahhabi has
transformed into capitalist enterprises and follow the
neoliberal logic, the market mechanism.
4. The Role of Socal Media
Bunt (2009) believes that the internet, literally the
social media has changed Islamic practices as well as
challenged Muslims’ self-perceptions (Akou, 2010: 332).
MEDIA, RELIGION and POPULAR CULTURE:
f ro m e x t r a o r d i n a r y t o e x t r a - o r d i n a r y
Given the current trendy status of the hijab and its
dissemination spread wide through social media, Lewis
(2013: 2-3) acknowledges a form of ‘empowerment’
through ICTs that are used extensively and creatively
by young Muslims. This suggests that young Muslim
women in Indonesia are difference with what Cooke
(2007) described.
In recent decades, people are more engage with the
new media technologies, such social media, mostly
four the younger generation. The young generation
using Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter even related
to their religious practice (Brunet, 2014 in Brubaker
and Haigh, 2017: 2; McClure, 2016). As Roach (2011
in Brubaker and Haigh, 2017) noted that 47% of
Protestant congregations actively use Facebook. This
indicating the rise of social media for religious
communication and also facilitate the religious
practice.
In context religion and its relation to the social
media, Facebook is the most frequently examined by
researchers due to the wide range of coverage and is
also the most famous social media by the world’s
population. In Indonesia, in 2016, at least 88.0 million
out of 259.1 million Indonesian population were the
active Facebook users (Ministry of Communication
and Informatics of Republic Indonesia, 2016).
This becomes a possible for Facebook to be a tool
Jurnalism ºi comunicare * Anul XII, nr. 2-3, 2017
for online sales.
As it easy to use Facebook is also used as a means
of marketing products or services. Facebook apps that
can show photos make it easy for sellers to show their
goods and services. The users can see easily photos of
goods and services sold on Facebook to the user’s
interest to buy it. This media is becoming in great
demand because of its easy application usage and free.
As a new strategic business space, the hijab
producers, both of the producer which endorsed by
Hijabers Community or the small scale enterprise
operated by the Wahhabi, trading their products
through Facebook to avoid the cost of promotion
and to attract their consumer from various social
categories. Indeed, that in Indonesia, we could easily
seeing one doing trading on-line using the Facebook
as their storefront. Relating to the Facebook user,
dominantly by young people. This was stimulating an
identity crises among the youth and some of them and
some join into radical groups starting on attracted by
the hijab sold by the group.
Two out of eight participants who categorized as
the radical are the active reseller of the hijab produce
59
MEDIA, RELIGION and POPULAR CULTURE:
f ro m e x t r a o r d i n a r y t o e x t r a - o r d i n a r y
by the Wahhabi. In Facebook, they not only selling
their product but also interspersed with provocative
words to attract the attention of other Facebook users.
Such provocative words on the one hand are part of
a product promotion, on the other hand implying a
propaganda to join a radical group. At one time
they were promoting their commodities, they insert
sentences containing faith, suggestions for wearing
hijab, and even condemnation sentences if a woman
does not wear hijab. It intended to make the spectators
to consider the importance of wearing hijab.
The infiltration of the Wahhabi in Facebook
stimulating for many young people to experience
the identity crises and found the new truth as
wearing hijab is their obligation to show the piety.
The Wahhabi also often frighten the viewers with the
threat of sin and hell as the reward for women those
not wear hijab, and also make a comparison between
the sacred women who are viewed holier than those
who do not by meme or caricatures. Kuriata (2016:
16-161) drawn perfectly the example of the memes.
5. The Identity Crises
All of the participant of the radicals is undergoing
a transition from childhood to the adulthood. Within
this transition, according to their Facebook profile all
Jurnalism ºi comunicare * Anul XII, nr. 2-3, 2017
the participants were experience the identity crises
since they were 15 to 16. We observe them when they
started joining Facebook and note the shifting attitude
according to their timeline. The social media
penetration in Indonesia was increasing dramatically
and make it possible for them to access Facebook and
become audience of the religious fan pages including
the radical fan pages. But in other hand, the youth
become a consumer of various information which
provided in Facebook. As the identity crises lead to
the opening cognition (Wictorowitz, 2005 in Azca,
2013) they tend easily to accept the new ideas while
choosing what they consider is appropriate. Within
Facebook, they found a new ideas that perceive as
fits with their religious tendency in order pursuing
God’s blessing.
