BANGUS FRY FISHERFOLK DIWATA MAGBUHOS vs THE HONORABLE ENRICO LANZANAS

Facts:

On 30 June 1997, Regional Executive Director Antonio G. Principe (RED Principe) of Region IV,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), issued an Environmental Clearance
Certificate (ECC) in favor of respondent National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR). The ECC authorized
NAPOCOR to construct a temporary mooring facility in Minolo Cove, Sitio Minolo, Barangay San Isidro,
Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro. The Sangguniang Bayan of Puerto Galera has declared Minolo Cove, a
mangrove area and breeding ground for bangus fry, an eco-tourist zone.

The mooring facility would serve as the temporary docking site of NAPOCORs power barge, which, due
to turbulent waters at its former mooring site in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, required relocation to a
safer site like Minolo Cove. The 14.4 megawatts power barge would provide the main source of power
for the entire province of Oriental Mindoro pending the construction of a land-based power plant in
Calapan, Oriental Mindoro. The ECC for the mooring facility was valid for two years counted from its
date of issuance or until 30 June 1999

Petitioners, claiming to be fisherfolks from Minolo, San Isidro, Puerto Galera,[5] sought reconsideration
of the ECC issuance. RED Principe, however, denied petitioners plea on 15 July 1997. On 21 July 1997,
petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7, for the cancellation of the
ECC and for the issuance of a writ of injunction to stop the construction of the mooring facility.

Petitioners opposed the motion on the ground that there was no need to exhaust administrative
remedies. They argued that the issuance of the ECC was in patent violation of Presidential Decree No.
1605,[8] Sections 26 and 27 of Republic Act No. 7160,[9] and the provisions of DENR Department
Administrative Order No. 96-37 (DAO 96-37) on the documentation of ECC applications. Petitioners also
claimed that the implementation of the ECC was in patent violation of its terms.

RTC: Dismissed the complaint. Petitioners have clearly failed to exhaust all administrative remedies
before taking this legal action in Court. The decision of the regional director may still be elevated to the
secretary of the DENR

Issue: The issue is whether the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners complaint for lack of cause of
action and lack of jurisdiction.

Held: The petition has no merit.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law. Such jurisdiction is determined by the
allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the reliefs
sought
A perusal of the allegations in the complaint shows that petitioners principal cause of action is the
alleged illegality of the issuance of the ECC. The violation of laws on environmental protection and on
local government participation in the implementation of environmentally critical projects is an issue that
involves the validity of NAPOCORs ECC. If the ECC is void, then as a necessary consequence, NAPOCOR or
the provincial government of Oriental Mindoro could not construct the mooring facility. The subsidiary
issue of non-compliance with pertinent local ordinances in the construction of the mooring facility
becomes immaterial for purposes of granting petitioners main prayer, which is the annulment of the
ECC. Thus, if the court has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the issuance of the ECC, then it has
jurisdiction to hear and decide petitioners complaint.

Clearly, the Manila RTC has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the issuance of the ECC, although it
could not issue an injunctive writ against the DENR or NAPOCOR. However, since the construction of the
mooring facility could not proceed without a valid ECC, the validity of the ECC remains the determinative
issue in resolving petitioners complaint.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The settled rule is before a party may seek the intervention of the courts, he should first avail of all the
means afforded by administrative processes. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery is
still available, with a procedure prescribed pursuant to law for an administrative officer to decide the
controversy, a party should first exhaust such remedy before resorting to the courts. The premature
invocation of a court's intervention renders the complaint without cause of action and dismissible on
such ground.

The rules on administrative appeals from rulings of the DENR Regional Directors on the implementation
of PD No. 1586 are found in Article VI of DAO 96-37, which provides:

SECTION 1.0. Appeal to the Office of the Secretary. — Any party aggrieved by the final decision of the
RED may, within 15 days from receipt of such decision, file an appeal with the Office of the Secretary.
The decision of the Secretary shall be immediately executory.

SECTION 2.0. Grounds for Appeal. — The grounds for appeal shall be limited to grave abuse of discretion
and serious errors in the findings of fact which would cause grave or irreparable injury to the aggrieved
party. Frivolous appeals shall not be countenanced.

SECTION 3.0. Who May Appeal. — The proponent or any stakeholder, including but not limited to, the
LGUs concerned and affected communities, may file an appeal.

Final decisions of the RED may be appealed. These decisions include those relating to the issuance or
non-issuance of an ECC, and the imposition of fines and penalties. By inference, the decision of the
Secretary on the issuance or non-issuance of the ECC may also be appealed based on this provision.
Resort to courts prior to availing of this remedy would make the appellant's action dismissible on the
ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

The right to appeal must be exercised within 15 days from receipt by the aggrieved party of such
decision. Failure to file such appeal within the requisite period will result in the finality of the RED's or
Secretary's decision(s), which can no longer be disturbed.
An appeal shall not stay the effectivity of the RED's decision, unless the Secretary directs otherwise.

The right to appeal does not prevent the aggrieved party from first resorting to the filing of a motion for
reconsideration with the RED, to give the RED an opportunity to re-evaluate his decision

On the Alleged Patent Illegality of the ECC

Petitioners nevertheless contend that they are exempt from filing an appeal with the DENR Secretary
because the issuance of the ECC was in patent violation of existing laws and regulations. These are (1)
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1605, as amended, (2) Sections 26 and 27 of Republic Act No. 7160
(Local Government Code of 1991), and (3) the provisions of DAO 96-37 on the documentary
requirements for the zoning permit and social acceptability of the mooring facility.

Petitioners' contention is without merit. While the patent illegality of an act exempts a party from
complying with the rule on exhaustion Of administrative remedies,22 this does not apply in the present
case.

Presidential Decree No. 1605

Presidential Decree No. 1605 ("PD No. 1605"),23 as amended by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1605-A and
1805, declares as ecologically threatened zone "the coves and waters embraced by Puerto Galera Bay as
protected by Medio Island." This decree provides in part:

Section 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the construction of marinas, hotels,
restaurants, other commercial structures; commercial or semi-commercial wharfs [sic]; commercial
docking within the enclosed coves of Puerto Galera; the destruction of its mangrove stands; the
devastation of its corals and coastline by large barges, motorboats, tugboat propellers, and any form of
destruction by other human activities are hereby prohibited.

