Global Studies Quarterly (2023) 3, 1–12

“Globalization and Social Identities at the Individual Level:

Populism from Shifting at the Top?”

D AV I D H . B E A R C E
Texas A&M University, USA

AND

A N D R E W M C L E E R A N D K E N S TA L L M A N
University of Colorado Boulder, USA

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isagsq/article/3/3/ksad038/7246564 by guest on 30 March 2024

This paper reconsiders the proposition that globalization leads to more transnational and less national identities. Providing an
argument specifying how these various international processes could shift identities at the individual level, it hypothesizes that
globalization should be associated with more transnational/less national identities for people toward the top of society based
on their experience with and information about globalization, but not for those at the bottom. Based on the identity shift
happening at the top but not at the bottom, globalization should also be associated with a larger identity difference between
the elite and the mass public. Using data from the sixth wave of the World Values Survey conducted across fifty-six countries
from 2010 to 2014 and the seventh wave across forty-four countries from 2017 to 2020, it presents results consistent with these
hypotheses. These results help explain the current “anti-global” backlash, providing evidence consistent with populist theories
but inconsistent with rising nationalism.

Cet article se penche à nouveau sur la proposition selon laquelle la mondialisation déboucherait sur une augmentation des
identités transnationales et une diminution des identités nationales. À l’aide d’un argument précisant comment ces différents
processus internationaux pourraient modifier les identités au niveau individuel, il émet l’hypothèse que la mondialisation
devrait être associée à davantage d’identités transnationales et moins d’identités nationales pour les personnes des couches
supérieures de la société, à cause de leur expérience de la mondialisation et des informations qu’elles détiennent la concer-
nant, et non pour les classes inférieures. D’après cette modification de l’identité intervenant dans les couches supérieures et
non inférieures, la mondialisation devrait également être mise en correspondance avec une plus grande différence d’identité
entre les élites et la majorité des citoyens. Grâce à des données issues de la sixième édition du World Values Survey (sondage
mondial sur les valeurs), menée dans 56 pays entre 2010 et 2014, et de la septième édition, menée dans 44 pays entre 2017
et 2020, l’article présente des résultats qui confirment cette hypothèse. Ces derniers permettent d’expliquer la réaction
d’opposition à la mondialisation que l’on observe actuellement; ils fournissent des éléments pour venir étayer les théories
populistes, mais pas la montée du nationalisme.

Este artículo reconsidera la afirmación de que la globalización conduce a identidades más transnacionales y menos nacionales.
Este artículo proporciona un argumento que especifica cómo estos procesos internacionales diversos podrían cambiar las
identidades a nivel individual y, partiendo de este argumento, el artículo plantea la hipótesis de que la globalización debería
asociarse con identidades más transnacionales y menos nacionales para las personas que forman parte de las zonas más altas de
la pirámide social en función de su experiencia e información sobre la globalización, pero no para los que se encuentran en las
zonas más bajas. Partiendo de la base de este cambio de identidad, que ocurre en la parte superior, pero no en la parte inferior
de la sociedad, concluimos que la globalización también debería asociarse con una mayor diferencia en materia de identidad
entre las élites y el público de masas. El artículo presenta resultados consistentes con estas hipótesis, obtenidos a partir de
datos procedentes de la sexta ola de la Encuesta Mundial de Valores, realizada en 56 países entre 2010 y 2014, y de la séptima
ola, realizada en 44 países entre 2017 y 2020. Estos resultados nos ayudan a explicar la actual reacción antiglobal, y pro-
porcionan evidencias que resultan consistentes con las teorías populistas, pero inconsistentes con el creciente nacionalismo.

Toward the end of the twentieth century as scholars began to At least superficially, the proposition that globalization
systematically study the phenomenon known as “globaliza- weakens national identities, leading to more transnational
tion,” many proposed that these various international pro- identities, appears incorrect. Given what some have identi-
cesses (social, economic, and political) would lead citizens fied as a recent rise in nationalism (e.g., Snyder 2019), it
to become less attached to their country or nation, taking seems more plausible that globalization has strengthened,
on more cross-nationally collective, or transnational, iden- not weakened, national identities (Norris 2005), hindering
tities with greater trust for people in other nations (e.g., the formation of transnational identities (Bremmer 2017).
Wendt 1994; Strange 1996; Rosenau 1997; Adler and Barnett It may also be the case that there is simply no relationship
1998; Cronin 1999). A quarter century later, this argument between globalization and one’s social identities. As offered
deserves some careful reconsideration, especially in what by Jung (2008, 600), it’s a “myth to expect cosmopolitan at-
has been described as the “new era of populist nationalism” titudes and supranational identities to increase significantly
(Copelovitch and Pevehouse 2019). in the current globalizing world.”
Bearce, David H. et al. (2023) “Globalization and Social Identities at the Individual Level: Populism from Shifting at the Top?”. Global Studies Quarterly,
https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksad038