For young Muslim male who experience the
identity crises like the radical participants, the
discourse of hijab has colored their mind. Commonly,
they tried to wear hijab at secondary school. At this
time, they were wear a casual hijab just when when
they are at school and and take it off after school.
Stimulating by the information on Facebook which
60
broadcasted by the radicals, at the next phase, the
participants tried the hijab syar’i and take the casual
off. Coupled with fear of sexual harassment, the
radical fan pages suggest that women must protect
their body from gaze of men. With the suggestion
sentence like ‘O woman, keep your honor with the
shari’a that is according to sharia to keep you from
the fire of hell’.
Connected on point 4 -the role of Social Media, all
of the participant were participants looked on their
Facebook screens on good hijab information from
hijab producers endorsed by the Hijabers Community
or produced by Wahabi agents. All of the participants
were attracted to the Hijabers Community and want
to imitate them, wearing such a high quality hijab
materials, expensive hijab, and look fashionable
without ignoring their piety.
Referring to their inability to purchase Hijabers
Community-approved hijab, the participants voted to
buy the hijab sold by Wahabbi even though the quality
of the material was not as good as that of the Hijabers
community. They assume, that to run the faith need
not be expensive. Furthermore, they are interested
in buying from the Wahhabi because of the scripture
information that obliges them to hijab and fear the
punishment of hell. According to them, they buying
the hijab from merchants which endorsed by
the (radical) clerics. These cleric were known as the
Wahhabism agent who operating their da’wa in
several social media. They are coming from the
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, Ikhwana al Muslimin, and
Jemaah Muslimin. The first two were known as
the biggest Islamic radical group in Indonesia.
The Jemaah Muslimin were less known compare to
the Hizbut Tahrir and Ikhwana al Muslimin.
All of the radical participant are the audience of
Islamic radical clerics who often suggest to wear hijab
syar’i. In Facebook, these cleric giving the sermon
based on salafy-wahhabism values that provoke
the participant to be totally hijra (move) leaving the
jahiliya (ignorance). There were two kind of ignorant:
1) the participant in past; and 2) they who are not
follow the radicalism. For the radical, hijra were part
of the jihad for God’s salvation. Perceived it as the
absolute and appropriate truth, the participant found
themselves to obey the radical group rules.
All participants choose to be intolerant to the
women who are not cover their body which as
determine by the radical group. Whoever different
from them, women who wear hijab but not wear hijab

syar’i is considered has lower piety than them. Based
on their belief to gain God’s mercy, they suggest the
other Muslim women to wear hijab like they do while
advising that it should be totally to cover their body.
Whoever reject their advice will be regarded as the
infidels. It was contrary with the principle of Islam.
As Chapter Al Baqarah (2) verse 256 points the Islam
is obviously an open-minded and inclusive faith, and
is not an intolerant political ideology nor is a religion
which forces people to embrace.
6. The Social Mobility or Faith Mobility
When a woman wears a hijab, it is generally seen
that the woman has experienced an increase in their
piety. The presumption is because the woman has
covered her body and distance themselves from the
gaze of male. Women who wear hijab assumed
escaped their act of seducing men. For this reason,
public assumes that women who wear hijab are
having a higher status than women who are not wear
hijab. With no exception to the participants, they
implicitly assume the position of their faith is higher
than the women who have not been hijab.
The participants were feel that by using hijab, their
faith has increased as well as with their faith. They do
not hesitate to advise the unlucky woman to wear
hijab to avoid the torment of hellish fire waiting for
her. For the participants, it is their da’wa action to
save women from further sins because it is not hijab.
It is also seen as their duty to invite women to
immediately close their bodies according to the rules
of religion and especially according to the rules set
forth by their clerics.
From the sociological perspectives, the radical
participants emerge the new social class related to
their piety. The radical participants view themselves
as superior because they have observed religious
commands. This superior position, in the social class,
becomes the possibility for them to view the other
women who are not wear hijab as the inferior group.
This expression of superiority is corroborated by the
words of its leaders in social media which state that
women’s degrees are higher than those of un-hijacked
women. Women who are not hijab are of the same
degree as animals (see Kuriata, 2016: 160).
