Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
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3860,05 05 B
3860,05 05 B
ET DES FUMEES
DANS LES TUNNELS ROUTIERS
05.05.B
Comit AIPCR des Tunnels routiers (C5)
PIARC Committee on Road Tunnels (C5)
AIPCR 1
05.05.B - 1999
SOMMAIRE
INTRODUCTION
10
14
I.1 Introduction
I.2 Travaux antrieurs de l'AIPCR
I.3 Directives existantes
I.4 Contexte et principes physiques
I.4.1 Les diffrents types de risques
I.4.2 Rayonnement
I.4.3 Temprature, chaleur convecte
I.4.4 Visibilit
I.4.5 Toxicit
I.4.6 Dure de fuite
I.5 Recommandations
I.6 Besoins en recherches
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30
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II.1 Introduction
II.2 Travaux antrieurs de l'AIPCR
II.3 Frquence des incendies
II.4 Choix des incendies de dimensionnement
II.4.1 Tempratures maximales aux parois du tunnel
II.4.2 Temprature en fonction du temps
II.4.3 Puissance thermique
II.4.4 Production de fume et visibilit
II.4.5 Monoxyde de carbone dans la fume
II.5 Scnarios d'incendie de dimensionnement
II.6 Recommandations pour les travaux futurs
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III.1 Introduction
III.2 Travaux antrieurs de l'AIPCR
III.3 Dveloppement et dispersion de la fume, apprciation gnrale
III.4 Dveloppement et dispersion de la fume lors d'essais d'incendie
III.4.1 Essais utilisant l'essence comme combustible (Ofenegg et Zwenberg)
III.4.2 Essais utilisant le gasole comme combustible (Memorial Tunnel)
III.4.3 Essais avec des voitures et camions rels (projet EUREKA n 499 - FIRETUN)
III.5 Influence de la dclivit du tunnel
III.6 Conclusion
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ISBN 2-84060-064-1
AIPCR 2
05.05.B - 1999
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
11
15
I.1 Introduction
I.2 Previous work by PIARC
I.3 Existing guidelines
I.4 Physical background and principles
I.4.1 Different kinds of threat
I.4.2 Radiation
I.4.3 Temperature, convected heat
I.4.4 Visibility
I.4.5 Toxicity
I.4.6 Escape time
I.5 Recommendations
I.6 Needs for research
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15
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21
23
27
31
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37
II.1 Introduction
II.2 Previous work by PIARC
II.3 Frequency of fires
II.4 Choice of design fires
II.4.1 Maximum temperatures at the tunnel wall
II.4.2 Temperature versus time
II.4.3 Heat release rate
II.4.4 Smoke production and visibility
II.4.5 Carbon monoxide in smoke gases
II.5 Design fire scenarios
II.6 Recommendations for further work
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67
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75
III.1 Introduction
III.2 Previous work by PIARC
III.3 Smoke development and dispersal of smoke, general statement
III.4 Smoke development and dispersal of smoke in fire tests
III.4.1 Fire tests using petrol as a fire source (Ofenegg and Zwenberg fire tests)
III.4.2 Fire tests using diesel oil as a fire source (Memorial Tunnel fire tests)
III.4.3 Fire tests with real cars and trucks (EUREKA project n 499 - FIRETUN)
III.5 Influence of the tunnel slope
III.6 Conclusion
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77
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83
85
87
87
PIARC 3
05.05.B - 1999
88
IV.1 Introduction
IV.2 Travaux antrieurs de l'AIPCR
IV.3 Essais en vraie grandeur
IV.3.1 Grands programmes de recherche
IV.3.2 Essais dans des tunnels avant mise en service ou en exploitation
IV.4 Exprimentations chelle rduite
IV.4.1 Objectifs
IV.4.2 Thorie de la similitude
IV.4.3 Techniques et exemples
IV.4.4 Limitations
IV.4.5 Conclusions et recommandations
IV.5 Simulations numriques
IV.5.1 Gnralits
IV.5.2 Directives et exprience existantes
IV.5.3 Principes
IV.5.4 Recommandations
IV.5.6 Conclusions
IV.6 Besoins en futurs travaux de recherche
IV.7 Conclusion
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128
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154
154
AIPCR 4
05.05.B - 1999
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172
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184
IV - STUDY METHODS
89
IV.1 Introduction
IV.2 Previous work by PIARC
IV.3 Full scale tests
IV.3.1 Large research programmes
IV.3.2 Tests in tunnels before or under operation
IV.4 Small scale experiments
IV.4.1 Objectives
IV.4.2 The similarity theory
IV.4.3 Techniques and examples
IV.4.4 Limitations
IV.4.5 Conclusions and recommendations
IV.5 Computer simulations
IV.5.1 General
IV.5.2 Existing guidelines and experience
IV.5.3 Background
IV.5.4 Recommendations
IV.5.6 Conclusions
IV.6 Needs for further research work
IV.7 Conclusion
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99
105
105
105
107
109
111
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115
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121
129
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133
137
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149
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153
153
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169
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181
183
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185
PIARC 5
05.05.B - 1999
192
VI.1 Introduction
VI.2 Sorties de secours et itinraires d'vacuation
VI.2.1 Travaux antrieurs de l'AIPCR
VI.2.2 Exprience existante
VI.2.3 Recommandations
VI.3 Autres quipements de scurit
VI.3.1 Dtection incendie
VI.3.2 Extincteurs
VI.3.3 Alimentation en eau
VI.3.4 Systmes d'extinction automatique (sprinklers)
VI.3.5 Tlphones de secours et boutons-poussoirs d'alarme
VI.3.6 Rseaux de surveillance par tlvision
VI.3.7 Haut-parleurs
VI.3.8 Radiocommunications
VI.4 Besoins en recherche
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194
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196
198
204
204
214
218
222
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234
238
242
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248
VII.1 Introduction
VII.2 Travaux antrieurs de l'AIPCR
VII.3 Raction au feu des matriaux
VII.3.1 Gnralits
VII.3.2 Gaz de combustion dangereux pour l'tre humain
VII.3.3 Corrosion chimique de la structure
VII.3.4 Incendie et effets sur / de la chausse
VII.3.5 Utilisation de la peinture
VII.4 Rsistance au feu des structures
VII.4.1 Gnralits
VII.4.2 Diverses structures de tunnel
VII.4.3 caillage
VII.4.4 Rsistance au feu de la structure principale selon le type de tunnel
VII.4.5 Gaines de ventilation
VII.4.6 Itinraires d'vacuation
VII.4.7 Structures suspendues et autres systmes attachs au plafond ou aux parois
VII.5 Rsistance au feu des quipements
VII.5.1 Gnralits
VII.5.2 Portes rsistant au feu
VII.5.3 Niches de scurit
VII.5.4 Utilisation des quipements d'extinction des incendies
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248
252
252
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254
256
256
258
258
260
262
262
264
266
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272
VIII.1 Introduction
VIII.2 Travaux antrieurs de l'AIPCR
VIII.3 Exprience existante
VIII.4 Recommandations
VIII.4.1 Planification de l'intervention
VIII.4.2 Essais d'incendie
VIII.5 Besoins en travaux de recherche
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272
274
278
278
280
282
IX - REFERENCES
284
AIPCR 6
05.05.B - 1999
193
VI.1 Introduction
VI.2 Exits and evacuation routes
VI.2.1 Previous work by PIARC
VI.2.2 Existing Experience
VI.2.3 Recommendations
VI.3 Other safety facilities
VI.3.1 Fire detection
VI.3.2 Fire extinguishers
VI.3.3 Water supply
VI.3.4 Sprinklers
VI.3.5 Emergency telephones and push button alarms
VI.3.6 Closed circuit television (CCTV)
VI.3.7 Loudspeakers
VI.3.8 Radio communications
VI.4 Need for research work
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215
219
223
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235
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249
VII.1 Introduction
VII.2 Previous work by PIARC
VII.3 Fire reaction of materials
VII.3.1 General
VII.3.2 Combustion gases dangerous for people
VII.3.3 Chemical corrosion of the structure
VII.3.4 Fire and the effects on/of the road surface
VII.3.5 Use of paint
VII.4 Fire resistance of structures
VII.4.1 General
VII.4.2 Various tunnel structures
VII.4.3 Spalling
VII.4.4 Fire resistance of the main structure according to the type of tunnel
VII.4.5 Ventilation ducts
VII.4.6 Escape routes
VII.4.7 Suspending structures and other systems attached to the ceiling or walls
VII.5 Fire resistance of equipment
VII.5.1 General
VII.5.2 Fireproof doors
VII.5.3 Emergency recesses
VII.5.4 Use of the fire extinguishing equipment
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VIII.1 Introduction
VIII.2 Previous work by PIARC
VIII.3 Existing Experience
VIII.4 Recommendations
VIII.4.1 Fire response planning
VIII.4.2 Fire tests
VIII.5 Needs for research work
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283
IX - REFERENCES
284
PIARC 7
05.05.B - 1999
Ce rapport a t prpar sous les auspices et avec l'accord du Comit AIPCR des
Tunnels routiers, par son groupe de travail n 6 "Incendie et dsenfumage". Ce groupe
de travail comprend les membres suivants :
Animateur
Secrtaire
Membres
(rapporteur du chapitre I)
(rapporteur du chapitre VI)
(rapporteur du chapitre V)
(rapporteur des chapitres VI et VII)
(rapporteur du chapitre IV)
(rapporteur du chapitre IV)
(rapporteur du chapitre II)
(rapporteur du chapitre V)
(rapporteur du chapitre III)
(rapporteur du chapitre III)
(rapporteur du chapitre VIII)
(rapporteur des chapitres VI et VII)
AIPCR 8
05.05.B - 1999
This report has been prepared under the auspices and with the approval of the PIARC
Committee on Road Tunnels by its working group No. 6 devoted to "Fire and Smoke Control".
This working group included the following members:
Leader
Secretary
Members
During the finalisation phase of this report, the secretary was Norman Rhodes (United
Kingdom), and the working group was complemented with the following new members:
Alberto ABELLA (Spain)
Rudolf BOPP (replacing Alex HAERTER - Switzerland)
Samuel ESTEFANIA (Spain)
Bernt FREIHOLTZ (Sweden)
Giulio GECCHELE (Italy)
Marko JRVINEN (Finland)
Toshinori MIZUTANI (replacing Hideto MASHIMO - Japan)
Hans-Rudolf SCHEIDEGGER (Switzerland)
Each section has been drafted by the aforementioned rapporteur(s) using information from its
country, literature and the other members of the group. The drafts have been reviewed at
successive group meetings, then put together and harmonised by Herv Biollay, Patrick Chass
and Didier Lacroix (France).
PIARC 9
05.05.B - 1999
INTRODUCTION
De plus en plus, des tunnels routiers sont construits pour traverser des zones montagneuses
ou pour viter des difficults d'environnement, principalement en zone urbaine. En mme
temps, la circulation augmente dans les tunnels existants. En consquence, la scurit dans
les tunnels routiers devient une question importante.
Parmi les risques possibles, les incendies de vhicules suscitent une inquitude particulire
car ce ne sont pas des vnements si rares et leurs consquences peuvent tre bien plus
graves en souterrain qu' l'air libre si les mesures appropries ne sont pas prises. galement,
la baisse importante et constante des missions polluantes des vhicules est telle
qu'aujourd'hui, les quipements de ventilation sont, dans de nombreux cas, dtermins par les
considrations de dsenfumage en cas d'incendie.
Depuis sa cration en 1957, le Comit AIPCR des Tunnels routiers a tudi les quipements
de scurit relatifs aux incendies, puis quelques annes plus tard, la ventilation pour le
dsenfumage. Des donnes ou des recommandations dans ces domaines figurent dans de
nombreux rapports que le Comit a publis pour les Congrs mondiaux de la Route : Rio de
Janeiro (1959), Tokyo (1967), Vienne (1979), Sydney (1983), Bruxelles (1987), Marrakech
(1991).
Jusqu'au Congrs de Marrakech, ces sujets taient traits parmi d'autres par des groupes de
travail diffrents, plus spcialement les groupes "Exploitation, entretien, gestion" et "Pollution,
environnement, ventilation". En 1992, le Comit des Tunnels routiers a dcid que l'importance
du sujet justifiait la cration d'un groupe spcifique sur "Incendie et dsenfumage".
Ce groupe de travail s'est runi deux fois lan depuis ses deux premires runions tenues
l'occasion de deux programmes importants de recherche : les essais FIRETUN d'EUREKA en
octobre 1992 en Norvge et le programme d'essai de ventilation d'incendie du Memorial
Tunnel en juin 1993 aux tats-Unis. Trs rapidement, le groupe a ressenti le besoin d'tablir
une vue densemble des connaissances actuelles sur tous les sujets touchant aux incendies en
tunnel routier ; en effet, de nombreuses recherches et rflexions, y compris caractre
rglementaire, taient menes de par le monde, mais aucune synthse nexistait. Les premiers
rsultats ont t publis dans le rapport du Comit des Tunnels routiers pour le XXe Congrs
mondial de la Route Montral (1995).
Le prsent rapport fournit un tat de l'art complet prpar par le groupe de travail. Il est destin
tous ceux qui sont concerns par la conception, la construction, l'exploitation ou la scurit
des tunnels routiers : matres d'ouvrage, entrepreneurs, exploitants, chercheurs, autorits
dictant les rglementations, pompiers, etc. Il devrait leur apporter une vue d'ensemble et des
recommandations, ainsi que des indications sur la faon de fournir une protection efficace et
rentable contre le feu et la fume dans les tunnels routiers. Il donne galement de nombreuses
rfrences bibliographiques qui peuvent s'avrer utiles pour de plus amples informations.
AIPCR 10
05.05.B - 1999
INTRODUCTION
More and more road tunnels are built to give way to new routes through mountainous areas or
to avoid environmental difficulties, mainly in urban zones. At the same time traffic is growing
through existing tunnels. As a consequence safety in road tunnels is becoming a major issue.
Among the possible risks, vehicle fires give rise to particular concern because they are not very
rare events and their consequences might be far larger underground than in the open if no
appropriate measures were taken. Also the important and continuous decrease in vehicle
pollutant emissions is such that nowadays ventilation equipment is in many cases determined
by smoke control considerations in case of fire.
Since its creation in 1957, the PIARC Committee on Road Tunnels has been engaged in safety
equipment related to fires and a few years later in ventilation for smoke control. Data or
recommendations in these fields appear in most reports it produced for the successive World
Road Congresses, namely: Rio de Janeiro (1959), Tokyo (1967), Vienna (1979), Sydney
(1983), Brussels (1987), Marrakech (1991).
Until this last Congress these topics had been examined among other matters by various
working groups, especially those devoted to Operation - Maintenance - Management and to
Pollution - Environment - Ventilation. In 1992 the Committee on Road Tunnels decided that the
prominence of this subject justified the creation of a specific group devoted to Fire and Smoke
Control.
This working group has met twice a year since the first two meetings it held on the scene of two
major research programmes: the EUREKA 'FIRETUN' tests in October 1992 in Norway and the
Memorial Tunnel Fire Ventilation Test Programme in June 1993 in the USA. From the very
beginning, the group has deemed it necessary to draw up a state-of-the-art of the main subjects
connected to fires in road tunnels, because many research works, reflections and even
regulatory documents had been published world-wide, but a synthesis was lacking. Early results
were published in the report prepared by the Committee on Road Tunnels for the XXth World
Road Congress in Montreal (1995).
The present report provides the complete state-of-the-art prepared by the working group. It is
intended for all those who are interested in road tunnels design, construction, operation or
safety: owners, consultants, contractors, operators, researchers, regulators, fire brigades, etc. It
should give them an overview, recommendations, as well as the background on the way to
provide a reasonably efficient and cost-effective protection against fire and smoke in road
tunnels. It also gives numerous literature references that should be useful to get further details.
PIARC 11
05.05.B - 1999
AIPCR 12
05.05.B - 1999
However, complementary experience and research are still needed because the field is quite
vast and the issues very complex: fires in tunnels involve numerous, various and interacting
physical phenomena, which are particularly difficult to investigate. We do not yet have a
complete understanding of the behaviour of a fire in a tunnel, even though our knowledge is
quickly improving through numerous research works. As a consequence further work will be
needed to achieve complete, well-founded and universally accepted guidelines. The PIARC
Committee on Road Tunnels will continue its efforts towards this aim. In order to advance all
aspects of tunnel structures resistance to fire, it has established a co-operation with the
International Tunnelling Association (ITA): PIARC Working Group on "Fire and Smoke Control"
will deal with the design fires and resistance objectives more specifically, while ITA Working
Group on Maintenance and Repair of Underground Structures will rather examine the
construction methods and materials to meet these objectives.
A very important risk factor when dealing with fire safety in a tunnel is whether vehicles
transporting dangerous goods are allowed or not. The criteria to decide when such transport
should be allowed are not examined in this report. The PIARC Committee on Road Tunnels has
established a specialised working group to deal with this issue. It has also launched a joint
research project on Transport of Dangerous Goods through Road Tunnels with the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The results of these works will be
published separately.
This report is composed of eight sections, which have been drafted by different rapporteurs but
are of course interdependent. Each section first mentions past work by PIARC. According to the
case it may then describe physical phenomena or present new research results. Whenever
possible, recommendations are drawn; in other cases reference is made to current practice in a
few countries and subjects are suggested for future research. Literature references are given in
section IX.
The PIARC Committee on Road Tunnels, and its working group on Fire and Smoke Control, will
welcome all comments and especially proposals to go still farther.
PIARC 13
05.05.B - 1999
Introduction
Ce premier chapitre est consacr aux objectifs de matrise des incendies et des fumes dans
les tunnels routiers.
Dans lidal, ces objectifs devraient tre exprims comme des exigences fonctionnelles et non
comme des rgles dtailles. Nous esprons que cela sera possible lavenir. Aujourdhui
cependant, la scurit dans les tunnels est le plus souvent fonde sur des rgles dtailles.
Cela est en grande part d un manque de connaissances, et doutils et de mthodes dtudes
unanimement reconnus.
Ce chapitre tente de formuler des objectifs aussi bien qualitatifs que quantitatifs de matrise des
incendies et des fumes. Ces objectifs peuvent tre utiliss pour interprter les rsultats des
diverses mthodes dtudes dcrites au chapitre IV. Ils forment la base des recommandations
faites dans les autres chapitres du rapport (chapitres IV VIII).
Aprs quelques mots sur les travaux antrieurs de lAIPCR et les directives existantes, la plus
importante partie de ce chapitre ( I.4) dcrit le contexte et les principes physiques. Enfin des
recommandations sont donnes ( I.5).
I.2
I.3
Directives existantes
I.4
Afin de comprendre et dinterprter les objectifs des rglements en matire dincendie, il est
ncessaire de possder des connaissances de base sur la physique des incendies, les limites
supportables pour les usagers en fuite et les pompiers, aussi bien que les critres de dgts
pour la construction et lquipement des tunnels. Afin de juger si les personnes peuvent
schapper en toute scurit, des donnes sont galement ncessaires sur leur vitesse de
marche et sur le dlai entre le dbut de lincendie et celui de lvacuation qui est la somme des
dlais de dtection, dalerte, de raction et dvacuation du vhicule.
AIPCR 14
05.05.B - 1999
Introduction
This first section is devoted to the objectives of fire and smoke control in road tunnels.
Ideally the objectives should be expressed as function-based requirements and not as detailed
regulations. It is hoped that it will be possible to do so in the future. Presently, however, safety
in tunnels is most generally based on detailed rules. This is mostly due to a lack of knowledge
and well-recognised study methods and tools.
This section attempts to formulate qualitative as well as quantitative objectives for fire and
smoke control. These objectives can be used to interpret the results of the various study
methods described in section IV. They are the background for the recommendations made in
the further sections of this report (sections IV to VIII).
After a few words on previous work by PIARC and existing guidelines, the largest part of this
section ( I.4) describes the physical background and principles. Finally ( I.5)
recommendations are given.
I.2
First recommendations in this area have been presented in the report of the Committee on Road
th
Tunnels for the XX World Road Congress [17].
I.3
Existing guidelines
Up to now there are no existing guidelines expressed only as functional requirements for road
tunnels.
I.4
In order to understand and interpret the objectives of fire regulations it is necessary to have
basic knowledge in physics of fire, tenable limits for escaping people and firemen as well as
damage criteria for tunnel construction and equipment. To judge if people can escape safely,
data are also necessary on the walking speed and the time between fire start and beginning of
evacuation, which consists of time for detecting, alerting, reacting and leaving vehicle.
PIARC 15
05.05.B - 1999
I.4.2 Rayonnement
Le rayonnement est cr par la temprature et peut tre exprim comme suit pour une couche
infinie de fume dans laquelle la temprature est constante :
E f = 5,67 10 8 r T 4
W / m2
q. [1.4.2.1]
AIPCR 16
05.05.B - 1999
I.4.2 Radiation
Radiation is created by temperature and may be expressed as follows for an infinite layer of
smoke in which the temperature is constant:
E f = 5.67 10 8 r T 4
W / m2
eq. [1.4.2.1]
where r is the resulting emissivity and T the temperature of the smoke (in kelvins).
The level of radiation depends on the temperature and the emissivity of the smoke. When the
temperature within the smoke layer is not constant an integration is necessary to calculate the
radiation level.
The radiation is produced by the fire itself and by the hot smoke layer (figure 1.4.2.1).
The continuous line in
figure 1.4.2.2 shows the
calculated
radiation
affecting
escaping
people from an infinite
smoke layer with a
constant temperature in
the whole layer. The
dashed
line
corresponds to a tunnel
8 m wide and 6 m high
in which the smoke
layer
PIARC 17
05.05.B - 1999
has descended to 3 m
above road level. A
value of 0.8 is assumed
for r in both cases.
Near the fire site a
contribution from the
flames
should
be
added.
La figure 1.4.2.3, daprs Hymes [7], montre la dure de rsistance avant blessure par brlure
pour diffrents flux de chaleur, jusqu une dure dexposition de 100 s. Par exemple, pour une
dure dexposition de 100 s, 11 kW/m provoquent 50 % de dcs.
Purser [13] montre, dans la figure 1.4.2.4, quil existe une limite dintensit relativement
vidente de 2,5 kW/m2 pour la rsistance une chaleur rayonne constante. Dans cette figure,
les lettres "a" "e" correspondent diffrentes valeurs observes dans la bibliographie et les
recherches.
A la figure 1.4.2.5, Danielsson [3] montre le moment o la douleur apparat diffrents niveaux
de rayonnement constant. P est un facteur scurit pour diffrents vtements : P = 1
correspond la peau nue et P = 26 correspond des vtements de pompier.
AIPCR 18
05.05.B - 1999
In figure 1.4.2.3, Hymes [7] shows tolerance times to burn injury levels for various incident heat
fluxes up to an exposure time of 100 s. For example at a 100 seconds exposure time, 11 kW/m
creates 50% lethality.
Purser [13] shows in figure 1.4.2.4 that there is a fairly obvious intensity limit for
tolerance of constant radiant heat at 2.5 kW/m2. In this figure letters "a" to "e"
correspond to different observed values in literature and investigations.
In figure 1.4.2.5 Danielsson [3] shows time until pain occurs at different constant radiation
levels. P is a safety factor for different clothes: P = 1 corresponds to naked skin and P = 26
corresponds to a fire-fighter clothes.
PIARC 19
05.05.B - 1999
q [1.4.3.1]
Si la temprature nest pas constante, comme dans une situation normale, le concept de dose
est introduit. Puisque la dure de rsistance prend la forme dune courbe exponentielle, il est
possible de considrer la victime comme ayant absorb une dose de chaleur convecte. Par
consquent, il est possible dutiliser le concept dune dose fractionnaire de chaleur absorbe
chaque minute du point de vue de la mise en incapacit :
1
Flh = e
5.1849 0.0273 T
q. [1.4.3.2]
o T est la temprature en C durant cette minute. Lorsque la dose cumule est suprieure 1,
la survie est menace.
AIPCR 20
05.05.B - 1999
eq [1.4.3.1]
If the temperature is not constant, as in a normal situation, the "dose" concept is introduced.
Since the tolerance time takes the form of an exponential curve, it is feasible to consider the
victim as taking up a "dose" of convected heat. Thereafter it is possible to use the concept of a
fractional incapacitating dose of heat acquired during each minute as follows:
Flh = e
5.1849 0.0273 T
eq. [1.4.3.2]
where T is the temperature in C during that minute. When the cumulative fractional dose
exceeds unity, life threatening conditions have occurred.
PIARC 21
05.05.B - 1999
Un exemple est dcrit au tableau 1.4.3.1. La dose cumule est suprieure 1 entre 2,5 et 3 mn.
La mise en incapacit due la douleur de lpiderme et aux brlures est ainsi prdite juste
avant 3 mn, avec probablement de graves brlures irrversibles de lpiderme et, trs
probablement, de lappareil respiratoire suprieur, particulirement durant la quatrime minute.
Tableau 1.4.3.1 - Exemples de tempratures et de prvision de "dose de chaleur"
conduisant une mise en incapacit pendant un incendie donn
Dure (mn)
0,5
1,0
1,5
2,0
2,5
3,0
3,5
4,0
Temprature C
38
38
44
83
173
295
461
479
Flh
0,007
0,028
0,428
12,739
Flh
0,007
0,035
0,463
13,202
Ondrus [11] donne les valeurs suivantes de dure de rsistance temprature constante :
140 C
115 C
70 C
50 C
5 mn
20 mn
60 mn
3-5 h
Il est vident que des auteurs diffrents donnent des limites diffrentes de rsistance.
I.4.4 Visibilit
Les proprits de la fume sont gnralement exprimes en termes de facteur de transmission
ainsi quen densit optique ou coefficient dattnuation (galement appel coefficient
dextinction).
Le facteur de transmission T de la fume est dfini comme suit :
T = Ix / Io
q [1.4.4.1]
o Io est lintensit de la lumire au dbut du trajet and Ix lintensit de la lumire qui subsiste
aprs son cheminement.
La densit optique par unit de distance est relie au facteur de transmission par lquation
suivante :
= - (log10T) / x
o x est la distance parcourue par la lumire (longueur du trajet).
AIPCR 22
05.05.B - 1999
q [1.4.4.2]
An example is shown in table 1.4.3.1. The cumulative fractional dose exceeds unity between 2.5
and 3 minutes. Incapacitation due to skin pain and burns is therefore predicted just before 3
minutes, with severe and probably fatal burns of the skin and upper respiratory tract being a
strong possibility, particularly during the fourth minute.
Table 1.4.3.1 - Example of temperature and predicted fractional incapacitating heat dose
during a specific fire
Time (mn)
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
Temperature C
38
38
44
83
173
295
461
479
Flh
0,007
0,028
0,428
12,739
Flh
0,007
0,035
0,463
13,202
Ondrus [11] gives the following values for tolerance time to a constant temperature:
140 C
115 C
70 C
50 C
5 minutes
20 minutes
60 minutes
3-5 h
I.4.4 Visibility
The properties of smoke are commonly expressed in term of transmittance as well as either
optical density or attenuation coefficient (also called extinction coefficient).
T = Ix / Io
eq [1.4.4.1]
where Io is the intensity of light at the beginning of the path and Ix the intensity of light remaining
after it has passed through the path length.
The optical density per unit distance is related to the transmittance by the following equation:
= - (log10T) / x
where x is the distance travelled by light (the path length).
PIARC 23
05.05.B - 1999
eq [1.4.4.2]
Le coefficient dattnuation (ou dextinction) par unit de distance K est dfini de la mme
manire que la densit optique, mais utilise des logarithmes npriens :
K = - (logeT) / x
q [1.4.4.3]
K = 2.303
q [1.4.4.4]
Parfois, le pourcentage de perte de transmission est utilis. Il est dfini comme :
= 100 (1-T)
Lquation [1.4.4.2] peut alors tre remplace par :
=
q [1.4.4.5]
log10 (1 / 100)
x
q [1.4.4.6]
Le tableau 1.4.4.1 compare ces diffrentes mthodes dexpression de la perte de visibilit par la
fume.
Tableau 1.4.4.1 - Comparaison des diffrentes mthodes dexpression de la perte de visibilit par la fume
Facteur
de transmission
% de perte de
transmission
Longueur du trajet
x (m)
Densit optique
(m-1)
Coefficient
-1
dattnuation K (m )
1,00
quelconque
10
0,0458
0,1054
10
0,0046
0,0105
0,222
0,511
10
0,022
0,051
0,523
1,204
10
0,052
0,120
1,00
2,30
10
0,10
0,23
2,00
4,61
10
0,20
0,46
0,90
0,60
0,30
0,10
0,01
40
70
90
99
La distance de visibilit D (m) peut tre calcule en utilisant le coefficient dextinction (ou
dattnuation) K (m-1) du mlange air-fume :
D=A/K
q [1.4.4.7]
dans lequel A est une constante comprise entre 2 et 6 selon les panneaux qui doivent tre lus
(rflchissants ou lumineux).
AIPCR 24
05.05.B - 1999
The attenuation (or extinction) coefficient per unit distance K is defined in the same way as the
optical density, but using neperian logarithms:
K = - (logeT) / x
eq [1.4.4.3]
K = 2.303
Sometimes the percentage obscuration is used. It is defined as:
eq [1.4.4.4]
= 100 (1-T)
Equation [1.4.4.2] can then be replaced by
=
eq [1.4.4.5]
log 10 (1 / 100)
x
eq [1.4.4.6]
Table 1.4.4.1 shows a comparison of these different methods of expressing smoke obscuration.
Table 1.4.4.1 - Comparison of different methods of expressing smoke obscuration
Transmittance
Percentage
obscuration
Path length x
(m)
Optical density
(m-1)
Attenuation
-1
coefficient K (m )
1.00
any
10
0.0458
0.1054
10
0.0046
0.0105
0.222
0.511
10
0.022
0.051
0.523
1.204
10
0.052
0.120
1.00
2.30
10
0.10
0.23
2.00
4.61
10
0.20
0.46
0.90
0.60
0.30
0.10
0.01
40
70
90
99
The visibility distance D (m) can be estimated using the extinction (or attenuation) coefficient K
(m-1) of the air-smoke mix:
D=A/K
eq [1.4.4.7]
where A is a constant between 2 and 6 depending on the signs to be seen (reflecting or
illuminated).
PIARC 25
05.05.B - 1999
Fujimara [6] indique que K = 0,4 est une valeur critique du coefficient dextinction de la fume
dans les tunnels routiers. La figure 1.4.4.1 montre la relation entre la visibilit des panneaux
lumineux et le coefficient dextinction pour de la fume blanche irritante et non irritante.
I.4.5 Toxicit
La toxicit de la fume dincendie est principalement dtermine par un petit nombre de gaz qui
peuvent agir de manire additionnelle, synergique ou antagoniste.
Par exemple, laddition des effets de CO et de HCN peut tre reprsente par :
A=
[CO]
[HCN]
+
LC 50 CO 30
LC 50 HCN 30
q [1.4.5.1]
LC50CO30 = 4 600 ppm (niveau de concentration auquel 50 % des personnes dcderont aprs
30 mn par le seul effet du CO),
LC50HCN30 = 160 ppm (niveau de concentration auquel 50 % des personnes dcderont aprs
30 mn par le seul effet du HCN).
Si A = 1, prs de 50 % des victimes dcderont.
Si A est un peu plus grand que 1, il est probable que toutes les victimes dcdent.
Il a t dmontr que cette relation tait valable pour des concentration de CO et HCN gales
25, 50 et 75 % de leur valeur respective LC50 30 mn.
Lquation 1.4.5.1 a t appele "lapproche par somme de fractions". Une approche plus
simple considre uniquement la concentration maximale admissible pour un feu donn. Klote et
Milke [9] ont prsent des niveaux globaux de mortalit pour des dures dexposition de 5 mn et
30 mn (voir tableau 1.4.5.1). Il est clair que des auteurs diffrents proposent des valeurs
diffrentes.
AIPCR 26
05.05.B - 1999
Fujimara [6] indicates that K = 0.4 is a critical value for the extinction coefficient of smoke in
road tunnels. Figure 1.4.4.1 shows the relation between visibility of light emitting signs and the
extinction coefficient for irritating and non irritating white smoke.
I.4.5 Toxicity
The toxicity of fire smoke is determined mainly by a small number of gases, which may act
additively, synergically or antagonis-tically.
Figure 1.4.4.1 - Relation between
visibility of light-emitting signs
and smoke extinction coefficient
for irritating and
non irritating smoke
For example the addition of the influence of CO and HCN may be represented by:
A=
where
[CO]
[HCN]
+
LC 50 CO 30
LC 50 HCN 30
eq [1.4.5.1]
PIARC 27
05.05.B - 1999
Gaz
LC50 prsum
(pour les humains)
5 mn
30 mn
(ppm)
(ppm)
CO2
dioxyde de
carbone
C2H4O
actaldhyde
> 20 000
C2H4O2
acide actique
11 000
NH3
ammoniac
20 000
9 000
HCl
gaz chlorhydrique
16 000
3 700
CO
monoxyde
de carbone
3 000
HBr
bromure
dhydrogne
NO
monoxyde dazote
COS
H2S
Rfrence
Sax (1984)
ACGIH (1980)
Levin et al. (1987b)
Sakurai (1988)
Nishimaru (1985)
Hartzell et al. (1985)
Higgins et al. (1972)
Levin et al. (1987b)
Kimmerle (1974)
LC(m,240)=1500
LC(R,240)=4000; LC(ham,250)=17,000
LC(r,30)=20,000; LC(r,420)=16,000
LC(m,60)=5620
EC(m,5)=20,000; EC(m,30)=4400
EC(r,5)=10,000; EC(r,30)=4000
r, p
LC(r,5)=40,989
LC(r,30)=4600
LC(h,30)=3000
3 000
Sax (1984)
LC(m,60)=814; LC(r,60)=2858
2 500
ACGIH (1980)
carbonyle sulfide
2 000
Sax (1984)
Sax (1984)
hydrogne sulfur
2 000
10 000
Kimmerle (1974)
Sax (1984)
HF
fluorure
dhydrogne
C3H4N
COF2
acrylonitrile
carbonyle fluoride
NO2
dioxyde dazote
C3H5O
acroline
CH2O
formaldhyde
SO2
dioxyde de soufre
500
HCN
acide
cyanhydrique
280
C9H6O2N2
tolune
disocyanate
10 000
2 000
2 000
750
5 000
500
750
300
250
135
100
COCl2
phosgne
50
90
C4F8
perfluoroisobutylne
28
Kimmerle (1974)
Sax (1984)
Clayton & Clayton (1982)
Sax (1984)
Notes : EC =concentration pour effet, LC0 = concentration laquelle les premiers effets mortels sont observs,
LC = LC50
AIPCR 28
05.05.B - 1999
Gas
Assumed LC50
(for humans)
5 min
30 min
(ppm)
(ppm)
>150,000
>150,000
Reference
CO2
carbon dioxide
C2H4O
acetaldehyde
C2H4O2
acetic acid
NH3
ammonia
20,000
9,000
HCl
hydrogen chloride
16,000
3,700
CO
carbon monoxide
3,000
HBr
hydrogen bromide
3,000
ACGIH (1980)
Levin et al. (1987b)
Sakurai (1988)
Nishimaru (1985)
Hartzell et al. (1985)
Higgins et al. (1972)
Levin et al. (1987b)
Kimmerle (1974)
Sax (1984)
NO
nitric oxide
2,500
ACGIH (1980)
COS
carbonyl sulfide
2,000
Sax (1984)
Sax (1984)
H2S
hydrogen sulfide
2,000
> 20,000
11,000
10,000
Kimmerle (1974)
Sax (1984)
HF
hydrogen fluoride
10,000
C3H4N
COF2
acrylonitrile
carbonyl fluoride
NO2
nitrogen dioxide
C3H5O
acrolein
CH2O
formaldehyde
SO2
sulfur dioxide
500
HCN
hydrogen cyanide
280
C9H6O2N2
toluene
disocyanate
2,000
2,000
750
5,000
500
750
300
250
135
100
COCl2
phosgene
50
90
C4F8
perfluoroisobutylene
28
Kimmerle (1974)
Sax (1984)
Clayton & Clayton (1982)
Sax (1984)
Notes: EC is concentration for effect, LC0 concentration at which first lethal effects are observed,
and LC stands for LC50
PIARC 29
05.05.B - 1999
I.5
Recommandations
Les objectifs des dispositions destines faire face aux incendies en tunnel sont par ordre
dimportance dcroissante :
sauvegarder les vies humaines en permettant lvacuation,
rendre possibles les oprations de secours et de lutte contre lincendie,
viter les explosions,
limiter les dommages sur le gnie civil et les quipements du tunnel et sur les constructions
voisines.
AIPCR 30
05.05.B - 1999
I.5
Recommendations
In order of importance, the aims of fire and smoke control in tunnels are:
PIARC 31
05.05.B - 1999
Chacun de ces buts peut tre pondr diffremment, en fonction de la politique suivie par
chaque pays, du type de tunnel (immerg, urbain, etc.) et de son mode dexploitation. Cela
concerne tout particulirement la protection du tunnel lui-mme, qui peut tre considre
comme plus ou moins ncessaire.
Il est possible de donner des estimations approximatives des conditions qui doivent tre
maintenues dans le tunnel pour les oprations dvacuation et de lutte contre lincendie. Le
temps ncessaire pour lvacuation peut tre de plusieurs minutes, en fonction de la distance
par rapport aux sorties et de la vitesse laquelle marchent les usagers. La vitesse normale
daccs une issue de secours est de 1,5 m/s, mais elle peut tre rduite 1 m/s, ou mme
moins (jusqu' 0,5 m/s), en prsence de fume.
Rayonnement maximal
Prs du foyer, le rayonnement rsulte du feu lui-mme et de la fume chaude. A plus grande
distance du foyer, ce nest que la temprature de la fume qui peut donner lieu des conditions
dangereuses.
Pour que lvacuation soit possible, le niveau de rayonnement doit tre infrieur la limite
provoquant une forte douleur sur la peau nue pour une exposition de quelques minutes : le
seuil est approximativement de 2 2,5 kW/m. Les pompiers peuvent normalement supporter
un niveau de rayonnement de 5 kW/m. Leur temps dintervention ne peut pas excder 30
minutes, avec le port dun respirateur.
Visibilit minimale
Une distance de visibilit dau moins 7 m est ncessaire pour marcher aisment dans une
atmosphre enfume. Pour pouvoir lire les panneaux de signalisation, cette distance doit tre
de 15 m. Il faut par consquent rechercher une distance minimale de visibilit de 7 15 m pour
les oprations dvacuation et de lutte contre lincendie.
Toxicit
Aucune mthode fiable nest connue pour calculer la concentration en gaz toxiques ou irritants
dgags par un incendie de vhicule. Des concentrations maximales ne sont donc pas donnes
ici. Il est probable que, dans de nombreux incendies en tunnel, lobtention dune visibilit
minimale maintiendra les concentrations en gaz dangereux en dessous du niveau admissible
pour lvacuation.
AIPCR 32
05.05.B - 1999
According to the policy of each country, the type of the tunnel (immersed, urban, etc.) and its
mode of operation, different weights may be given to the above aims. This particularly concerns
the protection of the tunnel itself, which may be considered more or less necessary.
It is possible to give rough estimates of the tunnel conditions that must be maintained for
evacuation and fire-fighting operations. Evacuation time can be several minutes, depending on
distance to exits and walking speed. Whilst normal walking speed to emergency exits is about
1.5 m/s, it may be reduced to about 1 m/s or even less (down to 0.5 m/s) due to the presence of
smoke.
Tolerable radiation
Near the fire, the radiation is created by the fire itself as well as the hot smoke. Further away it
is only the smoke temperature which creates a dangerous condition.
To make evacuation possible, the radiation level must be under the limit which causes severe
pain on bare skin for an exposure of several minutes: the threshold value is roughly 2 to 2.5
kW/m. Fire-fighters can normally withstand a radiation level of 5 kW/m. Their operation time is
not longer than 30 minutes wearing a breathing apparatus.
Minimum visibility
A visibility distance of at least 7 m is necessary to walk smoothly in a smoky atmosphere. To
read the signs this distance must be 15 m. Accordingly a minimum visibility distance of 7 to 15
m must be aimed at for evacuation and fire-fighting operations.
Toxicity
There is no reliable published method to calculate the concentration of the toxic or irritant gases
released in a vehicle fire. Therefore tolerable concentrations are not given here. It is expected
that in many tunnel fires, ensuring the minimum visibility will maintain the dangerous gases
concentrations under the tolerable limit for evacuation.
PIARC 33
05.05.B - 1999
caillage du bton
Lcaillage du bton ne doit pas empcher les usagers de schapper, ni tre lorigine de
blessures pour les pompiers. Le bton peut commencer scailler une temprature
superficielle de 150 200C. Cette limite peut tre infrieure pour les tunnels sans revtement
ou revtus d'une maonnerie en pierre naturelle. Lcaillage napparaissant gnralement
quaprs quelques minutes, il ne pose gnralement pas de problme pour les usagers en fuite.
Mais il peut reprsenter un danger pour les pompiers.
Chute dquipements
Les quipements lourds ne doivent pas tomber sur les personnes se trouvant lintrieur du
tunnel. Cela signifie quaucun gros appareil ne doit tomber pour une temprature infrieure
400-450C pendant le temps ncessaire pour combattre lincendie (dans un tunnel, ces
tempratures peuvent produire un rayonnement denviron 5 kW/m2 qui correspond la valeur
maximale admissible pour les pompiers).
I.6
Besoins en recherches
AIPCR 34
05.05.B - 1999
Spalling of concrete
Spalling concrete must not prevent people from escaping or injure firemen. Spalling of concrete
may start at a surface temperature of 150-200C. For tunnels with no lining or with natural stone
masonry, this limit can be lower. As spalling generally begins only after a few minutes, it will
generally not be a problem for escaping people. However, it may be a danger for firemen.
I.6
Many fields connected with the above issues still require further research. More knowledge is
especially needed with regards to evacuation models. Taking into account the problems raised
by disabled people should also be considered.
PIARC 35
05.05.B - 1999
Introduction
Ce chapitre traite de la frquence et de lintensit des incendies dans les tunnels routiers. De
rcents rsultats tirs dvaluations statistiques (II.3) et dexprimentations dincendies (II.4)
sont utiliss pour actualiser les travaux antrieurs de lAIPCR.
Lun des buts importants de ce chapitre est de spcifier les incendies de dimensionnement vis-vis de :
Il faut prendre en compte le transport des marchandises dangereuses dans le tunnel quand il
est autoris (par exemple, camions citernes). Comme indiqu dans l'introduction gnrale au
prsent rapport, la faon de dcider dans quelles conditions ce type de transport doit tre
autoris n'est pas examine ici. Le Comit AIPCR des Tunnels routiers a mis en place un
groupe de travail spcialis pour traiter de cette question. Il a aussi lanc un projet de
recherche conjoint sur le sujet avec l'Organisation de Coopration et de Dveloppement
conomiques (OCDE). Il sera rendu compte de ces travaux de faon spare. Le prsent
rapport considre la dcision d'autoriser ou d'interdire les marchandises dangereuses comme
une donne et propose des incendies de dimensionnement et des mesures de protection
adaptes chaque cas.
Ce chapitre traite galement des scnarios dincendie qui doivent tre utiliss pour :
Les futurs travaux sur la rsistance au feu des structures seront conduits conjointement avec
lAITES (Association internationale des Travaux en Souterrain), car lAITES traite de lingnierie
de la structure des tunnels.
De nombreux pays ont inclus dans leurs recommandations des rgles de conception visant la
scurit incendie ou travaillent actuellement sur la prparation de telles rgles. La plus grande
part de ces travaux est fonde sur le rapport du Comit AIPCR des Tunnels routiers prsent
Bruxelles en 1987 [19]. Depuis, des progrs ont t accomplis. Des essais dincendie, EUREKA
en Norvge [20] et Memorial Tunnel aux tats-Unis [22], ont t raliss, ainsi que des
incendies contrls de quelques vhicules dans de nouveaux tunnels avant leur ouverture la
circulation (en France et en Espagne [23 ; 24]).
AIPCR 36
05.05.B - 1999
Introduction
This section deals with frequencies and intensities of fires in road tunnels. Recent results of
statistical evaluations (chapter II.3) and fire experiments (chapter II.4) are used to update
existing PIARC work.
One important aim of this section is to specify design fires with regard to:
the engineering of the ventilation system (e.g. heat, toxic gas and smoke production
rates),
the training of people dealing with fires in road tunnels (e.g. fire brigades, supervising
staff at tunnel sites).
This must take into account transport of dangerous goods through the tunnel (e.g. petrol
tankers) when allowed. As stated in the general introduction of this report, the way to decide
under which conditions such transport should be allowed is not examined here. The PIARC
Committee on Road Tunnels has established a specialised working group to deal with this
issue. It has also launched a joint research project on this subject with the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). These works will be reported separately.
This report takes the decision concerning authorisation or banning of dangerous goods as a
data and proposes design fires and protective measures adapted to each case.
This section also deals with fire scenarios which should be used with regard to:
the engineering of the tunnel structure (e.g. layout of the reinforcement of concrete
elements, avoidance of structural weakness for tunnels beneath rivers),
the fire testing of structural elements (e.g. fire-resistant panels), and
the fire testing of tunnel equipment (e.g. jet fans, electrostatic precipitators, lighting,
cables).
Further work on fire resistance of structures will be carried out together with the International
Tunnelling Association (ITA), because ITA is dealing with the structural engineering of tunnels.
Several countries have included principles for a fire-safe design in their tunnelling
recommendations or are working on the preparation of such principles. Much work is based on
the report of the PIARC Committee on Road Tunnels presented at Brussels in 1987 [19]. Since
then further advances have been achieved. The EUREKA fire tests in Norway [20] and the
Memorial Tunnel tests in the United States [22] have been performed, as well as a controlled
burning of some cars in newly constructed tunnels (in France and Spain [23; 24]) before their
opening to traffic.
PIARC 37
05.05.B - 1999
Ces expriences ont permis dacqurir des connaissances supplmentaires sur les modles de
mcanique des fluides et les simulations numriques. Ces travaux sont encore en cours. Aussi
ce chapitre ne peut-il comporter que des rsultats intermdiaires sur les risques dincendie et
les incendies de dimensionnement.
Au moment de la compilation des chapitres suivants, il est apparu quil existe des rapports
dtaills sur les incendies dans les tunnels. Les descriptions des conditions que les incendies
de dimensionnement doivent remplir (par exemple, comment tester la rsistance la chaleur
des installations techniques des tunnels routiers) sont, elles, beaucoup plus rares. Les futurs
travaux de lAIPCR devraient donc se concentrer davantage sur des scnarios dincendie
appropris et, ensuite, dfinir des incendies de dimensionnement pour respecter ces scnarios
(par exemple, en vue de raliser des essais ou la ventilation).
II.2
LAIPCR a ralis un travail important sur la ventilation dans les tunnels routiers. Initialement,
ce travail tait ax sur la dilution des gaz dchappement, afin de limiter les niveaux de CO et
dopacit. Le dsenfumage a t abord pour la premire fois au Congrs de Tokyo en 1967,
suite aux essais dans le tunnel de l'Ofenegg (Suisse) [25]. Des recommandations plus prcises
furent prsentes dans les rapports de Vienne (1979) [26], de Sydney (1983) [27] et
principalement de Bruxelles (1987) [19]. Ce dernier synthtise les donnes sur la chaleur et la
fume gnres par un incendie, et sur le mouvement de la fume dans le tunnel selon le
courant dair longitudinal et lintensit de lincendie. De nombreux pays [28] utilisent toujours
ces informations comme base de conception de leurs systmes de dsenfumage.
Des tentatives ont galement t faites pour dterminer la frquence des incendies et valuer
leurs causes. Des mesures supplmentaires, comme le contrle des systmes de ventilation,
lutilisation dextincteurs et de sprinklers, ont t prsentes dans les mmes rapports et dans
les suivants [18 ; 17]. Les pratiques actuelles pour la protection des structures et des
quipements contre les incendies ont t rassembles et publies en 1991 [51]. Des
statistiques sur les pannes, les accidents et les incendies dans les tunnels ont souvent t
publies par le Comit AIPCR des Tunnels routiers, la dernire fois dans [33].
II.3
Ce sont gnralement les vhicules empruntant le tunnel qui sont impliqus dans les
incendies ; les principales causes sont :
des dfauts lectriques (le plus souvent pour les vhicules lgers),
la surchauffe des freins (selon des statistiques franaises [29], environ 60 70 % des
incendies impliquant des poids lourds),
dautres dfauts conduisant ce qu'un vhicule prenne feu sans cause extrieure.
collisions,
dfauts techniques des quipements du tunnel (qui prennent feu d'eux-mmes),
travaux dentretien dans les tunnels.
AIPCR 38
05.05.B - 1999
Further knowledge was gained by experiments with fluid mechanics models and CFD computer
simulations. This work is still in progress. So this section can only give interim results on fire risk
and design fires.
When compiling the following chapters it showed up that there are detailed reports on tunnel
fires. Descriptions of requirements that design fires should fulfil (e.g. testing the heat resistance
of technical installations in road tunnels) are far more rare. Future PIARC work therefore should
focus more on the definition of relevant fire scenarios and thereafter specify design fires to
cover these scenarios (e.g. testing purposes, ventilation purposes).
II.2
Important work has been done by PIARC on the ventilation of road tunnels. Initially this was
mainly directed towards the dilution of exhaust gases, in order to limit the CO and opacity
levels. The issues of smoke control were approached first at the Tokyo Congress in 1967,
following the fire tests in the Ofenegg tunnel (Switzerland) [25]. More accurate
recommendations were given in the Vienna (1979) [26], Sydney (1983) [27] and principally
Brussels (1987) [19] reports. This last summarises data on smoke and heat generation from a
fire, and on smoke movement along the tunnel according to the longitudinal airflow and fire
intensity. This information is still used as a basis to design smoke removal systems in many
countries [28].
Also attempts were made to derive fire frequencies and to evaluate the causes of fire events.
Further countermeasures like control of the ventilation system, use of fire extinguishers and
sprinklers were discussed in the same and further reports [18; 17]. Current practice for fire
protection of structures and equipment was reviewed and published in 1991 [51]. Statistics on
breakdowns, accidents and fires in tunnels have often been published by the PIARC Committee
on Road Tunnels, the last time in [33].
II.3
Frequency of fires
Fires in road tunnels generally concern vehicles using the tunnel and are caused mainly by:
collisions,
technical defects (self-ignition) of tunnel equipment, and
maintenance work in tunnels.
PIARC 39
05.05.B - 1999
Cependant, la plupart des incendies sont provoqus par la circulation traversant le tunnel et
non par les quipements du tunnel ou des travaux dentretien. Certains des incendies les plus
graves connus ce jour ont dmarr la suite daccidents (par exemple, collisions avantarrire).
En thorie, la frquence des incendies dans les tunnels est lie la longueur du tunnel, la
densit de circulation, le contrle de la vitesse et la pente de la route. Cela doit tre pris en
compte lors de la comparaison de diffrents tunnels. Par consquent, la frquence des
incendies est value non seulement en nombre par tunnel, mais galement en nombre par vh
x km pour incorporer les effets globaux de la longueur du tunnel et de la densit de circulation.
Bien que de nombreux incendies dans les tunnels soient connus, il nexiste que des statistiques
limites couvrant totalement un intervalle de temps (par exemple, une anne civile). Les taux
doccurrences et dincendies pour 45 tunnels sont donns, dans la limite des donnes
disponibles, aux tableaux 2.3.1 et 2.3.2.
Les taux sont calculs selon lexemple ci-dessus du Tunnel de lElbe [30] :
priode dobservation :
longueur du tunnel (avec bretelles) :
nombre de vhicules traversant le tunnel :
pourcentage de poids lourds :
nombre dvnements concernant des voitures particulires
pendant la priode dobservation
nombre dvnements concernant des poids lourds
durant la priode dobservation
2 ans
3,3 km
37 106 vh./an
15 %
13
9
A partir de ces donnes, des taux dincendie exprims en termes de cas dincendie par vh x
km ont t calculs pour le Tunnel de lElbe Hambourg (Allemagne) :
voitures particulires
VL =
13
cas
vhicules lourds
PL =
9
2 37 10 0,15 3,3
6
cas
vh. km
13 + 9
2 37 10 3,3
6
cas
vh. km
AIPCR 40
05.05.B - 1999
Most fires, however, are generated by the traffic passing through a tunnel and not by tunnel
equipment or maintenance
work. So-me of the most
serious fires known yet started
due to accidents (e.g. frontback-collisions).
Photo 2.1 - Fire following an
accident in the Velsen Tunnel
(Netherlands) in 1978
13
cases
.
