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Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem

ABDELALIM Seddik

The First International workshop on Attacks in Cryptography


July 22, 2022 | Casablanca, Morocco

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Plan

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Introduction RSA
P1

The RSA was invented by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman in 1978. This is the
example the most common form of asymmetric cryptography, still considered
secure, with current technology, for sufficiently large keys (1024, 2048 or even
4096 bit). Moreover the RSA128 (algorithm with 128-bit keys), proposed in 1978
by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman, was âbrokenâ only in 1996, by making work in
parallel with many computers on the internet. The first strong public key system
to be invented, and the most widely used today, is the RSA system. Published in
1977 by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT), RSA is based on the difficulty of factoring large
numbers, and the one-way function used is a "power" function .

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Introduction RSA
P2

Le premier syst¨me à cl© publique solide à avoir ©t© invent©, et le plus utilis©
actuellement, est le syst¨me RSA. Publi© par Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir et Leonard
Adleman de l’Institut de technologie du Massachusetts (MIT), le RSA est fond©
sur la difficult© de factoriser des grands nombres, et la fonction à sens unique
utilis©e est une fonction puissance.

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Chiffrement RSA
Chiffrement RSA P 3

Le syst¨me de chiffrement RSA utilise l’arithm©tique dans ™/n™.


On sait que U(™/n™) c’est ensemble des elements inversibles
(U(™/n™), .) est le groupe multiplicatif
On a card(U(™/n™)) = ï(n). donc x ï(n) = 1 dans ™/n™
card(U(™/p™)) = ï(p) = p − 1 car p est un nombre premier.
card(U(™/pq™)) = ï(pq) = (p − 1)(q − 1) car p et q sont deux nombres premiers
distincts.

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Chiffrement RSA
Chiffrement RSA P 4

Soit n = pq. o1 petqsontpremiers.SoitP=C=Z/nZ.Ond éfinitK =


{(n, p, q, a, b) n = pq ab = 1 mod(ï(n)) cad ab = 1 + kï(n)}n,bclespubliques
p, q, a cles priv©s
Chiffrement
M©thode de chiffrement message x
eK (x ) = x b = y
D©chiffrement
M©thode d©chiffrement message y
On va calculer ï(n) = ï(pq) = (p − 1)(q − 1)
dK (y ) = y a = x ba = x 1+kï(n) = x (x ï(n) )k = x

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Chiffrement RSA
Chiffrement RSA P 5

V©rifions que le chiffrement et le d©chiffrement sont bien des op©rations


r©ciproques. Comme
ab ≡ 1 mod (ï(n))
on a
ab = 1 + tï(n)
pour tout entier t ≥ 1. Soit x ∈ (™/n™)∗ . On a

x ba = (x b )a ≡ x 1+tï(n) mod(n) ≡ x (x ï(n) )t mod(n) ≡ x mod(n)

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Chiffrement RSA
Chiffrement RSA P 6

Exemple :
Supposons que Bob choisit p = 11 et q = 17 d’une secrete apres il publie
n = p × q et b = 9 .
Cles Prives Bob p = 11 et q = 17
Cles Publiques Bob n = 187 et b = 9
Alice veut crypter le message m = 97
1) Déterminer le message crypt© par Alice
2) Déterminer la methode de Bob pour decrypter le message d’Alice

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Chiffrement RSA
Chiffrement RSA P 7

Solution
1) Le message crypt© c’est exactement mc
mc = mb ≡ 979 mod187 ≡ 5 mod 187

2) 1er étape
ï(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1) = (11 − 1)(17 − 1) = 10 × 16 = 160
2eme etape
Determination des coeficients de bezout tel que
Ub + V ï(n) = 1 donc Ub = 1 − V ï(n)
1 = 4ï(n) − 71b
D’ou b −1 ≡ 9−1 ≡ −71 ≡ 89 ≡ mod 160

3eme etape
−1
m ≡ mcb ≡ 589 ≡ 97 mod187
Bob recup¨re le message originale m = 97

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Construction of Continued Fraction
P3

For any real number x , [x ] will denote the integer part of x .


Let x0 ∈ ‘ − ™.
Let’s set
x0 = x , a0 = [x0 ] ;
1 > 1, a = [x ] ;
x1 = x −a
0 0 1 1
x2 = x −a 1 > 1, a = [x ] ;
1 1 2 2
x3 = x −a 1 > 1, a = [x ] ;
2 2 3 3
we have :
1 1
x 0 = a0 + with x1 = > 1.
x1 x 0 − a0
If x1 ∈ ‘ − ™ we have
1 1
x1 = [x1 ] + : x2 = >1
x2 x1 − [x1 ]
so we get
1
x1 = a1 + .
x2
And by iteration let’s suppose that xn is not an integer we have xn = [xn ] + r
where
Cryptanalysis 0<
of some r < 1 therefore by setting
cryptosystem
Continued Fraction
P4

Definition
The sequence (xn )n∈I is called the continued fraction expansion of x0 . Let n ∈ I
xn is called the (n + 1)th complete quotient. an is called the (n + 1)ith incomplete
quotient. In what follows x denotes an irrational.
Denoting by [a0 , a1 , ..., an ]
1
a0 + 1
a1 + 1
a2 + a
3 +...+ 1
an−1 + a1
n

[a0 , a1 , ..., an ] is called the (n + 1)ith convergent fraction or the reduced (n + 1).

