Prussian Army - Napoleonic Wars - History - Organization - Preußische Armee

30/03/2023 16:47 Prussian Army : Napoleonic Wars : History : Organization : Preußische Armee
Armée prussienne des guerres

napoléoniennes
1805 - 1815
"Traditionnellement, la Prusse était Soldaten und Beamtenstaat ,
un état de soldats et de bureaucratie, un état formé par et pour la
guerre..." - Alfred Turney
"Au moment de sa mort, l'armée de Frédéric était l'envie de
l'Europe,
et ses concepts... beaucoup copiés. [En 1806] cependant, il restait
enraciné dans le passé : un fossile conservé dans l'ambre de la Baltique."
- Charles Summerville
Frederick était l'homme dont Napoléon a dit lors de son entrée triomphale en Prusse :
"S'il était vivant, nous ne serions pas ici."
1. Introduction : Brève histoire de la Prusse.

2. Années de gloire de l'armée prussienne.
3. Déclin de l'armée.
4. Réformes de 1807-1812.
5. Armée prussienne en 1812.
6. Armée prussienne en 1813-1815.
7. État-major prussien.
La défaite de l'armée prussienne par Napoléon

a choqué l'establishment prussien, qui s'était
senti invincible après les victoires de Frédéric le
Grand.
Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Grolman et Boyen
commencèrent
à réformer l'armée.
Les réformateurs ont été consternés par la
réaction indifférente de la population
aux défaites de 1806. Lorsque Napoléon arriva à
Berlin
, il fut accueilli par des foules aussi enthousiastes
que
celles qui l'avaient accueilli à Paris.
Les Prussiens s'étaient rendus et Photo : La porte de Brandebourg à Berlin.

l'épée et la ceinture de Frédéric le Grand furent Au sommet de la porte se trouve le Quadriga, avec
envoyées à Paris comme trophées. Viktoria,
La France a occupé la Prusse, et Napoléon a traité la déesse de la victoire conduisant le Quadriga.
la Prusse et son roi pire qu'il n'avait traité Après la défaite prussienne de 1806 à Iéna-Auerstedt,
n'importe quel pays conquis auparavant. Napoléon emmène le Quadrige à Paris.
L'occupation française Après la défaite de Napoléon en 1814 et l'
a provoqué la colère de nombreux Prussiens. occupation parisienne prussienne,
Par rapport à 1806, la population prussienne en le Quadrige est restitué à Berlin.
1813
était favorable à la guerre et des milliers de .
volontaires
ont rejoint l'armée. Les troupes prussiennes ont
remporté plusieurs batailles
et se sont révélées vitales lors des batailles de
Leipzig et de Waterloo.
Après la défaite et l'abdication de Napoléon,

la Prusse et la Russie ont proposé de partager la
France,
tandis que l'Autriche et la Grande-Bretagne
s'efforçaient
https://www.napolun.com/mirror/napoleonistyka.atspace.com/Prussian_army.htm 1/17
et poussaient à un traitement indulgent de la

France.
"La Prusse était à l'origine une tache insignifiante

sur le bord sud-est de la Baltique ..."
- Christopher Summerville
Introduction : Brève histoire de la Prusse.

"Au XVIIIe siècle, la Prusse s'est hissée au rang
de troisième grande puissance européenne..." - wikipedia.org
Prussia began as a small territory in what was later called West and East Prussia, which is now
Warmia-Masuria of northern Poland, the Kaliningrad exclave of Russia, and the Klaipeda Region of
Lithuania. The region was largely populated by Old Prussians, a Baltic people related to the
Lithuanians and Latvians.
In 1226 Polish Duke, Konrad I, invited the Teutonic Knights, a German

military order of crusading knights headquartered in Acre, to conquer the
Baltic tribes on his borders. However, during 60 years of struggles against
the Old Prussians, the Teutonic Knights created an independent state
which came to control Prussia. The Knights were eventually defeated by
Polish troops at Grunwald (1410) and were forced to acknowledge the
sovereignty of the Polish king Casimir IV Jagiellon in the Peace of Thorn
in 1466, losing western Prussia to Poland in the process.
In 1525 Grand Master Albert I Hohenzollern became a Lutheran Protestant

and secularized the Order's remaining Prussian territories into the Duchy of Prussia. For the first time,
these lands, the area east of the mouth of the Vistula river were in the hands of a branch of the
Hohenzollern family. Furthermore, with the dissolution of the Order, Albert could now marry and
produce offspring.
The unification of Brandenberg and Prussia came two generations later.
Frederick William went to Warsaw in 1641 to

render homage to King Wladyslaw IV Vasa of
Poland for the Duchy of Prussia, which was
still held in fief from the Polish crown.
Taking advantage of the difficult position of

Poland vis-á-vis Sweden in the Northern
Wars, and his friendly relations with Russia
during a series of Russo-Polish wars,
Frederick William later managed to obtain a
discharge from his obligations as a vassal to
the Polish king; he was finally given
independent control of Prussia in 1657. It was
one of the turning points in the history of
Prussia.
In 1701, Frederick William's son, Elector Frederick III, upgraded Prussia from a duchy to a kingdom,
and crowned himself King Frederick I. To avoid offending Leopold I, emperor of the Holy Roman
Empire where most of his lands lay, Frederick was only allowed to title himself "King in Prussia", not
"King of Prussia". However, Brandenburg was treated in practice as part of the Prussian kingdom
rather than a separate state. ( - wikipedia.org 2008)
"The aggrandizement of Prussia continued under Frederick's grandson, Frederick II, the 'Great' who
enlarged his domain with territories plundered from the ancient Kingdom of Poland. This trend
continued unabated until 1795, when Poland literally disappeared off the map: gobbled up by her
three powerful neighbours, Prussia, Russia, and Austria.
For her part Prussia took Posen (Poznan

today), and Danzig (Gdansk today),
adding them to Pomerania to form
'West Prussia'; plus the province of
Mazovia, including the capital of
Warsaw, which was added to Silesia
(acquired in the 1740s) to form 'South
Prussia.' Meanwhile, the original Baltic
duchy of Prussia was renamed 'East
Prussia'. ... " (Summerville - "Napoleon's
Polish Gamble" p 4)
PS.
Despite its overwhelmingly German
character, Prussia's annexations of
Polish territory in the Partitions of
Poland brought a large Polish
population that resisted the German
government and in several areas
constituted the majority of the population (i.e. Province of Posen: 62% Polish, 38% German). Silesia
was a Polish stronghold. It first belonged to Poland and then to Bohemia. In the 17th century it fell
under Austrian political influence, only to be conquered by Prussia in the 1740s. The greater part of
these lands have been germanized by sales and grants of public domains to Prussian colonists and by
measures against the Polish inhabitants.
If the Frenchmen excel them (Germans) in vivacity of onslaught,

if the Englishmen are their superiors in toughness of resistance,
the Germans excel all other European nations in that general
fitness for military duty which makes them good soldiers under
all circumstances.
Glory Years of the Prussian Army.