Section 2. x x x

No permit for the construction of any wharf, marina, hotel, restaurants and other commercial structures
in Puerto Galera shall be issued without prior approval of the Office of the President upon the
recommendation of the Philippine Tourism Authority

The mooring facility is not a "commercial structure; commercial or semi-commercial wharf or

commercial docking" as contemplated in Section 1 of PD No. 1605. Therefore, the issuance of the ECC
does not violate PD No. 1605 which applies only to commercial structures like wharves, marinas, hotels
and restaurants.

On the Alleged Non-Compliance with the Terms of the ECC

Lastly, petitioners claim that they are justified in immediately seeking judicial recourse because
NAPOCOR is guilty of violating the conditions of the ECC, which requires it to secure a separate ECC for
the operation of the power barge. The ECC also mandates NAPOCOR to secure the usual local
government permits, like zoning and building permits, from the municipal government of Puerto Galera.

The fact that NAPOCOR's ECC is subject to cancellation for non-compliance with its conditions does not
justify petitioners' conduct in ignoring the procedure prescribed in DAO 96-37 on appeals from the
decision of the DENR Executive Director. Petitioners vigorously insist that NAPOCOR should comply with
the requirements of consultation and locational clearance prescribed in DAO 96-37. Ironically,
petitioners themselves refuse to abide with the procedure for filing complaints and appealing decisions
laid down in DAO 96-37.

DAO 96-37 provides for a separate administrative proceeding to address complaints for the cancellation
of an ECC. Under Article IX of DAO 96-37, complaints to nullify an ECC must undergo an administrative
investigation, after which the hearing officer will submit his report to the EMB Director or the Regional
Executive Director, who will then render his decision. The aggrieved party may file an appeal to the
DENR Secretary, who has authority to issue cease and desist orders. Article IX also classifies the types of
violations covered under DAO 96-37, including projects operating without an ECC or violating the
conditions of the ECC. This is the applicable procedure to address petitioners' complaint on NAPOCOR's
alleged violations and not the filing of the instant case in court.

Ruling: The Court commends petitioners for their courageous efforts to safeguard and maintain the
ecological balance of Minolo Cove. This Court recognizes the utmost importance of protecting the
environment.[33] Indeed, we have called for the vigorous prosecution of violators of environmental
laws.[34] Legal actions to achieve this end, however, must be done in accordance with established rules
of procedure that were intended, in the first place, to achieve orderly and efficient administration of
justice.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.

ESTRADA VS CA

ALFREDO ESTRADA, RENATO T. CANILANG and MANUEL C. LIM, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS AND
BACNOTAN CEMENT CORPORATION (BCC),

The facts are as follows:

Alfredo Estrada, Renato T. Canilang and Manuel C. Lim, as concerned citizens and taxpayers, filed on July
31, 1996, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, a complaint for Injunction and
Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against Bacnotan
Cement Corp. (BCC), Wawandue Fishing Port, Inc. (WFPI), Jeffrey Khong Hun as President of WFPI,
Manuel Molina as Mayor of Subic, Zambales, and Ricardo Serrano as Regional Director of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)

The complaint alleges that: WFPI and the Municipality of Subic entered into an illegal lease contract,
which in turn became the basis of a sub-lease in favor of BCC; the sub-lease between WFPI and BCC is a
violation of the first lease because the cement plant, which BCC intended to operate in Wawandue,
Subic, Zambales, is not related to the fish port business of WFPI; and BCC's cement plant is a nuisance
because it will cause pollution, endanger the health, life and limb of the residents and deprive them of
the full use and enjoyment of their properties. The plaintiffs prayed that an order be issued: to restrain
and prohibit BCC from opening, commissioning, or otherwise operating its cement plant; and to require
the defendants to jointly and solidarily pay the plaintiffs P205,000.00 by way of actual, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees

The principal issue that needs to be resolved is whether or not the instant case falls under the
exceptional cases where prior resort to administrative agencies need not be made before going to court.

RULING

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort be first made with the
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the
same may be elevated to a court of justice for review.20 If a remedy within the administrative
machinery is still available, with a procedure pursuant to law for an administrative officer to decide the
controversy, a party should first exhaust such remedy before going to court. A premature invocation of a
court's intervention renders the complaint without cause of action and dismissible on such ground

The reason for this is that prior availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides
for a speedier disposition of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy
away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with

As we explained in Gonzales v. Court of Appeals,23

The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts must allow the
administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respective competence. It is presumed that an administrative agency, if
afforded an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous
error committed in its forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the courts
from entertaining cases proper for determination by administrative agencies. Hence, premature resort
to the courts necessarily becomes fatal to the cause of action of the petitioner.24

While the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is flexible and may be disregarded in
certain instances, such as:

(1) when there is a violation of due process,

(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,

(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,

(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned,

(5) when there is irreparable injury,

(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears
[sic] the implied and assumed approval of the latter,

(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable,

(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,

(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,

(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy,

(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention,

(12) when no administrative review is provided by law,

(13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies, and

(14) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.25

instant case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptional circumstances.

Petitioners claim that their action before the trial court, without going to the DENR first, is justified
because they are in danger of suffering grave and irreparable injury from the operation of respondent's
cement repacking plant and the DENR does not have the power to grant them the relief they are praying
for.

epublic Act No. 3931, An Act Creating the National Water and Air Pollution Control Commission, was
passed on June 18, 1964 to maintain reasonable standards of purity for the waters and air of the country
with their utilization for domestic, agricultural, industrial and other legitimate purposes. It created the
NPCC which had the power, to issue, renew, or deny permits, for the prevention and abatement of
pollution.26

In 1976, Presidential Decree No. 984 was enacted to strengthen the NPCC giving it, among others, the
following:

Sec. 6. Powers and Functions - . . .

(e) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of this Decree and its
implementing rules and regulations only after proper notice and hearing.

(f) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions and
the time within which such discontinuance must be accomplished.
(g) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such conditions as it may determine to be reasonable, for the
prevention and abatement of pollution, for the discharge of sewage, industrial waste, or for the
installation or operation of sewage works and industrial disposal system or parts thereof'

(j) serve as arbitrator for the determination of reparations, or restitution of the damages and losses
resulting from pollution.