C The Author(s) (2023). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Studies Association. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited.
2 Globalization and Social Identities at the Individual Level
This paper offers a new perspective on an old research
question, arguing that the basic proposition of globalization
being associated with less national and more transnational
identities is correct, although limited in its range at the individual
level. More specifically, we propose that only more elite indi-
viduals, or those toward the top of society in terms of their
education, income, and social class, should take on more
transnational and less national identities based on their ex-
perience with and/or information about globalization. If
experience and information are what produce this identity
shift for more elite individuals, then globalization should
have no strong impact on the social identities of less elite
individuals. On this basis, globalization should not increase
nationalism even for those at the bottom of society, but it should
create a larger identity gap between more and less elite in-
dividuals following an identity shift happening toward the top.
We test these hypotheses first using data from the sixth
wave of the World Values Survey (WVS) conducted across
fifty-six countries from 2010 to 2014 (Inglehart et al. 2014)
and then from the seventh wave of the same survey across
forty-four countries from 2017 to 2020 (Haerpfer et al.
2020). Using conventional indices of globalization (Dreher
2006; Gygli et al. 2019), our results provide evidence con-
sistent with all three hypotheses. First, country-level global-
ization can be associated with more transnational and less
national identities for more elite individuals, as measured
by their education, income, and social class. Second, glob-
alization shows little correlation with the same identities for
people at the bottom of the social ladder as measured along
these same dimensions. Third, globalization can be associ-
ated with a greater identity difference based on one’s social
status following the movement toward the top of the social
ladder. Indeed, at lower levels of globalization, we find no
significant identity differences based on one’s social status;
these differences only appear in countries with higher levels
of globalization.
Given that we use data available to other scholars and
enter an established research program, it becomes impor-
tant to identify from the outset what our analysis adds to
this literature. Indeed, the literature on “globalizing identi-
ties” is vast and too large to be fully cited here.1 However,
one strand in this literature considers identities in individual
countries (e.g., Mahammadbakhsh et al. 2012); this research
is often quite rich but also too narrow to discern any broader
global patterns. Another strand focuses on geographic re-
gions, especially Western Europe (e.g., Duchesne and Frognier
2008; Curtis 2014). However, given the special history in this
region post-WWII, the identity patterns observed in Europe
may be atypical of other regions and thus not correspond
to any global trends, whatever those may be. A third strand
seeks to understand the broader global patterns as we do
here (e.g., Dombrowski and Rice 2000; Jung 2008; Ariely
2012; Bekhuis, Lubbers, and Verkuyten 2014; Wang 2016;
Ariely 2019), but much of this literature suffers from theo-
retical and empirical problems, which we seek to reduce in
this analysis.
In terms of theory, many arguments about globalization
simply posit an unconditional relationship with individual-
level identities. Instead, our argument specifies how the var-
ious dimensions of globalization could influence individu-
als and where in domestic society this influence should (and
should not) be felt. In terms of empirics, almost none of
this scholarship even attempts to deal with the endogene-
ity problem stemming from the non-random assignment of
country-level globalization. We address this problem in the
1 For a recent review of some of this literature, see McFarland et al. (2019).
analysis below, while recognizing the inherent limitations as-
sociated with observational data.
Our results are important because they shed some light
on the origins of the current “anti-global” backlash. At least
two primary explanations have been offered for this politi-
cal development sweeping across many countries.2 The first
is a rise in nationalism that can be attributed to increased
globalization (e.g., Juergensmeyer 2019; Snyder 2019). The
second is that globalization has enlarged the gap between
the rich and the poor in many countries with the latter now
fighting back for greater political control.3
Consistent with Bieber’s (2018) evidence that nationalist
attitudes are not on the rise (although there may be an in-
crease in nationalist policies), our results provide little sup-
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port for the first explanation: globalization cannot be asso-
ciated with increased nationalism even for those at the bottom
of society. However, our results accord with the second ex-
planation: less educated and poorer individuals have been
effectively “left behind” through globalization as their iden-
tities separate further from more elite individuals. However,
importantly, this separation is not due to less educated and
lower class individuals taking on more national identities as
suggested by the first explanation. Instead, this identity sep-
aration stems from more educated and higher income indi-
viduals shifting toward more transnational and less national
identities.
The Argument
In making an argument about how globalization may in-
fluence social identities at the individual level, it is impor-
tant to begin by defining these concepts. We define one’s
“social identity” as a positive association with some group,
focusing here on national and larger transnational com-
munities. This definition accords with Tajfel et al.’s (1979)
conception of social identity as a person’s sense of who
they are based on their group memberships that constitute a
source of pride and self-esteem (i.e., a positive association). Since
these group associations are viewed positively, those outside
these groups are perceived more negatively, leading to in-
group/out-group differences and rivalries.
Following this definition, one’s group identity is not the
same as one’s connection to that group since individuals
may feel connected to, or part of, groups that they neg-
atively associate with, or do not trust. This difference un-
derscores how “belonging” and “loyalty” represent different
concepts in social identity theory. Individuals are unlikely to
feel loyalty to, pride in, or trust a group to which they do
not belong, but membership in a group does not by itself
imply loyalty, pride, or trust especially if that group associ-
ation is perceived negatively. For example, individuals may
feel connected to their family because they live nearby, but
not trust this same group because of perceived bad members
and/or a negative family history. Likewise, a person may be-
long to a country as a legal citizen with a passport, but not
2 A third explanation is that this backlash represents resistance to a globalized
Western culture (Rosenmann, Reese, and Cameron 2016), but we do not explore
this possibility in this paper.
3 In an interview with ProMarket on March 29, 2018, Dani Rodrik sum-
marized this second possible explanation: “you can also see it in the increase
of what one might call ’social distance’ between different groups in society:
those who are globally networked and feel themselves to be part of a cos-
mopolitan group that don’t recognize or need national borders, who have the
assets and the mobility to take advantage of the world economy, and those
who think that their fates are tied up with local communities, that don’t have
the assets or the resources and networks. It’s a social and cultural cleavage
that globalization has deepened by having very asymmetric effects on different
groups" (https://promarket.org/2018/03/29/globalization-contributed-tearing-
societies-apart/).
 D . H . B E A R C E et al.
feel proud of its history and/or policies; hence, there would
be only a weak identification with one’s country despite
belonging.
We define “globalization” as a country’s openness to and
connections with other actors in the international system,
including the ability to communicate and travel across na-
tional borders (social globalization), international trade and
capital flows (economic globalization), and connections
through inter-governmental organizations (political global-
ization). Defined as such, globalization represents a set of
international processes with variation at the country level
(i.e., some countries are more/less open to and connected
with other countries). But how might globalization influ-
ence identities at the individual level, making citizens feel
less nationalist and/or more transnationally collective with
greater trust for people in other nations?
Our argument identifies two primary mechanisms
through which these international processes might shape
the social identities of individuals. The first is experience,
defined as personal contact related to globalization. This
mechanism includes both direct contact with people in
other countries (e.g., international travel) and indirect ex-
perience with the same (e.g., purchasing products made by
people in other countries). The second mechanism is infor-
mation, or greater knowledge about these international pro-
cesses and how they might influence one’s life and the lives
of others. For example, individuals may feel less threatened
by people in other countries if they learn that their countries
participate in the same set of international institutions and
how their governments cooperate with each other in the
same. We now consider how these two mechanisms might
apply across the three primary dimensions of globalization:
social, economic, and political.
Social globalization, defined as the ability to communi-
cate with people in other countries and travel internation-
ally, has rapidly increased since the late twentieth century
due to major advances in information and communications
technology, although there remains a “digital divide” both
among states based on their level of economic/political de-
velopment and among individuals within states based on
their income and education (among other factors). Like-
wise, there has been a large growth in international tourism
(World Tourism Organization 2019) due to improved trans-
portation infrastructure and rising personal incomes, allow-
ing more individuals to afford travel across national bor-
ders. Of all the facets of globalization, the social dimen-
sion might be the one most directly experienced by indi-
viduals based on their opportunities to communicate with
the same in other countries and visit new cultures. And
based on these experiences, individuals may become more
trusting of those in other nations, as argued by Norris and
Inglehart (2009).
However, we need to push this argument further, consid-
ering the effect of other dimensions of globalization, includ-
ing economic and political integration. Economic globaliza-
tion can be defined as the freer flow of goods and services
(i.e., international trade) and production factors (e.g., cap-
ital and labor) across national borders. Certainly, individ-
uals experience these economic flows when they purchase
products made in other countries and/or produce for con-
sumers abroad, although they may not always be aware that
these experiences are international, especially since they
do not normally involve either direct contact or communi-
cation with foreign individuals (unlike for social globaliza-
tion). Likewise, individuals may be able to move their finan-
cial assets abroad (i.e., international capital mobility) and
work in other countries (i.e., international labor mobility)
3
based on their income and education.4 If individuals en-
gage in these cross-border economic activities and/or be-
lieve that they could, then they may feel not only less tied
to their home nation, but also more connected to people
living in other countries, leading to less national and more
transnational social identities.
Finally, political globalization refers to the increased den-
sity of inter-governmental organizations, the growing num-
ber of states participating in many of these organizations,
and their increased activities on behalf of member states
(Pevehouse et al. 2020). While ordinary individuals certainly
do not engage in, or experience, the processes of political
globalization as just described (unlike the international pro-
cesses defined as social and economic globalization), some
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individuals may nonetheless become informed about the
growing number of international structures, their increased
political activity, and even their pacific effects (e.g., Russett,
Oneal, and Davis 1998), perhaps becoming less fearful of
other countries and perhaps more trusting of their interna-