In 1740s Prussia had the 4th largest army in Europe,
even though her lands stood at 10th in order of size
and only 13th in population !
Frederick the Great imposed so spartan discipline
that 400 officers "are said to have asked to resign".
In 1740s Prussia owned 85.000 troops which gave her the 4th largest army in
Europe, even though her lands stood at 10th in order of size and only 13th in
population !
It means that it was possible for an agricultural state of few millions of

inhabitants, on a small territory, without a fleet or direct maritime commerce,
and with comparatively little manufacturing industry, to maintain, in some
respects, the position of a great European power. Truly amazing.
The army was magnificent. Frederick had devised Europe's first-ever battle-
scale maneuvers in 1743, which gave his generals invaluable peacetime
experience in directing large scale bodies of troops." (Duffy - "Instrument of
War" Vol I p 117)
The Prussian, as well as the German in general, makes capital stuff for a soldier. They are, withal,
among the most pugnacious people in the world, enjoying war for its own sake, and often enough
going to look for it abroad, when they cannot have it at home.
From the Landsknechte of the middle age to the present foreign legions of France and England, the
Germans have always furnished the great mass of those mercenaries who fight for the sake of fighting.
"If the French excel them in agility and vivacity of onslaught, if the English are their superiors in
toughness of resistance, the Germans certainly excel all other European nations in that general fitness
for military duty which makes them good soldiers under all circumstances." (Source: "The Armies of
Europe" in Putnam's Monthly, No. XXXII, publ. in 1855)
Foreign generals and observers admired the Prussian military machine of 18th Century. Austrian
commander, Prince Eugene of Savoy, reported that "the Prussian troops are the best of the German
forces. The rest are pretty well useless." The Prussian army enjoyed reputation as one of the best
trained, the most disciplined and one of the best led (Frederick the Great, Zieten, Seydlitz and other
generals).
The Prussians wore simpler dress than the French army with its many lackeys, cooks, courtesans,
actors and chaplains, friseurs and valets, chests full of perfumes, hair nets, sun shades and parrots.
Frederick the Great

imposed so spartan
discipline that 400 officers
"are said to have asked to
resign". Frederick's troops
fought with great success
against the Russians,
French, Germans, Swedes
and Austrians.
The Prussians could march

off to the battlefield in
perfect order in a holy
silence. The state of affairs
which prevailed in the French army was somehow different, there was a near riot when even the small
troop had to turn out. So this is not surprising that France had suffered a certain loss of prestige
through her shocking defeats in the war against Frederick's army.
The Prussian infantry was magnificent, marching in calm and silent lines under a withering fire. They
moved doggedly forward until the enemy began to mass in terrified flocks around their colors. When
the drums were playing "Ich bin ja Herr in deiner Macht !" it made a massive impression on everyone.
One eyewitness wrote "I have never been able to hear that melody without the deepest emotion."
The best part of the army however was the cavalry. One dragoon regiment routed 20 battalions and
captured 66 colors ! In 1745 at Soor 26 Prussian squadrons routed 45 enemy squadrons deployed on a
hilltop. Only the engineers and artillery were the weak link of Frederick's army.
King Frederick the Great, used the army to enter upon a period of conquest. His victory at Mollwitz
made a great sensation in Europe. It had never been supposed that the untried Prussian troops could
resist the veterans of Austria. King of France, Louis XV, when he heard of Frederick's invasion of
Silesia, said: "The man is mad." Frederick's camp was sought by envoys from almost every court of
Europe, and amongst them, on the part of France, came Marshal Belleisle.
1757 Battle of Leuthen: it was a decisive victory for Frederick the Great that ensured his control over
Silesia. This is important battle from military point of view as Frederick used Oblique Order. This is a
tactic where an attacking army refocuses its forces to attack enemy flank. The commander would
intentionally weaken one portion of the line to concentrate their troops elsewhere. They would then
create an angled or oblique formation, refuse the weakened flank and attack the strongest flank of the
enemy with a concentration of force. First recorded use of the tactic similar to oblique order was at the
Battle of Leuctra, when the Thebans defeated the Spartans (ext.link). This tactics required disciplined
and well trained troops able to execute complex maneuvers.
1757 Battle of Rossbach. The French commander, Marshal Prince de Soubise (54,000 men), was not
over-anxious to measure his strength with Frederick the Great, but his generals were eager for battle
and confident of success. Their only doubt was whether they could win any glory by destroying so
small Prussian force (22,000 men); their only fear lest he should retreat and escape them.
In early afternoon the order was given and in 30 minutes tents were struck and the Prussian army was
in marching order. The movement of Frederick's forces was masked by low hills, so the French could
see that the Prussians were doing something, without being able to tell what it was. Fancying them to
be in flight, and fearing lest the prey should escape, they rushed
forward in disorderly haste. Soon the French were mounting the
lower slopes of the Janusberg, when suddenly Prussian cavalry
appeared and swept down on them. The charge was utterly
unexpected. In 30 minutes the French were flying in wild
disorder.
About 3,500 Prussian horsemen had defeated an entire army of
two combined superpowers. Frederick was heard to say "I won
the battle of Rossbach with most of my infantry having their
muskets shouldered." This battle is considered one of his
greatest masterpieces due to destroying a combined French and German army twice its size with
negligible casualties: 550 Prussians and 5,000 French and Germans.
The importance of the Seven Years' War was an epoch in the history of Europe lies chiefly in its
bearing on the question of German unity. The war resulted in placing the young Prussian kingdom on
a footing of equality with the world powers (France, Russia, Britain, Austria) and so raising up within
Germany a rival and counterpoise to Austria. It thus laid the foundations of the unification of
Germany, which could never have been effected as long as the Austrian supremacy remained
unbroken. For though Austria, before the time of Frederick the Great, was undisputably the greatest of
German powers, she was after all more foreign than German. Her external interests in Hungary, Italy,
and elsewhere were too extensive for her to care much for the union of Germany.
Map of Europe in 1756. Prussia's allies were: Britain, Brunswick, Hannover, and Hesse-Kassel.
The war involved all of the major European powers, causing 900,000 to 1,400,000 deaths. It enveloped
both European and colonial theatres.
Frederick the Great was succeeded by Frederick Wilhelm II. Under his rule Prussia became even larger
by the partitions of Poland of 1793 and 1795 but also underwent a period of eclipse. The failure to
reform and the lack of preparedness after the death of Frederick the Great in 1786, and the real
efficiency in the field was sacrificed to precision on the parade-ground led to the decline of the army.
Frederick William III of Prussia succeeded the throne in 1796. He married Louise of
Mecklenburg, a princess noted for her beauty. Napoleon dealt with Prussia very
harshly, despite the pregnant Queen's personal interview with the French emperor.
Prussia lost all its Polish territories, as well as all territory west of the Elbe River, and
had to pay for French troops to occupy key strong points within the Kingdom. Too
distrustful to delegate his responsibility to his ministers, Frederick William was too
infirm of will to strike out and follow a consistent course for himself. In the following
years the reformers encouraged Friedrich Wilhelm's interest in designing the new
uniforms to keep him from interfering with their more radical measures.
Defeated by the French Revolutionary army, Prussia withdrew from the coalition and remained
neutral until 1806.
"At Jena, the Prussian army performed the finest

