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to what goals?
Ewen Fondrillon
Kateryna Bakulina
Piret Kuusik
Thomas Grandjouan
PARIS - 2016
Authors:
Ewen Fondrillion
Master's Candidate, International Security,
Paris School of International Affairs,
Sciences Po Paris.
Kateryna Bakulina
Analyst, HybridStrategies.eu
Master's Candidate,
International Public Management,
Paris School of International Affairs,
Sciences Po Paris.
Piret Kuusik
Master's Candidate, International Security,
Paris School of International Affairs,
Sciences Po Paris
Thomas Grandjouan
trois dernires annes, depuis l'annexation de la Crime en Mars 2014, que nous avons
identifi comme un changement essentiel dans la relation entre la Russie et l'UE.
Notre analyse se base sur des lments obtenus travers nos recherches personnelles de
sources acadmiques afin de construire une perspective plus objective, mais galement de
sources mdiatiques permettant de suivre en dtails les volutions stratgiques. Par ailleurs,
afin d'approfondir nos recherches, nous avons men une srie d'interviews auprs de
chercheurs spcialistes des relations russo-europennes, et d'expert impliqus dans ce
domaine, incluant d'anciens collaborateurs du gouvernement russe. Cependant, nos sources
ont demand rester anonymes. Ces interviews nous ont permis, notamment, de raliser une
cartographie offrant une meilleure ide de l'influence russe dans diffrents secteurs. Cette
approche sectorielle sert par ailleurs de structure au rapport tout entier.
Les rsultats de nos recherches offrent deux lments de rponse la question de l'influence
Russe. D'une part, l'influence conomique et son pouvoir de contrainte (hard power) en
matire de scurit diminuent, malgr d'importants investissements dans les deux domaines.
D'autre part, l'influence de la Russie dans les domaines de la culture, des mdias, et surtout
de la politique est en pleine croissance. Cela s'explique par plusieurs facteurs. Aprs
l'annexation de la Crime, les sanctions conomiques imposes par l'UE envers la Russie ont
considrablement rduit sa marge de manoeuvre en matire conomique et financire. La
crise des prix de l'nergie, le ptrole en particulier, a ajout ce handicap dj lourd, tel
point que l'influence conomique russe est presque compltement paralyse, et recule mme
dans le domaine de l'nergie, pourtant un vecteur traditionnel d'influence. En matire de
scurit, l'opposition de plus en plus vive des pays Baltes et de la Pologne, ajoute une
implication plus importante de l'OTAN en Europe orientale, a limit les tactiques d'intimidation
russe depuis 2014, d'autant que les forces armes russe sont galement impliques en Syrie
depuis quelques mois. Par contraste, devant l'inefficacit et les difficults employer ces
vecteurs traditionnel de l'influence russe, le Kremlin a investi de plus en plus lourdement dans
un appareil mdiatique visant destabiliser et dcrdibiliser le leadership actuel des tats
membres de l'UE, tout en se construisant une image de dfenseur des valeurs europennes,
consolidant ainsi une stratgie hybride dj mise l'preuve avec succs en Ukraine.
Introduction
Due to recent developments in global politics, from the Ukrainian crisis to the emergence of
ISIS, research on Russia is becoming increasingly relevant, especially from the European
perspective. However, current academic debate largely dates back to pre-Ukrainian crisis, and
therefore does not take into consideration the impact that the crisis had on Russian influence
in Europe, which is the focus of this paper.
It is an attempt at evaluating and studying Russian influence in Europe, through three
perspectives on influence as defined by James Sherr - economical, security, and
political/cultural, which are interwoven and cannot be considered independently from each
other. It is this wide perspective, including both sectors, that further sets this outlook apart from
other academic studies of Russian influence, as they tend to be quite narrowly focused on one
sector, or even one issue, while our aim is to provide a broad overview of Russias influence
in Europe.
The core argument of this paper is that the aim of Russias influence in Europe is to re-establish
itself as a power among equals in global politics, using Europe as a stepping stone. Through
each of our three perspectives, we will examine the tools Russia is using to extend its influence,
and aim at answer two questions: whether or not Russia has a comprehensive strategy, and
whether or not this strategy, or lack thereof, is furthering Russia's goal of stepping back into
the international community as a power to reckon with.
First, we will consider Russia's economic relations with Europe, with a particular attention to
the effects of European sanctions implemented because of the Ukrainian crisis. In our second
chapter, we examine Russian influence in the domain of hard power, which is an improper
term but the closest at hand to evoke its military power. Finally, we turn our attention to Russian
cultural and political influence throughout Europe.
Methodology
Considering the difficulty to access reliable sources and our own resources, we had to tailor
our methodology accordingly. Therefore, this paper is the fruit of a qualitative study. It is based
on interviews of academics experts on Russia and Europe, as well as practitioners in the field,
which helps bring perspective and depth to our own literature and press research. Most of the
interviewee's asked not to be quoted, meaning direct quotes are not prominent in this paper,
but the interviews still brought invaluable insights on the issues at hand.
Moreover, we also used these interviews to establish a cartography of Russian influence in
Europe, helping us illustrate our points. These maps are intended as support material, and
are exclusively based on our interviews, they are not comprehensive representation of
Russian influence, which, given the very nature of influence, would prove challenging to
represent, if possible at all.
Finally, clarifying our definition of influence is a crucial point before moving on to the core of
this report. When we refer to Russian influence, we understand it as the capacity Russia has
to change or alter the decisions taken by other countries or transnational institutions such as
the European Union (EU).
1
2
The result has diluted Russias economic influence in Europe, diminished the presence of
large Russian state and private energy companies in Central Europe, and undermined the
Russian governments ability to assert its influence through financial and economic channels.
While EU action in the wake of the Ukraine crisis did contribute to a reduction in Russian trade
figures, the negative impact of these sanctions is often over-estimated compared to the impact
that the drop in oil prices had on the Russian economy.