tional behavior. On this basis, political globalization could
also influence attitudes at the individual level, presumably
in a more collective and less purely national direction.
While globalization has certainly expanded in the twenty-
first century, the world is far from being “flat” to use
Friedman’s (2006) popular term for this international phe-
nomenon. Furthermore, the global processes just described
rely on experience (either direct or indirect) and/or infor-
mation to have their expected association with individual-
level identities. Thus, one should not expect globaliza-
tion, which remains incomplete, to be associated with more
transnational and less national identities for all individuals.
Instead, we hypothesize that this relationship should be
stronger for members of society with more experience re-
lated to globalization, namely wealthier individuals based
on their ability to travel internationally and afford desirable
foreign goods. Likewise, this association should be stronger
among more educated members of society with greater
knowledge about globalization. Stated differently, our first
hypothesis (H1) proposes that globalization should be associ-
ated with more transnational/less national identities for more elite
individuals (as measured by their education, income, and so-
cial class).
If experience and knowledge about these international
processes are what produce the relationship predicted in
H1, then we also posit that there should be no significant as-
sociation between globalization and social identities for less elite in-
dividuals (H2). Although this second hypothesis is stated as
a non-relationship, it is nonetheless important given that
one might anticipate reverse associations for those at the
social bottom based on the understanding that globaliza-
tion has hurt these individuals, perhaps leading to more
(less) national (transnational) social identities (e.g., Norris
2005; Bremmer 2017; Snyder 2019). Our argument does not
deny that many individuals have been harmed by economic
globalization; for example, trade openness has certainly cost
many low-skill individuals their jobs in more developed na-
tional economies (Autor, Dorn, and Hansen 2016). How-
ever, trade openness has also helped many low-skill individu-
als in lesser developed countries given that abundant factors
of production tend to benefit from open trade (Milner and
Kubota 2005). And in terms of the other dimensions of glob-
alization, it becomes harder to argue that those near the so-
cial bottom are hurt by international travel/communication
4 Even if most international migrants are comparatively less skilled, the ability
to migrate across national borders is positively correlated with income due to the
costs of international travel and positively correlated with education given the
greater demand for more skilled labor (Ruhs and Martin 2008).
4 Globalization and Social Identities at the Individual Level
(social globalization) or by intergovernmental organization
(IGO) networks (political globalization) except to the ex-
tent they have enjoyed fewer benefits than those near the
social top. On this basis, if there is any relationship at the
bottom of the social ladder, we expect it to appear in a less
positive, but not in a negative, direction.
Instead, this benefit gap leads to a different hypothesis.
Since we expect globalization to shift identities at the top
of society (H1), although not at the bottom (H2), our argu-
ment predicts that globalization should be associated with
larger identity differences based on one’s social position. We
thus offer a third hypothesis (H3): The identity differences as-
sociated with one’s social status should be greater with increased
globalization. Indeed, a strong version of H3 even predicts
no strong difference in social identities based on social sta-
tus at low levels of globalization with significant differences
only emerging at higher levels.
Research Design
To test these hypotheses, we estimate several versions
of equation (1) below. The dependent variables related to
Identity are measured at the individual level (i) using data
from the sixth and the seventh waves of the WVS (hence-
forth, WVS6 and WVS7). Like other scholars, we take advan-
tage of this survey instrument because of its extensive cross-
national coverage with fifty-six countries in the sixth wave5
and forty-four countries in the seventh wave,6 thus provid-
ing the greatest variation for the effective treatment variable
in equation (1): Globalization measured at the country level
(j).7 Indeed, across the sixth and the seventh waves, the WVS
samples include about half of all countries in the interna-
tional system. The moderating variable is Elite, an individual-
level measure of one’s social status based on education, in-
come, and class. Our specification also includes a large set of
control variables at both the country and individual levels.
I dent it yi = B1 ∗ Gl obal i zat i on j +
B2 ∗ Gl obal i zat i on ∗ E l it ei +
B3 ∗ E l it ei + BX ∗ C ont rol si, j + ei .
Dependent Variables
Since our argument concerns both transnational and na-
tional identities, we need valid operational measures for
5 By year, the following countries are part of the sixth wave sample: Japan, Ko-
rea (South), Qatar, and Trinidad and Tobago in 2010; Armenia, Azerbaijan, Be-
larus, Cyprus, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Morocco, Russia, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, Ukraine, the United States, Uruguay, and Uzbekistan in 2011; Australia,
Chile, Columbia, Egypt, Ghana, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Singapore, Turkey, and
Zimbabwe in 2012; Argentina, China, Ecuador, Germany, Iraq, Lebanon, South
Africa, Thailand, and Tunisia in 2013; and Algeria, Brazil, Georgia, Jordan,
Kuwait, Libya, and Yemen in 2014. Originally, the sixth wave was only intended
to cover the period 2010–2014, but Haiti was added in 2016.
6 By year, the following countries are part of the seventh wave sample: Ar-
gentina, Bolivia, Greece, Russia, Serbia, and the United States in 2017; Aus-
tralia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, China, Columbia, Ecuador, Egypt, Germany, In-
donesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea (South), Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Thailand, and Turkey in 2018; Cyprus, Japan,
Nicaragua, the Philippines, and Tunisia in 2019; and Ethiopia, Guatemala, Iran,
Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, New Zealand, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe
in 2020.
7 Although Globalization as the “treatment” variable varies only at the country
level, our argument proposes that its effect is moderated through individual-level
social status: Elite. Thus, the interaction Globalization∗ Elite varies at the individual
level based on its primary variation at the country level and its moderation at the
individual level.
both social identities, defined as a positive association with
(including trust or pride in) such larger groups. Before pre-
senting our preferred operational measures from this survey
instrument, let us consider the variables typically selected
from the WVS to consider arguments about globalization
and social identities (e.g., Dombrowski and Rice 2000; Jung
2008; Wang 2016). In the sixth and earlier waves, the WVS
included a set of parallel queries asking individuals to re-
spond to the following prompt: “People have different views
about themselves and how they relate to the world. I see my-
self as a world citizen/I see myself as part of the [country]/I
see myself as part of my local community/I see myself as an
autonomous individual.”
While it may be tempting to select responses to the “world
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citizen” and “part of the country” queries as operational in-
dicators for, respectively, one’s transnational and national
identities, it is important to observe that neither query asks
respondents how (i.e., positively or negatively) they associate
with these levels or units. On this basis, they arguably fail to
capture the concept of a social identity; instead, they cap-
ture one’s connection to some unit, although that attach-
ment may be perceived negatively (hence, not a group iden-
tity that constitutes a source of pride and/or self-esteem).
For example, respondents may indicate that they see them-
selves as citizens of the world because they have more infor-
mation about global affairs, although they negatively view
the lack of international cooperation on climate change, for
example. Likewise, respondents may report as being part
of the United States because they are officially a citizen,
while they hold negative associations with American history
and/or policy.
Indeed, when one looks at the bivariate correlations
among these four so-called identity variables (World, Coun-
try, Local, and Individual), they are consistently and strongly
positive as shown in Online Appendix table A1a, which is
puzzling for how respondents might have interpreted these
queries (perhaps as knowledge prompts) and theoretically
problematic in that they all move in the same direction.8 For ex-
ample, individuals who see themselves more as World citizens
also see themselves more as a part of their Country. Going
further, respondents who see themselves as an autonomous
Individual also see themselves more as a World citizen and as
part of their Country.
Furthermore, the mean value for each of these variables
is consistently close to 2 on their 0–3 scale, meaning that
respondents basically tend to “agree” with all these queries
more or less equally. While a high mean value for Coun-
try may be expected, it should be surprising to observe a
similarly high mean value for World if it validly captures
a cross-national collective identity since one expects that
this replacement identity to be slowly emerging within so-
ciety. In response, it might be argued that the high mean
value for World simply indicates that such an identity has
already strongly emerged (perhaps due to globalization),
but why then do we not see a smaller mean value for
Country?
These considerations lead us to another WVS prompt:
“I’d like to ask you how much you trust people of an-
other nationality” with four possible responses: do not
trust at all = 0/do not trust very much = 1/trust some-
what = 2/trust completely = 3. This query not only asks
about “people,” or a social group, but for a value judgment
8 Perhaps because of these problems, these queries were slightly altered in
the WVS7, asking respondents “how close do you feel to” the village, town, or
City/Country/World? However, responses about these different units exhibit the
same significant positive correlations with each other with the mean response
each rounding to 2 (indicating “close”), as shown in Online Appendix table A1b.
 D . H . B E A R C E et al.
about them. We thus use the response, labeled Trust Other
Nations, as our operational measure for a more transnation-
ally collective identity. We recognize that this query cannot
completely capture this larger social identity, but note that
it served as the primary query used by Norris and Inglehart
(2009, 183), the latter being the scholar who developed the
WVS, to capture one’s social identity related to potential
“outsiders.”
To capture one’s national identity, we use the follow-
ing WVS query, which asks for a value judgment about
the surveyed country: “How proud are you to be [Amer-
ican/French, etc.]?” with four possible responses: not at
all proud = 0/not very proud = 1/quite proud = 2/very
proud = 3. This second attitudinal dependent variable is la-
beled National Pride. As argued by Duchesne and Frognier
(2008, 147), this national pride question is “the most suit-
able for measuring the feeling of belonging to the national
group.”
We recognize that Trust Other Nations and National Pride
do not come from directly parallel queries; one concerns
trust and the other is about pride although both require
value judgments. However, some face validity for these op-
erational measures can be observed when comparing the
mean values for Trust Other Nations and National Pride with
both variables measured on a comparable 0–3 ordinal scale
(see tables A2a and A2b in the Online Appendix). Since one
would expect an individual’s social identity to be, at least on
average, closer to the more proximate group (i.e., his/her
own nation compared to other nations), it is reassuring to
observe that the mean value for National Pride is more than
twice as large as the same for Trust Other Nations in both the
sixth (2.50 vs. 1.15) and seventh (2.52 vs. 1.08) waves of the
WVS.
Likewise, it is interesting to observe a significant
(p < 0.001) negative correlation between these two social
identity measures in both waves of this survey: −0.05 in the
WVS6 and −0.08 in the WVS7. This negative relationship
indicates that our operational measure for a more transna-
tional identity (Trust Other Nations) can be associated with a
less national identity (National Pride), which accords with the
notion that a global identity should come to transcend a na-