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Continued Fraction
P5

Theorem
If
Pn
[a0 , a1 , ..., an ] =
Qn
with Pn and Qn are polynomials in a0 , a1 , ..., an .
then P0 = a0 , Q0 = 1, P1 = a0 a1 + 1, Q1 = a1 . ∀n ∈ − {0, 1}
Pn = an Pn−1 + Pn−2 and Qn = an Qn−1 + Qn−2 .

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Continued Fraction
Theo Flory P 5

Theorem
Soit x un irrationnel. Alors
Pn xn+1 + Pn−1
∀n ∈ ∗ : x = .
Qn xn+1 + Qn−1

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Continued Fraction
P6

Theorem
For all n ∈ ∗ , we have
Pn Qn+1 − Pn+1 Qn = (−1)n+1 .
Pn Qn+2 − Pn+2 Qn = (−1)n+1 an+2 .

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Continued Fraction
P6

Theorem
For all n ∈ ∗ , we have
Pn Qn+1 − Pn+1 Qn = (−1)n+1 .
Pn Qn+2 − Pn+2 Qn = (−1)n+1 an+2 .

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Continued Fraction
P7

Theorem
p
If (un ) et (vn ) two sequences of  such that un = pq2n et vn = q2n+1 then the two
2n 2n+1
sequences un , vn are adjacent converges to x and satisfy
p p2n+1
un = 2n < x < vn =
q2n q2n+1

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Continued Fraction
P7

Theorem
p
If (un ) et (vn ) two sequences of  such that un = pq2n et vn = q2n+1 then the two
2n 2n+1
sequences un , vn are adjacent converges to x and satisfy
p p2n+1
un = 2n < x < vn =
q2n q2n+1

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Continued Fraction
P7

Proposition
p (−1)n
x− n =
qn qn (xn+1 qn + qn − 1)
(−1)n
qn x − pn =
qn (xn+1 qn + qn − 1)

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Continued Fraction
P7

Corollary
If [a0 , a1 , a2 , · · · ] is the continued fraction of a number x , then the following
statements are satisfies
1) for all n ≥ 0 (qn x − pn )(qn+1 x − pn+1 ) < 0
2) for all n ≥ 0 |qn+1 x − pn+1 | < |qn x − pn |

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Continued Fraction
P7

Corollary
If [a0 , a1 , a2 , · · · ] is the continued fraction of a number x , then
x − pqn < q q1 for all n ≥ 0
n n n+1

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Continued Fraction
P7

Corollary
If [a0 , a1 , a2 , · · · ] is the continued fraction of a number x , then here is an infinity
of rational numbers pq such that x − pq < 12
q

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Continued Fraction
P7

Theorem
If [a0 , a1 , a2 , · · · ] is the continued fraction of a number x , then the following
statements are satisfies
1) for all n ≥ 0 (qn x − pn )(qn+1 x − pn+1 ) < 0
2) for all n ≥ 0 |qn+1 x − pn+1 | < |qn x − pn |

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Continued Fraction
P7

Theorem
p
If (un ) et (vn ) two sequences of  such that un = pq2n et vn = q2n+1 then the two
2n 2n+1
sequences un , vn are adjacent converges to x and satisfy
p p2n+1
un = 2n < x < vn =
q2n q2n+1

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Continued Fraction
P7

Theorem
p
If (un ) et (vn ) two sequences of  such that un = pq2n et vn = q2n+1 then the two
2n 2n+1
sequences un , vn are adjacent converges to x and satisfy
p p2n+1
un = 2n < x < vn =
q2n q2n+1

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Continued Fraction
P7

Theorem
p
If (un ) et (vn ) two sequences of  such that un = pq2n et vn = q2n+1 then the two
2n 2n+1
sequences un , vn are adjacent converges to x and satisfy
p p2n+1
un = 2n < x < vn =
q2n q2n+1

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Continued Fraction
P7

Theorem
p
If (un ) et (vn ) two sequences of  such that un = pq2n et vn = q2n+1 then the two
2n 2n+1
sequences un , vn are adjacent converges to x and satisfy
p p2n+1
un = 2n < x < vn =
q2n q2n+1