Impact of EU Sanction
The sanctions have only been partially effective, what accounts the most for a fall in Russian
trade is the 50% fall in oil prices3. The combination of the Ukrainian crisis, long-standing
sector-specific barriers, sanctions, Russian counter-sanctions, and the recession brought
about by the oil price drop has led Russia into a new phase of economic turbulence. A phase
that truly began in November 2015, when the Russian government reported its first GDP
contraction in five years, a 60% devaluation of the ruble since 2014, the halving of foreign
reserves to $370 in 2016 from $650 in 2007, inflation fluctuating between 12% and 16%, rising
outflows of domestic and foreign direct investment, and an increase in social tensions across
the country.
However, as several studies have shown, the EU share in Russian imports has been fairly
stable during the sanctions period beginning in July 2014 (slightly above 40% of overall
Russian goods imported), declining only to 37% in May 20154. Meanwhile, when the statistics
concerning the US and Japan are disentangled from the EUs export statistics, we see that
Japanese exports remain stable while Americans actually increase their share of total exports
during the sanctions period.
While Russia has undoubtedly suffered from the sanctions, the cost is often exaggerated. As
several studies have shown, the EU share in Russian imports has been fairly stable during
the sanctions period beginning in July 2014 (slightly above 40% of overall Russian goods
imported), declining only to 37% in May 2015. Meanwhile, when the statistics concerning the
US and Japan are disentangled from the EUs export statistics, we see that Japanese exports
remain stable while Americans actually increase their share of total exports during the
sanctions period. It is therefore, to consider sanctions as a political tool rather than as an
economic weapon.
3
4
Figure 3 : Russian imports, share of the United States, Japan and the EU during the sanctions
period5
With the reduced economic effectiveness of the sanctions in mind, its is helpful to consider
the punitive measures undertaken by the elected heads of Member States in the European
Council as a political tool rather than as an economic weapon, as a symbolic show of
resistance to President Putins aggression in Ukraine, rather than a measure that is truly
coercive that could dramatically change the economic balance of power between Russian and
its European neighbours. But nevertheless, once combined with the external macroeconomic
factors causing domestic turmoil in Russia, the result is an important amount of political
pressure in the context of a constraining economic climate that is limiting the Russias
government ability to assert its influence in the European Union. To see how this influence
translates throughout the region and where it is located, we must now proceed to a countryby-country approach.
5
6
CEPS (2015)
European Commission, DG Trade (2016)
The difficulty of the European Commission in negotiating a common, unitary position for all
Member States shows just how divergent different European countries are in their relationship
with Russia. The states negotiating sanctions in 2014 can be split into two groups. On the one
hand, those pushing hard for sanctions included Poland, Romania, Sweden, the Netherlands,
the United Kingdom and the Baltic states, and on the other hand, Slovakia, Hungary, Italy and
Spain reluctant to sign on sanctions, while France occupies a position between the two, who
initially warned against sanctions but also took the important step of halting the sale of Mistral
warships.
The consensus secured to pass EU sanctions against Russia is an important example of
European unity vis--vis their Eastern neighbour and a glaring example of Russias loss of
influence in the chancelleries of Europes capitals. Despite tensions and growing criticism of
the measures, including Frances parliamentarians voting a non-binding motion to lift the
sanctions in April 2016, the renewal of the measures at the European Council meeting of 2829 June 2016, is expected to pass unanimously, meaning even the Kremlins most loyal allies,
like Viktor Orban, have confirmed they will not, as good Europeans, block the proposal.
What specifically prevented EU Member States from quickly rallying behind a common
position on sanctions? Using the five categories of EU member states developed in the PowerAudit of EU-Russia relations undertaken by the European Council of Foreign Relations in
2007, we can identify the size of Russias economic footprint in each country. By examining
the weight of their economic ties with Russia we will be able to see how it translates into
economic influence if at all. The five groups identified in 2007 have not evolved out their
categories since the initial audit was carried out, apart from the addition of Croatia to the
friendly pragmatists, the countries in order of the the most supportive of Russian interests in
Europe are:
The Trojan Horses (Cyprus and Greece) who often defend Russian interests through
their willingness to veto common EU positions
The Strategic Partners (France, Germany, Italy, and Spain) who entertain a special
relationship with Russia based on long-standing economic relations and political ties
10
The Frosty pragmatists (Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, the
Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom), also focus on business
interests but are less intimated to criticise Russia on human rights and other issues
The New Cold Warriors (Lithuania and Poland), hold an overtly hostile relationship with
Moscow, and willing to use their veto to block EU negotiations with Russia.
Lets start with countries most opposed to sanctions. A month before the first sanctions regime
was decided in 2014, Vladimir Putin on a visit in Austria called out on Russias friends in
Europe to avert further sanctions. The central and south European countries he had in mind
are clearly linked to Russia through their dependence on its supply of oil and gas, as well as
investment brought by tourism. 8
Euractiv (2014)
TASS (2016)
Washington Times (July 2015)
11
ECFR (2007)
12
ECFR, (2007)
9
10
11
countries except France, with whom Russian trade accounts only for 0.9% of external trade,
and whose ties with Russia are founded more on cooperating on global issues (Iran, Iraq,
Syria) and a shared conception of multi-polarity.
The largest Russian economic footprint is in Germany, Russias biggest trading partner and
most important market for Russian gas, the fifth biggest investor in Russia in 2006 ($5 bn),
and an important destination for Russian holidaymakers and business interests, (342,575
Russian visitors to Germany in 2006). These close economic ties translates into an awareness
among German policy-makers of the need to coordinate and cooperate with Russia, even
leading to Merkels government to pursue a Russia-first policy on the Eastern neighbourhood,
and advocate integration with Russia before the economic and political crisis shifted the terms
of the debate.13
Italy, like Germany, has maintained a strong diplomatic relationship with Russia built on firm
economic foundations. Italy is Russias third biggest trading partner after Germany and China,
and its third biggest gas market, accounting for 11% of all of Russias natural gas exports in
2014.14 Italys energy giant ENI is Gazproms key partner in the Blue Stream II pipeline project
and several other energy companies have joint ventures for refineries in Italy. It is no
coincidence that Russias substantial economic stake in the Italian economy has led Matteo
Renzi, Italys prime minister, to advocate a more balanced approach to Russia.15
Spains economic relationship is less intensive than other large countries (accounting for only
1% of each others trade) but Russia does supply 13% of Spains oil, while the Spanish
government has long promoted a policy of economic cooperation with Russia. The tourism
industry is important, Spain being the most attractive destination for Russian holidaymakers
after Turkey. As the ECFR points out, Spain avoids raising sensitive political issues with
Russia at the European level and is wary of engagement in the Eastern neighbourhood.