and most spectacular maneuvers, but I soon put
a stop to this tomfoolery and taught them that
to fight and to execute dazzling maneuvers and
wear splendid uniforms were very different matters."
- Napoleon
Decline of the Army: defeats at Jena and Auerstadt

[by 1806] The Prussian Army, however, remained rooted in the past:
a fossil preserved in Baltic amber."- Charles Summerville
In 1806 Napoleon was very interested in the Prussian army. Officer Chlapowski of Napoleon's Guard
Lancers writes: "... the Emperor asked me about very many things. He fired questions at me as if I was
sitting an exam. He already knew from our conversations ... that I had served in the Prussian amry, so
he asked about my studies there, about my military instructors, about the organization of the artillery
and of the whole Prussian army, and finally he asked how many Poles were likely to be in the corps
which was still in East Prussia beyond the Vistula under General Lestoq. I could not answer this
question but pointed out that most of his corps must be Lithuanians, as it had been mainly recruited in
Lithuania. At that time, since the last partition [of Poland] the whole district of Augustow belonged to
Prussia.
I also explained that in Lithuania only the gentry were Polish, and the people Lithuanians. He did not
know anything about Lithuania ... The Emperor listened patiently and carefully to all these details. ...
[he] asked me about the [Prussian] military academies. How far did they go in the study of
mathematics ? He was surprised at the elementary level at which they stopped. Didn't they teach
applied geometry ? I myself had not learned this, but only later studied it in Paris."
(Chlapowski/Simmons - "Memoirs of a Polish Lancer" p 12-13)
In 1806 the Prussian army consisted of 200,000 men: 133,000 infantrymen, 39,600 cavalrymen and
10,000 artillerymen and few thousands of engineers, garrisons, reserves etc.
Infantry
. . . . . . . . . 2 Guard infantry regiments (2 battalions each)
. . . . . . . . . 58 infantry regiments (2 battalions each)
. . . . . . . . . 1 jager regiment (3 battalions)
. . . . . . . . . 27 grenadier battalions
. . . . . . . . . 24 fusilier battalions
Cavalry
. . . . . . . . . 13 cuirassier regiments (5 squadrons each)
. . . . . . . . . 14 dragoon regiments (10 x 5 squadrons and 2 x 10 squadrons)
. . . . . . . . . 9 hussar regiments (10 squadrons each)
. . . . . . . . . 1 'Towarzysze' regiment (10 + 5 squadrons)
Artillery
. . . . . . . . . 4 foot artillery regiments (36 12pdr batteries of 8 guns)
. . . . . . . . . 1 horse artillery regiment (20 6pdr batteries of 8 guns)
. . . . . . . . . reserve (2 10pdr mortar batteries, 1 light mortar battery, 4 7pdr howitzer batteries
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6pdr batteries)
Napoleon was not impressed with the king of Prussia: "When I went to see the king of Prussia
Friedrich Wilhelm III, instead of a library I found he had a large room, like an arsenal, furnished with
shelves and pegs, in which were placed fifty or sixty jackets of various cuts ... He attached more
importance to the cut of a dragoon or a hussar uniform than would have been necessary for the
salvation of a kingdom. At Jena, his [Prussian] army performed the finest and most spectacular
maneuvers, but I soon put a stop to this tomfoolery and taught them that to fight and to execute
dazzling maneuvers and wear splendid uniforms were very different matters. If the French army had
been commanded by a tailor, the king of Prussia would certainly have gained the day."
Napoleon's efforts to get Prussia to close its ports to British goods in 1806 had revealed a problem.
When Prussia agreed, the British navy retaliated by seizing 700 Prussian merchant ships in port or at
sea and blocking their access to the North Sea. Facing economic collapse, the Prussian king then turned
his anger on Napoleon, rescinding their agreements and ordering the French out. That in turn led to
war.
"When in August 1806, Prussia mobilized her army

for a war against France, she did with all the
confidence that was due to the inheritors of the
traditions of Frederick the Great. There was never a
moment of doubt that Prussian arms would
triumph, and it was with this attitude, that her
soldiers met the French in the twin battles of Jena
and Auerstadt on October 14."
Up to that time, the Prussian Army had proudly
reflected the image of Frederick's glory, but it was
this in itself which was one of the principal defects
in the military system. A cult of reverence, in regard to anything that was connected with Frederick,
dominated military thought. Any measure which had sufficed under the Great Soldier-King, was
considered good enough for his heirs, irrespective of the forward movement of military science and
the revolutionary principles of warfare, which had been demonstrated in Europe since 1792.
Tradition was clung to as if it were a means to glory and success. The fact that the 1780 pattern of
musket was one of the worst in Europe, or that the Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of Brunswick, and
the Senior Royal Advisor, von Mollendorf, were not the men they had been, was little considered. The
state of the Prussian Army at that time was well summed up by Clausewitz when he remarked that '...
for Prussia, the cost of anachronism was to be high." ( - David Nash - "The Prussian Army 1808-15" p 5)
Prussian order of battle: Jena 1806 (Saxons excluded)