2 37 10 (1 0.15) 3.3 veh. km
heavy vehicles
HGV =
9
cases
13 + 9
cases
6
2 37 10 3.3 veh.km
PIARC 41
05.05.B - 1999
Table 2.3.1 - Occurrence des incendies dans des tunnels urbains de plusieurs pays [18 ; 21 ; 29 ; 30 ; 31 ; 32 ; 33]
Cas dincendies
Voitures
particulires
Poids lourds
Tous vhicules
Longueu
r
[m]
Annes
observes
Trafic
moyen annuel
[106 vh/an]
Canada
- Ville-Marie
- L.. Hippolyte
Lafontaine
2 800
1 400
1988 - 1991
1987 - 1991
28,5
40,0
0,0
0,0
0,3
0,0
France
- Croix Rousse
- Fourviere
- Vieux Port
1 800
1 800
600
1985 - 1991
1985 - 1991
1989 - 1994
29,4
34,9
23,9
6
7
6
2,0
1,8
2,0
0
1
0
0,0
1,9
0,0
6
8
6
1,8
1,8
1,8
3 300
(avec
rampes)
1990 - 1991
37,0
13
6,3
24,6
22
9,0
1986 - 1988
Pays
Tunnel
nombre
taux
nombre
taux
nombre
[108 vh
[108 vh
x km]
x km]
taux
[108 vh
x km]
Allemagne
- Elbe
Pays-Bas
- Bnlux
- Coen
1 300
1 200
1986 - 1988
25,0
30,0
0
0
0,0
0,0
0
0
0,0
0,0
0
0
0,0
0,0
Norvge
- Oslo
1 800
1990 - 1993
18,3
2,0
- Fredhall
- Sder
- Klara
- Karlberg
200
1 100
500
500
1987 - 1991
1987 - 1991
1987 - 1991
1987 - 1991
36,8
25,6
9,6
9,6
0
0
0,0
0,0
0
0
0,0
0,0
0
0
0,0
0,7
15,5
0,0
1 700
1987 - 1992
9,7
25,0
3 200
2 800
2 500
1989 - 1991
1989 - 1991
1987 - 1991
21,0
26,4
38,3
23,0
14,0
15,0
Sude
Royaume-Uni - Tyne
tats-Unis
- Brooklyn
Battery
QueensMidtow
n
- Lincoln
AIPCR 42
05.05.B - 1999
Table 2.3.1 - Occurrence of tunnel fires in urban tunnels of several countries [18; 21; 29; 30; 31; 32; 33]
Cases of fires
Country
Tunnel
Length
[m]
Years
inquired
Passenger cars
Average
annual traffic
6
[10 veh/year]
Number
Lorries
All vehicles
Rate
Rate
8
8
[10 veh
[10 veh
Number
Number
x km]
x km]
Rate
8
[10 veh
x km]
Canada
- Ville-Marie
- L.. Hippolyte
Lafontaine
2800
1400
1988 - 1991
1987 - 1991
28.5
40.0
0.0
0.0
0.3
0.0
France
- Croix Rousse
- Fourviere
- Vieux Port
1800
1800
600
1985 - 1991
1985 - 1991
1989 - 1994
29.4
34.9
23.9
6
7
6
2.0
1.8
2.0
0
1
0
0.0
1.9
0.0
6
8
6
1.8
1.8
1.8
3300
(with
ramps)
1990 - 1991
37.0
13
6.3
24.6
22
9.0
- Benelux
- Coen
1300
1200
1986 - 1988
1986 - 1988
25.0
30.0
0
0
0.0
0.0
0
0
0.0
0.0
0
0
0.0
0.0
Norway
- Oslo
1800
1990 - 1993
18.3
2.0
Sweden
- Fredhall
- Sder
- Klara
- Karlberg
200
1100
500
500
1987 - 1991
1987 - 1991
1987 - 1991
1987 - 1991
36.8
25.6
9.6
9.6
0
0
0.0
0.0
0
0
0.0
0.0
0
0
0.0
0.7
15.5
0.0
United
Kingdom
- Tyne
1700
1987 - 1992
9.7
25.0
- Brooklyn
Battery
- Queens
Midtown
- Lincoln
3200
2800
2500
1989 - 1991
1989 - 1991
1987 - 1991
21.0
26.4
38.3
23.0
14.0
15.0
Germany
Netherlands
USA
- Elbe
PIARC 43
05.05.B - 1999
Table 2.3.2 - Occurrence des incendies dans les tunnels autoroutiers de rase campagne [18 ; 21 ; 29 ; 30 ; 31 ; 32 ; 33]
Cas dincendies
Pays
Tous vhicules
Longueur
[m]
Type de
circulation
Voitures
Poids lourds
particulires
Trafic
moyen annuel
taux
taux
[106 vh/an] nombre [108 vh nombre
[108
x km]
vh
x km]
Annes
observes
1 500
1 400
700
1 200
1984 - 1991
1990 - 1993
1990 - 1992
1990 - 1992
7,3
4,8
6,0
6,0
1
1
1
0
1,6
3,0
10,4
0,0
0
0
0
1
0,0
0,0
0,0
3,4
1
1
1
1
1,3
2,0
8,0
8,1
300
400
200
300
2 900
3 000
6 720
3 100
3 300
3 800
2 300
3 500
4 500
500
14 000
5 400
6 400
12 900
11 600
11 000
16 900
9 300
6 600
3 200
1991
1987 - 1991
1987 - 1991
1987 - 1991
1987 - 1991
1987 - 1991
1985 - 1988
1984 - 1991
1988 - 1992
1989 - 1990
1989 - 1990
1988 - 1990
1988 - 1990
1987 - 1991
1987 - 1991
1987 - 1991
1987 - 1991
1980 - 1991
1985 - 1992
1985 - 1995
1981 - 1987
1981 - 1987
1968 - 1987
1978 - 1986
7,6
7,7
7,7
4,0
3,0
5,4
3,6
5,8
8,5
0,2
0,3
1,1
0,9
1,6
1,7
3,9
4,5
1,0
1,9
7,3
3,7
4,2
1,7
11,0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
4
13
-
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,6
1,5
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
3,5
1,5
1,5
-
0
0
0
0
0
1
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
6
17
-
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
40,0
22,6
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
12,7
12,9
-
0
0
0
0
0
2
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
9
21
-
0
0,0
0,0
19,0
0,0
0,0
0,7
1,1
6,8
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
2,5
0,0
0,0
8,6
5,4
3,0
2,0
5,0
1,0
Tunnel
Dullin
Vuache
France
Chatillon
St.Germain
de
trafic uniJoux
directionnel
Aguas Santas
Portugal
Karra
Sude
Sorvik
Askloster
Perjen
Autriche
Amberg
Pfnder
Lpine
France
Chamoise
trafic
Hvaler
bidirectionnel
Flekkeroy
Norvge
Ellingsoy
Valderoy
Windo
Sude
Arlberg
Autriche
Katschberg
Tauern
Frejus
tunnels
France/Italie
Mont Blanc
daltitude
avec trafic
Kan-etsu
Japon
bidirectionnel
Gothard
Seelisberg
Suisse
San Bernardino
Belchen
AIPCR 44
05.05.B - 1999
taux
nombre [108 vh
x km]
Table 2.3.2 - Occurrence of tunnel fires in rural motorway tunnels [18; 21; 29; 30; 31; 32; 33]
Flow of
traffic
Country
France
unidirectiona
l traffic
Length
[m]
Tunnel
Dullin
Vuache
Chatillon
St. Germain de Joux
Aguas Santas
Karra
Sweden
Sorvik
Askloster
Perjen
Austria
Amberg
Pfnder
L'Epine
France
Chamoise
bidirectional
Hvaler
traffic
Flekkeroy
Norway
Ellingsoy
Valderoy
Windo
Sweden
Arlberg
Austria
Katschberg
Tauern
Frejus
mountain
France/Italy
Mont Blanc
tunnels with
bidirectional
Kan-etsu
Japan
traffic
Gothard
Switzerland Seelisberg
San Bernardino
Belchen
Portugal
Years
inquired
1500
1400
700
1200
300
400
200
300
2900
3000
6720
3100
3300
3800
2300
3500
4500
500
14000
5400
6400
12900
11600
11000
16900
9300
6600
3200
1984 - 1991
1990 - 1993
1990 - 1992
1990 - 1992
1991
1987 - 1991
1987 - 1991
1987 - 1991
1987 - 1991
1987 - 1991
1985 - 1988
1984 - 1991
1988 - 1992
1989 - 1990
1989 - 1990
1988 - 1990
1988 - 1990
1987 - 1991
1987 - 1991
1987 - 1991
1987 - 1991
1980 - 1991
1985 - 1992
1985 - 1995
1981 - 1987
1981 - 1987
1968 - 1987
1978 - 1986
PIARC 45
05.05.B - 1999
Cases of fires
Average
passenger cars
lorries
annual traffic
rate
rate
6
8
[10
number [108 veh numbe
[10
veh/year]
r
veh
x km]
x km]
7.3
1
1.6
0
0.0
4.8
1
3.0
0
0.0
6.0
1
10.4
0
0.0
6.0
0
0.0
1
3.4
7.6
0
0.0
0
0.0
7.7
0
0.0
0
0.0
7.7
0
0.0
0
0.0
4.0
3.0
0
0.0
0
0.0
5.4
0
0.0
0
0.0
3.6
5.8
1
0.6
1
40.0
8.5
1
1.5
5
22.6
0.2
0
0.0
0
0.0
0.3
0
0.0
0
0.0
1.1
0
0.0
0
0.0
0.9
0
0.0
0
0.0
1.6
0
0.0
0
0.0
1.7
3.9
0
0.0
0
0.0
4.5
0
0.0
0
0.0
1.0
3
3.5
6
12.7
1.9
4
1.5
17
12.9
7.3
13
1.5
3.7
4.2
1.7
11.0
-
all vehicles
rate
number
[108
veh
x km]
1
1.3
1
2.0
1
8.0
1
8.1
0
0
0
0.0
0
0.0
19.0
0
0.0
0
0.0
0.7
2
1.1
6
6.8
0
0.0
0
0.0
0
0.0
0
0.0
0
0.0
2.5
0
0.0
0
0.0
9
8.6
21
5.4
3.0
2.0
5.0
1.0
En comparant les taux des tableaux 2.3.1 et 2.3.2, il faut au moins conserver lesprit les
conditions mentionnes ci-avant [18 ; 21 ; 31 ; 32] :
en gnral, les incendies dans les tunnels routiers sont des vnements rares, aussi
la signification statistique des taux dincendies est-elle limite ; un seul incendie peut
considrablement modifier ces taux ;
en Suisse, le poids des vhicules lourds est limit 28 tonnes, alors quaux PaysBas il est limit 50 tonnes ;
dans le Tunnel de lElbe en Allemagne ainsi que dans les tunnels franais cits,
chaque incendie dtect est comptabilis, cest--dire mme ceux qui sont teints
par le conducteur du vhicule lui-mme ;
la proportion de poids lourds varie, pour les diffrents tunnels, denviron 9 % jusqu
55 % (pour le Tunnel du Frjus) ;
Cependant, partir des taux indiqus dans les tableaux 2.3.1 et 2.3.2, les points suivants
ressortent :
le taux moyen dincendie dans les tunnels routiers ne dpasse en aucun cas
25 incendies par 108 vhicules x km ;
selon les statistiques disponibles ce jour, les tunnels urbains semblent avoir un
taux dincendie plus lev que les autres ;
dans plusieurs tunnels (par exemple, Chamoise, Elbe, Frjus, Mont Blanc), le taux
dincendie des poids lourds est bien plus lev que celui des vhicules particuliers ;
Comme indiqu par le taux dincendie plus lev, les incendies impliquant des poids lourds
sont, dans certains tunnels, plus frquents malgr leur trafic peu lev. Ainsi, les donnes
relatives au Tunnel de lElbe montrent quen moyenne, les poids lourds causent
approximativement 30 % des incendies alors quils comptent pour seulement 15 % environ du
trafic total en semaine [20 ; 34].
AIPCR 46
05.05.B - 1999
When comparing the rates of tables 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 at least the conditions mentioned beneath
should be kept in mind [18; 21; 31; 32]:
in general fires in road tunnels are rare events, so the statistical significance of the
rates of fires is limited; the rates can change considerably by only one fire event;
in Switzerland the weight for heavy vehicles is limited to 28 tons, whereas in the
Netherlands it is limited to 50 tons;
the rates quoted for Switzerland (table 2.3.2) represent the number of times the fire
brigade had to intervene;
in the German Elb Tunnel as well as in all the French tunnels mentioned every
detected fire is counted i.e. including those which are extinguished by the vehicle
driver himself;
the proportion of heavy goods vehicles varies from about 9% to about as high as 55%
(Frjus tunnel) for the different tunnels;
Nonetheless from the rates for the tunnels quoted in tables 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 the following items
show up:
the average rate of fire in road tunnels does not exceed 25 fires per 108 vehicles x km
in any of the cases;
according to the statistics available up to now urban tunnels tend to have a higher fire
rate than other tunnels;
in several tunnels (e.g. Chamoise, Elb, Frjus, Mont Blanc) the rate for lorry fires is
considerably higher than for private cars;
an event frequency span of about 1 fire per month to 1 fire per year per tunnel applies
only to tunnels which are either very long, or with much traffic, or both. A very large
majority of tunnels have far less fires.
As indicated by the higher fire rate, fire events involving lorries are in some tunnels more
frequent than inferred from their traffic rate. So the Elb Tunnel data show that, on average,
lorries cause approximately 30% of the fire cases although they account only for about 15% of
total traffic on weekdays [20; 34].
PIARC 47
05.05.B - 1999
Dans une tude franaise, mene sur 400 x 106 km parcourus en souterrain par des poids
lourds, les incendies dans 26 tunnels ont t analyss et approximativement classs selon leur
importance vis--vis de lenvironnement souterrain (tableau 2.3.3). La puissance thermique des
incendies considrs comme causant quelques dommages au tunnel est estime tre infrieure
20 MW. Une puissance de plus de 20 MW est considre seulement pour les trs graves
incendies [36]. Ainsi, les incendies graves sont des vnements trs rares, mme vis--vis du
nombre total de poids lourds dans les tunnels (tableau 2.3.3).
Tableau 2.3.3 - Estimation des taux dincendie dans des tunnels franais [35 ; 36]
Cas dincendie
8
pour 10 vh x km
1-2
2 (estimation)
Incendies impliquant
les marchandises dangereuses
0,3 (estimation)
Selon les premires donnes dune tude franaise, le taux dincendie dun camion lair libre
semble tre quelque peu infrieur au taux dincendie dans les tunnels [35 ; 36]. Mais ce rsultat
devra probablement tre rvis lorsque plus dinformations seront rassembles et que les
schmas de classification utiliss par les diffrentes institutions concernes seront ajusts. De
plus, il est probable que tous les incendies lair libre qui auraient pu avoir des rpercussions
importantes sur un tunnel nont pas t rpertoris.
Le risque quun vhicule prenne feu tend augmenter en cas de surchauffe du moteur (voies
du tunnel en pente raide, tunnels prcds dune longue cte) et de surchauffe des freins
(grandes descentes) [18 ; 21]. Sur une courte priode aprs louverture dun nouveau tunnel, il
peut galement y avoir une tendance plus dincendies ainsi quil a t observ dans le Tunnel
de lElbe [30]. Lorsque les conducteurs deviennent plus familiers avec lenvironnement du
tunnel, le taux dincendie se stabilise un niveau infrieur.
Comparativement au nombre total de pannes et daccidents dans les tunnels, les incendies sont
rares. Des donnes allemandes et suisses montrent que seule une panne sur 100 500 est
accompagne dun incendie [30 ; 32]. Quant aux accidents, un incendie survient dans environ
un sur 10 20 accidents.
Dans deux tunnels franais Lyon (Tunnel de Fourvire, Tunnel de La Croix Rousse), environ
40 % des incendies ont t matriss laide dun extincteur (6 cas). Pour 60 % des incendies
(8 cas), lintervention des pompiers fut ncessaire [21].
AIPCR 48
05.05.B - 1999
In a French study representing 400 x 106 km run by lorries underground, lorry fires in 26 tunnels
were analysed and roughly classified according to their importance with regard to the tunnel
environment (table 2.3.3). The heat release for fires classified as causing some damage to the
tunnel is estimated to be below 20 MW. Only for the very serious fires a heat release of more
than 20 MW is considered [36]. So, major fires are very rare events even in relation to the whole
number of lorry fires in tunnels (table 2.3.3).
Table 2.3.3 - Estimation of fire rates in French tunnels [35; 36]
Cases of fire
8
for 10 veh x km
Classification of fire
Passenger cars
Lorries transporting
dangerous goods
1-2
2 (estimation)
0.3 (estimation)
According to first data given in a French study the lorry fire rate on open roads seems to be
somewhat lower than in tunnels [35; 36]. But, probably this result has to be revised when more
information is gathered and the classification schemes used by the different institutions involved
are adjusted. Furthermore, probably not all fires in the open that might have caused important
consequences in a tunnel have been recorded.
The risk of a vehicle fire tends to increase in situations of intensified motor heating (steep uphill
lanes of tunnels, tunnels after a long uphill slope) and intensified brake heating (long downward
slopes) [18; 21]. Also for a short period since the opening of a new tunnel there can be a
tendency to more fire events as it was observed in the Elb Tunnel [30]. As the drivers become
more acquainted with the tunnel environment the fire rate will stabilise on a lower level.
In relation to the whole number of breakdowns and accidents in tunnels, fires are rare events.
German and Swiss data show that only about 1 of 100 to 500 breakdowns is accompanied by a
fire [30; 32]. In comparison with accidents in about 1 of 10 to 20 accidents fire is involved.
According to two French tunnels in Lyon (Tunnel Fourviere, Tunnel La Croix Rousse) about
40% of the fires were blown out by a fire extinguisher (6 cases). In about 60% of the events (8
cases) the help of a fire brigade was needed [21].
PIARC 49
05.05.B - 1999
De par le monde, il y a eu trs peu dincendies trs srieux avec de graves consquences pour
les conducteurs, les passagers, les vhicules et le tunnel. Ces vnements rares, mais graves,
sont rsums au tableau 2.3.4 qui couvre une vaste priode, prs dun demi-sicle, de 1949
1995. Ces 16 vnements majeurs dans plus de 80 pays membres de lAIPCR eurent les
consquences suivantes :
destruction d'quipements
tlcommunications),
du
tunnel
(par
exemple,
clairage,
ventilation,
Les impacts de ce dernier aspect ne doivent en aucun cas tre sous-estims. Dans certain cas,
la remise en tat a pris des semaines, voire des mois [20 ; 34]. Pendant ce temps, les
encombrements de circulation sur les routes adjacentes au tunnel ferm sont une consquence
invitable, tout spcialement dans les agglomrations.
AIPCR 50
05.05.B - 1999
World-wide only very few fire events developed into major fires with serious consequences for
the drivers and passengers, vehicles and tunnel constructions involved. These rare, but severe
events are summarised in table 2.3.4 which covers a time span from the year 1949 to the year
1995 - nearly half a century. These 16 major events in the more than 80 PIARC member
countries were accompanied by:
heat, smoke, gases, lack of oxygen and loss of visibility led to intoxication,
suffocation, burns and even death (fortunately in only 7 of the 16 events, and in none
of them more than 7 fatalities up to now); when there are reports about injured or
dead people, in most cases it is not quite clear whether this is due to the fire event or
to an accident before it developed into a fire event (except for the Pfnder Tunnel in
1995 and the Isola delle Femmine Tunnel in 1996 [40; 41]);
damage to the tunnel construction: main effects are spalling of concrete, overheating
of concrete reinforcement, collapse of false ceilings and ventilation ducts;
close down of the tunnel due to the fire event itself, the structural damage and the
necessary repair work thereafter.
The effects of this latter aspect should on no account be underestimated. In some cases,
redevelopment can take weeks or months [20; 34]. During this time traffic congestion on the
roads in the vicinity of the closed tunnel is an almost inevitable result especially in built-up
areas.
PIARC 51
05.05.B - 1999
Tableau 2.3.4 - Incendies graves dans des tunnels routiers [20 ; 31 ; 34 ; 37 ; 38 ; 39 ; 40 ; 41]
Anne
Tunnel
Lieu et pays
Vhicules lorigine
de lincendie
Cause probable
Dure de
lincendie
Holland
L = 2 550 m
New York
tats-Unis
Moorfleet
L = 243 m
Guadarrama
L = 3.330 m
B6
L = 430 m
Hamburg
Allemagne
Guadarrama
Espagne
Paris
France
1 camion
remorque blocage des freins
(14 t de sacs en polythne)
1 camion citerne charg de inconnue
rsine de pin
1 camion charg de 16 t de inconnue
paquets de polyester
1 h 30
66 blesss
inhalation
fume
nant
2 h 45
Velsen
L = 770 m
Nihonzaka
L = 2 045 m
Kajiwara
L = 740 m
Velsen
Pays-Bas
Shizuoka
Japon
Japon
2 camions + 4 voitures
collision frontale
1 h 20
4 camions + 2 voitures
collision frontale
4 jours
collision
contre
et renversement
Caldecott
L = 1 028 m
Frjus
L = 12 868 m
Felbertauern
L = 5 130 m
Gotthard
L = 16 321 m
Gumefens
L = 340 m
Serra Ripoli
L = 442 m
Gotthard
L = 16 321 m
Oakland
tats-Unis
Modane
France-Italie
Autriche
Goeschenen
Suisse
Bern
Suisse
Bologne
Italie
Goeschenen
Suisse
Autriche
1995
Pfnder
L = 6 719 m
Italie (Sicile)
1996
Isola delle
Femmine
L = 150 m
1949
1968
1975
1976
1978
1979
1980
1982
1983
1984
1984
1987
1993
1994
AIPCR 52
4h
1h
la
paroi
collision frontale
Consquences sur
Vhicules
Tunnel
par 10 camions
Importants dgts sur 200 m
de 13 voitures
Personnes (1)
1 remorque
nant
1 camion
12 blesss lgers
par inhalation de
fume
5 morts
5 blesss
7 morts
2 blesss
1 mort
1 camion
2 camions
4 voitures
127 camions
46 voitures
1 camion (4 t)
1 camion (10 t)
7 morts
2 blesss
1 h 50 mn nant
1 h 30 mn nant
1 autobus
05.05.B - 1999
2 h 40
Importants
dgts
1 100 m
Dgts sur 280 m
24 mn
2h
2 h 30
2h
1h
inconnu
nant
1 camion
2 morts
2 camions
1 camionnette
4 camions
11 voitures
1 camion +
remorque
4 morts
+ blesss
nant
3 morts
(en raison
choc)
5 morts
lincendie)
20 blesss
1 camion
du 1 camionnette
1 voiture
(par 1 camion
citerne
1 autobus
18 voitures
Table 2.3.4 - Serious fires in road tunnels [20; 31; 34; 37; 38; 39; 40; 41]
Year
1949
1968
1975
1976
1978
1979
1980
1982
1983
1984
Tunnel
Holland
L = 2.550 m
Moorfleet
L = 243 m
Guadarrama
L = 3.330 m
B6
L = 430 m
Velsen
L = 770 m
Nihonzaka
L = 2.045 m
Kajiwara
L = 740 m
Caldecott
L = 1.028 m
Frjus
L = 12.868 m
Felbertauern
L = 5.130 m
Gotthard
L = 16.321 m
Gumefens
L = 340 m
Serra Ripoli
L = 442 m
Gotthard
L = 16.321 m
Place and
country
New York
USA
Hamburg
Germany
Guadarrama
Spain
Paris
France
Velsen
Netherlands
Shizuoka
Japan
Japan
Oakland
USA
Modane
France-Italy
Austria
brakes jamming
Consequences on
Vehicles
Tunnel
4h
66 injured
10 lorries
serious damage for 200
smoke inhalation 13 cars
m
1 h 30 mn none
1 trailer
serious damage for 34 m
unknown
2 h 45 mn none
Probable cause
front-back collision
4 lorries + 2 cars
front-back collision
unknown
1 h 30 mn none
1 bus
Pfnder
1995 L = 6.719 m
Austria
collision
Isola delle
1996 Femmine
L = 150 m
Italy (Sicilia)
PIARC 53
1 lorry
blocking brakes
1994
12 slight injured
smoke inhalation
1 h 20 mn 5 dead
5 injured
4 days
7 dead
2 injured
1 dead
fire in engine
1993
1h
1 lorry
2 h 40 mn 7 dead
2 injured
1 h 50 mn none
1987
People (1)
2 lorries
4 cars
127 lorries
46 cars
1 truck (4 t)
1 truck (10 t)
3lorries+4cars
+ 1 coach
1 lorry
Goeschenen
Switzerland
Bern
Switzerland
Bologna
Italy
Goeschenen
Switzerland
1984
Duration
of fire
05.05.B - 1999
24 mn
2h
none
1 lorry
2 dead
2 lorries
1 van
4 lorries
11 cars
1 lorry + trailer
2 h 30 mn 4 dead
+ injured
2h
none
1h
unknown
3 dead
(by crash)
1 lorry
1 van
1 car
5 dead (by fire) 1 tanker
20 injured
1 bus
18 cars
II.4
Les matriaux qui brlent au cours dun incendie proviennent essentiellement des vhicules
impliqus. Ce sont des lments des vhicules, tels que siges, pneus, matires plastiques
utilises pour les finitions, voire pour la carrosserie elle-mme, le carburant contenu dans les
rservoirs (dont le volume se monte des centaines de litres pour les camions), ainsi que le
chargement transport, principalement en ce qui concerne les vhicules de transport de
marchandises. La nature des marchandises transportes est extrmement variable et peut
provoquer de multiples varits dincendies. Quelques exemples de charge calorifique sont
donns au tableau 2.4.1.
Tableau 2.4.1 - Exemples de charge calorifique [20 ; 42]
Type de vhicule
Voitures particulires
Voiture particulire
Voiture en matire plastique
Autobus
Charge combustible d'un transport
international routier
Poids lourds
Camion citerne avec 50 m
dessence
Charge calorifique
[MJ]
3 000 - 3 900
Remarques
Utilis pour des essais dincendie en
Finlande
6 000
7 000
41 000
65 000
88 000
1 500 000
Des caractristiques diffrentes de lincendie sont ncessaires, selon que lon veut
dimensionner la structure du tunnel ou les quipements de ventilation (dsenfumage) :
AIPCR 54
05.05.B - 1999
II.4
The materials which burn in a fire mostly come from the vehicles involved. They include
elements of the vehicles such as the seats, tyres, plastic materials in the finishing, or even in
the body work itself, the fuel from the vehicle tanks, which amounts to hundreds of litres for
trucks, and the loading, principally for goods vehicles. This latter can be extremely varied and
lead to many different sorts of fires. Some principle examples of combustion energy outputs are
given in table 2.4.1.
Type of vehicle
Private cars
Private car
Plastic car
Public bus
TIR fire load
Heavy goods vehicle
Tanker with 50 m petrol
Remarks
Used for fire tests in Finland
1 500 000
Different fire characteristics are needed depending on whether the purpose is to design the
tunnel structure or the ventilation facilities (smoke control):
The design of structures for fire resistance is based on the temperature of the hot air
(C) versus time.
The design of ventilation is based on the heat release rate (thermal power in MW) or
the smoke release rate (flow at the temperature of the hot smoke in m3/s) versus time.
The dependence upon time is very important to evaluate the conditions at the
beginning of the fire, taking into account the evacuation phase (time for fire brigade to
arrive and get organised).
For design purposes, it is necessary to choose typical fire characteristics corresponding to the
traffic which uses a particular tunnel. Conditions like the allowance of hazardous transports
have to be taken into account.
In the following, data is given for passenger cars, buses and lorries which are based on the
EUREKA fire-tests on road vehicles and the Brussels report of PIARC [19; 20; 43; 44]. For
petrol tankers data from KIVI [42] and the Oresund Tunnel [43] are used.
PIARC 55
05.05.B - 1999
Il faut souligner que tous les rsultats EUREKA dpendent bien videmment des conditions
dessais. Celles-ci incluent de basses vitesses de lair durant la plupart des essais et une
section transversale sensiblement plus petite que dans les tunnels routiers habituels, ce qui
survalue le rayonnement
thermique
renvoy
par
les
parois. Lessai avec
un poids lourd, par
ailleurs, a t fait
spcialement
avec
une vitesse longitudinale de lair de
6 m/s en avant de
lincendie pendant les
15 premires minutes, ce qui donnait
en moyenne environ
13 m/s autour du
vhicule : une telle
vitesse est significaPhoto 2.2 - Incendie de poids lourd
tivement suprieure
ce qui est gnralors des essais dincendie EUREKA
lement rencontr dans les tunnels routiers et elle produit galement une combustion plus
intense. En consquence, les essais EUREKA donnent des indications prcieuses sur les
conditions durant un incendie, mais ils peuvent difficilement fournir par eux-mmes de
nouvelles valeurs ralistes de dimensionnement. Aucune donne nouvelle nest disponible en
ce qui concerne les incendies de marchandises dangereuses.
AIPCR 56
05.05.B - 1999
It must be emphasised that all the EUREKA results are of course dependent upon the test
conditions. These include low air velocities during most of the tests and a cross-section
significantly smaller than usual for road tunnels, which overestimates the heat radiation coming
back from the walls. The test with a Heavy Goods Vehicle (HGV) on the other hand was
specifically conducted with a longitudinal air velocity of about 6 m/s ahead of the fire during the
first 15 minutes, which gave about 13 m/s on average around the vehicle: such a velocity is
significantly higher than what is normally encountered in road tunnels and also produces a more
intense combustion. As a consequence the EUREKA tests give valuable hints about the
conditions during a fire event, but they can hardly provide new realistic design values on their
own. No new experimental data is available concerning dangerous goods fires.
PIARC 57
05.05.B - 1999
Comme le montre la figure 2.4.2 dans les essais EUREKA, des tempratures potentiellement
dangereuses pour les armatures du bton ont t enregistres jusqu environ 100 m en aval
de lincendie et, en raison de la remonte de fumes, jusqu environ 30 m en amont. Ltendue
de cette zone peut tre sensiblement diffrente selon les tunnels, en raison notamment de la
ventilation, de la dclivit du tunnel, de la rugosit de la surface et des revtements rsistant au
feu. Une nouvelle valuation des rsultats dEUREKA est ncessaire pour parvenir des
spcifications plus globales des zones menaces.
plastique
Dans lensemble, les tempratures maximales suivantes au niveau des parois ou du plafond
doivent tre considres en ce qui concerne la structure du tunnel et les rglementations du
trafic poids lourds pour des tunnels spciaux :
voiture particulire
400 C
autobus/petit camion
700 C
poids lourd (HGV) avec matires combustibles
(sauf essence ou autres marchandises dangereuses)
1 000 C
camion citerne dessence (cas gnral)
1 200 C
camion citerne dessence (cas extrmes :
par exemple, aucun bnfice tir du drainage du tunnel
et d'un dbit de fuite limit ; grande citerne ;
viter linondation dun tunnel immerg)
1 400 C
05.05.B - 1999
As can be seen by figure 2.4.2 in the EUREKA tests, temperatures which can be dangerous to
the steel reinforcement of concrete were found till about 100 m downstream of the fire and
because of back-layering till about 30 m upstream of the fire. The extension of this region in
various road tunnels can be quite different from these values due to e.g. the ventilation, tunnel
inclination, surface roughness and fire-resistant coatings. For a more general specification of
endangered regions a further evaluation of the EUREKA results is necessary.
On the whole the following maximum temperatures at the tunnels wall or ceiling should be
considered with regard to the tunnel structure and the cargo-traffic-regulations for specific
tunnels:
passenger car
400 C *
bus/small lorry
700 C *
heavy lorry (HGV) with burning goods
(not petrol or other dangerous goods)
1 000 C
petrol tanker (general case)
1 200 C
petrol tanker (extreme cases: e.g. no benefits due to
tunnel drainage and limited leakage rate; large tanker;
avoidance of the flooding of an immersed tunnel)
1 400 C
*: Higher if flames touch the walls.
PIARC 59
05.05.B - 1999
Ce comportement nest pas couvert par la courbe standard de temprature de la norme ISO 834
(voir figure 2.4.3). Cest pourquoi plusieurs courbes de tempratures ont t proposes, qui se
rapprochent plus prcisment des phases importantes dun incendie dans un tunnel. Ces
spcifications sont incluses par exemple dans :
Un fort gradient de temprature en dbut dincendie est inclus dans la courbe hydrocarbone
(HC) qui est dcrite, en plus dISO 834, dans le projet Eurocode 1 [46]. La temprature
maximale de 1 100 C est quelque peu infrieure celle des courbes RWS ou ZTV. Jusqu
prsent, aucune de ces courbes na rencontr de consensus au niveau mondial. Les
discussions portent sur :
Eu gard la probabilit des diffrents incendies, il devrait y avoir plus de souplesse dans le
choix des tempratures maximales pour, par exemple, les essais de matriaux sur les
revtements rsistant au feu ou les quipements de ventilation. Les hypothses sur la dure
dun incendie devraient galement tre distingues selon quil sagit de lincendie dun camion
ou dune voiture particulire.
La dure de la phase chaude dun incendie couvre normalement un intervalle de temps
denviron 30 60 mn aprs ltape de mise feu (figure 2.4.3), sauf en cas dincendie dune
nappe dessence importante provenant dun camion citerne. Dans ce dernier cas, les
rglementations nerlandaises [42] indiquent une phase chaude denviron deux heures. Si les
pompiers peuvent effectivement arriver rapidement (en quelques minutes) sur les lieux, la dure
de la phase chaude sera plus courte.
Aprs la phase chaude, il faudra du temps avant que l'incendie ne steigne sil n'y a pas
d'action pour l'teindre. Les normes allemandes ZTV admettent environ 110 mn de temprature
linairement dcroissante. Les essais EUREKA ont confirm la dure des incendies, mais ont
montr un plus rapide dclin des tempratures juste aprs la phase chaude (figure 2.4.3). D'un
autre ct, lincendie de Nihonzaka a dur quatre jours (tableau 2.3.4).
AIPCR 60
05.05.B - 1999
This behaviour is not covered by the standard temperature curve according to ISO Standard
834 (see figure 2.4.3). Therefore several temperature curves were put forward which model
important phases of a tunnel fire more closely. Specifications are included e.g. in the
A similar steep temperature gradient at beginning of the fire is included in the hydrocarbon
(HC) curve which is described besides the ISO 834 in the draft of the Eurocode 1 [46]. The
maximum temperature of 1100 C is somewhat lower than given by RWS or ZTV. Up to now
none of the curves has found general acceptance world-wide. Discussions focus on :
With regard to the probability of the different fire events there should be more flexibility in
choosing maximum temperatures for the purpose of e.g. material tests on fire-resistant coatings
or ventilation equipment. Also the assumptions about the duration of a fire should be split
according to fires of lorries and passenger cars.
The duration of the hot phase of a fire covers normally a time interval of about 30 minutes to 60
minutes after ignition stage (figure 2.4.3) if no big pool fire due to a petrol tanker is involved. For
a big petrol tanker the Dutch regulations [42] indicate a hot phase of about two hours. If fire
brigades which can deal with the fire effectively arrive soon (within some minutes) on the scene,
the duration of the hot phase will be shorter.
After the hot phase it will take time for the fire to die away if it is not extinguished. The German
ZTV-Tunnel assumes about 110 minutes of linear temperature decaying. The EUREKA tests
confirmed the duration of fires but show a steeper decline of temperatures just after the hot
phase (figure 2.4.3). On the other hand the Nihonzaka fire lasted four days (table 2.3.4).
PIARC 61
05.05.B - 1999
Depuis, des progrs ont t raliss. En regroupant les essais dincendie EUREKA en Norvge
et en Finlande, les donnes AIPCR de Bruxelles et les rcentes propositions du CETU
(France), on peut faire apparatre les donnes approximatives suivantes de puissance
thermique pour une dure significative dun incendie dans un tunnel [19 ; 20 ; 36] (exemple :
figure 2.4.4, camion citerne dessence : voir tableau 2.4.2) :
2,5 MW
5 MW
8 MW
15 MW
20 MW
20-30 MW
Les poids lourds plus importants transportant des matires combustibles, et plus spcialement
des marchandises dangereuses, peuvent produire de fortes puissances thermiques. Les essais
dincendie EUREKA sur poids lourd ont rvl une puissance maximale denviron 100 120
MW, mais seulement sur une trs courte priode.
Les puissances maximales relles peuvent scarter de ces valeurs car elles dpendent du type
de vhicule, du type de cargaison, de la ventilation, des vitesses de combustion, etc. Pour les
camions citernes dessence, les fuites provoques par un accident et la capacit du systme de
drainage du tunnel ont galement une grande influence.
Puissance thermique
(MW) et dbit d'nergie
Puissance thermique
Dbit d'nergie
En ce qui concerne la construction du tunnel, les scnarios KIVI [42] tiennent compte dun
incendie de 300 MW pour les tunnels immergs. Une proposition franaise prconise un
incendie de 200 MW si un camion citerne dessence est impliqu [47]. Une analyse de risque
pour le tunnel dOresund [43] considre la possibilit dune fuite de carburant partir de
brches de diamtre quivalent 15, 35 et 50 mm. Cela reprsente une dfaillance potentielle
dun tuyau de carburant de petit diamtre ou un lger dgt sur une collerette de tuyau, mais ne
reprsente pas la rupture complte dun tuyau de livraison, ce qui quivaudrait un orifice de
100 mm de diamtre. Le dbit de la fuite dpend du diamtre de lorifice et de la pression du
liquide. Pour les orifices considrs, les dbits massiques sont respectivement de 0,5, 2,7 et
5,6 kg/s.
AIPCR 62
05.05.B - 1999
Since then further advances have been achieved. In summarising the EUREKA fire tests in
Norway and Finland, the PIARC data from Brussels and recent CETU proposals in France the
following approximate maximum calorific power outputs may occur for a significant duration
during fire events in tunnels [19; 20; 36] (example: figure 2.4.4; petrol tanker: see table 2.4.2):
2.5 MW
5 MW
8 MW
15 MW
20 MW
20-30 MW
Larger vehicles (HGV) with burning goods and especially with dangerous goods may cause
higher calorific power outputs. The EUREKA HGV fire test indicated a peak power output of
approx. 100 to 120 MW, but during a very short period only.
Real peak powers will differ from the values given above because they depend on the type of
vehicle, type of cargo, ventilation, burning rates, etc. For petrol tankers there is also a great
influence due to the leakage opening produced by an accident and the capacity of the tunnel
drainage system.
Table 2.4.2 - Effect of leakage diameter
and drainage rate
on the fire size of petrol tankers [43]
Leakage mass
flow
of petrol
[kg/s]
15
1 kg/s
2 kg/s
5 kg/s
0.5
22
35
2.7
120
76
33
50
5.6
245
201
158
27
Diamtre
quivalent
de la fuite [mm]
Dbit massique
de la fuite
dessence [kg/s]
0 kg/s
1 kg/s
2 kg/s
5 kg/s
With regard to the tunnel construction, KIVI scenarios [42] take a 300 MW fire for immersed
tunnels into account. A French proposal claims a 200 MW fire if a petrol tanker is involved [47].
A risk analysis for the Oresund tunnel [43] considers the possibility of fuel leakage from ruptures
of 15, 35, and 50 mm equivalent diameter. These represent the potential failure of small
diameter fuel lines or a small damage of a delivery hose flange. They do not represent the
complete rupture of a delivery hose which would give a hole diameter of 100 mm. The leakage
flow depends on the diameter of the hole and the fluid pressure at the hole. For the holes
considered the mass flows are 0.5, 2.7 and 5.6 kg/s respectively.
PIARC 63
05.05.B - 1999
La capacit de drainage (de leau) des avaloirs dans ce tunnel est normalement 10 fois
suprieure, mais il a t admis que, lors dun accident, une obstruction peut limiter le dbit du
drainage [43]. Les calculs pour diffrents scnarios dincendie ont donn des puissances
thermiques comprises entre 22 et 245 MW (tableau 2.4.2).
La variation de la puissance thermique en fonction du temps pendant les expriences EUREKA
ressemble fort au dveloppement de la temprature (figures 2.4.2 et 2.4.3). Les modles
mathmatiques doivent prendre en compte la puissance observe et les chutes de temprature.
CETU
Essais
(proposition
EUREKA
) 1996
Production de CO2
(essais EUREKA)
[kg/s]
Production
de CO [kg/s]
Voiture particulire
20
Voiture particulire
en matire plastique
30
0,4 - 0,9
0,020 - 0,046
2-3
voitures
particulires
30
1 camionnette
50
60
50 - 60
80
1,5 - 2,5
0,077 - 0,128
6,0 - 14,0
0,306 - 0,714
100 - 200
300
Autobus / camion
sans marchandises
dangereuses
Poids lourd
Camion citerne
Ltude compare de la perte de visibilit due la fume, mesure par la densit optique, et de
la concentration de CO2 indique une corrlation linaire lorsquune correction est faite pour tenir
compte de la temprature des gaz chauds [20 ; 43 ; 44 ; 48]. Lorsquun signal lumineux doit tre
peru une distance denviron 10 m, la densit optique ne doit pas dpasser 0,13 m-1 [49]. Lors
des essais EUREKA, cette valeur critique correspondait des concentrations de CO2 denviron
0,05 0,3 % seulement. Selon le matriau combustible, des valeurs maximales de CO2 de 2
16 % ont t enregistres. Ainsi, il y avait une production intense de fume qui engendrait une
visibilit trs rduite en aval due la puissance de lincendie [48]. Dans une prochaine tape,
ces calculs prliminaires seront poursuivis et les rsultats correspondants seront communiqus
ds que possible.
AIPCR 64
05.05.B - 1999
The drainage capacity (for water) of the gullies in this tunnel is normally 10 times greater but it
was assumed that in an accident an obstruction could limit the amount of drainage [43]. The
calculations for the different fire scenarios gave calorific power outputs between 22 MW and
245 MW (table 2.4.2).
The time dependence of the heat release during the EUREKA experiments closely resembles
the temperature development (figure 2.4.2, figure 2.4.3). Mathematical models should account
for the observed power and temperature dips.
Table 2.4.3 - Smoke, CO2 and CO production [19; 20; 43; 44; 47; 48]
CO2 production
(EUREKA-tests)
[kg/s]
CO production
[kg/s]
Passenger car
20
Passenger van
(plastic)
30
0.4 - 0.9
0.020 - 0.046
2 - 3 passenger cars
30
1 van
50
Bus/lorry without
dangerous goods
60
50 - 60
80
1.5 - 2.5
0.077 - 0.128
Heavy goods
vehicle
6.0 - 14.0
0.306 - 0.714
Petrol tanker
100 - 200
300
The correlation of the smoke dependent visibility measured by the optical density and the
concentration of CO2 indicates a linear relation when a correction for the smoke gas
temperature is made [20; 43; 44; 48]. On the assumption that a lighted signal should be
perceived over a distance of about 10 m the optical density must not exceed 0.13 m-1 [49].
During the EUREKA tests this critical value corresponded to CO2 concentrations of approx.
0.05% to 0.3% only. Depending on the burning material maximum values of 2% to 16% CO2
were observed. So, there was an intense smoke production leading to a very reduced visibility
downstream from the fire load [48]. In a next step these preliminary calculations will be
extended. Corresponding results will be reported when available.
PIARC 65
05.05.B - 1999
300 ppm
2 900 ppm
6 500 ppm
II.5
Les sections prcdentes prsentaient des informations importantes sur la probabilit des
incendies et le dgagement de chaleur et de substances toxiques observs en ralit et au
cours d'essais dincendie en vraie grandeur. Dans ce contexte, un certain nombre de scnarios
dincendies doivent tre conus pour atteindre une stratgie optimale de prvention des
incendies dans les tunnels. Jusqu prsent, seuls quelques sujets spcifiques sont dcrits
dans les scnarios dincendies. Il devrait y avoir des scnarios dincendies pour :
05.05.B - 1999
300 ppm
2 900 ppm
6 500 ppm
CO concentrations of more than 500 ppm were exceeded from about 10 to 15 minutes from the
start of the fire and lasted about 2 hours during the bus fire and about 15 minutes during the
heavy goods vehicle fire. During an experiment with a mixed fire load CO concentrations of 500
ppm and more occurred not before about 80 minutes after the start of the fire [49] and lasted for
90 minutes.
These EUREKA results depend very much on the different ventilation of the test tunnel during
the fire tests. Further they are related to the type of burning material. So the EUREKA results
may not be transferred directly to other tunnels. However, the EUREKA results indicate that
downstream of fires there is, at least for bigger fires, a need for escape and rescue within about
10 to 15 minutes from the start of a fire. Harmful CO concentrations should be expected also in
the progressive stage of vehicle fires [49].
When analysing the EUREKA tests, a reasonable linear correlation between the production
rates of CO2 and CO was found [48]. The ratios of CO mass production to CO2 mass production
cover a span from approx. 0.015 to 0.073 when restricting to vehicle and vehicle load fires [48].
This gives on the average a ratio of 0.051 with a standard deviation of 0.015. This average is
used for the calculation of the CO production rates given in table 2.4.3.
II.5
The preceding chapters summarised important information about the probability of fires and the
release of heat and toxic substances as observed in reality and 1:1 fire tests. Against this
background a number of fire scenarios must be designed to get at an optimum fire prevention
strategy for road tunnels. Up to now only special topics are covered by a description of fire
scenarios. There should be fire scenarios for:
PIARC 67
05.05.B - 1999
Des exemples de spcifications sur les essais de matriaux existent entre autres dans les
rglementations allemandes et nerlandaises (RWS-Curve [42], ZTV-Tunnel [45]). Un important
paramtre de classement est la temprature des armatures du bton qui ne doit pas dpasser
environ 300 C. En ce qui concerne la conception de la ventilation et lexploitation du tunnel, les
paramtres les plus importants sont la taille et le nombre de vhicules impliqus (puissance de
lincendie), les conditions de circulation au moment du dclenchement de lincendie (par
exemple, circulation saccade), le type de circulation (uni- ou bidirectionnelle), la ventilation
naturelle du tunnel et les possibilits de fuite pour les usagers en prsence de chaleur, fume
et gaz toxiques.
Parmi les diffrents types possibles dincendies, les suivants doivent tre examins :
Pour la conception, il ne parat cependant pas ncessaire denvisager les pires cas alors que
leur probabilit de se produire est trs faible. Par exemple, trs rares sont les incendies qui
rsultent dune collision alors que ce type dincident provoque les puissances thermiques et les
tempratures les plus leves. Mais lorsque les consquences peuvent tre catastrophiques
(par exemple, la rupture dun tunnel immerg), de tels scnarios doivent tre envisags lors du
projet.
Les consquences des incendies dans les conditions suivantes de circulation doivent tre
approfondies selon les caractristiques du tunnel (par exemple, tunnel urbain) :
Les plus mauvaises conditions ne sont gnralement pas prises en compte lors du
dimensionnement, selon un quilibre entre les cots additionnels de construction et
dexploitation, et limportance des risques (probabilit et consquences).
AIPCR 68
05.05.B - 1999
the traffic situation encountered when dealing with questions about tunnel ventilation
and operation,
guidelines for the set-up of material tests, and
specifications to be fulfilled by material, equipment and structure with regard to fire
prevention strategies.
Examples of specifications about material testing are found in Dutch and German regulations for
instance (RWS-Curve [42], ZTV-Tunnel [45]). An important rating parameter is the temperature
at the concrete reinforcement which should not exceed approx. 300 C. With regard to the
ventilation design and the operation of the tunnel the most important items are the size and
number of vehicles (fire load) involved, the traffic situation at the time of the outbreak of the fire
(e.g. a stop and go-situation), the mode of traffic flow (e.g. uni or bi-directional), the natural
ventilation of the tunnel and the escape possibilities for people in the presence of heat, smoke
and toxic gases.
Among the possible fire loads the following vehicle fires should be examined:
However, worst cases should not necessarily be considered for design when their probability is
very low. For instance very few fires result from a collision whilst this case leads to the highest
heat release rates and temperatures. If the consequences may be catastrophic (e.g. collapse of
an immersed tunnel), such very severe scenarios should be taken into account for design.
The consequences of fire incidents in the following traffic situations should be investigated
according to the characteristics of the tunnel (e.g. urban tunnel):
Also worst conditions are generally not considered in design, depending on a balance between
extra construction/operational costs and importance of risk (probability and consequences).
PIARC 69
05.05.B - 1999
En ce qui concerne lefficacit des quipements d'vacuation et de secours, les points suivants
doivent tre tudis :
Ces sujets sont rgulirement couverts dans les activits des bureaux d'tude pour des projets
de tunnels spcifiques. Une plus grande normalisation serait trs utile pour dvelopper et
prparer, par exemple, des stratgies de ventilation pour des situations durgence.
Dans lensemble, un large ventail de scnarios dincendies de dimensionnement est possible
selon lobjectif : construction de tunnel, quipement, exploitation. Cependant, le but des futurs
travaux est de slectionner les incendies de dimensionnement les plus importants et de
prparer une courte description des scnarios dincendie, comme le montrent les premiers
exemples du tableau 2.5.1.
II.6
Selon les lments prsents dans ce chapitre, les futurs travaux sur le risque incendie
devraient porter sur :
publication de directives pour les essais dincendie et leur valuation (par exemple,
pour les revtements rsistant aux incendies).
AIPCR 70
05.05.B - 1999
With regard to effective escape and rescue possibilities the following items should be
considered:
These topics are regularly covered in consulting activities for specific tunnel projects. More
standardisation would be very helpful for developing and preparing e.g. ventilation strategies for
emergency situations.
On the whole a broad spectrum of design fire scenarios is possible regarding their different
aims (tunnel construction, equipment, tunnel operation). Therefore the intention of the further
work is to select the most important design fires and to prepare a short description of the fire
scenarios like the first examples in table 2.5.1.
II.6
According to the preceding chapters of this section further work on fire risk should be devoted
to:
analysis of fire events and tests to specify the production of CO, soot and lightabsorbing area more comprehensively,
issuing of guidelines for fire tests and their evaluation (e.g. with regard to fireresistant coatings).
PIARC 71
05.05.B - 1999
Conditions importantes
qui doivent tre remplies
Description de lincendie
de dimensionnement
Exemples de normes
nationales
correspondantes
no.
Sujet
- courbe temprature-temps
dans le four dessai selon la
courbe RWS
- temprature
maximale
- la temprature des armatures mtalliques
1 350 C, dure du test : 2
ne doit pas dpasser 250 C.
heures
AIPCR 72
05.05.B - 1999
Directives
nerlandaises K.I.V.I.
et du Rijkswaterstaat
[42]
Les
quipements
dessai
doivent pouvoir produire de lair
RABT 1994, Allemagn
additionn de suies chaudes
e [50]
dune temprature de 250 C
pendant au moins 90 mn.
- donnes dincendie: voir n 2
- production de fume :
environ. 60 m3/s ( une
temprature de rfrence de
300 C)
RABT 1994, Allemagn
e [50]
Fire scenarios
o
n.
Important requirements,
which have to be met
Purpose
Description of
the design fire
- enough power to push the smoke into one - fire data: see no. 2
- smoke generation: approx.
direction of the tunnel (e.g. account for
60 m3/s (at a reference
designing of a longitudinal ventilation thrust loss of fans in hot air)
- choice of fan distribution along the tunnel
temperature of 300 C)
system with jet fans capable to
for retaining enough fans for smoke control
control a lorry fire event with a
when some fans are damaged due to the
calorific heat output of approx.
fire
20 MW
- availability of a fan operation mode which
keeps emergency paths free from smoke
05.05.B - 1999
ZTV-Tunnel, Germany
[45]
PIARC 73
Examples of related
national standards
Introduction
Un tunnel pouvant tre emprunt par divers vhicules (voitures, autobus, camions, vhicules
spciaux, etc.) avec diffrentes charges (passagers, matires inflammables, non inflammables,
explosives, toxiques, etc.), les incendies dans les tunnels diffrent en termes de quantit et de
qualit. Dans la plupart des cas, ils prsentent peu de danger, de petits incendies avec de
faibles dveloppements de temprature et de fumes ; mais il peut se produire des incendies
de camion citerne trs dangereux, avec de hautes tempratures, une norme production de
fumes et une possibilit dexplosion. Il nest donc pas possible de dcrire le dveloppement de
la temprature et de la fume pour toute sorte possible dincendie en tunnel.
Il a paru cependant utile dinclure dans ce chapitre quelques informations gnrales sur le
comportement de la fume durant les incendies. Cela pourra permettre de mieux comprendre
les autres chapitres de ce rapport.
III.2
Des informations concernant la production de fume et de chaleur lors dun incendie et les
mouvements de la fume dans le tunnel ont t publies pour le XVIIIe Congrs mondial de la
Route [19]. Des informations complmentaires sur les travaux antrieurs de lAIPCR sont
donnes en rfrence [52].
III.3
AIPCR 74
05.05.B - 1999
Introduction
Since a tunnel can be used by different vehicles such as cars, buses, trucks, special vehicles,
etc., which may have different loads (persons, non-flammable, flammable, explosives, toxic
goods, etc.), possible tunnel fires may differ in terms of quantity and quality. In most cases they
are relatively harmless, small tunnel fires with minor temperature and smoke development, but
very dangerous tanker fires with high temperatures, enormous smoke production and the
danger of explosion may occur. Therefore, it is not possible to describe the temperature and
smoke development for every possible kind of tunnel fire.