Statista, (2016)
Reuters (2015)
ECFR, (2007)
16
ECFR (2007)
17
International Herald Tribune( 2006)
14
15
12
18
D. Hegedus ( 2016)
Veselin Zhelev, EUobserver (2016)
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Y. Boyadjiev and A. Andreev ( 2015)
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13
Unlike either Hungary or Bulgaria, Slovakia is loosening its economic ties with Russia in favour
of its European partners. Over the past 12 months, Bratislava has transformed its position
towards Russia as one with important business interests to preserve, including most of its gas
deliveries and nuclear fuel for its Russian built power plants, and some core defense
equipment, towards its position today of openly supporting the European Commissions
compliance demands with Moscow and pushing for the diversification of gas supplies away
from Russia.21 The fears of regional instability caused by the Ukraine crisis and the
identification of a new gas connection to Poland, seem to be the main cause behind Slovakias
westward turn thereby rendering Russian influence in the region more difficult.
To the list of countries categorised by Mark Leonard in 2007 as friendly pragmatists, we must
now add Croatia, a country whose government is divided between obligations to the European
Commission to carry out deep and unpopular structural reforms in order to fully benefit from
the EUs Single Market, and a cultural affinity with Russia as a fellow Slavic nation. However,
the country having little influence in the European Councils deliberations due to its small size,
recent arrival, and macroeconomic difficulties like high unemployment, high debt and a high
deficit, Croatia does not seem to be a target for Russian influence in Europe. A fact that is
corroborated by the absence of any major Russian investment projects in 2015.22
Frosty Pragmatists: Russias sceptical trading partners in the core and periphery
Russias economic relationship in Europe is constrained by another large group of countries
that despite also having pragmatic acceptance of the possible benefits of Russian business
interests, are also ready to challenge Russia about democracy and human rights. This group
comprises countries from the core and periphery and that are both large and small member
states: Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Estonia, Latvia,
Romania and the Czech Republic, who have all had bilateral disputes with Russia, and
repeatedly been willing to challenge Russia openly on the diplomatic stage when it violates
interests and diplomatic norms.
Russias economic interests are strongest within the Czech Republic, Latvia and Estonia, who
depend on Russia for the majority, or the totality in Latvia and Estonias case, of their gas and
oil supplies. The Czech Republic has cooled its relations with Russia due to disputes over the
installation of a US missile shield and support for a more active EU in the Eastern
neighbourhood. Estonia has engaged in several diplomatic rows with Russia since 2007,
including a dispute originating around the location of a war memorial to Soviet soldiers,
resulting in economic pressures imposed on Estonia by Russia, and travel-ban against proKremlin activists. The tensions have continued to mount with cybersecurity attacks and military
drills carried out in 2015 and 20 16 in Estonian airspace. Meanwhile, Latvia has sought a more
moderate relationship with Russia. The large population of ethnic Russians (25%), the
linguistic prevalence of Russian (spoken at home by 34% of Latvians) and Latvias
dependence on Russia for 100% of its countrys gas needs, makes it easy to understand why
Latvia seeks a stable relationship with Russia.23 However, Latvia has not hesitated to turn on
Russia, it was very critical of Russia during the Ukraine crisis, which recalled dark memories
of the countries post-war Soviet occupation, and the Latvian Prime Minister continues to be
among those calling for an extension of sanctions.24
21
J. Kobzova (2015)
Russia.HR, (2014)
Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia (2016)
24
Ukraine Today,( 2016)
22
23
14
The Netherlands and the United Kingdom both have reasonably strong economic and trade
ties with Russia, however, both countries have not hesitated to defend EU policy on a common
EU neighbourhood policy, raising human rights concerns at the European level, and strongly
advocating sanctions. But, according to Mark Leonard from the European Council of Foreign
Relations, the concerns raised by the Netherlands have been never enough to damage its
commercial interests.
Romania, unlike its neighbour Bulgaria, has been an outspoken critic of Russian energy policy
and its involvement in Moldova. And Sweden and Ireland, who have weak economic ties to
Russia, have strongly made the case for sanctions and voiced concerns about violation of
human and civil rights in Russia.
What is common to all these countries is that their willingness to choose European unity over
Russian dialogue is in many ways passive. By default they will uphold their interests and
obligations as European member states, but they have not either attempted to mount a
proactive and sustained effort to circumscribe or soften EU policy towards Russia.
25
26
ECFR, (2007)
J. Dempsey, Carnegie Europe, (October 2015)
15
Eurostat 2015
16
Delimiting the influence of the Kremlin over Russian energy companies from company policies
is problematic. Driving the prices lower and keeping business relations with Ukraine, a transit
country important for Russian gaz and oil to reach western Europe are logical and likely
profitable business strategies, if they succeed. On the other hand, losing control over the
energy sector would be not only an economical, but a political disaster. Essentially, energy
companies and the Russian State have the same goal: maintaining dominance over energy
supply to Europe, which is both a way to gain political influence and draw financial profit.
However, our research and interviews, although we cannot use a direct quote as per our
interviewee's request, have suggested that the Kremlin is essentially in charge, and that if
energy companies have some leeway, it is hard to estimate. This is coherent with the strong
net of connection between energy companies and the Russian state: Rosatom, Gazprom and
Rosneft are State companies, for example. Additionally, the strategic planning horizon also
seem to be very limited, to a few month at most, which is partly dictated by the fluctuating
energy prices. For no, it cannot be said with certainty that there is indeed a Russian strategy
in the energy field.
