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Fire and the spatial separation of buildings

McGuire, J. H.

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https://doi.org/10.4224/40001478
Technical Paper (National Research Council of Canada. Division of Building
Research); no. DBR-TP-212, 1966-02-01

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 -7 7
113
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
CANADA
CONSEIL NATIONAL DE RECHERCHES

e9s?s
Fire and the Spatial
Separationof Buildings
by
J. H. McGuire

ANALYZED

Reprinted from
Fire Technology, Vol. 1, No. 4
November 1965, pp. 278-287

Technical Paper No. 212

of the
Division of Building Research

OTTAWA
February 1966

Price 25 cents NRC 8901

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LE FEU ET LA DISTANCE SEPARANT :+
LES BATIMENTS --
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SOMMAIRE

On sous-entend que les valeurs des distances de s6para-

tion des bdtiments calcul6es sur la base d'un rayonnement
maximal pr6viendront la propagation d'un incendie par
rayonnement pendant une dur6b ind6finie. Les valeurs
calcul6esdes distances d6passent toutefois ce qui est r6alisable
pratiquement. L'auteur pr6sente des tables de distances de
s6paration suffisantes pour pr6venir la propagation des in-
cendies par rayonnement pendant un laps de temps per-
mettant aux sapeurs-pompiers de commencer leurs op6ra-
tions. L'auteur explique comment ces tables ont 6te calcul6es
et 6tur'' {e leur
emplr
 REPRIIVTED FROM FT.12
FIRE TECHNOLOGY
Vol. I No.4 NOV. 1965

Fire and the Spatial

Separationof Buildings
J. H. McGUIRE, SFPE
Diuision of Building Research
National Research Council (Canada)

It has been implied that spatial separations based on peak radia-

tion levels will prevent ignition by radiation, indefinitely. The
specified distances, however, exceedpractical limits. Separations
calculated to prevent ignition by radiation long enough for fire ex-
tinguishing operations to be initiated have been tabulated. The
author explains how the tables were derived and discussesproblems
that may be encountered in their use.

,TtHE spread of fire from one building to another separated from the first
I by a vacant space may result from one or more of the following mecha-
nisrrs:
o Flying brands.
o Convective heat transfer.
o Radiative heat transfer.
Flying brands may initiate secondary fires at substantial distances
from the primary fire, e.g., at least a quarter of a mile. It is not, therefore,
practical to consider the spatial separation of buildings as a means of com-
bating this hazard. Regulation of the choice of exterior cladding materials,
particularly on roofs, minimizes such ignitions, and their extinguishment
is usually easy, provided they are detected at an early stage.
Convective heat transfer will cause ignition only if ttre temperature of
the gas stream is several hundred degrees Celsius. Such high gas temper-
atures are only to be found in or very near the flames emanating from the
windows of burning buildings.
Ignition by radiation from a burning building can occur at distances
substantially greater than those to which flames generally extend. It is
this mechanism, therefore, that will be the factor governing the specifica-
tion of the spatial separation of buildings from the fire point of view.
Norn: This paper is a contribution of the Division of Building Research, National
Research Counciil,-Canada, and is published with the approval oT the Director of the
Division. Acknowledgement is due-to Mr. G. Williams-Leir for programming the com-
pr.rter to solve the configuration factor equations and to Mr. P. Huot for carr5ring out
the computations.

Copyrisht1965 NATIONAt tlRE FROTTCTION

ASSOCTATION
60 EATTERYMARCH
ST., BOSTON,MASS, O21IO Prinrodin U.S.A.
Separation of Buildings 279
The remainder of this paper is devoted to the formulation of a tech-
nique for prescribing separation distances between buildings with a view to
reducing the likelihood of spread of fire by radiative heat transfer.

TOLERABLE RADIATION LEVEL

When discussing the possibility that combustible materials will be ig-
nited by radiant heat, the lowest level of intensity that proves to be sig-
nificant is 0.3 cal/sq crnfsec; below this, most materials cannot be ignited
in the presenceof a pilot flame. Unfinished, untreated fiberboard does not
obey this generalization and will ignite in the presence of a pilot flame at
even lower intensities. In the present context, however, this feature will
not be considered on the grounds that untreated, unfinished fiberboard is
very unlikely to be a material exposed to radiant heat from fire in an
adjacent building.
The mechanism discussedabove involves the presenceof a pilot flame,
which constitutes a local high-temperature source. When a building is on
fire and is exposing another to radiation, sparks and flying brands con-
stitute the local high-temperature sources. In many cases,where a radia-
tion level greater than 0.3 cal/sq cm/sec is incident on a building, a spark
or flying brand will pass through the evolved streams of combustible
volatiles.
It will therefore be assumed, that the spatial separation of buildings
should be such that a fire in one building should not subject the facade of
another to levels of radiation higher than 0.3 cal/sq cm/sec.