At this phase, hijab re-gain its sacred meaning and
become a tool to judge other Muslim women who
does not wear hijab. Hijab is used as a sacred weapon
to awaken the other Muslim women who have not
MEDIA, RELIGION and POPULAR CULTURE:
f ro m e x t r a o r d i n a r y t o e x t r a - o r d i n a r y
been wear hijab. From this phase, it is lead to the
judgmental action by the radical participants towards
the moderate participant both on social media and in
their real life. This judgmental action raises the
resistance response from the moderate participants.
7. The Judgmental Action: The Conflict
Between The Radical Against the Moderate
In this phase, we were found the massive
propaganda released by the radical participant in term
of hijab both in social media and also in real life of
the hard-liner women. Firstly, they view hijab as their
religious identity and also shown to public as
their religious obedience. Secondly, hijab was their
political instruments to mobilize the resources
as their struggle to the glory of Islam in Indonesia.
Thirdly, the radical participants had developing the
negative sentiment towards those who does not hijab
and tend to critic women who wear different clothes
as their standards. At this phase, radicals also
contradicted to those who wear veil but not similar
with their hijab.
From the moderate participant, the radicals were
perceive as not eligible as the religious obedient
persons. The one and only who have right to judge
them is Allah (God), human being are not have a right
Jurnalism ºi comunicare * Anul XII, nr. 2-3, 2017
to judge the other nor labelled as the obedient or the
infidels. For the moderate participant the negative
sentiment might because the radicals were cover their
body wearing hijab syar’i and feels superior in
context of piety. The participants also points out the
political orientation of the radical which they known
as the hard-liner Islam, a group who easily labelled
the other as the infidels and consider themselves as
holier than the moderate Muslim.
From this contradiction, conflict was escalated
when they facing the women who does not wear
hijab. The hard-liner juxtaposed the women who does
not wear hijab to some kind label of disobedient
group, heresy, and at last perceive them as infidels.
The stigma were raise to those who does not wear
hijab such as contributing the sins for their father, the
causal factors for sexual harassment or amoral. Both
in social media or in their reality life, the radicals
perceive that women who does not wear hijab
analogous with the candy cover, animals-like, does
not get guidance for faith and reject the religious role
(see Kuriata, 2016: 160-161). For those who does not
wear hijab were labelled as infidels and they should
61
MEDIA, RELIGION and POPULAR CULTURE:
f ro m e x t r a o r d i n a r y t o e x t r a - o r d i n a r y
be avoided. In the social media, the hard-liner were
impose their opposition with many propagandas and
provoke them to admit the hard-liner’s values and join
them. Those who reject their values were stigmatize
as the prospective occupant of hell and must be
rejecting if they want to become a friend of the
hard-liner.
In opposition, the women who does not wear hijab
has the contradiction view. They perceive that the
hard-liner does not have the right to judge them
whether they were hijab or not and criticizing the
radicals imposing their religious value as unwise
action and intolerance to the other connected to
the plurality of Indonesian cultures. The moderate
participants rejecting the imposing values of the
radicals and positioned themselves as the opposing
group. Furthermore, for some moderate participants,
they define the radical as misogynist – a person who
hate female body.
It is, the latent conflict were generated by the third
party who controls the situations. The third party were
male Wahhabi clerics as the interest group to impose
their radical values in which to achieve their goals
subverting Indonesian state power. This interest group
using religion as their tools to achieve their goals
using the young women as their pawns to influence
the people using the religious symbols.
Jurnalism ºi comunicare * Anul XII, nr. 2-3, 2017
8. Discussion
Our research not just enriching with the previous
research, but also giving a significant differences in
order to examine the commodification of religious
Figure 1 – The Complex Dialectical Sacred-Profane-Sacred The Hijab
62
clothes radicalism. We also have to enhance the
previous research which may was not done before.
Commonly, the previous researchers stressing the
religious clothes on the emerging of the new
consumerism, the Islamic consumerism (Jones, 2007;
Gokariksel dan Secor, 2009; Beta, 2014; Hassim,
2014; Harun, 2016). The previous research also
having a biased by the researcher’s religion (Hassim,
2014; Harun, 2016; Fakhruroji and Rujiati, 2017)
which perceived too positively conducting the
emergence of hijab awareness. This research also
critizes Hassim (2014) that the Wahhabism ideology
then take part in merchandising hijab fashion, while
Hassim (2014) could not consider it. At certain level
this research agree with Shirazi (2016) that noted that
hijab is not authentically created through religious
honor and sentiments but rather the profit driven, with
the additional in hijab as the strategy to recruit a new
member of Islamic radical group.