However, while hard to confirm, if energy companies are subservient to the Russian state, it
is highly likely that there is a comprehensive strategy to maintain Russian domination over the
energy market in Europe. Most likely, Russia is aiming at keeping its position as an energy
supplier to use as leverage, as it has already done against Ukraine(during the winter 2009
crisis, for example), in order to help further its international goals. This leverage is important
particularly for Eastern Europe, which is dependent not only on Russian supplies but also on
Russian infrastructure. Towards Western Europe, Russia is less forceful, but still uses energy
deals as a way to bypass EU negotiations and influence specific member states through
bilateral deals. The main example of such a manoeuvre is the North Stream II project, which
would connect directly Russia to Germany through the Baltic sea, and has received strong
German support in EU institutions.
On the other hand, while there is a general goal of maintaining Russia's quasi-monopoly over
European energy supplies, the means are opportunistic, and Russian companies operate both
under the direction of the Kremlin and with a 2-3 month horizon. This influence on Europe
through energy is extremely unbalanced, and largely dependent on territory (maybe also
historic relations and social constructions).
Strategic assessment
Russia's strategy in the energy sector is an important part of the country's economic relations
and influence over Europe. But is it successful? How have Russia's energy leverage been
influenced by the Crimean crisis? Recent developments, in the past two years, seem to
indicate it has suffered from several factors, and that Russia have growing difficulties to exploit
its position.
17
First, Russia and Europe are co-dependent on the energy market. We have already pointed
out Europe's dependency on Russia, but the Russian energy industry needs Europe's
business and financial support, as well as European machine-tools that it cannot manufacture
on its own in order to conduct the exploration of new gas and oil resources in Siberia, the
Pacific Coast and Barent Sea, needed to maintain its production28. This support, due to
European sanctions, have been significantly reduced, reducing in turn new oil and gas fields
discoveries, and threatening the long-term stability of the sector.
In addition, Russia is facing increasing opposition, especially from the Baltic countries, over
energy grid use, and the shared infrastructure is proving to be an issue to supply Kaliningrad,
while the Baltic countries themselves are becoming independent from Russia's infrastructure:
Lithuania has connected its grid through a multi-billion euro project to Poland and Sweden's
electricity grids, and together the three countries are seeking further integration to the
European market, as part of the European policy to get rid of energy islands. Latvia and
Estonia are considering similar projects. Apart from electricity, they are also seeking more
independence from Russia's supplies, and Lithuania, for example, is now solely relying on
Norway and the Baltic Sea resources to import gaz. This attitude conflictual attitude from the
28 Smith (2008)
18
New Cold Warriors29 towards Russia is not new, but it is showing increasingly influential
effects.
On a domestic level, Russia's main energy companies have been hit hard by the oil price
sharp fall in the past two years, which further eroded their financial resources. They are unable
to explore and exploit new hydrocarbons resources, and their position is increasingly
precarious: a diminished production contracts their income, which in turn makes investment
in new projects increasingly difficult, sparking a vicious cycle that could only be broken by a
rise in gas and oil prices and/or a lifting of sanctions. Even attempts to put pressure on Ukraine
through its dependency on Russian gas have been counterbalanced by Hungary, Slovakia
and Poland, through the development of reverse-flow capacities enabling them to send part
of the gas back to Ukraine.
On the other hand, Russia is still the primary energy supplier of Europe, and despite the crisis
of its energy sector, remains a primary player in this field. Moreover, Russia is turning to Asia,
and actively completing its pipelines to China, which is, however a difficult customer. It also
attempts to sway EU member states through energy deals and threats (Ex: Italy, France,
Germany), who have been defined as strategic partners30. North Stream II is particularly
blatant in that regard31, as it would put another direct connection between Russia and
Germany, but France and the UK are also pressured by their energy distribution companies
into lowering barriers to entry on the energy market for Russian companies. Greece and
Cyprus32, as well, have not role to play on the energy market but willingly advocate a position
closer to Russia, and support for the North Stream II, which creates rifts in the EU institutions.
As far as the nuclear sector goes, Russia's is actually faring relatively well, the only
competition in Europe being French. Russia uses its expertise to establish build/own/operate
programs for reactors all over Europe: two in Belarus at Ostrovets, one in Hungary at Paks,
others in Bulgaria and Kaliningrad. Yet, once again it's facing trouble and a virulent opposition
from the Baltic countries who are ostensibly hostile towards Russia. Russias position is
weakening.
European reactions to these manoeuvres have been even more damaging to Russia's
dominance. They have fuelled the project of a Common Energy policy, which first started after
the gas crisis of 2009, but picked up after the Crimea crisis and the beginning of the war in
Ukraine, as Europe, fearing a new gas shortage, united in support of the initiative. This
Common Energy policy was recently approved, becoming the Energy Union, in February
2015. It aims at unifying the market, which is extremely threatening to Russia, and our
interviews have pointed out that it worries the Kremlin's inner circle as it could mean a unified
European opposition on the energy market, where European countries would be able to
leverage Russia's co-dependency on the energy business. On the other hand, there are still
29 Leonard and Popescu (2007)
30 Leonard and Popescu (2007)
31 Kropatcheva (2011)
32 Leonard and Popescu (2007)
19
bilateral deals foiling attempts to find a common solution, and several European countries are
defending a position closer to Russia, which undermines the whole decision process.
Furthermore, Russia is opposed by the Baltic countries, Poland, but also Bulgaria and Italy
since the cancellation of the South Stream project33, which was supposed to reach Northern
Italy through the Balkans. They have formed a coalition to oppose Russian within the EU
institutions, despite Gazprom lobbying, gathering most of Eastern and Southern Europe,
which proves to be a sizeable opposition. As evoked above, Europe has also been trying to
solve the issue of energy islands, countries isolated from the European grid and market, with
some success, strengthening the European market in the process. There are even some
signs of active opposition, like the lawsuit that has been filed against Gazprom in Stockholm
for violation of antitrust and monopoly regulations. Yet, despite these projects and initiatives,
the European institutions are still divided, and a rift is forming between Germany and the
opposition to the North Stream II project.