RADIATION LEVELS FROM

BURNING BUILDINGS
ExppnrupNrar- FrNnrNcs
The radiation levels to be expected from burning buildings were investi-
gated in the course of a program of full-scale burns known as the St.
Lawrence Burns, carried out by the Division of Building Research, Na-
tional Research Council, during the winter of 1958.1 The following were the
principal findings:
. The nature of exterior cladding - brick or clapboard - did not
noticeably influence radiation levels.
. Peak radiation levels at some distance from the buildings coincided
with those that would result if window openings, at an appropriate hypo-
thetical temperature, were taken to be the only sources of radiation.
. Peak radiation levels from buildings with highly flammable linings
were twice those from buildings with noncombustible linings.
o Radiation levels were affected by wind direction, those on the lee-
ward side of a building being, in general, much greater than those on the
windward side.
Using the second result described above, it was found that peak hy-
pothetical radiation levels at window openings on the leeward sides of
280 Fire Technology
the buildings came to nearly 40 and 20 cal/sq cmfsec, respectively, for
buildings with highly flammable and noncombustible linings. These values
are, in fact, much greater than the maximum level to be expected at win-
dow openings - about 4 cal/sq cm/sec - because it is assumed that
radiation from the flames above windows is actually emanating from the
window openings themselves. Spatial separation calculations using these
results gave a range of values that were inordinately large and virtually
impractical. An attempt, therefore, was made to justify basing spatial
separation calculations on lower levels of radiation from burning buildings.
In re-examining the results of the St. Lawrence Burns, it was noticed
that, although the fires had been arranged to develop very rapidly, radia-
tion levels did not exceed about one-flfth of the peak values listed, i.e.,
40 and 20 cal/sq cmf secuntil at least 16 min had elapsed. As fire fighting
is in progress at this stage for the great majority of fires, it is possiblethat
spatial separation would perform adequately if it merely gave protection
against the spread of fire during this period. In many cases,spatial separa-
tion calculated on this basis would, in fact, protect a building indefinitely,
for the radiation levels previously discussed are maxima and would not
always prevail.

Frnr.o Sr:unrns
To throw more light on the possiblehazard.of adopting the lessstringent
approach just referred to, it is worth examining the results of the very
Iimited number of field investigations carried out to date.
It is preferable to discuss this question in terms of a quantity called the
configuration factor rather than in terms of radiation levels, which obvi-
ously are not recorded during a fire. A configuration factor is defined as
the ratio of the radiant intensity at the receiving swface to that at the
(one or more) radiating surfaces. Assuming that these are at, a uniform
black body temperature, a configuration factor is calculated solely from
the relative geometry of the radiating and receiving surfaces. If it is
assumed that radiation may be represented as emanating solely from win-
dows and other openings, then this latter calculation is usually feasible
following a fire.
The configuration factors that would be specified on this basis, to offer
protection against the peak levels of radiation measured at the St. Lawrence
Burns would be 0.3/40:0.0075 (hazardous cases) and 0.3/20:0.015
(normal cases). To guard against radiation levels of about one-fifth the
peak value would call for configuration factors of 0.035 (hazardous cases)
and 0.07 (normal cases).
The first record of configuration factor calculations made on this basis
during field investigations may be found in a British technical paper pub-
lished in 1950.' The results relate to two fires. For the first, the results
refer to the condition of a number of window frames in the exposed buitd-
ing and are given in Table 1. The exposing building was a multistory
clothing store.
Separation of Buildings