In 1987, Executive Order No. 192 was passed, reorganizing the DENR. It transferred the power of the
NPCC to the Environmental Management Bureau28 and created the PAB, under the Office of the
Secretary, which assumed the powers and functions of the NPCC with respect to the adjudication of
pollution cases under R.A. No. 3931 and P.D. No. 984.29

In Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals,33 we also pronounced that:

The matter of determining whether there is'pollution of the environment that requires control, if not
prohibition, of the operation of a business establishment is essentially addressed to the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR which, by virtue of Section 16 of Executive Order No. 192,
series of 1987 has assumed the powers and functions of the defunct National Pollution Control
Commission created under Republic Act No. 3931. Under said Executive Order, a Pollution Adjudication
Board (PAB) under the Office of the DENR Secretary now assumes the powers and functions of the
National Pollution Control Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution cases.

As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication
Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another forum.34

Clearly, the claim of petitioners that their immediate recourse to the regular courts is justified because
the DENR is powerless to grant them proper relief is without basis.

The Court of Appeals correctly found that the petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies
before going to court which renders their complaint dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.

OPOSA VS FACTORAN

FACTS:

The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first complaint
was filed as a taxpayer’s class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court,
National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit,
use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country’s virgin tropical forests. They
further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted
that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and
have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country
and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.

Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause
of action against him and that it raises a political question.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for
would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.

Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to
rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused
his discretion in dismissing the action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

HELD:

YES. Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right
violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree
with this. The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the
duty to refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious
management and conservation of the country’s forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the
DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for the governing and supervising the
exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the country’s natural resources. The policy
declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the
bases for policy formation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the
petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR’s duty
to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or
protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the
TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and
healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or
granted.

MERCADO VS MTC GR 230170

The root of this controversy is a domestic dispute between estranged spouses petitioner Mercado and
private respondent Go. Such dispute eventually led to the filing of numerous suits by both parties
against each other, as summarized below.

Cases filed by private respondents against petitioners

Sometime in October 2015, respondent Go filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Custody of their
children, which was docketed as Civil Case No. R-QZN-15-08943. The case was raffled to and is still
pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 86, which is presided by herein public
respondent Judge Roberto P. Buenaventura.2

Within the period of September 2015 to November 2015, private respondents also filed the following
cases against petitioners:

People v. Sugar Mercado and Yolanda Mercado (Crim. Case No. R-QZN-16-06371-CR) for violation of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 76103;

People v. Yolanda Mercado (Crim. Case No. R-QZN-16-06372-CR) for violation of R.A. No. 7610;

Kristofer Go v. Sugar Mercado-Go (NPS XV-INV-15J-11698) for Libel;

Kristofer Go v. Yolanda Mercado (NPS-XV-INV-15J-11699) for Libel;

People v. Sugar Mercado (Crim. Case No. R-QZN-16-5596-98-CR) for Physical Injuries, Oral Defamation,
Slander by Deed, and Unjust Vexation; and

People v. Yolanda and Reynaldo Mercado (Crim. Case No. 16-09066-69) for Unjust Vexation, Unlawful
Arrest, Slight Physical Injuries, Grave Coercion.

Petitioners aver that the cases filed by private respondents against them (the subject cases) are forms of
SLAPP intended to harass, intimidate, and silence them.15 Petitioners claim that the subject cases are
false and baseless complaints that were filed to emotionally, psychologically, and financially drain them
and ultimately to pressure them to give up custody of petitioner Mercado's minor children. Petitioners
also argue that the filing of the subject cases falls within the definition of "abuse" and "violence against
women" under R.A. No. 9262. In this regard, petitioners claim that public respondents committed grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in taking cognizance of the subject cases
even though petitioner Mercado is a "judicially declared victim of domestic violence" and in whose favor
a PPO has been issued.

ISSUE

As gathered from the submissions of the parties, the principal issue for the Court's resolution is whether
public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of the subject cases.

The Petition is procedurally infirm; availability of plain, speedy, and adequate remedies; failure to state
material dates

At the outset, the Court finds the filing of the instant Petition premature. For a petition for certiorari or
prohibition to prosper, the Rules require that there be no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
available in the ordinary course of law.17 Here, the cases before the public respondents are still
pending. Thus, there still exists in law a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy for petitioners which is to
participate in said cases and await the judgment of the RTC. And, if the RTC renders an unfavorable
judgment against petitioners, they may appeal the cases to the CA. Meanwhile, as to the complaints
filed before the OCP of Quezon City, the same may be elevated via petition for review before the
Secretary of Justice and thereafter to the Office of the President; if the prosecutor's finding of probable
cause is ultimately upheld, the case may then proceed to trial.

n the same vein, petitioner Mercado is also entitled to the appropriate relief under R.A. No. 9262 in case
of a violation of the PPO dated February 19, 2016 issued in Civil Case No. R-QZN-15-10201. Under
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9262, a violation of any provision of a PPO shall constitute Contempt of Court
punishable under Rule 71 of the Rules:

SECtION 21. Violation of Protection Orders. -

xxxx

Violation of any provision of a TPO or PPO issued under this Act shall constitute contempt of court
punishable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, without prejudice to any other criminal or civil action
that the offended party may file for any of the acts committed.

, the Petition is dismissible for failure to include a statement of material dates in violation of Rule 56 of
the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 3 of Rule 46. Rule 46 provides that the following material dates
must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65: (a) the date when notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution was received, (b) the date when a motion for new trial or for
reconsideration was filed, and (c) the date when notice of the denial thereof was received.19 The same
provision states that the petitioner's failure to comply with said requirements shall be sufficient ground
for the dismissal of the petition

The purpose of this requirement is to determine whether the petition was filed within the proper
reglementary period. A petition for certiorari or prohibition must be filed not later than sixty (60) days
from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed

The Court's rule-making power cannot be invoked through a Rule 65 petition

Petitioners invoke the power of the Court to promulgate rules of procedure, presumably to extend the
relief of SLAPP to those cases filed against victims of domestic violence in the context of R.A. No. 9262

the rule-making power of the Court in matters of pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts is vested
by Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution.26 Hence, being plenary in nature, the Court cannot be
called upon by a private citizen to exercise such power in a particular manner, especially through the
vehicle of a petition for certiorari or prohibition, which is intended for an entirely different purpose.

petition filed under Rule 65 is directed against any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi�-judicial functions that has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.27 Relief in such a petition merely takes
the form of correcting any error of jurisdiction committed by the tribunal or officer. Here, petitioners
would want the Court to accommodate her cause of action by granting a collateral relief that is not
comprehended under the provisions of Rule 65 - or any of the Rules, for that matter - which is to extend
the concept of SLAPP to cases of violence against women and their children.