Commander: GL von Ruchel
(GL General-Lieutenant , GM General-Major)
Advance Guard
Main Body
- GL von Winning
Infantry Brigade
Light Brigade - - - - - 9th Infantry Regiment [1 battalion]
- - - - - Jager Company - - - - - 23rd Infantry Regiment [1 battalion]
- - - - - 27th Infantry Regiment [2 battalions] - - - - - X Grenadier Battalion
- - - - - half of 7th Hussar Regiment [5 Infantry Brigade
squadrons] - - - - - 29th Infantry Regiment [1 battalion]
- - - - - half of XIX 6pdr Foot Battery - - - - - 43rd Infantry Regiment [1 battalion]
Light Brigade - - - - - IX Grenadier Battalion
- - - - - Jager Company Infantry Brigade
- - - - - I and II Fusilier Battalion - - - - - 10th Infantry Regiment [2 battalions]
- - - - - 3rd Hussar Regiment [10 squadrons] - - - - - 37th Infantry Regiment [2 battalions]
- - - - - half of XI 6pdr Horse Battery - - - - - XVIII Fusilier Battalion
Cavalry Brigade
. - - - - - 5th Cuirassier Regiment [5 squadrons]
- - - - - 4th Dragoon Regiment [5 squadrons]
.
- - - - - half of 7th Hussar Regiment [5
. squadrons]
Artillery
. - - - - - 12pdr Foot Battery
- - - - - half of XIX 6pdr Foot Battery
. - - - - - half of 6pdr Foot Battery
- - - - - half of XI 6pdr Horse Battery
The French army, honed to a fine edge by the brilliantly conducted previous campaign in Bavaria and
Austria, secured the total annihilation of the Prussian army and state in precisely one month, from
October 6 to November 6. It was a remarkable demonstration of what the French military system could
accomplish under Napoleon's guidance. Prussia was broken and dismembered by the war. Her army
was ruined, she had no money, and she had lost half of her former possessions.
Napoleon's plan of this campaign was beautiful. To base himself on the Rhine River and Upper
Danube and simply advance north - eastwards on Berlin would, perhaps, be the easiest for Napoleon,
but it would offer no strategical advantages; for if he met and defeated the Prussians on this west-east
line, he would simply drive them backwards on their supports, and then on Russians, whose advance
from Poland was expected.
To turn the
Thuringian
Forest Mountains
by an advance
from his right,
was a less safe
movement; but, it
offered great
advantages.
First of all
Napoleon would
threaten the
Prussian supply
lines, line of
retreat, and line
of
communications
with Berlin.
Secondly,
Napoleon would
separate the
Prussians and the
advancing strong
Russian Army.
The danger with
this maneuver
was this that the
Prussians by a rapid advance through the Thuringian Forest Mountains against his communication
line, might sever him from France !
In the last days of September the Prussian army was spread over a front of 190 miles. The Saxons had
not yet completed their mobilisation. Within few days the Prussians shortened their front to 85 miles in
a direct line. At the same time Napoleon had huge army already assembled on a front of 38 miles. At
last Napoleon's real plan had dawned on the Prussian headquarters. Advance guards were sent in the
direction of the Thuringian Forest. The Prussians also detached small corps from Ruchel's force against
Napoleon's supply lines. By doing this they weakened their own main army.
Heavy fighting began when elements of

Napoleon's main force encountered Prussian
troops near Jena. The Battle of Jena cost
Napoleon approx. 5,000 men, but the
Prussians had a staggering 25,000 casualties.
At Auerstadt Marshal Davout's also crushed

the enemy. Napoleon initially did not believe
that Davout's single corps had defeated the
Prussian main body unaided, and responded
to the first report by saying "Tell your
Marshal he is seeing double". As matters
became clearer, however, the Emperor was
unstinting in his praise.
"The whole campaign was epitomised by the surrender of Hohenlohe's army at Prenzla, where Murat
was able to bluff a vastly superior force into laying down its arms. Twenty-nine thousand men under
L'Estocq managed to link up with the Russian army in East Prussia, but by the end of November 1806,
the majority of the Prussian Army had surrendered and Frederick the Great's sword and sash were on
their way to Les Invalides as trophies. The basic material of the old army, the private soldier, was
sound, but internal weaknesses had meant that the Prussian army was out-thought as well as
outfought." (Robert Mantle - "Prussian Reserve Infantry: 1813-15")
Peter Hofschroer gives three main reasons for why Prussia was defeated in 1806.
Not joining Austria and Russia in 1805 in

the Third Coalition. This combination would
most likely have led to Napoleon's defeat.
Going to war against France in 1806
without the direct support of another great
power. The Prussian army should have
adopted a defensive strategy until the arrival
of the Russians.
Dividing the army into three in the face of
the enemy. Nobody was really in charge and
King Frederick William III lacked the
authority to impose his will.
"... just after the victories of Jena and

Auerstadt, in which Napoleon
destroyed the Prussian army and shook
the Prussian state to its core, was to be
something of a turning point. The
Prussians were shocked and insulted
by the French victories, but they also
saw them as proof of the superiority of
France and her political culture.
When Napoleon rode into Berlin he
was greeted by crowds which,
according to one French officer, were as
enthusiastic as those that had
welcomed him in Paris on his
triumphant return from Austerlitz the
previous year. 'An undefinable feeling,
a mixture of pain, admiration and
curiosity agitated the crowds which
pressed forward as he passed,' in the words of one eyewitness ...
Napoleon treated Prussia and her King worse than he had treated any conquered country before.
At Tilsit he publicly humiliated Frederick by refusing to negotiate with him, and by treatening Queen
Louise, who had come in person to plead her country's cause, with insulting gallantry. He did not
bother to negotiate, merely summoning the Prussian Minister Goltz to let him know his intentions. He
told the Minister that he had thought of giving the throne of Prussia to his own brother Jerome, but out
of regard for Tzar Alexander, who had begged him to spare Frederick, he had graciously decided to
leave him in possession of it. But he diminished his realm by taking away most of the territory seized
by Prussia from Poland ... " (Zamoyski - "Moscow 1812" p 43)
"The schooling of subaltern officers, of captains

and battalion commanders is exemplary and still
an object of envy and imitation by our neighbours,
but what about the schooling of generals ?
Where is the opportunity to be trained as a general,
i.e. as an independent commander of all arms ?."
- Massenbach
Reforms of 1807-1812.
Corps System and People's Army.
"After the disaster of 1806, there was a widespread sense of outrage at the way in which the Prussian
Army had been humiliated. Public and political pressures caused the King, Frederick William III, to
make some move towards setting up a board of enquiry to determine the causes of defeat and with the
wider object of reforming the army. The first steps towards these objectives were taken on July 15,
1807, when the King requested Graf Lottum and Major-General v.Scharnhorst to head the newly
established Military Reorganization Commission. Under their influence, the places within the
Commission were soon filled with a mixture of reactionaries and visionaries including Konen, von
Massenbuch, von Borstell, von Bronikowski, and, more significantly, Boyen, Gneisenau and a young
captain of artillery named Clausewitz." ( Nash - "The Prussian Army 1808-15" p 5)
The Convention of Paris in 1808 restricted the Prussian army to 36.000 men (many sources give 42.000
men.) However it seems that the army had been never actually reduced to less than 45,000 men.
It was the third humiliation Prussia suffered (first was defeat at Jena and Auerstadt, and the second
was reduction of her territory after the Tilsit Treaty). In this situation the reformers modified their
organization tables to produce 6 brigades:
- East Prussia Brigade