However, it has been deemed useful to include in this section some general information on
smoke behaviour during tunnels fires. It can be a useful background to best understand the
further sections of this report.
III.2
Information concerning smoke and heat generation from a fire and smoke movement along the
tunnel was published at the XVIIIth World Road Congress [19]. Further information on past
PIARC work is contained in the reference [52].
III.3
The development and dispersal of smoke resulting from fires depend mainly on the following
factors:
Basically it can be said that due to the heat released around the fire site, the smoke is lifted up
to the ceiling, and that it continues its flow in one direction when the longitudinal velocity is high
(with or without backlayering), and in both directions when the longitudinal velocity is low. Thus
there is a space without any smoke gases a couple of meters above the road surface - at least
for a short period of time.
PIARC 75
05.05.B - 1999
Cependant, puisque la fume perd de la chaleur au niveau des parois du tunnel, elle se
rafrachit et retombe le long des parois de chaque ct du tunnel. Par consquent, deux
tourbillons se forment : ils entranent la fume vers le bas le long des parois froides et
produisent un mouvement ascendant au milieu du tunnel. Si un vhicule se trouve dans le
tunnel, deux tourbillons opposs se produisent [58]. En raison de la basse pression en aval du
vhicule, la fume descend au milieu et remonte prs des pidroits. Tous ces tourbillons font
que la fume redescend une certaine distance du foyer et envahit lespace auparavant libre
de toute fume au niveau du sol. Les paragraphes suivants fournissent une description
dtaille de la manire dont la fume se propage dans des incendies spcifiques de tunnels.
III.4
AIPCR 76
05.05.B - 1999
However, since the smoke releases its heat at the tunnel walls, it cools down and flows down on
both sides at the walls. Hence a pair of vortices develops: they bring the smoke down near the
cold walls and produce an upward flow in the middle of the tunnel. If there is a vehicle in the
tunnel, a pair of opposite vortices appears [58]. Because of the low pressure downstream the
vehicle, the smoke flows down in the middle and streams upward near the tunnel walls. All
these vortices make the smoke come down at some distance from the fire site and destroy the
smoke-free ground zone. The following paragraphs provide a detailed description of how the
smoke disperses in specific tunnel fires.
III.4
III.4.1 Fire tests using petrol as a fire source (Ofenegg and Zwenberg fire tests)
In order to gain at least a general insight into the temperature conditions and the amounts of
smoke to be expected from a petrol fire, tests were performed very early in the Swiss Ofenegg
tunnel [53] and the Zwenberg tunnel in Austria [54], both of them being abandoned railroad
tunnels. The total cross-sectional area of the Zwenberg and Ofenegg tunnels was approx. 24 m2
which is much smaller than the cross-sectional area of normal road tunnels with two lanes,
2
2
which is between 45 m and 60 m .
In the Ofenegg tunnel as well as in the Zwenberg tunnel, petrol was poured into a concrete tub
and then ignited. The petrol used was regular petrol (86% carbon and 14% hydrogen) with a
3
density of = 730 kg/m (at 15 C) and a lower calorific value of approx. 44 MJ/kg. The rate of
burning of petrol in free air is a function of the fire area: first it increases as the fire site
increases in size, then it remains constant when the fire site reaches an area of approx. 1 m2.
2
2
According to references [25] and [55], the rate of burning is 0.08 l/(m .s) to 0.1 l/(m .s) in the
open.
In a tunnel, however, the conditions are much more complicated than in the open. The tunnel
ceiling and the walls restrict the flow of the smoke. If there is no artificial fresh air supply
sending air directly to the fire site, fresh air can only be supplied from two sides. In every
possible ventilation case, the burning conditions are worse (less oxygen) than in the open. In
the open, the flow of fresh air from the borders of the fire site into the centre of the fire is
unhindered, and the smoke can easily flow off. The fire tests (in the Zwenberg tunnel) have
shown that, depending on the test arrangement, the rate of burning in the tunnel was lower by
the factor 0.52 to 0.65 compared to the fires in the open. When very large areas are covered
with gasoline, this factor may be significantly lower. The area concentration (fuel amount per
total tub area) in the Zwenberg tunnel was f = 29.4 l/m2, and in the Ofenegg tunnel it was only
half as much.
PIARC 77
05.05.B - 1999
Schweiger [56] a ralis une valuation thermodynamique des essais du tunnel du Zwenberg
pour une quantit de combustible de 200 l dessence ordinaire. Pour une flaque de 7 m2,
lnergie totale disponible tait de 6 410 MJ. Une combustion stchiomtrique suppose cela
aboutit une masse totale de produit de combustion (fume) de 2 322 kg (besoins en air et en
essence pour la combustion). Une combustion stchiomtrique est le rsultat de la combustion
de lessence avec le minimum dair ncessaire. Pendant lincendie du tunnel, il ny avait pas
une combustion stchiomtrique.
En plus des composants CO2 et H2O rsultant dune combustion stchiomtrique, se sont
galement forms du CO et du NOx. Cependant, la quantit de ces derniers tait faible (en
concentration), ce qui signifie quil nest pas ncessaire de les prendre en compte lors de
lquilibre thermodynamique. Lvaluation tait ensuite fonde sur lhypothse quil ne pouvait y
avoir de condensation de vapeur deau dans la fume.
La figure 3.4.1 montre la production par combustion stchiomtrique (CO2, H2O et N2 non
brl) dans le tunnel en fonction de la dure de l'incendie pour 200 l dessence ordinaire. On
peut observer que la totalit de lessence brle en 10 mn environ. Au dbut, les produits de
combustion montrent un accroissement linaire rapide. Aprs 400 secondes, 2 100 kg de fume
ont t produits. Ensuite, la production de fume dcrot fortement, et aprs 620 secondes,
lessence est totalement brle. Durant les 400 premires secondes, la puissance thermique
tait d'environ 15 MW.
Lvolution de cet incendie tait pour l'essentiel indpendante du type de ventilation
(transversale, transversale sans apport dair frais, semi-transversale, longitudinale avec une
3
vitesse de lair de 2 m/s). Le systme de ventilation tait conu pour fournir 30 m /s dair frais et
aspirer 30 m3/s dair vici sur une longueur de 400 m. Ainsi, dans le cas de la ventilation
transversale, il tait possible dextraire de lespace de circulation la totalit de la fume sur une
distance denviron 200 m.
AIPCR 78
05.05.B - 1999
Schweiger [56] made a thermodynamic evaluation of the fire tests in the Zwenberg tunnel for a
fuel mass of 200 l of regular petrol. In a 7 m2 pool area the total available fuel energy was 6410
MJ. Based on an assumed stoichiometric combustion, this results in a total combustion product
(smoke) amount of 2322 kg (fuel and air requirements for combustion). A stoichiometric
combustion product amount is the result of the complete combustion of fuel with the necessary
minimum amount of air. During the tunnel fire there was no stoichiometric combustion.
)LJXUH
0DVV RI VPRNH SURGXFHG
ZLWK O RI JDVROLQH
)LJXUH
4XDQWLWp GH IXPpH
SURGXLWH SDU O GHVVHQFH
In addition to the
compo-nents CO2 and
H2O resulting from a
stoichiometric
combustion, CO and NOx
were formed as well.
However, the amount
of these components
was small (within the
ppm range), which
means that they can be
neglected
in
the
thermodynamic
balance.
The
evaluation was further
based
on
the
assumption that no
condensation of the
water vapour contained
in the smoke took
place.
PIARC 79
05.05.B - 1999
Pour convertir les masses de fume en volumes, il est ncessaire de connatre la temprature
de la fume. Les tempratures thoriques de combustion stchiomtrique de lessence
ordinaire sont denviron 2 000 C. Les tempratures relles en cas dincendie sont
gnralement plus faibles, principalement parce que la combustion nest pas stchiomtrique,
ou parce que la fume se mlange lair.
Les essais raliss dans les tunnels de lOfenegg et du Zwenberg ont montr que les
tempratures maximales le long du plafond au-dessus du foyer de lincendie variaient entre 800
et 1 200 C.
Temprature (C)
Site de l'incendie
Sortie nord
La figure 3.4.3 montre la situation avec une vitesse longitudinale un peu plus leve (4 m/s).
Il est difficile de comparer directement les deux rsultats, puisque lvolution de la temprature
est seulement disponible des laps de temps diffrents (ramener les chiffres aux mmes temps
nest pas possible).
De plus, le facteur suivant doit tre pris en compte : dans le cas de vitesses longitudinales plus
basses, les flammes ne sont que modrment rediriges dans le sens du courant d'air. On peut
noter une lgre remonte des fumes le long du plafond, contre-courant du flux principal.
Cependant, dans le cas de vitesses longitudinales plus grandes, les gaz de fume sont
totalement rediriges dans la direction du courant d'air. En gnral, on peut dire que les
tempratures des fumes jusqu une distance denviron 200 m sont plus leves dans le cas
de vitesses longitudinales de 4 m/s que dans le cas de vitesses longitudinales plus basses. A
partir dune distance de 200 m, cependant, les tempratures sont plus faibles en raison de la
vitesse longitudinale leve et de leffet de lchange thermique avec la paroi.
AIPCR 80
05.05.B - 1999
In order to convert the smoke masses produced to smoke volumes it is necessary to know the
smoke temperatures. The theoretical stoichiometric combustion temperatures of regular
gasoline are about 2000 C. The real fire temperatures are usually much lower, mainly because
the combustion is not stoichiometric, or because the smoke mingles with air.
The fire tests performed in the Ofenegg tunnel and in the Zwenberg tunnel showed that the
maximum local temperatures along the ceiling above the fire site were between 800 C and
1200 C.
Figure 3.4.2 shows the main temperature distribution in the tunnel relative to time in the case of
a longitudinal ventilation with a longitudinal velocity of 2 m/s. The temperature is the mean value
of all temperature measurements performed in one measuring cross-section.
Figure 3.4.3 shows the conditions with a slightly higher longitudinal velocity of 4 m/s.
It is not possible to directly compare the two measurement results with each other, since the
temperature distribution is only available for different times (converting the figures to the same
times is not possible).
In addition, the following fact must be considered as well: in the case of lower longitudinal
velocities, the flames are being redirected into the flow direction only to a small extent. There is
still a minor backlayering of the flue gases along the ceiling, which is directed against the main
flow. In the case of higher longitudinal velocities, however, the flue gases are completely
redirected toward the flow direction. In general it can therefore be said that the flue gas
temperatures up to a distance of approximately 200 m are higher in the case of higher
longitudinal velocities of 4 m/s that in the case of lower longitudinal velocities. As of a distance
of 200 m, however, temperatures decrease due to the higher longitudinal velocity and the
resulting improvement in the heat transition into the rock.
PIARC 81
05.05.B - 1999
ventilation naturelle,
ventilation longitudinale par acclrateurs,
ventilation transversale pure,
ventilation transversale partielle avec extraction seule,
ventilation transversale partielle avec injection d'air seule,
ventilation transversale partielle en deux cantons,
ventilation transversale partielle avec un seul point dextraction,
ventilation transversale partielle avec des bouches dextraction surdimensionnes.
Il nest pas possible de relater en dtails tous les rsultats des essais ; ce qui suit prsente
donc uniquement les plus importants. Pour les dtails, voir [22].
AIPCR 82
05.05.B - 1999
III.4.2 Fire tests using diesel oil as a fire source (Memorial Tunnel fire tests)
In the years 1993 to 1995, intensive fire tests were performed in an abandoned two-lane road
tunnel (Memorial Tunnel) in West Virginia (USA). In contrast with the Zwenberg tunnel and the
Ofenegg tunnel, the cross-section in this tunnel was representative of usual road tunnels
(approx. 60.5 m2 without intermediate ceiling). Diesel oil was used as a fire source. The density
3
3
of diesel oil is between 815 kg/m and 855 kg/m (at 15 C), and the lower calorific value is 42.5
MJ/kg. In terms of weight percentage, diesel oil mainly consists of carbon (86%) and hydrogen
(14%). The stoichiometric air consumption is 14.5 kg of air per kilogram of diesel oil. Except for
the fact that diesel oil ignition qualities are not as good as those of petrol, there are no major
differences between diesel oil and petrol in the case of a fire both in terms of smoke
development and in terms of smoke dispersal.
During the Memorial Tunnel fire test programme, a number of tests with different fire loads of 10
MW, 20 MW, 50 MW and 100 MW were performed in a 853 m long tunnel with a slope of 3.2%.
The following ventilation systems were closely examined:
natural ventilation,
longitudinal ventilation with jet fans,
full transverse ventilation,
partial transverse exhaust ventilation,
partial transverse supply ventilation,
two-zone partial transverse ventilation,
partial transverse ventilation with single point extraction,
partial transverse ventilation with oversized exhaust ports.
It is not possible to discuss all the test results in detail, so the following contains the most
important results only. For detailed results see [22].
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05.05.B - 1999
III.4.3 Essais avec des voitures et camions rels (projet EUREKA n 499 FIRETUN)
Lors de ces essais raliss en Norvge, une attention spciale a t porte la production et
la dispersion des fumes provenant dincendie de vhicules (voitures et camions). La charge
calorifique tait comprise entre 5 000 MJ (voitures) et 90 000 MJ (poids lourds) (voir chapitre II
et [20]). Un des essais fut ralis avec de lheptane C7H16 (84 % C et 16 % H). La masse
volumique de lheptane est denviron 680 kg/m ( 15 C) et sa capacit calorifique denviron
44,4 MJ/kg. Ainsi ce carburant est trs proche de lessence et du gasole. La valeur moyenne de
la section transversale du tunnel tait dapproximativement 30 m 35 m. En comparaison
avec les essais raliss avec de lessence, du gasole et de lheptane, il faut tout
particulirement tenir compte de deux facteurs qui influencent considrablement la production
et la dispersion des fumes lors dincendies impliquant des vhicules rels :
les tempratures initiales aux parois du tunnel taient relativement basses ; de plus,
les parois taient grossirement excaves et trs rugueuses, aussi le flux de chaleur
se propageait-il rapidement vers le rocher.
AIPCR 84
05.05.B - 1999
1. With no mechanical ventilation, the smoke spreads due to the natural ventilation
(chimney effect) with 2.2 m/s (20 MW) or 3.4 m/s (50 MW), respectively. After
5 minutes (20 MW) or 3 minutes (50 MW), the whole cross-section of the traffic space
is completely filled with smoke.
2. Air velocities of 2.5 (10 MW) to 2.95 m/s (100 MW) were sufficient to prevent
backlayering. The thermal effects of the fires significantly reduced tunnel air flows
compared to non-fire situation (reduction factors: 10% (10 MW) to 50% - 60%
(100 MW)).
3. Full transverse ventilation (fresh air = exhaust air) was ineffective in management of
smoke and temperatures for fire sizes of 20 MW or higher.
4. Partial transverse supply ventilation with no exhaust air did not provide effective
temperature and smoke management. Two-zone partial transverse ventilation was
capable of maintaining smoke and heat in well-stratified layers and in close proximity
to the fire.
5. Partial transverse ventilation with single extraction and partial transverse ventilation
with oversized exhaust ports are similar to concentrated smoke withdrawal and were
very effective.
III.4.3 Fire tests with real cars and trucks (EUREKA project n 499 - FIRETUN)
In these tests performed in Norway, special attention was paid to the smoke development and
the smoke dispersal resulting from the combustion of vehicles (cars and trucks). The fire load
was between 5000 MJ (cars) and 90000 MJ (heavy goods vehicles) (see section II and [20]).
One fire test was performed with n-heptane C7H16 (84% C and 16% H). The density of nheptane is about 680 kg/m (at 15 C), the calorific value is approx. 44.4 MJ/kg. So this fuel is
very similar to gasoline or diesel oil. The mean value of the tunnel cross section was approx.
30 m - 35 m. As compared to fire tests performed with gasoline, diesel oil and n-heptane,
special attention must be paid to two factors which heavily influence the smoke development
and the dispersal of smoke in fires involving real road vehicles:
the materials used for the vehicle construction (without load) are flame-retardant and
hardly combustible;
the natural initial temperatures at the tunnel wall in the test tunnel were relatively low;
in addition, the tunnel wall was roughly excavated and very rough, so that the heat
released was rapidly conveyed to the rock.
PIARC 85
05.05.B - 1999
Ces deux facteurs ralentissent la production de chaleur et donc le dveloppement des fumes,
et ils rduisent les tempratures par rapport aux incendies ayant du carburant comme source.
Par ailleurs, ces incendies durent plus longtemps que ceux provoqus par du carburant. De
plus, les tempratures des fumes baissent rapidement mesure quelles sloignent du foyer,
de telle manire que les fumes retombent rapidement au sol. La section transversale du tunnel
fut remplie de fume. A loppos dautres essais, o il y a normalement une zone libre de fume
au-dessus du sol (au moins pendant un certain temps), cette zone nexistait pratiquement pas
(sauf dans le cas dun incendie impliquant du bois). Ainsi, les conditions de cet essai furent
sensiblement plus mauvaises que dans le cas dessais utilisant du carburant.
III.5
III.6
Conclusion
AIPCR 86
05.05.B - 1999
Both factors retard the heat release and thus the smoke development, and they reduce the fire
temperatures compared to fuel fires. On the other hand, these fires last much longer than fuel
fires. In addition, the smoke temperatures decreased rapidly with increasing distance from the
fire site, so that the smoke quickly cooled down and sank to the ground. The total tunnel crosssection was filled with smoke. In contrast to other fire tests, where there is normally a ground
zone without smoke - at least for a certain period of time - there was no such free zone during
these fires (except in the case of a wood fire). Thus the conditions were in this test significantly
worse than in the case of fuel fires.
III.5
The slope of the tunnel has an important influence on the dispersion of the flue gases.
Unfortunately, there are currently no comparable test results for various tunnel slopes available.
Corresponding tests are still to be performed.
In general it can be said that due to the chimney effect, the dispersion velocity of the flue gases
increases with the increase in the tunnel slope. If the flue gases are to be pressed down against
a tunnel slope higher than 3.2%, as was the case in the Memorial Tunnel tests, and if a
backlayering is to be prevented, the longitudinal velocity should be higher than 3 m/s (100 MW).
III.6
Conclusion
The development and dispersal of smoke depends on a number of factors and is different from
fire to fire. Due to the thermal buoyancy, the smoke is lifted up to the ceiling near the fire site
and spread in the upper area of the tunnel, until it cools down and sinks back to the ground.
From that point of time, the tunnel cross section is, for the major part, completely filled with
smoke. In many cases, a ground-level zone free of smoke will - at least for a short period of time
- be formed around the fire site.
PIARC 87
05.05.B - 1999
Puisque dans un tunnel, la capacit de ventilation est le seul paramtre capable de contrecarrer
les effets dun incendie, le contrle de la vitesse longitudinale de lair apparat trs souvent
comme le dnominateur commun de toutes ces tudes.
Les moyens utiliss dans de telles tudes impliquent diffrentes mthodes (exprimentales ou
numriques) et leur importance peut considrablement varier dune tude lautre. Ces tudes
sont gnralement ralises pour des projets spcifiques de tunnel ou pour prparer des
recommandations ou des rglementations. De nombreux rsultats exprimentaux et thoriques
ont t obtenus ; la plupart dentre eux sont dun grand intrt. Les mthodes tant
nombreuses, avec des cots, validits et rsultats diffrents, il nest pas toujours ais de
reprer quel type dapproche est le plus appropri pour un problme donn. Un panorama
gnral de ces tudes a donc sembl ncessaire pour classifier les mthodes disponibles selon
leur intrt spcifique, et recommander le meilleur usage faire de chacune.
Trois familles de mthodes ont t distingues : essais en vraie grandeur, essais chelle
rduite et simulations numriques. Leur prsentation successive sera suivie de conclusions
gnrales.
AIPCR 88
05.05.B - 1999
Safety strategies: the investigations generally deal with the evaluation of opacity,
toxic gases concentrations, air velocity fields, smoke movement, etc. Their results
concern the definition of the ventilation rates, the geometric organisation of the flow
rates, the emergency routes or the possibilities for fire brigades intervention.
Influence of the fire on the tunnel structure and equipment: the walls and ceilings
may suffer from the heat released by the fire. The situation may be dangerous in the
case of an immersed structure or in the case of air ducts located above the ceiling of
the tunnel. The fire may also cause severe damage to the equipment, and especially
to the ventilation system.
As in a tunnel the ventilation capacity is the only parameter able to counterbalance the effects
of a fire, the control of the longitudinal air velocity often appears of common interest for all these
studies.
The means used in such studies involve different methods (experimental or numerical) and their
importance may significantly vary from one investigation to another. These studies are generally
performed for specific tunnel projects or to prepare recommendations or regulations. Many
experimental and theoretical developments have been performed and most of them are of great
interest. With regard to such a number of methodologies with various costs, validity and results,
it is not always obvious to know which kind of approach is best appropriate for a given problem.
This is the reason why a general review of these studies seems to be necessary to classify the
available methods according to their specific interest, and to recommend the best use of each
one.
Three families of methods have been distinguished: full scale tests, small scale experiments
and computer simulations. They will be examined successively before general conclusions are
drawn.
05.05.B - 1999
Les principales recommandations de lAIPCR, directement lies aux mthodes dtude, ont t
publies dans le rapport de Bruxelles et, plus rcemment, dans le rapport de Montral [17].
Le rapport de Bruxelles [19] dfinit trois catgories dincendies de vhicules de
dimensionnement (voiture particulire, autobus ou camion, marchandises dangereuses) et
donne, pour chacune delles, des caractristiques relatives la source de lincendie (puissance
thermique et production de fume maximales) et lextension de la couche de fume sous deux
conditions de ventilation (vitesse faible et vitesse critique, qui est la vitesse longitudinale
minimale de lair capable dviter le mouvement contre-courant, ou remonte, de la fume).
Ces recommandations sont fondes sur les rsultats des importants essais en vraie grandeur
mentionns prcdemment et ont t utilises de par le monde en vue de la dfinition des
incendies de dimensionnement pour les systmes de dsenfumage. Le rapport de Bruxelles
prsente galement les simulations numriques comme une nouvelle mthode de prvision
dune situation dincendie dans un tunnel. Il est dit que "les outils informatiques permettent
dutiliser la modlisation mathmatique pour comprendre les incendies dans les tunnels. Cela
permet de mieux connatre linfluence de nombreux paramtres et donc, de rserver les essais
en vraie grandeur au calibrage des modles".
Le rapport de Montral [17] donne de nouvelles recommandations et les grandes lignes des
thmes dvelopps dans le prsent rapport.
IV.3.1.2 Moyens
Ces programmes exprimentaux sont gnralement mens dans des tunnels dsaffects et
requirent dimportants moyens financiers.
Les principaux programmes dj raliss sont les suivants :
tunnel de l'Ofenegg (Suisse, 1965) [59] : ces essais furent conduits afin dtudier les
capacits de la ventilation en cas dincendie, dans le cadre des grands projets
suisses des annes soixante. Linstallation tait un tunnel ferroviaire se terminant en
cul-de-sac 190 m de la tte. Environ onze incendies furent provoqus laide de
bacs dessence de 6,6 m 95 m. Les mesures portrent sur la temprature, la
vitesse de lair, les concentrations en gaz (CO et O2) et la visibilit.
tunnel du Zwenberg (Autriche, 1975) [60] : ce programme fut dcid en liaison avec
deux importants projets dautoroutes en Autriche. Les systmes de ventilation
longitudinale et semi-transversale furent tests. Les essais portrent sur un total de
30 bacs dessence. Les surfaces dessence enflamme taient de 6,8 m et 13,6 m.
Les mesures portrent sur la temprature, les concentrations en gaz (CO, CO2, NOx,
O2), lopacit et le taux de combustion.
AIPCR 90
05.05.B - 1999
The major PIARC recommendations which are directly connected with the study methods have
been published in the Brussels report and more recently in the Montreal report [17].
The Brussels report [19] defines three types of design road vehicle fires (private car, bus or
truck, dangerous goods) and gives for each one some characteristics on the fire source itself
(maximum heat release rate and smoke production) and the spread of the smoke layer under
two ventilation conditions (low velocity and critical velocity - which is the minimum longitudinal
airflow velocity able to avoid the backward propagation, or backlayering, of the smoke). These
recommendations are based on the results of the large fire tests mentioned previously and have
been used world-wide to define the design fire for smoke control systems. The Brussels report
also mentions the computer simulations as a new method for predicting fire situation in a tunnel.
It is said that "computer facilities also allow fire problems in a road tunnel to be solved on the
basis of mathematical modelling. This will give further insight on the influence of many
parameters, so that full scale tests must only be made to calibrate the mathematical models".
The Montreal report [17] gives new updated recommendations and outlines the topics
developed in the present report.
IV.3.1.2 Means
These experimental programmes are usually held in disused tunnels. They require important
financial means.
The main programmes performed in the past are the following:
Ofenegg tunnel (Switzerland, 1965) [59]: these tests were carried out in order to
study the ventilation capacities in the case of a fire under the large Swiss tunnel
projects of the sixties. The facility was a railway tunnel with a dead end located 190 m
from the portal. About 11 fires were performed using petrol pools from 6.6 m to
95 m. The measurements concerned temperature, air velocity, gas concentrations
(CO and O2) and visibility.
Zwenberg tunnel (Austria, 1975) [60]: this programme was decided in connection
with two major motorways projects in Austria. Longitudinal and semi-transverse
ventilation systems were tested. The tests concerned a total of 30 pool fires. The
ignited petrol areas were 6.8 m and 13.6 m. The performed measurements were:
temperature, gas concentration (CO, CO2, NOx, O2), opacity and combustion rate.
PIARC 91
05.05.B - 1999
expriences PWRI (Japon, 1980) [61] : les essais japonais en vraie grandeur
utilisrent une galerie de 700 m de long construite par lInstitut de Recherche des
Travaux publics (PWRI) et un tunnel de 3 300 m de long. Seize exprimentations
furent ralises dans la galerie et huit dans le tunnel. On utilisa comme foyers des
bacs dessence (dix essais avec 4 m, deux essais avec 6 m), des vhicules
particuliers (six essais) et des autobus (six essais). Les conditions physiques
mesures dans le tunnel furent corrles aux capacits de secours. Linfluence de la
vitesse longitudinale de lair fut dmontre.
tunnel de Repparfjord (Norvge, 1990-1992) [62] : ces essais furent conduits dans
une ancienne galerie minire dune longueur de 2,3 km (parois non revtues et
section transversale allant de 30 40 m). Ils rassemblrent neuf pays europens et
constiturent la base du
projet
EUREKA
499
"Firetun". Un total de
21 essais fut men sur des
wagons de train et de mtro,
des vhicules particuliers,
des poids lourds et des feux
calibrs (bacs dheptane et
palettes en bois). Prs de
400 capteurs furent installs
le long du tunnel et
lintrieur des foyers. Les
mesures por-taient sur la
temprature de lair et des
parois, la vitesse, lopacit,
la concentration des gaz, le
mouvement des fumes (par
vido), etc.
Les rcents programmes de recherche sont fonds sur des systmes complets de mesures. Les
capteurs sont nombreux et sont organiss en rseaux tout fait semblables ceux utiliss dans
les simulations numriques par modle de champ.
AIPCR 92
05.05.B - 1999
PWRI experiments (Japan, 1980) [61]: the Japanese full scale test programmes
used a 700 m long gallery built by the Public Works Research Institute (PWRI) and a
3300 m long road tunnel. 16 experiments were performed in the gallery and 8 in the
tunnel. The fire sources were fuel pools (10 tests with 4 m, 2 tests with 6 m),
passenger cars (6 tests) and buses (6 tests). The physical conditions measured in
the tunnel during the fires were connected with the emergency capacities. The
influence of the longitudinal airflow velocity was shown.
Memorial tunnel (USA, 1993-1995) [63]: this programme was financed by the
Federal Highway Administration and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for the
Boston Central Artery Tunnel project. The experiments were performed in an
abandoned 850 m long road tunnel located in West Virginia. About 91 tests were
performed with diesel
oil pool fires. The
obtained heat release
rates
vary
from
10 MW (4.5 m) to
100 MW (44.4 m).
The transverse and
longitudinal
ventilation configurations
were tested. 1450
captors were installed
in
the
tunnel,
providing about 4 millions
data
per
experiment.
The recent research programmes are based on complete measurement systems. The captors
are numerous and they are organised in networks quite similar to the mesh used in CFD
models.
PIARC 93
05.05.B - 1999
IV.3.1.3 Rsultats
Lune des caractristiques de ces expriences est
quil ny a pas daccs au site de lincendie. Aucune
observation visuelle nest possible (sauf si une
camra vido est installe sur le site). Dans certains
cas, les oprateurs pouvaient tre prsents dans les
sections situes en amont de lincendie (figure
4.3.1). Cet emplacement ne peut permettre une vue
densemble de lexprience.
Figure 4.3.1 Front de la remonte
de fume lors d'un essai
avec un wagon de mtro
(EUREKA 499)
Dans ces conditions, le grand nombre de donnes recueillies est utile pour construire des
interpr-tations concernant les phnomnes se dveloppant lors dun incendie (figure 4.3.2). La
localisation des capteurs sur un maillage 3D apparat fondamentale pour lanalyse.
Si certains phnomnes peuvent tre correctement identifis, il est plus difficile de dduire des
lois gnrales partir des expriences en vraie grandeur. Cela est d au peu dexpriences
conduites dans chaque programme. Il faut noter que leur objectif nest pas daboutir des lois
gnrales. Par exemple, les essais japonais ont t en partie raliss pour recueillir des
informations qualitatives sur les sorties de secours sous diffrentes conditions de vitesse de
lair. Ce but ne semble pas tre compatible avec lutilisation des rsultats dans des modles
scientifiques.
Lune des caractristiques des essais EUREKA 499 est lutilisation de vrais vhicules routiers et
ferroviaires comme charge combustible. Comme la puissance thermique de tels incendies est
lun des paramtres du risque encore inconnus, les oprateurs ont saisi cette occasion pour
raliser les mesures correspondantes. Le confinement de la chaleur semblait accrotre les taux
de combustion. En ralit, les interprtations des rsultats obtenus avec des mthodes
diffrentes conduisent des rsultats diffrents [65].
En raison des incertitudes des rsultats de mesure, les interprtations concluent gnralement
que la puissance thermique calcule est lie la mthode utilise pour son valuation.
Nanmoins, certaines des conclusions tires des essais sur les incendies de poids lourds
(essai EUROTUNNEL) semblent en relative contradiction avec les informations disponibles
dans les prcdentes recommandations de lAIPCR. Dans le rapport de Bruxelles [19], on
mentionnait 20 MW pour la puissance thermique dun poids lourd en flammes. Les rsultats
EUREKA montrent des valeurs plus leves : certaines dpassent 100 MW pendant quelques
minutes.
AIPCR 94
05.05.B - 1999
IV.3.1.3 Results
One of the characteristics of these experiments is the fact that no access is possible in the fire
area. No visual observation is then possible (except when a video camera is installed in that
zone). In some cases, operators could be present in the sections located upstream from the fire
(Figure 4.3.1). This situation cannot provide an overview of the experiment.
In these conditions, the great number of recorded data is helpful to build interpretations
concerning the phenomena developed during the fire (Figure 4.3.2). The location of the captors
on 3D mesh appears fundamental for this analysis work.
If some phenomena can be correctly identified, it is more difficult to deduce general laws from
the full scale experiments. This is due to the relatively low number of experiments performed in
each programme. It is to be noticed that their aim is not the research of such relations. For
example, the Japanese tests were partly planned to give qualitative information about the
escape routes in different air velocity control conditions. This target does not appear to be
compatible with the use of the results in scientific models.
A characteristic of the EUREKA 499 experiments is the use of real road and rail vehicles as fire
loads. As the heat release rate of such fires is one of the unanswered questions concerning the
risks, the operators took this opportunity to perform the corresponding measurements. The heat
confining seemed to increase the burning rates. Actually, the interpretations of results
performed with different methods show different results [65].
Figure 4.3.2 - Deux tourbillons (dus la conjugaison de
la force hydrostatique et de la trane de lincendie)
peuvent tre dduits des courbes isothermes calcules
partir des mesures (section transversale situe 20
m en aval de lincendie lors de lessai lheptane H32,
EUREKA 499 [64])
16
120
0
16
14 0
0
12
12
14
0
100
0
10
80
80
60
60
0
-3
-2
-1
0
1
Largeur - Width (m)
Because of the uncertainties on the measurement results, the interpretations generally conclude
that the calculated heat release rate is linked to the method used for its evaluation.
Nevertheless, some of the conclusions drawn from the heavy goods vehicle fire (EUROTUNNEL
test) appear in a relative opposition with the information available in previous PIARC
recommendations. In the Brussels report [19], the heat release rate of a burning HGV was
mentioned as 20 MW. The EUREKA results show higher peak values: some were found above
100 MW during a few minutes.
PIARC 95
05.05.B - 1999
la thmatique : une exprience de rfrence doit traiter des incendies dans les
tunnels ;
Ainsi, ces rgles aboutissent une complte connaissance des expriences de rfrence. En
considrant cette remarque, aucune exprience en vraie grandeur dincendie dans un tunnel ne
prsente les caractristiques d'une rfrence. Cela ne signifie pas que la validation des outils
de simulation nest pas possible, mais quen raison de la difficult dobtenir une parfaite
connaissance des phnomnes, la qualification doit tre considre comme relative des
rfrences exprimentales spcifiques.
IV.3.1.4 Limitations
Le nombre dessais est limit en raison des cots normes de ce genre de programme (environ
10 millions USD pour EUREKA 499 et 40 millions USD pour le programme du Memorial
Tunnel). Ces cots conduisent donc limiter la dure du programme et, par consquent, le
nombre dessais possibles.
La plupart de ces programmes ont t raliss dans des tunnels dsaffects. Pour les
applications routires, des extrapolations sont souvent ncessaires en raison de la taille plus
rduite de la section transversale et de sa forme diffrente (en fer cheval au lieu de rectangle
par exemple).
AIPCR 96
05.05.B - 1999
The full scale experiments generally provide interesting qualitative observations. For example,
some opacity situations appear clearly as a combination of the heat release rate, the nature of
the burning object (smoke density) and the longitudinal air velocity. Unfortunately, as mentioned
before, the relatively low number of experiments does not allow to draw general laws from the
analysis of the measurements (as an exception, such a remark may not be true for the Memorial
Tunnel programme because of the large number of tests). These observations can be used as a
reference for more specific research works using appropriate tools (small scale or numerical
models).
In a general manner, the measurements made during the experiments can be used as a basis
for simulations and particularly for computational fluid dynamics (CFD). The qualification of a
simulation tool must respect some rules:
the adaptability: even if the previous characteristics are satisfied, the reference
experiment must be adapted to a comparison with simulation. For example, chaotic
behaviours linked to uncontrolled fires such as vehicle fires are not easy to
understand and to integrate as boundary conditions.
So, these rules lead to the complete knowledge of the reference experiments. Considering this
remark, no full scale experiment relative to fires in tunnels has the characteristics of a
reference. This does not mean that the simulation tools validation is not possible, but due to the
difficulty of getting a perfect knowledge of the phenomena, the qualification is to be considered
as relative to specific experimental references.
IV.3.1.4 Limitations
The number of experiments is limited because of the huge costs engaged in such programmes
(about 10 millions USD for EUREKA 499 and 40 millions USD for Memorial Tunnel programme).
These costs lead to limit the duration of the programme, and, as a consequence, the number of
the affordable experiments.
Most of these programmes were performed in abandoned tunnels. For a road application,
extrapolations are often necessary because of the reduced cross-section and its different shape
(horse shoe instead of rectangular shape for instance).
PIARC 97
05.05.B - 1999
AIPCR 98
05.05.B - 1999
The second aim of these tests is to show to the operators how to react in case of a fire. The
tests may be completed with fire brigade exercises and intervention evaluations.
These two aspects are treated in the report of the PIARC Committee on Road Tunnels to the
Marrakech World Road Congress [18]. This document proposes to perform tests before opening
the tunnel in order to establish instructions for fire situations. The second kind of tests is
proposed during operation, to train operators and fire brigades. This means that the tunnel must
be closed specifically for these tests. One of the report recommendations is to organise such
tests regularly.
In the present presentation, only the first kind of tests is studied because the second one does
not bring fundamental information about the fire developments in the tunnel.
PIARC 99
05.05.B - 1999
IV.3.2.3 Rsultats
Lefficacit du systme de ventilation peut tre dmontre, mais elle est bien videmment lie
une exploitation correcte de lextraction des fumes [67]. Les consignes dexploitation sont
particulirement difficiles tablir dans le cas de ventilation semi-transversale, car lefficacit
du systme est directement lie la stratification de la fume.
Les essais mens dans des tunnels routiers franais dots dune ventilation semi-transversale
ont montr que le manque defficacit est partiellement d des paramtres non contrls,
comme la vitesse longitudinale naturelle de lair lintrieur du tunnel [23 ; 67 ; 69].
Les essais dans les tunnels du Puymorens et de Chamoise [67 ; 69] ont t effectus avec des
bacs dheptane. De nombreux tats stationnaires ont t caractriss. Ces rsultats ont t
utiliss pour dterminer des consignes de ventilation. Ils ont galement t analyss dun point
de vue scientifique afin de dterminer des lois gnrales rgissant les mouvements des fumes
et autres comportements thermo-mcaniques.
AIPCR 100
05.05.B - 1999
The tests can also use small cars to be more demonstrative. The experiments show that the
heat release rate of such fires is quite chaotic. The tunnel ventilation system effect is better
characterised when the thermal situation is stabilised. The use of cars as fire loads may be
recommended to complete fire pool tests.
During the tests, the ventilation control must be available, so that no transposition is necessary
between the experiments and a real fire situation in the tunnel, except for the heat release rate.
Some measurements can be performed. The heaviest systems include more than 100 sensors
organised in the same manner as for research programmes (thermocouples, anemometers and
radiation measurements) [67]. It has been shown that such systems give correct information for
the tunnel protection during the fire, and for phenomenological interpretations after the fire.
Many tests can be performed in a rather short period. In Puymorens tunnel [67], the fire duration
was about 30 min, and it required one hour to record the data, to check the measuring system,
to wait for the pool to be cooled, and to fill it again with heptane. It is estimated that about 20
fires can be performed in one week, assuming a correct safety level.
IV.3.2.3 Results
The efficiency of the ventilation system can be demonstrated, but it is of course linked to a
correct operation of smoke extraction [67]. Operating instructions are especially difficult to
establish in the case of semi-transverse ventilation because the system efficiency is directly
linked to the smoke stratification.
The tests performed in French road tunnels using semi-transverse ventilation have shown that
the lack of efficiency is partly linked to non-controlled parameters such as the natural
longitudinal air velocity inside the tunnel [23; 67; 69].
The Puymorens and Chamoise tunnels tests [67; 69] have been based on heptane pools fires.
Many different steady states have been characterised. These results have been used to
determine ventilation instructions. They have also been analysed on a scientific point of view in
order to determine the general laws governing smoke motions and other thermo-mechanic
behaviours.
PIARC 101
05.05.B - 1999
Par exemple, lors des essais du tunnel de Chamoise, il a t possible de mesurer la distance
de remonte des fumes dans
chaque situation (figure 4.3.3).
Lanalyse
com-plte
des
diffrents paramtres montre que
la distance de remonte peut
tre dcrite comme une fonction
de Ri, le nombre de Richardson
(voir IV.4.2) :
a
iR .
(IV.1)
nomer
.
o l0 et a dpendent des
caractristiques du tunnel. Le
nombre de Richardson doit
prendre en compte la densit des
gaz dans la zone dimpact du
panache de fume sous le
plafond (voir IV.4.2).
Une
telle
analyse
est
gnralement difficile raliser
partir des donnes fournies par
les diffrents programmes de recherche ; en effet, la plupart du temps, les situations observes
ne correspondent pas des tats stationnaires, ou bien ne sont pas suffisamment nombreuses.
Puisque la puissance thermique est limite, il est possible dobserver les phnomnes dans des
endroits diffrents du tunnel, mme prs du foyer. Ces observations peuvent tre corrles aux
mesures (mouvements de la fume compars aux champs de tempratures, volution de la
remonte de fume, stratification en aval de lincendie, etc.).
IV.3.2.4 Limitations
Linstrumentation est relativement limite, mais lvolution de ces essais tend accrotre le
nombre de capteurs. Bien videmment, leur nombre total sera limit car cette sorte
dexprience est diffrente des programmes de recherche. En particulier, il sera difficile de
caractriser les phnomnes qui se produisent de grandes distances du foyer de lincendie.
La taille de lincendie doit aussi tre limite car ces essais sont non destructifs. Il est ncessaire
de limiter le produit puissance thermique x dure. Des essais impliquant des foyers de 20 MW
ont t raliss, mais cette valeur doit tre considre comme une exception [23].
Gnralement, les incendies raliss ne dpassent pas 5 MW. Pendant les essais avec des
vhicules particuliers, des pointes de 7 8 MW ont t enregistres, mais sur des priodes trs
courtes.
AIPCR 102
05.05.B - 1999
For example, during the Chamoise tests, it has been possible to measure the backlayering
distance in each situation (Figure
4.3.3). The complete analysis of
Backlayering distance
the various parameters shows that
Air velocity
the backlayering distance may be
written as a function of Ri, the
Richardson number (see IV.4.2):
Heptane pool fire
Backlayering distance (m)
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
-50
-100
-150
-2
-1
lbackl. = l 0 . Ri
(IV.1)
As the heat release rate is limited, it is possible to observe the phenomena in different zones of
the tunnel, even near the fire. These observations may be correlated with the measurements
(smoke motions compared with temperature fields, backlayering evolution, stratification of
downstream the fire, etc.).
IV.3.2.4 Limitations
Instrumentation is quite limited, but the evolution of these tests tends to increase the number of
sensors. Of course, the total amount will be limited because this kind of experiment is distinct
from research programmes. Particularly, it will be difficult to characterise the phenomena
occurring at large distances from the fire zone.
The size of the fire must also be limited because these tests must be non-destructive. Actually,
it is necessary to limit the product "Heat release rate x Duration". Tests involving 20 MW
sources were performed, but this value is to be considered as an exception [23]. Generally, the
performed fires do not exceed 5 MW. During passenger cars tests, peaks of 7 to 8 MW were
observed, but during very short periods.
PIARC 103
05.05.B - 1999
IV.4
IV.4.1 Objectifs
IV.4.1.1 Application un projet de tunnel
Les exprimentations chelle rduite sont destines reprsenter un incendie dans un tunnel
en projet. Cette mthode est fonde sur des lois de similitude qui sont en fait le lien entre la
situation en vraie grandeur et la situation modlise.
Le but de telles expriences est de reprsenter les phnomnes survenant lors dun incendie
se dclarant lintrieur du tunnel. Par rapport des essais en vraie grandeur, cette mthode
permet de grandes conomies de temps et dargent. Un autre de ses atouts est de bien montrer
les phnomnes car il est possible de visualiser la fume en utilisant, par exemple, de la
lumire laser ou des flux colors.
Cependant, on mentionne trs peu dexemples dexpriences chelle rduite pour la
conception des tunnels [70].
IV.4.1.2 Recherche
Les travaux de recherche peuvent aussi utiliser les maquettes chelle rduite pour des
raisons scientifiques. Sil est besoin de caractriser des comportements spcifiques, la
meilleure solution peut consister les visualiser en utilisant des mthodes compltement
contrlables.
Des essais complmentaires peuvent tre raliss avec des installations en vraie grandeur. La
connaissance des lois obtenues avec les maquettes chelle rduite est utile pour planifier les
expriences en vraie grandeur.
Les maquettes chelle rduite ont t utilises pour mesurer lefficacit des trappes
daspiration de la fume situes au plafond [71] ou pour dterminer les lois non dimensionnelles
rgissant lexistence d'une remonte de fume [72].
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IV.4.1.2 Research
Research works can also use small
scale models for scien-tific reasons. If
some specific behaviours have to be
charac-terised, the best solution can
be to show them using totally
controllable
methods.
Complementary tests may be perfor-med with
full
scale
facilities.
The
Photo 4.4.1 - Small scale model
Photo 4.4.1 Maquette chelle rduite
used to study ceiling trap doors
utilise pour tudier les trappes
knowledge
of
the
laws
daspiration en plafond
obtained with the models is
useful to plan the full scale experiments.
Small scale models have been used to characterise the efficiency of ceiling trap doors for
smoke extraction [71] or to determine of the non-dimensional laws governing the existence of
backlayering [72].
05.05.B - 1999
U. Dh
(IV.2)
U
Fr =
g. Dh
(IV.3)
g. Dh
.
2
(IV.4)
Dautres paramtres peuvent tre utiliss pour tudier les phnomnes sur les maquettes
chelle rduite. Par exemple, le nombre de Grashof est une combinaison des nombres de
Reynolds et de Richardson :
Gr = g.
Dh
(IV.5)
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In order to represent the same characteristics of the longitudinal flow, it appears necessary to
respect the Reynolds number Re:
Re =
U. Dh
(IV.2)
where Dh represents the hydraulic diameter and the fluid cinematic viscosity.
The effect of buoyancy forces are partially represented by the Froude number Fr:
2
U
Fr =
g. Dh
(IV.3)
g. Dh
.
2
(IV.4)
Other parameters may be used to study phenomena on reduced scale models. For example, the
Grashof number is a combination of the Reynolds and the Richardson numbers:
Gr = g.
Dh
(IV.5)
Many studies do not take into account the Reynolds similarity, especially in the case of air
models. Such a constraint should lead to use too high air velocities values. Actually, the
Reynolds condition is generally limited to checking that the Reynolds numbers in the model are
sufficient to ensure the turbulent character of the longitudinal airflow.
The relation between the backlayering distance, the local slope, the heat release and the
thermal exchanges with the walls has been clearly shown in such models.
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IV.4.4 Limitations
Lutilisation dune maquette chelle rduite pour la conception dun systme de ventilation
peut rencontrer des limites et ce, pour deux raisons principales :
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In the first studies, the analysis of the source terms was performed on simple assumptions
(complete combustion): the control of the density should represent the temperature and the
vertical velocity the production of burned gases. A second analysis has shown that most of the
situations represented by the isothermal source do not take into account the physics of fires. In
realistic situations, the combustion temperature is connected to the vertical velocity, and in the
experiments, these two parameters are not dependent (for example, it is possible to represent
cold fires).
A similar technique has been used to study the efficiency of the smoke extraction based on
remote controlled trap doors [71]. In this case, the similarity preserves the Froude number.
The liquids most used are generally salted water or alcohol injected into water. Salted water
leads to inverse the geometry of the model (the heaviest liquid is injected at the top of the model
to represent the fire).
IV.4.4 Limitations
Using a small scale model to design a tunnel ventilation system may be limitative for two main
reasons:
the technical conclusions are relative to the similarity law(s) used in the application;
as a fire is a complex phenomenon, its representation cannot be limited to one or two
global relations.
the heat release rate representation remains an unsolved problem; a representation
supposed to be correct generally provides unrealistic physical situations (temperature
and opacity fields) inside the modelled tunnel; as a consequence, the laws
established with the model need an intermediate step to be applied to full scale
situations.
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On ne peut cependant pas en conclure que le manque de similitude parfaite conduit des
rsultats irralistes. En effet, les conclusions tires dexpriences chelle rduite sur des
navettes dans le tunnel sous la Manche ont ensuite t confirmes par des essais en vraie
grandeur [70].
Une autre caractristique de ces essais est le nombre relativement faible de capteurs installs
sur la maquette. Cette situation peut se justifier par les deux raisons suivantes :
Une bonne solution consiste placer les capteurs aux extrmits de la maquette pour obtenir
des informations correctes sur les conditions limites.
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It is difficult to conclude that the lack of total similarity leads to unrealistic results. For example,
the conclusions drawn from small scale experiments performed for the Channel Tunnel shuttles
have been confirmed by full scale tests performed later [70].
Another characteristic of these experiments is the relatively low number of sensors installed in
the model. Two main reasons can be mentioned to justify this situation:
A good possibility is to place the sensors at the limits of the model so that they can give correct
information about the boundary conditions.
The second case is the use of small scale models for research. The conclusions of such studies
are generally limited to the studied model. The transposition of the established laws to full scale
situations needs reference experiments. So, the interest of these models is to show that general
laws can be drawn from the study of specific situations, and they give the analytic form for these
laws (example: existence of backlayering vs source characteristics and longitudinal air velocity).
In a general manner, the validity of a study based on the use of models is directly linked to the
interpretation of the similarity law.
Computer simulations have become more and more popular to study fire behaviour in tunnels
since the 80's [77]. The main reasons are the very fast development of computer capacities and
the comparatively reasonable cost of the calculations compared to real fire tests. They also give
many detailed data which are unattainable by other means.
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Ce chapitre traite principalement des simulations numriques par modle de champ, bien quil
existe dautres simulations pouvant tre utilises pour tudier les incendies, comme les
modles de zone ou les modles unidimensionnels.
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This chapter will be mainly focused on CFD codes, even though there are also other models
which can be used to study fire situations in tunnel, as zone models or one-dimensional models.
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Nom
des codes
VENDIS-FS
MFIRE
Auteurs
Utilisateurs
TUNNEL
BRI2
FAST
BRI, Japon
NIST, tats-Unis
FASIT
University of Leeds,
Royaume-Uni
CSTB, France
VESTA
Modles
de zone
INERIS, France
US Bureau of Mines, tatsUnis
Parsons Brinckerhoff, tatsUnis
TNO, Pays-Bas
CIFI
Modles
unidimensionnels
TNO, Pays-Bas
SES
CHAMPION
PHOENICS
JASMINE
Modles
de champ
2D & 3D
CHAM, Royaume-Uni
FLOW3D
FLUENT
STORM
FIRR
FURNACE
AIPCR 114
Remarques
INERIS, France
VTT, Finlande
Parsons Brinckerhoff, tatsUnis
TNO, Pays-Bas
Plus du tout utiliss
(1988)
VTT, Finlande
NIST, tats-Unis
Non utiliss dans les
tunnels
University of Leeds,
Royaume-Uni
CSTB, France
Utiliss pour les
btiments
TNO, Pays-Bas
En cours de
dveloppement
Delft Univ. Techn, PaysPlus du tout utiliss
Bas
Univ. Graz, Autriche
INERIS, France
VTT, Finlande
Fire Research Station,
Dvelopps sur la
Royaume-Uni
base de PHOENICS
Univ. Lund, Sude
AEA Consultant, RoyaumeUni
HSE, Royaume-Uni
Mott Mac Donald,
Royaume-Uni
CETU, France
Univ. Graz, Autriche
FOA, Sude
SCETAUROUTE, France
Univ. Graz, Autriche
Univ. Sydney, Australie
05.05.B - 1999
As they cannot take the layering phenomena into account, they cannot be applied in the fire
vicinity. Nevertheless these principles seem sufficient for studying the conditions far from the
source in an underground road network or a very long tunnel, and for providing boundary
conditions to a CFD code in the case where the whole tunnel is not modelled by this latter
model.
Name
of codes
Authors
Users
Remarks
VENDIS-FS
MFIRE
VTT, Finland
TUNNEL
TNO, NL
TNO, NL
BRI2
BRI, Japan
VTT, Finland
FAST
NIST, USA
NIST, USA
FASIT
University of Leeds, UK
University of Leeds, UK
CIFI
CSTB, France
CSTB, France
Used in buildings
VESTA
Zone
models
INERIS, France
SES
1D models
INERIS, France
TNO, NL
TNO, NL
Under development
Out of use
CHAMPION
PHOENICS
CHAM, UK
JASMINE
Atomic
UK
Energy
FLUENT
FOA, Sweden
STORM
ADAPTIVE, USA
SCETAUROUTE, France
FIRR
AVI, Austria
FURNACE
Australia
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Developed on the
base of PHOENICS
Les rponses font apparatre que les simulations numriques sont de plus en plus utilises pour
lanalyse du risque incendie. Plusieurs raisons expliquent ce phnomne : tout dabord, la
difficult et le cot des expriences en vraie grandeur ; ensuite, la vaste gamme dinformations
fournies par les simulations numriques ; enfin, le dveloppement de diffrents codes et les
nouvelles performances des ordinateurs qui permettent de raliser des calculs importants et
complexes en un temps raisonnable.
Les utilisateurs des codes sont gnralement conscients que les simulations numriques
peuvent conduire des rsultats irralistes si aucune prcaution nest prise. Il existe donc un
consensus sur le besoin dune validation fonde sur des expriences relles avant dutiliser les
simulations numriques pour la conception des systmes de dsenfumage. De plus,
lexprience des utilisateurs dans le domaine de la modlisation des incendies ne peut tre
nglige si lon veut assurer la qualit des rsultats.
La figure 4.5.3 donne quelques lments de validation obtenus par le CETU sur les essais du
tunnel de lOfenegg [79].