tional identity as predicted by the early theories about how
more collective identities might eventually come to replace
pre-existing national identities (e.g., Wendt 1994; Strange
1996; Rosenau 1997; Adler and Barnett 1998; Cronin 1999).
Independent Variables
To help ensure that these social identity-dependent vari-
ables are not simply measuring general trust or a more gen-
eral attachment to one’s nation, we include on the right-
hand side in all models both a Trust Baseline and a Nation
Baseline attitudinal control. The former comes from the re-
sponse to the following query: “How much [do] you trust”
the “people you know personally.” And the latter comes
from the response to the already discussed query: “I see my-
self as part of the [country] nation.”
Our primary independent variable is a country-level mea-
sure of “total” globalization, combining the separate dimen-
sions of Social, Economic, and Political Globalization, which will
also be considered separately as robustness checks, from the
KOF9 Globalization Index introduced by Dreher (2006) and
revised by Gygli et al. (2019). Rescaled as a continuous vari-
able from 0 to 1, Total Globalization combines forty three dif-
9 https://kof.ethz.ch/en/forecasts-and-indicators/indicators/kof-
globalisation-index.html
5
ferent country-level variables related to both de facto (i.e.,
actual flows and activities) and de jure (i.e., policies that
enable these flows and activities) globalization across these
three dimensions. To ensure the correct temporal ordering,
the Globalization variables are measured in the year prior to
the country’s survey year.
The obvious problem that we confront with this research
design stems from the fact that the Globalization treatment
variable has not been (and indeed cannot be) randomly ap-
plied to the individuals in the WVS samples. Consequently,
we address its endogeneity by adding other country-level
variables that one might expect to influence its level of
Globalization (Angrist and Pischke 2008, chapter 3).10 These
controls begin with power and size measures, including the
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country’s value in terms of the Composite Index of National
Capabilities (CINC) and the natural log of both Gross Do-
mestic Product and population (GDPln and Populationln).11
To capture the globalization variation based on the coun-
try’s economic development, we include its Urban popula-
tion percentage and its value on the Human Development
Index (HDI), including its life expectancy, mean years in
schooling, and GDP per capita.12 Finally, to account for
the political determinants of globalization, we include the
country’s Polity score, its respect for human rights using
the CIRI13 measure, and an indicator of its fractionaliza-
tion from the Historical Index of Ethnic Fractionalization
(HIEF).14 All of these country-level controls are measured
in terms of their most recent year value prior to the global-
ization treatment variable.
The countries in our sample also have different histories
that may influence their level of globalization, but we cannot
add country-fixed effects and retain the Globalization consti-
tutive term, which is necessary to test H2; however, we will
provide a parallel set of results with country-fixed effects
testing H1 and H3. Nonetheless, these histories may vary in
meaningful ways based on geographic region, so we instead
add a set of regional dummies: the Americas, Western Europe,
Eastern Europe/FSU (former Soviet Union), MENA (Middle
East and North Africa), Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia/Pacific.
Finally, to proxy systemic factors that influence the country’s
level of Globalization, we also add a set of year dummies, in-
dicating when the country survey was conducted.
The obvious question is whether this set of variables ade-
quately controls for the non-random selection of Globaliza-
tion. The answer to this question will certainly vary for differ-
ent readers, but we show in Online Appendix table A3 how
this set of indicators explains most of the variation in our To-
tal Globalization measure with an R2 of 0.80 for the countries
10 Another possible strategy to deal with the endogeneity of Globalization would
be to find strong and excludable instruments for it. In fact, it is not hard to find
strong instruments, but their strength is artificial since the sensible instruments
(and variables close to them) are already included within these Globalization in-
dices (Gygli et al. 2019, 545). Effectively, the plausible instrument set has been
used to construct the measures.
11 The CINC data come from the Correlates of War Project (https://
correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities). The GDP and pop-
ulation data come from the World Bank (https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/
dataset/world-development-indicators).
12 The Urban data come from the World Bank site above. The HDI
data come from the United Nations Development Programme (http://hdr.
undp.org/en/data).
13 https://kof.ethz.ch/en/forecasts-and-indicators/indicators/kof-
globalisation-index.html
14 The Polity data come from the Center for Systemic Peace (http://www.
systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html). The CIRI data come from David L.
Cingranelli, David L. Richards, and K. Chad Clay (http://www.humanrightsdata.
com/p/data-documentation.html). The HIEF data come from Lenka
Drazanova (https://www.academia.edu/39915643/Historical_Index_of_Ethnic_
Fractionalization_ Dataset).
6 Globalization and Social Identities at the Individual Level
in the WVS7 sample (n = 44) and exceeding the same (0.84)
for the countries in the WVS6 sample (n = 56).15 Indeed,
if we think of a variable as being composed of an explain-
able dimension next to some random variation, then as the R2
increases, it becomes more plausible to argue that the un-
explained variation approximates its random variation. And
if Total Globalization in the presence of these country-level
controls captures this random variation, then this treatment
variable becomes “as if” randomly assigned across the indi-
viduals in our WVS samples.
Of course, our hypothesis also includes a moderating
variable for one’s social status. This variable is created us-
ing factor analysis (principal component factors) of three
individual-level variables available from the WVS instru-
ment: (1) Education measured over nine levels of attain-
ment, (2) Income measured over ten steps, and (3) Social
Class self-reported over five ranks. As shown in Online Ap-
pendix table A4a and A4b, these three variables load to a
single factor with an eigenvalue that is greater than 1.0 and
a proportion greater than 0.5. We identify this factor as mea-
suring one’s social status based on these three related con-
siderations. This factor is then rescaled as a percentile so
that 0 captures the very bottom of the social ladder and 1
indicates the very top.
In identifying the Elite as a moderating variable per Baron
and Kenny (1986), we do not model its selection as done
in Online Appendix table A3 for Globalization, the effective
treatment variable. However, we do wish to control for po-
tential confounders in this mediated relationship and thus
add a set of individual-level controls available from the WVS
instrument. These additional controls include the respon-
dent’s reported gender (Female), Age (in years), employment
status (with dummy variables for both Working Fulltime and
Retired), and whether the individual is currently Married,
along with the number of their Children. We also add dummy
variables indicating if they reported as being a Noncitizen and
if they were born within the surveyed country (Born in Coun-
try). Descriptive statistics for these variables are provided in
Online Appendix table A2a for the WVS6 sample and in On-
line Appendix table A2b for the WVS7 sample.
Results
With independent variables at two levels (by country and by
individuals within countries), we estimate multilevel, or hi-
erarchical, models with country-level random effects (Bell
and Jones 2015) and the standard errors clustered by coun-
try. Although our Identity dependent variables have a limited
number of values, we treat them as continuous measures
given the potential complications associated with interpret-
ing interaction coefficients in logit/probit models (Ai and
Norton 2003). However, there are no statistically significant
differences when our models are estimated as multilevel or-
dered logits/probits. Using the same sequence of models
(described below), we first test our hypotheses in the WVS6
sample and then in the WVS7 sample. While we also find
support for our hypotheses when combining the two waves,
there are some important but subtle differences to observe
when separating them (e.g., how much further down the so-
cial ladder a significant Identity/Globalization association can
be observed in the second of these waves compared to the
first).
15 Due to their multicollinearity, few of these country-level variables appear as
statistically significant on an individual basis. But collectively, they explain at least
four-fifths of the Total Globalization variation.
In the appendix, we present parallel sets of results using
an ordinary least squares (OLS) specification that includes
country-fixed effects. This specification requires us to drop
all the country-level control variables, including the region
and year dummies (since no countries were surveyed more
than once in any multi-year WVS wave). Furthermore, it re-
quires us to drop the Globalization constitutive term, so this
specification cannot test H2. However, the specification with
country-fixed effect does allow us to test H1 and H3, and
the coefficients for the Globalization interaction term and the
Elite constitutive term are almost identical to those using the
multilevel random effects specification. Indeed, Hausman
tests suggest that we should prefer the more efficient ran-
dom effects specification presented in the main text.
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WVS6
Beginning with our measure for a more transnational iden-
tity (Trust Other Nations), the results in table 1 begin with
a specification that deliberately omits the Globalization∗Elite
interaction and the country-level controls, including region
and year dummies. While we believe this to be an incorrect
specification both theoretically and methodologically, it par-
allels models that already appear in the literature, assessing
the unconditional effect of globalization on identities. In
this specification, we find what appears to be a strong asso-
ciation between Total Globalization and a more transnational
identity. Indeed, the Total Globalization coefficient (1.04) in
this first model would be even stronger (1.30) had we also
omitted the Trust and Nation Baseline attitudinal controls.
However, when we add the country-level controls in the
second model, the unconditional Total Globalization coeffi-
cient is cut by a quarter (0.78), losing most of its statisti-
cal significance. Of course, this specification does not test
any of our hypotheses, but it helps to demonstrate how the
country-level controls, included to address the endogeneity
of the treatment variable, have the intended effect in reduc-
ing the probability of a Type 1 error (i.e., attributing an iden-
tity effect to Globalization that does not exist). These models
also show that Elite, our percentile factor variable measuring
one’s societal status, is positively signed and statistically sig-
nificant, indicating that more elite individuals tend toward a
more transnationally collective identity. To review, H3 posits
that this positive association is driven, at least in part, by in-
creased Globalization.
In the third model, we add the Globalization∗ Elite interac-
tion variable necessary to test our conditional hypotheses.
Consistent with expectations, it is positively signed and sta-
tistically significant. To better assess H1 and H2 using this
model, we first plot the marginal effect of Total Globaliza-
tion conditioned on the value of Elite [0, 1] in figure 1. As
predicted by H1, one can observe that this marginal effect
is positive and statistically significant toward the top of the
social ladder, or when Elite is greater than about 0.55, corre-
sponding to most of the top half of society. And consistent
with H2, this relationship is not negative at the bottom of
the social ladder. For less elite individuals, or the bottom 55
percent, there is no significant relationship between Total
Globalization and this transnational identity measure.
To better assess H3, we plot in figure 2 the marginal ef-
fect of Elite conditioned on the values of Total Globalization
[0.42, 0.89] within the WVS6 sample. Our third hypothe-
sis predicted that the Elite association with a more transna-
tional identity should increase with globalization. Indeed,
at this sample’s minimum value for Total Globalization, there
is no significant Elite difference in terms of a transnational
identity, suggesting that the unconditional Elite difference
 D . H . B E A R C E et al. 7