Has this strategy served Russias aims and objectives, in light of the European reactions?
Definitely not. Not only has Russia been weakened by the recent crash of oil prices, but
European countries and the EU have taken measures to weaken Russia's hold on European
energy supply and strengthen Europe's energy supply, measures that have receive
increased support, despite the divided EU institutions, because of the Crimean incident and
subsequent Ukrainian civil war. This unfortunate combination has severely shaken Russia's
hold on the energy sector. While it is still considerable, it is weakening, and as the situation
continues to deteriorate, it is increasingly likely that Russia will lose its dominant position.
This is essential to evaluate Russian influence: it is not only a matter of foreign influence, but
also a prime domestic concern, as the State's budget is also heavily dependent on energy
prices.
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switched off, the collision was avoided merely by good visibility in the air36. Both on the Black
Sea and Baltic Sea, Russian planes have conducted near by passes over USS Donald Cook
on the Black Sea in 201437 and USS Ross 201538 and on the Baltic Sea near Poland in
February 201639. These incidents are an examples of high risk encounters that may escalate
quickly. However, Thomas Frear stresses also that next to creating surprise and fear with such
behaviour, these activities also aim to gather intelligence40.
Second example of Russias offensive military posture is its increased number of military
exercises since 2014. Military exercises have instrumental value for intimidating neighbours.
There are three elements, which support this point. First location and scenario, secondly the
comprehensiveness of exercises and thirdly the secrecy and quick development of these
exercises. Firstly, most of Russias military exercises have been taking place in the Western
military district, which in the light of Russias military reform from 2008 has become the most
capable and well prepared part of Russian military. Additionally, scenarios for exercises are
often offensive in nature and targeted against real places such as Warsaw or Stockholm for
example41. Second aspect causing uneasiness among European countries is the
comprehensive nature of these military exercises. Namely, it is come to be regularity that
Russias military exercises include Russias civilian state structures. Today, civil-military
cooperation in Russia is at the level that Western countries can only dream of42. Thirdly,
secrecy and quick start of these exercises have been called out by European states as going
against the agreed conditions and rules of Vienna document 1999 that sets out the conditions
for military activities in Europe. For example, the requirement to notify military activities and
right to observe military exercises by outside parties43. Last year Russia had a snap drill
involving 8000 soldiers in response to Norways The Arctic Challenge exercise. Whilst
information about The Arctic Challenge was available already a year, there was no
information provided by Russia about its exercise. Bringing together the examples of Russias
military activities allows us to conclude that we have witnessed a drastic change in Russias
security and military behaviour.
22
speaking, Wales Summit in autumn 2014 was a key event where it was decided how to react
to Russias assertive behaviour. Firstly, Readiness Action Plan was agreed, whereby creation
of easily moveable and rapid force unit was decided. In addition, it was agreed to organise
more joint exercises and deploy NATO forces to countries sharing the eastern border with
Russia. All this has been happening- NATO Response Force has been established and is
currently being integrated into NATOs structures. NATO has organised a number of land and
air exercises in the Baltic countries and Poland and also a number of naval exercises on the
Black Sea. Finally, currently there are US soldiers stationed in the Baltic countries and Poland
on bilateral basis. However, NATO has declared that it is planning to establish a rotation of
4000- soldiers in the Baltic countries and Poland44.
Focusing specifically at Europe we have observed a shift in the policy discourse. Hard power,
security and Russia are back in the policy agenda. Russian threat has become the forefront
of national security discourse in countries sharing a border with Russia, however here we
would also like to look at the reactions of some of the Western European countries.
UK in its recent National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015:
A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom talks about a potential state based threat, explicitly
focusing on Russia and Russias behaviour. It is clearly understood by the UK that Russias
behaviour may be aggressive against Britains allies and thus may draw UK into a conflict45.
Hereby, it is noteworthy to mention that UK is leading a NATO Joint Expeditionary Force,
which includes Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania46.
Additionally, UK is taking part of the Northern Group, with Sweden, Finland and Poland to
promote greater regional security. Additionally, UK is contributing to the Baltic Air Mission and
has stationed a small number of troops in the Baltic countries and Poland. In the light of NATO
Warsaw Summit this summer, UK has announced to send 5 ships to the Baltic Sea on 6month rotational basis with NATO forces47.
Germany is torn between two extremes. On the one hand, it seems to understand the
necessity for improved military capabilities in facing Russia, on the other hand it is constrained
by its domestic attitudes towards increased military capabilities. However, Germany is taking
important steps further. In May, Germany announced a 7000 personnel increase of its troops
first time since the Cold War and just recently Defence Minister of Germany asked for increase
in defence budget48.
It is also important to look at the reactions by Finland and Sweden. These two countries are
located in the Baltic Sea region and have been targets of Russias intimations. Additionally,
both are members of the EU, but do not belong to NATO. NATO and countries in the region
argue that Finland and Sweden joining NATO would strengthen the regions security.
Governments of both Sweden and Finland are weighing the options and both have set up
institutions to deal with the issue. Public opinion on the other hand is mixed. In Sweden almost
half of population favours NATO membership, whilst in Finland it has been around 27%49.
Bulgaria and Romania are ready to become more important players in Europe. In the security
realm, they have been seeking to establish regional cooperation in a form of joint brigade with
Ukraine and potentially also with Lithuania and Poland50. However, constraints are present.
44
Burns (2016)
Government of the UK (2015)
46
Ministry of Defence of the UK (2014)
47
MacAskill (2016)
48
Wagstyl (2016)
49
Braw (2015)
50
Adamowski (2016)
45
23
Sofia has been more inclined towards Russia than Bucharest, however both countries have
become an important part of NATOs military buildup in eastern parts of Europe51.