Temperatures C
800
measurement L
measurement M
measurement H
prediction L
prediction M
prediction H
700
600
500
400
Velocity m/s
4
3
2
1
300
200
-1
100
0.5
1.5
2.5
3.5
4.5
5.5
-2
0
0
0.5
1.5
2.5
3.5
4.5 5 5.5 6
Time in minutes
-3
Time in minutes
-4
Figure 4.5.3 Comparaison entre valeurs prvues et mesures la sortie du tunnel de lOfenegg
Malheureusement, peu dessais en vraie grandeur raliss de par le monde fournissent des
mesures pouvant tre utilises pour valider les simulations numriques. Dune part, les essais
ne sont pratiquement jamais effectus dans cet esprit. Dautre part, peu d'essais impliquent une
grande gamme de conditions de ventilation (les essais du Memorial Tunnel peuvent cet gard
apporter des rponses intressantes).
La dure du calcul peut apparatre comme une limite la taille des modles tudis avec les
modles de champ. Gnralement, les tunnels de plus de quelques centaines de mtres ne
peuvent tre modliss en trois dimensions sur une station de travail. Par consquent,
quelques hypothses doivent tre faites pour fixer les conditions limites dans le cas o
seulement une partie du tunnel est modlise.
IV.5.3 Principes
Afin dapprhender la complexit du problme, les quations fondamentales et les mthodes
numriques sont succinctement prsentes ci-aprs. Dans une premire tape, si l'on
considre l'coulement transitoire et anisotherme dun gaz considr comme homogne, le
problme consiste dterminer six fonctions scalaires inconnues : les trois composantes ux, uy
et uz de la vitesse, la densit , la pression p et la temprature T. Elles dpendent de quatre
variables indpendantes : les trois variables d'espace x, y, z, et le temps t.
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From all the available answers, it appears that CFD codes are more and more popular for fire
risk analysis. Several reasons explain this evolution. The first one is the difficulty and the cost
linked to full scale experiments. The second one is the large range of information given by CFD
codes. The last reason is the development of various CFD codes and the new performances of
computers which allow large and complex calculations to be performed in a reasonable time.
The CFD users are generally aware that numerical simulations may lead to unrealistic results if
no precaution is taken. There is a consensus on the need for a validation based on real
experiments before using CFD codes for designing smoke control systems. Also the experience
of users in the field of fire modelling cannot be neglected to ensure the quality of results.
Figure 4.5.3 presents some elements of a validation work carried out by CETU on the Ofenegg
tunnel fire experiments [79].
Temperatures C
800
measurement L
measurement M
measurement H
prediction L
prediction M
prediction H
700
600
500
400
Velocity m/s
4
3
2
1
300
200
-1
100
0.5
1.5
2.5
3.5
4.5
5.5
-2
0
0
0.5
1.5
2.5
3.5
4.5 5 5.5 6
Time in minutes
-3
Time in minutes
-4
Figure 4.5.3 - Comparison between predicted and measured values at the free exit of the Ofenegg tunnel
Unfortunately, few full scale fire experiments over the world provide measurements that can be
used for CFD codes validation. On one hand, the tests are generally not performed to meet this
objective. On the other hand, few experiments involve a wide range of ventilation conditions (the
Memorial Tunnel fire tests may bring valuable answers as far as this question is concerned).
The calculation duration may appear as a limitation to the size of the models treated with CFD
codes. Generally, tunnels longer than some hundred meters cannot be modelled in three
dimensions on workstations. Therefore some assumptions must be done to set the boundary
conditions if only a part of the tunnel is modelled.
IV.5.3 Background
In order to give an idea of the problem complexity, the fundamental equations are outlined.
Then the computational methods are rapidly presented. In a first step, if the anisothermal and
transient flow of a gas assumed to have a homogeneous composition is considered, the
problem is to determine six unknown scalar functions: the three components ux, uy and uz of
the velocity, density , pressure p and temperature T. They depend on four independent
variables, the three space variables x, y and z and time t.
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(. )
+ div .u. + J = S
t
H
J = . grad
(IV.7)
H
avec
(IV.6)
(IV.8)
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Fluid mechanics and the first principle of thermodynamics provide the equivalent of five scalar
differential equations, deduced from the conservation of mass, momentum and energy. These
have the general form of the following transport equation:
(. )
+ div .u. + J = S
t
H
J = . grad
(IV.7)
H
with
(IV.6)
where stands for a general fluid property and , u , J , S are density, velocity vector,
diffusive flux vector and source rate per unit volume, respectively. denotes the effective
diffusive exchange coefficient of .
H
Thermodynamics supply the missing equation to close the problem, this one being generally the
state equation of ideal gas:
.T
. T
= 0 0
P0 + p
P0
(IV.8)
This very complex system obviously requires to use computational methods. The finite element
method can be applied. However, the finite volume method, similar to the finite differences, is
more often used. It imposes a structured grid, which is not too annoying due to the rather
simpler geometry of a tunnel, and leads to generally shorter computation times. In addition it is
very physical, for it ensures that the various conservation equations are observed in each cell.
The computation duration still remains lengthy with the current computers. A 3D simulation of a
several minutes fire in a several hundreds meters long tunnel requires several CPU hours on a
mainframe, and one day or more on a workstation.
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IV.5.4 Recommandations
Comme indiqu prcdemment, il existe diffrentes manires de modliser les incendies avec
les codes numriques. Le nombre de variables inconnues et la dure de calcul varient selon les
hypothses.
Il y a au moins 8 quations rsoudre pour des simulations 3D, les variables inconnues tant
, p, T, ux, uy, uz, k et , et 7 quations rsoudre pour des simulations 2D. Des quations
complmentaires peuvent tre ncessaires afin de prendre en compte le transfert de chaleur
par rayonnement, le processus de combustion ou le transfert de chaleur par conduction
lintrieur des parois.
Puisquil existe diffrentes faons de modliser un incendie, chacune sera commente selon
lexprience des membres du groupe de travail. Ces commentaires ne doivent pas tre
considrs comme des recommandations, mais plutt comme des conseils aux personnes qui
dbutent dans le domaine de la modlisation des incendies ou qui sous-traitent de tels calculs.
Modle de combustion
Le modle Eddy-Break-Up est le plus gnralement utilis. Cette mthode peut tre
intressante si les informations que lon veut obtenir partir de la simulation portent
sur la zone dincendie. Les limites de cette mthode concernent la charge
combustible de lincendie. Il nest en effet pas toujours possible de fournir une
quivalence en termes de consommation de carburant.
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IV.5.4 Recommendations
As explained previously, there are different ways to model fire with CFD codes. The number of
unknown variables and the calculation duration vary according to the hypotheses.
There are at least 8 equations to solve in 3D simulations, the unknown variables being , p, T,
ux, uy, uz, k and , and 7 equations to solve in 2D simulations. Additional equations may be
required in order to take into account the radiative heat transfer, the combustion process or the
heat transfer by conduction inside the walls.
Because there are different ways to model a fire, some comments will be given on each one,
according to the experience of the members of the working group. They should not really be
considered as recommendations, but more as an advice for people who would start in the tunnel
fire modelling field or sub-contract such calculations.
Combustion process
The Eddy-Break-Up model is generally used. This method may be interesting if the
information required from the simulation concerns the fire zone. The limitation
concerns the fire load. It is not always possible to give an equivalence in terms of fuel
consumption.
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La deuxime mthode (puissance thermique fixe dans un volume) devrait gnralement avoir
la prfrence car elle est moins coteuse (en temps CPU) que la modlisation du processus de
combustion, et prsente moins dinconvnients que les autres mthodes.
Le chapitre II de ce rapport donne des informations sur les puissances thermiques de
dimensionnement qui peuvent tre utilises directement avec cette mthode.
05.05.B - 1999
The second method (fixed heat release rate in a volume) should generally be preferred because
it is cheaper (CPU time) than modelling the combustion process and presents less
disadvantages than the other methods.
In addition, section II of this report gives information on design heat release rates, which can be
directly used with this method.
Temperatures at 2 m
above ground
measure
prediction
900
700
500
300
100
0
-150 -100 -50
1100
Temperatures C
Temperatures C
1100
900
Temperatures at 5 m
above ground
measure
700
500
300
100
0
-150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Distance from fire (m)
Figure 4.5.4 - Longitudinal profiles of predicted and measured temperatures at 2 m and 5 m above the floor
(EUREKA 499 fire test H32 [78])
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La deuxime mthode (globalisation des coefficients de flux thermique par rayonnement et par
convection) est recommande lorsque les transferts thermiques par rayonnement ne sont pas
modliss. Elle peut tre combine avec la troisime mthode (rduction la source de la
puissance thermique de lincendie pour prendre en compte les pertes par rayonnement cet
endroit).
05.05.B - 1999
The second method (lump radiative and convective heat transfer coefficient at the walls) is
recommended in the case where the radiative heat transfers are not modelled. It can be
combined with the third method (lump reduction of the heat release source to take into account
radiative losses at the fire site).
Combination of fixed temperature with heat fluxes. This technique may be used in
order to roughly model the heat conduction process in the rock. Actually, it does
not directly take it into account.
Heat conduction inside the rock. This method appears as the best physical
interpretation of the problem. The heat transfer to the walls may have noticeable
effects especially in the case of long fires. However, it leads to larger meshes
and longer calculation and is often not necessary.
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Proprits des fluides fixes une extrmit et pression fixe l'autre extrmit
Cette solution peut se justifier par lanalyse des conditions rgnant dans le tunnel
sous des effets connus de ventilation. La condition en amont semble tre quelque
peu limitative car elle force l'coulement aller dans un sens, spcialement si les
composantes de la vitesse sont imposes.
Qincendie
est identique en 2D et en 3D
S tunnel
o Qincendie est la puissance thermique et Stunnel la section transversale du tunnel.
Ces contraintes agissent sur la gomtrie et la gravit. Des validations ont t
entreprises partir des expriences du tunnel de lOfenegg [79] (figure 4.5.5).
Certaines limites importantes doivent tre mentionnes. Par exemple, cette technique ne dcrit
pas correctement la stratification lorsque la vitesse longitudinale est plus basse que la valeur
critique [80]. De fait, les simulations en 2D ncessitent des prcautions spcifiques et ne
peuvent tre utilises que dans certains cas.
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Given fluid properties fixed at one end and fixed pressure at the other end
This solution may be justified for the analysis of the conditions inside the tunnel with
known ventilation effects. The upstream condition appears to be quite limitative
because it forces the flow to one direction, especially if the velocities components are
imposed.
to take into account the reduction of the friction forces, some authors introduce
additional volume forces [81];
another solution based on similarities may also be used and is based on the
Reynolds (equation IV.2), Froude (equation IV.3), and energy non-dimensional
parameters.
The energy non-dimensional parameters represent the energy released by the fire or
the quantity of fuel injected per square meter of tunnel cross-sectional area to respect
the analogy with the actual tunnel, that is
Q fire
should be the same in 2D and 3D ,
S tunnel
where Q fire is the heat release rate and Stunnel the tunnel cross-sectional area.
These constraints influence the geometry and the gravity terms. A validation work
has been performed on the basis of Ofenegg tunnel experiments [79] (Figure 4.5.5).
Some important limitations must be mentioned. For example, this technique does not describe
correctly the stratification in the case when the longitudinal velocity is lower than the critical
value [80]. Consequently 2D simulations require specific precautions and can be used in
specific situations only.
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IV.5.6 Conclusions
Le principal avantage des simulations numriques par modle de champ est de permettre
dtudier des cas pour lesquels aucune donne exprimentale nest disponible. Si une
validation prliminaire a t ralise partir d'essais en vraie grandeur, ils peuvent servir
simuler de nombreux autres cas. Cette technique fournit une description gnrale des divers
phnomnes et est la seule capable doffrir de telles possibilits, mme si les rsultats doivent
plutt tre considrs comme des ordres de grandeur.
Les principales limites de cette technique sont le temps ncessaire au calcul et la complexit de
son usage : de ce point de vue, la mthode n'a pas encore atteint le degr de maturit des
calculs de structure par lments finis par exemple. Des validations prliminaires plutt longues
et des utilisateurs expriments sont ncessaires ; sinon les rsultats risquent dtre tout fait
trompeurs.
Les modles de champ sont donc principalement adapts certains usages spcifiques :
De plus, un certain nombre davantages peuvent tre tirs de lutilisation de ces modles en les
associant dautres mthodes dtude. Par exemple, quelques simulations numriques
prliminaires et, si besoin est, trs imprcises seront profitables aux essais en vraie
grandeur afin dvaluer les phnomnes prvus et leur ordre de grandeur. De plus, un
programme dessais sur des maquettes chelle rduite pourrait gagner tre prpar par
calcul dvaluation de la qualit des similitudes et des ordres de grandeur. Les maquettes
chelle rduite permettraient alors dtudier le phnomne en faisant varier les paramtres
intressants. Enfin, de nouveaux calculs pourraient tre raliss pour, dans un premier temps,
caler le code numrique et, dans un deuxime temps, comprendre, voire extrapoler, les
mesures.
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Temperatures at 124.25 m
from fire at 60 s
Velocities at 124.25 m
from fire at 60 s
6
5
4
Height (m)
Height (m)
2
1
2
1
0
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
Temperature (C)
-8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Velocity (m/s)
Figure 4.5.5 - Comparison between 2D and 3D simulations (fire test No.1 [79])
IV.5.6 Conclusions
The main advantage of the CFD models is to allow the study of cases for which no experimental
data are available. If a preliminary validation has been made from full scale tests, they should
be able to simulate many other situations. This technique provides a general description of the
various phenomena. This is the only method that offers such possibilities, even if the results
must rather be considered as orders of magnitude.
The major restriction is the time needed for the calculation and the complex utilisation: from this
point of view the method has not yet come to the same maturity as for instance the structure
calculation by finite elements. Rather lengthy preliminary validations and skilful users are
necessary; otherwise the obtained results may be quite misleading.
The CFD models are therefore adapted principally to certain specific uses:
Moreover there are a lot of advantages that can be drawn from their use in conjunction with
other study methods. For instance, full size testing will profit from some preliminary
computational simulations - if necessary very approximate - in order to assess the expected
phenomena and their orders of magnitude. Also, a test programme on scale models would
advantageously be prepared by calculations aimed at evaluating the quality of similarities and
orders of magnitude. The reduced scale model will then allow to make the study by varying the
useful parameters. Lastly, new calculations can be made in order to calibrate the computational
code in a first step, and in a second step to understand - even extrapolate - the model
measurements.
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Afin de simuler les incendies dans de grands tunnels ou dans des rseaux souterrains
complexes, il pourrait tre utile de combiner une simulation 3D avec dautres simulations plus
simples, comme la 2D ou la 1D, pour dterminer les conditions limites. Cette technique apparat
potentiellement intressante pour le dveloppement des simulations numriques [80].
Les modles de champ comprennent de nombreux modles physiques qui ont t valid sur
quelques expriences fondamentales, mais peu de validations globales ont t ralises sur
des essais d'incendie en vraie grandeur. Ainsi, les bases de donnes tires des essais
EUREKA 499 et du Memorial tunnel devraient-elles tre trs utiles pour la validation des
modles numriques. Ces travaux ont dj commenc dans divers pays, mais ils ncessitent
beaucoup de temps.
Lespoir de mettre au point un modle numrique, pouvant facilement tre utilis par des
personnes non averties qui auraient juste appuyer sur un bouton (car ce modle aurait t
cal et les nombreux paramtres auraient tous t ajusts) est probablement utopique. Des
travaux prliminaires de validation doivent comparer, la fois qualitativement et
quantitativement, les rsultats et mesures afin de dfinir des rgles de conduite des simulations
dincendie ; mais cela ne doit pas amener ajuster tous les paramtres sans raisons physiques,
car de tels calages de modles ne pourraient pas tre transposs dautres configurations.
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In order to simulate fires in long tunnels or complex underground networks, it may be useful to
couple a 3D simulation with simplified ones such as 2D or 1D models in order to determine
boundary conditions. This technique appears as a potential development of the numerical
simulation [80].
The CFD models include several physical models which have been validated against
fundamental experiences, but few global validations have been made on full scale fire tests. In
this way, the data bases drawn from the EUREKA 499 and the Memorial Tunnel experiments
should be very useful for validating CFD models. This work has already started in different
countries but requires much time.
The hope to set up a CFD model which could be easily used by unskilled users who would have
to only press a button, because the model would have been calibrated and all the numerous
parameters would have been fitted, is probably unrealistic. A preliminary validation work must
compare qualitatively and quantitatively calculated results and measurements in order to define
rules for running fire simulations, but it must not lead to fit all the parameters without physical
reasons because such calibration could not be transposed to other configurations.
The CFD codes are already largely used to study fire situations in tunnels and should go on
developing in the future, but research and validation works are required to ensure the validity of
their results.
Some research works are required to improve existing models, such as turbulence or
combustion models, but they are not specific to tunnels and concern fluid dynamics modelling.
These research works are generally done by universities and laboratories, the activity of which
deals with fundamental fluid dynamics phenomena and development of CFD codes.
Some other research works are more specific to tunnels and consist in adapting or calibrating
physical models for fire modelling. Such research work has been done for example to improve
the standard k- model which might not correctly estimate the length of backlayering [83].
PIARC 131
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Des donnes exprimentales sont ncessaires la validation des codes numriques ; ces
donnes ne sont pas toujours disponibles car beaucoup de grands essais d'incendie mens
dans le pass taient raliss pour dautres objectifs. Les programmes dessais incendie
EUREKA 499 et du Memorial Tunnel ont t raliss en prenant cet objectif en compte ; ils ont
ainsi pu permettre de crer des bases de donnes trs intressantes pour la communaut
internationale et ce, afin de valider les codes numriques.
De nouvelles exprimentations, que ce soit chelle rduite ou en vraie grandeur, doivent tre
entreprises lavenir, en ayant pour objectif principal de valider et caler les modles physiques.
Cela peut porter sur la comprhension des coulements gnrs par lincendie, tout comme sur
les mesures de certaines proprits physiques de la fume, qui font dfaut aux modles (par
exemple, proprits de rayonnement de la fume, gnration de suie).
Manifestement, les diffrentes approches prsentes dans ce chapitre sont complmentaires.
Le choix dune approche pour tudier la situation des incendies dans les tunnels, aussi bien
pour la recherche que pour la conception dun tunnel, dpend des objectifs poursuivis dans
chaque situation.
IV.7 Conclusion
tudier le problme dun incendie dans un tunnel requiert des moyens spcifiques. Ces dernier
doivent tre adapts aux objectifs et aux ressources financires qui peuvent raisonnablement
tre dpenses compte tenu des enjeux de ltude.
Le tableau 4.7.1 prsente une synthse du point de vue de la conjugaison des moyens et des
objectifs de recherche pour la scurit incendie dans les tunnels.
AIPCR 132
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The validation of CFD codes requires experimental data which are not always available
because many large fire experiments carried out in the past had other objectives. The EUREKA
499 and Memorial Tunnel fire tests programmes have been performed taking into account this
objective, so that they provide very interesting databases for the international community to
validate CFD codes.
New small or large scale experiments should be undertaken in the future with the priority
objective of validating and calibrating physical models. It may concern the understanding of flow
generated by fire as well as measurements of some physical smoke properties which are
missing for models (i.e. radiative smoke properties, generation of soot).
Obviously the different approaches which have been presented in this section are
complementary. The choice of one approach for studying fire situation in tunnels, as well as for
research or tunnel design, depends on the objectives which are sought in each case.
IV.7 Conclusion
Studying the problem of a fire in a tunnel requires specific means. They have to be adapted to
the aims and the amount of money which can reasonably be spent in the study with respect to
its stakes.
Table 4.7.1 gives a synthetic point of view about the combination of the means and the
objectives of investigation in fire safety in tunnels.
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Essais
dincendie en
vraie
grandeur
Essai
dincendie
avant ou
pendant
lexploitation
(pour
optimiser les
consignes de
ventilation)
Essais
dincendie
avant ou
pendant
lexploitation
(pour la
formation des
exploitants et
des
pompiers)
Maquette
chelle
rduite
Simulation
numrique
(modle de
champ)
Avantage :
- Observations visuelles possibles
Inconvnient :
- Manque dinformations d
labsence de capteurs
Conclusion :
- Inadapt
Avantage :
- Essai ralis avec de vrais
systmes de ventilation
Inconvnient :
- Analyses limites en raison du
manque de mesures
Conclusion :
- Pas bien adapt
Avantages :
- Montre aux exploitants comment
la ventilation ragit
- Pompiers trs intresss par ce
quils auront combattre en
ralit
Inconvnient :
- Pas dexploitation possible
pendant les essais
Conclusion :
- Bien adapt
Avantage :
- Situation reprsentative
Inconvnient :
- Pas dexploitation possible
pendant les essais
Conclusion :
- Bien adapt
Avantages:
- Nombreux essais possibles
- Possibilit dtudier des lois
globales rgissant des situations
spcifiques
Inconvnient :
- Besoin dessais de rfrence en
vraie grandeur pour les transposer
aux situations relles
Conclusion :
- Mthode utile pour la recherche
Avantages :
- Possibilit dtudier plusieurs
situations diffrentes
- Informations sur structures
d'coulement qui ne pourraient tre
obtenues par dautres mthodes
Inconvnient :
- Les conclusions doivent tre
corrles avec des donnes
exprimentales existantes
Conclusion :
- Mthode utile pour la recherche
Avantage:
- Moins onreux que les essais en
vraie grandeur
Inconvnient :
- Li aux limitations induites par
les lois de similitude
Conclusion :
- Trs difficile de conclure que les
rsultats sont reprsentatifs de
situations en vraie grandeur
Avantage :
- Cot
Inconvnients :
- Li aux limitations induites par
les lois de similitude
- Aucun respect des contraintes
de temps
Conclusion :
- Certainement peu raliste, mais
dmonstratif
Avantage :
- Possibilit dobtenir une
optimisation partir de diffrentes
hypothses
Inconvnient :
- Le modle doit tre utilis par
des personnes qualifies
Conclusion :
- Mthode utile pour les projets, si
elle est valide
Avantage :
- Possibilit de dcrire les
conditions physiques en plusieurs
endroits du tunnel
Inconvnient :
- Rsultats thoriques conduisant
des conclusions thoriques
Conclusion :
- Ladaptation dpend de
lutilisation du modle
AIPCR 134
05.05.B - 1999
Means
Tunnel fire
tests before
or under
operation
(aimed at
optimising
the
ventilation
instructions)
Advantages:
- Partial results with full scale
facilities
- Numerous different situations
Disadvantages:
- Lack of information due to the
limited number of sensors
Conclusions:
- Useful but partial results
Tunnel fire
tests before
or under
operation
(aimed
at operators
and fire
brigades
training)
Advantages:
- Visual observations possible
Disadvantages:
- Lack of information due to the
absence of sensors
Conclusions:
- Not suited
Advantages:
- Test performed with real
ventilation systems
Disadvantages:
- Limited analysis due to the
lack of measurements
Conclusions:
- Not well suited
Advantages:
- Many tests possible
- Possibility to study global laws
governing specific situations
Disadvantages:
- Needs full scale reference tests
for transposition to real situations
Conclusions:
- Useful method for research
Advantages:
- Cost lower than full scale
tests.
Disadvantages:
- Linked to the limitations
induced by the similarity laws
Conclusions:
- Very difficult to conclude that
the results are representative of
full scale situations
Advantages:
- Possibility to get an
optimisation by the use of
different assumptions
Disadvantages:
- The model requires
qualification
Conclusions:
- Useful method for projects, if
validated
Reduced
scale
models
Numerical
models
(CFD)
Advantages:
- Possibility to study many
different situations
- Information on flow structures
unattainable with other methods
Disadvantages:
- The conclusions must be
correlated to existing
experimental references
Conclusions:
- Useful method for research
PIARC 135
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Advantages:
- Shows to the operators how
the ventilation reacts
- Fire brigades very interested
in what they will face for real
Disadvantages:
- No operation possible during
the tests
Conclusions:
- Well suited
Advantages:
- Representative situation
Disadvantages:
- No operation possible during
the tests
Conclusions:
- Well suited
Advantages:
- Cost
Disadvantages:
- Linked to the limitations
induced by the similarity laws
- No respect of time basis
Conclusions:
- Possibly unrealistic but
demonstrative
Advantages:
- Possibility to describe the
physical conditions in several
points of the tunnel
Disadvantages:
- Theoretical results lead to
theoretical conclusions
Conclusions:
- The adaptation depends on
the use of the model
Ce chapitre donne des dfinitions et des critres pour lvaluation des niveaux de scurit et le
dimensionnement des systmes de ventilation selon les critres de matrise des incendies et
des fumes.
Un systme de ventilation conu uniquement partir des critres environnementaux et de
dilution donnera souvent des rsultats insatisfaisants du point de vue de la matrise des
fumes.
De plus, les normes environnementales forcent les constructeurs de vhicules, aujourdhui plus
quhier et probablement de plus en plus lavenir, amliorer la technologie de rduction des
missions des vhicules ; ainsi, le dbit dair requis pour le critre de dilution est de plus de
plus rduit, de mme que la puissance lectrique ncessaire. Puisque la matrise des fumes
est indpendante des amliorations technologiques, ses critres seront lavenir dcisifs pour
un nombre toujours croissant de projets (voir figure 5.2).
AIPCR 136
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PIARC 137
05.05.B - 1999
Le paragraphe V.1 donne un court aperu des questions de ventilation avec quelques
rfrences aux problmes de dilution et denvironnement, alors que le reste de ce chapitre ne
traite que des recommandations en matire de matrise des fumes et des questions qui y sont
lies. Des informations gnrales sont donnes sur des travaux antrieurs de lAIPCR ( V.2),
les directives et expriences existantes ( V.3), de nouveaux rsultats de recherches ( V.4),
les objectifs de ventilation pour la matrise des incendies et des fumes ( V.5). Cependant, la
majeure partie de ce chapitre est consacre des informations dtailles et des
recommandations sur la matrise des incendies avec les principaux systmes de ventilation :
naturelle ( V.6), longitudinale ( V.7), transversale et semi-transversale ( V.8).
V.1
Introduction la ventilation
Une valuation doit tre ralise en tenant compte du volume dair ncessaire la dilution des
polluants ainsi que dautres facteurs comme la longueur du tunnel, sa situation, le type de
circulation, les lois sur lenvironnement et, facteur non ngligeable, la scurit. Un systme de
ventilation peut alors ensuite tre choisi pour chaque tunnel.
Les systmes possibles de ventilation sont :
- longitudinale,
- transversale,
- semi-transversale (et semi-transversale rversible),
- transversale partielle ;
Les principes de chaque mthode sont brivement dcrits ci-aprs. Les mthodes ne sont pas
toujours indpendantes, des combinaisons sont possibles et, dans certains cas, invitables.
AIPCR 138
05.05.B - 1999
Paragraph V.1 is a short overview of the ventilation matters with a few references to dilution and
environmental issues, while the remaining part of the section only deals with smoke control
recommendations and related issues. Some general information is given of previous work by
PIARC ( V.2), existing guidelines and experience ( V.3), new research results and physics (
V.4), objectives of ventilation for fire and smoke control ( V.5). However, the largest part of the
section is devoted to detailed information and recommendations regarding fire control with the
main ventilation systems: natural ( V.6), longitudinal ( V.7), transverse and semi-transverse (
V.8).
V.1
Introduction to ventilation
Taking into account the volume of air required for the dilution of pollutants as well as other
factors, such as tunnel length, location, type of traffic, environmental laws, and not least, fire
safety considerations, an assessment can be performed and the ventilation system can be
chosen for each particular tunnel.
The possible ventilation systems are:
- longitudinal,
- fully transverse,
- semi-transverse (and reversible semi-transverse),
- partial (pseudo) transverse;
The principles of each method are shortly described below. The methods are not always
distinct; combinations are possible and, in some cases, unavoidable.
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PIARC 141
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1 Par exemple, les autorits franaises recommandent une vitesse maximale de lair de 8 m/s pour des tunnels bidirectionnels
et 10 m/s pour des tunnels unidirectionnels.
AIPCR 142
05.05.B - 1999
From the point of view of the dilution criterion, the ventilation is considered satisfactory when
the system is able to keep the concentration of pollutants in the tunnel air below certain
thresholds, which are obviously under the noxious levels for people who travel throughout the
tunnel or who are forced to be stationary within for a while.
A ventilation system designed only according to the above-exposed dilution criterion, could be
satisfactory also from the smoke control point of view, but is often not; thus the project has to be
verified to take into account the smoke control criteria exposed in V.7.2.
In tunnels with longitudinal ventilation, the concentration of noxious substances increases in the
direction of the airflow and decreases with the fresh air rate. The maximum concentration
increases according to the tunnel length. In any cases, the production of pollutants varies with
the traffic volume, its velocity, the roadway gradient and the tunnel altitude. Therefore, if we
compute the required airflow for the ventilation of two tunnels with the same (flowing) traffic, we
would find the greater flow rate for the longer one and for the tunnel with the greater upward
slope.
The longitudinal airflow velocity has a practical upper limit; consequently, for a given traffic and
slope of the roadway, the tunnel length for which longitudinal ventilation is possible has a
maximum limit too. As a first estimate, this upper limit could be evaluated knowing the cross2
sectional area of the tunnel and the maximum air velocity (today considered to be about 8 to 10
m/s) which is cost effective and does not disturb vehicles and the staff operating within the
tunnel. Moreover, the mechanical power of the ventilation system increases, in fact, with the
third power of the tunnel length in tunnels used bi-directionally.
For tunnels that require
an overall airflow over
the
aforementioned
threshold,
the
longitudinal ven-tilation is
still possible, but it has to
be supplemented with
shafts
for
massive
exchange of exhaust with
fresh air.
2 For instance, the French authorities recommend a maximum air velocity of 8 m/s for two-way tunnels and 10 m/s for oneway tunnels.
PIARC 143
05.05.B - 1999
Air frais
100 %
100 % (ventuellement
intermdiaire)
100 %
semi-transversal
semi-transversal rversible
- en exploitation normale
- en cas dincendie
100 %
intermdiaire
100 %
0 % dbit 100 %
transversal partiel 3
Air vici
0%
0 % dbit 100 %
0%
3 Le type le plus commun des systmes de ventilation transversaux partiels nvacue quune fraction de lair vici par rapport
au total dair frais fourni (100 %) par des gaines supplmentaires. Par consquent, une certaine quantit dair vici est
vacue par les ttes du tunnel. Par exemple, lorigine, chaque moiti du tunnel du Mont-Blanc tait quipe dun systme
3
3
de ventilation capable dinjecter 600 m /s (100 %) dair frais et dextraire seulement 300 m /s (50 %) dair vici. Les 50 %
restants taient chasss par les ttes du tunnel. Plus tard, le systme fut modifi en systme semi-transversal rversible,
3
avec une injection de 900 m /s (100 %) et aucune extraction en conditions normales dexploitation.
AIPCR 144
05.05.B - 1999
Longitudinal ventilation is generally performed by axial-flow fans called "jet fans" or "boosters"
(Figure 5.1.2.1) distributed along the tunnel and outside the traffic gauge. The size and
distribution of the jet fans along the tunnel have practically no effect on the overall tunnel air
velocity provided that a few technical rules are observed. Sometimes also the longitudinal
ventilation by injection is used, where the Saccardo effect is the way of transmission of the
thrust.
The cheapest criterion for the installation is the concentration of fans near the portals. In this
way the length of cables is the shortest possible. From the aerodynamics point of view, if the
fans are too close to the exit their efficiency is reduced. Consequently the first and last sets of
fans are usually installed at least 80-100 m within the tunnel.
Fresh air
Exhaust air
100%
100%
intermediate
100%
0%
Fully transverse
Partial (pseudo) transverse4
Semi transverse
Reversible semi transverse
- in normal operation
- in case of fire
100%
0%
0% flow 100%
0% flow 100%
Fully-transverse system
In fully-transverse ventilation systems there is one or more fresh air ducts that lay
parallel to the traffic tube. The fresh air is supplied through louvers distributed all
along the tunnel; the exhaust air is removed in the same way from the opposite side
of the tunnel by using one or more exhaust ducts. In this system, the amount of
exhausted air per metre of tunnel length equals the amount of supplied air. In some
cases of cut-and-covers, there are no ducts: the fresh air is injected directly from
outside through small fans, and the exhaust air is discharged in the same way directly
to the outside. The two air streams (injected fresh air and extracted exhaust air)
create a flow in the main tube, the direction of which is transverse to the longitudinal
axis of the tunnel.
4 The most common type of pseudo-transverse ventilation system is the one with an intermediate value for the exhaust air
evacuated through additional ducts and the full amount of fresh air (100%) supplied. Consequently a certain amount of
exhaust air is evacuated through the portals of the main tunnel. As an example, we can consider that originally each half of
3
the Monte Bianco tunnel was equipped with a ventilation system able to perform the inlet of 600 m /s (100%) while extracting
3
only 300 m /s (50%) of exhaust air. The remaining 50% was blown out through the tunnel portals. Later the system was
3
turned to reversible semi-transverse system, with an injection of 900 m /s (100%) and no extraction under normal operation.
PIARC 145
05.05.B - 1999
Un tel courant d'air est perturb par dautres facteurs (diffrences de pression du
vent aux ttes du tunnel, diffrences de pression atmosphrique, incendie dans le
tunnel, etc.), qui crent un courant dair longitudinal. Cela signifie quen pratique, un
courant d'air purement perpendiculaire laxe longitudinal du tunnel sera peu
probable. Un deuxime aspect noter est que le courant dair longitudinal est difficile
contrler, mme si la capacit du systme de ventilation transversale est grande,
car il nexiste pas de forces compensatrices dans le sens longitudinal. La manire la
plus rpandue davoir un quelconque contrle sur ce courant dair longitudinal est de
crer des cantons de ventilation indpendants et successifs dans lesquels linjection
et lextraction dair peuvent tre ralises sparment.
La concentration de pollution dans lair est constante tout au long du tunnel (sil ny a
pas de courant dair longitudinal). Ce systme est donc applicable dans les grands
tunnels. En principe, il ny a pas de limite la longueur du tunnel en ce qui concerne
lvacuation de la pollution, mais des restrictions conomiques et techniques entrent
bien sr en ligne de compte.
Lair ventil est amen et extrait grce des gaines construites cet effet. Le volume
total dair ventil ncessaire est considrable, spcialement dans les grands tunnels.
De fait, les gaines sont grandes et bien videmment onreuses. La capacit des
ventilateurs est en grande partie dtermine par la vitesse de lair dans les gaines.
Dans les grands tunnels, les gaines sont donc divises longitudinalement en
cantons, lair est fourni en des endroits diffrents afin de restreindre la vitesse de lair
dans les diffrents cantons. Des vitesses de 15 25 m/s dans les gaines dair
lorsquelles sont pleine charge sont frquentes. Comme dj mentionn, crer
plusieurs cantons de ventilation indpendants permet galement davoir un certain
contrle du courant dair longitudinal. Les ventilateurs sont gnralement installs
prs des entres du tunnel pour une meilleure accessibilit, ou dans des usines
souterraines.
En cas dincendie, la gaine daspiration de lair vici dans la zone de lincendie
fonctionne en aspiration totale et les cantons de ventilation voisins sont contrls de
manire ce que la vitesse longitudinale de lair au cur de lincendie pousse les
fumes dans le bon sens. Cependant, lexprience montre que, dans les petits
tunnels et sous linfluence du vent et de leffet de chemine des fumes chaudes, il
nest pas ais de contrler la direction et la vitesse de lair dans la zone de l'incendie.
AIPCR 146
05.05.B - 1999
The ventilating air is generally supplied and extracted through purpose built air ducts.
The total volume of ventilating air required is considerable, especially in long tunnels.
As a result the ducts are large and therefore expensive. The air velocity in the ducts
determines the required capacity of the fans to a significant extent. In long tunnels
the ducts system is therefore longitudinally divided into sections and the air is
supplied at various places in order to restrict the air speed in the various sections.
Speeds of 15 to 25 m/s in the air ducts under full load conditions are usual. As
already mentioned, creating several independent ventilation sections also provides a
means to have some control on the longitudinal airflow. The fans are usually installed
near the tunnel portals in order to be easy to reach, or in underground plants.
In case of a fire, the exhaust air duct in the fire area is turned on to full exhaust and
the neighbouring ventilation sections are controlled in such a way that a longitudinal
air velocity in the fire zone can move the smoke in a suitable way. However,
experience shows that, in short tunnels and under the influence of the wind and
chimney effect of the hot smoke, it is not easy to control the air direction and speed in
the fire zone.
Normal operation
Exploitation normale
PIARC 147
Fire
Incendie
05.05.B - 1999
Les installations actuelles sont principalement fondes sur des prcipitateurs lectrostatiques
capables dextraire les poussires et les suies de lair du tunnel.
En raison de la forte proportion de camions dans les tunnels japonais, le premier paramtre qui
y atteint le seuil critique de pollution est la visibilit. Cest pourquoi cest au Japon qua t
appliqu pour la premire fois un systme capable de rduire la concentration des particules
solides lintrieur du tunnel.
AIPCR 148
05.05.B - 1999
Remark: In Switzerland, there are some tunnels with only exhaust shafts.
to lessen the airflow rate required for the ventilation of the tunnel,
to reduce the overall pollution released at tunnel portals and shafts.
The present applications mainly rely on electrostatic precipitators able to collect dust and soot
from the tunnel air.
Given the high proportion of trucks within the Japanese tunnels, the visibility is the pollution
parameter that first reaches the relevant threshold. For this reason, first in Japan, a system able
to reduce the concentration of solid particles within the tunnel air has been applied.
PIARC 149
05.05.B - 1999
Plusieurs tunnels Oslo (Norvge) sont aussi quips dun systme pour le traitement de lair,
car il existe une forte concentration de poussire dans les tunnels en hiver lorsque les
vhicules sont quips de pneus clous.
Des programmes complmentaires de recherche sont en cours dans ces deux pays et
galement en Autriche (tunnel de Plabutsch) et en Allemagne (tunnel de lElbe). Certains
dentre eux ont pour but lenlvement du CO, du NO x et des hydrocarbures. Le plus rcent porte
sur le traitement biologique de lair des fins de protection de lenvironnement.
Une voie intressante a t ouverte par la recherche sur les filtres lectrostatiques capables
dextraire la poussire et la suie des fumes chaudes dun incendie afin damliorer la visibilit.
Les rsultats sont encourageants et montrent que la visibilit peut tre amliore en prcipitant
les particules de fume. Cependant, cette technologie na jamais t applique comme moyen
unique de lutte contre lincendie.
V.2
Pratiquement tous les rapports du Comit des Tunnels routiers aux Congrs mondiaux de la
Route ont trait du problme de la ventilation des tunnels, de ses lois physiques, des taux
dmission des polluants, des niveaux maximaux admissibles des polluants, etc.
Les rapports numrs ci-aprs traitent galement de la ventilation en cas dincendie :
V.3
De nombreuses directives sur la ventilation des tunnels, la scurit et la gestion des incendies
existent de par le monde.
Dans de nombreux autres pays, seuls les rapports AIPCR servent de rfrence.
AIPCR 150
05.05.B - 1999
Several tunnels in Oslo (Norway) are also equipped with a system for air cleaning because a
high concentration of dust affects the tunnel air in wintertime when vehicles are equipped with
studded tires.
Complementary research programmes on the topic are under development in these two
countries and also in Austria (Plabutsch tunnel) and Germany (Elbe tunnel). Some of them aim
at removing CO, NOx and hydrocarbons. The latest research programme deals with the use of
biological cleaning of the air for environmental purposes.
There is an interesting line of research on electrostatic filters able to collect dust and soot from
the hot smoke of a fire, to improve the visibility. There are encouraging results that show that
the visibility can be improved by precipitating the particles from the fire smoke. However, this
technology has never been applied as the only fire control measure.
V.2
Every report of the Committee on Road Tunnels for the successive World Road Congresses
has dealt with the problem of tunnel ventilation, its physics, the pollutants emission rates,
maximum allowed pollutant levels, etc.
The reports listed below deal with the problem of ventilation in case of fire also:
V.3
Several guidelines dealing with tunnel ventilation, fire safety design and fire management exist
all over the world.
The Japan Road Association wrote ventilation guidelines (in Japanese [85]). The
most important points are reported in a Technical memorandum of PWRI [86].
PIARC 151
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V.4
Lannexe de ce chapitre dcrit lexprience des Pays-Bas sur la rsistance lincendie des
acclrateurs. Dautres rsultats intressants sur les questions abordes ont t dcrits dans
les chapitres III et IV.
Il est conseill de se reporter ces chapitres pour plus de dtails sur les nouvelles recherches
en matire de ventilation pour la matrise de lincendie et des fumes.
V.5
Du point de vue de la scurit en cas dincendie, les critres suivants doivent tre appliqus
lors de la conception :
1. Lobjectif du contrle de la propagation de la fume est de maintenir le plus
longtemps possible les personnes dans une zone libre de toute fume ; cela signifie
que soit la stratification de la fume doit tre conserve intacte, laissant une zone
plus ou moins claire et respirable sous la couche de fume (cela est prfrable dans
des tunnels circulation bidirectionnelle ou circulation unidirectionnelle
congestionne) ; soit la fume doit tre totalement refoule vers un ct de lincendie
(cela sera de prfrence appliqu dans des tunnels circulation unidirectionnelle
non congestionne lorsquil ny a normalement aucun usager en aval de lincendie).
2. Dans tous les cas, les usagers doivent pouvoir atteindre un lieu sr en un temps et
sur une distance suffisamment courts (voir chapitre I) ; par consquent, des sorties
de secours ou des abris ventils rsistant au feu doivent tre installs o cela est
ncessaire (voir chapitre VI).
3. Le systme de ventilation doit pouvoir maintenir les ouvrages non touchs par
l'incendie libres de toute fume (sorties de secours, deuxime tube dun tunnel, etc.).
4. Le systme de ventilation doit tre capable d'assurer de bonnes conditions pour la
lutte contre lincendie.
5. En cas dincendie dessence, il faut viter les explosions secondaires dues une
combustion incomplte. Le systme de ventilation doit alors pouvoir fournir
suffisamment dair pour une combustion ou dilution complte des gaz explosifs. Il faut
galement un bon systme de drainage afin de rduire la zone dvaporation de
lessence.
V.6
La ventilation naturelle repose sur des phnomnes naturels et sur la circulation. Ce systme
de ventilation peut savrer trs efficace pour la dilution des polluants (principalement pour les
tunnels unidirectionnels) ; mais du point de vue scurit, il nest pas possible de se fier ce
systme. En fait, lors dun incendie en tunnel, la circulation est gnralement interrompue et la
ventilation provient uniquement de phnomnes naturels qui ne peuvent tre que partiellement
dterministes (comme leffet de chemine) ; mais le principal composant de la ventilation reste
inconnu (comme les composants mtorologiques) et n'est, bien videmment, pas fiable.
AIPCR 152
05.05.B - 1999
V.4
The appendix of this section describes the experience of the Netherlands on heat resistance of
jet fans. Other interesting results are related with the issues discussed in sections III and IV.
Please refer to these sections for further details on new research on ventilation for fire and
smoke control.
V.5
From the point of view of safety in case of fire, the following criteria have to be applied in the
design:
1. The purpose of controlling the spread of smoke is to keep people as long as possible
in a smoke-free part of the traffic room. This means that either the smoke stratification
must be kept intact, leaving more or less clear and breathable air underneath the
smoke layer (this is applicable to bi-directional or congested unidirectional tunnels)
or/and to completely push the smoke to one side of the fire (this should preferably be
applied to non-congested unidirectional tunnels where there are normally no people
downstream of the fire).
2. People must, in any cases, be able to reach a safe place in a reasonably short time
and covering a reasonably short distance (see section I). Therefore facilities such as
emergency exits or fireproof shelters should be provided whenever necessary (see
section VI).
3. The ventilation system must be able to keep clear of smoke the air in unharmed
structures (escape routes, twin traffic tube, etc.)
4. The ventilation system must be able to produce good conditions for fire fighting.
V.6
Natural ventilation relies on natural phenomena and traffic to renew the air in the tunnel. This
ventilation system can be very effective for the dilution of pollutants (especially for one-way
tunnels), but it is not possible to rely upon the natural ventilation for safety purposes. In fact in
the event of a fire in the tunnel, the traffic will probably stop and the ventilation is only provided
by natural phenomena that could be only partially deterministic (as chimney effect), but the main
component of the ventilation will be quite uncertain (as meteorological components) and
therefore unreliable.
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Pour cette raison, plusieurs pays ont publi des directives pour limiter lapplication de la
ventilation naturelle. Quelques-unes dentre elles sont prsentes ci-aprs.
Allemagne : les normes RABT de 1994 [50] estiment quun tunnel de 350 m de long
(et jusqu 700 m) est suffisamment sr en cas dincendie sans sorties de secours ni
ventilation mcanique.
France : les tunnels sur le rseau national [89] ncessitent des mesures de contrle
des fumes au-del des longueurs suivantes :
-
tunnels urbains :
300 m
tunnels non urbains :
500 m (gnralement)
tunnels non urbains :
jusqu 800-1 000 m
(si trafic < 2 000 vh/jour par sens de circulation).
Recommandations
En raison du nombre de paramtres qui interfrent sur le choix de ventiler ou non un tunnel
(longueur, situation, circulation, type de vhicules traversant le tunnel, etc.), il nest pas
possible lheure actuelle dexprimer des recommandations universelles sur les limites de la
ventilation naturelle, tout spcialement la longueur admissible sans ventilation mcanique. Les
lecteurs de ce rapport pourront utiliser comme rfrence les recommandations nationales
numres ci-dessus.
V.7
AIPCR 154
05.05.B - 1999
For this reason several countries issued guidelines to limit the application of natural ventilation.
Some of the above-mentioned guidelines are outlined hereafter.
Germany: the RABT standards of 1994 [50] regard a tunnel length of 350 m (and up
to 700 m) as safe enough in case of fire without emergency exits and mechanical
ventilation.
France: tunnels in the French national network [89] need smoke control measures
beyond the following lengths:
-
urban:
300 m
not urban:
500 m (generally)
not urban:
up to 800-1000 m
(if traffic < 2000 veh/day per traffic direction).
United Kingdom: the tunnel length with natural ventilation can reach 400 m, but
requires justification.
United States: natural ventilation can be used for a tunnel length up to 240 m (800 ft)
in the current NFPA 502 guideline.
Recommendations
Because of the number of different parameters which interfere in the choice to ventilate or not a
tunnel (length, location, traffic, type of vehicles using the tunnel, etc.), it is not possible at this
moment to express universal recommendations about the limits of the natural ventilation,
especially the allowable length without mechanical ventilation. The reader of this document can
use the above-mentioned national recommendations as a reference.
V.7
In case of fire inside the tunnel, generally, the only feasible way to evacuate smoke is pushing it
through the tunnel to the portal. However, the airflow velocity necessary for such operation is
the cause of turbulence and affects the smoke stratification downstream of the fire. This
phenomenon is the more evident the higher the air velocity. The smoke stratification can also be
upset by the longitudinal slope of the tunnel (especially when air flows downwards) and by
vehicles.
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La fume dincendie dans un tunnel sans dclivit aura naturellement tendance se propager
dans les deux directions en raison de la pousse hydrostatique. Si la ventilation est en
fonctionnement, la fume aura alors tendance suivre la direction du courant d'air de
ventilation. A de faibles vitesses de lair, le mouvement hydrostatique induit nest pas
entirement matris et un peu de fume scoulera en amont, ce qui est souvent appel
"remonte de fume".
La distance de remonte des fumes peut tre dfinie comme la distance de lincendie
laquelle la vitesse de la fume en amont est annule par le dbit de ventilation du tunnel. Ainsi,
une distance de remonte des fumes gale zro signifierait quil ny a aucune fume en
amont. La vitesse de lair ncessaire pour remplir cette condition est appele vitesse critique.
Une quation simple a souvent t utilise pour dfinir la vitesse de lair ncessaire pour viter
la remonte de fume :
gHQ
C p A
Q
+ T
C p AVc
Vc = K 1 K 2
1/ 3
1.5
0.5
0
20
40
60
Q (MW)
Ce comportement gnral a t confirm par des simulations numriques [94] : certains des
rsultats sont prsents la figure 5.7.1 (prvisions). On peut constater quil existe une
certaine variation entre la simulation et lquation empirique. Les analyses numriques en 3D
prennent en compte des facteurs comme la largeur de lincendie, dont linfluence a t
dmontre.
AIPCR 156
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Smoke from a fire in a tunnel with no slope will naturally tend to propagate in both directions
due to buoyancy effects. If the ventilation is in operation, then the smoke will tend to be driven
in the direction of the ventilation airflow. At low tunnel airflow speeds, the buoyancy induced
flow is not entirely overcome, and some smoke will flow upstream, which is often termed
"backlayering".
The backlayering distance may be defined as the distance from the fire where the upstream
smoke velocity is cancelled by the tunnel ventilation flow. Hence a backlayering distance of zero
would imply that no smoke flows upstream. The tunnel air velocity required to achieve this
condition is termed the "critical velocity". A simple equation has often been used to determine
the tunnel air velocity required to prevent backlayering:
gHQ
C p A
Q
+ T
C p AVc
Vc = K 1 K 2
1/ 3
where VC is the critical velocity, K1 and K2 are constants, g is the acceleration due to gravity, H
is the tunnel height, Q is the fire heat release rate, A is the tunnel cross-sectional area, C p the
specific heat of air, and T are density and temperature of ambient air.
So the air velocity to prevent the backlayering depends on the fire heat release rate Q, the
tunnel area A and height H. It is plotted in Figure 5.7.1 against variable Q for fixed tunnel
parameters. It can be seen that the velocity increases with fire heat release rate, but levels off
as the heat release rate increases.
2.5
1.5
0.5
0
20
40
60
Q (MW)
This general behaviour has been confirmed by computer simulation [94]: some of the results
are also shown in Figure 5.7.1 ("prediction"). It can be seen that there is some variability
between the simulation and the empirical equation. The three-dimensional computer ana-lysis
takes into account factors such as the width of the fire, which is shown to have an influence.
PIARC 157
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Rcemment, des rsultats trs intressants ont t obtenus partir dessais dincendie raliss
sur maquettes [95] ou en vraie grandeur au Memorial tunnel [22]. Ils montrent quau-del dun
certain seuil de puissance thermique (dpendant probablement de la section transversale et de
la dclivit du tunnel), la vitesse critique dpend moins de la puissance que dans lquation
mentionne ci-avant.
Tous ces rsultats tendent montrer que pour une puissance ne dpassant pas 100 MW et une
pente infrieure 4 %, une vitesse de lair de 3 m/s est suffisante pour empcher la remonte
de fume.
Le dimensionnement et lexploitation des systmes de ventilation doivent tenir compte du fait
que, en raison de la prsence du courant d'air longitudinal, la zone en aval de lincendie est
expose aux fumes et aux gaz de combustion, avec un danger de suffocation ou de brlure si
les usagers du tunnel se trouvent cet endroit. Toute mesure destine faciliter la fuite des
usagers de la zone dangereuse (en aval ou dans la zone dincendie) doit tre prise. Pour cette
raison, les recommandations formules ici tiennent compte des cas suivants.
A) Tunnel unidirectionnel, non conu pour les embouteillages (zone non urbaine)
Dans ce cas, la conception de la ventilation doit tenir compte de ce que les usagers en aval de
lincendie pourront fuir avec leur propre vhicule alors que ceux qui se trouvent en amont ne le
pourront pas. Les tunnels situs dans les zones non urbaines ne sont gnralement pas sujets
de frquentes situations de congestion. Leur systme de ventilation nest donc pratiquement
jamais conu dans cette optique. Les tunnels non urbains, qui sont frquemment
congestionns, doivent eux tre dimensionns en fonction des embouteillages (voir paragraphe
suivant). Un incendie provoqu par un vhicule impliqu dans un accident avec dautres
vhicules bloqus en aval est possible, mais sa probabilit est faible (voir chapitre II). Ce cas
n'est pratiquement jamais pris en compte lors du dimensionnement. Si ncessaire, le risque
dun tel vnement peut tre rduit par une dtection automatique dincident et par un systme
de contrle de la circulation (voir chapitre VI).
C) Tunnel bidirectionnel
Dans le cas dun tunnel circul dans les deux sens, il faut penser que, en cas dincendie, des
personnes ne pouvant fuir avec leur vhicule se trouveront gnralement situes de part et
dautre de lincendie.
AIPCR 158
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Recently very interesting results have also been obtained from fire tests performed in scale
models [95] or in full size in the Memorial Tunnel [22]. These show that above a given level of
heat release (probably depending on tunnel cross-section and slope) the critical velocity
depends less on heat release rate than in the above equation.
All these results tend to show that for a heat release rate not exceeding 100 MW and a slope
lower than 4%, an airflow velocity of 3 m/s is sufficient to prevent backlayering.