Tanr-n L. Damage Related to Configuration Factor

Configwation foctor Condition of window frame

0.067 Paint blistered

0.067 Paint blistered, little charring
0.081 Surface charring
0.093 Burned
o.L12 Burned

The second fire gave only one result - a timber billboard with a con-
figuration factor of 0.092 ignit€d.
A fire that occurred in Winnipeg in 1956 also offers interesting informa-
tion on this subject. At one stage, an exposd building had a configuration
factor of 0.05 but did not becorne involved in the fire. Shortly afterwards,
,another building ignited, raising the configuration factor of the exposd
building to 0.1. Many of the window frames of the exposed building then
ignit€d.
The choice of a corifiguration factor of 0.07, based on the St. Lawrence
Burns rreeults, appears to be eompatible with the above field obeervations
and appropriate for normal use. The high intensities recorded during some
of the St. Lawrence Burns are so disturbing, however, that it is suggested
that a configuration factor of 0.035 should form the basis of separation
calculations involving buildings that can be expected to burn extra vigor-
ously.
Since the above suggestion was adopted in the 1960 edition of the Na-
tional Building Code of Canada, a field fire investigation involving two
dwellings has further justified it. The two dwellings were separated by a
dietanc€ of 17 ft, which is 2 ft gxeater than the 15 ft given by a configuration
factor of 0.035 together with a constant addition of 7 ft, i.e., as for Table
2. Despite this substantial separation, ignition still occurred, suggesting
that the distances prescribed are not excessive. The fire was started with
gasoline, which pertly explairrs the very rapid development and the attain-
ment of poak radiation levels before the arrival of the fire department.

THE TABLES
DnnlettoN
Tables 2 and 3 are samples of calculations based on configuration factors
of 0.035 and 0.07, respectively, for particularly hazardous and normal con-
ditions. In other words, the specified separations theoretically reduce the
radiant intensity at an exposed building to 0.035 or 0.07 times the equiva-
lent intensity at the window openings of the exposing building.
Further distances of 7 ft (particdlarly hazardous) and 5 ft (normal)
have been added, following the basic calculations, to account for the fact
that flamee have a horizontal projection and that the equivalent radiating
?42 Fire Technology

Tnnr,n 2. Building &parations (hazardous conditions)

Width of Per cent Height of comportment (ft)

compartment of window
(ft) opening 12.5 25 37.5 50 75 100

100 40 53.5 63 7l 84 93.5

to 35.5 47 DD 61.5 72 79.5
50 30 39 45 50 57.5 62.5
25 22.5 28 32 34.5 37.5 39.5

100 53.5 73 87.5 100 119.5 135.5

ID 47 64 76.5 86.5 103 116.5
20 50 39.5 53 62.5 7L 83.5 93.5
25 29 38 44.5 49.5 57 62

100 64 88 106 t2t.5 146 166.5

to 56 76.5 92.5 105.5 126.5 L43.5
'/D.b
30 50 46 63 86 L02.5 116
25 33 45 O.t.A 60.5 71 78.5

100 86 t20.5 147 169 205.5 235.5

75 74 104.5 L27.5 146.5 L77.5 203.5
60 50 60 85 LO4 119.5 L44.5 165
25 4l 59.5 72.5 83 100.5 114

100 106 L52 186.5 2L5.5 263 303

'tc
90.5 131 161 186 227.5 26t.5
100 50 7L.5 105.5 130 151 184.5 212.5
25 16 7I 89 103.5 L27.5 146.5

100 136.5 204.5 255 297 366 423.5

lo r13.5 173.5 218 254.5 315 365
200 50 85.5 136 173.5 203.5 253.5 294.5
25 50 85 1t2.5 135 17L 200.5

surface is thus in front of an actual building facade. The two dimensions,

7 ft and 5 ft, were results given by the St. Lawrence Burns during peak
levels of radiation. As the separations ane not intended to offer protection
in these circumstances, it might well be that these dimensions are somewhat
excessive and should be reduced by some 2 or 3 ft.
To cater for the almost infinite variety of window shapes and distribu-
tions that exist in building facades, a variable "percentage window open-
ing" has been introduced. Where windows are uniformly distributed and
are close together in comparison with the spatial separation distance, this
action will not introduce noticeable error-
Calculation of Tables 2 and,3 was made on a computer suitably pro-
grammed by a colleague in the Fire Section of NRC.*

-._*Amplified ve{Fions of thee tableq, together with others involving, for example,
different story heighte, and different increments in percentage window opening, are
available on r€queot from the Division of Building Research, National Research
Council.
Separation of Buildings 283
Pnnctrcer- Appr,tcattot r
The first feature to be considered in applying tables of this nature is
whether or not the adoption of an average value of percentagewindow open-
ing will give a valid distance of separation. If, say, windows occupy a
greater proportion of exterior wall area at one end of a building facade than
at the other, then a greater separation is called for in that region. To be
on the safe side, it would be desirable to require a separation in that par-
ticular region based on the adoption of a higher value of percentage window
opening while retaining the true values of the height and width of the
building.
If an individual window or other opehing proved to be very large, i.e.,
to have dimensions comparable with the separation dimensions, further
modification would be necessary. It would be essential to provide for
greater separation that that given on the assumption that a particular
window was the only radiator. Without delving more deeply into the
evaluation of configuration factors,3it is not practical to offer recommenda-