Cyber warfare
by Ewen Fondrillon
Russia is one of the few countries possessing cyberwarfare and cybersecurity capabilities, as
illustrated by several cyber attacks linked to Russian nationals, which in turn are believed to
be backed by the Kremlin. Since 2008 cyber security has been an integral part of Russian
defense doctrine and foreign policy52. We aim to explain how Russia's cyber capacities are
part of its security strategy by looking at its impact on Europe and determining its success
based and linking European reactions.
To begin with, there are several actors operating at once in cyberspace, and making clear
distinctions between them is difficult. There are three types of actors, which have been
accused of most cyber attacks conducted from Russia. However, there is no clear proof tying
them to Kremlin. The first group is composed of criminal groups, such as the Russian Business
Network believed to be tied to cyber attacks during the 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict or the
Dukes. These groups rent out bot-herds, which allow them to flood targets with information,
which then crashes websites and digital infrastructures. Estonia in 2007 is the most wellknown case, but Poland and Ukraine have been targeted as well since 2015 through these
networks. Independent hackers have also been tied to these groups. Their motivations are
unclear, ranging from patriotism, to mere financial gains. These groups have been
responsible for data thefts, phishing, and other criminal activities directly linked to financial
profit, but attacks have also been conducted against foreign websites which does not fit with
the financial motivation except if they have been hired to do it.
Second group are private legitimate actors, such as cybersecurity and software companies,
like Kaspersky Lab, who notably produces antivirus softwares. Kaspersky has been tied to
Kremlin through personal relations, as Eugene Kaspersky is a former KGB employee, and
maintains ties with the Russian intelligence community. Finally, there is Russian State itself,
who has made cyber warfare a focus of its defense doctrine since the early 2000s, integrating
it in its national defence doctrine, developing cyber warfare capabilities, defending both public
infrastructures and private actors, and promoting Russian position regarding the cyberspace
at the international level. Russia has not signed the European Convention on Cybercrime of
2001 and refuses to cooperate with European countries on cyber security issues53. Russian
state activities in internet are most visible in campaigns, flooding Internet-based media with
comments ranging from disapproving but seemingly reasonable to outright propaganda. This
type of information warfare has not been tied to the Russian state per se, but to web
brigades, operating loosely under Kremlin supervision5455. Good example to illustrate their
activities is the the case of the comment section of a British newspaper The Guardian in 2014.
After events in Crimea, the newspaper online website became a subject to a large number of
Russian comments, sometimes outright crashing the website and preventing debate and
discussion.
51
Stratford (2016)
Giles (2012)
53
Smith (2012)
54
Polyakova (2015)
55
Giles (2011)
52
24
Nocetti (2015)
Lanozska (2016)
58
Jrvenp (2016)
57
25
serving its wish to be seen as a powerful country. However, the reaction that Russias
assertive military behaviour has received, has first changed Wests perception of todays
global order. It was assumed in Europe that hard power is reminiscent of the past59. It was
believed that Russia was in the same side of the history and this has clearly not been the
case. Russias activities challenge the current security architecture of Europe. Therefore, in
the course of last two years NATO has increased its military presence in the Baltic states and
on the Black Sea and in Europe in general. However from Russias point of view, this is
countereffective, since it has brought NATO forces closer to its borders. Therefore, it allows
us to conclude that hard power is not the most effective tool for projecting and inserting
Russias influence in European countries.
However, Russias intimidating security posture has highlighted a key challenge, which does
not only apply to security and defence. Namely, the continuous disunity and fragmentation
among countries in Europe. It is a paradoxical phenomenon whereas Europe is the most
integrated continent in the world, but at the same time collaborations on burning issues are
proving to be a great challenge. Russia uses these disagreements for its own gains and in the
next chapter we are going to illustrate just that point.
26
Spanish, and Italian ones). However, Kremlin-sponsored media outlets are just the tip of the
iceberg: a complex mechanism with a wide range of sophisticated tools lies underneath the
surface. In its first section, this chapter investigates Kremlins practices and instruments used
to promote its political and cultural influence in Europe. Against this background, the second
section analyses these tools highlighting their strategic use and overarching goals.
Cultural Diplomacy
The foundations of Russian cultural diplomacy can be traced back to the 1990s. Relying on
the extensive experience of the Soviet Public Diplomacy, the Russian government
adopted/elaborated the concept of Russkiy Mir (Russian World) and embedded it in various
state institutions operating both domestically and abroad60. Judging just from the name, one
can sense that the concept encompasses geographical and cultural conjunctions but at the
same time does not cast strong affiliation with the state. The word Russkiy, instead of
Rossiyskiy, has wider cultural connotations because it refers to a broader area, beyond the
political borders of the Russian Federation: it highlights the common cultural bonds of the
Slavic nations. Such an all-encompassing concept is intentionally used to appeal not only Near
Abroad, which shares historical ties with Russia, but also anyone in the West who has an
interest in Russian culture, regardless of the political standpoint.
The concept was institutionalised in 2007, through the foundation of the Russkiy Mir Fund.
The Fund serves as an umbrella institution encompassing many other organisations spread
throughout Europe and whose overall aim is the diffusion of the Russkiy Mir paradigm. These
organisations do so in many different ways, including by promoting Russian language and
culture, disseminating unbiased information about the country, creating favourable public
opinion, and so on. The Fund supports them through the provision of grants, but it also has
permanent branches abroad: currently, these are present in 21 EU Member States. The
institutional structure of the branches varies depending on the host country; however, there
are three main structures can be identified. In countries like Austria, Belgium, Italy, Finland,
branches are located within universities and schools as Russian Centres; in Greece, they
are independent entities carrying the parent organizations name; in the UK they are
incorporated in different other organisations, which serve the goals of the Fund.
Another entity that promotes Russian culture abroad is the Rossostrudnichestvo. Unlike the
Russkiy Mir Fund, the Rossostrudnichestvo is a federal agency that operates according to the
government programmes. It implements projects designed to strengthen international
relations, enhance cooperation in the humanitarian sphere and form a positive image of
Russia abroad. Activities aim to contribute to overcoming cultural barriers, negative
stereotypes and other barriers to the development of international cooperation61.