The design of the ventilation system and its operation must take into consideration that, due to
the presence of the longitudinal airflow, the zone downstream of the fire is exposed to smoke
and hot combustion gases with the danger of suffocation or burning if tunnel users are in this
zone. Any possible design measure aiming at a safe fleeing of users from the dangerous
section (fire area or downstream) must be taken. For this reason the present recom-mendations
take into consideration the following cases:
A) Tunnel with one-way traffic not designed for queues (non-urban area)
The ventilation design, in this case, can assume that drivers downstream of the fire are free to
escape by their own cars whilst drivers upstream will not. Tunnels located in non-urban areas
are generally not liable to frequent congestion situations. Therefore the relevant ventila-tion
systems are generally not
desi-gned for queues. Nonurban tunnels which are frequently congested have
instead to be designed for
queues
(see
follo-wing
paragraph). The event of a
fire ignited by vehicles
involved in a secondary
acci-dent in the pre-sence of
others vehicles trapped
downstream is possible, but
the relevant probability is
low (see section II); this
case is nearly never taken
into account in the design
Figure 5.7.2 - Design
Figure 5.7.2 Hypothses
phase. If necessary the
assumption
de circulation tudier
risk
of
such
an
for the traffic
occurrence can be reduced by an automatic incident detection and a traffic control system (see
section VI).
B) Tunnel with one-way traffic designed for queues (urban area)
The ventilation design must take into consideration that people prevented from escaping with
their own vehicles can likely stand on both sides of the fire. In urban areas it is quite usual to
find stop and go traffic situation, therefore this case applies generally to urban tunnels of
sufficient length.
C) Tunnel with two-way traffic
In case of tunnels used by vehicles running in both directions, it must be taken into
consideration that, in the event of fire, people prevented from escaping with their own vehicles
will generally be located on both sides of the fire.
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La ventilation longitudinale par acclrateurs est applicable pour les tunnels jusqu 2 km de
long si la circulation est bidirectionnelle (dans ce cas, certains quipements et issues de
secours sont obligatoires). Dans le cas dune circulation unidirectionnelle, la ventilation
longitudinale peut tre utilise jusqu 4 km.
France
Pour les tunnels bidirectionnels non urbains, la ventilation longitudinale est autorise jusquaux
longueurs suivantes :
gnralement 800 m,
1 000 m si circulation 2 000 vh/jour par sens.
Pour les tunnels bidirectionnels urbains, la ventilation longitudinale est toujours interdite.
AIPCR 160
05.05.B - 1999
The level of risk within a tunnel, and therefore the design fire size, depend on the type of traffic
allowed; the relevant cases (see II.4) are:
There is no general limitation in the use of longitudinal ventilation. The decision is based on a
risk analysis which takes into account normal operation and fire situations. The main factors for
the analysis are the distance between emergency exits and the potential danger of the tunnel. If
longitudinal ventilation is used with two-way traffic, the following additional equipment is
implemented for the regulation and operation of ventilation: monitoring of the direction and
velocity of the airflow, fire detection, CCTV.
Germany
Longitudinal ventilation by jet fans is applicable to tunnels up to 2 km if the traffic is bidirectional (in this case a certain set of equipment and safety exits are required). In case of oneway traffic, longitudinal ventilation can be applied up to 4 km.
France
For two-way tunnels in non-urban areas, longitudinal ventilation is authorised up to the following
lengths:
800 m generally
1000 m if traffic 2000 veh/day per direction.
PIARC 161
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Pour les tunnels unidirectionnels, la ventilation longitudinale est autorise jusquaux longueurs
suivantes :
La longueur limite pour les tunnels unidirectionnels peut tre dpasse si une extraction
massive est prvue tous les 4 000 m dans les tunnels non urbains et tous les 800 m dans les
tunnels urbains.
tats-Unis
Auparavant, aucun tunnel ntait ventil longitudinalement aux tats-Unis. Actuellement, cette
mthode est utilise pour des tunnels infrieurs 900 m.
Recommandations
Gnralement, on saccorde pour considrer que les systmes de ventilation longitudinale
doivent tre utiliss dans les conditions suivantes :
A)Tunnel unidirectionnel, non conu pour les embouteillages (zone non urbaine)
La ventilation longitudinale peut toujours tre utilise, condition que les vhicules circulant en
aval de lincendie puissent sortir du tunnel et que les vhicules bloqus en amont se trouvent
dans le courant dair frais de la ventilation longitudinale.
C) Tunnel bidirectionnel
La ventilation longitudinale peut tre utilise dans les tunnels bidirectionnels, si une analyse
montre que le risque est compatible avec les normes nationales de scurit. Lanalyse du
risque doit prendre en compte tous les facteurs de dimensionnement et les conditions limites, et
au moins :
le volume de circulation,
le type de trafic autoris,
la gomtrie du tunnel,
les facteurs de risques admis au niveau national.
AIPCR 162
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The length limit for one-way tunnels can be overcome if massive extraction is provided at such
distances (every 4000 m in non-urban tunnels and every 800 m in urban tunnels).
USA
In the past there was no tunnel longitudinally ventilated in the USA. Nowadays the application of
this method is used with tunnels up to 900 m.
Recommendations
It is generally agreed that longitudinal ventilation systems should be used under the following
conditions:
A) Tunnel with one-way traffic not designed for queues (non-urban area)
Longitudinal ventilation is always applicable under the assumption that the traffic downstream of
the fire site can leave the tunnel and the stopped traffic upstream is in the fresh air stream of the
longitudinal ventilation.
PIARC 163
05.05.B - 1999
Incendie (MW)
France
Pays-Bas
Sude
vhicules particuliers
2,5 - 8
autobus et camions
<100
camions citernes
>100
pas de rgles
gnrales
(voir ci-aprs)
En Sude, il nexiste pas de rgles gnrales relatives la vitesse de lair en cas dincendie.
Pour le boulevard priphrique de Stockholm, lincendie de dimensionnement est de 100 MW et
la vitesse correspondante de dimensionnement de lair est fixe 3 m/s. Le transport de
liquides inflammables qui senflamment plus facilement que le gasole est limit dans ces
tunnels.
Recommandations
Durant lincendie de dimensionnement, le systme de ventilation doit pouvoir produire une
vitesse longitudinale de lair suffisante pour pousser toutes les fumes dans une direction (le
sens de circulation dans le cas dun tunnel unidirectionnel).
Une vitesse de dimensionnement de lair de 3 m/s est recommande pour tous les incendies qui
nimpliquent pas de poids lourds transportant des marchandises dangereuses trs
inflammables.
Il nest pas possible aujourdhui de donner des recommandations prcises en ce qui concerne
les incendies de camions citernes. Ceux-ci peuvent produire une puissance thermique de
plusieurs centaines de mgawatts. Les vitesses de lair recommandes par quelques pays et
mentionnes ci-avant peuvent tre utilises comme rfrences.
AIPCR 164
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Table 5.7.1 shows the design velocities more recently recommended by several countries
further to new research results.
Table 5.7.1 - Examples of longitudinal velocity used in different countries
Fire (MW)
France
Netherlands
2.5 - 8
<100
Petrol tanker
>100
Sweden
No general
rules
(see below)
In Sweden, there are no general rules concerning air velocity in case of fire. For the Stockholm
Ring Road the design fire is 100 MW and the corresponding air design velocity is set to 3 m/s.
Transports of flammable liquids that are ignited more easily than diesel oil are restricted in
these tunnels.
Recommendations
During the design fire, the ventilation system must be able to produce a longitudinal airflow
velocity sufficient to push all smoke to one direction (the direction of traffic in the case of a oneway tube).
A design airflow velocity of 3 m/s is recommended for all fires which do not involve a heavy
goods vehicle carrying very flammable dangerous goods.
It is not possible at present to give precise recommendations for the case of a petrol tanker fire
which can produce a heat release rate of several hundreds megawatts. The above-mentioned
design velocities recommended by several countries can be used as a reference.
PIARC 165
05.05.B - 1999
Hypothses de dimensionnement
La vitesse longitudinale de dimensionnement doit tre obtenue selon les hypothses nonces
ci-aprs :
1
2
w
2
effets de lincendie sur le courant dair : plusieurs aspects doivent tre pris en
compte :
-
leffet de blocage de lincendie sur le courant d'air longitudinal produit une perte
de charge localise supplmentaire ;
selon la dclivit du tunnel, leffet chemine peut atteindre des valeurs notables ;
AIPCR 166
05.05.B - 1999
Design hypotheses
The design longitudinal velocity must be obtained under the hypotheses discussed below:
p = k
1
2
w
2
where p represents the pressure induced by wind, the air density, w the wind
speed, k a design parameter which depends on the configuration of the portals.
The orientation of both tunnel portals with respect to the prevailing winds is a very
significant parameter; in fact the effective wind resistance (or thrust) is a function of
the angle between the direction of the wind and the direction of the air flow
entering/exiting the tunnel.
Standstill traffic: while evaluating the necessary thrust in case of fire, it must be
assumed that a certain number of vehicles can be trapped in the tunnel and their
presence reduces the performance of the ventilation system. The number of vehicles
trapped can be assessed according to the design mix of traffic (% of passenger cars
and heavy vehicles), the level and the performance of the current road operation and
traffic control system available for the tunnel.
Effects of fire on the air flow: several aspects must be taken into account:
in the event of a big fire, the high temperature induces an increase of air volume
and therefore of air speed, as a result of which the air friction losses increase.
The density, in fact, decreases, the friction velocity increases and, on balance, the
overall local losses increase;
according to the grade of the tunnel, the chimney effect can raise to appreciable
values;
the decrease of air density results in the lowering of the driving force of the
boosters that work in the hot air.
PIARC 167
05.05.B - 1999
Rversibilit du systme
La rversibilit du systme peut tre utile dans plusieurs situations durant la phase de lutte
contre lincendie, spcialement si le tunnel possde des accs de secours en plus des deux
ttes.
Lorsque lon prvoit la rversibilit, il faut tenir compte du fait quune telle opration peut
prendre du temps (jusqu 10 mn), selon le systme de ventilation, la gomtrie du tunnel, le
type dacclrateurs utiliss et dautres conditions limites. Par ailleurs, il faut observer que les
acclrateurs nont pas toujours la mme pousse en direction inverse. Par exemple, il existe
des acclrateurs spcialement conus pour une direction ; leur pousse dans la direction
inverse peut tre infrieure de 50 % leur pousse nominale.
Dans le cas de tunnels bitubes, linversion du courant d'air dans le tunnel intact peut empcher
la recirculation des fumes vacues par la tte de l'autre tube. Une telle recirculation de la
fume peut galement tre vite par des travaux de gnie civil (dcalage entre les deux ttes,
mur de protection entre les ttes, etc.).
AIPCR 168
05.05.B - 1999
When planning the reversing of the air, it must be taken into consideration that such operation
can take a long time (up to 10 minutes), depending on the ventilation system, the tunnel
geometry, the fans used and other boundary conditions. Besides it should be observed that fans
do not give the same thrust in the reversed direction. For instance there are jet fans specially
designed for one direction, whose thrust in the reversed direction may be lower than 50% of the
nominal one.
In the case of twin tunnels the reversing of the flow in the unharmed tunnel can prevent the
circulation of smokes evacuated through the portal of the twin tunnel. Such circulation of smoke
can also be prevented by civil engineering works (distance between the twin portals, protection
walls between portals, etc.).
PIARC 169
05.05.B - 1999
sous tempratures leves, les pales se dilatent en longueur plus rapidement que le
carter ; les pales tendent alors bloquer la rotation ; on peut soit utiliser des
extrmits de pales en matriau abrasif, soit mnager un plus grand espace entre les
pales et le carter ;
un moteur dacclrateur doit tre refroidi par lair extrieur pour rpondre aux
exigences de refroidissement ; cependant, certains moteurs suffisamment rsistants
peuvent fonctionner sans refroidissement extrieur ;
tous les quipements auxiliaires, de mme que le cblage des acclrateurs, doivent
galement remplir certaines exigences quant aux tempratures.
Pour toutes ces raisons, les ventilateurs doivent tre conus et construits afin de rsister de
fortes tempratures ; de nombreuses normes nationales existent pour la rsistance au feu des
acclrateurs, de 250 C pour 1h (Autriche, tats-Unis, Pays-Bas, Royaume-Uni), 250 C pour
1h30 (France), 300 C pour 1 h (Norvge, Sude), 400 C pour 1h30 (France, Suisse).
Rsistance au feu
des acclrateurs
Pays
France
Tunnel > 500 m
Pays nordiques
[90]
Pays-Bas
Temprature
Dure de
rsistance
400 C
1h30
250 C
1h30
aucune protection
250 C
1h
AIPCR 170
avec marchandises
dangereuses
70 m
100 m
500 m
150 - 300 m
en aval de lincendie
Voir annexe
200 m
400 m
(interdit)
05.05.B - 1999
the length of the blades grows quicker than the housing enlarges due to high
temperatures. The blade tips tend to block the rotation. Abrasive tips may be
introduced or a larger distance between blades and housing provided;
a normal fan motor has to be cooled by outside air to meet the cooling requirements.
However, there are motors available which have a very high resistance without
external cooling;
all the auxiliary equipment as well as the wiring of the fan have to meet the air
temperatures also.
For these reasons, fans must be designed and built in order to withstand high temperatures;
there are several national standards for the heat resistance of fans ranging from 250 C for 1
hour (Austria, Netherlands, United Kingdom, USA), 250 C for 1.5 hours (France), 300 C for
1 hour (Norway, Sweden), 400 C for 1.5 hours (France, Switzerland).
Fans distribution
As mentioned above, the cheapest criterion for the installation is the concentration of fans near
portals. In this way the length of cables is in fact the shortest possible.
Should the fire take place in the portal area, and adopting the above-reported fan distribution, a
full set of fans may be put out of order. If the mechanical power of a single group of fans is
sufficient to control the smoke during the evacuation and fire-fighting phases the above criterion
can be adopted, otherwise it is recommended to divide fans in several sets that will be
distributed all along the tunnel.
In case of fans distribution all along the tunnel, a limited fan redundancy is recommended and
can avoid the use of fireproof fans: in fact in case of fire the temperature decreases rapidly
when the distance from the fire spot increases, and it may be cost-effective to envisage the
destruction of a few machines rather than protecting all the fans. Table 5.7.2 gives some
examples in different countries.
Temperature
Endurance
400 C
1.5 h
250 C
1.5 h
no protection
250 C
1h
PIARC 171
without
dangerous goods
70 m
100 m
500 m
150 - 300 m
downstream of fire
See appendix
05.05.B - 1999
with
dangerous goods
200 m
400 m
(forbidden)
AIPCR 172
05.05.B - 1999
The tunnel operation in case of fire, since the ignition to the extinction, can be characterised
using the following four phases (that generally overlap):
1. ignition phase: this phase starts with the ignition of the fire and includes both the
detection (manual or automatic) and the consequent intervention on the ventilation
regime;
2. evacuation phase 1 (self rescuing): during this phase the users are escaping from the
fire area and the fire brigade is not yet on the spot;
3. evacuation phase 2 (assisted): during this phase the fire brigade assists injured or
handicapped users to escape from the fire area;
4. fire-fighting: during this phase the control of operation is (generally) already passed
from the tunnel operator to the fire brigade; the fire brigade has already checked that
all users have already escaped (or have already been rescued) from the fire area (all
of them are out of the tunnel, upstream of the fire or in other safe places).
The ventilation action during an evacuation phase must be such that optimal conditions for the
fleeing person in the tunnel are established.
When the evacuation phase is concluded, fire fighting must be facilitated by proper smoke
handling. A basic requirement is a smoke free access to the fire from one side. Preferably the
direction of smoke flow should not be changed from the situation during evacuation. In any
case, upon the arrival of the fire-fighting brigade, it can be decided on site which better fan
control should be used to facilitate fire fighting.
PIARC 173
05.05.B - 1999
Un tube
avec circulation
bidirectionnelle
Deux tubes
avec circulation
unidirectionnelle
V.8
Phases dvacuation
La stratification de la fume ne
doit pas tre perturbe :
- vitesse longitudinale de lair
relativement faible,
- aucun acclrateur en
fonctionnement dans la zone
enfume.
AIPCR 174
05.05.B - 1999
The reversal of jet fans is generally not recommended during the evacuation phase, even if the
fire is located near the entrance portal. In the period between the ignition of the fire and the
reversal of the jet fans, the smoke can have travelled several hundreds metres already. When
the smoke layer flow is reversed, it will be spread over the whole cross section whilst during the
phases of people evacuation it is important to maintain good visibility conditions.
So a possible reversal of the air flow direction should only take place when all people are out of
the tunnel. The reversing can be evaluated in the case of traffic jam inside the tunnel, but it
must be a human choice, not an automatic configuration.
The following table sums up the recommended ventilation operation in case of fire:
Longitudinal ventilation
One tube
with two-way traffic
Two tubes
with one-way traffic
V.8
Evacuation phases
Fire-fighting phase
PIARC 175
05.05.B - 1999
Pour extraire une couche de fume stratifie de lespace de circulation sans perturber la
stratification, une mthode efficace est lextraction continue par une gaine d'vacuation de l'air.
Cependant, les conditions suivantes doivent tre remplies :
La vitesse longitudinale de lair doit tre infrieure 2 m/s dans le tunnel, selon les
observations faites lors des essais japonais en vraie grandeur. A des vitesses plus
grandes, la turbulence verticale l'interface entre la fume et lair frais refroidit
rapidement la couche suprieure et la fume se mlange dans toute la section
transversale.
Dans une ventilation semi-transversale rversible avec les gaines au plafond, lair
frais, en fonctionnement normal de ventilation, est inject par des ouvertures au
plafond. Si un incendie se dclenche, tant que lair frais est fourni par ces ouvertures,
la quantit de fume augmente dans les mmes proportions et des jets puissants
tendent ramener la fume vers la surface de la chausse. Le passage de l'injection
dair lextraction doit tre ralis aussi vite que possible.
AIPCR 176
05.05.B - 1999
To remove a stratified smoke layer out of the traffic room without disturbing the stratification, a
continuous extraction into a return air duct is efficient. However, the following conditions must
be fulfilled:
The longitudinal velocity of the tunnel air must be below 2 m/s. These were the
observations in the Japanese full scale tests. With higher velocities the vertical
turbulence in the shear layer between smoke and fresh air quickly cools the upper
layer and then the smoke mixes over the whole cross-section.
With practically zero longitudinal air velocity, the smoke layer expands to both sides
of the fire. The smoke spreads in a stratified way during up to 10 minutes, even
without smoke extraction. After this initial phase smoke starts to mix over the whole
cross-section unless by this time the extraction is in full operation.
With an air velocity around 2 m/s, most of the smoke of a medium size fire spreads to
one side of the fire (little backlayering) and starts mixing over the whole cross section
at a distance of 400 - 600 m downstream of the fire site. This mixing over the cross
section can also be prevented if the smoke extraction is activated early enough.
Vehicles standing in the longitudinal air flow increase strongly the vertical turbulence
and encourage the vertical mixing of the smoke.
In a transverse ventilation system, the fresh air jets entering the traffic room at the
floor level induce a rotation of the longitudinal airflow, which tends to bring the smoke
layer down to the road. That is the reason for the recommendation to throttle the fresh
air rate to 1/2 - 1/3 of the full capacity, depending on the initial fresh air jet
momentum. No fresh air should be injected from the ceiling in a zone with smoke,
because this increases the amount of smoke and tends to suppress the stratification.
In a reversible semi-transverse ventilation with the duct at the ceiling, the fresh air is
added through ceiling openings in normal ventilation operation. If a fire occurs, as
long as fresh air is supplied through ceiling openings, the smoke quantity increases
by this amount and strong jets tend to bring the smoke down to the road surface. The
changeover of the duct from supply to extraction must be done as quickly as possible.
PIARC 177
05.05.B - 1999
Capacit dextraction
Ds quun incendie de dimensionnement a t choisi, ainsi que son dbit de production de
fume, une longueur admissible sur laquelle la fume peut se propager doit tre fixe. Selon le
type d'ouvertures (fixes ou tlcommandes), la capacit dextraction par mtre de longueur du
tunnel dans la zone dincendie est calcule. En gnral, un systme dextraction a besoin dun
moindre volume global d'aspiration lorsquil y a des clapets tlcommands que lorsque les
ouvertures sont fixes. Cependant, il faut tenir compte du fait que pendant la premire phase,
entre le dbut de la propagation de la fume et le plein fonctionnement du systme dextraction
avec de grands clapets, la fume peut stre propage sur un kilomtre, et peut-tre plus,
partir du foyer de lincendie. Il nest donc pas suffisant douvrir seulement quelques clapets
proches de lincendie, mais un dbit minimum dextraction le long de toute la section de
ventilation est aussi recommand. Une stratgie dextraction doit tre mise au point selon le
type de tunnel et son systme de ventilation.
AIPCR 178
05.05.B - 1999
Extraction capacity
Once a design fire and its amount of smoke production have been chosen, a permissible length
over which the smoke may spread has to be fixed. Depending on the type of exhaust openings
(fixed or remote-controlled), the extraction capacity per metre of tunnel length in the fire zone is
derived. In general an extraction system needs less total exhaust volume when remotecontrolled flaps are installed than
with fixed openings. However, it has
also to be considered that in the
first phase between start of the
smoke spreading and full operation
of the exhaust system with large
flaps, the smoke may have spread
over 1 km and more from the fire
site. Thus it is not sufficient to only
open a few exhaust openings near
the fire, but a minimum exhaust rate
along the whole ventilation section
is recommended also. A suction
strategy has to be developed
depending on the type of tunnel and
its ventilation system.
PIARC 179
05.05.B - 1999
La capacit dextraction sur la longueur o il est accept que la fume se propage, doit quelque
peu dpasser le dbit de fume gnr par lincendie, car les ouvertures ne vont pas seulement
aspirer de la fume, mais, invitablement, galement de lair frais. Il semble que 80 m3/s soit
une valeur trop faible pour des poids lourds sans marchandises dangereuses, mais il nexiste
pas de consensus pour recommander une nouvelle valeur.
AIPCR 180
05.05.B - 1999
The extraction capacity over the length which is permissible for smoke to spread must
somewhat exceed the smoke rate generated by the fire, because the openings will not only suck
smoke but inevitably some fresh air too. It seems that 80 m3/s is too low for a heavy goods
vehicles without dangerous goods, but there is no consensus to recommend a new value.
The exhaust capacity and the longitudinal velocity created by the jet fans in the tunnel section
filled with smoke have to be matched as well as controlled under operation. It does not matter
whether the smoke is stratified or spread over the whole tunnel cross section. The
recommended extraction value is based on cross-sectional area longitudinal velocity. It must
be able to take out a longitudinal airflow of 3 to 4 m/s and furthermore a small air velocity in the
following ventilation section towards the exhaust opening in order to prevent the spreading of
smoke beyond the suction point.
In this way the mixing of smoke into the fresh air layer can be minimised and the smoke eddies
being torn into the fresh air layer are continuously diluted. A large tunnel fire creates strong
longitudinal airflows to supply the oxygen to the fire. With a continuous fresh air supply along
the tunnel this longitudinal velocity is reduced, which again minimises the air exchange with the
smoke layer.
Fresh air jets entering from ceiling openings are unfavourable. When they enter the traffic room
vertically, they pierce the smoke layer, induce smoke into the jet and thus pump smoke into the
fresh air layer. A strong jet also induces a rotation of the whole tunnel air volume what tends to
bring the smoke layer down. Therefore the exit velocity of such ceiling jets should be small.
Fresh air jets entering from the ceiling should be stopped immediately after fire alarm in the
ventilation section where the fire is located. For longer tunnels it is recommended to position the
fresh air outlets near the road surface.
PIARC 181
05.05.B - 1999
AIPCR 182
05.05.B - 1999
The situation is very different for an open system where tunnel air is taken directly out of the
traffic room by large exhaust openings and the fans are positioned near the extraction openings.
In the case that such fans are placed at the end of a shaft, the shaft has a favourable cooling
effect.
The most usual way to control the longitudinal velocity is to provide several independent
ventilation sections. When a tunnel has several ventilation sections, a certain longitudinal
velocity in the fire section can be obtained by a suitable operation of the individual air ducts. By
reversing the fan operation an exhaust air duct can also be used as supply air duct and vice
versa.
Whatever the means of controlling the longitudinal air velocity are, their operation has to be preprogrammed according to the location of the fire in the tunnel.
PIARC 183
05.05.B - 1999
ANNEXE
Lexprience des Pays-Bas sur la rsistance lincendie des acclrateurs
En 1994, le Ministre des Transports a lanc une initiative dans laquelle un certain nombre dessais ont t mens
afin de dterminer si les acclrateurs existants remplissaient les conditions de rsistance des tempratures de
250 C pendant une heure. Il fut dcid de mener ces recherches laide dun essai qui recrerait une situation
aussi proche que possible de la ralit.
Un deuxime objectif de cette recherche tait de dfinir si les principes de calcul pour dterminer la capacit du
systme de ventilation taient ralistes en cas dincendie. Cela impliquait la mesure de la composition chimique
des gaz de fume et la pousse. De plus, la quantit et la vitesse des gaz de fume devaient tre mesures.
Durant la premire srie dessais, il fut galement recherch dans quelle mesure lacclrateur dit standard
rsisterait ou non des tempratures suprieures 250 C.
20
100
200
300
400
500 *
600 *
700 *
1,2
0,95
0,75
0,61
0,52
0,45 *
0,38 *
0,30 *
0
79
62
50
43
37
31
25
AIPCR 184
05.05.B - 1999
APPENDIX
The experience of the Netherlands on fire resistance of fans
In 1994, the Ministry of Transport introduced an initiative whereby a number of fire tests were carried out in order to
be able to determine whether the jet fans supplied complied with the temperature-resistance required of 250 C for
1 hour. It was decided to conduct this research by means of a test which would recreate the tunnel situation as
closely as possible.
A second objective of this research was to determine whether the calculation principles for the determination of the
capacity of the ventilation system would hold up in a fire. This involved measuring the chemical composition of the
flue gases and the thrust during the research. Furthermore, the amount of the flue gas and the flue gas speed in
the test situation had to be measured. During this first series of fire tests, it was also simultaneously investigated
whether and to what extent the fan supplied as "standard" is resistant against temperatures higher than the 250 C
required.
Effective density
in % (rounded off)
0
79
62
50
43
37
31
25
PIARC 185
05.05.B - 1999
La capacit finale dun systme de ventilation lors dun incendie est dtermine par la localisation du cur de
lincendie. Les ventilateurs jet proximit de lair frais fonctionnent parfaitement. Les acclrateurs en aval de
lincendie cesseront de fonctionner selon la distance laquelle ils se trouvent du cur de lincendie, sa dure et la
temprature ambiante. On peut prvoir que les tempratures vers le cur de lincendie seront si leves quil sera
virtuellement impossible de concevoir des acclrateurs suffisamment rsistants et, de plus, cela serait inutile
comme mentionn prcdemment.
Capacit de lincendie
300 MW
10
350
360
350
300
< 300
7,5*
500
480
425
350
< 350
650
600
500
400
< 400
1 000
800
550
400
< 400
Vitesse
de
ventilation
en m/s
1 200
900
550
400
< 400
NB : * valeurs interpoles
AIPCR 186
05.05.B - 1999
The final capacity of the ventilation system during a fire is determined by the location of the seat of the fire. The
number of boosters in the vicinity of cool air works perfectly. The fans downstream of the fire will stop working
depending on the distance to the seat of the fire, the duration of the fire and the ambient temperature. It should be
expected that the temperatures close to the seat of the fire will be so high that it will be virtually impossible to build
fans which can resist, and furthermore this would be pointless, as described above.
The temperature evolution is not experimental, but computed (by the Netherlands Organisation for Applied
Scientific Research - TNO) in a "standard" tunnel with the large and medium-sized fire using the VESTA
program. Unfortunately, this programme has still not been validated, and until this is the case, it is assumed that
the results are valid. In order to also be able to say something about the temperature course in the small fire
scenario behind the fire, the Netherlands Ministry proposes reducing the temperatures in proportion to the fire
capacity. However, as is evident from the tables below, in this scenario there are hardly any temperature problems
for fans, so no further investigations have been undertaken.
The tables below demonstrate that the temperatures which occur behind the fire are determined to a great extent
by the air speed of ventilation. For example, a 300 MW fire with a 10 m/s air speed gives temperatures lower than
360 C, but reducing the air speed to 5 m/s gives 650 C as the maximum. This results in the following table,
whereby a stationary situation and a heating-up time of 10 minutes is assumed. It is assumed that within this time
the fire is fully developed and the full power is being released. This situation will continue as long as the fire has
fuel and sufficient oxygen to burn.
Fire capacity
300 MW
400
10
350
360
350
300
< 300
7.5*
500
480
425
350
< 350
650
600
500
400
< 400
1000
800
550
400
< 400
Ventilation
speed in m/s
1200
900
550
400
< 400
PIARC 187
05.05.B - 1999
Capacit de lincendie
100 MW
230
230
200
175
< 175
360
340
260
200
< 200
500
400
300
200
< 200
Vitesse
de
ventilation
en m/s
600
410
250
150
< 150
Capacit de
lincendie
300 MW
Vitesse de
ventilation
en m/s
10
7,5*
5
3
2
Nombre dacclrateurs
dtruits selon leur
rsistance la
temprature
250 C
400 C
12
12
12
12
12
Capacit de
lincendie
100 MW
Nombre dacclrateurs
dtruits selon leur
rsistance la
temprature
12
3*
12
12
12
Vitesse de
ventilation
en m/s
400 C
1
2
12
12
12
250 C
12
12
AIPCR 188
05.05.B - 1999
230
230
200
175
< 175
360
340
260
200
< 200
500
400
300
200
< 200
600
410
250
150
< 150
Fire capacity
100 MW
Ventilation
speed in m/s
400
Medium-sized fire
7. With a medium-sized fire and at a ventilation speed of 5 m/s, all fans from 50 m behind the seat of the
fire will remain in operation if these are suitable for temperatures > 230 C.
8. With a medium-sized fire and ventilation speeds greater than 3 m/s, all fans from 50 m behind the seat
of the fire will remain in operation if these are suitable for ambient temperatures > 360 C.
9. At ventilation speeds below 2 m/s, the critical distance is 100 m at > 410 C or 250 m at > 250 C.
Fire capacity
300 MW
10
Ventilation
speed
in m/s
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
250 C
PIARC 189
05.05.B - 1999
12
3*
12
12
12
12
Ventilation
speed
in m/s
400 C
7.5*
Fire capacity
100 MW
12
12
05.05.B - 1999
Application of clusters
Another possibility is that the fans are placed in clusters. Two or more fans are placed alongside one another on the
ceiling in cross-section.
The number of clusters is usually limited to two or three clusters. The consequence of such a construction method
is that, in the event of a fire immediately in front of a cluster, all the fans in this cluster are lost. And if the following
cluster is less than 300 m away, the fans here too will be in a critical temperature area. If we take the example of
the ventilation of the 2nd Benelux tunnel, we see 3 clusters with 3 fans per cluster. The distance between the
clusters is 340 or 280 m. In the event of a fire immediately in front of cluster 1, the next cluster will be lost if the
temperature-resistance is 250 C. At a temperature-resistance of 400 C the cluster remains in operation. It is to be
expected that the temperature at the following cluster at 620 m has dropped to below 250 C, so this will remain in
operation. In this example therefore, 2/3 of the number of fans is lost at a temperature-resistance of 250 C. At
400 C this becomes 1/3. If the fans are placed separately along the tunnel, the centre-to-centre distance is 620/8 =
77.5 m. The number of fans which is lost in this situation is 300/77.5 = 3.8 4 fans at 400 C and 600/77.5 = 7.7
8 fans. At larger cluster distances, it is clear that fewer clusters are lost, so the situation is more favourable from a
fire safety point of view. At smaller distances between the clusters, the difference between the number of fans lost
with each system is less. However, the example shows that, at the distances commonly applied in the Netherlands,
the cluster situation is a little more vulnerable than the separate situation if the temperature-resistance is not
increased to 400 C.
05.05.B - 1999
VI.
SORTIES DE SECOURS
ET AUTRES EQUIPEMENTS
DE SECURITE
VI.1 Introduction
Ce chapitre traite des accs durgence pour lvacuation et les secours, et des autres
quipements de scurit ncessaires en cas dincendie dans les tunnels. Ces installations font
partie intgrante de tous les tunnels routiers modernes. Le type et la quantit dquipements
sont gnralement fonds sur le type et la longueur du tunnel, le trafic, etc. De nombreux pays
utilisent un systme de classification des tunnels qui les catgorise en groupes, et qui spcifie
les quipements de scurit ncessaires pour chaque groupe. LAIPCR a publi un rapport
spcial sur ce sujet [96].
Les quipements de scurit recouvrent toutes les installations ncessaires en cas dincendie
ou dautre accident. Au dpart, un systme est ncessaire pour dtecter l'incendie ou laccident
(tlphone durgence, dtection dincident, tlvision en circuit ferm, boutons dalarme,
dtecteur dincendie, etc.). Ce systme alerte le personnel du tunnel qui, le cas chant,
prvient les quipes de secours ou les pompiers. La prsence dextincteurs est importante, car
ils permettent souvent de circonscrire rapidement un dbut dincendie. Des conduites et des
poteaux fournissent leau aux pompiers. De plus, des quipements doivent permettre de fermer
le tunnel le plus rapidement possible et dempcher les automobilistes de pntrer lintrieur.
Dans les grands tunnels, les conducteurs peuvent tre informs par transmission radio, hautparleurs ou panneaux message variable. Enfin, il doit y avoir des issues de secours, des
galeries de retournement, ou bien des accs directs d'autres tubes ou lair libre. Les
mthodes utilises varient bien sr dun tunnel lautre, et selon les pays.
Il est trs important de dvelopper une stratgie pour sauvegarder les usagers et protger la
structure et les quipements du tunnel et, partant, de planifier les quipements, les mesures de
protection et les oprations de secours. Dans certains pays o le trafic est faible, la stratgie
retenue est de construire des garages et des galeries de retournement afin de permettre aux
conducteurs de faire demi-tour et de quitter le tunnel. Dans les tunnels urbains, il est
gnralement possible de permettre aux usagers de s'chapper directement lair libre ou par
des caves ou autres installations souterraines. Dans le pass, il arrivait frquemment quune
brigade de pompiers soit affecte un tunnel. Mais cela est onreux et les nouveaux tunnels
dpendent gnralement de la collaboration des brigades voisines.
Dans ce chapitre, sont rsums les expriences ou les guides de dimensionnement existant en
Allemagne, Autriche, Belgique, tats-Unis, France, Italie, Japon, Norvge, Pays-Bas, Sude,
Suisse et Royaume-Uni. Tous ces pays possdent de nombreux tunnels, courts ou longs, avec
diffrents niveaux de circulation. Ils couvrent donc un ventail intressant de tunnels.
AIPCR 192
05.05.B - 1999
VI.
VI.1 Introduction
This section deals with emergency accesses for evacuation and rescue, and other safety
equipment necessary in case of fire in tunnels. These facilities are an integral part of all modern
road tunnels. The type and amount of equipment is usually based on tunnel type and length,
traffic, etc. Many countries use a tunnel classification system that categorises tunnels into
groups, and specifies the necessary emergency equipment for each group. A special report has
been published by PIARC on this subject [96].
Safety equipment covers all facilities necessary in case of fire or some other accident. Initially, a
system is needed to detect the fire or accident (emergency telephone, incident detection, closed
circuit television, alarm buttons, fire detectors, etc.). This equipment will alert the tunnel
personnel who will call upon the rescue teams or the fire brigade as necessary. Fire
extinguishers are important, as many fires can easily be extinguished in their early stages.
Hydrants and water mains will supply water to the firemen. Furthermore there should be
equipment to close the tunnel as fast as possible and stop drivers before they enter the tunnel.
In major tunnels drivers can be informed by radio transmissions, loudspeakers or variable text
signs. Then there should be emergency exits, turning galleries, or direct accesses to other
tunnel tubes or the open. Methods used may vary from tunnel to tunnel, or from country to
country.
It is very important to develop a strategy for saving people and protecting tunnel equipment and
structure, and consequently plan the equipment protection and rescue operations. In some
countries where the traffic is low, the chosen strategy is to build lay-bys and turning galleries so
as to make drivers turn and drive out of the tunnel. In city tunnels it is usually possible to let
people escape to the open directly or through cellars or other underground facilities. Earlier
tunnels often had their own fire-fighting brigade. This is costly and new tunnels usually depend
on co-operation with nearby fire brigades.
In this section experience or design guides from Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States
are summarised. All these countries have many tunnels both short and long, with varying
amounts of traffic. They should therefore cover an interesting spectrum of tunnels.
PIARC 193
05.05.B - 1999
galeries transversales dbouchant sur lextrieur ou dans le tube adjacent pour les
pitons et/ou les vhicules,
galeries transversales conduisant des galeries de scurit pour les pitons,
salles sres spcialement quipes (abris, aussi appels refuges),
galeries de retournement pour les vhicules.
Il na pas t possible de donner des recommandations gnrales sur la distance entre les
sorties de secours. Cela doit tre fix au cas par cas, par une tude soigneuse des conditions
qui prvalent.
AIPCR 194
05.05.B - 1999
Most of these countries have new or newly revised guidelines on safety equipment. The
guidelines are different but give almost the same type of equipment if compared tunnel for
tunnel. There are however some major differences when fire detection systems and sprinklers
are discussed. This difference can be due to special fire experience or differences in
regulations.
Detailed recommendations are given concerning emergency exits and equipment specially
devoted to fire safety such as fire detection, extinguishers, water supply (hydrants) and
sprinklers. Only general recommendations are given as concerns emergency telephones and
alarm push buttons, closed circuit television (CCTV), loudspeakers and radio communication
systems since they are also designed for many purposes other than fires.
cross connections leading to the open or to the adjacent tunnel tube for pedestrians
and/or vehicles;
cross connections into safety tunnels for pedestrians;
especially equipped safety rooms (shelters - also called refuges);
turning galleries for vehicles.
It was not possible to give general recommendations for the distance between escape exits.
This must be decided for each individual case by a careful study of the prevailing conditions.
PIARC 195
05.05.B - 1999
Essai n
501
502
Test
Puissance thermique
atteinte
nominale
en pointe
(MW)
(MW)
20
15,5
50
52,1
Nominal
Actual Peak
(MW)
(MW)
Heat Release Rate
6+
4
Vitesse
de pointe
de la fume
(m/s)
3,8
5,2
Smoke Fills
Carriageway (mn)
Peak Smoke
Velocity (m/s)
La fume remplit
La couche de
fume commence
l'espace de
descendre (mn) circulation (mn)
5+
3
Smoke Layer
begins Descent
(mn)
05.05.B - 1999
In underwater tunnels these accesses are located at the portals and may be equipped with
escalators or lifts.
PIARC 197
05.05.B - 1999
Pour viter de mettre lusager en danger en raison de la circulation dans la voie la plus rapide
du tube adjacent, il est parfois dusage de conserver close (par exemple, par verrouillage
lectrique) la porte de communication entre deux tubes jusqu ce que la circulation soit
interrompue. Dautres pensent que le risque de piger les usagers en bloquant la porte est trop
grand. Dans les deux cas, un sas dans la galerie entre les deux tubes est utile. Quelle que soit
la solution adopte, il faut que la procdure ait fait ses preuves et soit bien rode pour parer
toute ventualit.
VI.2.3 Recommandations
VI.2.3.1 Tunnels circulation bidirectionnelle
On peut utiliser les possibilits dvacuation suivantes :
tunnel lui-mme pour lvacuation pied (ou avec le vhicule dans les tunnels
faible trafic) ;
communication directe avec lextrieur ;
couloir ou galerie spare d'vacuation ;
abris (appels aussi refuges ou cabines de scurit).
AIPCR 198
05.05.B - 1999
To avoid endangering the road user because of the traffic in the fast lane of the adjacent tube,
some authorities keep the communicating door between the two tubes closed until the traffic is
stopped (e.g., by electric lock). Others believe that the risk of trapping people by locking the
door is too great. An airlock in the gallery between the two tubes is useful in both cases.
Whatever solution is adopted there must be a well-tried and rehearsed procedure to deal with
the eventuality.
Shelters
In long one-tube tunnels with no parallel safety gallery, some countries provide ventilated safety
rooms at intervals, to be used as shelters during a fire.
In a few tunnels, a duct provided for artificial fresh air ventilation is fitted out to take in escaping
users and give them temporary protection in case of fire.
VI.2.3 Recommendations
VI.2.3.1 Tunnels with bi-directional traffic
The following evacuation possibilities exist:
PIARC 199
05.05.B - 1999
Lvacuation des tunnels se fait gnralement pied. Dans certains tunnels, un service spcial
de secours est mis en place pour les conducteurs bloqus.
3m
12 - 24 m
Certains pays prvoient des galeries de retournement pour les vhicules dans les tunnels longs
(plus de deux km) faible circulation (moins de 2 000 3 000 vh/jour). Les vhicules
particuliers peuvent faire demi-tour dans un garage traditionnel (3 m x 12 m) et les petits
camions dans un garage un peu plus grand (3 m x 24 m). Pour les poids lourds et les bus, des
galeries de retournement sont ncessaires. Elles font gnralement 4 m x 17 m, parfois plus, et
doivent tre situes tous les un deux kilomtres. Dans les tunnels fort trafic, le retournement
des vhicules pour lvacuation nest pas recommand, car cela peut crer des difficults de
circulation pouvant provoquer une panique. Un pays prvoit ce genre dinstallations uniquement
pour les vhicules de secours.
Lorsquil ny a pas de fume, les usagers pied prfrent quitter le tunnel par le tube lui-mme.
Dans les tunnels superficiels, spcialement dans les villes, lorsque la circulation est intense,
des galeries dvacuation vers lextrieur doivent tre construites. De telles galeries doivent
pouvoir permettre de quitter le tunnel intervalles rguliers, par exemple tous les 100 200 m
en ville. Ces galeries peuvent dboucher sur dautres installations souterraines, comme des
parcs de stationnement ou des caves.
Dans les tunnels profonds, des galeries dvacuation spares ne sont habituellement pas
prvues en raison de leur cot lev. Cependant, si elles ont t construites pour des raisons
techniques, elles doivent tre quipes de manire fournir un itinraire sr en cas d'urgence.
Les abris sont des enceintes spcialement quipes dune alimentation spciale et
indpendante en air frais et dun tlphone de secours. Les abris doivent rsister aux
tempratures qui rgnent proximit immdiate dun incendie. Cependant, leffet psychologique
sur les personnes sy rfugiant nest pas bien connu. Si les abris sont utiliss, ils doivent tre
placs au niveau des garages et conus de manire accueillir les personnes jusqu larrive
des quipes de secours (plusieurs heures). Ils doivent tre suffisamment vastes pour accueillir
le nombre maximum de personnes pouvant se trouver entre deux abris.
AIPCR 200
05.05.B - 1999
Tunnels are usually evacuated on foot. In some tunnels a special rescue service is provided for
blocked drivers.
17 m
4m
Some countries provide turning bays for vehicles in long tunnels (more than 2 km) with low
traffic (less than 2000-3000 vehicles per day). Private cars can turn in a regular lay-by (3 m by
12 m) and smaller trucks in a larger lay-by (3 m by 24 m). For heavy goods vehicles and buses,
turning galleries are needed. These are usually 4 m by 17 m or larger. When they are used,
they should be placed every 1-2 kilometres. In tunnels with heavy traffic, the turning of vehicles
for evacuation is not recommended, because of the possibility of creating traffic problems which
may result in panic. A country provides turning facilities which can be used by safety vehicles
only.
When there is no smoke, tunnel users on foot prefer to leave the tunnel through the tube itself .
In shallow tunnels, especially in cities, where the traffic is generally high, escape corridors to
the open should be built. Such corridors should give an exit possibility from the tunnel at regular
intervals, for example 100 - 200 metres in cities. Such escape corridors may run into other
underground premises, such as car parks or cellars.
In deep tunnels, separate escape tunnels are usually not built, because they are very costly.
However, if they are built for technical reasons during the construction of the tunnel, they should
be equipped to provide a safe evacuation route during an emergency.
Shelters are specially equipped enclosures with a separate special fresh air supply and an
emergency telephone service. Shelters should withstand the temperatures that exist very near a
fire. However, the psychological effect of making people use them is not well known. If shelters
are used, they should be placed at lay-bys and designed to hold people as long as needed by
the rescue team (several hours). They should be large enough to take in the number of persons
expected to be between two shelters.
PIARC 201
05.05.B - 1999
Litinraire dvacuation le plus frquent dans les tunnels deux tubes est une communication
transversale entre les deux tubes. La distance entre les intercommunications dpendra de la
densit de la circulation et des scnarios de secours durgence, par exemple 100 200 m en
ville. Cette distance doit permettre aux usagers datteindre la plus proche sortie avant que la
fume ne rduise la visibilit. Lorsque de telles communications transversales sont utilises,
lexploitant du tunnel doit prvoir que des personnes pntreront dans le deuxime tube. En
consquence, la circulation dans lautre tube doit tre immdiatement interrompue.
Des communications directes vers lair libre sont galement possibles dans les tunnels
superficiels deux tubes et les bretelles d'accs au tunnel. De longues bretelles doivent tre
quipes de communications avec d'autres tubes ou avec lextrieur.
Dans les ouvrages immergs et en tranche couverte, un couloir spcial dvacuation peut tre
plac entre les deux tubes. Ce couloir de secours doit tre clair et possder un systme
spcial de ventilation.
AIPCR 202
05.05.B - 1999
PIARC 203
05.05.B - 1999
Tous les systmes dvacuation doivent tre maintenus clairs pour rassurer les
automobilistes et leur indiquer quils sont en tat de fonctionnement.
Environ 5 % de la population sont affects d'une forme ou d'une autre de handicap [97]. Prs
de la moiti utilisent des fauteuils roulants, des cannes, des bquilles, etc. La vitesse de
dplacement de ces personnes est denviron 0,5 1 m/s. Tous les itinraires dvacuation et
autres quipements doivent faire l'objet d'une tude permettant de dcider s'ils doivent pouvoir
tre utiliss par les personnes handicapes sans aide extrieure. Si non, un plan d'vacuation
de secours appropri doit tre prvu et mis en uvre.
Les incendies peuvent tre dtects par lusager du tunnel, par un quipement spcial ou par le
personnel dexploitation. Des circuits ferms de tlvision sont particulirement utiles et ils
peuvent tre complts par des quipements comme une alarme active par lenlvement dun
extincteur et, dans les grands tunnels, par une dtection automatique dincendie se dclenchant
en fonction soit d'une temprature maximale, soit d'une vitesse d'lvation.
En outre, il existe habituellement des capteurs pour mesurer le trafic.
Congrs de Sydney, 1983 [27]
Il est de plus recommand davoir une alarme sonore dans la salle de contrle pour attirer
lattention sur lusage dun bouton dalarme ou dun extincteur.
AIPCR 204
05.05.B - 1999
All evacuation systems should be kept always lighted to educate drivers and show that the
systems are in working order.
Around 5% of the population have one or another kind of disability [97]. Of these, around 2.5%
use wheel chairs, sticks, crutches, etc. The speed of movement for these people will be about
0.5 - 1.0 m/s. All evacuation routes and other facilities should be evaluated to decide whether
they should be used by disabled persons without outside help. If not, an appropriate evacuation
and rescue plan should be developed and implemented.
Fires may be detected by the tunnel user, by appropriate equipment or by the tunnel operational
staff. Closed circuit television is particularly useful in this respect and it may be complemented
by equipment such as an alarm activated by the removal of a fire extinguisher and, in long
tunnels, by automatic fire detection through either maximum temperature or rate of rise.
It is further recommended that there be a sound alarm in the control room to draw attention if an
alarm button or a fire extinguisher are used.
PIARC 205
05.05.B - 1999
Lincendie doit tre dtect le plus tt possible. Les recommandations suivantes sont faites pour
dtecter un incendie :
dtecteurs de temprature
- une alarme sonore se dclenche lorsque la temprature :
- dpasse une valeur prdtermine,
- slve plus rapidement que la normale ;
- pour rduire le risque de fausse alerte, lalarme doit tre situe suffisamment
haut.
dtecteurs de fume
- une alarme sonore se dclenche lorsque la visibilit tombe en dessous dun
niveau prdtermin ; mme de petits incendies peuvent produire des quantits
dangereuses de fume.
conclusions
- il est important que linstallation des dtecteurs couvre tout le tunnel.
- bien que lefficacit de ces dtecteurs ne soit pas reconnue par tous les
exploitants, ils sont cependant gnralement placs dans les grands tunnels
forte circulation.
- les deux types de dtecteurs devraient tre utiliss en combinaison et, pour viter
une fausse alerte, tre relis au circuit de tlvision.
Les dtecteurs dincendie doivent tre installs dans les tunnels o il existe un risque rel
(tunnels connaissant une intense circulation de poids lourds, tunnels o le transit de
marchandises dangereuses est autoris, tunnels immergs).
Les dtecteurs dincendie sont conus de manire transmettre un signal au centre de contrle
lorsque la temprature dpasse un certain niveau, ou bien lorsquelle augmente une vitesse
suprieure une valeur prdtermine. Les dtecteurs doivent pouvoir dtecter 20 litres
dessence en combustion.
Un dtecteur peut tre constitu dun tube de mtal dans lequel lair ou le gaz augmentent de
volume mesure que la temprature augmente (dtecteur linaire), ou bien dquipements
individuels espacs au maximum de 25 m (dtecteurs isols).
Congrs de Montral, 1995 [17]
05.05.B - 1999
Early detection of a fire is required. The following recommendations are made to detect fires:
Smoke detectors
- An alarm is sounded when the visibility falls below a predetermined level. Even
small fires can produce dangerous quantities of smoke.
Criteria for fire detectors
- Detectors should be able to detect the burning of 20 litres of petrol;
- Detectors should be installed in tunnels with much heavy goods traffic, and where
dangerous materials are allowed.
Conclusions
- It is important that the detector installation covers the entire tunnel.
- Although the effectiveness of these detectors is not recognised by all operators,
they are usually placed in long and heavily-trafficked tunnels.
-
Both types of detectors should be used in combination and, to avoid false alarms,
they should be linked to the television installation.
Fire detector installations should be provided in tunnels where there are significant risks
(tunnels carrying a lot of heavy goods traffic, tunnels where the transit of dangerous materials is
permitted, underwater tunnels).
Fire detectors are designed to transmit a signal to the control centre when the temperature rises
above a certain level, or increases at a rate in excess of a predetermined value. They should be
able to detect the burning of 20 l of petrol.
The installed detector can consist of a metal tube in which the enclosed air or gas expands as
the temperature increases (distributed detector) or of individual devices spaced not more than
25 m apart (isolated detectors).
Montreal 1995 Congress [17]
There is a large ongoing development with automatic incident detection. Detection can be
simplified to detect incidents by means of close circuit television (CCTV) monitoring. Fire
detection systems can be used in tunnels that are long, complicated or driven through by
vehicles carrying dangerous goods, and where it is necessary to have a quick alarm or to know
exactly where the fire is.
PIARC 207
05.05.B - 1999
Les dtecteurs sont galement trs utiles dans les tunnels non surveills pourvus dune
ventilation transversale ou semi-transversale car, si un incendie se dclare dans un tunnel de
ce type sans tre dtect, les capteurs de CO et dopacit utiliss pour la ventilation normale
dclenchent automatiquement le soufflage maximal dair frais, alors que la raction approprie
est de rduire ou de stopper le soufflage dair frais et de dmarrer laspiration de la fume. De
tels systmes sont actuellement utiliss dans de nombreux pays.
Des expriences en Autriche ont montr que la combinaison de dtecteurs dincendie et dun
circuit ferm de tlvision est trs utile. Dans le cas o le systme de dtection met une
fausse alerte, celle-ci peut tre vrifie par le circuit de tlvision.
Belgique
Deux tunnels (Liefkenshoek et Tijsmans) sont quips de dtecteurs dincendie. Ce sont des
dtecteurs ponctuels qui dtectent des variations anormales de temprature. Seuls les tunnels
emprunts par des transports de marchandises dangereuses possdent des dtecteurs. Ces
derniers alertent la police qui dclenche les actions ncessaires.
Danemark
Dans le tunnel de Guldborgsund, des dtecteurs dincendie sont situs au plafond tous les 10
m. Le systme est dclench par la temprature. Les alarmes provoquent la fermeture du
tunnel et les pompiers sont alerts. Les dtecteurs dincendie ne sont pas considrs aussi
importants que les alarmes dincendie qui peuvent tre actives partir de panneaux durgence
dans le tunnel, ou que les appels durgence des automobilistes par lintermdiaire de
tlphones mobiles.
France
Aucun tunnel en France nest quip de systme de dtection dincendie. A lheure actuelle, les
incendies sont dtects par des capteurs de CO et dopacit qui dclenchent automatiquement
le rgime le plus fort de ventilation ds que la fume les atteint. Les incendies sont galement
dtects laide de tlvision en circuit ferm ou par tlphone durgence.
AIPCR 208
05.05.B - 1999
Fire detectors are also very helpful in unmanned tunnels with transverse or semi-transverse
ventilation, because if a fire occurs in such a tunnel and is not detected, the CO and opacity
sensors used for normal ventilation will automatically put maximum fresh air blowing into
operation whilst the proper measure is to reduce or stop fresh air and start smoke extraction.
Such systems are currently used in many countries.