Table 1. Multilevel Trust Other Nations models using WVS6 sample

Globalization IV Total Total Total Social Economic Political

Globalization 1.04∗∗∗ (0.24) 0.78∗ (0.40)

0.51 (0.44) 0.75∗ (0.45) −0.12 (0.41) 0.31 (0.31)
Globalization∗ Elite 0.52∗∗ (0.26) 0.40∗∗ (0.18) 0.38∗ (0.21) 0.18 (0.22)
Elite 0.26∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.26∗∗∗ (0.03) −0.09 (0.18) 0.003 (0.12) 0.04 (0.13) 0.12 (0.18)
Trust Baseline 0.29∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.29∗∗∗ . (0.02) 0.29∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.29∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.29∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.29∗∗∗ (0.02)
National Baseline −0.02∗∗ (0.01) −0.02∗∗ (0.01) −0.02∗∗ (0.01) −0.02∗∗ (0.01) −0.02∗∗ (0.01) −0.02∗∗ (0.01)
Female −0.01 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01)
Age 0.002∗∗∗ (0.0005) 0.002∗∗∗ (0.0005) 0.002∗∗∗ (0.0005) 0.002∗∗∗ (0.0005) 0.002∗∗∗ (0.0005) 0.002∗∗∗ (0.0005)
Working Fulltime 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Retired 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Married −0.01 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01)
Children −0.012∗∗∗ (0.004) −0.012∗∗∗ (0.004) −0.012∗∗∗ (0.004) −0.012∗∗∗ (0.004) −0.012∗∗∗ (0.004) −0.012∗∗∗ (0.004)
−0.01 (0.06) −0.01 (0.06) −0.003 (0.05) −0.002 (0.06) −0.002 (0.06) −0.005 (0.06)

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Noncitizen
Born in Country −0.12∗∗∗ (0.02) −0.12∗∗∗ (0.02) −0.12∗∗∗ (0.02) −0.12∗∗∗ (0.02) −0.12∗∗∗ (0.02) −0.12∗∗∗ (0.02)
CINC 0.29 (0.97) 0.25 (0.96) 0.37 (0.91) 0.51 (0.87) 0.57 (0.99)
GDPln 0.10∗ (0.06) 0.09 (0.06) 0.08 (0.06) 0.099 (0.061) 0.09 (0.06)
Populationln −0.098 (0.062) −0.09 (0.06) −0.07 (0.06) −0.10 (0.07) −0.117∗ (0.066)
Urban 0.003 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003) 0.004 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003)
HDI −0.85 (0.66) −0.80 (0.65) −1.05 (0.72) −0.42 (0.67) −0.54 (0.62)
Polity 0.001 (0.005) 0.001 (0.005) 0.002 (0.005) 0.004 (0.005) 0.002 (0.005)
CIRI 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02)
Fractionalization 0.14 (0.13) 0.14 (0.13) 0.14 (0.13) 0.16 (0.13) 0.15 (0.13)
Region dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

N = 73,772 across fifty-six countries. Mixed-effects regression with country random effects and robust standard errors clustered on the country.
Statistical significance: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 (two tailed).