Tasr,p 3. Building Separations (normal conditions)

Width of Per cent Height of compartment (ft)

compartment of window
(ft) opening 12.5 25 37.5 50 75 roa
100 28 J' 43 48 55.5 60.5
'lD 46.5
24.5 32 DJ 4T 50
10 50 20.5 26 30 32.5 36 37.5
25 15 18 20 20.5 2L.5 22

100 o, 51 60.5 69 81.5 91.5

75 32.5 44 52.5 59 69.5 77.5
20 50 27 36 42.5 47.5 55 60
25 19 25 29 31.5 34.5 36.5

100 44 61 73.5 84 100.5 1L4

IO 38 53 63.5 72.5 86.5 97
30 50 31 43 51.5 Dt'.D 69 76.5
25 2l 29.5 35 39 44.5 48.5

100 58 83.5 LO2 tt7.5 t42.5 163

75 49.5 71.5 87.5 101 122.5 140
60 50 39 57 70.5 81 98.5 118
25 24.5 37.5 47 54 65 73

100 69.5 103.5 t28 t49 782.5 2tO.5

75 58 88 109.5 t27.5 156.5 180.5
100 50 44 69 87' 101.5 125.5 L44.5
25 26 42.5 55.5 66 82.5 95

100 83.5 134 r7t.5 201.5 251.5 292.5

75 67 111 t44 170.5 214.5 250
200 50 48 83 110.5 r32.5 169 198.5
25 26.5 46.5 64.5 80.5 106.5 127
284 Fire Technology
tions that are both simple and valid. Having derived separation distances
based on a mean percentage window opening and on the window opening
itse[ it must be left to the designer to assessan appropriate separation.
Radiation levels at a fixed distance from a building facade will decrease
as the distance from the center of symmetry increases; therefore, it would
be reasonable to relax spatial separation requirements near the corners of
buildings. A number of sample calculations indicate that appropriate
separations near the corners of buildings range between 65 and 95 per cent
of those listed in Tables 2 and 3. It might be reasonable to suggest a re-
laxation to 80 per cent of the value tabulated. The resulting separation
requirements are illustrated in Figure 1.

FIRE RESISTANT WA LL
NO OPENINGS

60% Dl

ir
80 /-r sov.
350 rgs9
ao% Dl eoz.3rl ..
g
- D= oR
Dr D2 wHIcHEVER
IS THE LARGER
Figure 7. Boundary conditions at the corners of buildings.

Figure 1 also gives the conditions required beyond the extreme corners
of the building. In the caseillustrated on the left of Figure 1, it might be
considered some hardship that the boundary of the restricted area extends
beyond the projection of the imperforate fire resistant side wall. This re-
striction can be eliminated by ensuring that there are no window open-
ings in the section CE of the adjoining wall.
The above measure has made use of two virtually self-apparent defini-
tions. First, the equivalent building facade whose width and height will be
looked up in either Table 2 or Table 3 will probably not coincide with the
actual building facade. It is only necessaryto include those openings that
will be radiating freely during a fire. Thus, each story of the average build-
ing will be separated from iLs neighbor by appropriately fire resistant con-
struction and can be treated separately in the present context. Second,
openings may be described as portions of the facade that might collapseand
fall out during the course of a fire. Thus, any portion that does not meet
Separation of Buildings 285
the integrity requirements associated with fire resistance considerations
will fall in this category. There is no call for it to meet any temperature
requirements.
A complicating feature to be catered for is that the exterior wall of a
building is often irregular in shape (Figure 2). In such cases,preliminary
considerations should refer to a line joining the extremities of the exterior
wall. Where the building is entirely contained behind this line no further
steps are required, for so far as radiation levels are concerned the irregular
external wall is closely represented by an imaginary one having the same
percentage window openings and located on the line referred to. Where a
portion of the building projects beyond the line, separation requirements
will be largely fulfilled by a composite boundary line as illustrated in Fig-
we 2. It is made up of a boundary line as calculated above, together with
one referring solely to the projecting portions of the building.