Austria
All tunnels with a length more than 1500 m are equipped with a fire detection system. Usually a
linear heat detection is installed.
Experiences in Austria showed that a combination of fire detection and CCTV system is very
useful. In case of false alarms of the detection system, it can be checked by the CCTV system.
Belgium
Two tunnels (Liefkenshoek and Tijsmans) are equipped with fire detectors. The detectors are
point detectors that detect abnormal temperature variations. Only tunnels that are designed to
carry dangerous goods have detectors. The detectors alert the police to take the necessary
actions.
Denmark
The Guldborgsund Tunnel has fire detectors located in the ceiling every 10 m. The system is of
a temperature-activated type. Alarms will cause a closing of the tunnel and the fire department
will be alerted. Fire detectors are not considered as important as fire alarms which can be
activated from emergency panels in the tunnels and emergency calls from motorists in the
tunnels using mobile telephones.
France
No tunnel in France is equipped with fire detection systems. Today fires are detected by CO
and opacity metres that automatically switch on the highest ventilation regime once smoke
reaches them. Fires are also detected by closed circuit television (CCTV) if any and by
emergency telephones.
PIARC 209
05.05.B - 1999
La France prvoit dutiliser les dtecteurs dincendie dans des tunnels ventilation semitransversale qui ne sont pas surveills 24 heures sur 24. Si des incendies sont dtects dans
ces tunnels, le systme actuel souffle de lair frais par le plafond et dstratifie la fume. Lusage
de dtecteurs dincendie est galement envisag dans des tunnels emprunts par des
transports de marchandises dangereuses, spcialement si ce sont de longs tunnels deux
voies. Les dtecteurs dincendie localiseront lincendie de telle faon que louverture
tlcommande des bouches adquates daspiration de la fume soit active.
Les systmes de dtection dincendie doivent dclencher immdiatement le systme de
dsenfumage. Si le tunnel est surveill, le personnel sera alert par le systme. Si le tunnel
nest pas surveill, les dtecteurs devront dclencher la fermeture du tunnel et lalerte des
pompiers.
Allemagne
Les alarmes automatiques dincendie sont utilises dans tous les tunnels de plus de 350 m. Les
dtecteurs doivent pouvoir dtecter la combustion de 20 litres dessence.
Italie
En Italie, certains tunnels possdent des dtecteurs dincendie. Les tunnels sont quips dun
cble rsistance variable. Ce systme est utilis dans le tunnel du Frjus et dans des tunnels
sur la M5 et la M24. Les dtecteurs dincendie sont installs dans les longs tunnels deux
voies et dans les tunnels deux voies plus courts, mais avec une circulation intense. Il est
important que le systme dclenche une squence prprogramme de ventilation.
Un systme de dtection par fibre optique a t test dans une station souterraine de chemin
de fer Genoa-Principe.
Japon
Au Japon, on utilise des dtecteurs de flamme. Ils dtectent une combustion partir de
caractristiques de distribution spectrale et de frquence variable qui sont typiques dune
flamme. Les dtecteurs sont utiliss dans tous les tunnels de plus de 10 000 m et dans des
tunnels plus courts forte circulation. Lorsque les dtecteurs sont activs, les exploitants
ferment le tunnel, alertent le personnel et les pompiers, passent le systme de ventilation en
mode incendie et indiquent litinraire dvacuation aux usagers. Toutes les installations sont
testes avec un incendie de 0,5 m dessence dans un bac ouvert.
Norvge
Aucun tunnel nest quip de dtecteurs dincendie ; ces quipements sont jugs trop coteux
compte tenu du faible volume de circulation dans les tunnels. Un systme de dtection
dincendie est en cours dvaluation pour le nouveau tunnel de Laerdal de 24 km.
Suisse
Les tunnels longs sont quips de dtecteurs linaires dincendie. Le tableau 6.3.1 donne les
rsultats dune tude portant sur six types de dtecteurs dincendie. Lessai a t conduit dans
le tunnel de Mosi en Suisse (1992). Les huit tests ont couvert diffrentes superficies dincendie,
avec de lalcool et de lessence comme combustible.
AIPCR 210
05.05.B - 1999
France contemplates using fire detectors in semi-transverse tunnels that are not manned 24
hours a day. If fires are detected in such tunnels, today the system will start blowing fresh air
from the ceiling and delayering the smoke. Fire detectors are also contemplated in tunnels with
dangerous goods, especially if they are two-way long tunnels. The fire detectors will locate the
fire so that the appropriate remote-controlled smoke openings can be activated.
Fire detection systems should start the smoke control system immediately. If the tunnel is
manned, the system should alert the personnel. If the tunnel is not manned, the detectors
should close the tunnel and alert the fire brigade.
Germany
Automatic fire alarms are required in all tunnels longer than 350 metres. Detectors must be able
to detect fire of 20 litres of petrol.
Italy
Some tunnels in Italy have fire detectors. The tunnels are equipped with a cable with variable
resistance. This system is used in the Frejus tunnel and tunnels on M5 and M24. Fire detectors
are installed in long two-way tunnels and shorter two-way tunnels with heavy traffic. It is
important that the system activates a pre-set ventilation strategy.
The Italian railroads have tested an fibre optic detection system in the underground railway
station in Genoa-Principe.
Japan
In Japan flame detectors are used. The detectors detect burning from the variable frequency
and spectral distribution characteristics that are typical of a flame. Detectors are required in all
tunnels longer than 10000 m and in shorter tunnels with heavy traffic. When the detectors are
activated, the tunnel operators close the tunnel, alert the tunnel staff and the fire department,
activate the ventilation system on fire mode and designate the evacuation route for people in
the tunnel. All installations are tested by using a 0.5 m gasoline fire in an open pan.
Norway
No tunnel has fire detectors. These systems have not been considered because of their high
cost and the low traffic volume in tunnels. A system of fire detectors is being evaluated for the
new 24 km long Laerdal tunnel.
Switzerland
Long tunnels are equipped with linear fire detectors. Table 6.3.1 shows the results from a test of
six different types of fire detection systems. The test was made in the Mositunnel in Switzerland
(1992). The eight tests cover different fire areas and include both alcohol and petrol as the fire
source.
PIARC 211
05.05.B - 1999
Tableau 6.3.1 - Tests sur dtecteurs dincendie dans le tunnel de Mosi (Suisse) :
temps (mn/s) avant lalarme dans des essais avec alcool (Alc) et essence
ESSAI no
Combustible
Superficie de lincendie
(m)
Dtecteur ponctuel
de temprature
- pr-alarme
- alarme
Dtecteur de chaleur
par cble coaxial
Capteur linaire
de temprature
Cble linaire
de dtection de fume
Capteur fibre optique
7
Alc
8
Alc
9
Alc
10
Alc
11
12
13
14
Essence
Essence
Essence
Essence
0,6
1:35
1:25
5:15
0:69
1:68
1:02
1:61
0:63
1:03
0:53
0:43
1:33
0:26
0:33
0:34
1:44
0:22
5:18
4:09
1:35
1:50
1:21
0:40
4:51
4:52
0:02
0:03
0:02
0:03
3:34
4:50
1:10
1:08
0:42
1:05
0:52
0:33
Royaume-Uni / Pays-Bas
Dans ces pays, il ny a pas de dtecteurs dincendie dans les tunnels. En raison du cot des
systmes de dtection dincendie et de leur manque de fiabilit, la surveillance vido en circuit
ferm, les quipements de contrle de la visibilit et les capteurs de trafic sont utiliss en
combinaison pour dtecter les incidents.
tats-Unis
La dtection dincendie dans les tunnels routiers utilise un certain nombre dquipements :
surveillance vido en circuit ferm, capteurs de trafic et dtecteurs dincendie. Les capteurs de
trafic identifient les modifications de la circulation, la vido en circuit ferm est ensuite utilise
pour vrifier un incident. Lorsque des dtecteurs dincendie sont utiliss, il sagit de dtecteurs
linaires.
VI.3.1.3 Recommandations
Un certain nombre de systmes de dtection dincendie sont disponibles : dtecteurs de
chaleur (temprature et vitesse daugmentation), de fumes, de flammes. De plus, il existe des
dtecteurs ponctuels de chaleur et des dtecteurs linaires, ce dernier type tant prfrable.
Des questions se posent pour lutilisation des dtecteurs dincendie vis--vis des fausses
alarmes et des alarmes tardives. Ces dernires sont lies au temps ncessaire un incendie
bord dun vhicule pour avoir un impact sur lenvironnement du tunnel.
Les systmes de dtection dincendie peuvent tre utiles dans les tunnels qui sont de grande
longueur, de configuration complexe, et plus spcialement lorsque le transit de marchandises
dangereuses y est autoris, ou lorsque quil ncessaire de connatre de faon prcise lendroit
o lincendie sest dclar. Les dtecteurs sont galement trs utiles dans les tunnels non
surveills pourvus dune ventilation transversale ou semi-transversale.
Les dtecteurs dincendie demandent un entretien rgulier.
AIPCR 212
05.05.B - 1999
TEST no
Fire source
Fire area
(m)
Temperature point
detector
- pre alarm
- alarm
Coaxial heat
detector cable
Linear temperature
sensor
Linear smoke
detector cable
Optic fibre sensor
7
Alc
8
Alc
9
Alc
10
Alc
11
Petrol
12
Petrol
13
Petrol
14
Petrol
0.6
1:35
1:25
0:69
5:15
1:68
1:02
1:61
0:63
0:53
1:03
0:43
1:33
0:26
0:33
0:34
1:44
0:22
5:18
4:09
1:35
1:50
1:21
0:40
4:51
4:52
0:02
0:03
0:02
0:03
3:34
4:50
1:10
1:08
0:42
1:05
0:52
0:33
VI.3.1.3 Recommendations
There are a number of fire detection systems available. These include detectors of heat
(temperature and rate of rise), smoke, and flame. In addition, there are spot and linear heat
detectors, the latter being preferable. There are concerns regarding the use of fire detectors
related to false alarms and delayed alarms. The delayed alarms relate to the time required for a
fire in the interior of a vehicle to have an impact on the tunnel environment.
Fire detection systems can be useful in tunnels that are long or complicated, especially when
dangerous goods are allowed or when it is necessary to precisely determine the location of the
fire. Detectors can also be helpful in unmanned tunnels with transverse or semi-transverse
ventilation.
PIARC 213
05.05.B - 1999
De faon alternative, un systme de dtection automatique d'incident peut tre utilis pour
dtecter rapidement un incendie. La dtection automatique d'incident est de plus en plus
souvent mise en uvre dans les tunnels importants (de par leur circulation, leur longueur ou
cause de risques particuliers). Les installations rcentes utilisent gnralement les camras de
tlvision du tunnel et un systme de traitement ddi pour dtecter les vhicules arrts, une
circulation ralentie, etc. Si une surveillance humaine de la tlvision est assure en
permanence, de tels systmes assurent une dtection indirecte trs rapide des incendies : le
vhicule qui brle est dtect comme un incident de circulation ds qu'il s'arrte, la camra de
tlvision est automatiquement montre au centre de contrle, et l'oprateur peut alors
facilement reconnatre l'incendie.
VI.3.2 Extincteurs
VI.3.2.1 Travaux antrieurs de lAIPCR
Congrs de Vienne, 1979 [26]
Des extincteurs portables doivent tre disponibles. De petits incendies sont gnralement
circonscrits laide dextincteurs main. A mesure que lincendie augmente, la lutte devient
ingale avec des extincteurs. Les flammes peuvent tre teintes, mais la temprature de
lessence nest pas suffisamment rduite. Lvaporation qui sensuit dgage des vapeurs, qui
peuvent tre charries par un courant dair longitudinal et propages en diffrents endroits du
tunnel.
Congrs de Sydney, 1983 [27]
Les extincteurs sont jugs trs utiles pour les incendies de petits vhicules. Il faut cependant
mentionner quavec une ventilation longitudinale, leffet de la poudre peut tre rduit car elle est
entrane par le courant dair. Pour les automobilistes, lextincteur portable reprsente le
premier quipement de lutte contre lincendie. Lenlvement dun extincteur de son support doit
provoquer une alarme sonore au centre de contrle. Cette alarme a deux objectifs : signaler le
vol ventuel d'un extincteur et signaler l'utilisation d'un extincteur pour un incendie.
Congrs de Bruxelles, 1987 [19]
La taille dun incendie est toujours limite au dpart ; il peut alors tre facilement circonscrit.
Cest pourquoi une intervention rapide est de la plus haute importance. Les extincteurs sont le
meilleur moyen de matriser un incendie ds le dpart.
Lexprience a montr que les usagers eux-mmes savent utiliser un extincteur de manire
efficace. Deux extincteurs contenant 6 kg de poudre sont normalement installs dans chaque
niche de secours. Il faut sassurer quun extincteur vide na pas t replac sur son support.
Seul le personnel dexploitation du tunnel est autoris remplacer un extincteur vide par un
plein. L'enlvement dun extincteur doit produire la transmission dune alarme la salle de
contrle.
Rapport AIPCR, 1995 [96]
Les extincteurs sont ncessaires, mais dans de nombreux pays, ils font souvent lobjet de vols,
mme dans les tunnels sous surveillance vido.
AIPCR 214
05.05.B - 1999
An effective automatic incident detection system can be used as an alternative way to detect
fires quickly. Automatic incident detection is more and more often implemented in important
tunnels (i.e. with high traffic, or length, or special risks). State-of-the-art equipment generally
uses the CCTV cameras and a devoted data-processing system to detect stopped vehicles,
slow traffic, etc. If round the clock CCTV human surveillance is available, such systems ensure
a very fast indirect detection of fires: the burning vehicle is detected as a traffic incident as soon
as it stops, the corresponding CCTV camera is automatically displayed at the control center,
and the operator can then recognise the fire easily.
Portable fire extinguishers should be provided. Small fires are usually dealt with by the hand
extinguisher. As the fire increases in size, fire-fighting with extinguishers becomes doubtful. The
flames may well be stopped but the temperature of the petrol is not sufficiently reduced. Fumes
are given off by subsequent evaporation. They can be carried by a longitudinal airflow and
expelled at different points in the tunnel.
Fire extinguishers are considered very useful in small car fires. It is, however, mentioned that
with longitudinal ventilation the effect of the powder can be reduced because the powder is
carried away by the air stream. The portable fire extinguisher is the first aid fire-fighting
equipment available to the motorists. Removal of the extinguisher from its support should sound
an alarm in the central monitoring facility. This alarm serves two purposes, signalling the
potential theft of an extinguisher and signalling the use of an extinguisher on a fire.
Brussels 1987 Congress [19]
The size of a fire is always limited at the beginning with and while it is small it can easily be
extinguished. Thus rapid intervention is most important. Fire extinguishers are the most
appropriate means for bringing a fire under control when it begins.
Experience has shown that even tunnel users know how to make an effective use of fire
extinguishers. Two 6 kg powder fire extinguishers are normally installed in each emergency
recess. Facilities must be provided to ensure that an empty fire extinguisher is not replaced in
its holder. Only the tunnel operating personnel are allowed to fit a full fire extinguisher to its
holder in place of an empty one. The removal of an extinguisher should result in the
transmission of an alarm signal to the control room.
PIARC Report 1995 [96]
Fire extinguishers are necessary, but in many countries they are frequently stolen even in
tunnels with CCTV control.
PIARC 215
05.05.B - 1999
VI.3.2.3 Recommandations
Puisque la plupart des incendies de vhicule commencent par un feu de petite taille qui peut
tre facilement teint laide dun extincteur portable, des extincteurs doivent absolument tre
disponibles dans les tunnels routiers. Les extincteurs portables doivent tre situs dans des
coffrets ou des niches trs bien signals intervalles rguliers.
AIPCR 216
05.05.B - 1999
fire
fire
box
be
Netherlands
Two powder extinguishers (9 kg) are provided
every 50 m on each side of the roadway.
Norway
Fire extinguishers are required in all tunnels,
located every 150 m in booths. Removal of
extinguishers should give alarm.
Photo 6.5
A fire extinguisher box
with a push button fire alarm
in a tunnel in Japan
Photo 6.5
Coffret dextincteurs
avec un bouton-poussoir
dans un tunnel au Japon
United Kingdom
For all tunnels, emergency panels at about 50 m
regular intervals contain 2 x 3 kg dry powder
extinguishers or 9 litre AFFF foam, and 45 m
hose of 19 mm internal diameter.
United States
Portable fire extinguishers are required in tunnels of 240 m long or more. Each location must
have at least one 9 kg multipurpose fire extinguisher placed on both sides of the tunnel in wellmarked cabinets at spacing of not more than 90 m.
VI.3.2.3 Recommendations
Since most vehicle fires start as a small fire which can be readily extinguished with a portable
fire extinguisher, extinguishers should be provided in road tunnels. The portable fire
extinguishers should be located in conspicuously marked boxes or recesses at uniformly
spaced intervals.
PIARC 217
05.05.B - 1999
Lenlvement dun extincteur de son support doit provoquer une alarme au centre de contrle.
Les extincteurs doivent avoir une contenance minimale de 6 kg (lorsque la circulation est
surtout compose de vhicules particuliers) et une contenance maximale de 9 kg (lorsqu'il y a
de nombreux poids lourds). Ils doivent pouvoir teindre des incendies dorigines diverses :
quipements lectriques, graisses, liquides.
Des poteaux dincendie avec des drouleurs de tuyaux doivent tre installs de faon
permanente intervalles rguliers.
Congrs de Sydney, 1983 [27]
Les poteaux dincendie doivent tre relis une conduite deau ou des citernes deau lgre
(une mulsion qui produit de la mousse recouvrant lincendie et qui permet leau qui se trouve
en dessous de refroidir lobjet en combustion). La longueur de tuyau doit correspondre la
distance sparant les poteaux. Les tuyaux peuvent tre placs sur des drouleurs dans les
niches de scurit ou stocks ailleurs. Des vhicules spcialement quips pour la lutte contre
lincendie, lusage de lexploitant du tunnel, doivent tre stationns ct du tunnel.
Congrs de Bruxelles, 1987 [19]
Les poteaux dincendie doivent tre situs dans les niches de scurit ou leur proximit. Ils
doivent fournir de leau sous pression (1 000 1 200 l/mn 0,6 MPa). La canalisation amenant
leau doit tre protge contre le gel. Leau doit tre amene partir des deux ttes du tunnel.
Les poteaux ne doivent tre utiliss que par lexploitant du tunnel ou les pompiers. Ils peuvent
galement servir des travaux de nettoyage.
Un tuyau souple peut tre fix au poteau (tuyau permanent). La longueur dun tel tuyau ne
devra pas tre infrieure la distance dun poteau lautre, de telle manire quil soit possible
de combattre un incendie nimporte quel endroit du tunnel : durant lincendie dans le tunnel de
Velsen, un poteau situ en face de lincendie na pu tre utilis.
Rciproquement, les poteaux peuvent ne pas tre munis de tuyau demeure et, dans ce cas,
lexploitant du tunnel ou les pompiers doivent, en cas dincendie, fixer manuellement aux
poteaux un tuyau de longueur approprie.
AIPCR 218
05.05.B - 1999
The removal of a fire extinguisher from its holder should result in an alarm transmission to a
central monitored location.
The fire extinguishers should have a minimum content of 6 kg (when the traffic includes mainly
passenger cars) and a maximum of 9 kg (when heavy goods vehicles are numerous). They
should be rated for liquid, grease and electrical equipment fires.
Permanently installed wall hydrants with hose reels located at intervals should be provided.
Sydney 1983 Congress [27]
Hydrants are connected to the water main or to tanks of light water (an emulsion which
produces a foam to cover the fire and enables the water underneath to cool the burning object).
The hose length should cover the distance between hydrants. Hoses may be located on reels in
the emergency recesses or stored elsewhere. Specially equipped vehicles, including fire
fighting equipment, for use by tunnel operator may be provided at the tunnel site.
Fire hydrants should be provided in the emergency recesses or in the vicinity of such recesses.
They should be supplied with water under pressure (1000-1200 l/min at 0.6 MPa). The pipe
carrying the water must be protected against freezing conditions. The water should be supplied
from both ends of the tunnel.
Fire hydrants should be used only by tunnel operators or fire station personnel. They can also
be used for cleaning operation.
A flexible hose can be attached to the fire hydrant (permanent fire hose point). The length of
such a pipe should not be less than the distance from one fire hydrant to the next one so that it
would be possible to deal with a fire at all points along the tunnel: during the fire in the Velsen
tunnel, a hydrant located opposite to the fire could not be used.
Conversely, the fire hydrants may not be provided with permanently attached pipe and in this
case the tunnel operator or fire station personnel must manually attach suitable type of pipes of
appropriate length to the hydrants when dealing with a fire.
PIARC 219
05.05.B - 1999
Un accs leau est ncessaire pour refroidir les vhicules aprs que lincendie aura t
circonscrit. En effet, il faut viter un nouvel incendie ou une explosion et il faut nettoyer les
lieux. Les manires de fournir leau sont trs nombreuses ; certains pompiers prfrent une
citerne plutt que des poteaux. Les poteaux et les canalisations d'eau peuvent reprsenter un
problme dans des tunnels soumis des conditions hivernales rigoureuses.
AIPCR 220
05.05.B - 1999
Access to water is necessary to cool the vehicles after the fire is extinguished to prevent the
start of a new fire, to avoid an explosion and to clean up after a fire. How the water supply is
arranged may vary; some fire brigades prefer a water tank instead of hydrants. Hydrants and
water mains can be a problem in tunnels with severe winter conditions.
PIARC 221
05.05.B - 1999
Pays-Bas
Des poteaux d'incendie et des tuyaux installs en permanence et aliments en mousse AFFF
sont prvus sur le pidroit gauche tous les 50 m.
tats-Unis
Tous les tunnels routiers de plus de 90 m doivent avoir une canalisation fixe d'alimentation en
eau avec un poteau tous les 85 m. Ces systmes de canalisations fixes sont conus pour
fournir 960 l/mn (16 l/s) une pression rsiduelle minimale de 0,45 MPa la valve de tuyau la
plus loigne. Les canalisations peuvent tre sches ou humides.
VI.3.3.3 Recommandations
Il est recommand que tous les tunnels routiers dune longueur suffisante (200 1 000 m selon
les cas) soient dots dune canalisation d'alimentation en eau sur toute la longueur du tunnel.
Cette canalisation doit avoir un dbit minimum de 1 000 l/mn 0,5 MPa. Les canalisations
peuvent tre sches ou humides. Les poteaux doivent tre placs une interdistance de 100
200 m.
Les dispositifs darrosage (systmes d'extinction automatique) sont fixs au plafond ou sur les
pidroits ; ils sont destins refroidir instantanment la source dun incendie ds quil se
dclare. Ils doivent pouvoir dverser de grandes quantits deau ou de mousse. Ceux installs
dans les immeubles sont moins bien adapts aux tunnels que ceux utiliss dans les hangars
daviation.
Les dispositifs darrosage prsentent certaines difficults :
Les dispositifs darrosage sont installs le long du plafond ou des parois du tunnel. Ils sont
conus pour dverser une certaine quantit deau ou de mousse.
AIPCR 222
05.05.B - 1999
Netherlands
Hydrants and permanently installed water hoses with AFFF foam are provided at the left hand
wall every 50 m.
United States
All road tunnels longer than 90 m are recommended to have a water supply standpipe with
hydrants spaced at 85 m. These standpipe systems are to be designed to provide 960 l/min (16
l/s) at a minimum residual pressure of 0.45 MPa at the most remote hose valve connection.
Standpipe systems may be wet or dry.
VI.3.3.3 Recommendations
It is recommended that all road tunnels of sufficient length (200 to 1000 m according to the
case) be provided with a water supply standpipe installed through the length of the tunnel. This
standpipe should have a minimum capacity of 1000 l/min at 0.5 MPa. The standpipes can be
either wet or dry. Hydrants should be placed at a spacing of 100 to 200 m.
VI.3.4 Sprinklers
VI.3.4.1 Previous work by PIARC
Sydney 1983 congress [27]
Sprinklers are fixed to the ceiling or the walls and are intended to cool the source immediately
when a fire starts. They must therefore be capable of discharging large quantities of water or
foam. The types installed in buildings are less suitable than those used in aircraft hangars.
In view of these adverse and even dangerous factors the installation of sprinklers is not
recommended in road tunnels.
Brussels 1987 Congress [19]
Sprinklers are installed along the roof or walls of the tunnel. They are designed to distribute a
certain quantity of water or foam.
PIARC 223
05.05.B - 1999
Cependant, en l'tat des connaissances actuelles, lutilisation de dispositifs darrosage dans les
tunnels routiers nest pas recommande car :
leau peut provoquer la dispersion de liquides combustibles sur une grande tendue ;
leau peut occasionner des ractions dangereuses lorsquelle entre en contact avec
certains produits ;
mme si les flammes sont teintes, les parties mtalliques des vhicules ne
refroidissent pas rapidement et les produits inflammables peuvent continuer
produire des gaz, crant ainsi des mlanges explosifs ;
leau (ou la mousse) qui est dverse, comme dans le cas d'un incendie de citerne
d'essence, peut ne pas suffire pour teindre lincendie dun vhicule transportant une
grande quantit de carburant.
Aucun pays europen nutilise des dispositifs darrosage de faon rgulire. Au Japon, ils sont
utiliss dans les tunnels de grande longueur ou fort trafic, pour refroidir les vhicules en feu.
Les dispositifs darrosage ne sont gnralement pas recommands pour les raisons suivantes :
AIPCR 224
05.05.B - 1999
Given our present knowledge of the subject, however, the use of sprinkler systems in road
tunnels is not recommended for the following reasons:
the water can result in the dispersion of burning liquids over a large surface area;
water can cause dangerous reactions when it comes into contact with certain
products;
even if the flames are extinguished, the metal parts of vehicles do not cool very
quickly and inflammable products can continue to give off gases leading to the
presence of explosive mixtures;
the water (or foam) that is distributed may, as in the case of a petrol tanker fire, be
insufficient to extinguish the fire on a vehicle carrying a large quantity of fuel.
No European country uses sprinklers on a regular basis. In Japan, sprinklers are used in
tunnels with important length or traffic to cool down vehicles on fire.
Sprinklers are normally not recommended in road tunnels for the following reasons:
Belgium
No sprinklers are installed in road tunnels.
Denmark
No tunnels are equipped with sprinklers.
PIARC 225
05.05.B - 1999
France
A ce jour, aucun tunnel nest quip de dispositif darrosage. Le seul argument pouvant modifier
cette position serait la preuve que ces dispositifs peuvent sauver des vies. Or, jusque l, rien
na t dmontr. En France, la ventilation longitudinale est utilise dans la plupart des tunnels
unidirectionnels. Le flux dair protge alors de la fume les usagers bloqus derrire lincendie.
Dans les tunnels ventilation transversale ou semi-transversale rversible, la fume est
aspire par des ouvertures au plafond ou en haut des pidroits. Dans ce cas, les dispositifs
darrosage refroidiraient la fume qui serait dstratifie.
La France craint galement les problmes dentretien causs par ces dispositifs.
Italie
Aucun tunnel nest quip de dispositif darrosage.
Japon
Les dispositifs darrosage sont prconiss pour tous les tunnels de plus de 10 000 m et pour
ceux de plus de 3 000 m qui supportent un fort trafic.
Mais le facteur qui joue le plus en leur dfaveur est que leur fonction dextinction est
incontrlable. Puisque le systme est soit en marche, soit arrt, la quantit deau dverse ne
peut tre rgule. Dans le cas dun incendie provoqu par un liquide, cela peut aboutir une
situation dlicate quant la propagation ventuelle de lincendie.
Norvge
En Norvge, deux tunnels sont quips de dispositifs darrosage. Dans les deux cas, ils utilisent
de leau et sont maintenus secs en raison du gel en hiver. Dans le tunnel de Vlreng (800 m,
TMJA 37 000, deux tubes), ces dispositifs sont conus pour arroser le revtement du tunnel
(polyurthanne). Il y a eu des problmes de fuites. Dans le tunnel de Flyfjell (3,2 km, TMJA 26
000, deux tubes), les pompiers ont propos deux solutions aux autorits routires : recouvrir le
revtement en thaphome avec du bton projet ou installer un dispositif darrosage. Elles ont
choisi la seconde solution, mais ont rencontr des problmes de gel. Rcemment, sur une
priode de six mois, le systme darrosage a provoqu 70 fausses alertes.
Dans les directives norvgiennes, les dispositifs darrosage ne font pas partie des quipements
exigs pour les tunnels.
AIPCR 226
05.05.B - 1999
France
There are no tunnels with sprinklers in France today. The only reason to change this policy
would be if sprinklers could be proven to save lives. So far this has not been proven. In France
longitudinal ventilation is used in most unidirectional tunnels. The airflow will then protect the
users jammed behind the fire from smoke. In tunnels with transverse or reversible semitransverse ventilation, smoke is extracted through openings in the ceiling or at the top of
sidewalks. In this case sprinklers would cool the smoke so that it would not remain stratified.
France also notes that they would be afraid to depend on the sprinkler because of possible
maintenance problems.
Italy
No tunnels in Italy are equipped with sprinklers.
Japan
Sprinklers are required in all tunnels of length greater than 10000 m and in shorter tunnels
(longer than 3000 m) if heavy traffic.
In Japan there are 82 tunnels equipped with sprinkler systems. The sprinklers normally use
water, and are standing with water under pressure. Sprinklers are, however, difficult to manage
and the water spray causes the smoke to drop down in the tunnel. Before starting the sprinklers
the tunnel staff must be certain that there are no people in the water shower area. Sometimes
the visibility in the tunnel is so bad that it is difficult to be sure that no one is in the area. The
main reasons to use sprinklers are to lower the temperature inside the tunnel, protect the tunnel
structure and make the conditions for escaping persons more suitable.
Netherlands
Sprinkler systems are not applied in tunnels in the Netherlands. The disadvantages of sprinkler
systems are greater than the advantages. In addition the installation and maintenance costs are
high.
The most important reason for not using sprinkler systems is that the extinguishing function is
not controllable. Since the system is either on or off the amount of water dispensed cannot be
regulated. In the case of a liquid fire, this can result in undesirable situations regarding potential
spread of the fire.
Norway
In Norway two tunnels are equipped with sprinklers. In both cases the sprinklers are kept dry
because of temperatures below zero during winter. Both systems use water. In the Vlreng
tunnel (800 m, AADT 37000, two tubes) the sprinklers are designed to spray on the lining
material (polyurethane). There have been problems with leakage in the system. In the Flyfjell
tunnel (3.2 km, AADT 26000, two tubes) the Fire Department gave the road authorities two
alternatives, to cover the ethaphome lining with shotcrete or to sprinkle the tunnel. The road
authorities decided to install sprinklers. There have been problems with freezing water in the
system. During a recent six-month period there have been 70 false alarms registered from the
sprinkler systems.
Sprinklers are not mentioned in the Norwegian guidelines for required tunnel equipment.
PIARC 227
05.05.B - 1999
Sude
A ce jour, des dispositifs darrosage ne sont utiliss que dans le tunnel de Tegelbacken.
Linstallation na servi quune seule fois et a bien fonctionn. Mme avec un dispositif
darrosage, le transit de marchandises dangereuses nest pas autoris dans ce tunnel. Ces
dispositifs, actionns par des dtecteurs de chaleur, dversent leau en pluie diluvienne. Aucun
problme particulier dentretien na t signal.
Royaume-Uni
Il ny a pas de dispositifs darrosage dans les tunnels.
tats-Unis
De manire gnrale, il ny a pas de tels dispositifs dans les tunnels routiers aux tats-Unis.
Cependant, des systmes mousse sont actuellement installs dans les tunnels de CANA, Mt.
Baker Ridge et Mercer Island car il est prvu que le transit des marchandises dangereuses y
soit autoris.
VI.3.4.3 Recommandations
Aucun pays europen nutilise rgulirement de dispositifs darrosage (systmes d'extinction
automatique). Des dispositifs darrosage ont t utiliss dans certains tunnels, en Europe, dans
des buts particuliers. Au Japon, les dispositifs darrosage sont utiliss dans les tunnels de
grande longueur ou fort trafic pour refroidir les vhicules en feu. Aux tats-Unis, seuls
quelques tunnels autoriss aux marchandises dangereuses sont dots dun certain type de
sprinkler. La raison pour laquelle la plupart des pays nutilise pas ces dispositifs dans les
tunnels est que la majorit des incendies prennent naissance dans un compartiment ferm et
que les dispositifs darrosage ne sont daucune utilit tant que lincendie y reste confin. Ils
peuvent cependant tre utiliss pour refroidir les vhicules, empcher le feu de se propager aux
autres vhicules (cest--dire rduire la zone dincendie et les dommages provoqus sur les
biens) ou pour stopper des incendies secondaires dans les tunnels revtement en matire
plastique. Lexprience du Japon montre que les dispositifs darrosage sont efficaces pour
refroidir la zone autour du foyer et rendre ainsi plus efficaces les oprations de lutte contre le
feu.
Cependant, lusage des dispositifs darrosage pose un certain nombre de difficults qui peuvent
tre rsumes comme suit :
Par consquent, les dispositifs darrosage ne doivent pas tre utiliss dans la zone dincendie
avant que toutes les personnes en aient t vacues.
AIPCR 228
05.05.B - 1999
Sweden
Today sprinklers are only used in the Tegelbacken tunnel. The installation has been used once,
and performed well that time. Even if sprinklers are installed, no dangerous goods are allowed
through the tunnel. The sprinklers use water and are of a deluge type that is activated by heat
detectors. There have been no special maintenance problems.
United Kingdom
There are no sprinklers in tunnels within the United Kingdom.
United States
In general there are no sprinklers in road tunnels in the United States; currently, however, there
are foam suppression systems installed in the CANA, Mt. Baker Ridge and Mercer Island
Tunnel due to the proposed authorised transport of hazardous goods through these tunnels.
VI.3.4.3 Recommendations
No European country uses sprinklers on a regular basis. In some tunnels in Europe sprinklers
have been used for special purposes. In Japan sprinklers are used in tunnels with important
length or traffic to cool down vehicles on fire. In the United States only a few tunnels carrying
hazardous cargo have some form of sprinkler. The reason why most countries do not use
sprinklers in tunnels is that most fires start in the motor room or in the compartment, and
sprinklers are of no use till the fire is open. Sprinklers can be used, however, to cool down
vehicles, to stop the fire from spreading to other vehicles (i.e. to diminish the fire area and
property damage) and to stop secondary fires in lining materials. Experiences from Japan show
that sprinklers are effective in cooling down the area round the fire, so that fire fighting can be
more effective.
However, the use of sprinklers raises a number of problems which are summarised in the
following points:
water can cause explosion in petrol and other chemical substances if not combined
with appropriate additives,
there is a risk that the fire is extinguished but flammable gases are still produced and
may cause an explosion,
vaporised steam can hurt people,
the efficiency is low for fires inside vehicles,
the smoke layer is cooled down and de-stratified, so that it will cover the whole
tunnel,
maintenance can be costly,
sprinklers are difficult to handle manually,
visibility is reduced.
As a consequence, sprinklers must not be started before all people have evacuated.
PIARC 229
05.05.B - 1999
Les dispositifs darrosage ne peuvent donc tre considrs comme des quipements utiles pour
sauver des vies. Ils peuvent seulement servir protger le tunnel aprs lvacuation. En ne
tenant compte que de ce facteur conomique (protection des biens et non scurit), les
dispositifs darrosage ne sont gnralement pas considrs comme rentables et ne sont pas
recommands dans les tunnels courants.
Cependant, ils peuvent tre utiliss, lorsque ncessaire, dans les salles annexes aux tunnels et
dans dautres installations.
Dans les grands tunnels, des rseaux dappel durgence et des alarmes incendie sont
frquemment installs.
Congrs de Sydney, 1983 [27]
Bien que trs fiables, les tlphones sont rarement utiliss car les conducteurs essaient de se
dpanner par leurs propres moyens et les incidents sont la plupart du temps dtects par la
tlvision.
Pour tre utiliss, ces quipements doivent tre attrayants. Ils doivent donc tre bien entretenus
et, si possible, encastrs dans un botier impermable et hermtique la poussire.
Tout comme la tlvision, le tlphone est une pice essentielle des quipements de scurit
dans un tunnel ; des tlphones doivent, tout le moins, tre installs aux entres.
Congrs de Bruxelles, 1987 [19]
AIPCR 230
05.05.B - 1999
Based on these facts, sprinklers cannot be considered as an equipment useful to save lives.
They can only be used to protect the tunnel once evacuation is completed. Taking into account
this exclusively economic aim (protection of property and not safety), sprinklers are generally
not considered as cost-effective and are not recommended in usual road tunnels.
However, sprinklers can be used in ancillary rooms in tunnels and other tunnel facilities, where
appropriate.
In long tunnels, emergency call network and fire alarms are usually provided.
Although very reliable, telephones are not much used because drivers try to help themselves
and are usually detected by television.
If it is to be used, the equipment must appear attractive. It must therefore be kept clean, and if
possible enclosed in a water and dust tight box.
Like television, the telephone is an essential item of safety equipment in a tunnel; as a minimum
telephones should be provided at the tunnel portals.
When alarm push buttons are installed, it is recommended to use one button only because
when several are provided with different meanings, many people push the wrong button or all
buttons.
In two-way traffic tunnels the emergency telephones should be placed on the tunnel walls
opposite one another. With one-way traffic the telephones are provided on the side of
emergency stops only, that is on the tunnel wall adjacent to the slow traffic lane. Emergency
telephones should not be in the entrance or exit zones: emergency posts should be provided
outside the tunnel instead. Emergency telephones inside tunnels should be installed in sound
proof cabins or in illuminated and clearly designed emergency recesses. The opening of the
door to the telephone recess should result in the flashing of a yellow light above the recess.
PIARC 231
05.05.B - 1999
VI.3.5.3 Recommandations
Il est recommand que tous les tunnels routiers, partir dune certaine longueur ou dun certain
trafic, soient quips dun systme de tlphones durgence le long du tunnel. Les boutonspoussoirs dalarme sont facultatifs.
AIPCR 232
05.05.B - 1999
Sweden
Emergency telephones are provided in all tunnels and push button alarms in some tunnels.
Switzerland
SOS telephones are installed in booths spaced every 150 m.
United Kingdom
All tunnels have emergency telephones at 50 m intervals in lay-bys and at tunnel portals on the
approach road.
United States
All road tunnels longer than 240 m are recommended to have emergency communications and
alarm systems.
VI.3.5.3 Recommendations
It is recommended that all road tunnels with a sufficient length or traffic be equipped with a
system of emergency telephones located through the length of the tunnel. Push button alarms
are optional.
PIARC 233
05.05.B - 1999
La tlvision en circuit ferm est particulirement utile pour dtecter un incendie ; elle peut tre
complte par des quipements tels quune alarme active par lenlvement dun extincteur, ou
dautres dispositifs.
Congrs de Sydney, 1983 [27]
La tlvision en circuit ferm permet une surveillance continue de la circulation, une dtection
rapide de toutes les anomalies et une vrification de lefficacit de toutes les dispositions prises
pour amliorer la scurit. Elle est reconnue comme lquipement le plus utile dans
lexploitation des tunnels, et est le seul qui puisse donner une ide prcise de la situation dun
incendie.
Les camras doivent rpondre certaines caractristiques :
les camras directionnelles munies de lentilles de 200 mm doivent tre places aux
entres ;
lintrieur du tunnel, la distance entre camras dpend de la stratgie retenue et
des caractristiques du tunnel : il peut tre appropri davoir une vision de toute sa
longueur ou seulement des endroits risque (virage, bifurcation)
pour une apprciation gnrale de la circulation, un espacement de 200 m suffit ;
pour avoir une vue plus dtaille des vhicules et mme des conducteurs en difficult
sur le trottoir, les camras ne doivent pas tre espaces de plus de 150 200 m ;
l'emplacement des camras doit permettre une surveillance visuelle des points
durgence.
La tlvision en circuit ferm est un dispositif trs efficace pour observer les conditions de
circulation lies une urgence incendie.
Pour une bonne couverture du tunnel, lespacement entre les camras doit tre de 150 200 m.
Les camras situes en dehors du tunnel (routes daccs, plates-formes, stations de page,
entres et sorties) doivent tre quipes dun zoom et doivent pouvoir tre actionnes dans
toutes les directions.
Congrs de Montral, 1995 [17]
AIPCR 234
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Closed circuit television is particularly useful for fire detection and it may be complemented by
equipment such as alarm activated by removal of a fire extinguisher and other devices.
Sydney 1983 Congress [27]
CCTV will give a continuous surveillance of the traffic flow, a rapid detection of all traffic
abnormalities and a verification of the effectiveness of all actions taken to improve safety. CCTV
is recommended as the most useful equipment in tunnel operations, and is the only one that
gives an accurate idea of a possible fire situation.
cameras which are directional and fitted with 200 mm lenses should be installed at
the portals;
inside the tunnel the distance between cameras depends on the strategy adopted,
and on the character of the tunnel: it may be appropriate to have vision throughout its
length or merely at potential trouble spots (curves, bifurcation);
for a general appreciation of the traffic, a spacing of more than 200 m will suffice;
for a detailed view of cars and perhaps drivers in difficulty on a footway, the spacing
should be no more than 150 m to 200 m;
the sitting of the cameras should permit visual surveillance of the emergency points.
Closed circuit television is a very effective facility for observing traffic conditions as related to a
fire emergency.
The spacing between the closed circuit television cameras should be 150-200 m for the best
coverage of the tunnel. Television cameras located outside the tunnel (access roads, platform,
toll stations, entries and exits ) should be fitted with a zoom lens and with the means for pointing
the camera in any direction.
Montreal 1995 Congress [17]
The television network must cover the whole tunnel. The use of colour cameras and monitors
allows a fire to be detected very quickly.
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AIPCR 236
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Austria
Austria has guidelines that make CCTV mandatory in all tunnels longer than 1500 m with a
staffed control centre.
France
The need for CCTV in a tunnel is based on a study taking into account among other factors
tunnel length, traffic, route type and operation mode.
Germany
CCTV is optional in tunnels over 1050 m in length. Camera spacing is 100 to 300 m.
Japan
CCTV should be installed for all tunnels beyond 3000 m in length and in shorter tunnels with
heavy traffic. Spacing is 200 m in two-lane tunnels.
Netherlands
CCTV is required.
Norway
CCTV is optional in tunnels with an average daily traffic of 10000 and more, and in tunnels
longer than 2500 m with a lower traffic.
Sweden
An analysis is required to determine if there is a need for CCTV.
United Kingdom
CCTV is installed in all tunnels as part of the incident monitoring equipment. It ensures a 100%
coverage of the tunnel interior and approach roads.
United States
Detection systems should include TV cameras with traffic monitoring.
PIARC 237
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VI.3.6.3 Recommandations
Il est recommand que tous les grands tunnels routiers, quils soient surveills en permanence
ou partiellement, soient dots dun rseau de surveillance par tlvision couvrant lintrieur du
tunnel et ses ttes. Toute la longueur du tunnel doit tre couverte, ce qui permet la dtection
rapide et la vrification de tout incident de circulation et, plus spcialement, des incendies.
VI.3.7 Haut-parleurs
VI.3.7.1 Travaux antrieurs de lAIPCR
Congrs de Vienne, 1979 [26]
Les haut-parleurs sont gnralement prvus dans les grands tunnels pour donner des
instructions aux automobilistes.
Congrs de Sydney, 1983 [27]
Lutilisation des haut-parleurs doit tre envisage pour conseiller un automobiliste en panne
repr par tlphone. Les haut-parleurs ne peuvent fournir des informations que lorsque le
conducteur se trouve en dehors de son vhicule, ou lorsque les vitres sont ouvertes. Il faut
prvoir plus dune langue. Les parois et le plafond du tunnel doivent tre insonoriss par des
panneaux dabsorption phonique. Il ne faut pas accorder une grande priorit aux haut-parleurs
dans les systmes de scurit. Ils doivent seulement tre prvus si le tunnel est surveill en
permanence et que fonctionne un systme de tlvision en circuit ferm.
Congrs de Bruxelles, 1987 [19]
AIPCR 238
05.05.B - 1999
VI.3.6.3 Recommendations
It is recommended that all important road tunnels that are manned full or part-time be provided
with closed circuit television coverage at the portals and inside the tunnel. The installation
should cover the whole tunnel length, which permits the rapid detection and verification of any
traffic incident, and especially fire emergencies.
VI.3.7 Loudspeakers
VI.3.7.1 Previous work by PIARC
Vienna 1979 Congress [26]
Loudspeakers enable a tunnel operator to transmit information and instructions to a tunnel user
or a group of users. Depending on the circumstances, messages can be transmitted by means
of one or a number of loudspeakers. Also messages can be pre-recorded on a magnetic tape.
Loudspeaker installations do, however, have some limitations; thus the use of more than one
language is necessary in tunnels where the users can be of different nationalities. In addition to
this, drivers often proceed with all windows of their vehicle closed. Given an environment where
the noise level is very much higher than it is outside the tunnel, the loudspeakers are not heard
very clearly.
Better results are obtained in tunnels where there has been some sound-proofing treatment
(absorbing panels), but even in these cases it is not always possible to avoid difficulties due to
the reflection and interference of sound waves. The importance of a loudspeaker system with
regard to safety is not insignificant and research is in progress with a view to improving the
performance of such a system, particularly as related to the ability of motorists to hear inside
their vehicle.
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VI.3.7.3 Recommandations
Un fort besoin existe en matire de fourniture dinformations aux usagers en cas durgence
dans un tunnel. Cependant, les haut-parleurs ne sont en gnral pas recommands dans les
tunnels routiers cause des difficults suivantes :
lusage dune seule langue peut tre un problme pour les trangers ;
la communication est normalement seulement possible dans les tunnels ayant reu
un traitement acoustique ;
le bruit des vhicules et de la ventilation peut poser problme.
A partir du moment o ces difficults sont rsolues, il est possible d'utiliser des haut-parleurs.
AIPCR 240
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Austria
The Austrians refer to some good results obtained in the Bosvuck Tunnel on the A9 motorway
(Pyhrnautobahn).
France
Loudspeakers are considered as unadvisable because of their ineffectiveness.
Germany
In Germany loudspeakers are optional in tunnels longer than 1050 m and are then usually used
in tunnels with CCTV.
Japan
Loudspeakers are required in all tunnels longer than 3000 m and shorter tunnels with heavy
traffic.
Netherlands
Loudspeakers are required. They are used in case of an incident or emergency.
Sweden
Loudspeakers are optional in all tunnels based on a specific analysis.
United Kingdom
Loudspeakers are not the preferred option due to their ineffectiveness (echo, car noise, etc.).
United Kingdom is looking at providing visual signs, variable message signs for controlling
traffic on approach roads and inside tunnels.
United States
There are no loudspeakers installed in road tunnels in the United States.
VI.3.7.3 Recommendations
There is a strong need to give information to people inside the tunnel in case of an emergency.
However, loudspeakers are generally not recommended in road tunnels because of the
following problems:
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VI.3.8 Radiocommunications
VI.3.8.1 Travaux antrieurs de lAIPCR
Congrs de Vienne, 1979 [26]
Dans les grands tunnels, les communications radio sont utilises par le personnel du tunnel.
Congrs de Sydney, 1983 [27]
Il est tout fait possible de fournir un systme qui assure les retransmissions radio lintrieur
dun tunnel et la possibilit, pour le personnel de surveillance, de communiquer avec les
automobilistes. Quelques limitations existent, notamment du point de vue linguistique,
technique et lgal.
Congrs de Bruxelles, 1987 [19]
Les signaux radio peuvent tre fournis par des cbles metteurs ou des antennes (tunnels
courts). Des panneaux peuvent informer les conducteurs sur les frquences couter.
Rapport AIPCR 1995 [96]
AIPCR 242
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It is feasible to provide a system which will ensure the retransmission of radio inside a tunnel
and the capability for control personnel to communicate with motorists. Some limitations exist
due to language, technical and legal issues.
Radio signals can be provided by radiating cables or antennas (short tunnels). Signs should
provide drivers with information regarding frequencies.
The first goal of radio rebroadcast is safety and the second goal is to increase the motorists
comfort. Radio rebroadcast in tunnels will enable the tunnel operator or the rescue team to give
instructions to the motorists during an emergency.
Austria
All tunnels longer than 1000 m or tunnels with heavy traffic have radio communication providing
continuous reception for the traffic information channel. If possible, a service that relays
messages to drivers from the control room should be provided.
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France
Dans les tunnels de plus de 800 m, il faut obligatoirement avoir un systme permettant les
communications entre tous les services durgence lintrieur du tunnel et avec leurs QG.
Lorsque des stations radio grand public sont retransmises, il faut pouvoir les interrompre pour
diffuser des messages durgence, condition qu'il existe un centre de contrle avec prsence
humaine.
Allemagne
Tous les tunnels de plus de 1 000 m doivent possder leur systme de radiocommunications.
Japon
Des appareils de retransmission radio sont installs dans les tunnels de plus de 10 000 m dans
certaines circonstances.
Pays-Bas
Les systmes de retransmission radio sont recommands.
Norvge
En Norvge, les tunnels recevant un trafic moyen journalier annuel (TMJA) suprieur 5 000 et
les tunnels de plus de 2 500 m doivent tre dots de systmes de radiocommunications.
Royaume-Uni
Tous les tunnels sont munis dinstallations de retransmission radio pour tous les services de
secours. Rien nest prvu pour les radios commerciales ou les tlphones mobiles, sauf
exception : les tunnels de Mersey sont quips d'une retransmission pour tlphones mobiles.
tats-Unis
La plupart des tunnels routiers amricains sont quips de systmes de retransmission radio.
VI.3.8.3 Recommandations
Un systme de radiocommunications est recommand dans les tunnels importants (de grande
longueur ou circulation dense). La premire priorit est de permettre les communications des
services de secours et de lexploitant. La retransmission des radios commerciales donne la
possibilit, en cas durgence, de transmettre des messages de scurit aux automobilistes.
Cependant, certaines difficults doivent tre prises en compte :
lusage dune seule langue peut causer des problmes aux trangers ;
seuls les conducteurs dots dune radio et, parmi eux, seuls ceux qui l'ont allume et
ont slectionn les bonnes stations peuvent entendre les messages de scurit ;
dans certains pays, lutilisation de la radio sous cette forme peut prsenter un
problme juridique.
AIPCR 244
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France
In tunnels longer than 800 m, a system is compulsory to ensure the communication of all
emergency services inside the tunnel and with their headquarters. When radio channels are
rebroadcast for the general public, it must be possible to interrupt them to give emergency
messages, provided that there is a manned control centre.
Germany: in
Germany all tunnels
longer than about
1000m have a radio
communi-cation
system.
Japan: radio
rebroadcast
apparatus is installed
in tunnels longer than
10000 m in special
circumstances.
Netherlands:
radio
rebroadcast
systems are
required.
Norway: in Norway, tunnels with Average Annual Daily Traffic (AADT) over 5000 or tunnels
longer than 2500 m have radio communication systems.
United Kingdom: radio rebroadcast facilities for all emergency services are provided in all
tunnels. There is no provision for commercial radio or mobile phones except in special cases,
e.g. Mersey Tunnels have mobile phones transmitters.
United States: radio rebroadcast systems are installed in many road tunnels in the United
States.
VI.3.8.3 Recommendations
A radio communication system is recommended in important tunnels (long or with much traffic).
The first priority is to allow the communication of the emergency and operation services.
Rebroadcasting commercial radios gives the opportunity to pass on safety messages to the
motorists in case of an emergency. However, the following difficulties must be taken into
account:
PIARC 245
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Les rponses certaines de ces questions doivent tre trouves pour rendre les tunnels aussi
srs que possible. Aujourdhui, de nombreux pays investissent beaucoup pour accrotre la
scurit dans les tunnels routiers, mais rien ne leur prouve que ces investissements sont
rentables, ni quils font le meilleur usage des moyens engags.
Divers quipements et stratgies de secours ont t dvelopps et utiliss en pratique. Un
autre domaine intressant de recherche serait de recueillir et dvaluer les expriences en la
matire.
AIPCR 246
05.05.B - 1999
Another need is to find better means to communicate with motorists during an emergency and
let them know whether they should leave their cars, which evacuation route they should use,
etc.
Even more interesting is behavioural research. We need to know more about many aspects of
people behaviour during an emergency:
How will drivers and passengers in cars and buses react to fires and other accidents?
Will they evacuate the tunnel on foot or try to turn their car and drive out?
If on foot, will they use the emergency exits or walk in the tunnel towards the portal?
These are some questions that should be answered to make tunnels as safe as possible. Today
many countries invest large sums to increase the safety in road tunnels, but they are not sure
that the investments have a favourable benefit/cost ratio and they make the best possible use of
the money invested.
Different kinds of equipment and rescue strategies have been developed and used in practice.
Another research field of great interest would be to collect and evaluate experiences with these
different types of equipment and rescue strategies.
PIARC 247
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Le prsent chapitre fournit des informations et des recommandations sur les deux sujets. Il est
bien sr intimement li au chapitre II qui traite des incendies de dimensionnement.