Prescinding therefrom, the Court finds no occasion under the circumstances to allow such a relief.

The concept of SLAPP is inapplicable to cases of domestic violence against women and children under
R.A. No. 9262

The concept of SLAPP was first introduced to this jurisdiction under the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC).28 As defined therein, a SLAPP refers to

an action whether civil, criminal or administrative, brought against any person, institution or any
government agency or local government unit or its officials and employees, with the intent to harass,
vex, exert undue pressure or stifle any legal recourse that such person, institution or government agency
has taken or may take in the enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment or
assertion of environmental rights.29 (Emphasis supplied)

In application, the allegation of SLAPP is set up as a defense in those cases claimed to have been filed
merely as a harassment suit against environmental actions:

Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation

xxxx

SECTION 2. SLAPP as a Defense; How Alleged. - In a SLAPP filed against a person involved in the
enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment, or assertion of environmental
rights, the defendant may file an answer interposing as a defense that the case is a SLAPP and shall be
supported by documents, affidavits, papers and other evidence; and, by way of counterclaim, pray for
damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.

The court shall direct the plaintiff or adverse party to file an opposition showing the suit is not a SLAPP,
attaching evidence in support thereof, within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from receipt of
notice that an answer has been filed

The defense of a SLAPP shall be set for hearing by the court after issuance of the order to file an
opposition within fifteen (15) days from filing of the comment or the lapse of the period.

SLAPP, as a defense, is a mere privilege borne out of procedural rules; accordingly, it may only be
exercised in the manner and within the scope prescribed by the Court as a rule-making body.34 Here,
petitioners cannot, under the guise of substantial justice, rely on a remedy that is simply not available to
them. In fact, by invoking the Court's rule-making power in their Petition, petitioners have admitted that
the instant action has no basis under any of the rules promulgated by the Court. The Court takes this
occasion to remind petitioners that rules of procedure are not a "one-size� fits-all" tool that may be
invoked in any and all instances at the whim of the litigant as this would be anathema to the orderly
administration of justice.

Further on this matter, it is highly improper for petitioners to invoke SLAPP as a defense in an original
action before a separate forum considering that the above rules clearly mandate that such a defense
can only be invoked in the same action and consequently, before the same court. Here, petitioners
essentially initiated an omnibus motion before the Court to dismiss all cases pending elsewhere. Such
maneuver is patently repugnant to established procedure and thus cannot be sanctioned by the Court.

Based on the foregoing standards, the Court finds that petitioners herein utterly failed to establish their
entitlement to a corrective writ of certiorari or prohibition.

It bears stressing that a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition seeks solely to correct errors of
jurisdiction and not merely errors of judgment made in the exercise of jurisdiction.37 In this case,
petitioners failed to demonstrate that the subject cases fell outside of the respective jurisdictions of
public respondents; there was no showing that the subject matters of the said cases were not properly
cognizable by the offices of public respondents. Instead, petitioners merely argue that public
respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in the taking of cognizance of the subject cases
despite the issuance of the PPO in favor of petitioner Mercado.

BORACAY FOUNDATION INC VS CATICLAN

FACTS:

Claiming that tourist arrivals to Boracay would reach 1 million in the future, respondent Province of
Aklan planned to expand the port facilities at Barangay Caticlan, Municipality of Malay. Thus, on May 7,
2009, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Aklan Province issued a resolution, authorizing Governor Carlito
Marquez to file an application with respondent Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA)to reclaim the
2.64 hectares of foreshore area in Caticlan. In the same year, the Province deliberated on the possible
expansion from its original proposed reclamation area of 2.64 hectares to forty (40)hectares in order to
maximize the utilization of its resources.

After PRA’s approval, on April 27, 2010, respondent Department of Environment and Natural Resources-
Environmental Management Bureau-Region VI (DENR-EMB RVI) issued to the Province Environmental
Compliance Certificate-R6-1003-096-7100 (the questioned ECC) for Phase 1 of the Reclamation Project
to the extent of 2.64 hectares to be done along the Caticlan side beside the existing jetty port. On May
17, 2010, the Province finally entered into a MOA with PRA which stated that the land use development
of the reclamation project shall be for commercial, recreational and institutional and other applicable
uses. It was at this point that the Province deemed it necessary to conduct a series of public
consultationmeetings. On the other hand, the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan, the Sangguniang Bayan
of the Municipality of Malay and petitioner Boracay Foundation, Inc. (BFI), an organization composed of
some160 businessmen and residents in Boracay, expressed their strong opposition to the reclamation
project on environmental, socio-economic and legal grounds. Despite the opposition, the Province
merely noted their objections and issued a notice to the contractor on December 1, 2010 to commence
with the construction of the project. Thus, on June 1,2011, BFI filed with the Supreme Court the instant
Petition for Environmental Protection Order/Issuance of the Writ of Continuing Mandamus. Thereafter,
the Court issued a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) and ordered the respondents to
file their respective comments to the petition. The Petition was premised on the following grounds,
among others

a) the Province failed to obtain the favorable endorsement of the LGU concerned

b) the Province failed to conduct the required consultation procedures as required by the Local
Government Code (LGC).The Province responded by claiming that its compliance with the requirements
of DENR-EMBRVI and PRA that led to the approval of the reclamation project by the said government
agencies, as well as the recent enactments of the Barangay Council of Caticlan and theSangguniang
Bayan of the Municipality of Malay favorably endorsing the said project, had “categorically addressed all
the issues” raised by the BFI in its Petition. It also considered the Petition to be premature for lack of
cause of action due to the failure of BFI to fully exhaust the available administrative remedies even
before seeking judicial relief

ISSUES:

1. WON the petition is premature because petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before
filing this case?