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Continued Fraction
P7

Theorem
p
If (un ) et (vn ) two sequences of  such that un = pq2n et vn = q2n+1 then the two
2n 2n+1
sequences un , vn are adjacent converges to x and satisfy
p p2n+1
un = 2n < x < vn =
q2n q2n+1

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Hopfian and co-Hopfian abelian groups
P8

Theorem
Let A be abelian group such that rank(A) < ∞ then the following conditions are
equivalent :
1) A is hopfian
2) TA is reduced

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Hopfian and co-Hopfian abelian groups
P9

Theorem
Let A be abelian group such that rank(A) < ∞ then the following conditions are
equivalent :
1) A is co-hopfian
2) A/TA is divisible

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Hopfian and co-Hopfian abelian groups
P 10

Theorem
Let A be a torsion abelian group such that A = ⊕p Ap with rank(Ap ) < ∞ then A
is co-hopfian.

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Strongly Co-Hopfian Abelian Groups
P 11

Definition
Let A the torsion abelian group. A is called strongly co-hopfian if A satisfies one
the following properties :
(i) For all f ∈ End(A) there exists n0 ∈ ∗ such that ker (f n0 ) + Im(f n0 ) = A
(ii) For all f ∈ End(A) there exists n0 ∈ ∗ such that Im(f n0 ) = Im(f n0 +1 )
(iii) The sequence Im(f n ) is stationary.

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Strongly Co-Hopfian Abelian Groups in the Category of Torsion Abelian
Groups
Strongly Co-Hopfian Torsion Abelian Groups P 12

Theorem
Let A be a torsion group then the following properties are equivalents :
1- A is strongly co-hopfian.
2- There exists n0 ∈ ∗ such that for all prime number p, we have r (Ap) ≤ n0
and p n0 A are p-divisible with Ap is the p-component of A.
3- A is the direct sum of two strongly co-hopfian abelian groups with one of
them is a maximal divisible subgroup.

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Weakly Co-Hopfian abelian groups
P 13

Definition
An abelian group A is called weakly co-Hopfian if any injective endomorphism of
A is essential

Kaidi, Gold Smith, Essannouni, Sangharé, Haghany and


Vedadi

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Weakly Co-Hopfian abelian groups
P 14

Definition
Let A be abelian groupe and B is sub group of A
BTis called an essential subgroup of A if for every subgroup C of A we have
B C ,0

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Hopfian abelian groups
Properties P 15

Proposition
A direct summand of Hopfian abelian group is Hopfian.

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Hopfian abelian groups
Properties P 16

Theorem
If A and B are two Hopfian abelian groups such that Hom(A, B) = Hom(B, A) = 0
then A ⊕ B is also Hopfian.

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Characterization Hopfian abelian groups in the category of divisible group
Divisible P 17

Proposition
Let A be a divisible group and free torsion then the following properties are
equivalents :
1- A is hopfian
3- A is weakly co-Hopfian
4- rank(A) < ∞

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Characterization Weakly Co-Hopfian abelian groups in the category of
algebraically compact abelian group
Divisible P 18

Proposition
For an algebraically compact abelian group A and free torsion , the following
statements are equivalent.
1 A is Hopfian.
q n A.
T T
2 rank(Ap ) < ∞ for every prime p, Ap =
q,p n∈∗

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Dedekind finite
P 19

Definition
An abelian group A is called is Dedekind finite if for every g, f ∈ end(A) such
that fg = idE then g is automorphisme

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Weakly Cohophian abelian groups
P 20

Theorem
The following are equivalent conditions
1). A is weakly co-Hopfian. L
2). For any abelian group B, if there is an monomorphism A B −→ A, then
B = 0.
3). A is Dedekind finite and the image of any injective endomorphism of A is
either essential or a proper direct summand.
4). There exists a fully invariant essential subgroupe which is weakly co-Hopfian.

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Weakly Cohophian abelian groups
P 21

Theorem
If A is quasi injective, then the following statements are equivalent.
1). M is co-Hopfian.
2). M is weakly co-Hopfian.
3). M is Dedekind finite.

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Semi-Hopfian and Semi-Cohopfian
P 22

Definition
An abelian group A is called is Semi Hopfian if for every epimorphisme f of A
then Ker (f ) is direct summand of A.

Definition
An abelian group A is called is Semi Cohopfian if for every monomorphisme f of
A then Im(f ) is direct summand of A.

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Artinian

Injective Endo − artinian
⇓ ⇓
quasiinjective StronglyCohopfian

⇓ Cohopfian
↙ ⇓
SemiCohopfian WeaklyCohopfian

Dedekindfinite

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


the p-component of the Strongly Hopfian abelian groups
P 24

Proposition
The p-component of strongly co-hopfian abelian group is also strongly
co-hopfian.