Le concepteur dun tunnel doit acqurir une connaissance des critres dincendie remplir par
les structures et les quipements, pour pouvoir satisfaire aux exigences pratiques et de
scurit. Ce chapitre peut galement apporter des informations aux gestionnaires de tunnels
dans le domaine de lentretien et de la matrise des grandes catastrophes. Enfin, les services
de secours pourront aussi en tirer des informations intressantes sur le comportement des
structures de gnie civil et des quipements en cas dincendie, et ajuster en consquence leurs
mthodes de lutte contre les incendies.
La rsistance au feu des ventilateurs utiliss pour la ventilation des tunnels a dj t voque
au chapitre V ( V.7.3 et V.8.4, et annexe au chapitre V).
AIPCR 248
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the reaction to fire of a material characterises its ability to take part in a fire to which it
is exposed, including by its own decomposition (e.g. combustion);
This section provides information and recommendations on both these subjects. It is of course
linked to the design fires studied under section II.
The designer of a tunnel should gain insight into the fire criteria to be fulfilled by civil
engineering structures and equipment in order to comply with the safety and practical
requirements. Tunnel managers too can gain information from this section in the area of
maintenance and the control of major disasters. Finally, the emergency service departments will
also be able to obtain useful information on the behaviour of the civil engineering structure and
the equipment in the event of fire, and adjust their fire-fighting response accordingly.
The fire resistance of the fans used for tunnel ventilation are dealt with in section V ( V.7.3 and
V.8.4, and appendix to section V).
Most recommendations appear in the reports of the Committee to the successive World Road
Congresses.
PIARC 249
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la temprature et sa variation dans le temps sont les seuls critres dterminants pour
la rsistance dune structure lincendie ;
pour la rsistance au feu des lments porteurs, les caractristiques de rsistance
des matriaux employs sont dune importance dcisive ; quelques exemples sont
donns ;
les rsultats d'essais autrichiens sur de petits incendies sont prsents ;
les tempratures dans les gaines dair vici sont prises en compte ;
des recommandations sont donnes sur les lments de construction, les
quipements lectriques et mcaniques, et sur la dtection et la lutte contre les
incendies.
AIPCR 250
05.05.B - 1999
the temperature and its development is the only criterion for structural fire resistance;
PIARC 251
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Les consquences sur les personnes et la structure seront traites dans les deux prochains
paragraphes. Celles sur lenvironnement ne sont gnralement pas prises en compte ; les
exigences en la matire sont en effet faibles, car un incendie est un vnement rare, et il y a
peu de diffrence pour lenvironnement si lincendie se dclare dans un tunnel ou lair libre.
Les deux derniers paragraphes sont consacrs des matriaux particuliers : matriaux de
chausse et peintures.
AIPCR 252
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the first and worst one is the spreading of fire by the burning material: of course it is
not possible to avoid any damage to the tunnel in the vicinity of a serious fire,
however, it is imperative that no tunnel material can burn in such a way that it brings
a local fire to other parts of the tunnel;
another possible dangerous consequence is that the material combustion strongly
increases the heat output of the fire: tunnel materials must not be able to produce a
significant amount of heat if they burn;
even if the material does not spread the fire nor produce much heat, it may generate
dangerous smoke when burning or strongly heated. This can raise several threats: to
the people present in the tunnel, i.e. evacuating users and rescue teams, to the
tunnel structure by chemical corrosion, and to the environment.
The threats to people and the structure will be examined in the next two paragraphs. The
consequences for the environment are generally not considered, because the corresponding
requirements are lower, taking into account that a fire is a rare and unwanted event and it does
not make much difference for the environment if the same fire takes place in a tunnel rather
than in the open. The last two paragraphs are devoted to particular materials: those used for the
road construction, and paints.
PIARC 253
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AIPCR 254
05.05.B - 1999
For instance polyurethane was used until very recently for the moisture barriers in rock tunnels
in Norway. However, fire tests have shown that this resulted in unacceptable risks for the public
and the emergency service personnel, due to the generated poisonous fumes.
In this respect, attention must also be drawn on the application of wall-covering materials for
architectural, waterproofing or lighting purposes. The specifications set for such materials
should also include requirements concerning their properties in the event of a fire. External
appearance, maintenance and resistance to corrosion are usually looked at, but not so
frequently the properties with respect to fire. It is necessary to choose a wall-covering material
which is not combustible or at least will not spread fire nor produce hazardous substances in
appreciable quantities when burning. Non-combustible materials include tiles, enamelled steel
panels, etc.
Of course, the quantity of material used must be considered. There is no point prohibiting
potentially dangerous materials indiscriminately, as this increases the costs unnecessarily.
An example of a corrosive compound which can be produced during a fire is hydrochloric acid
(HCl). It is for instance produced by the burning of PVC, a material very often used in power and
control cable insulation. Hydrochloric acid is very corrosive and the inhalation of its vapours is
dangerous to living creatures. Inhalation has an immediate effect, but the corrosive behaviour of
HCl shows its effect on the structures in a longer period. Therefore countries require that cable
insulation containing PVC should not be used in tunnel installations. Other countries consider
that the only important condition is that the cables should not spread fire: if they meet this
criteria, the quantity of HCl released by the cables local combustion is deemed to be negligible
compared to the corrosive gases released by the vehicle which burns.
It is also not advisable to use coatings which form corrosive vapours or smoke in the event of a
fire. Of course, the amount of the materials to be applied must be considered. The
indiscriminate banning of certain materials is not advisable and can result in an unnecessary
increase in costs.
PIARC 255
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Il faut tout de mme attirer lattention sur les matriaux transports par les usagers. Ces
matriaux sont bien videmment hors du contrle du concepteur et de lexploitant du tunnel.
Cela signifie que ces derniers ne peuvent prvoir leffet, sur la structure, de la fume et des
vapeurs produites par la combustion dun de ces matriaux.
bton de ciment,
enrob bitumineux dense classique,
enrob drainant, qui est utilis pour stocker leau de pluie sous la surface afin de
rduire les claboussures et/ou de rduire le bruit.
Le bton de ciment est le seul qui ne soit pas combustible et qui ne prsente aucune difficult
dutilisation dans les tunnels.
Lenrob bitumineux classique peut senflammer de trs fortes tempratures. Il produit
galement des fumes et des gaz chauds dangereux car la quantit denrob en feu augmente
la production de chaleur de lincendie. Cependant, comparativement au feu dorigine, ces
productions supplmentaires sont la plupart du temps ignores ; lenrob bitumineux classique
peut donc tre utilis.
Lenrob drainant nest pas recommand dans les tunnels car une fuite de carburant, que ce
soit en conditions normales de circulation ou lors daccidents ou dincendies, sera stocke sous
la surface. Ce stockage entranera une plus large propagation de l'incendie, et il faudra plus de
temps pour pomper le carburant. Un autre dsavantage de lenrob drainant est le suivant : en
cas de fuite, une surface plus importante est atteinte par le liquide, dont les vapeurs, en raison
de leur combustion incomplte, risquent de provoquer une explosion l'extrieur de la zone de
lincendie. En outre, la structure granulaire de ce type denrob augmente la surface
dvaporation.
AIPCR 256
05.05.B - 1999
A general remark has to be made in relation to the materials passing through the tunnel in the
users' vehicles. These materials are outside the control of the tunnel designers and operators.
That means as well that no prediction can be made of the effect on the structure of the smoke
and vapour produced during a burning of these materials.
cement concrete,
common compact asphalt,
very open asphalt which is used to store the rain below the road surface in order to
reduce the splashing effect on the traffic, and/or to reduce noise.
Of these, cement concrete is the only one which is not combustible and does not raise any
question as to its use in tunnels.
The normal asphalt can be ignited by a high temperature fire. Some additional dangerous
smoke and hot gases will be produced while the amount of burning asphalt will increase the fire
burning rate. However, seen in comparison with the initial fire, these additional outputs are most
generally ignored, so that normal asphalt can be used in any case.
The open asphalt is not advisable in tunnels as a fuel spillage, occurring during normal traffic,
accident or fire situations, will be stored below the road surface. The fire area will be spread
more by this storage volume, which also takes more time to be removed. Another disadvantage
of the open asphalt is the fact that the spillage creates a larger liquid area from which vapours
can easily generate an explosion danger outside the direct fire spot due to the not-complete
burnt vapours. Besides the larger area, also the granular structure of this type of asphalt
enlarges the surface of evaporation.
PIARC 257
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Les deux premiers objectifs sont lis la scurit, le troisime la protection de louvrage. Un
objectif supplmentaire, fortement li au troisime, est de :
En ce qui concerne le dlai tolr avant la dfaillance de la structure dun tunnel, la manire
dont ces objectifs gnraux sont traduits en exigences prcises dpend des consquences
dune dfaillance : plus elles sont importantes, plus les exigences seront leves. En
consquence, ces exigences dpendent :
du type de tunnel (certains tunnels, comme par exemple, les tunnels immergs, les
tunnels urbains peu profonds ou les tunnels dans des sols meubles ou boulants,
seront bien plus affects par une rupture localise que dautres, comme les tunnels
creuss dans la roche) ;
du type de structure et de son rle pour la scurit et la protection des biens (par
exemple, la dalle sparant le tunnel dun immeuble proche doit tre mieux protge
quune sortie de secours lair libre qui, de toute faon, ne peut pas tre utilise sil y
a des tempratures leves son entre) ;
du type de circulation autoris dans le tunnel (selon quil ny a que des vhicules
particuliers, ou galement des poids lourds, ou aussi des transports de marchandises
dangereuses, la courbe temprature-temps utilise pour vrifier la rsistance au feu
sera diffrente voir chapitre II-, mais aussi lincendie durera plus longtemps et peut
ncessiter une dure plus longue avant rupture).
Lexigence de base est quune rupture localise ne doit pas entraner des effets gnraliss
tout le tunnel. Des applications spcifiques de ce principe sont dcrites dans les paragraphes
qui suivent, mais, dans tous les cas, il y a deux consquences :
un effondrement en chane doit tre vit, ce qui signifie que la dfaillance dune
partie ne doit pas transfrer de sollicitations une partie proche et conduisant la
rupture de celle-ci, et ainsi de suite jusqu provoquer une raction en chane ;
AIPCR 258
05.05.B - 1999
The first two objectives relate to safety, the third one to the protection of property.
A supplementary objective, strongly linked to the third one, is the following:
to limit the time during which traffic will be disrupted due to the repairs after a fire.
The way these general objectives are translated into precise requirements concerning the
accepted time before failure of tunnel structures depends on the consequences of a failure: the
larger the consequences, the higher the requirements will be. As a consequence, these
requirements will depend on:
the type of tunnel (certain types of tunnels - as e.g. immersed tunnels, shallow urban
tunnels or tunnels in soft or running ground - will be much more affected by a local
collapse than other ones - as e.g. rock tunnels);
the type of structure and its role for safety and protection of property (e.g. the slab
separating the tunnel from a nearby building requires a stronger protection than an
emergency exit to the open which cannot be used anyway when there are high
temperatures at its entry in the tunnel);
the type of traffic allowed in the tunnel (if only passenger cars, or also heavy goods
vehicles, or also dangerous goods are allowed, the temperature-time curve to be
used to check the fire resistance will be different - see section II - but also the
duration of the fire will be longer and may require a longer time before failure).
The basic requirement is that a local collapse should not lead to generalised consequences in
the tunnel. Specific applications of this principle are described in the following paragraphs, but
two consequences apply in all cases:
progressive collapse must be prevented, which means that the failure of a part must
not transfer the stress to a nearby part in such a way that this part will fail and
transfer the stress farther away, and so on;
PIARC 259
05.05.B - 1999
une rupture localise ne doit pas couper un quipement longitudinal essentiel comme une
alimentation lectrique ou un cble de communication, une gaine ncessaire lors dun incendie,
etc. ; sil nest pas jug ncessaire de protger la totalit de la structure, alors ces quipements
doivent tre situs un endroit o ils seront toujours labri, par exemple dans une tranche
protge sous le revtement.
Les deux paragraphes qui suivent donnent des informations sur la rsistance au feu des
diverses structures et sur lcaillage. Des recommandations sont ensuite donnes sur la
rsistance au feu de la structure principale et des autres lments de gnie civil.
AIPCR 260
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a local collapse must not cut off a vital longitudinal system such as an electrical supply or
communication cable, a duct necessary during a fire, etc. If it is not deemed necessary to
protect the structure, then this vital longitudinal equipment must be located in such a place that
it is protected in any case, for instance in an insulated trench under the pavement.
The next two paragraphs give information on fire resistance of various structures and spalling.
Then recommendations are given on the fire resistance of the main and some other structures.
In a number of other cases, shotcrete support is left visible. It can be reinforced with steel mesh
or various kinds of steel or polymer fibres. Further work is necessary to gain better knowledge in
the fire behaviour of such materials.
Better known is reinforced concrete which is used in TBM driven tunnels, cut-and-covers,
immersed structures, etc.
Due to the high intensity of the heat generated during a major fire, the reinforced concrete used
in tunnel structures can lose its supporting function. The strength of the reinforced concrete
largely depends on the temperature. This material quickly loses its strength at a temperature of
400C. The high-grade steel in particular has a poor temperature characteristic.
The increase in temperature of the reinforcement is delayed by the concrete cover. In the past,
it was common practice to have a rather thick (up to 5 cm) of concrete cover in combination with
low-grade types of steel. At present, most often high-grade steel with a thinner cover of concrete
is applied. Both facts, namely the thinner cover of concrete and the high-grade of the steel are a
disadvantage in the event of a fire.
Prestressed reinforcement can be used for large spans. The prestressing ducts are fitted as low
as possible in the structure, which means close to the surface which can be heated by a fire.
In all cases, an insulating fire-resistant protection can be applied to prevent early damage to the
structure. It is then necessary to consider the fire resistance of the total construction (type and
depth of reinforcement/prestressing, additional protection, etc.).
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VII.4.3 caillage
Des carts de temprature et de dilatation l'intrieur du bton et avec larmature ventuelle
peuvent provoquer lcaillage du bton, ds que la temprature en surface atteint 200 C. Cela
peut tre dangereux pour larmature qui se trouve ainsi plus facilement expose des
tempratures leves. Comme indiqu dans le chapitre I ( I.5), lcaillage napparaissant pas
avant une temprature et un dlai donns, il ny a gnralement pas de risques pour les
usagers en fuite, mais cela peut savrer dangereux pour les pompiers.
Bien quil ne puisse tre compltement vit en raison des tempratures leves lors dun
incendie, le risque dapparition de lcaillage et ses effets peuvent tre rduits par une
protection rsistant au feu. Si aucune protection nest prvue, il y aura invitablement un risque
plus lev deffondrement du tunnel en cas dincendie.
Le risque dcaillage est accru par les oprations dextinction. Il peut survenir lorsque leau
utilise pour lextinction refroidit trop rapidement la structure. Pour plus de dtails, voir le
paragraphe VII.5.4 Utilisation des quipements dextinction des incendies.
AIPCR 262
05.05.B - 1999
VII.4.3 Spalling
Differences in temperature and expansion inside the concrete and with the possible
reinforcement can cause a spalling of the concrete. This may start already at a surface
temperature of 200 C. It causes a danger for the reinforcement which is more easily exposed to
high temperatures. As stated in section I ( I.5), due to the temperature and time needed to start
spalling, it will generally not be a danger for evacuating people, but it may be dangerous for
firemen.
A fire-resistant protection can be used to reduce the risk and the effects of spalling, although it
never can be completely prevented due to the occurring high temperatures. If no protection is
installed, this will automatically result in a higher risk of tunnel collapsing in the event of a fire.
The danger of spalling is increased by the fire-extinguishing activities. It may occur when the
water used for fire-fighting cools down the structure too quickly. For more details on this subject
please refer to paragraph VII.5.4 "Use of the fire extinguishing equipment".
VII.4.4 Fire resistance of the main structure according to the type of tunnel
Immersed tunnels versus land tunnels
A distinction must be made between immersed tunnels (under water) and land tunnels (under
land).
In an immersed tunnel, a local collapse can cause the whole tunnel to be flooded with
catastrophic consequences on people and construction. As such a tunnel is generally built of
reinforced concrete, it will not be possible to repair it after a collapse, or if it is possible, it will
take a lot of time and money. The additional economic loss of the lack of availability of the
tunnel connection for a long period of time is very large. As a consequence, a complete
protection is advisable during the total time of the worst fire. It is recommendable to install a fireresistant insulation on those parts of the structure where the reinforcement is under strain of
tension, the ceiling and a section at the top of the wall. The cost of such installation is around
50 euros/m2.
In a land tunnel, a local collapse will generally have much smaller consequences on safety and
property. It will often be repaired more easily and in a shorter time so that a more limited fire
resistance can be sufficient.
However, a number of land tunnels can lead to consequences similar to an immersed tunnel
should a local collapse occur. For example, the collapse of a tunnel in soft or running ground
conditions with a high water table can be disastrous in terms of evacuation of people. Similarly
shallow tunnels in urban situations, where their collapse can also affect and endanger overlying
services and structures to a significant degree, also deserve high precautions.
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AIPCR 264
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In most excavated tunnels, a local collapse of the main structure will not have a major impact on
safety, provided that vital longitudinal systems are located so that they are protected in any
circumstances. However, a repair or replacement of parts of driven tunnels is often very difficult,
due to the deep positions of these tunnels, but it is not impossible. It strongly depends on the
soil conditions. Situations could arise in which, as a result of ground water penetration filling the
tunnel, repair from the outside is essential. This leads to an extremely long repair time, and
therefore high costs. The fire protection must be adapted to these stakes.
Rock tunnels
In rock tunnels, the risk of a total collapse is very low, but the fact that parts of the vault can fall
down should be considered. This can constitute a danger to the people and equipment present
in the tunnel, such as emergency service personnel and their equipment. However, nobody can
normally survive near a place where the temperature is high enough to cause a collapse: the
main risk is that important safety facilities such as supply or communication cables are cut off,
which means that these should be protected.
What has been stated above about immersed tunnels does not apply to underwater tunnels built
in rock, such as the undersea tunnels in Norway and Japan. Such structures behave as rock
tunnels as described in this paragraph.
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Il est donc ncessaire dexaminer les consquences dune rupture localise de gaine en cas
dincendie. Lorsque les consquences peuvent tre srieuses, telles que la perte de contrle du
courant d'air longitudinal ou l'interruption de l'alimentation dair frais dans une partie du tunnel
o cela est indispensable, la gaine doit tre protge durant la priode ncessaire aux
oprations de secours et de lutte contre lincendie. Dans dautres cas, par exemple lorsque le
seul risque d'une rupture localise est de faciliter l'entranement de la fume dans une gaine,
aucune mesure spciale nest ncessaire en termes de scurit (sil ny a aucun risque
d'effondrement en chane). La dure d'interruption de la circulation ncessaire aux rparations
aprs un incendie important peut cependant justifier une protection.
Quand les gaines de ventilation sont situes sous la chausse, la situation est plus favorable
quant la rsistance lincendie, puisque la dalle est moins expose lincendie. Cependant,
cette conception prsente aussi des inconvnients comme le poids des vhicules et les
dangers prsents par les substances inflammables et/ou explosives sinfiltrant dans les gaines
de ventilation. Si lincendie se propage aux gaines de ventilation, ou si une explosion a lieu
dans une gaine, les effets seront catastrophiques.
Les aspects de scurit doivent tre intgrs dans le processus de dimensionnement le plus en
amont possible, de telle manire que les risques soient dj pris en compte dans les tudes
prliminaires. En tenant compte des aspects de scurit lis aux incendies ds le choix du type
de tunnel et des quipements, beaucoup de temps et dargent ne seront pas investis a
posteriori pour amliorer la scurit.
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When the ventilation ducts are located under the road surface, the situation is better concerning
the fire resistance, as the separation is not so much exposed to fire. However, there are also
disadvantages attached to this design, such as traffic load, and the danger caused by
flammable and/or explosive substances seeping into the ventilation ducts. If the fire spreads into
the ventilation ducts, or an explosion occurs in this duct, the effects may be disastrous.
Safety considerations should be integrated in the design process at an early project phase, so
that such risks are already taken into account in the preliminary design. By considering these
fire and safety aspects while determining the tunnel type and systems in an early stage, a lot of
time and money will not be spent in a later phase to change these principles in order to improve
the tunnel safety.
Protection of escape routes means that the air in the route has to be free of smoke and other
toxic products generated by the fire or accident. In addition, the temperature inside this area
must not be too high. The structure must not be affected by the situation (major accident, fire,
high temperatures) which may exist inside the tunnel itself.
VII.4.7 Suspending structures and other systems attached to the ceiling or walls
Use of plugs and anchors
All the fittings used for the fixing of equipment to the structures should be considered in relation
to the fire situation. This means that use of the usual plastic plugs and similar devices should be
prohibited. This material will either soften or melt at high temperatures, resulting in falling down
of the equipment. This can even occur at places which are not directly exposed to the flames.
Further research will have to demonstrate to what extent special plastic is suitable for fixing
equipment inside the tunnel.
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Le comportement des chevilles en acier et des ancrages doit aussi tre contrl en situation
dincendie. La rsistance la traction diminue haute temprature. Le calcul des ancrages doit
tre fond sur les tempratures maximales auxquelles lancrage doit continuer se comporter
correctement.
Une distinction doit tre tablie entre les quipements majeurs, qui doivent continuer
fonctionner en cas durgence, et les quipements dont le fonctionnement nest pas
indispensable pendant ou aprs une catastrophe importante.
Dans tous les cas, comme indiqu au chapitre I ( I.5), lexigence minimale est que les gros
quipements ne doivent pas tomber lors de lvacuation des usagers ou lorsque le personnel
de secours est encore dans le tunnel. Cela signifie quaucun quipement lourd ne doit tomber
en dessous de tempratures de 400 - 450 C durant le temps requis pour la lutte contre
l'incendie (dans un tunnel, de telles tempratures produisent un niveau de rayonnement de
5 kW/m, ce qui est le maximum tolrable pour les pompiers).
Usage de laluminium
Comme laluminium perd sa rsistance une temprature d'environ 550 C, il est recommand
denvisager son utilisation avec prudence. Les matriaux de remplacement sont lacier ou lacier
inoxydable.
AIPCR 268
05.05.B - 1999
Also steel plugs and anchors should be checked for their behaviour during a fire situation. The
tensile stress reduces at high temperatures. The calculation of these anchors should be based
on the maximum temperatures at which the anchoring should be still properly working.
A distinction must be made between major equipment, which should remain in function during
an emergency situation, and equipment whose functions may not be needed during or after a
major disaster.
In all cases, as stated in section I ( I.5), the minimum requirement is that heavy equipment
should not fall down when evacuating users or rescue personnel are in the tunnel. This means
that no heavy item must fall under exposure to temperatures of 400 - 450 C during the time
necessary to fight fire (in a tunnel, such temperatures can produce a radiation level of about
5 kW/m, which is the maximum tolerable value for firemen).
Use of aluminium
As aluminium loses its strength at a temperature of approximately 550C, it is recommended to
carefully consider the use of aluminium materials in a tunnel critically. Alternative materials are
steel or stainless steel.
Two types of doors can be used, the slide-type and the swing-type.
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Lun des inconvnients dune porte battante est sa sensibilit la surpression lintrieur de
litinraire dvacuation. Si la pression est trop forte, la porte est dure ouvrir, ou bien peut
prsenter un risque pour la personne qui cherche louvrir. Ce type de porte gnera toujours
partiellement le passage.
La porte coulissante prsente moins dinconvnients : elle est plus facile ouvrir en cas de
surpression et ne provoque pas de blocage de litinraire dvacuation. Ce type de portes a t
test aux Pays-Bas en conditions combines de rsistance au feu et de surpression ; il en
rsulte que ces portes sont appropries et sont moins sensibles la surpression. Elles sont,
entre autres, utilises au Japon et aux Pays-Bas dans certains tunnels et sont recommandes
dans les nouveaux tunnels.
Aprs ouverture, les portes doivent se refermer automatiquement afin dempcher lair pollu de
pntrer lintrieur de litinraire dvacuation.
Dans dautres pays, lorsque les niches de scurit ne sont pas utilises comme passage vers
un itinraire dvacuation, aucune exigence en matire de rsistance au feu nest impose
puisque la niche ne sera pas utilise si elle est proche de lincendie.
05.05.B - 1999
A disadvantage of the swing door is its sensitivity to the level of the overpressure inside the
escape corridor. If this pressure is too high the door is difficult to open, or can be dangerous
towards the person who tries to open the door. This type of door will always block a part of the
passage.
The slide door has less disadvantages, is easier to open in relation to the overpressure and
causes no blockage of the escape route. These slide doors have been tested in the Netherlands
for the combined conditions of fire resistance and overpressure, and were found to be suitable
and less sensitive to the overpressure. Among others slide doors have been used in Japan and
the Netherlands in some tunnels and are recommended in the new ones.
After opening, the doors must close automatically, in order to prevent polluted air from entering
into the escape corridor.
In the Netherlands an emergency cabinet, housing a fire hydrant, fire extinguisher and alarm
push button is positioned in the concrete wall between the traffic tube and an escape corridor.
The front of this cabinet is fitted with a glass door to make it easier for the public to recognise
and use the fire extinguishers. The type of glass should be considered in relation to the fire
resistance and safety. It can be assumed that in case a cabinet is close to the fire it will not be
used, hence there is no need to use fire-resistant glass.
As its wall separates the cabinet from the escape corridor, the fireproof requirement of the wall
between the tunnel tube and the escape corridor has to be fulfilled with an additional fireproof
lining behind the emergency cabinet. A fire cross-over must be prevented.
In other countries, when the emergency recesses are not used as a passage to an escape
route, there is no fire resistance requirement for the same reason as above: the cabinet will not
be used if it is close to the fire.
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05.05.B - 1999
une planification en amont est ncessaire pour tablir des consignes claires en cas
dincendie, que ce soit pour les responsables de lexploitation du tunnel ou pour les
services de secours ;
il est indispensable que la coordination entre les diffrentes interventions de secours
se mette en place le plus rapidement possible ;
les directives doivent tre prtes avant la mise en service dun tunnel et mises jour
la suite des enseignements tirs d'exercices et dincidents rels.
Les actions prioritaires, indiques en [18], qui forment la base des plans de gestion de
lintervention en cas dincendie, sont :
Les consignes doivent tenir compte du systme de ventilation, mais aussi des caractristiques
du tunnel : longueur, circulation uni- ou bidirectionnelle, systme de ventilation, nature des
installations dalarme et de secours, situation en zone urbaine ou rurale, existence dun poste
de commande, difficults daccs et dintervention des secours.
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More specifically, the report of the Committee on Road Tunnels [18] presented guidelines for
the preparation of instructions on how to deal with fire. The major points made were as follows:
advance planning is required to create clear instructions on how to deal with a fire for
those responsible for the operation of the tunnel, including emergency services;
these plans must ensure that co-ordination of the various emergency responses
takes place in the shortest time;
instructions should be prepared before commissioning the tunnel and amended in the
light of lessons learned during trial exercises and actual incidents.
Priority actions, noted in reference [18], and which must form the basis of emergency response
plans, must be:
Instructions must take into account the method of ventilation and the characteristics of the
tunnel e.g. length, one-way or two-way traffic, ventilation system, nature of the alarm and
emergency equipment, urban or rural location, existence of a control room, problems of access
and difficulties for the intervention of emergency services.
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Des essais et des exercices doivent tre conduits pour tester le plan de gestion de
lintervention. Le rapport [18] fournit quelques suggestions quant aux procdures adopter.
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To test the plan, fire tests and trial exercises should be carried out. Reference [18] provides
some suggestions for the procedures to be adopted.
Lighting is set to maximum levels, staff must inform the police, the fire emergency service, the
safety team responsible for assisting with means of heavy rescue and if necessary, personnel
working inside the tunnel (technical rooms, ducts, tunnel).
The ventilation system must be automatically started up according to pre-planned procedures.
Later manual control can be used if this can provide better evacuation or fire-fighting conditions
in the tunnel.
Specific instructions for various fire scenarios must be available in the tunnel technical rooms.
05.05.B - 1999
Actions supplmentaires
En plus des actions de base cites auparavant, d'autres actions sont ncessaires. Leur ordre
de priorit dpendra du type dincident et des caractristiques du tunnel, de son exploitation et
de son environnement.
Pendant lincident
Le personnel doit pouvoir oprer dans une zone libre de toute fume.
Personne ne doit voluer dans le tunnel sans que le responsable du contrle nait
vrifi les conditions de circulation et denfumage.
Le poste de contrle doit rester libre, except pour le personnel impliqu dans les
oprations.
Aux points de contrle des entres, une voie libre doit tre conserve, ainsi que des
voies daccs pour permettre aux vhicules de secours de rouler ventuellement
contresens.
Le responsable du contrle de la circulation doit suivre l'volution de lincident sur les
crans de tlvision, estimer la nature et la gravit de lincident, et prendre les
mesures appropries.
Du personnel supplmentaire de police et d'entretien doit se tenir prt intervenir si
ncessaire.
Le gestionnaire du tunnel doit tre tenu inform.
Un service de restauration doit tre prvu pendant toute la dure des interventions.
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Unmanned Tunnel
The above remarks imply that the tunnel is manned and suitable surveillance systems are
available. In the event of an unmanned tunnel then reliance will have to be placed on members
of the public to report the occurrence of incidents.
As a minimum, the tunnel should have emergency stations without remote control but with
telephone and rudimentary fire-fighting equipment. Clear instructions as to the emergency
procedures should be provided, including telephone numbers and order of priorities.
Additional Actions
In addition to the basic actions set out above, the additional actions listed below may be
necessary. Their order of priority will depend on the type of incident and the characteristics of
the tunnel, its operation and environment.
Ensure investigating personnel proceed into the tunnel in smoke free area and not
into dense smoke.
Ensure that nobody proceeds into the tunnel without first receiving assurances from
the traffic controller regarding traffic and smoke.
Maintain control point clear except for personnel involved in the operation of the
incident.
Instruct the portal control points to maintain a "clearway" including crossover lanes
for possible contra-flow for emergency vehicles.
The traffic controller will monitor the incident on the TV monitors and assess the
nature and seriousness of the incident, and take further action as appropriate.
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Un code prcis de fin d'alarme incendie doit tre diffus, par radio, aux responsables
de la circulation.
Les conducteurs et les passagers doivent tre raccompagns leurs voitures
abandonnes sur le lieu de lincident.
Il faut mettre en place, selon le cas, une circulation alterne sur une voie restant
utilisable ou une circulation contresens dans le tunnel non touch par l'incendie.
Ds que les circonstances le permettent, il faut revenir progressivement des
conditions normales de circulation.
Les informations doivent tre inscrites dans le journal de bord du poste de contrle.
Un rapport complet doit ensuite tre prpar et diffus.
VIII.4 Recommandations
VIII.4.1 Planification de l'intervention
Les aspects lis l'incendie lui-mme sont de la responsabilit des pompiers sous le contrle
du responsable le plus grad. Les installations du tunnel doivent tre exploites par le
personnel du tunnel, qui connat bien le tunnel et ses installations, sous la direction, selon le
cas, de la police ou du responsable des pompiers.
Les remarques prcdentes prouvent lvidence qu'une planification soigneuse de la gestion
des interventions de secours est indispensable. Les directives existantes pour les plans
d'intervention durgence sont fondes sur des actions logiques qui doivent tre menes pour
chaque cas particulier lintrieur dun cadre conu pour viter la confusion ou un manque de
clart dans les responsabilits. Le plan doit donc prendre en compte les points suivants :
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Depending on the nature and the scale of the incident, the following facilities may be
required by the emergency services:
a) casualty collection point,
b) evacuation assembly point,
c) mortuary collection point.
Maintain liaison with emergency services to assist in dealing with the injured persons.
Guide the drivers and passengers to abandoned cars at the scene of the incident.
VIII.4 Recommendations
VIII.4.1 Fire response planning
During a fire incident the fire aspects of the incident are the responsibility of the fire brigade
under the control of the most senior fire officer present. Tunnel plant should be operated by
tunnel personnel, familiar with the tunnel and its plant, under the direction of the police or fire
incident officer, as appropriate.
Expanding on the above remarks it is evident that the emergency response management is
based on careful planning. Existing guidelines for emergency response plans are based on
logical actions which need to be taken for the particular case within a framework which is
designed to avoid confusion or unclear responsibilities. The plan should therefore consider the
following:
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Lexigence la plus importante pour une gestion russie des urgences est l'entranement rgulier
du personnel concern, ce qui permet de perfectionner le plan de gestion. Lorganisation
dessais dincendie reprsente une part importante de cette formation.
Mthode dessai
Les essais doivent tre mens selon le mode opratoire d'urgence spcifique au tunnel ; cela
inclut la dsignation d'un responsable gnral de la coordination des interventions. Les
pompiers doivent tre prts matriser l'incendie avec les quipements disponibles aux points
de secours. Une motopompe doit tre galement disponible en cas de dfaillance des
quipements du tunnel ou de la procdure durant les essais.
L'instrumentation doit comprendre la mesure de la vitesse de l'air, la mesure de la temprature
5 m, 10 m, 20 m, 50 m et 100 m de l'incendie dans les deux directions au niveau de la
chausse, 1,5 m au-dessus de la chausse, et au niveau des cbles d'clairage et des autres
quipements vulnrables dans les 3 m suprieurs de la section transversale. La temprature
ambiante et la vitesse de l'air doivent tre mesures avant et aprs l'essai. Les donnes de
temprature et les mesures fournies par les capteurs habituels du tunnel de CO doivent tre
enregistres pendant toute la dure de l'essai. Il faut galement prendre des photographies,
raliser un reportage vido ou tout autre enregistrement du dveloppement de la fume.
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start-up of the appropriate automatic smoke control ventilation regime at the initial
stage, to be made part of the standing instructions. Alternative operational modes of
the system can be implemented by the operator in the light of the specific emergency
and what is deemed to be a more appropriate manual response to achieve smoke
control as quickly as possible;
confirmation of the agreed emergency operation sequences according to schedules
set up after fire trials in the tunnel with the participation of all intervention teams;
the text of the instructions must be simple, easy to read and remember. They must be
aimed at the operation and emergency response staff, and may be supplemented by
display panels. Instructions to the users about appropriate behaviour in case of fire
should be prepared either as messages written in advance and used in telephone
responses or as pre-recorded messages to be broadcast by the tunnel radio system
in case of fire.
The most important requirement for successful emergency response is regular training of
relevant staff and the subsequent refinement of the response plan. An important part of this
training is the organisation of fire tests.
This section discusses in detail the tests to verify the smoke control procedures.
Complementary recommendations appear in section IV ( IV.3.2).
Test method
Tests should be conducted using the draft emergency operating procedure for the tunnel which
will include appointing somebody with the overall responsibility for co-ordinating the
intervention. Firemen should be ready to control the fire using the equipment available at the
tunnel emergency points. A fire appliance should also be in attendance in case of any failure of
the tunnel equipment or procedures during the tests.
Instrumentation should include air velocity measurement, temperature measurement at 5 m, 10
m, 20 m, 50 m and 100 m from the fire in both directions at the road level, at 1.5 m above the
road and at the level of lighting cables or other vulnerable equipment in the top 3 m of the
tunnel cross-section. Ambient temperature and air velocity should be measured before and after
the test. Temperature data and the output from the tunnel normal CO, smoke and air velocity
measuring equipment should be continuously recorded during the test. Photographic and video
or other recording of the smoke development should be made.
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D'aprs l'exprience, il est peu probable que les incendies de cette taille provoquent des dgts
au tunnel s'ils sont correctement placs par rapport aux quipements vulnrables. Si on utilise
une pave de voiture, le rservoir doit tre compltement vid de son carburant et rempli d'eau
pour viter une explosion.
Prcautions prendre
Pour protger la chausse, le foyer doit tre plac sur des tles ondules, ou bien sur un lit de
sable de 20 cm d'paisseur, ou encore sur des cales et en arrosant la chausse durant l'essai.
L'essai doit tre conduit avant que le plafond ou la vote soient peints ou traits du point de vue
de l'acoustique. L'exprience a montr que des essais d'incendie de quelques MW
n'endommageront pas le plafond si la ventilation fonctionne. Cependant, un grand feu,
quivalent un poids lourd, peut provoquer des dgts au plafond. Les pidroits et autres
quipements ne seront vraisemblablement pas endommags, mais, titre prventif, on peut
recouvrir de plaques les pidroits sur une longueur de 8 m, l'clairage sur 10 m et les cbles
sur 20 m.
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by burning a mixture of 25 litres of petrol, 5 litres of gas oil and pieces of car tyre in a
4 m3 steel tank placed on the road surface,
by burning an old car,
by burning diesel oil or heptane. This solution permits a better repeatability. The tank
surface is adapted to obtain an acceptable heat release rate (a few megawatts).
Experience shows that fires of this size are unlikely to damage the tunnel if carefully sited in
relation to vulnerable equipment. If an old car is used the petrol tank must be emptied of petrol
and must then be filled with water to prevent explosion.
Useful precautions
To protect the carriageway, the fire should be placed on corrugated iron sheets or a 20 cm thick
bed of sand or blocks with the carriageway watered during the test. The test should be carried
out before the ceiling or vault is painted or any acoustic treatment applied. Fire experience
suggests that test fires of a few megawatts will not damage the ceiling provided the ventilation is
operated. However, a large fire, equivalent to an HGV, can be expected to damage the ceiling.
Sidewall equipment is not likely to be affected, but plastered plates covering the sidewalls for a
length of 8 m, the lighting for 10 m and cables for 20 m can be employed as a precaution.
Test report
The
test
report
should record the
attending
personnel,
the
object,
conditions
and
method of the tests,
the initial condition,
instrumentation,
description of the
development of the
fire including the
smoke
movement,
measured data and
analysis, evalua-tion
of the fire intensity
and les-sons to be
drawn.
Figure 8.1 - Test of alertness at a tunnel
in Norway
05.05.B - 1999
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CETU, "Abstracts on breakdowns, accidents and fires in the tunnels: Fourvire (Lyon), Croix
Rousse (Lyon), Frjus (Alpes)", Bron (France), 1993
MASSACHUSSETTS HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT AND FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION:
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05.05.B - 1999
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Draft for development.
DANIELSON, Mnniskans fysiska tlighet vid brand, vrmeupplagring. FOA-report C54055, May
1984, Stockholm.
ERIKSSEN, Forprosjekt Brannkatastrofer - bedre brannmmingsmodeller. Huvedrapport SINTEF,
Trondheim 1991.
FARDELL ET AL, A study of life threat in bus fires. Interflam 1993.
FUJIMURA ET AL, Practical test of emergency ventilation combined with bus firing at the KanEstu tunnel. 6th international symposium on the aerodynamics and ventilation of vehicle tunnels,
September 1988.
HYMES, The Physiological And Pathological Effects of Thermal Radiation. Health and Safety
Executive, UK, September 1983.
ISO/TC 92/SC 3N, 38, Toxic hazards in fire, CD 13344, Determination of the lethal toxic potency
of fire effluents..
KLOTE, MILKE, Design of smoke management systems. ASHRAE, 1993.
MELAND ET AL, Smoke hazard in offshore platform fires. STF 25 A 91007, SINTEF, Trondheim.
ONDRUS, Brandfrlopp. Lund Technical University, 1990.
PURSER [1], Interactions between behaviour patterns and physiological impairment in escape
from fire. Interflam 1993.
PURSER [2], Modelling Toxic and Physical Hazard in Fire. Interflam 1993.
PURSER [3], The effects of Fire Products on Escape Capability in Primates and Human Fire
Victims. Fire Safety Science, First international symposium 1985.
PURSER [4], Modelling Time to Incapacitation and Death from Toxic and Physical Hazard in
Aircraft Fires. Aircraft fire safety, Conference, Proceedings No.467, AGARD.
STENSAAS, Toxicity, visibility and heat stress of the fire effluents-human tenability limits.
SINTEF, Trondheim 1991.
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PIARC COMMITTEE ON ROAD TUNNELS, Report to the XX World Road Congress, Montreal
(Canada-Qubec), September 1995 (ref. 20.05.B) / COMITE AIPCR DES TUNNELS ROUTIERS,
rapport au XXe Congrs mondial de la Route, Montral (Canada-Qubec), septembre 1995 (rf.
20.05.B)
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in transport tunnels; Report on full-scale tests", Verlag und Vertriebsgesellschaft, Dsseldorf,
November 1995
CETU, "Abstracts on breakdowns, accidents and fires in the tunnels: Fourvire (Lyon), Croix
Rousse (Lyon), Frjus (Alpes)", Bron (France), 1993
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05.05.B - 1999
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(Australia), October 1983 / COMITE AIPCR DES TUNNELS ROUTIERS, rapport au XVIIe
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Conference on Aerodynamics and Ventilation of Vehicle Tunnels, BHR Group Conference Series,
Publication No. 12, Mechanical Engineering Publications Ltd, London, 1994
PERARD M.: "Statistics on breakdowns, accidents and fires in French road tunnels", First
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Hamburg (Germany), Tiefbauamt
LACROIX D.: "Smoke control in road tunnels in case of fire - issues and current methods", Revue
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RUCKSTUHL F.: "Accident statistics and accident risks in tunnels", reports on the OECD-seminar
on road tunnel management, p. 346-349, Lugano (Switzerland), November 1990
PIARC COMMITTEE ON ROAD TUNNELS: "Road Safety in Tunnels", ref. 05.04.B, 1995 /
COMIT AIPCR DES TUNNELS ROUTIERS "Scurit routire dans les tunnels", rf. 05.04.B,
1995
HAACK A.: "Fire protection in traffic tunnels - Initial findings from large-scale tests", Tunnelling
and Underground Space Technology, vol. 7, no. 4, p. 363-375, 1992
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CETU: "remarks on fire risks", January 1996
MINISTRY OF CONSTRUCTION, PUBLIC WORK RESEARCH INSTITUTE: "State of the Road
Tunnel Equipment Technology in Japan -ventilation, Lighting, Safety Equipment", Technical note,
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ROTH R.: "Brand eines Lastzuges im Gotthard-Straentunnel", PVT 1995, no. 2, p. 49-53
AMT DER VORARLBERGER LANDESREGIERUNG, DEPT. OF ROAD CONSTRUCTION:
"Brandkatastrophe im Pfndertunnel bei Bregenz am 10. April 1995", Bregenz (Austria), May 1995
SOCIETA INIZIATIVE NAZIONALI AUTOSTRADALI (SINA): "Press reports about the fire in the
tunnel :Isola delle Femmine", Milano (Italy), April 1996
ROYAL INSTITUTE OF ENGINEERS (KIVI): "Ventilation of Road Tunnels", Netherlands,
November 1993
SWEDISH NATIONAL TESTING AND RESEARCH INSTITUTE: "Proceedings of the International
Conference on Fires in Tunnels", Bras, October 1994
AIPCR 286
05.05.B - 1999
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42]
[43]
PERARD M., BROUSSE B.: "Full size tests before opening two French tunnels",
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BHR Group Conference Series, Publication No. 12, Mechanical Engineering
Publications Ltd., London, July 1994
HACAR F., ABELLA A., GARCIA-ARANGO I.: "Incendios en tuneles", Ediciones Paraiso S.L.,
Muoz Degrain, Oviedo (Spain), 1993
SWISS COMMITTEE FOR SAFETY IN ROAD TUNNELS : "Final Report on the Fire Tests in the
Ofenegg Tunnel", (Switzerland), 1965.
PIARC COMMITTEE ON ROAD TUNNELS, Report to the XVIth World Road Congress, Vienna
(Austria), September 1979 / COMITE AIPCR DES TUNNELS ROUTIERS, rapport au XVIe
Congrs mondial de la Route, Vienne (Autriche), septembre 1979
PIARC COMMITTEE ON ROAD TUNNELS, Report to the XVIIth World Road Congress, Sydney
(Australia), October 1983 / COMITE AIPCR DES TUNNELS ROUTIERS, rapport au XVIIe
Congrs mondial de la Route, Sydney (Australie), octobre 1983
LACROIX D.: "PIARC Activities on Fire and Smoke Control in Road Tunnels", 8th International
Conference on Aerodynamics and Ventilation of Vehicle Tunnels, BHR Group Conference Series,
Publication No. 12, Mechanical Engineering Publications Ltd, London, 1994
PERARD M.: "Statistics on breakdowns, accidents and fires in French road tunnels", First
International Conference on Tunnel Incident Management, Korsor (Denmark), May 1996
"Statistics on the traffic in the Elbtunnel from the year 1975 to the year 1992", Baubehrde
Hamburg (Germany), Tiefbauamt
LACROIX D.: "Smoke control in road tunnels in case of fire - issues and current methods", Revue
Gnrale des Routes et des Arodromes, n. 723, November 1994
RUCKSTUHL F.: "Accident statistics and accident risks in tunnels", reports on the OECD-seminar
on road tunnel management, p. 346-349, Lugano (Switzerland), November 1990
PIARC COMMITTEE ON ROAD TUNNELS: "Road Safety in Tunnels", ref. 05.04.B, 1995 /
COMIT AIPCR DES TUNNELS ROUTIERS "Scurit routire dans les tunnels", rf. 05.04.B,
1995
HAACK A.: "Fire protection in traffic tunnels - Initial findings from large-scale tests", Tunnelling
and Underground Space Technology, vol. 7, no. 4, p. 363-375, 1992
LINGELSER S.: "Donnes sur les incendies importants de poids lourds dans les tunnels routiers",
internal paper of the French Centre d'Etudes des Tunnels and the Direction de la Scurit Civile,
Lyon (France), september 1995, not published
CETU: "remarks on fire risks", January 1996
MINISTRY OF CONSTRUCTION, PUBLIC WORK RESEARCH INSTITUTE: "State of the Road
Tunnel Equipment Technology in Japan -ventilation, Lighting, Safety Equipment", Technical note,
Vol. 61, September 1993
Werkhof Gschenen: Reports on the Gotthard-truck fire from July 5th, 1994
ROTH R.: "Brand eines Lastzuges im Gotthard-Straentunnel", PVT 1995, no. 2, p. 49-53
AMT DER VORARLBERGER LANDESREGIERUNG, DEPT. OF ROAD CONSTRUCTION:
"Brandkatastrophe im Pfndertunnel bei Bregenz am 10. April 1995", Bregenz (Austria), May 1995
SOCIETA INIZIATIVE NAZIONALI AUTOSTRADALI (SINA): "Press reports about the fire in the
tunnel :Isola delle Femmine", Milano (Italy), April 1996
ROYAL INSTITUTE OF ENGINEERS (KIVI): "Ventilation of Road Tunnels", Netherlands,
November 1993
SWEDISH NATIONAL TESTING AND RESEARCH INSTITUTE: "Proceedings of the International
Conference on Fires in Tunnels", Bras, October 1994
PIARC 287
05.05.B - 1999
[44]
[45]
[46]
[47]
[48]
[49]
[50]
[51]
[52]
[53]
[54]
[55]
[56]
[57]
[58]
[59]
[60]
[61]
[62]
[63]
[64]
AIPCR 288
05.05.B - 1999
[44]
[45]
[46]
[47]
[48]
[49]
[50]
[51]
[52]
[53]
[54]
[55]
[56]
[57]
[58]
[59]
[60]
[61]
[62]
[63]
[64]
PIARC 289
05.05.B - 1999
[65]
[66]
[67]
[68]
[69]
[70]
[71]
[72]
[73]
[74]
[75]
[76]
[77]
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[79]
[80]
[81]
[82]
[83]
[84]
[85]
[86]
EUREKA 499 Report: "Fires in transport tunnels, Report on full scale tests", Edited by
Studiengesellschaft Stahlanwendung e.V., Dsseldorf, April 1996
PERARD M.: "Organisation of fire tests in an operated road tunnel", First International Conference
on Safety in Road and Rail Tunnels, Basel (Switzerland), November 1992
CASALE E., MOULET J.M.: "Essais incendie au tunnel du Puymorens", Tunnels et Ouvrages
Souterrains, N 127, pp 45-56, January / February 1995
KOSEKI H., HAYASAKA H.: "Estimation of thermal balance in heptane pool fire", J. of Fire
Sciences, Vol. 7, pp 237-250, July/August 1989
SCETAUROUTE DTTS: "Essais d'incendie au tunnel de Chamoise - Rapport scientifique",
February 1996 (Unpublished)
SALAN-PENQUER G., GUILLAUME R., COLLINI P.: "Comportement du Halon 1301 dans les
wagons-navettes (feux de siges et feux de chassis)", Rapport d'tudes Env XXXIII pour
TRANSMANCHE-LINK, June 1989
LACROIX D., CHASSE P., MULLER T.: "Small scale study of smoke trap door systems", 8th
International Symposium on Aerodynamics and Ventilation of Vehicle Tunnels, Liverpool (UK), pp.
409-438, July 1994
VAUQUELIN O.: "Caractrisation exprimentale de l'apparition d'une nappe de retour", Compte
Rendu l'Acadmie des Sciences de Paris, t. 321, Srie II b, pp 15-18, 1995
LACROIX D.: Smoke control in road tunnels in case of fire: issues and current methods research
ways, CETU publication, November 1994, March 1995
GUELZIM A., SOUIL J.M., VANTELON J.P., DOAN KIM SON, GABAY D., DALLEST D.:
"Modelling of a reverse layer of fire induced smoke in a tunnel", 4th International Symposium on
Fire Safety Science, Ottawa, Ontario (Canada), June 1994
SAITO N., YAMADA T., SEKIZAWA A., YANAI E., WATANABE Y., MIYAZAKI S.: "Experimental
study on fire behaviour in a wind tunnel with a reduced scale model", 2nd International Conference
on Safety in Road and Rail Tunnels, Granada (Spain), April 1995
CORDIER H., VAUQUELIN O., BERTRAND E., CASALE E., OUAZZANI J.: "Experimental and
numerical study of reduced scale model tunnel fires", First European Symposium on Fire Safety
Science, Zrich (Switzerland), August 1995
KUMAR S. & COX G.: "Mathematical modelling of fires in road tunnels", 5th International
Symposium on the Aerodynamics and Ventilation of Vehicle Tunnels, Lille (France), May 1985
BIOLLAY H.: "Projet EUREKA 499: Simulations numriques de lessai dheptane H32", Journe de
prsentation de rsultats de recherche, Arche de la Dfense, Paris, January 1996
BIOLLAY H. & CHASSE P.: "Validating and optimizing 2D and 3D computer simulations for the
Ofenegg tunnel fire tests", 8th International Symposium on the Aerodynamics and Ventilation of
Vehicle Tunnels, Liverpool (UK), July 1994
BIOLLAY H.: "Contribution la simulation numrique dun incendie en tunnel par un modle de
champ", PhD thesis, Lyon1 University (France), March 1997
KAWABATA N., OHASHI H., KATO Y.: "Numerical simulation of fire fume propagation along the
ceiling of a down-grade tunnel", 7th International Symposium on the Aerodynamics and Ventilation
of Vehicle Tunnels, Brighton (UK), November 1993
SIMCOX S., WILKES N.S., IONES L.P.: "Computer simulation of the flows of hot gases from the
fire at Kings Cross underground station", Fire Safety Journal, Vol. 18, pp 49-73, 1992
WOODBURN B.: "CFD simulations of fires in tunnels: a sensitivity study", First European
Symposium on Fire Safety Science, Zrich, August 1995
PIARC COMMITTEE ON ROAD TUNNELS: "Road Tunnels: Emissions, Ventilation, Environment",
ref. 05.02.B,1995 / COMITE AIPCR DES TUNNELS ROUTIERS : "Tunnels routiers : missions,
ventilation, environnement", rf. 05.02.B, 1995
JAPAN ROAD ASSOCIATION: "Tunnel ventilation design guidelines", Japan, 1985
PUBLIC WORKS RESEARCH INSTITUTE (PWRI): "Road Tunnel Technology in Japan",
Technical Memorandum of PWRI n 3023, Japan, October 1991
AIPCR 290
05.05.B - 1999
[65]
[66]
[67]
[68]
[69]
[70]
[71]
[72]
[73]
[74]
[75]
[76]
[77]
[78]
[79]
[80]
[81]
[82]
[83]
[84]
[85]
[86]
EUREKA 499 Report: "Fires in transport tunnels, Report on full scale tests", Edited by
Studiengesellschaft Stahlanwendung e.V., Dsseldorf, April 1996
PERARD M.: "Organisation of fire tests in an operated road tunnel", First International Conference
on Safety in Road and Rail Tunnels, Basel (Switzerland), November 1992
CASALE E., MOULET J.M.: "Essais incendie au tunnel du Puymorens", Tunnels et Ouvrages
Souterrains, N 127, pp 45-56, January / February 1995
KOSEKI H., HAYASAKA H.: "Estimation of thermal balance in heptane pool fire", J. of Fire
Sciences, Vol. 7, pp 237-250, July/August 1989
SCETAUROUTE DTTS: "Essais d'incendie au tunnel de Chamoise - Rapport scientifique",
February 1996 (Unpublished)
SALAN-PENQUER G., GUILLAUME R., COLLINI P.: "Comportement du Halon 1301 dans les
wagons-navettes (feux de siges et feux de chassis)", Rapport d'tudes Env XXXIII pour
TRANSMANCHE-LINK, June 1989
LACROIX D., CHASSE P., MULLER T.: "Small scale study of smoke trap door systems", 8th
International Symposium on Aerodynamics and Ventilation of Vehicle Tunnels, Liverpool (UK), pp.