Geographically agencys activities are more concentrated in the Near Abroad, however are
not limited to it. Currently in almost all EU member states (26 out of 28) there are
representative offices of Rossostrudnichestvo. They operate as cultural embassies and have
far more rigid structure than the one affiliated with the Russkiy Mir Fund. One of the examples
of the agencys programmes is holding years of Russia in hosting countries. The current year
60
61
Laruelle, M. (2015)
Rs.gov.ru. (2016)
27
is the year of Russia in Monaco, throughout which numerous cultural events, student
exchanges and other activities took place in the principality.
The affiliated centres of the Russkiy Mir Fund as well as the representative offices of the
Rossostrudnichestvo declare to evolve their actions exclusively around the cultural nexus.
Therefore, degree of politicisation of their activities is a subject to a closer scrutiny. However,
as noted by Peter Duncan and many others, culture is always political. Given that both
organisations receive money directly from the Kremlin, they definitely serve political purposes.
Media
The second and currently most evident political instrument of exerting Russian influence in
Europe is the use of international media outlets, such as Russia Today (RT), Sputnik and
Russia Beyond Headlines. Whereas the latter ones are less known to the general public, RT
has definitely gained its prominence over the last few years. As pointed out by Maragarita
Simonyan, chief editor of Russia Today media holding, when the conflict in Georgia unfolded
the Kremlin realised that despite Russia achieved its objectives in military terms, it had lost
the war due to its inability to communicate the Russian perspective to the Western audience62.
Hence, since 2008, RT has been flooded with public money to deliver the Russian standpoint
internationally.
From the moment RT embarked on its mission, it has achieved undeniable results: today it is
broadcasted in 100+ countries, in eight languages. Such success was achieved through a
definite shift in strategy. RTs management realized that airing news about Russia to promote
a positive image, had not brought desirable results because the audience has a very short
attention span when it comes to foreign news. Thus, instead of talking about Russian
domestic affairs, RT decided to focus on international audiences own countries. What makes
as special is that the image and the message we show differ from the one you find at the BBC,
Euronews or any other mainstream media- continues chief editor of RT -- We provide an
alternative view. Indeed, today RT is popular and even appreciated among Europeans for
bringing up issues and voices left out by their mainstream media. Although some may
advocate that bringing plurality to media space ultimately benefits the general public, it is
important to analyse the content provided. As a matter of fact, if one takes a closer look at
RTs proposition, it becomes difficult to support that it is without bias.
RT does give a platform to those mostly excluded form the forefront discussions and sheds
light on underreported issues. However, the calibre of those that the TV channel highlights is
rather particular and the tone used appears somewhat toxic. To name few examples, the
RT-UK gave platform for controversial producer Martin Durkin to crowdfund for the
documentary advocating to leave in the upcoming Brexit vote, as well as the channel invited
various members of UKIP to comment on the most controversial issues surrounding the
campaign. When reporting the refugee crisis, RT repetitiously put together a sequences of
contrasting images picturing welcoming Germans and rioting Hungarians complemented by
comments form various underdog European politicians claiming that the European Union
62
28
collapse was underway63. Even while reporting the tragedy of Paris attacks, RT International
infused scepticism bent by connecting the attacks with Western governments responsibility
in Syria64. In line with Russias domestic media dogma of pronounced anti-Western narratives,
RTs input into the European media landscape attempts to compromise the effectiveness of
European institutions and national governments.
As confirmed by Dr. Andrew Foxall of the Henry Jackson Society, since the annexation of
Crimea RT has become increasingly heavy-handed. The channel was accused of propaganda
and false reporting, which exposed it to serious dangers of losing broadcasting license in some
countries. If the European media space is rightfully vulnerable to open propaganda, last years
have shown that Kremlins media protagonists are not shun even of the blunt lies. In the midst
of the refugee crisis, Russian state First Channel, which is also broadcasted around Europe
in Russian and is a usual source of information for Russian immerge, aired a news report
about Lisa, 13-year-old girl of Russian-German origin allegedly raped by three immigrants in
Berlin. The news firstly caused massive mobilisation of Russian diaspora followed by the antiMuslim activists and opponents of Merkels open door policy who went on the streets
demanding explanations and actions from the German authorities. Despite, in a few days
investigations concluded that the story was false, Russian domestic media and the First
Channel International continued to report the story and Sergei Lavrov, the Russian Minister of
Foreign Affairs, even accused Germany of covering up the story. The so-called Liza Affair
came out shortly before Germany held State elections and constitutes an evident attempt to
galvanize strength of the Christian Democratic Party and the chancellor herself. This is one of
the prominent examples of how the Kremlin uses its media web to shaken the stand of the
leading European political actors exploiting the most socially sensitive issues.
Religious Influence
The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) is a prominent and long-standing actor in
Russias social and political spheres and has influenced the countrys domestic and
international affairs. The ROC, together with the Security Service, is the only institution that
has survived the collapse of the Soviet Union. Evidence shows that during the Soviet era the
ROC was subordinate to the decisions of the Communist Party and incorporated KGB officers
into its operations 65. In modern Russia, this link between the State and the ROC has not
disappeared66.
Through its Department of External Church Relations, the ROC develops relations between
local orthodox and non- orthodox Churches, religious communities, and international
organizations, and it works in close cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Kirill, the
Patriarch of Moscow and Russia, regularly receives foreign Ambassadors to Russia and
makes reciprocal visits abroad. These meetings evolve around the line of religious
63
Refugee crisis could lead to EU collapse, Luxembourg FM warns (2015) RT, 9 Nov.
Political author Gearoid O Colmain discusses the Paris attacks with RT International (2015) RT, 14 Nov.
65
Armes (1993)
66
Blitt (2011)
64
29
cooperation, but usually imply for a cooperation that goes beyond the spiritual domain; a
cooperation between the two States.