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Characterization of the Weakly Co-Hopfian abelian groups in the categorie
of divisible abelian groups
P 25

Theorem
For a divisible abelian group A, the following statements are equivalents.
1 A is Weakly Co-Hopfian.
2 A is Co-Hopfian.
3 There exists a positive integer n0 such that r0 (A) ≤ n0 and rp (A) ≤ n0
4 There
nLn exists
L a positive
Ln0 integero n0 such that A is a subgroup of
0
 er ™(p ∞)
i=1 p 1 i=1

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Construction of the Strongly co-Hopfian Abelian Groups
P 26

Remark
Let A be a divisible group, and B subgroup of A
1- If A is strongly hopfian then B is also hopfian
2- If A is hopfian then B is hopfian

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Construction of the Strongly Hopfian Abelian Groups
P 27

Remark
If A is strongly hopfian then the p-component of A is also strongly hopfian

The Question*
The torsion part of strongly hopfian abelian group is also strongly hopfian
abelian group ?

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Construction of the Strongly Co-Hopfian Abelian Groups
P 28

Construction
A is subgroup of ⟨xk ⟩ such that o(xk ) = qkk with qk are distinct prime
µ
k∈∗
numbers
* +
L
A= ⟨xk ⟩ , S(k,Ø)k∈,Ø∈{0,1}
k∈∗

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Construction of the Strongly Hopfian Abelian Groups
P 29

Remark
L
If A B is a strongly co-hopfian abelian group then A and B are strongly
co-hopfian abelian groups

The Question
The direct sum of strongly co-hopfian abelian group is strongly co-hopfian
abelian group ?

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Construction of the Strongly Hopfian Abelian Groups
P 30

Remark
abelian groups such that Hom(Ai , Aj ) = 0 for
(Ai )i∈I is the family of hopfian L
every i, j ∈ I and i , j then the Ai is also hopfian
i∈I

The Question
Let (Ai )i∈I be the family of strongly co-hopfian abelian groups such that
Hom(Ai , Aj ) = 0 for every i, j ∈ I and i , j

Ai is strongly co-hopfian ?
L
i∈I

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Construction of Weakly Co-Hopfian Abelian Groups
P 31

Remark
Let A be a divisible free torsion group, and B subgroup of A
1-If A is strongly co-hopfian then B is also strongly co-hopfian
2- If A is co-hopfian then B is co-hopfian
3- If A is weakly co-Hopfian then B is also weakly co-Hopfian

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Construction of Weakly Co-Hopfian Abelian Groups
P 32

Remark
A is strongly co-hopfian then the p-component of A is also strongly co-hopfian

The Question
The p-component of weakly co-hopfian abelian group is weakly co-hopfian
abelian group ?

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Construction of Weakly Co-Hopfian Abelian Groups
P 33

Construction µ
k
A subgroup of ⟨xk ⟩ such that o(xk ) = p k
k∈ E ∗
D
A = ⊕k∈∗ ⟨xk ⟩ , Si,Ø such that Ø ∈ {0, 1}
, Si,Ø ∈
µ
⟨xk ⟩
k∈∗

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


Construction Weakly Co-Hopfian Abelian Groups
P 34

Remark
If A ⊕ B weakly co-hopfian abelian group then A and B are also weakly
co-hopfian abelian groups

Question
the direct sum of weakly co-hopfian abelian groups is weakly co-hopfian abelian
group ?

Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem


References
P 35

Seddik. ABDELALIM, Abdelhakim. CHILLALI and Hassane.


ESSANNOUNI, The Strongly Hopfian Abelian Groups. Gulf Journal of
Mathematics Vol 3, Issue 2 (2015) 61-65.
ABDELALIM Seddik, Characterization of the Strongly Co-Hopfian Abelian
Groups in the Category of Abelian Torsion Groups, JOURNAL OF
MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS V 1 (2015), PAGES 1-18
Aziz El Mejdani, H.Essannouni, A.Kaidi.Rings with nice Artinian Modules,
International Journal of Algebra, Vol. 2, 2008, no. 18, 895 - 904
PETER Crawley An infinite primary abelian group without proper isomorphic
subgroups, Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 68,462-467. 1962
A.Hmaimou, A.Kaidi,Sanchez Campos. Generalized Fitting modules and rings.
Volume 308, Issue 1, 1 February 2007, Pages 199-214
A. Haghany and M. R. Vedadi. Modules whose Injective Endomorphisms are
Esssential, J. Algebra 243,765-779(2001)
A. Ghorbani and A. Haghany. Generalized Hopfian modules. J. algebra 255.
324-341. 2002
Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem
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Cryptanalysis of some cryptosystem

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