- West Prussia Brigade
- Brandenburg Brigade
- Lower Silesia Brigade
- Upper Silesia Brigade
- Pommerania brigade
A new system of officer selection and promotions was introduced. The Military Schools of Artillery
and Engineers were founded. Traditional punishments such as flogging and running the gauntlet were
abolished. In the end of 1808 the Prussian Ministry of War was founded. In January 1812 new official
training regulations were issued.
"The most important series of measures taken by the reformers sought to increase Prussian military
power in contravention of the Treaty of Paris. On June 6, 1809, a small commission ... set to work on
the question of conscription. Their work culminated in a report appealing for universal service which
was rejected by the King on February 5 1810, but which was ultimately destined to be the framework
of the famous Boyen conscription laws of Sept 1814.
The original idea of the 'Krumper' seems to have been provided by Scharnhorst who, on July 31 1807,
suggested that each company and squadron should discharge 20 trained men and should take in equal
number of new recruits. This led to a Cabinet Order requiring each of these units to send 5 men on
furlough each month and to replace this wastage with untrained recruits. Although this measure was
put into practice, it was not done consistently throughout the years. ...
It has been suggested that the Krumper' system allowed the army to triple its size in 1813, but this is
not true. The scheme met with opposition at many points - commanding officers were often reluctant
to part with good men and therefore continually discharged the worst, or none at all. By March 1812,
the army, together with its trained reserves, still only numbered 65,675 all ranks, which nonetheless,
was a sizeable increase over the 42,000 permitted." (Nash - "The Prussian Army" p 8)
Digby-Smith writes: "By dint of much creative thinking, however, Scharnhorst and other members of
the Prussian General Staff had invented the Krumper System by which each regiment called up a
certain number of recruits, gave them basic military training, and then discharged them again in order
to call up and train another batch, so that the 42,000 ceiling imposed by Napoleon was never
exceeded." (Digby-Smith, - p 35)
In 1812 the Prussian army was small:

Infantry
. . . . . 12 infantry regiments (the 8th was Guard).
. . . . . 6 grenadier battalions
. . . . . 1 (Guard) jäger battalion
. . . . . 1 (East-Prussian) jäger battalion
. . . . . 1 (Silesian) schützen battalion
Cavalry
. . . . . 4 cuirassier regiments (the 3rd was Guard)
. . . . . 6 dragoon regiments
. . . . . 6 hussar regiments
. . . . . 3 uhlan regiments (and squadron of Garde-Uhlanen)
In 1812 was issued 'Exerzir-Reglement fur die Artillerie der Koniglich Preussischen Armee'. It had one
section on the use of the combined arms within brigades. The brigade consisted of all arms - infantry,
cavalry, artillery, engineers and staff.
In 1812 Prussia "... as an 'ally' of France, has been ordered to provide the French Grand Army with a
30.000-man contingent to protect its left wing, in the same way as the Austrians are to protect its right.
This had caused the Berlin court to put out secret feelers to Vienna - feelers which, after three no less
ruinous defeats, have fallen on deaf ears. Even so, just to make sure there are no misunderstandings,
Marshal Oudinot is ordered to occupy Berlin with his 30,000-strong II Corps, while Narbonne at the
same time is sent there to exercise his old-style diplomacy on a traumatized Prussian court." (Britten
Austin - "1812: The March on Moscow" p 27)
"The regiments mobilised for this campaign weere all (except the Leib-Regiment) 'composite' units,
each consisting of infantry battalions and cavalry squadrons drawn from two parent regiments. In this
way the invaluable training experience of service in the field was imparted to twice as many regiments
as actually participated in the campaign. " (Digby-Smith, - p 35)
"Prussia's contribution to the French invasion of Russia was 20,842 men, grouped into 'combined
regiments' drawn from all six brigades. They were commanded by Yorck, who had vociferously
opposed many army reforms, with another conservative, Kleist as his second-in-command. This Corps
was assigned to the left wing of the invasion, under the command of Marshal Macdonald, operating
along the Baltic coast with St Petersburg as the objective. The advance bogged down around Riga,
while the central army group, under Napoleon's command, disintegrated; Macdonald had to pull back
before overwhelming Russian forces.
During this retreat, Yorck's force became detached from the main body and surrounded. Clausewitz
and Baron Stein, a former minister who had been expelled from Prussia on Napoleon's orders, open
negotiations with Yorck, who finally signed the Covention of Tauroggen on December 30 1812, joining
forces with the Russians and advancing with them into East Prussia." (- Robert Mantle)
"That the morale of the majority of the Prussian army

withstood the rigours of the field and the shock of
Ligny was due to the high quality of leadership
at all levels." - Mark Adkin
Prussian Army in 1813-1815.

Katzbach - Leipzig - Laon - Ligny - Waterloo
Under the noses of French spies Prussia developed a

reserve army capable of taking the field.
On March 1st 1813 were established so-called
Reserve Battalions. They were considered as part of
their parent regiments and were made of reservists
and raw recruits. The officers and NCOs were
supplied by the parent regiments. The 39 Reserve
Battalions formed twelve Reserve Regiments. In
March 1814 these units were assigned numbers in
line.
Scharnhorst also persuaded King Friedrich Wilhelm

III to institute a national militia called Landwehr. The Landwehr accepted men aged 25 to 40, too old
and weak for the army. They were equipped not by the central goverment and ministry of war but by
provinces.
The Prussian troops in 1813-1814 were of four types:
regular
reserve
volunteers
Landwehr
The regiments were formed in brigades. Each brigade had infantry, cavalry and artillery. When in 1813
the brigades were strenghtened with newly raised troops, and although still designated 'brigades', they
were in fact 'divisions'. The regiments and brigades were well trained but iIt was apparent that the
army needed more experience on multi-brigade level.
In 1813 at Dennewitz the Prussian 3rd and 4th Brigade became completely mixed up before their
officers were able to put order.
In 1813 at Weinberg Defile the Prussian 2nd and 7th Brigade became entangled while executing a
deployment into battle formation.
Despite its shorcomings the Prussian army distinguished itself at Katzbach, Dennewitz, Leipzig, and
Laon. All the battles were victories. At Waterloo the Prussian army was instrumental in the ultimate
defeat of Napoleon.
The landwehr in Prussia was first formed by a royal edict of 17