2. WON there was proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for the project?

RULING:
1. The Court held that the petition is not premature for failing to exhaust administrative remedies and to
observe the hierarchy of courts as claimed by the respondents. The rule may also be disregarded when it
does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedyor where the protestant has no other recourse.
Meanwhile, the new Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, provides a relief
for petitioner under the writ of continuing mandamus, which is a special civil action that may be availed
of “to compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law” and which provides for the
issuance of a TEPO “as an auxiliary remedy prior to the issuance of the writ itself.” The writ of continuing
mandamus allows an aggrieved party to file a verified petition in the proper court when any government
agency or instrumentality or officer thereof “unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty xxx in connection with the enforcement or violation of an
environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, xxx and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” Such proper court may be the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territory wherethe actionable neglect or omission occurred, the Court of
Appeals, or the Supreme Court. Here, the Court found that BFI had no other plain, speedy, or adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law to determine the questions of unique national and local
importance raised that pertain to laws and rules for environmental protection

2. The Court found that there was no proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for the project.
The Local Government Code (LGC) establishes the duties of national government agencies in the
maintenance of ecological balance and requires them to secure prior public consultations and approval
of local government units. Under the Local Government Code, two requisites must be met before a
national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be
implemented: (1) prior consultation with the affected local communities, and (2) prior approval of the
project by the appropriate sanggunianThe absence of either of such mandatory requirements will
render the project’s implementation as illegal.

Here, the Court classified the reclamation project as a national project since it affects the environmental
and ecological balance of local communities. Furthermore, the lack of prior public consultation and
approval is not corrected by the subsequent endorsement of the reclamation project by the
Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan and the Sangguniang Bayan in 2012, which were both undoubtedly
achieved at the urging and insistence of the Province

FC MINERALS VS LUNAG

The remedy of Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation under the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases cannot be indiscriminately invoked by any defendant in an environmental case. It
may only be invoked by individuals who became target of litigation due to their environmental
advocacy. It is not a remedy of powerful corporations to stifle the actions of ordinary citizens who seek
to make them accountable. More so, it is not a tool given to large concessionaires who have obligations
and responsibilities under the law.

FACTS
FCF Mineral FCF Mineral is a domestic corporation engaged in mining. In 2009, it entered into a Financial
or Technical Assistance Agreement (Agreement) with the Republic of the Philippines. [3] The Agreement
granted FCF Mineral an exclusive right to explore, mine, and utilize minerals within a 3,093.51-hectare
contract area in Barangay Runruno, Quezon, Nueva Vizcaya

In 2012, Joseph Lunag, et al. (Lunag, et al.), who claim to belong to the Ifugao, Kalanguya, and Cordillera
Indigenous Cultural Communities, [5] filed a Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan with Prayer for
the Issuance of Environment Protection Order and Writ of Continuing Mandamus before this Court. [6]
The petition was filed against the Secretary of Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the
Director of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau, the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, and
FCF Mineral.

Lunag, et al. questioned the open-pit mining method used by FCF Mineral. [8] They claimed that open-
pit mining will destroy their ancestral land which embraces forest cover, watersheds, rice paddies,
residential areas, burial grounds, and worship houses, among others. [9] They contended that FCF
Mineral is excavating areas 50-100 meters away from their residential houses, exposing them to threats
of landslide.

ISSUE:

The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not the action respondents filed against petitioner
constitutes a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation.

RULING:

A Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation [93] or SLAPP generally refers to claim suits filed against
private individuals as a retaliation to the latter's recourse to the government on an issue of public
concern. SLAPP actions do not forward any genuine cognizable interest but are only used to oppose and
to suppress the defendants' political activities.

The concept of SLAPP is of foreign origin. The term was first coined by American legal sociologists
George Pring and Penelope Canan in the late 1980s. At that time, they observed a proliferation of
damages suits used by deep-pocketed individuals and corporations against citizens who participate in
public issues. [95] They concluded that these cases called SLAPP derail public participation by
intimidating defendants and drying up their resources.

Pring and Canan have described the development of SLAPP suits into three stages. [97] First, a citizen
addresses the government on a matter of public concern. The citizen espouses a view contrary to that of
another individual or group, who is inevitably threatened by the citizen's actions because this
undermines their interest, which is often monetary.

Second, those threatened by the communication to the government will file a case to intimidate the
citizen, who, in turn, is compelled to spend time and money to defend themselves. Third, the defendant-
citizen must raise the defense that their communication to the government was constitutionally-
protected.
In the process, the plaintiff in a SLAPP suit uses the judicial process to silence the defendant. Pring and
Canan remarked that SLAPP filers were able to use the courts and judicial processes as leverage against
ordinary citizens.

The application of SLAPP was meant to be broad and encompassing. As Pring and Canan described,
SLAPP only requires that the communication to the government is an issue of public interest or concern.
Thus, to constitute SLAPP, they proposed that the following elements must be present:

1. a civil complaint or counterclaim (for monetary damages and/or injunction);

2. filed against non-governmental individuals and/or groups;

3. because of their communications to a government body, official, or the electorate; and

4. on an issue of some public interest or concern.

Our Rules define SLAPP in the following sections:

RULE 1

Section 4. Definition of Terms. … (g) Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) refers to an
action whether civil, criminal or administrative, brought against any person, institution or any
government agency or local government unit or its officials and employees, with the intent to harass,
vex, exert undue pressure or stifle any legal recourse that such person, institution or government agency
has taken or may take in the enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment or
assertion of environmental rights.

RULE 6

Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation Section 1. Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation
(SLAPP). — A legal action filed to harass, vex, exert undue pressure or stifle any legal recourse that any
person, institution or the government has taken or may take in the enforcement of environmental laws,
protection of the environment or assertion of environmental rights shall be treated as a SLAPP and shall
be governed by these Rules.