2
1.5
1
0.5
0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
-0.5

Figure 1. The Marginal Effect of Total Globalization on Trust Other Nations conditioned on Elite from table 1. The dots on the
solid line indicate the minimum, mean, and maximum values for Elite with the dashed lines providing 95 percent confidence
intervals.

0.45
0.35
0.25
0.15
0.05
-0.05 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9

Figure 2. The Marginal Effect of the Elite on Trust Other Nations conditioned on Total Globalization from table 1. The dots on
the solid line indicate the minimum, mean, and maximum values for Total Globalization with the dashed lines providing 95
percent confidence intervals.

observed in the first two models of table 1 partially emerges
through these international processes. To the extent that
the Elite marginal effect captures “populist” differences (i.e.,
between those at the top versus the bottom of society), it is
also substantively significant by increasing more than 40 per-
cent from this sample’s mean value of Total Globalization to
its maximum value.
In the final three models of table 1, we split the Total Glob-
alization independent variable into its three major compo-
nents: Social Globalization, Economic Globalization, and Politi-
cal Globalization. While the strongest interaction coefficient
comes for the social dimension, the interaction term for the
economic dimension takes on a similarly sized and signif-
icant positive coefficient, while the political dimension of
globalization is positively signed but not statistically signifi-
cant. It is important to note that for Social Globalization, its
positive association with a more transnational identity can
be seen even at the bottom of the social ladder given that
8 Globalization and Social Identities at the Individual Level

Table 2. Multilevel National Pride models using WVS6 sample

Globalization IV Total Total Total Social Economic Political

Globalization −0.81∗∗∗ (0.25) −0.20 (0.55) 0.07 (0.57) 0.55 (0.50) −0.19 (0.31) 0.11 (0.32)
Globalization∗ Elite −0.50∗∗ (0.22) −0.41∗∗ (0.18) −0.22 (0.20) −0.31∗ (0.19)
Elite 0.06∗∗ (0.03) 0.06∗∗ (0.03) 0.40∗∗∗ (0.15) 0.32∗∗∗ (0.11) 0.19∗ (0.11) 0.31∗∗ (0.14)
Trust Baseline 0.02∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.02∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.02∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.02∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.02∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.02∗∗∗ (0.005)
National Baseline 0.31∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.31∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.31∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.31∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.31∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.31∗∗∗ (0.02)
Female 0.014∗∗ (0.006) 0.015∗∗ (0.006) 0.015∗∗ (0.006) 0.015∗∗ (0.006) 0.015∗∗ (0.006) 0.014∗∗ (0.006)
Age 0.001∗∗ (0.0004) 0.001∗∗ (0.0004) 0.001∗∗ (0.0004) 0.001∗∗ (0.0004) 0.001∗∗ (0.0004) 0.001∗∗ (0.0004)
Working Fulltime −0.01 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01)
Retired 0.06∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.06∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.06∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.06∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.06∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.06∗∗∗ (0.01)
Married 0.02∗∗ (0.01) 0.02∗∗ (0.01) 0.02∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.02∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.02∗∗ (0.01) 0.02∗∗ (0.01)
Children 0.01∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.01∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.01∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.01∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.01∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.01∗∗∗ (0.002)
−0.22∗∗ (0.11) −0.23∗∗ (0.11) −0.23∗∗ (0.11) −0.23∗∗ (0.11) −0.23∗∗ (0.11) −0.23∗∗ (0.11)

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Noncitizen
Born in Country 0.08∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.08∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.08∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.08∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.08∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.08∗∗∗ (0.03)
CINC −1.00 (0.86) −0.96 (0.87) −1.10 (0.88) −0.77 (0.90) −1.05 (0.88)
GDPln −0.03 (0.06) −0.02 (0.06) −0.03 (0.06) −0.03 (0.06) −0.02 (0.06)
Populationln −0.02 (0.07) −0.03 (0.07) −0.02 (0.07) −0.03 (0.06) −0.02 (0.07)
Urban −0.008∗∗∗ (0.003) −0.008∗∗∗ (0.003) −0.008∗∗∗ (0.003) −0.008∗∗∗ (0.003) −0.008∗∗∗ (0.003)
HDI 1.54∗∗ (0.75) 1.49∗∗ (0.75) 1.14 (0.76) 1.59∗∗ (0.73) 1.42∗∗ (0.69)
Polity −0.01∗ (0.006) −0.01∗ (0.006) −0.01∗ (0.006) −0.01∗ (0.006) −0.01∗ (0.006)
CIRI −0.03 (0.02) −0.03 (0.02) −0.03 (0.02) −0.03 (0.02) −0.03 (0.02)
Fractionalization 0.26∗∗ (0.11) 0.26∗∗ (0.11) 0.25∗∗ (0.12) 0.27∗∗ (0.11) 0.26∗∗ (0.11)
Region dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

N = 76,776 across fifty-six countries. Mixed-effects regression with country random effects and robust standard errors clustered on the country.
Statistical significance: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 (two tailed).

0.3
0.2
0.1
0
-0.1 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
-0.2

Figure 3. The Marginal Effect of the Elite on National Pride conditioned on Total Globalization from table 2. The dots on
the solid line indicate the minimum, mean, and maximum values for Total Globalization with the dashed lines providing 95
percent confidence intervals.

the Globalization constitutive term (capturing its marginal
effect when Elite = 0) is positively signed and statistically
significant. This result is inconsistent with H2, but impor-
tantly, it also does not accord with the argument about glob-
alization hindering the formation of transnational identities
(e.g., Bremmer 2017; Juergensmeyer 2019; Snyder 2019).
For readers who may be concerned that our multilevel
random effects specification does not sufficiently address
the potential endogeneity of the Globalization treatment,
we also provide a parallel sequence of OLS models with
country-fixed effects in Online Appendix table A5. With
these country dummies, the measures that vary only by
country must drop from the specification: all the country-
level controls, including the region and year dummies since
no countries were surveyed more than once in each WVS
wave, and the Globalization constitutive term. Thus, the fixed
effects OLS specification cannot test H2, but it does allow
us to test both H1 and H3, which require coefficients for
the Globalization interaction and the Elite constitutive terms.
These fixed effects results show that the coefficients for both
these variables are almost identical to those in table 1 when
using the multilevel random effects specification. In effect,
there are no significant differences for the coefficients that
we can estimate using either random or fixed effects.
In table 2, we present the same sequence of models for
our measure of a more national identity: National Pride.
As one can observe when comparing the first two models,
adding the country-level controls has a large effect in re-
ducing the probability of a Type 1 error as the Globaliza-
tion marginal effect shrinks by three-quarters (from −0.81
to −0.20), losing all statistical significance. When the inter-
action variable is added in the third model, one again ob-
serves results that accord with the three hypotheses. Con-
sistent with H1, the interaction variable is negatively signed
and statistically significant, indicating that Total Globalization
can be associated with a significantly less national identity
for those at the top of the social ladder (Elite = 1) com-
pared to those at the bottom (Elite = 0). Consistent with H2,
the Globalization constitutive term is statistically insignificant,
indicating no association with a more national identity for
those at the bottom of the social ladder, or when Elite = 0.
Consistent with H3, the Elite constitutive term is positively
signed and statistically significant, projecting that more elite
individuals would have a much greater national identity
 D . H . B E A R C E et al. 9