ROCs international objectives encompass the promotion and protection of Orthodox values
as well as the defense of believers abroad. Such aims broadly coincide with Kremlins latest
doctrine, which emphasises traditional values overlapping with Orthodox ones and the
protection of Russian speakers in foreign countries. An example of such close cooperation
between the Church and the State was the historical meeting between Patriarch Kirill and
Pope Francis, which took place in Cuba last February. According to sources close to the
Kremlin, Vladimir Putin asked the Patriarch to meet with the Pope out of the foreign policy
considerations.
Professor Soroka of Harvard University claims that, despite the close cooperation with the
Kremlin, the ROC is an independent actor enjoying a relatively good/decent level of autonomy.
It is very hard to establish the degree of ROCs dependence on the Kremlin, as their
partnership has many dimensions. The Ukrainian Crisis greatly undermined the synergy
between the two. Being preoccupied for its community in Ukraine and other near abroad
states, the Patriarch refrained from expressing support to the Kremlins recent foreign policy
conduct. Thus, it is possible to suggest that rather than being an instrument available in the
government arsenal, the ROC is a rightful partner, which Putin is able to leverage only when
interests coincide.
In Europe, the ROC is present through affiliated churches and religious communities, and its
degree of influence is proportional to the share of the Orthodox population. Thus the ROC
exercises a significant influence in former Eastern Block states, such as Bulgaria, Hungary,
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Currently, given the general paradigm of Russias
exceptionalism, ROCs presence in Europe serves similar objectives to those of Russian state
media. Even before the Crimean debacle, the Russia establishment has started to increasingly
emphasise on Russias cultural distinction from Europe and portray Russia a guardian of
traditional values, that take their roots from the Christianity. Discussing the single-sex
marriages, adoption rules, and the other private freedoms the Kremlin referencing the
Orthodox values accuses Europe of downgrading the moral threshold. These narratives can
be appealing to those living in Europe that share similar concerns. Thus, the presence of the
ROC abroad reinforces Kremlins claims and serves as a stronghold for Russian immigrants
and other believers who, irrespectively of their political views, find themselves closer to the
traditional values.
Political Influence
Historically, Russia prefers to establish bilateral relations with its counterparts. As in the
aftermath of the Ukrainian crises, the relations between the leading European powers and the
Kremlin have tensed. Thus, Vladimir Putin has made a significant effort to build relations with
Europes far-right and opposition parties across the continent. In March 2015, the Russian
Government hosted the first Russian International Conservative Forum and it invited
representatives from many of Europes most controversial parties. Among others participants
30
included the European Alliance for Peace and Freedom, EIN ZWEI DREI of Germany, Italys
Forza Nuova and many others who share nationalist stands and are saturated with Euroscepticism. After days of discussions fuelled with nationalist statements, aspirations for
traditionalist moral values, and criticism of the official European response to Kremlins actions
in Ukraine, the forum concluded with a resolution to work in a close partnership to end the
Cold War imposed on Russia and Europe by the United States67.
When it comes to exerting influence on European institutions (i.e. the European Commission),
Russia acts through lobbying. The first time that Russia hired lobbying firms in the US and
Europe was when Mr Putin became president of the G8 in 2006. In Europe, Russia and
Russian state-owned oil companies are represented by one of the most powerful lobbying firm
in Brussels, GPlus, which has many former EU representatives in its ranks. Hired to spread
the Kremlins message and foster investments in GazProm, GPlus carries out standard
lobbying practices such as organizing press-conferences, open tables, creating PR-strategies
and liaising with the MEPs. Lobbying efforts succeeded in removing Gazprom form the EU
sanctions list in 2014. However, according to the Corporate Europe Observatory report, such
outcome is not solely a result of GPluss work: Gazproms European partners, energy firms
from Italy, France, and Germany, were involved in the lobbying68.
From the lobbying, the Kremlin has learned how to exploit European practices. A very telling
recent example is the recent referendum held in the Netherlands. In April 2016 the Dutch held
the plebiscite with regards to the Ukraine- European Union Association Agreement. Judging
from the plea of European politicians advocating against the agreement and the arguments
employed by the NO-campaigners there is a strong possibility of the Kremlins involvement.
Vasyl Myroshnechenko, founder of the Ukrainian Crisis Media Centre, and the one
responsible for supporting Ukrainian interests in the referendum has pointed to us that he is
sure that the Kremlin has not missed an opportunity to undermine the European political
cohesion and was participating in the funding NO-campaign. Although, this is yet to be
confirmed by further investigations, Kremlins ties to the European far-right supports this
assumption.
Strategic assessment
The instruments Kremlin uses to exert Russian cultural influence are strategic in nature
because they have been established long before the current turn in the Russian- European
relations and require long-term investments and infrastructure. These tools, i.e. state-run
cultural centres, are not different from the ones adopted by other countries. Similarly, Germany
has Goethe-Institut around the world, the UK hosts British Councils and France presents itself
with French institutes. The practice of state-run cultural organisations is a truly Western
tradition and the Russian practise does not deviate from it.
67
68
31
The picture changes when the political influence comes into the focus. Despite many of the
interviewed experts suggest that Russia does not have a defined strategy of political influence
in Europe, thorough look at the practice shows some distinct features that taken together
account for a strategic practice. First of all, they have a common overarching goal, that will be
further discussed in the following section; and, secondly, they all have one particular similarity
which makes the Russian political influence in Europe enigmatic. Rather than creating own
conduits of influence, the Kremlin exploits ascending opportunities. Through the state-owned
media outlets, the Russian state manipulates the news, tainting the events of European
political agenda. Referring to the classic propaganda methods such as taking quotes out of
context, appeal to prejudice or even disinformation, the Kremlin reinforces possible political
and social dissatisfaction of the European citizens, fuels Euro-scepticism and creates
uncertainties. Similarly, rather than creating new political forces, the Kremlin co-opts the
existing ones, making the partnership appealing by vocalising same conservative values and
converging end goals69.
69
Polyakova (2016)
32
33
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