In a SLAPP suit involving environmental laws and rights, a defendant must raise the affirmative defense
of SLAPP along with the supporting evidence and pray for damages by way of counterclaim. Under Rule
6, Section 2 of the Rules: Section 2. SLAPP as a defense; how alleged. – In a SLAPP filed against a person
involved in the enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment, or assertion of
environmental rights, the defendant may file an answer interposing as a defense that the case is a SLAPP
and shall be supported by documents, affidavits, papers and other evidence; and, by way of
counterclaim, pray for damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.

The court shall direct the plaintiff or adverse party to file an opposition showing the suit is not a SLAPP,
attaching evidence in support thereof, within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from receipt of
notice that an answer has been filed. The defense of a SLAPP shall be set for hearing by the court after
issuance of the order to file an opposition within fifteen (15) days from filing of the comment or the
lapse of the period.
Since a motion to dismiss is prohibited in environmental cases, [157] SLAPP may be raised as an
affirmative defense by the defendant in its answer. The defendant may likewise pray for damages,
attorney's fees, and costs of suit by way of counterclaim. [158] When the defense of SLAPP is raised, the
plaintiff is ordered to file an opposition to show that it is not.

Here, petitioner alleges that the Petition for Writ of Kalikasan filed by respondents is a SLAPP. It
contends that the petition constitutes tortious interference in relation to the implementation of its
mining contract. [163] Petitioner argues that it fully complied with the terms of the Agreement as well
as the provisions of the Philippine Mining Act, National Integrated Protected Areas System Act, and
Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act. [164] Petitioner claims that respondents are illegal small-scale miners
who are adversely affected by its mining operations. [165] It further points out that the respondents
referred to another company named Oceana in the petition, indicating that their grievances were
directed against a different mining corporation. [166]

We deny the petition.

The application of our SLAPP-back rules must be done with a thorough understanding of its underlying
rationale and policy, lest we condone the very evil that the rule intended to address.

Anti-SLAPP is a legal remedy given to ordinary citizens who are exercising their constitutional rights of
free speech and petition for redress to the government. At its core, SLAPP-backs are intended as a tool
to address lawsuits designed to squelch the people's exercise of basic constitutional rights. It is not a
blanket provision which may be invoked in any event.

The Writ of Kalikasan, [171] an environmental writ which may be issued under the rules, is an equally
unique legal tool intended to ensure environmental law enforcement by making the powerful
accountable. Similarly, the writ was created to "provide a stronger defense for environmental rights
through judicial efforts where institutional arrangements of enforcement, implementation, and
legislation have fallen short... and to address the potentially exponential nature of large-scale ecological
threats." [172] In fact, the rules were intentionally applied not only against the government but also
against private entities because the Court recognized the "reality that private corporations threaten the
exercise of environmental rights as much as government agencies that fail to fulfill their duties.

Hence, the remedy of anti-SLAPP cannot be haphazardly invoked by any defendant in an environmental
case. SLAPP is a defense that may only be invoked by individuals who became target of litigation due to
their environmental advocacy. It is not a remedy of powerful corporations to stifle the actions of
ordinary citizens who seek to make them accountable. More so, it is not a tool given to large
concessionaires who have their obligations and responsibilities under the law. On the other hand,
citizens are favored under our Constitution to hold corporations accountable for the way that they
discharge their responsibility as contractors and as agents of government in utilizing and developing
natural resources that should benefit all.

this case, petitioner cannot use this remedy. Within the context of SLAPP, petitioner is not exercising the
right to free speech or the right to petition the government for redress of grievances. At the outset,
petitioner is not advocating for the protection, preservation, and rehabilitation of the environment, but
enforcement of its mining grant. The enforcement of a large mining concession is not an activity
intended to be protected by the rules. This does not fall within the political activities protected by an
anti-SLAPP law.

To reiterate, an anti-SLAPP motion is an extraordinary remedy deliberately crafted to address lawsuits

tending to squelch an ordinary citizen's constitutional rights to free speech and petition to the
government for redress of grievances. We cannot authorize the use of this remedy to a case for which it
was never intended. To do otherwise would be a misuse of our environmental rules and a betrayal of
social justice.

CITIZEN FOR GREEN CAMIGUIN VS KING ENERGY

FACTS:

Citizens for a Green and Peaceful Camiguin, Sulog, Inc., Save CDO Now Movement, Inc., Task Force
Macajalar, Fe E. Ulfstein, Aristeo Marbella, Sr., Maria Teresa Rami, Magdalena L. Maestrado, Marijone
Saab Gapas, Magdalina L. Rodriguiz, Cris T. Magallon, Victor L. Umaran, George L. Bonita, Ranel G.
Semaña, Floriza A. Bolo, Elpidia L. Taganas, Gerry E. Agbu, Eduardo M. Payca, Maria Teresa E. Estrada,
Concepcion G. Ebcas, Jonas E. Ebcas, Eugene C. Abao, Ivy May B. Acebes, Celeste Lupina, Zuendelyn
Penalosa, Jocelyn Diana King, Jocelyn Tagupa, Michael Philip L. Kho, Remedio Vicente, Orlando Ebcas,
and Joan S. Dagondon, (petitioners) filed twin petitions before the CA seeking the issuance of writs of
kalikasan and continuing mandamus against "the establishment and/or construction of a diesel power
plant by King Energy Generation, Inc. (KEGI) in Sitio Maubog, Barangay Balbagon, Mambajao, Camiguin."
According to them, the construction of said power plant violates their constitutional right to a balanced
and healthful ecology and a slew of environmental laws.

Petitioners also fault public respondents Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and local government units in Balbagon, Mambajao,
Camiguin, for allegedly allowing the construction of the power plant in contravention of the laws they
are mandated to enforce. Respondent Camiguin Electric Cooperative (CAMELCO) is also impleaded for
having contracted with KEGI for the construction of the power plant allegedly without complying with
applicable laws

ASSERTION:

Petitioners claim that: (1) following the precautionary principle under both national and international
environmental law, the project should not have been approved in view of its "innumerable" health,
safety and environmental hazards; 4 (2) respondents failed to secure an Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) as required under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1151 5 and PD No. 1586; 6 (2) n the
project did not have the approval of the President upon recommendation of the Philippine Tourism
Authority as required under Proclamation No. 1801; 7 (3) the construction did not comply with the
requirement of public consultation under Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code (LGC); 8 and
(4) respondent Sangguniang Bayan violated Memorandum Circular No. 54 when it caused the
reclassification/conversion of the area where the power plant is to be located from agricultural to
industrial land without conducting the necessary public hearings.