Table 3. Multilevel Trust Other Nations models using WVS7 sample

Globalization IV Total Total Total Social Economic Political

Globalization 1.39∗∗∗ (0.31) 0.95∗∗ (0.46) 0.78 (0.49) 1.65∗∗∗ (0.55) 0.31 (0.31) 0.12 (0.35)
Globalization∗ Elite − − 0.36∗ (0.20) 0.28∗ (0.15) 0.04 (0.17) 0.52∗∗∗ (0.15)
Elite 0.26∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.26∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.03 (0.14) 0.09 (0.11) 0.24∗∗ (0.10) −0.16∗∗∗ (0.13)
Trust Baseline 0.26∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.26∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.26∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.26∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.26∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.26∗∗∗ (0.01)
National Baseline 0.017 (0.013) 0.017 (0.013) 0.017 (0.013) 0.017 (0.013) 0.017 (0.013) 0.017 (0.013)
Female −0.04∗∗∗ (0.01) −0.04∗∗∗ (0.01) −0.04∗∗∗ (0.01) −0.04∗∗∗ (0.01) −0.04∗∗∗ (0.01) −0.04∗∗∗ (0.01)
Age 0.0003 (0.001) 0.0003 (0.001) 0.0003 (0.001) 0.0003 (0.001) 0.0003 (0.001) 0.0003 (0.001)
Working Fulltime 0.002 (0.02) 0.002 (0.02) 0.002 (0.02) 0.002 (0.02) 0.002 (0.01) 0.002 (0.01)
Retired 0.004 (0.03) 0.004 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) 0.005 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03)
Married −0.027∗∗ (0.011) −0.027∗∗ (0.011) −0.028∗∗ (0.011) −0.028∗∗ (0.011) −0.027∗∗ (0.011) −0.028∗∗ (0.011)
Children −0.01∗∗∗ (0.004) −0.012∗∗∗ (0.004) −0.013∗∗ (0.004) −0.013∗∗ (0.004) −0.013∗∗∗ (0.004) −0.013∗∗ (0.004)
0.14∗∗ (0.06) 0.14∗∗ (0.06) 0.14∗∗ (0.06) 0.14∗∗ (0.06) 0.14∗∗ (0.06) 0.14∗∗ (0.06)

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Noncitizen
Born in Country −0.11∗∗ (0.05) −0.11∗∗ (0.05) −0.11∗∗ (0.05) −0.11∗∗ (0.05) −0.11∗∗ (0.05) −0.11∗∗ (0.05)
CINC − −0.15 (0.75) −0.16 (0.74) −0.26 (0.61) −0.23 (0.72) 0.12 (0.90)
GDPln − 0.12 (0.11) 0.11 (0.11) 0.14 (0.10) 0.08 (0.11) 0.11 (0.12)
Populationln − −0.11 (0.12) −0.11 (0.12) −0.09 (0.11) −0.06 (0.12) −0.13 (0.14)
Urban − 0.002 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003)
HDI − −0.20 (1.40) −0.22 (1.39) −1.97 (1.46) 0.70 (1.32) 0.20 (1.49)
Polity − 0.003 (0.01) 0.003 (0.01) 0.001 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.004 (0.01)
CIRI − 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
Fractionalization − 0.02 (0.16) 0.02 (0.16) 0.12 (0.16) −0.007 (0.16) 0.01 (0.16)
Region dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

N = 57,015 across forty-four countries. Mixed-effects regression with country random effects and robust standard errors clustered on the country.
Statistical significance: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 (two tailed).

2.25
1.75
1.25
0.75
0.25
-0.25 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1

Figure 4. The Marginal Effect of Total Globalization on Trust Other Nations conditioned on the Elite from table 3. The dots
on the solid line indicate the minimum, mean, and maximum values for Elite with the dashed lines providing 95 percent
confidence intervals.

0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9

Figure 5. The Marginal Effect of the Elite on Trust Other Nations conditioned on Total Globalization from table 3. The dots on
the solid line indicate the minimum, mean, and maximum values for Total Globalization with the dashed lines providing 95
percent confidence intervals.

when Total Globalization = 0, but this more national iden-
tity effectively disappears with globalization as shown by the
negatively signed interaction term. Since this globalization
value is far out-of-sample, we plot in figure 3 the marginal
effect of Elite for the range of Total Globalization values within
the WVS6 sample [0.42, 0.89]. At the minimum value, more
Elite individuals have a significantly greater national identity,
but this Elite difference declines with globalization, becom-
ing statistically insignificant as the Elite approaches 0.7.
Finally in the last three models of table 2, we decompose
Total Globalization into its three component parts. As ob-
served earlier for the transnational identity measure, the
greatest conditional association with a less national identity
comes for Social Globalization. However, unlike the results
observed in table 1, a significant conditional association can
be seen for Political Globalization and not for Economic Global-
ization. In Online Appendix table A6, we present the set of
OLS National Pride models with country-fixed effects, which
10 Globalization and Social Identities at the Individual Level

Table 4. Multilevel National Pride models using WVS7 sample

Globalization IV Total Total Total Social Economic Political

Globalization −1.40∗∗∗ (0.31) −0.32 (0.57) −0.19 (0.54) −0.32 (0.64) −0.12 (0.35) 0.05 (0.33)
Globalization∗ Elite − − −0.27 (0.24) −0.20 (0.17) −0.15 (0.20) −0.20 (0.21)
Elite −0.01 (0.02) −0.01 (0.02) 0.17 (0.16) 0.11 (0.10) 0.07 (0.11) 0.16 (0.17)
Trust Baseline 0.05∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.05∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.05∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.05∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.05∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.05∗∗∗ (0.01)
National Baseline 0.28∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.28∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.28∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.28∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.28∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.28∗∗∗ (0.03)
Female 0.02∗∗ (0.01) 0.02∗∗ (0.01) 0.019∗ (0.01) 0.02∗∗ (0.01) 0.02∗∗ (0.01) 0.019∗ (0.01)
Age 0.0014∗∗ (0.0007) 0.0014∗∗ (0.0007) 0.0014∗∗ (0.0007) 0.0014∗∗ (0.0007) 0.0014∗∗ (0.0007) 0.0014∗∗ (0.0007)
Working Fulltime −0.01 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01)
Retired 0.06∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.06∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.06∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.06∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.06∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.06∗∗∗ (0.02)
Married 0.0136∗ (0.0075) 0.0135∗ (0.0075) 0.015∗∗ (0.007) 0.015∗∗ (0.007) 0.0143∗ (0.0074) 0.014∗ (0.008)
Children 0.008∗∗ (0.0032) 0.008∗∗ (0.0032) 0.008∗∗ (0.0032) 0.008∗∗ (0.0032) 0.008∗∗ (0.0032) 0.008∗∗ (0.003)
−0.18∗∗ (0.08) −0.17∗∗ (0.08) −0.17∗∗ (0.08) −0.17∗∗ (0.08) −0.17∗∗ (0.08) −0.17∗∗ (0.08)