At larger scale, this research also shown that
Muslim is not entirely like the West perceive. Even
its belief as a single entity, but in Indonesian case,
it was different with Cooke (2007) describe about
the Muslim women. We will not judge Cooke’s
perspective as the Western perspectives but rather
than the progress of societal life according to this
research just recently conduct a decade after Cook’s
research.
This research considers the hijab as the material
thing were having a form of dialectical process from
it sacred meaning through the consensus of the
Muslim according to the Holy Qur’an. In next
phase, the shifting of economic-political system and

the development of technologies, the hijab were
commodified into profane, as part as fashion alienated
from its sacred meanings. As the time progress,
through the shifting global political-economic shifting
and stimulating by the social media, the hijab regain
its sacred meaning in this decade with the intervention
of the Islamic radical group. Furthermore, we also
constructing that hijab become a ‘sacred weapon’ to
judge women who are not wear hijab. Here is, the
radicals were influenced by the certain religious group
and having the resistance respond from the moderates.
In this research, we would agree with both Erikson
(1968) and Azca (2013) that youth female were in the
transition period. However, the rapid development of
information technology became a stimulant factor that
they have not noticed. Although Azca (2013) noted
that network plays the significant role on shared
meanings of radicalism values, in this research, the
participants firstly stimulating by the radical values
which shape their rationality choosing type of hijab as
the can afford that relevance with their financial
condition. In fact, the social media platform such
Facebook, at least, now become arena of trading
action, including religion’s item.
In regards to the research methodology, the virtual
ethnography was very useful to gain the description of
the commodification process and also to observe
several conflict which happen in Facebook based on
belief or ideology. As the actors were live in virtual
arena, it is possible to observe them and gain
the meaning in that natural setting (Kozinet, 2010),
the researcher could conduct their research and being
there involving themselves in social media arena.
9. Conclusion
In this study, we have shown the religious clothes
such hijab were have its own complex dialectics. Not
just shifting form sacred to profane stimulating by the
global political-economic but also regain its sacred
values with various stimulant factor as social media,
the intervention of the Islamic radical group, and
ultimately an existence of the young Muslim female
who experienced the identity crises. These factors
complement previous studies relating to religious
clothes and its commodification.
The regain of sacred values of the hijab become an
instrument to raise the conflict between the Muslim,
especially the women which categorized as the radical
and the moderate. The conflict was triggered by the
MEDIA, RELIGION and POPULAR CULTURE:
f ro m e x t r a o r d i n a r y t o e x t r a - o r d i n a r y
superior feelings of women who wear hijab syar‘i and
impose their will on other Muslim women. Although
the conflict has not been transformed into a physical
conflict, it signified that the integrity of society is
under threat. The preventive action needs to be done
by the community to reduce the conflict that is by
prioritizing multicultural awareness, especially for the
radical groups. We assumed, according to Habermas
(1984) that if the deliberative democracy and the
public sphere has develop in the social media,
the conflict will be never escalated as we describe in
this article that the radicals were not implementing the
deliberative democracy rather ignoring the rights of
people which different to them.
This research would be perceive to correct the
Western perspective about Islam that not of all of
Islam are the radical but mostly moderate and having
a high level of tolerance and open-mind. By just a few
of the radical, internally, the moderate Islam were in
opposite position against the radicals. Form this research
we are also shown, although the commodification
process often viewed can be threatens a religion, at a
certain level, commodification takes place precisely
provokes a revival condition of religious teachings.
Irrespective that this is actually done by radical
groups. In other hand, we may look at the radical as
their effort to restore values as in the past, when the
Jurnalism ºi comunicare * Anul XII, nr. 2-3, 2017
religion was birthed.
We suggest that these finding hint a broader
relationship between commodification, social media,
gender and radical groups. In the future, will the
social media platform can be the arena to explore, for
example the masculinity of the radical group? This
would be very meaningful for future research, that
how could be researchers explore the realm of the
dynamic religio-social-political in the social media
related with the late modernity.
References
Abu-Loghod, L. (2002). Do Muslim Women
Really Need Saving? Anthropological reflection on
Cultural Relativism and Its Others. American
Anthropologist, 104(3), 783-790.
Akou, H.M. (2010) Interpreting Islam through the
Internet: Making sense of hijab. Contemporary Islam,
4(3): 331-346.