ISSUE

Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petitions.

ALLEGATION:

Petitioners essentially reiterate their arguments before the CA. They state that although Camiguin is an
isolated island province far from the nearest cities and provinces, it should not be denied of the benefits
of a law created to champion the protection and promotion of our natural resources. 16 They allege that
the power plant in issue is located only in the municipality of Mambajao, thus "it does not mean that the
pollutants it [will produce] will not contribute to the threat that causes the recent natural calamities that
took the lives of hundreds of inhabitants in northern Mindanao." Petitioners claim that the
precautionary principle creates a bias in favor of the constitutional right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology.

The EMB, similarly with co-respondents Provincial and Local Governments of Camiguin, 18 maintains
that the CA correctly dismissed the twin petitions. It counters that the writs of kalikasan and continuing
mandamus are not general remedies that are readily available whenever there are violations or
threatened violations against the environment. Far from being universal solutions in every case involving
environmental damage, a writ of kalikasan is issued only when certain conditions are met, including the
requirement of damage being of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants in two or more cities or municipalities

RULING

We DENY the petition. The CA did not commit any reversible error in dismissing the petitions

We note at the outset the defect in the verification attached to the petitions filed before the CA. As
correctly pointed out by the EMB, 28 the verification signed by alleged authorized representatives of
petitioner organizations/petitioner-corporations was bereft of proof to show that said signatories were
indeed so authorized. 29 Even granting substantial compliance with the verification requirement, 30 the
petitions must still fail.

Section 1, Rule 7, Part III of the RPEC provides: Section 1. Â Nature of the writ. — The writ is a remedy
available to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law, people's organization, non-
governmental organization, or any public interest group accredited by or registered with any
government agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology
is violated, or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee,
or private individual or entity, involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the
life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

It is settled that magnitude of environmental damage is a condition sine qua non in a petition for the
issuance of a writ ofkalikasan and must be contained in the verified petition. 31 So extraordinary is the
nature of the remedy of a writ of kalikasan that this Court, in promulgating the RPEC, has expressly
reserved its issuance only for cases which are sufficiently grave in terms of territorial scope.

Here, after listing the allegedly "innumerable" safety, health and environmental hazards posed by the
diesel power plant, petitioners failed to allege how its construction would cause damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
33 They instead rely on the application of the precautionary principle to cure this defect in their
petitions. 34 The precautionary principle, however, finds direct application in the evaluation of evidence
and bridges the gap in cases where scientific certainty in factual findings cannot be achieved. 35 It does
not and should not be made to supply allegations where there are none. The defect in petitioners'
pleading becomes even more apparent when they went on to argue that it would be unfair to deny the
benefit of the writ of kalikasan to the inhabitants of Camiguin solely on account of the island's "unique"
location ("far from the nearest cities or provinces").

Before they proceed with the case, they must be ready with the evidence necessary for the
determination of the writ's issuance. 37 Here, an examination of the petition filed before the CA readily
shows that petitioners were unable to meet the burden of proving their entitlement to the writ of
kalikasan prayed for. Apart from citing a purported Press Release issued by the International Agency for
Research on Cancer (IARC) on the association between cancer and diesel exposure, 38 as well as a
Wikipedia article on the advantages and disadvantages of diesel engines vis-á-vis spark ignition engines,
39 they offered no other evidence to substantiate the alleged safety, health and environmental damage
caused (or to be caused) by the construction of the diesel power plant to the residents of Camiguin.
Petitioners are also reminded of this Court's ruling in Paje v. Casiño that lack of approval of the
concerned sanggunians over the subject project (pursuant to Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC) "would not
lead to or is not reasonably connected with environmental damage but, rather, it is an affront to the
local autonomy of LGUs.

That petitioners find fault with the findings of these agencies does not justify ignoring the proper
procedure for appeals of said findings and/or issuances. Under DENR Administrative Order (AO) No. 03-
30, for example, any party aggrieved by the final decision on an ECC/CNC application may, within 15
days from receipt of such decision, file an appeal with the EMB Director or the DENR Secretary, as the
case may be. 48 A Conversion Order issued by the Regional Director, as in this case, may be subject of a
motion for reconsideration, appeal or petition for revocation/withdrawal under Administrative Order
No. 1, Series of 2002, of the DAR. 49 As this Court held in Abogado v. Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, 50 the writ of continuing mandamus "should not be used to supplant executive or
legislative privileges. Neither should it be used where the remedies required are clearly political or
administrative in nature." Petitioners have also not shown a causal link or reasonable connection
between the agencies' alleged lapses and the environmental damage of the magnitude contemplated
under the RPEC.

MERCADO VS LOPENA

Factual Antecedents
Sometime in October 2015, respondent Go filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Custody of their
children, which was docketed as Civil Case No. R-QZN-15-08943. The case was raffled to and is still
pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 86, which is presided by herein public
respondent Judge Roberto P. Buenaventura.

All the cases were still pending at the time the Petition was filed, except for NPS XV-INV-15J-11698,
which was dismissed by the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City in a Resolution dated
November 23, 2016.

The root of this controversy is a domestic dispute between estranged spouses petitioner Mercado and
private respondent Go. Such dispute eventually led to the filing of numerous suits by both parties
against each other,

On the other hand, on November 5, 2015, petitioner Mercado filed an Urgent Petition for Issuance of
Temporary and/or Permanent Protection Order (TPO/PPO), docketed as Civil Case No. R-QZN-15-10201
(the PPO Case). 7 The case was also raffled to Branch 86 of the RTC of Quezon City. 8 Therein, petitioner
Mercado complained of several acts of respondent Go allegedly constituting domestic violence.

At the same time, petitioner Mercado also filed a criminal complaint for violation of R.A. No. 9262 9
against respondent Go and his parents, respondent spouses Peter and Esther Go, which was eventually
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

ISSUE:

the principal issue for the Court's resolution is whether public respondents committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the subject cases.