March 1813, which called up all men capable of bearing arms
between the ages of 18 and 45, and not serving in the regular
army, for the defence of the country.
Loraine Petre writes: "A decree of the king established the

landwehr, based on the model of that of Austria of 1809. ... As
the impoverished state of Prussian finances precluded much
assistance from the State, the expense of equipment had to fall
on the men themselves, or their villages. ... At first, the front
rank was often armed with pikes or scythes, and it was only as
French muskets were taken from the battlefields that the men
were armed with yet another pattern of firearm. There was a
great dearth of officers, as most of the half-pay officers still fit for
service were required for the reserve battalions. All sorts of
officials, many of them very unsuitable as military officers,
joined, and it was only later on that men of some experience
were got from the 'volunteer-jagers, etc. Naturally, the
landwehr, as a whole, was at first of no great military value,
though their initial worth was in some corps (Yorck's and Bulow's especially) enhanced by long
marches and still more by early successes." (Petre - "Napoleon at War" p 114)
Prussian Landwehr in 1813
District Landwehr Infantry Landwehr Cavalry
East Prussia 5 Regiments [20 battalions] 5 Regiments [16 squadrons]

West Prussia 3 Regiments [11 battalions] 3 Regiments [9 squadrons]
Pommerania 3 Regiments [12 battalions] 3 Regiments [12 squadrons]
Neumark 3 Regiments [12 battalions] 2 Regiments [8 squadrons]
Kurmark 7 Regiments [26 battalions] 7 Regiments [28 squadrons]
Silesia 17 Regiments [68 battalions] 10 Regiments [40 squadrons]
Prussia had numerous units made of volunteers. They were well equipped since they were from
wealthier families, and one of the conditions of service was that they provided the weapons, shakos
and green uniforms. The weapon was frequently the family's hunting rifle.
The volunteer-jagers were formed into small detachments (100-150 men each) that were allotted to
infantry and cavalry units. The purpose of this was to give foundation for a military education that
would enable these men to fulfil the duties of NCOs or officers, at a later date. In September 1813 the
following regular units had a detachment of volunteer-jagers (freiwilligen-jagers) as part of their
established strength:
- 1st and 2nd Foot Guard Regiment
- Guard Jager Battalion
- Silesian Schutzen Battalion
- all grenadier battalions
- 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th Infantry Regiment
- 7th, 8th, 9th, 11th, and 12th Infantry Regiment
- 1st and 5th Reserve Infantry Regiment
- Lutzow's Free Corps
- Garde du Corps (Garde zu Pferde)
- Guard Light Cavalry Regiment

- 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Cuirassier Regiment
- 1st and 2nd Uhlan Regiment
- 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th Dragoon Regiment
- 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th Hussar Regiment
- 3rd West Prussia Landwehr Cavalry Regiment
There were also so-called free corps. These troops are evidence of the intense patriotism that existed at
that time in Prussia. The most famous of these units was the Lutzow's Freikorps. The Lützow Free
Corps (Lützowsches Freikorps) was a voluntary force formed in February 1813 and named after its
commander Ludwig von Lutzow. Lützow had fought in 1806 at Auerstadt and in 1807 at Kolberg with
Schill making raids upon the French beseigers. In 1808, he had taken part in Schill's raid.
In February 1813, only few days after King Frederick Wilhelm's call for volunteers, Lützow presented
his king with a petition, begging that he might raise an independent corps. He laid stress that some of
these men would also come from other German states eager to serve the Prussian cause. Though
Napoleon chose to brand them as brigands, there is ample evidence to prove that they were part of the
Prussian army, and subject to military law as it pertained to regular combattants." ( - Gary Shively)
Lützow Free Corps consisted mostly of students, writers and academics from all over Germany, who
had volunteered to fight against the French. The volunteers had to equip and supply themselves by
their own means. The volunteers adopted black as the color of their units. Lutzow's Free Corps
consisted of 2900 infantry, 600 cavalry, and 120 artillery. The volunteers fought in several battles,
operating first independently in the rear of the French troops, later as a regular unit in the allied
armies. After the peace of 1814 the corps was dissolved, the infantry becoming the 25th Regiment, the
cavalry the 6th Uhlans.
Left: Lutzow's Free

Corps in 1813-15.
Picture by Knotel.
From left to right:
- musketier
- officer of jagers
- jager
- private of volunteer-
jagers
Right: Lutzow's Free

Corps in 1813-15.
Picture by Knotel.
From left to right:
- officer of volunteer-
jagers
- jager
- hussar
- officer of hussars
Prussian Army in June 1813
Infantry Cavalry Artillery and Engineers
40,890 infantry 12,000 cavalry 16,180 artillery

29,600 reserve infantry 1,350 provincial cavalry 1,300 engineers
11,400 'ersatz' infantry 2,400 volunteer cavalry -
6,460 foreign infantry 3,460 cavalry depots -
4,550 volunteer infantry - -
20,400 garrison infantry - -
"The rapid expansion of the [Prussian] army at this time created problems of major significance. Of
prime importance was a general shortage of fire arms. The British Government supplied 113,000
muskets..." (Nash - "The Prussian Army 1808-1815" p 12)
Prussian Army in August 1813

Infantry Cavalry Artillery and Engineers
8,750 men [50 field batteries]

72,130 regular infantry [90 btns.] 13,375 regular and volunteers [89
6,565 men [33 fortress
31,830 res. and garrison inf.[39 sq.]
and siege companies]
btns] 3,390 reserve cavalry [22 sq.]
570 men [7 pioneer comp.]
11,150 jager and foreign [8 btns.] 3,060 jager and foreign [23 sq.]
740 men [7 fortress pioneer
109,120 Landwehr [151 btns.] 10,950 Landwehr [113 sq.]
cop.]
According to Peter Hofschroer the army of 1813-14 was drawn almost entirely from the core provinces
of the Kingdom of Prussia - whereas the army of 1815, consisted only in part of "old" Prussians. The
Rhinelanders and to an extent the Westphalians were "new" Prussians of questionable loyalty. Also in
1815 a number of foreign, i.e. non-Prussian, formations had been amalgamated into the line and were,
on paper at least, now considered regular formations, although it was really only after the Waterloo.
The Rhinelanders' support for the Napoleonic code opened them up to accusations by later German
nationalist historians like Treitschke of somehow being Francophile, and disloyal to the German
nation. Michael Rowe writes: "The positive reception given to the codes does seem convincing
evidence of Rhenish acceptance of French rule: surely it justifies locating the regiom securely within
the inner empire.
Yet, there is an alternative explanation. Firstly, we need to consider what Rhinelanders liked about the
Napoleonic legal system. This is not difficult, thanks to a thorough investigation conducted by the
Prussian authorities after 1815. ... This revealed that the French system was popular not so much
because of the contents of the civil code or penal code, but rather because of the procedures of the
French courts: the oral, public proceedings in front of juries, the principle of equality before the law,
and the independence of the judiciary from political interference."
In 1815, the Prussian army consisted of:

. . . . . 279 infantry battalions
. . . . . 280 cavalry squadrons
. . . . . 78 artillery batteries
. . . . . 17 pioneer companies
. . . . . 1 Landwehr pioneer battalion
These forces were organized into six army corps and guard corps.
In contrast with the French and British, the Prussian Guard, the cuirassiers and the grenadiers
were not present at Ligny and Waterloo. After the war the Prussian Guard Corps stationed in Paris.
Kommandeur - der General-Lieutenant Herzog Carl von Meklenburg Strelitz
Chef des Generalstabs, der Oberst-ltn. von Wedell
Infanterie-Brigade - Oberst von Alvensleben
. . . . . . . . . 1ste Regiment Garde zu Fuss - Oberst-ltn. von Block
. . . . . . . . . 2te Regiment Garde zu Fuss - Oberst-ltn. von Muffling
. . . . . . . . . Garde-Jäger-Bat. - Major von Bock
Infanterie-Brigade - Oberst von Ratzmer
. . . . . . . . . Grenadier-Regiment Kaiser Alexander -Major von Schachtmeier
. . . . . . . . . Grenadier-Regiment Kaiser Franz - Oberst-ltn. von Klür
. . . . . . . . . Garde-Schützen-Bat. - Major Graf von Meuron
Kavallerie-Brigade - Oberst von Knobelsdorf
. . . . . . . . . Regiment Garde zu Pferde - Oberst-ltn. Graf von Brandenburg
. . . . . . . . . Garde-Husaren-Regiment - Major von Knobloch
. . . . . . . . . Garde-Dragoner-Regiment - Oberst-ltn. von Zastrow
. . . . . . . . . Garde-Uhlanen-Regiment - Major von Kraft
Artillerie-Brigade - Major Willmann
. . . . . . . . . 6pfund. Garde Fussbatterie No. 1. - von Lehmann,
. . . . . . . . . 12pfund. Garde Fussbatterie No. 1. - Kpt. von Witt
. . . . . . . . . reitende Garde-Batterie No. 1. - Major von Willmann
. . . . . . . . . reitende Garde-Batterie No. 2. - Kpt. von Neuendorf
. . . . . . . . . Park-Kolonne No. 37.
At Waterloo the Prussians had 38,000 infantry in 62 battalions,
7,000 cavalrymen in 61 squadrons, and 134 guns. Total of 50,000
men arriving in different times on the battlefield. The troops
were led by seasoned officers and generals. "That the morale of
the majority of the Prussian army withstood the rigours of the
field and the shock of Ligny was due to the high quality of
leadership at all levels. " (Adkin - "The Waterloo Companion" p
208)
According to Alessandro Barbero "At Waterloo, almost all the

Prussian officers from the rank of captain up began their military service before 1806, yet the average
age of the corps and divisional commanders - 45 - was the same as in Napoleon's and Wellington's...
On the eve of battle, the Prussian army was affliceted by what we call a crisis of growth.
The Congress of Vienna in 1814 had elevated the Kingdom of Prussia to the rank of a great European
power, thus considerably expanding its borders and the recruitment pool at the service of its military.
The human resources in the new territories, however, were thought to be less reliable than those in the
old provinces of the kingdom... " (Barbero - "The Battle" p 30)
Charles Esdaile writes "At Jena and Auerstadt the Prussian army had fought adequately, but its
performance had hardly been heroic. At Leipzig and Waterloo, by contrast, it is claimed that a very
different vision was on show."
Gunther Rothenberg writes: "In 1806 the typical Prussian soldier had been a mercenary or a reluctant
conscript; now he was animated both by patriotism and by a deep and even savage hatred of the
French. The first expressed itself, as it had in the days of Frederick, by religion. As the Prussian
infantry saw the French retreating the evening of Waterloo, the fusiliers began to sign the old Lutheran
hymn, 'A mighty fortress is our God' ... Hatred of the French expressed itself in bitter fighting and in
the ability to rally after initial defeat."
After Napoleonic Wars, at the Vienna Congress, Prussia was widely perceived as under Russian
influence. Prussia and Russia proposed to partition France, while Austria and Great Britain strove for
and pushed through a lenient treatment of France.
US Army military staff service has

its origins in the Prussian army.
In the the US Staff College Publication 1
is clearly stated that "The modern general
staff was developed in Prussia during
the XIXth century."
Prussian General Staff of the Napoleonic Wars.

Quartermaster-Generall - GL August Graf von Gneisenau
Chef des Generallstabs - GM von Grolman
Picture: Chief-of-Staff of the Prussian Army (Napoleonic Wars),

General von Gneisenau, on white horse, and a staff officer. By
Christa Hook.
Despite small population (see diagram below) Prussia had one

of the largest armies in the world. Such army required an
efficient staff. The origins of what would become the German
General Staff of the 19th and 20th Centuries - probably the most
professional military machine in the world - can be traced to the
Prussian Army of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic
Wars.
POPULATION.
Denmark - 1 million
Saxony - 1,1 millions
Lombardy - 2 millions
Papal State - 2,3 millions
Sweden - 2,3 millions
Portugal - 3 millions
Poland Duché de Varsovie - 4,3 millions
Naples - 5 millions
USA - 6 millions
Holland & Belgium - 6,2 millions
Prussia - 9,7 millions (in 1806 reduced to 4,9 millions)
Spain - 11 millions
Great Britain - 18,5 millions (England, Ireland, Scotland)