Ali, S. (2005). Why Here, Why Now? Young
Muslim Women Wearing Hijab. The Muslim World,
95, 515-530.
63
MEDIA, RELIGION and POPULAR CULTURE:
f ro m e x t r a o r d i n a r y t o e x t r a - o r d i n a r y
Azca, M.N. (2013). Yang Muda Yang Radikal:
Refleksi Sosiologis Terhadap Fenomena Kaum Muda
Muslim Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru. Ma’arif, VIII(1),
14-44.
Barkin, G. (2014). Commercial Islam in Indonesia:
How Television Producers mediate Religiosity among
National Audiences. International Journal of Asian
Studies, 11(1), 1-24.
Barnard, M. (2011). Fashion Sebagai Komunikasi,
Yogyakarta: Jalasutra.
Beta, A.R. (2014). Hijabers: How Young Urban
Muslim Women Refines Themselves in Indonesia.
The International Communication Gazette, 76 (4-5),
377-389.
Blommaert, J., and Varis, P. (2015). Culture as
Accent: The Cultural Logic of Hijabistas. Semiotica,
203, 153-177.
Bouma, G.D., and Brace-Govan, J. (2000). Gender
and Religious Settlement: Families, Hijabs and
Identity. Journal of Intercultural Studies. 21, 159-175.
Brubaker, P.J., and Haigh, M.M. (2017). The
Religious Facebook Experience: Uses and Gratification
of Faith-Based Content. Social Media + Society,
3(2), 1-11.
Bunt, G. (2009), iMuslims: Rewiring the House of
Islam. Chapel Hill, NC: UNC Press.
Jurnalism ºi comunicare * Anul XII, nr. 2-3, 2017
Cashore, C., and Tuason, T.G. (2009). Negotiating
the Binary: Identity and Social Justice for Bisexual
and Transgender Individuals. Journal of Gay &
Lesbian Social Services, 21: 374-401.
Castells, M. (1997). The Power of Identity.
Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, Inc.
Cooke, M. (2007). The Muslimwoman.
Contemporary Islam, 1(2): 139-154.
Fakhruroji, M. (2015). Transformasi Konsep
Diri Muslimah dalam Hijabers Community, Jurnal
Al-Tahrir 15 (2), 431-450.
Fakhruroji, M., and Rojiati, U. (2017). Religiously
Fashionable: Constructing Identity of Urban
Muslimah in Indonesia. Malaysian Journal of
Communication, 33(1), 199-211.
Gokariksel, B., and McLarney, E. (2010).
Introduction Muslim Women, Consumer Capitalism,
and the Islamic Culture Industry. Journal of Middle
East Women’s Studies, 6(3), 1-18.
Gokariksel, B. and Secor, A. (2009). Post-secular
Geographies and the Problem of Pluralism: Religion
and Everyday Life in Turkey. Political Geography.
46, 21-30.
64
Habermas, J. The Theory of Communicative
Action Vol. 1: Reason and Rationalization of Society.
Boston: Beacon Press.
Haddad, Y.Y. (2007). The Post 9/11 Hijab as Icon.
Sociology of Religion, 68 (3), 253-367.
Hassan, N. (2009). The Making of Public
Islam: Piety, Agency, and Commodification on
the Landscape of the Indonesian Public Sphere.
Contemporary Islam, 3: 229-250.
Hassan, N. (2011). Islam in Provincial Indonesia:
Middle Class, Lifestyle and Democracy. Al-Jamiah,
49(1):119-157.
Hassim, N. (2014). Hijab and the Malay-Muslim
Women in Media. Procedia-Social Behavioral
Sciences, 155, 428-433.
Harun, S.H.H.H. (2016). Factors influencing
fashion consciousness in hijab fashion consumption
among hijabistas, Journal of Islamic Marketing,
Vol. (4), 476-494.
Henley, D., and Davidson, J.S. (2013). The Revival
of Tradition in Indonesian Politic: The Deployment
of Adat from Colonialism to Indigenism. London:
Routledge.
Hine, C. (2000). Virtual Ethnography. London:
Sage.
Jardim, G. L. and Vorster, J.M., Hijab and the
construction of female religious identity, In die
Skriflig, 36(2), 2003, 271-287.
Kozinets, R. V. (2010). Netnography: Doing
Ethno graphic Research Online. London: Sage
Publications.