409-438, July 1994
VAUQUELIN O.: "Caractrisation exprimentale de l'apparition d'une nappe de retour", Compte
Rendu l'Acadmie des Sciences de Paris, t. 321, Srie II b, pp 15-18, 1995
LACROIX D.: Smoke control in road tunnels in case of fire: issues and current methods research
ways, CETU publication, November 1994, March 1995
GUELZIM A., SOUIL J.M., VANTELON J.P., DOAN KIM SON, GABAY D., DALLEST D.:
"Modelling of a reverse layer of fire induced smoke in a tunnel", 4th International Symposium on
Fire Safety Science, Ottawa, Ontario (Canada), June 1994
SAITO N., YAMADA T., SEKIZAWA A., YANAI E., WATANABE Y., MIYAZAKI S.: "Experimental
study on fire behaviour in a wind tunnel with a reduced scale model", 2nd International Conference
on Safety in Road and Rail Tunnels, Granada (Spain), April 1995
CORDIER H., VAUQUELIN O., BERTRAND E., CASALE E., OUAZZANI J.: "Experimental and
numerical study of reduced scale model tunnel fires", First European Symposium on Fire Safety
Science, Zrich (Switzerland), August 1995
KUMAR S. & COX G.: "Mathematical modelling of fires in road tunnels", 5th International
Symposium on the Aerodynamics and Ventilation of Vehicle Tunnels, Lille (France), May 1985
BIOLLAY H.: "Projet EUREKA 499: Simulations numriques de lessai dheptane H32", Journe de
prsentation de rsultats de recherche, Arche de la Dfense, Paris, January 1996
BIOLLAY H. & CHASSE P.: "Validating and optimizing 2D and 3D computer simulations for the
Ofenegg tunnel fire tests", 8th International Symposium on the Aerodynamics and Ventilation of
Vehicle Tunnels, Liverpool (UK), July 1994
BIOLLAY H.: "Contribution la simulation numrique dun incendie en tunnel par un modle de
champ", PhD thesis, Lyon1 University (France), March 1997
KAWABATA N., OHASHI H., KATO Y.: "Numerical simulation of fire fume propagation along the
ceiling of a down-grade tunnel", 7th International Symposium on the Aerodynamics and Ventilation
of Vehicle Tunnels, Brighton (UK), November 1993
SIMCOX S., WILKES N.S., IONES L.P.: "Computer simulation of the flows of hot gases from the
fire at Kings Cross underground station", Fire Safety Journal, Vol. 18, pp 49-73, 1992
WOODBURN B.: "CFD simulations of fires in tunnels: a sensitivity study", First European
Symposium on Fire Safety Science, Zrich, August 1995
PIARC COMMITTEE ON ROAD TUNNELS: "Road Tunnels: Emissions, Ventilation, Environment",
ref. 05.02.B,1995 / COMITE AIPCR DES TUNNELS ROUTIERS : "Tunnels routiers : missions,
ventilation, environnement", rf. 05.02.B, 1995
JAPAN ROAD ASSOCIATION: "Tunnel ventilation design guidelines", Japan, 1985
PUBLIC WORKS RESEARCH INSTITUTE (PWRI): "Road Tunnel Technology in Japan",
Technical Memorandum of PWRI n 3023, Japan, October 1991
PIARC 291
05.05.B - 1999
[87]
[88]
[89]
[90]
[91]
[92]
[93]
[94]
[95]
[96]
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ROYAL INSTITUTE OF ENGINEERS (KIVI): "Ventilation of Road Tunnels", Netherland, July 1991
CENTRE DETUDES DES TUNNELS (CETU): "Dossier pilote des tunnels - Document
quipements - Section ventilation", France, to be published
th
LACROIX D. : "New French recommendations for fire ventilation in road tunnels", 9 International
Conference on Aerodynamics and Ventilation of Vehicle Tunnels, Aosta (Italy), October 1997
FORSCHUNGSGESELLSCHAFT FUR DAS VERKEHR UND STRASSENWESEN (FVS) - RVS
9261; 9262, " Design guidelines tunnel ventilation", Austria, 1997
NORDISK VEJTEKNISK FORBUND (NVF) - Sub Committee 61- : "Ventilation of road tunnels",
Report n6: 1993, English translation 1995
PUBLIC ROADS ADMINISTRATION: "Norwegian design guide - Road Tunnels", Norway,
December 1990
SWEDISH NATIONAL ROAD ADMINISTRATION: "Tunnel 95 - General Technical Specification",
Publ. 1995:32E, Sweden, 1996
RHODES N.: "Smoke Modelling", Proceedings of the One Day Seminar on Smoke and Critical
Velocity in Tunnels, Organised and sponsored by Independent Technical Conferences Ltd.,
London (UK), April 1996.
OKA Y., ATKINSON G. : "Control of Smoke Flow in tunnel fires", Fire Safety Journal, Vol. 25, pp.
305-322, 1995
PIARC COMMITTEE ON ROAD TUNNELS: "Classification of tunnels, Existing guidelines and
experiences, Recommendations", 1995, ref. 05.03.B / COMITE AIPCR DES TUNNELS
ROUTIERS: "Classification des tunnels, directives et expriences existantes, recommandations",
1995, rf. 05.03.B
SHIELDS T.J., BOYCE K.E., Emergency egress capabilities of people with mixed abilities, Fire
SERT, Univ. of Ulster, 2nd International Conference on Safety in Road and Rail Tunnels, Granada
(Spain), April 1995.
th
PIARC COMMITTEE ON ROAD TUNNELS, report to the XV World Road Congress, Mexico City,
1975 / COMITE AIPCR DES TUNNELS ROUTIERS, rapport au XVe Congrs mondial de la Route,
Mexico City, 1975
ROYAL INSTITUTE OF ENGINEERS (KIVI) : "Ventilation of Road Tunnels, Recommendations
1991", Department of Tunnel Technology and Underground Engineering Works, (Netherlands),
printed February 1994
PIARC: Safety - General Report to the XIXth World Road Congress, Marrakesh, September 1991,
ref. 19.34.B / AIPCR : Scurit Rapport gnral au XIXe Congrs mondial de la Route,
Marrakech, septembre 1991, rf. 19.34.B
AIPCR 292
05.05.B - 1999
[87]
[88]
[89]
[90]
[91]
[92]
[93]
[94]
[95]
[96]
[97]
[98]
[99]
[100]
ROYAL INSTITUTE OF ENGINEERS (KIVI): "Ventilation of Road Tunnels", Netherland, July 1991
CENTRE DETUDES DES TUNNELS (CETU): "Dossier pilote des tunnels - Document
quipements - Section ventilation", France, to be published
th
LACROIX D. : "New French recommendations for fire ventilation in road tunnels", 9 International
Conference on Aerodynamics and Ventilation of Vehicle Tunnels, Aosta (Italy), October 1997
FORSCHUNGSGESELLSCHAFT FUR DAS VERKEHR UND STRASSENWESEN (FVS) - RVS
9261; 9262, " Design guidelines tunnel ventilation", Austria, 1997
NORDISK VEJTEKNISK FORBUND (NVF) - Sub Committee 61- : "Ventilation of road tunnels",
Report n6: 1993, English translation 1995
PUBLIC ROADS ADMINISTRATION: "Norwegian design guide - Road Tunnels", Norway,
December 1990
SWEDISH NATIONAL ROAD ADMINISTRATION: "Tunnel 95 - General Technical Specification",
Publ. 1995:32E, Sweden, 1996
RHODES N.: "Smoke Modelling", Proceedings of the One Day Seminar on Smoke and Critical
Velocity in Tunnels, Organised and sponsored by Independent Technical Conferences Ltd.,
London (UK), April 1996.
OKA Y., ATKINSON G. : "Control of Smoke Flow in tunnel fires", Fire Safety Journal, Vol. 25, pp.
305-322, 1995
PIARC COMMITTEE ON ROAD TUNNELS: "Classification of tunnels, Existing guidelines and
experiences, Recommendations", 1995, ref. 05.03.B / COMITE AIPCR DES TUNNELS
ROUTIERS: "Classification des tunnels, directives et expriences existantes, recommandations",
1995, rf. 05.03.B
SHIELDS T.J., BOYCE K.E., Emergency egress capabilities of people with mixed abilities, Fire
SERT, Univ. of Ulster, 2nd International Conference on Safety in Road and Rail Tunnels, Granada
(Spain), April 1995.
th
PIARC COMMITTEE ON ROAD TUNNELS, report to the XV World Road Congress, Mexico City,
1975 / COMITE AIPCR DES TUNNELS ROUTIERS, rapport au XVe Congrs mondial de la Route,
Mexico City, 1975
ROYAL INSTITUTE OF ENGINEERS (KIVI) : "Ventilation of Road Tunnels, Recommendations
1991", Department of Tunnel Technology and Underground Engineering Works, (Netherlands),
printed February 1994
PIARC: Safety - General Report to the XIXth World Road Congress, Marrakesh, September 1991,
ref. 19.34.B / AIPCR : Scurit Rapport gnral au XIXe Congrs mondial de la Route,
Marrakech, septembre 1991, rf. 19.34.B
PIARC 293
05.05.B - 1999
I.4.2 Rayonnement
Le rayonnement est cr par la temprature et peut tre exprim comme suit pour une couche
infinie de fume dans laquelle la temprature est constante :
E f = 5,67 10 8 r T 4
W / m2
q. [1.4.2.1]
AIPCR 16
05.05.B - 1999
I.4.2 Radiation
Radiation is created by temperature and may be expressed as follows for an infinite layer of
smoke in which the temperature is constant:
E f = 5.67 10 8 r T 4
W / m2
eq. [1.4.2.1]
where r is the resulting emissivity and T the temperature of the smoke (in kelvins).
The level of radiation depends on the temperature and the emissivity of the smoke. When the
temperature within the smoke layer is not constant an integration is necessary to calculate the
radiation level.
The radiation is produced by the fire itself and by the hot smoke layer (figure 1.4.2.1).
The continuous line in
figure 1.4.2.2 shows the
calculated
radiation
affecting
escaping
people from an infinite
smoke layer with a
constant temperature in
the whole layer. The
dashed
line
corresponds to a tunnel
8 m wide and 6 m high
in which the smoke
layer
PIARC 17
05.05.B - 1999
has descended to 3 m
above road level. A
value of 0.8 is assumed
for r in both cases.
Near the fire site a
contribution from the
flames
should
be
added.
La figure 1.4.2.3, daprs Hymes [7], montre la dure de rsistance avant blessure par brlure
pour diffrents flux de chaleur, jusqu une dure dexposition de 100 s. Par exemple, pour une
dure dexposition de 100 s, 11 kW/m provoquent 50 % de dcs.
Purser [13] montre, dans la figure 1.4.2.4, quil existe une limite dintensit relativement
vidente de 2,5 kW/m2 pour la rsistance une chaleur rayonne constante. Dans cette figure,
les lettres "a" "e" correspondent diffrentes valeurs observes dans la bibliographie et les
recherches.
A la figure 1.4.2.5, Danielsson [3] montre le moment o la douleur apparat diffrents niveaux
de rayonnement constant. P est un facteur scurit pour diffrents vtements : P = 1
correspond la peau nue et P = 26 correspond des vtements de pompier.
AIPCR 18
05.05.B - 1999
In figure 1.4.2.3, Hymes [7] shows tolerance times to burn injury levels for various incident heat
fluxes up to an exposure time of 100 s. For example at a 100 seconds exposure time, 11 kW/m
creates 50% lethality.
Purser [13] shows in figure 1.4.2.4 that there is a fairly obvious intensity limit for
tolerance of constant radiant heat at 2.5 kW/m2. In this figure letters "a" to "e"
correspond to different observed values in literature and investigations.
In figure 1.4.2.5 Danielsson [3] shows time until pain occurs at different constant radiation
levels. P is a safety factor for different clothes: P = 1 corresponds to naked skin and P = 26
corresponds to a fire-fighter clothes.
PIARC 19
05.05.B - 1999
q [1.4.3.1]
Si la temprature nest pas constante, comme dans une situation normale, le concept de dose
est introduit. Puisque la dure de rsistance prend la forme dune courbe exponentielle, il est
possible de considrer la victime comme ayant absorb une dose de chaleur convecte. Par
consquent, il est possible dutiliser le concept dune dose fractionnaire de chaleur absorbe
chaque minute du point de vue de la mise en incapacit :
1
Flh = e
5.1849 0.0273 T
q. [1.4.3.2]
o T est la temprature en C durant cette minute. Lorsque la dose cumule est suprieure 1,
la survie est menace.
AIPCR 20
05.05.B - 1999
eq [1.4.3.1]
If the temperature is not constant, as in a normal situation, the "dose" concept is introduced.
Since the tolerance time takes the form of an exponential curve, it is feasible to consider the
victim as taking up a "dose" of convected heat. Thereafter it is possible to use the concept of a
fractional incapacitating dose of heat acquired during each minute as follows:
Flh = e
5.1849 0.0273 T
eq. [1.4.3.2]
where T is the temperature in C during that minute. When the cumulative fractional dose
exceeds unity, life threatening conditions have occurred.
PIARC 21
05.05.B - 1999
I.5
Recommendations
In order of importance, the aims of fire and smoke control in tunnels are:
PIARC 31
05.05.B - 1999
Most fires, however, are generated by the traffic passing through a tunnel and not by tunnel
equipment or maintenance
work. So-me of the most
serious fires known yet started
due to accidents (e.g. frontback-collisions).
Photo 2.1 - Fire following an
accident in the Velsen Tunnel
(Netherlands) in 1978
13
cases
.
2 37 10 (1 0.15) 3.3 veh. km
heavy vehicles
HGV =
9
cases
13 + 9
cases
6
2 37 10 3.3 veh.km
PIARC 41
05.05.B - 1999
Il faut souligner que tous les rsultats EUREKA dpendent bien videmment des conditions
dessais. Celles-ci incluent de basses vitesses de lair durant la plupart des essais et une
section transversale sensiblement plus petite que dans les tunnels routiers habituels, ce qui
survalue le rayonnement
thermique
renvoy
par
les
parois. Lessai avec
un poids lourd, par
ailleurs, a t fait
spcialement
avec
une vitesse longitudinale de lair de
6 m/s en avant de
lincendie pendant les
15 premires minutes, ce qui donnait
en moyenne environ
13 m/s autour du
vhicule : une telle
vitesse est significaPhoto 2.2 - Incendie de poids lourd
tivement suprieure
ce qui est gnralors des essais dincendie EUREKA
lement rencontr dans les tunnels routiers et elle produit galement une combustion plus
intense. En consquence, les essais EUREKA donnent des indications prcieuses sur les
conditions durant un incendie, mais ils peuvent difficilement fournir par eux-mmes de
nouvelles valeurs ralistes de dimensionnement. Aucune donne nouvelle nest disponible en
ce qui concerne les incendies de marchandises dangereuses.
AIPCR 56
05.05.B - 1999
It must be emphasised that all the EUREKA results are of course dependent upon the test
conditions. These include low air velocities during most of the tests and a cross-section
significantly smaller than usual for road tunnels, which overestimates the heat radiation coming
back from the walls. The test with a Heavy Goods Vehicle (HGV) on the other hand was
specifically conducted with a longitudinal air velocity of about 6 m/s ahead of the fire during the
first 15 minutes, which gave about 13 m/s on average around the vehicle: such a velocity is
significantly higher than what is normally encountered in road tunnels and also produces a more
intense combustion. As a consequence the EUREKA tests give valuable hints about the
conditions during a fire event, but they can hardly provide new realistic design values on their
own. No new experimental data is available concerning dangerous goods fires.
PIARC 57
05.05.B - 1999
Comme le montre la figure 2.4.2 dans les essais EUREKA, des tempratures potentiellement
dangereuses pour les armatures du bton ont t enregistres jusqu environ 100 m en aval
de lincendie et, en raison de la remonte de fumes, jusqu environ 30 m en amont. Ltendue
de cette zone peut tre sensiblement diffrente selon les tunnels, en raison notamment de la
ventilation, de la dclivit du tunnel, de la rugosit de la surface et des revtements rsistant au
feu. Une nouvelle valuation des rsultats dEUREKA est ncessaire pour parvenir des
spcifications plus globales des zones menaces.
plastique
Dans lensemble, les tempratures maximales suivantes au niveau des parois ou du plafond
doivent tre considres en ce qui concerne la structure du tunnel et les rglementations du
trafic poids lourds pour des tunnels spciaux :
voiture particulire
400 C
autobus/petit camion
700 C
poids lourd (HGV) avec matires combustibles
(sauf essence ou autres marchandises dangereuses)
1 000 C
camion citerne dessence (cas gnral)
1 200 C
camion citerne dessence (cas extrmes :
par exemple, aucun bnfice tir du drainage du tunnel
et d'un dbit de fuite limit ; grande citerne ;
viter linondation dun tunnel immerg)
1 400 C
05.05.B - 1999
As can be seen by figure 2.4.2 in the EUREKA tests, temperatures which can be dangerous to
the steel reinforcement of concrete were found till about 100 m downstream of the fire and
because of back-layering till about 30 m upstream of the fire. The extension of this region in
various road tunnels can be quite different from these values due to e.g. the ventilation, tunnel
inclination, surface roughness and fire-resistant coatings. For a more general specification of
endangered regions a further evaluation of the EUREKA results is necessary.
On the whole the following maximum temperatures at the tunnels wall or ceiling should be
considered with regard to the tunnel structure and the cargo-traffic-regulations for specific
tunnels:
passenger car
400 C *
bus/small lorry
700 C *
heavy lorry (HGV) with burning goods
(not petrol or other dangerous goods)
1 000 C
petrol tanker (general case)
1 200 C
petrol tanker (extreme cases: e.g. no benefits due to
tunnel drainage and limited leakage rate; large tanker;
avoidance of the flooding of an immersed tunnel)
1 400 C
*: Higher if flames touch the walls.
PIARC 59
05.05.B - 1999
Depuis, des progrs ont t raliss. En regroupant les essais dincendie EUREKA en Norvge
et en Finlande, les donnes AIPCR de Bruxelles et les rcentes propositions du CETU
(France), on peut faire apparatre les donnes approximatives suivantes de puissance
thermique pour une dure significative dun incendie dans un tunnel [19 ; 20 ; 36] (exemple :
figure 2.4.4, camion citerne dessence : voir tableau 2.4.2) :
2,5 MW
5 MW
8 MW
15 MW
20 MW
20-30 MW
Les poids lourds plus importants transportant des matires combustibles, et plus spcialement
des marchandises dangereuses, peuvent produire de fortes puissances thermiques. Les essais
dincendie EUREKA sur poids lourd ont rvl une puissance maximale denviron 100 120
MW, mais seulement sur une trs courte priode.
Les puissances maximales relles peuvent scarter de ces valeurs car elles dpendent du type
de vhicule, du type de cargaison, de la ventilation, des vitesses de combustion, etc. Pour les
camions citernes dessence, les fuites provoques par un accident et la capacit du systme de
drainage du tunnel ont galement une grande influence.
Puissance thermique
(MW) et dbit d'nergie
Puissance thermique
Dbit d'nergie
En ce qui concerne la construction du tunnel, les scnarios KIVI [42] tiennent compte dun
incendie de 300 MW pour les tunnels immergs. Une proposition franaise prconise un
incendie de 200 MW si un camion citerne dessence est impliqu [47]. Une analyse de risque
pour le tunnel dOresund [43] considre la possibilit dune fuite de carburant partir de
brches de diamtre quivalent 15, 35 et 50 mm. Cela reprsente une dfaillance potentielle
dun tuyau de carburant de petit diamtre ou un lger dgt sur une collerette de tuyau, mais ne
reprsente pas la rupture complte dun tuyau de livraison, ce qui quivaudrait un orifice de
100 mm de diamtre. Le dbit de la fuite dpend du diamtre de lorifice et de la pression du
liquide. Pour les orifices considrs, les dbits massiques sont respectivement de 0,5, 2,7 et
5,6 kg/s.
AIPCR 62
05.05.B - 1999
Since then further advances have been achieved. In summarising the EUREKA fire tests in
Norway and Finland, the PIARC data from Brussels and recent CETU proposals in France the
following approximate maximum calorific power outputs may occur for a significant duration
during fire events in tunnels [19; 20; 36] (example: figure 2.4.4; petrol tanker: see table 2.4.2):
2.5 MW
5 MW
8 MW
15 MW
20 MW
20-30 MW
Larger vehicles (HGV) with burning goods and especially with dangerous goods may cause
higher calorific power outputs. The EUREKA HGV fire test indicated a peak power output of
approx. 100 to 120 MW, but during a very short period only.
Real peak powers will differ from the values given above because they depend on the type of
vehicle, type of cargo, ventilation, burning rates, etc. For petrol tankers there is also a great
influence due to the leakage opening produced by an accident and the capacity of the tunnel
drainage system.
Table 2.4.2 - Effect of leakage diameter
and drainage rate
on the fire size of petrol tankers [43]
Leakage mass
flow
of petrol
[kg/s]
15
1 kg/s
2 kg/s
5 kg/s
0.5
22
35
2.7
120
76
33
50
5.6
245
201
158
27
Diamtre
quivalent
de la fuite [mm]
Dbit massique
de la fuite
dessence [kg/s]
0 kg/s
1 kg/s
2 kg/s
5 kg/s
With regard to the tunnel construction, KIVI scenarios [42] take a 300 MW fire for immersed
tunnels into account. A French proposal claims a 200 MW fire if a petrol tanker is involved [47].
A risk analysis for the Oresund tunnel [43] considers the possibility of fuel leakage from ruptures
of 15, 35, and 50 mm equivalent diameter. These represent the potential failure of small
diameter fuel lines or a small damage of a delivery hose flange. They do not represent the
complete rupture of a delivery hose which would give a hole diameter of 100 mm. The leakage
flow depends on the diameter of the hole and the fluid pressure at the hole. For the holes
considered the mass flows are 0.5, 2.7 and 5.6 kg/s respectively.
PIARC 63
05.05.B - 1999
Schweiger [56] a ralis une valuation thermodynamique des essais du tunnel du Zwenberg
pour une quantit de combustible de 200 l dessence ordinaire. Pour une flaque de 7 m2,
lnergie totale disponible tait de 6 410 MJ. Une combustion stchiomtrique suppose cela
aboutit une masse totale de produit de combustion (fume) de 2 322 kg (besoins en air et en
essence pour la combustion). Une combustion stchiomtrique est le rsultat de la combustion
de lessence avec le minimum dair ncessaire. Pendant lincendie du tunnel, il ny avait pas
une combustion stchiomtrique.
En plus des composants CO2 et H2O rsultant dune combustion stchiomtrique, se sont
galement forms du CO et du NOx. Cependant, la quantit de ces derniers tait faible (en
concentration), ce qui signifie quil nest pas ncessaire de les prendre en compte lors de
lquilibre thermodynamique. Lvaluation tait ensuite fonde sur lhypothse quil ne pouvait y
avoir de condensation de vapeur deau dans la fume.
La figure 3.4.1 montre la production par combustion stchiomtrique (CO2, H2O et N2 non
brl) dans le tunnel en fonction de la dure de l'incendie pour 200 l dessence ordinaire. On
peut observer que la totalit de lessence brle en 10 mn environ. Au dbut, les produits de
combustion montrent un accroissement linaire rapide. Aprs 400 secondes, 2 100 kg de fume
ont t produits. Ensuite, la production de fume dcrot fortement, et aprs 620 secondes,
lessence est totalement brle. Durant les 400 premires secondes, la puissance thermique
tait d'environ 15 MW.
Lvolution de cet incendie tait pour l'essentiel indpendante du type de ventilation
(transversale, transversale sans apport dair frais, semi-transversale, longitudinale avec une
3
vitesse de lair de 2 m/s). Le systme de ventilation tait conu pour fournir 30 m /s dair frais et
aspirer 30 m3/s dair vici sur une longueur de 400 m. Ainsi, dans le cas de la ventilation
transversale, il tait possible dextraire de lespace de circulation la totalit de la fume sur une
distance denviron 200 m.
AIPCR 78
05.05.B - 1999
Schweiger [56] made a thermodynamic evaluation of the fire tests in the Zwenberg tunnel for a
fuel mass of 200 l of regular petrol. In a 7 m2 pool area the total available fuel energy was 6410
MJ. Based on an assumed stoichiometric combustion, this results in a total combustion product
(smoke) amount of 2322 kg (fuel and air requirements for combustion). A stoichiometric
combustion product amount is the result of the complete combustion of fuel with the necessary
minimum amount of air. During the tunnel fire there was no stoichiometric combustion.
)LJXUH
0DVV RI VPRNH SURGXFHG
ZLWK O RI JDVROLQH
)LJXUH
4XDQWLWp GH IXPpH
SURGXLWH SDU O GHVVHQFH
In addition to the
compo-nents CO2 and
H2O resulting from a
stoichiometric
combustion, CO and NOx
were formed as well.
However, the amount
of these components
was small (within the
ppm range), which
means that they can be
neglected
in
the
thermodynamic
balance.
The
evaluation was further
based
on
the
assumption that no
condensation of the
water vapour contained
in the smoke took
place.
PIARC 79
05.05.B - 1999
Pour convertir les masses de fume en volumes, il est ncessaire de connatre la temprature
de la fume. Les tempratures thoriques de combustion stchiomtrique de lessence
ordinaire sont denviron 2 000 C. Les tempratures relles en cas dincendie sont
gnralement plus faibles, principalement parce que la combustion nest pas stchiomtrique,
ou parce que la fume se mlange lair.
Les essais raliss dans les tunnels de lOfenegg et du Zwenberg ont montr que les
tempratures maximales le long du plafond au-dessus du foyer de lincendie variaient entre 800
et 1 200 C.
Temprature (C)
Site de l'incendie
Sortie nord
La figure 3.4.3 montre la situation avec une vitesse longitudinale un peu plus leve (4 m/s).
Il est difficile de comparer directement les deux rsultats, puisque lvolution de la temprature
est seulement disponible des laps de temps diffrents (ramener les chiffres aux mmes temps
nest pas possible).
De plus, le facteur suivant doit tre pris en compte : dans le cas de vitesses longitudinales plus
basses, les flammes ne sont que modrment rediriges dans le sens du courant d'air. On peut
noter une lgre remonte des fumes le long du plafond, contre-courant du flux principal.
Cependant, dans le cas de vitesses longitudinales plus grandes, les gaz de fume sont
totalement rediriges dans la direction du courant d'air. En gnral, on peut dire que les
tempratures des fumes jusqu une distance denviron 200 m sont plus leves dans le cas
de vitesses longitudinales de 4 m/s que dans le cas de vitesses longitudinales plus basses. A
partir dune distance de 200 m, cependant, les tempratures sont plus faibles en raison de la
vitesse longitudinale leve et de leffet de lchange thermique avec la paroi.
AIPCR 80
05.05.B - 1999
In order to convert the smoke masses produced to smoke volumes it is necessary to know the
smoke temperatures. The theoretical stoichiometric combustion temperatures of regular
gasoline are about 2000 C. The real fire temperatures are usually much lower, mainly because
the combustion is not stoichiometric, or because the smoke mingles with air.
The fire tests performed in the Ofenegg tunnel and in the Zwenberg tunnel showed that the
maximum local temperatures along the ceiling above the fire site were between 800 C and
1200 C.
Figure 3.4.2 shows the main temperature distribution in the tunnel relative to time in the case of
a longitudinal ventilation with a longitudinal velocity of 2 m/s. The temperature is the mean value
of all temperature measurements performed in one measuring cross-section.
Figure 3.4.3 shows the conditions with a slightly higher longitudinal velocity of 4 m/s.
It is not possible to directly compare the two measurement results with each other, since the
temperature distribution is only available for different times (converting the figures to the same
times is not possible).
In addition, the following fact must be considered as well: in the case of lower longitudinal
velocities, the flames are being redirected into the flow direction only to a small extent. There is
still a minor backlayering of the flue gases along the ceiling, which is directed against the main
flow. In the case of higher longitudinal velocities, however, the flue gases are completely
redirected toward the flow direction. In general it can therefore be said that the flue gas
temperatures up to a distance of approximately 200 m are higher in the case of higher
longitudinal velocities of 4 m/s that in the case of lower longitudinal velocities. As of a distance
of 200 m, however, temperatures decrease due to the higher longitudinal velocity and the
resulting improvement in the heat transition into the rock.
PIARC 81
05.05.B - 1999
expriences PWRI (Japon, 1980) [61] : les essais japonais en vraie grandeur
utilisrent une galerie de 700 m de long construite par lInstitut de Recherche des
Travaux publics (PWRI) et un tunnel de 3 300 m de long. Seize exprimentations
furent ralises dans la galerie et huit dans le tunnel. On utilisa comme foyers des
bacs dessence (dix essais avec 4 m, deux essais avec 6 m), des vhicules
particuliers (six essais) et des autobus (six essais). Les conditions physiques
mesures dans le tunnel furent corrles aux capacits de secours. Linfluence de la
vitesse longitudinale de lair fut dmontre.
tunnel de Repparfjord (Norvge, 1990-1992) [62] : ces essais furent conduits dans
une ancienne galerie minire dune longueur de 2,3 km (parois non revtues et
section transversale allant de 30 40 m). Ils rassemblrent neuf pays europens et
constiturent la base du
projet
EUREKA
499
"Firetun". Un total de
21 essais fut men sur des
wagons de train et de mtro,
des vhicules particuliers,
des poids lourds et des feux
calibrs (bacs dheptane et
palettes en bois). Prs de
400 capteurs furent installs
le long du tunnel et
lintrieur des foyers. Les
mesures por-taient sur la
temprature de lair et des
parois, la vitesse, lopacit,
la concentration des gaz, le
mouvement des fumes (par
vido), etc.
Les rcents programmes de recherche sont fonds sur des systmes complets de mesures. Les
capteurs sont nombreux et sont organiss en rseaux tout fait semblables ceux utiliss dans
les simulations numriques par modle de champ.
AIPCR 92
05.05.B - 1999
PWRI experiments (Japan, 1980) [61]: the Japanese full scale test programmes
used a 700 m long gallery built by the Public Works Research Institute (PWRI) and a
3300 m long road tunnel. 16 experiments were performed in the gallery and 8 in the
tunnel. The fire sources were fuel pools (10 tests with 4 m, 2 tests with 6 m),
passenger cars (6 tests) and buses (6 tests). The physical conditions measured in
the tunnel during the fires were connected with the emergency capacities. The
influence of the longitudinal airflow velocity was shown.
Memorial tunnel (USA, 1993-1995) [63]: this programme was financed by the
Federal Highway Administration and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for the
Boston Central Artery Tunnel project. The experiments were performed in an
abandoned 850 m long road tunnel located in West Virginia. About 91 tests were
performed with diesel
oil pool fires. The
obtained heat release
rates
vary
from
10 MW (4.5 m) to
100 MW (44.4 m).
The transverse and
longitudinal
ventilation configurations
were tested. 1450
captors were installed
in
the
tunnel,
providing about 4 millions
data
per
experiment.
The recent research programmes are based on complete measurement systems. The captors
are numerous and they are organised in networks quite similar to the mesh used in CFD
models.
PIARC 93
05.05.B - 1999
IV.3.1.3 Rsultats
Lune des caractristiques de ces expriences est
quil ny a pas daccs au site de lincendie. Aucune
observation visuelle nest possible (sauf si une
camra vido est installe sur le site). Dans certains
cas, les oprateurs pouvaient tre prsents dans les
sections situes en amont de lincendie (figure
4.3.1). Cet emplacement ne peut permettre une vue
densemble de lexprience.
Figure 4.3.1 Front de la remonte
de fume lors d'un essai
avec un wagon de mtro
(EUREKA 499)
Dans ces conditions, le grand nombre de donnes recueillies est utile pour construire des
interpr-tations concernant les phnomnes se dveloppant lors dun incendie (figure 4.3.2). La
localisation des capteurs sur un maillage 3D apparat fondamentale pour lanalyse.
Si certains phnomnes peuvent tre correctement identifis, il est plus difficile de dduire des
lois gnrales partir des expriences en vraie grandeur. Cela est d au peu dexpriences
conduites dans chaque programme. Il faut noter que leur objectif nest pas daboutir des lois
gnrales. Par exemple, les essais japonais ont t en partie raliss pour recueillir des
informations qualitatives sur les sorties de secours sous diffrentes conditions de vitesse de
lair. Ce but ne semble pas tre compatible avec lutilisation des rsultats dans des modles
scientifiques.
Lune des caractristiques des essais EUREKA 499 est lutilisation de vrais vhicules routiers et
ferroviaires comme charge combustible. Comme la puissance thermique de tels incendies est
lun des paramtres du risque encore inconnus, les oprateurs ont saisi cette occasion pour
raliser les mesures correspondantes. Le confinement de la chaleur semblait accrotre les taux
de combustion. En ralit, les interprtations des rsultats obtenus avec des mthodes
diffrentes conduisent des rsultats diffrents [65].
En raison des incertitudes des rsultats de mesure, les interprtations concluent gnralement
que la puissance thermique calcule est lie la mthode utilise pour son valuation.
Nanmoins, certaines des conclusions tires des essais sur les incendies de poids lourds
(essai EUROTUNNEL) semblent en relative contradiction avec les informations disponibles
dans les prcdentes recommandations de lAIPCR. Dans le rapport de Bruxelles [19], on
mentionnait 20 MW pour la puissance thermique dun poids lourd en flammes. Les rsultats
EUREKA montrent des valeurs plus leves : certaines dpassent 100 MW pendant quelques
minutes.
AIPCR 94
05.05.B - 1999
IV.3.1.3 Results
One of the characteristics of these experiments is the fact that no access is possible in the fire
area. No visual observation is then possible (except when a video camera is installed in that
zone). In some cases, operators could be present in the sections located upstream from the fire
(Figure 4.3.1). This situation cannot provide an overview of the experiment.
In these conditions, the great number of recorded data is helpful to build interpretations
concerning the phenomena developed during the fire (Figure 4.3.2). The location of the captors
on 3D mesh appears fundamental for this analysis work.
If some phenomena can be correctly identified, it is more difficult to deduce general laws from
the full scale experiments. This is due to the relatively low number of experiments performed in
each programme. It is to be noticed that their aim is not the research of such relations. For
example, the Japanese tests were partly planned to give qualitative information about the
escape routes in different air velocity control conditions. This target does not appear to be
compatible with the use of the results in scientific models.
A characteristic of the EUREKA 499 experiments is the use of real road and rail vehicles as fire
loads. As the heat release rate of such fires is one of the unanswered questions concerning the
risks, the operators took this opportunity to perform the corresponding measurements. The heat
confining seemed to increase the burning rates. Actually, the interpretations of results
performed with different methods show different results [65].
Figure 4.3.2 - Deux tourbillons (dus la conjugaison de
la force hydrostatique et de la trane de lincendie)
peuvent tre dduits des courbes isothermes calcules
partir des mesures (section transversale situe 20
m en aval de lincendie lors de lessai lheptane H32,
EUREKA 499 [64])
16
120
0
16
14 0
0
12
12
14
0
100
0
10
80
80
60
60
0
-3
-2
-1
0
1
Largeur - Width (m)
Because of the uncertainties on the measurement results, the interpretations generally conclude
that the calculated heat release rate is linked to the method used for its evaluation.
Nevertheless, some of the conclusions drawn from the heavy goods vehicle fire (EUROTUNNEL
test) appear in a relative opposition with the information available in previous PIARC
recommendations. In the Brussels report [19], the heat release rate of a burning HGV was
mentioned as 20 MW. The EUREKA results show higher peak values: some were found above
100 MW during a few minutes.
PIARC 95
05.05.B - 1999
IV.4.1.2 Research
Research works can also use small
scale models for scien-tific reasons. If
some specific behaviours have to be
charac-terised, the best solution can
be to show them using totally
controllable
methods.
Complementary tests may be perfor-med with
full
scale
facilities.
The
Photo 4.4.1 - Small scale model
Photo 4.4.1 Maquette chelle rduite
used to study ceiling trap doors
utilise pour tudier les trappes
knowledge
of
the
laws
daspiration en plafond
obtained with the models is
useful to plan the full scale experiments.
Small scale models have been used to characterise the efficiency of ceiling trap doors for
smoke extraction [71] or to determine of the non-dimensional laws governing the existence of
backlayering [72].
05.05.B - 1999
Ce chapitre traite principalement des simulations numriques par modle de champ, bien quil
existe dautres simulations pouvant tre utilises pour tudier les incendies, comme les
modles de zone ou les modles unidimensionnels.
AIPCR 112
05.05.B - 1999
This chapter will be mainly focused on CFD codes, even though there are also other models
which can be used to study fire situations in tunnel, as zone models or one-dimensional models.
PIARC 113
05.05.B - 1999
Ce chapitre donne des dfinitions et des critres pour lvaluation des niveaux de scurit et le
dimensionnement des systmes de ventilation selon les critres de matrise des incendies et
des fumes.
Un systme de ventilation conu uniquement partir des critres environnementaux et de
dilution donnera souvent des rsultats insatisfaisants du point de vue de la matrise des
fumes.
De plus, les normes environnementales forcent les constructeurs de vhicules, aujourdhui plus
quhier et probablement de plus en plus lavenir, amliorer la technologie de rduction des
missions des vhicules ; ainsi, le dbit dair requis pour le critre de dilution est de plus de
plus rduit, de mme que la puissance lectrique ncessaire. Puisque la matrise des fumes
est indpendante des amliorations technologiques, ses critres seront lavenir dcisifs pour
un nombre toujours croissant de projets (voir figure 5.2).
AIPCR 136
05.05.B - 1999
PIARC 137
05.05.B - 1999
1 Par exemple, les autorits franaises recommandent une vitesse maximale de lair de 8 m/s pour des tunnels bidirectionnels
et 10 m/s pour des tunnels unidirectionnels.
AIPCR 142
05.05.B - 1999
From the point of view of the dilution criterion, the ventilation is considered satisfactory when
the system is able to keep the concentration of pollutants in the tunnel air below certain
thresholds, which are obviously under the noxious levels for people who travel throughout the
tunnel or who are forced to be stationary within for a while.
A ventilation system designed only according to the above-exposed dilution criterion, could be
satisfactory also from the smoke control point of view, but is often not; thus the project has to be
verified to take into account the smoke control criteria exposed in V.7.2.
In tunnels with longitudinal ventilation, the concentration of noxious substances increases in the
direction of the airflow and decreases with the fresh air rate. The maximum concentration
increases according to the tunnel length. In any cases, the production of pollutants varies with
the traffic volume, its velocity, the roadway gradient and the tunnel altitude. Therefore, if we
compute the required airflow for the ventilation of two tunnels with the same (flowing) traffic, we
would find the greater flow rate for the longer one and for the tunnel with the greater upward
slope.
The longitudinal airflow velocity has a practical upper limit; consequently, for a given traffic and
slope of the roadway, the tunnel length for which longitudinal ventilation is possible has a
maximum limit too. As a first estimate, this upper limit could be evaluated knowing the cross2
sectional area of the tunnel and the maximum air velocity (today considered to be about 8 to 10
m/s) which is cost effective and does not disturb vehicles and the staff operating within the
tunnel. Moreover, the mechanical power of the ventilation system increases, in fact, with the
third power of the tunnel length in tunnels used bi-directionally.
For tunnels that require
an overall airflow over
the
aforementioned
threshold,
the
longitudinal ven-tilation is
still possible, but it has to
be supplemented with
shafts
for
massive
exchange of exhaust with
fresh air.
2 For instance, the French authorities recommend a maximum air velocity of 8 m/s for two-way tunnels and 10 m/s for oneway tunnels.
PIARC 143
05.05.B - 1999
The ventilating air is generally supplied and extracted through purpose built air ducts.
The total volume of ventilating air required is considerable, especially in long tunnels.
As a result the ducts are large and therefore expensive. The air velocity in the ducts
determines the required capacity of the fans to a significant extent. In long tunnels
the ducts system is therefore longitudinally divided into sections and the air is
supplied at various places in order to restrict the air speed in the various sections.
Speeds of 15 to 25 m/s in the air ducts under full load conditions are usual. As
already mentioned, creating several independent ventilation sections also provides a
means to have some control on the longitudinal airflow. The fans are usually installed
near the tunnel portals in order to be easy to reach, or in underground plants.
In case of a fire, the exhaust air duct in the fire area is turned on to full exhaust and
the neighbouring ventilation sections are controlled in such a way that a longitudinal
air velocity in the fire zone can move the smoke in a suitable way. However,
experience shows that, in short tunnels and under the influence of the wind and
chimney effect of the hot smoke, it is not easy to control the air direction and speed in
the fire zone.
Normal operation
Exploitation normale
PIARC 147
Fire
Incendie
05.05.B - 1999
Recently very interesting results have also been obtained from fire tests performed in scale
models [95] or in full size in the Memorial Tunnel [22]. These show that above a given level of
heat release (probably depending on tunnel cross-section and slope) the critical velocity
depends less on heat release rate than in the above equation.
All these results tend to show that for a heat release rate not exceeding 100 MW and a slope
lower than 4%, an airflow velocity of 3 m/s is sufficient to prevent backlayering.
The design of the ventilation system and its operation must take into consideration that, due to
the presence of the longitudinal airflow, the zone downstream of the fire is exposed to smoke
and hot combustion gases with the danger of suffocation or burning if tunnel users are in this
zone. Any possible design measure aiming at a safe fleeing of users from the dangerous
section (fire area or downstream) must be taken. For this reason the present recom-mendations
take into consideration the following cases:
A) Tunnel with one-way traffic not designed for queues (non-urban area)
The ventilation design, in this case, can assume that drivers downstream of the fire are free to
escape by their own cars whilst drivers upstream will not. Tunnels located in non-urban areas
are generally not liable to frequent congestion situations. Therefore the relevant ventila-tion
systems are generally not
desi-gned for queues. Nonurban tunnels which are frequently congested have
instead to be designed for
queues
(see
follo-wing
paragraph). The event of a
fire ignited by vehicles
involved in a secondary
acci-dent in the pre-sence of
others vehicles trapped
downstream is possible, but
the relevant probability is
low (see section II); this
case is nearly never taken
into account in the design
Figure 5.7.2 - Design
Figure 5.7.2 Hypothses
phase. If necessary the
assumption
de circulation tudier
risk
of
such
an
for the traffic
occurrence can be reduced by an automatic incident detection and a traffic control system (see
section VI).
B) Tunnel with one-way traffic designed for queues (urban area)
The ventilation design must take into consideration that people prevented from escaping with
their own vehicles can likely stand on both sides of the fire. In urban areas it is quite usual to
find stop and go traffic situation, therefore this case applies generally to urban tunnels of
sufficient length.
C) Tunnel with two-way traffic
In case of tunnels used by vehicles running in both directions, it must be taken into
consideration that, in the event of fire, people prevented from escaping with their own vehicles
will generally be located on both sides of the fire.
PIARC 159
05.05.B - 1999
Extraction capacity
Once a design fire and its amount of smoke production have been chosen, a permissible length
over which the smoke may spread has to be fixed. Depending on the type of exhaust openings
(fixed or remote-controlled), the extraction capacity per metre of tunnel length in the fire zone is
derived. In general an extraction system needs less total exhaust volume when remotecontrolled flaps are installed than
with fixed openings. However, it has
also to be considered that in the
first phase between start of the
smoke spreading and full operation
of the exhaust system with large
flaps, the smoke may have spread
over 1 km and more from the fire
site. Thus it is not sufficient to only
open a few exhaust openings near
the fire, but a minimum exhaust rate
along the whole ventilation section
is recommended also. A suction
strategy has to be developed
depending on the type of tunnel and
its ventilation system.
PIARC 179
05.05.B - 1999
Essai n
501
502
Test
Puissance thermique
atteinte
nominale
en pointe
(MW)
(MW)
20
15,5
50
52,1
Nominal
Actual Peak
(MW)
(MW)
Heat Release Rate
6+
4
Vitesse
de pointe
de la fume
(m/s)
3,8
5,2
Smoke Fills
Carriageway (mn)
Peak Smoke
Velocity (m/s)
La fume remplit
La couche de
fume commence
l'espace de
descendre (mn) circulation (mn)
5+
3
Smoke Layer
begins Descent
(mn)
05.05.B - 1999
In underwater tunnels these accesses are located at the portals and may be equipped with
escalators or lifts.
PIARC 197
05.05.B - 1999
Lvacuation des tunnels se fait gnralement pied. Dans certains tunnels, un service spcial
de secours est mis en place pour les conducteurs bloqus.
3m
12 - 24 m
Certains pays prvoient des galeries de retournement pour les vhicules dans les tunnels longs
(plus de deux km) faible circulation (moins de 2 000 3 000 vh/jour). Les vhicules
particuliers peuvent faire demi-tour dans un garage traditionnel (3 m x 12 m) et les petits
camions dans un garage un peu plus grand (3 m x 24 m). Pour les poids lourds et les bus, des
galeries de retournement sont ncessaires. Elles font gnralement 4 m x 17 m, parfois plus, et
doivent tre situes tous les un deux kilomtres. Dans les tunnels fort trafic, le retournement
des vhicules pour lvacuation nest pas recommand, car cela peut crer des difficults de
circulation pouvant provoquer une panique. Un pays prvoit ce genre dinstallations uniquement
pour les vhicules de secours.
Lorsquil ny a pas de fume, les usagers pied prfrent quitter le tunnel par le tube lui-mme.
Dans les tunnels superficiels, spcialement dans les villes, lorsque la circulation est intense,
des galeries dvacuation vers lextrieur doivent tre construites. De telles galeries doivent
pouvoir permettre de quitter le tunnel intervalles rguliers, par exemple tous les 100 200 m
en ville. Ces galeries peuvent dboucher sur dautres installations souterraines, comme des
parcs de stationnement ou des caves.
Dans les tunnels profonds, des galeries dvacuation spares ne sont habituellement pas
prvues en raison de leur cot lev. Cependant, si elles ont t construites pour des raisons
techniques, elles doivent tre quipes de manire fournir un itinraire sr en cas d'urgence.
Les abris sont des enceintes spcialement quipes dune alimentation spciale et
indpendante en air frais et dun tlphone de secours. Les abris doivent rsister aux
tempratures qui rgnent proximit immdiate dun incendie. Cependant, leffet psychologique
sur les personnes sy rfugiant nest pas bien connu. Si les abris sont utiliss, ils doivent tre
placs au niveau des garages et conus de manire accueillir les personnes jusqu larrive
des quipes de secours (plusieurs heures). Ils doivent tre suffisamment vastes pour accueillir
le nombre maximum de personnes pouvant se trouver entre deux abris.
AIPCR 200
05.05.B - 1999
Tunnels are usually evacuated on foot. In some tunnels a special rescue service is provided for
blocked drivers.
17 m
4m
Some countries provide turning bays for vehicles in long tunnels (more than 2 km) with low
traffic (less than 2000-3000 vehicles per day). Private cars can turn in a regular lay-by (3 m by
12 m) and smaller trucks in a larger lay-by (3 m by 24 m). For heavy goods vehicles and buses,
turning galleries are needed. These are usually 4 m by 17 m or larger. When they are used,
they should be placed every 1-2 kilometres. In tunnels with heavy traffic, the turning of vehicles
for evacuation is not recommended, because of the possibility of creating traffic problems which
may result in panic. A country provides turning facilities which can be used by safety vehicles
only.
When there is no smoke, tunnel users on foot prefer to leave the tunnel through the tube itself .
In shallow tunnels, especially in cities, where the traffic is generally high, escape corridors to
the open should be built. Such corridors should give an exit possibility from the tunnel at regular
intervals, for example 100 - 200 metres in cities. Such escape corridors may run into other
underground premises, such as car parks or cellars.
In deep tunnels, separate escape tunnels are usually not built, because they are very costly.
However, if they are built for technical reasons during the construction of the tunnel, they should
be equipped to provide a safe evacuation route during an emergency.
Shelters are specially equipped enclosures with a separate special fresh air supply and an
emergency telephone service. Shelters should withstand the temperatures that exist very near a
fire. However, the psychological effect of making people use them is not well known. If shelters
are used, they should be placed at lay-bys and designed to hold people as long as needed by
the rescue team (several hours). They should be large enough to take in the number of persons
expected to be between two shelters.
PIARC 201
05.05.B - 1999
PIARC 203
05.05.B - 1999
fire
fire
box
be
Netherlands
Two powder extinguishers (9 kg) are provided
every 50 m on each side of the roadway.
Norway
Fire extinguishers are required in all tunnels,
located every 150 m in booths. Removal of
extinguishers should give alarm.
Photo 6.5
A fire extinguisher box
with a push button fire alarm
in a tunnel in Japan
Photo 6.5
Coffret dextincteurs
avec un bouton-poussoir
dans un tunnel au Japon
United Kingdom
For all tunnels, emergency panels at about 50 m
regular intervals contain 2 x 3 kg dry powder
extinguishers or 9 litre AFFF foam, and 45 m
hose of 19 mm internal diameter.
United States
Portable fire extinguishers are required in tunnels of 240 m long or more. Each location must
have at least one 9 kg multipurpose fire extinguisher placed on both sides of the tunnel in wellmarked cabinets at spacing of not more than 90 m.
VI.3.2.3 Recommendations
Since most vehicle fires start as a small fire which can be readily extinguished with a portable
fire extinguisher, extinguishers should be provided in road tunnels. The portable fire
extinguishers should be located in conspicuously marked boxes or recesses at uniformly
spaced intervals.
PIARC 217
05.05.B - 1999
Sweden
Emergency telephones are provided in all tunnels and push button alarms in some tunnels.
Switzerland
SOS telephones are installed in booths spaced every 150 m.
United Kingdom
All tunnels have emergency telephones at 50 m intervals in lay-bys and at tunnel portals on the
approach road.
United States
All road tunnels longer than 240 m are recommended to have emergency communications and
alarm systems.
VI.3.5.3 Recommendations
It is recommended that all road tunnels with a sufficient length or traffic be equipped with a
system of emergency telephones located through the length of the tunnel. Push button alarms
are optional.
PIARC 233
05.05.B - 1999
France
In tunnels longer than 800 m, a system is compulsory to ensure the communication of all
emergency services inside the tunnel and with their headquarters. When radio channels are
rebroadcast for the general public, it must be possible to interrupt them to give emergency
messages, provided that there is a manned control centre.
Germany: in
Germany all tunnels
longer than about
1000m have a radio
communi-cation
system.
Japan: radio
rebroadcast
apparatus is installed
in tunnels longer than
10000 m in special
circumstances.
Netherlands:
radio
rebroadcast
systems are
required.
Norway: in Norway, tunnels with Average Annual Daily Traffic (AADT) over 5000 or tunnels
longer than 2500 m have radio communication systems.
United Kingdom: radio rebroadcast facilities for all emergency services are provided in all
tunnels. There is no provision for commercial radio or mobile phones except in special cases,
e.g. Mersey Tunnels have mobile phones transmitters.
United States: radio rebroadcast systems are installed in many road tunnels in the United
States.
VI.3.8.3 Recommendations
A radio communication system is recommended in important tunnels (long or with much traffic).
The first priority is to allow the communication of the emergency and operation services.
Rebroadcasting commercial radios gives the opportunity to pass on safety messages to the
motorists in case of an emergency. However, the following difficulties must be taken into
account:
PIARC 245
05.05.B - 1999
by burning a mixture of 25 litres of petrol, 5 litres of gas oil and pieces of car tyre in a
4 m3 steel tank placed on the road surface,
by burning an old car,
by burning diesel oil or heptane. This solution permits a better repeatability. The tank
surface is adapted to obtain an acceptable heat release rate (a few megawatts).
Experience shows that fires of this size are unlikely to damage the tunnel if carefully sited in
relation to vulnerable equipment. If an old car is used the petrol tank must be emptied of petrol
and must then be filled with water to prevent explosion.
Useful precautions
To protect the carriageway, the fire should be placed on corrugated iron sheets or a 20 cm thick
bed of sand or blocks with the carriageway watered during the test. The test should be carried
out before the ceiling or vault is painted or any acoustic treatment applied. Fire experience
suggests that test fires of a few megawatts will not damage the ceiling provided the ventilation is
operated. However, a large fire, equivalent to an HGV, can be expected to damage the ceiling.
Sidewall equipment is not likely to be affected, but plastered plates covering the sidewalls for a
length of 8 m, the lighting for 10 m and cables for 20 m can be employed as a precaution.
Test report
The
test
report
should record the
attending
personnel,
the
object,
conditions
and
method of the tests,
the initial condition,
instrumentation,
description of the
development of the
fire including the
smoke
movement,
measured data and
analysis, evalua-tion
of the fire intensity
and les-sons to be
drawn.
Figure 8.1 - Test of alertness at a tunnel
in Norway
05.05.B - 1999