RULING:

The Petition is dismissed. The Petition is procedurally infirm; availability of plain, speedy, and adequate
remedies; failure to state material dates

At the outset, the Court finds the filing of the instant Petition premature. For a petition for certiorari or
prohibition to prosper, the Rules require that there be no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
available in the ordinary course of law. 17 Here, the cases before the public respondents are still
pending. Thus, there still exists in law a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy for petitioners — which is
to participate in said cases and await the judgment of the RTC. And, if the RTC renders an unfavorable
judgment against petitioners, they may appeal the cases to the CA. Meanwhile, as to the complaints
filed before the OCP of Quezon City, the same may be elevated via petition for review before the
Secretary of Justice and thereafter to the Office of the President; if the prosecutor's finding of probable
cause is ultimately upheld, the case may then proceed to trial

In the same vein, petitioner Mercado is also entitled to the appropriate relief under R.A. No. 9262 in
case of a violation of the PPO dated February 19, 2016 issued in Civil Case No. R-QZN-15-10201. Under
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9262, a violation of any provision of a PPO shall constitute Contempt of Court
punishable under Rule 71 of the Rules: SECTION 21. Â Violation of Protection Orders. — xxx xxx xxx
Violation of any provision of a TPO or PPO issued under this Act shall constitute contempt of court
punishable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, without prejudice to any other criminal or civil action
that the offended party may file for any of the acts committed.

the Petition is dismissible for failure to include a statement of material dates in violation of Rule 56 of
the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 3 of Rule 46. Rule 46 provides that the following material dates
must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65: (a) the date when notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution was received, (b) the date when a motion for new trial or for
reconsideration was filed, and (c) the date when notice of the denial thereof was received. 19 The same
provision states that the petitioner's failure to comply with said requirements shall be sufficient ground
for the dismissal of the petition. 20 The purpose of this requirement is to determine whether the
petition was filed within the proper reglementary period. A petition for certiorari or prohibition must be
filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be
assailed

Those who seek relief from the Court must comply with its rules. Procedural rules are in place for the
orderly administration of justice. Litigation may not be a mere contest of technicalities, but this does not
excuse strict compliance with the Rules of Court. 25 The Court will only relax the application of the rules
for the most compelling and exceptional reasons, none of which are existent in this case. Based on the
foregoing, the Petition should therefore be dismissed.

The Court's rule-making power cannot be invoked through a Rule 65 petition

Petitioners invoke the power of the Court to promulgate rules of procedure, presumably to extend the
relief of SLAPP to those cases filed against victims of domestic violence in the context of R.A. No. 9262.

Foremost, the rule-making power of the Court in matters of pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts is vested by Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the Constitution. 26 Hence, being plenary in nature, the
Court cannot be called upon by a private citizen to exercise such power in a particular manner,
especially through the vehicle of a petition for certiorari or prohibition, which is intended for an entirely
different purpose

Moreover, as discussed above, a petition filed under Rule 65 is directed against any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions that has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 27 Relief in
such a petition merely takes the form of correcting any error of jurisdiction committed by the tribunal or
officer. Here, petitioners would want the Court to accommodate her cause of action by granting a
collateral relief that is not comprehended under the provisions of Rule 65 — or any of the Rules, for that
matter — which is to extend the concept of SLAPP to cases of violence against women and their children

The concept of SLAPP is inapplicable to cases of domestic violence against women and children under
R.A. No. 9262

The concept of SLAPP was first introduced to this jurisdiction under the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC). 28 As defined therein, a SLAPP refers to: an action whether
civil, criminal or administrative, brought against any person, institution or any government agency or
local government unit or its officials and employees, with the intent to harass, vex, exert undue pressure
or stifle any legal recourse that such person, institution or government agency has taken or may take in
the enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment or assertion of environmental
rights.

In application, the allegation of SLAPP is set up as a defense in those cases claimed to have been filed
merely as a harassment suit against environmental actions: Aa

RULE 6 Strategic Lawsuit against Public Participation xxx xxx xxx SECTION 2. Â SLAPP as a Defense; How
Alleged. — In a SLAPP filed against a person involved in the enforcement of environmental laws,
protection of the environment, or assertion of environmental rights, the defendant may file an answer
interposing as a defense that the case is a SLAPP and shall be supported by documents, affidavits,
papers and other evidence; and, by way of counterclaim, pray for damages, attorney's fees and costs of
suit.

SLAPP, as a defense, is a mere privilege borne out of procedural rules; accordingly, it may only be
exercised in the manner and within the scope prescribed by the Court as a rule-making body. 34 Here,
petitioners cannot, under the guise of substantial justice, rely on a remedy that is simply not available to
them. In fact, by invoking the Court's rule-making power in their Petition, petitioners have admitted that
the instant action has no basis under any of the rules promulgated by the Court. The Court takes this
occasion to remind petitioners that rules of procedure are not a "one-size-fits-all" tool that may be
invoked in any and all instances at the whim of the litigant as this would be anathema to the orderly
administration of justice.

The public respondents did not commit grave abuse of discretion; writs of certiorari and prohibition are
not available remedies to petitioners

The writs of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 are extraordinary remedies that may be availed of
when any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, o.

r with grave abuse of jurisdiction amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 35 The term grave abuse of
discretion connotes capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or a lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. 3

It bears stressing that a special civil action forcertiorari or prohibition seeks solely to correct errors of
jurisdiction and not merely errors of judgment made in the exercise of jurisdiction.

In this case, petitioners failed to demonstrate that the subject cases fell outside of the respective
jurisdictions of public respondents; there was no showing that the subject matters of the said cases
were not properly cognizable by the offices of public respondents. Instead, petitioners merely argue that
public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in the taking of cognizance of the subject cases
despite the issuance of the PPO in favor of petitioner Mercado. 38 This is serious error.

Further, neither does the issuance of the PPO prevent private respondents from seeking redress from
the courts for any alleged offense committed by petitioners against them. The PPO granted in favor of
petitioner Mercado does not and cannot insulate her from prosecution for acts committed in violation of
the law, even if the action is initiated by private respondent Go. Granted, the PPO is a directive
addressed to private respondent Go; however, the latter is still entitled to redress and be granted the
reliefs he sought so long as they were based on legitimate ground