Kuriata, A. (2016). Hijab-Muslim Response to
Globalisation?. Czlowiek I Spoleczenstwo, XLI,
147-161. Retrieved from http://czlowiek-wns.home.
amu.edu.pl/sites/default/files/archiwum/xli/Kuriata_
CziS_XLI_16_ss.pdf
Lewis R (2013). Modest Fashion. London:
I.B. Tauris
McLure, P.M. (2016). Faith and Facebook in a
Pluralistic Age: The Effects of Social Networking
Sites on the Religious Beliefs of Emerging Adults.
Sociological Perspectives, 59(4), 818-834.
Ministry of Communication and Informatics
Republic of Indonesia. (2016). Data Statistik
Direktorat Jenderal Sumber Daya dan Perangkat
Pos dan Informatika Semester I 2016. Jakarta:
Kemenkominfo.
Mir-Hosseini, Z. (2011). Hijab and Choice:
Between Politic and Theology. In Kamrava, M. (ed).

Innovation in Islam: Tradition and Innovation.
California: Springer-Verlag.
Muljadji, Y. (2016). The Folk Underground Music
as Culture Revivalism: Mixing The Sundanese
Traditional Musical Instruments and Underground
Music as the Struggle For Culture Sovereignty. Keep
It Simple Make, It Fast! An Approach to Underground
Music Scene. Vol 2. Porto: Universidade do Porto.
Faculdade de Letras.
Munip, A. (2012). Menangkal Radikalisme Agama
di Sekolaj. Jurnal Pendidikan Islam, 1(2), 159-181.
Potts, J. (2009). Lifting the Veil on Fashion Filling
the Gaps between Modesty and Fashion Apparels.
The Ohio State University
Ruby, T.F. (2006). Listening to the voices of hijab.
Women’s Studies International Forum, 29, 54-66.
Shirazi, F. (2016). Brand Islam: The Marketing
and Commodification Piety. Austin: University of
Texas Press.
Thomson and Reuters. (2015). State of Global
Islamic Economy 2014-2015 Report. New York:
Thomson and Reuters.
Twigg, J. (2009). Clothing, identity and the
embodiment of age. In Powell J and Gilbert T (eds).
Aging and Identity: A Postmodern Dialogue. New
York: Nova Science Publishers, 1-19.
Weintraub, A. N. (2011). Islam and Popular
Culture in Indonesia and Malaysia. London:
Routledge, Taylor & Francis,
William, R.H., and Vashi, G. (2007). Hijab and
American Muslim Women: Creating the Space for
MEDIA, RELIGION and POPULAR CULTURE:
f ro m e x t r a o r d i n a r y t o e x t r a - o r d i n a r y
Autonomous Sleeves. Sociology of Religion, 68(3),
269-287.
Woodward, M. (2011). Java, Indonesia and Islam.
Heidelberg-London-New York: Springer.
Yusar. (2015). Perlawanan Kaum Muda Terhadap
Hegemoni Radikalisme Agama dalam Bentuk-bentuk
Budaya Populer. Jurnal Ilmu Sosial Mamangan, 2(1),
73-88.
Yusar. (2016). The Youth, The Sciences Students,
and Religious Radicalism. Jurnal Al Ulum, 16(2), 330-347.
Yusar MULJADJI, lecturer in Department of
Sociology – Universitas Padjadjaran, Indonesia.
Address: Jl. Raya Bandung Sumedang Km.21
Jatinangor, Sumedang 45363, Indonesia.
E-mail: yusar@unpad.ac.id.
Bintarsih SEKARNINGRUM, senior lecturer in
Department of Sociology – Universitas Padjadjaran,
Indonesia.
Address: Jl. Raya Bandung Sumedang Km.21
Jatinangor, Sumedang 45363, Indonesia.
E-mail: bintarsih.sekarningrum@unpad.ac.id.
R.A. Tachya MUHAMAD, senior lecturer in
Department of Sociology – Universitas Padjadjaran,
Jurnalism ºi comunicare * Anul XII, nr. 2-3, 2017
Indonesia.
Address: Jl. Raya Bandung Sumedang Km.21
Jatinangor, Sumedang 45363, Indonesia.
E-mail: ra.tachya@unpad.ac.id.
65
Reproduced with permission of copyright owner. Further reproduction
prohibited without permission.