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Noncitizen
Born in Country 0.07∗∗ (0.03) 0.07∗∗ (0.03) 0.07∗∗ (0.03) 0.07∗∗ (0.03) 0.07∗∗ (0.03) 0.07∗∗ (0.03)
CINC − −0.95 (0.64) −0.94 (0.64) −0.93 (0.63) −0.86 (0.68) −1.02 (0.66)
GDPln − −0.01 (0.10) −0.01 (0.10) −0.01 (0.10) 0.005 (0.10) −0.001 (0.10)
Populationln − −0.03 (0.10) −0.03 (0.10) −0.04 (0.10) −0.05 (0.10) −0.03 (0.11)
Urban − −0.001 (0.003) −0.001 (0.003) −0.001 (0.003) −0.001 (0.003) −0.001 (0.003)
HDI − −1.02 (1.27) −1.01 (1.27) −0.70 (1.64) −1.32 (1.15) −1.25 (1.26)
Polity − −0.02∗∗ (0.01) −0.02∗∗ (0.01) −0.02∗∗ (0.01) −0.02∗∗ (0.01) −0.018∗∗∗ (0.007)
CIRI − 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
Fractionalization − 0.45∗∗∗ (0.13) 0.45∗∗∗ (0.13) 0.44∗∗∗ (0.14) 0.47∗∗∗ (0.13) 0.46∗∗∗ (0.13)
Region dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

N = 58,267 across forty-four countries. Mixed-effects regression with country random effects and robust standard errors clustered on the country.
Statistical significance: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 (two tailed).

again demonstrate almost identical coefficients for the
variables that we can estimate when using this alternative
specification.
WVS7
Although the sample of countries and individuals is some-
what smaller, the seventh wave of the WVS (2017–2020) was
conducted squarely within the current anti-global national-
ist/populist era. Consequently, it becomes important to con-
sider if our hypotheses continue to receive support when us-
ing these most recent data and how the results differ across
the two waves. Table 3 thus provides the same sequence of
Trust Other Nations models using the WVS7 sample, and the
results are similar with a few exceptions that will be discussed
below.
Starting with the third model when the Globalization∗ Elite
interaction term is added to the specification, the WVS7
sample provides results consistent with the three hypothe-
ses. Figure 4 plots the marginal effect of Total Globalization
across the range of Elite values [0, 1]. Consistent with H1, a
statistically significant positive association between globaliza-
tion and Trust Other Nations appears for Elite values greater
than about 0.3, which includes the top 70 percent of the social
ladder and thus a wider range of individuals than observed
in the WVS6 sample (see figure 1). However, there remains
no significant association at the bottom of the social ladder,
consistent with H2.
Figure 5 plots the marginal effect of Elite across the range
of Total Globalization values in the WVS7 sample [0.44, 0.88].
Consistent with H3, the positive Elite association with a more
cross-national identity gets larger in more globalized coun-
tries. However, when we compare figure 2–5, one can ob-
serve that this Elite difference becomes statistically signifi-
cant at a lower level of Total Globalization. If we think of this
difference as being a potential driver of the current anti-
global backlash (to be discussed below), then one might ex-
pect it to be present in a wider set of countries within this
second sample (2017–2020) compared to the first (2010–
2014), and these results show how this appears to be the
case.
Finally in table 3, we provide estimates of Trust Other Na-
tions for each of the three globalization dimensions. Con-
sistent with table 1, we find the strongest association for So-
cial Globalization. Although its interaction coefficient is not
as large as the same for Political Globalization, the Social Glob-
alization constitutive coefficient is again statistically signifi-
cant, indicating that this dimension has a positive associa-
tion with a more transnational identity all the way down to
the bottom of society (i.e., when Elite = 0), inconsistent with
H2. Different in table 3 for the WVS7 sample are the results
showing that Political Globalization has the hypothesized as-
sociation, but that Economic Globalization does not. Finally, in
Online Appendix table A7, we offer the parallel set of OLS
regressions with country-fixed effects.
In table 4, we complete our sets of identity models with
National Pride as the dependent variable using the WVS7
sample. While the Globalization interaction variables take on
the expected negative signs, thus associating these interna-
tional processes with less national identities, the coefficients
are no longer statistically significant. Thus, while globaliza-
tion could be associated with both more transnational and
less national identities in the WVS6 sample, it can only be
associated with the former in the WVS7 sample. As before,
we present a parallel set of OLS National Pride regressions
with country-fixed effects in Online Appendix table A8.
Discussion
This paper has considered a longstanding, but arguably still
unanswered, research question asking if and how globaliza-
tion influences national and transnational identities. Pro-
viding a new argument specifying how various international
processes might shift identities at the individual level, it hy-
 D . H . B E A R C E et al.
pothesized that globalization should increase transnational
and decrease national identities for people toward the top
of the social ladder based on their experience with and in-
formation about these various international processes. How-
ever, globalization should have no strong effect on the iden-
tities of people at the bottom given their comparative lack of
attributable experience with and knowledge about the same.
Finally, based on the identity shift happening at the top of
society, globalization should produce a larger identity dif-
ference between more and less elite individuals within soci-
ety. Our results provided support for these hypotheses from
both the World Value Survey’s sixth and seventh waves.
These results also help provide support for one ex-
planation and counter another explanation for what has
been described as the “new era of populist nationalism”
(Copelovitch and Pevehouse 2019). The first, if not the pri-
mary, explanation is a rise in nationalist attitudes driven by
globalization. However, the argument/evidence presented
in this paper offers little support for this conventional wis-
dom. Not only is there no relationship between globaliza-
tion and a stronger national identity for those at the bottom
of society, globalization also appears associated with a weaker
national identity for more elite individuals.
The second explanation separates the concept of nation-
alism from populism with the latter defined as “an ideol-
ogy that considers society to be ultimately separated into
two homogeneous and antagonistic groups” (Mudde 2004,
562). The first group is “the people”. The “economic, po-
litical, and cultural elites” form the second group, which
includes not only the rich but also “the powerful, the well-
connected, the (over-) educated, and the institutionally em-
powered” (Brubaker 2017, 363). By definition, if the elite
are those with greater education, income, and social con-
nections (precisely the operational measures used to con-
struct our Elite variable), then “the people” can be identified
by their relative lack of the same. Based on these character-
istics, it is normal to expect that the identities and interests
of the elite would be at least somewhat different from those
within the mass public. And some differences between these
two groups should be tolerable, even sustainable, within do-
mestic society.
However, the recent populist backlash that can be ob-
served in many countries may stem from the fact that the
difference in identities (and correspondingly in interests)
between these two societal groups have now widened to an
intolerable extent. Indeed, as Mudde (2004, 563) predicted
almost two decades ago: “populism will be a more regular
feature of future democratic politics, erupting whenever sig-
nificant sections of ’the silent majority’ feels that ’the elite’
no longer represents them.” Likewise, as more recently de-
scribed by Zaccaria (2018, 44), the populist backlash repre-
sents the people’s demand for a “reduction of the distance
between the elite and the people.” However, this distance
stems not from backward movement in the people’s identity
as commonly assumed, but instead from forward movement
in the identity of the elite consistent with globalization as
shown here.
Supplementary Information
Supplementary information is available in the Global Studies
Quarterly data archive.
Acknowledgments
Earlier drafts were presented at APSA 2020 and ISA 2021.
We thank Haillie Lee, Gabriella Lloyd, Andrew Rosenberg,
11
and Stacy Bondanella Taninchev for their helpful comments
and suggestions.
Conflict of Interest statement
The authors know of no potential conflicts of interest in ei-
ther conducting or publishing this research.
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Bearce, David H. et al. (2023) “Globalization and Social Identities at the Individual Level: Populism from Shifting at the Top?”. Global Studies Quarterly,
https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksad038

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