BUILDING

B U IL D I N G

BOUNDARY
LIMITS

Figure 2. Boundary mnditions for irregularly shaped buildings.

Building codes usually discuss the location of a building with relation

to the lot line rather than to another building. It is difficult to seehow this
type of specification can be soundly framed. The only practical suggestion
that has so far been conceived is that buildings should be separated from
their lot lines by half the distances derived according to the principles here
discussed. Where this rule is adopted for two adjacent buildings that are
mirror images of each other, the separation between the two will, in fact,
be appropriate. For dissimilar buildings, however, this will not be the case,
and the separation may be more than adequate if the one building catches
fire and less than adequate if the other ignites. It is doubtful whether this
286 Fire Technology
incompatibility will ever be resolved. The only mitigating feature is that,
in most cases, the building exposed to unnecessary hazard, will be the
smaller of the two - the greater the difference in size, the greater the
hazard.

COMPARISON WITH OTHER WORK

The Joint Fire Research Organization in the United Kingdom has de-
veloped recommendations concerning the spatial separation of buildings
along the same lines as those described in this paper.a The choice of the
level of radiation to be considered tolerable at an exposed building is the
sanne,both being based on JFRO results.
In specifying the radiation levels to be expected from burning buildings,
it is stated that the radiant contribution from flames issuing from windows
may virtually be neglected. It is assumed that windows and other open-
ings radiating at a temperature not exceeding 1,100'C will be the only
sources of radiation. In terms of configuration factors, the recommenda-
tion is that calculations should normally be based on a value 0.075.
This value correspondsclosely with the one used in this paper, although
it is not claimed that separations based on the latter (together with the
additional 5 ft always included) will prevent the spread of fire unless fire
fighting is undertaken before the fire attains its peak. The British report
implies that the separations wilI be adequate in their own right.
The British report also suggeststhat where fire loads are low, 5 lb/sq ft
or less, much less stringent separations based on a configuration factor of
0.15 are acceptable. It is probable that this relaxation is appropriate for
certain types of buildings now being constructed. Relaxation of the separa-
tions suggestedin the present paper could, in fact, conveniently be achieved
without computing additional tables. By multiplying the percentage
window openings by a factor of 2, Lhe "normal" tables, instead of being
based on a configuration factor of 0.07, would be based on one of 0.14 (with
the constant addition of 5 ft). The values thus obtained would correspond
closely to those given in the British table, except for the 5-ft addition re-
ferred to.
The lowest value of percentage window opening available in the table
would then be 2 X20% :4070, and it might be consideredsome hard-
ship not to have lower values available. However, the use of lower values
might be somewhat dangerous. Separation values would be small and
might well become comparable to the dimensions between windows. Such
conditions would invalidate the use of the variable "percentage window
opening," which assumesa continuous distribution of very small windows.
A relaxation, such as the above, might be recommended where wall
linings and the contents of a building have very low flammability ratings
and constitute a low fire load, say less than 5 lb/sq ft.
In the British report, the absence of especially stringent requirements
with regard to buildings that might burn extra vigorously would seem
Separation of Buildings 287

undersirable as far as Canadian conditions are concerned. The results

of the St. Lawrence Burns and the field investigation of the dwelling house
fire, here reported, emphasize the need for a stringent requirement here in
Canada.
The British report states that "A wall clad with timber would be con-
sidered as an opening, since the burning timber would act as a source of
radiation . . ." The St. Lawrence Burns results suggest that the radiation
level from clapboard cladding can be neglected, provided the wall remains
intact and is fairly thick. A plane vertical sheet of thick timber will burn
vigorously only if it receives supporting radiation or convection on' its
front side, or alternatively, supporting conducted heat from the reverse
side.

REFERENCES
r "The St. Lawrence Burns," G. W. Shorter, J. H. McGuire, N. B. Hutcheon, and
R. F. Legget, NFPA Quarterly, Vol. 53, No.4 (April 1960), pp. 300-316.
, "Radiation from Building Fires," R. C. Bevan and C. T. Webster, Investigations
on Building Fires - Part III, National Building Studies Technical Paper No. 5, 1950.
3 "Heat Transfer by Radiation," J. H. McGuire, Fire Research Special Report
No. 2, 1953.
a "Heat Radiation from Fires and Building Separation," M. Law, Joint Fire Re-
search Organization Technical Paper No. 5, 1963.