Austria - 21 millions (with Hungary)
France - 30 millions
Russia - 40 (with annexed
territories)
The chief-of-staff was on army, corps and brigade level. Each of the had a goup of staff officers. In 1809
a corps of permanent staff officers was established and specific uniforms were introduced for them.
Chief-of-staff of Army
The supreme command was naturally the responsibility of the army's commanding general,
with the role of his chief-of-staff [of the army] being to turn the commanding general's
intentions into practical plans. "The Prussian General Staff operated under a chief-of-staff
system. In this instance Lieutenant-General von Gneisenau filled the post officially known as
Quartermaster-General. He was the second-in-command to Blücher, as well as being
responsible for co-ordinating all staff functions. He was also the officer representing the
Minister of War with the army, and had juridiction (under the commander who took overall
credit or blame for the army's activities) over both operational and administrative matters. In
the field Gneisenau wielded his authority in the name of the commander-in-chief in virtually all
military spheres - movement, tactics, deployment, intelligence and logistics (food, clothing,
ammunition and accommodation). Blücher made the major decisions after consultation with
Gneisenau and others, such as Major-General von Grolmann who headed the staff at the
headquarters."
(Adkin - "The Waterloo Companion" p 111)
Chief-of-staff of Corps
"The chief-of-staff of a corps was responsible for its organisation and leadership, acting as an
advisor to the corps commander...
Chief-of-staff of (Division) Brigade
These [brigade staff officers] dealt with matters such as the reconnaissance of terrain and any
resulting changes in the direction of the marching columns ... with reconnoitring the enemy and
the countryside, particularly with regard to the supply and quartering of the troops; with the
receipt and implementation of orders regarding combat, deployment and marching. Finally, the
brigade staff officer was required to deal with every matter drawn to his attention by the
brigade commander."
(Hofschroer - "Prussian Staff..." p 11)
PS.
After Napoleon's defeat in 1815 at Waterloo by Prussian and the German-British-Netherland army,
Europe entered a long period of peace. Armies were cut back and interest in military science waned in
most nations. Only in Prussia did military men study the crises of command that emerged during the
last stages of the Napoleonic Wars, when mass armies took to the battlefields.
If Napoleon Bonaparte was the last Great Captain of history, then von Moltke (ext.link) was the first
Great Manager of the modern military era. He built up a new system based on the principle of using
highly trained and interchangeable staff officers. Noting von Moltke's success over the French army, all
major European nations copied his methods.
Sources and Links.

Recommended Reading.
Oiver Schmidt - "Prussian Regular Infantryman 1808-1815" 2003

Hofschroer - "1815: The Waterloo Campaign. The German Victory."
Hofschroer - "Prussian Light Infantry 1792-1815" 1984
Hofschroer - "Prussian Staff and Specialist Troops 1791-1815"
Craig - "The Germans" 1991
Duffy - "Frederick the Great" 1985
Digby-Smith - "1813: Leipzig" Duffy - "The Army of Frederick the Great" 1974
Holborn - "A History of Modern Germany 1648-1840" 1982
Petre - "Napoleon’s Conquest of Prussia 1806" 1993
Simms - "The Struggle for Mastery in Germany" 1998
Summerville "Napoleon's Polish Gamble"
Pictures by Knoetel, and L. & F. Funcken
www.napoleon-series.org
flags from warflag.com
Lützow's Free Corps and Volunteer Riflemen 1813-2003 {Lützowschen Freikorps}
History of Prussia and Military History {Preußische Geschichte und Militärgeschichte}
Reenactors of Kurmark Landwehr 1813 {Kurmärkische Landwehr}
East-Prussian Landwehr 1813 {Ostpreußische Landwehr}
Silesian Landwehr 1813{Schlesische Landwehr 1813}
5e brigade prussienne {5. Brigade preussische}
Armée prussienne des guerres napoléoniennes
Infanterie prussienne - - Cavalerie prussienne - - Artillerie prussienne
Bataille de Dennewitz, 1813

Le général von Bulow écrase le maréchal Ney
Bataille de Leipzig, 1813
La bataille des Nations,
le plus grand conflit jusqu'à la Première Guerre mondiale :
Bataille de Waterloo, 1813
La victoire allemande - entretien avec Peter Hofschroer
Napoléon, son armée et ses ennemis

Prussian Army - Napoleonic Wars - History - Organization - Preußische Armee

Transféré par

Informations du document

Titre original

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Prussian Army - Napoleonic Wars - History - Organization - Preußische Armee

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

30/03/2023 16:47 Prussian Army : Napoleonic Wars : History : Organization : Preußische Armee

Armée prussienne des guerres

1. Introduction : Brève histoire de la Prusse.

La défaite de l'armée prussienne par Napoléon

Les Prussiens s'étaient rendus et Photo : La porte de Brandebourg à Berlin.

Après la défaite et l'abdication de Napoléon,

et poussaient à un traitement indulgent de la

"La Prusse était à l'origine une tache insignifiante

Introduction : Brève histoire de la Prusse.

In 1226 Polish Duke, Konrad I, invited the Teutonic Knights, a German

In 1525 Grand Master Albert I Hohenzollern became a Lutheran Protestant

Frederick William went to Warsaw in 1641 to

Taking advantage of the difficult position of

For her part Prussia took Posen (Poznan

If the Frenchmen excel them (Germans) in vivacity of onslaught,

Glory Years of the Prussian Army.

It means that it was possible for an agricultural state of few millions of

Frederick the Great

The Prussians could march

"At Jena, the Prussian army performed the finest

Decline of the Army: defeats at Jena and Auerstadt

"When in August 1806, Prussia mobilized her army

Prussian order of battle: Jena 1806 (Saxons excluded)

Heavy fighting began when elements of

At Auerstadt Marshal Davout's also crushed

Not joining Austria and Russia in 1805 in

"... just after the victories of Jena and

"The schooling of subaltern officers, of captains

- East Prussia Brigade

In 1812 the Prussian army was small:

"That the morale of the majority of the Prussian army

Prussian Army in 1813-1815.

Under the noses of French spies Prussia developed a

Scharnhorst also persuaded King Friedrich Wilhelm

The Prussian troops in 1813-1814 were of four types:

The landwehr in Prussia was first formed by a royal edict of 17

Loraine Petre writes: "A decree of the king established the

Prussian Landwehr in 1813

District Landwehr Infantry Landwehr Cavalry

East Prussia 5 Regiments [20 battalions] 5 Regiments [16 squadrons]

- Guard Light Cavalry Regiment

Left: Lutzow's Free

Right: Lutzow's Free

Prussian Army in June 1813

Infantry Cavalry Artillery and Engineers

40,890 infantry 12,000 cavalry 16,180 artillery

Prussian Army in August 1813

8,750 men [50 field batteries]

In 1815, the Prussian army consisted of:

According to Alessandro Barbero "At Waterloo, almost all the

US Army military staff service has

Prussian General Staff of the Napoleonic Wars.

Picture: Chief-of-Staff of the Prussian Army (Napoleonic Wars),

Despite small population (see diagram below) Prussia had one

Great Britain - 18,5 millions (England, Ireland, Scotland)

Sources and Links.

Oiver Schmidt - "Prussian Regular Infantryman 1808-1815" 2003

Armée prussienne des guerres napoléoniennes

Infanterie prussienne - - Cavalerie prussienne - - Artillerie prussienne

Bataille de Dennewitz, 1813

Napoléon, son armée et ses ennemis

Vous aimerez peut-être aussi