COLLECTION TURCICA

VOL. XVII

«∞∞L'ivresse de la liberté∞∞».
La révolution de 1908 dans
l'Empire ottoman

sous la direction de
François GEORGEON

PEETERS
PARIS - LOUVAIN - WALPOLE, MA
2012
 TABLE DES MATIÈRES

AVANT-PROPOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VII

PRÉSENTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XV

PREMIÈRE PARTIE
Prémices révolutionnaires

≤erif MARDIN
Out of the Shadows : Exploring the Complex Background of
the Young Turks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
M. ≤ükrü HANIOGLU
The Committee of Union and Progress and the 1908 Revolu-
tion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Erdal KAYNAR
Les Jeunes Turcs et l’Occident, histoire d’une déception pro-
grammée . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Wajda SENDESNI
Les Turcs, les Arabes et la question du califat : une contro-
verse entre le Türk et al-Manar (1903-1904) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Erik J. ZÜRCHER
The Historiography of the Constitutional Revolution : Broad
Consensus, Some Disagreement, and a Missed Opportunity . 91

DEUXIÈME PARTIE
La révolution entre discours et pratique

Nader SOHRABI
Illiberal Constitutionalism. The Committee Union and Progress
as a Clandestine Network and the Purges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Noémi LEVY
La reprise en main des institutions : l’exemple de la police
ottomane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
X TABLE DES MATIÈRES

Nazan MAKSUDYAN
New ‘Rules of Conduct’ for State, American Missionaries, and
Armenians : 1909 Adana Massacres and the Ottoman Orpha-
nage (Dârü’l-Eytâm-ı Osmânî ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
Dorothée GUILLEMARRE
Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, témoin de la révolution jeune-turque . 173
Bedross Der MATOSSIAN
Formation of Public Sphere(s) in the aftermath of the 1908
Revolution among Armenians, Arabs, and Jews . . . . . . . . . . . 189
Anastassia FALIEROU
La révolution jeune-turque : une révolution de la condition
féminine ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221

TROISIÈME PARTIE
La révolution et les provinces

Bernard LORY
Manastir / Bitola, berceau de la révolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
Nathalie CLAYER
Le temps de la liberté, le temps de la lutte pour le pouvoir : la
révolution jeune-turque dans les provinces albanaises . . . . . . 257
Vangelis KECHRIOTIS
The Enthusiasm Turns to Fear : Everyday Life Relations
between Christians and Muslims in Izmir in the Aftermath of
the Young Turk Revolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
Édouard MÉTÉNIER
Le moment 1908 à Bagdad : connections personnelles et
convergences politiques entre la mouvance salafiste et le mou-
vement constitutionaliste . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317
Juliette HONVAULT
Des faits étranges… Les échos de la révolution jeune-turque
au Yémen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387
Anne-Laure DUPONT
Réforme et révolution dans la pensée arabe après 1908 . . . . . 415
 TABLE DES MATIÈRES XI

QUATRIÈME PARTIE
Au delà de l’Empire, 1908 dans un monde global
Renée WORRINGER
Rising Sun over Bear : The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War
upon the Young Turks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455
Houri BERBERIAN
Connected Revolutions: Armenians and the Russian, Ottoman,
and Iranian Revolutions in the Early Twentieth Century . . . . 487
Stéphane A. DUDOIGNON
« Et l’Iran saigne encore… ». Les révolutions iranienne de
1906 et turque de 1908 vues par la presse des musulmans de
l’Empire russe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 511
Édith YBERT
De Bakou à Saint-Pétersbourg : la «Turquie nouvelle» dans
la presse russe (1908-1909) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 553
Rebecca E. KARL
Revolution and Politics : The Young Turks and the Republican
Chinese Revolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 569
Sophie BASCH
Au pays des firmans d’Eugène Marsan (1906) : une turquerie
au temps des Jeunes Turcs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 593
 Vangelis KECHRIOTIS

THE ENTHUSIASM TURNS TO FEAR:

EVERYDAY LIFE RELATIONS BETWEEN
CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS IN IZMIR IN THE
AFTERMATH OF THE YOUNG TURK REVOLUTION1

After initial enthusiasm for the restoration of the Constitution, in July

1908, the social unrest that followed due to the strikes and the proclama-
tion of the elections led to increasing tension between Christians and
Muslims. In Izmir, where the Christian population was predominantly
Greek-Orthodox, this tension was triggered by rumors spread on both
sides concerning plans for imminent violence. Consular accounts and
local Ottoman and Greek newspapers reveal clearly how prevailing
mutual distrust about the two parties’ intentions could have paved the
way for misinformation and misunderstandings that could easily spark a
flame.
The purpose of the present essay is to discuss the everyday life aspects
of this distrust by suggesting a parallel reading of sources that provides
a better insight into the presumed inevitability of the course of these
events. In her work Subjects of the Sultan, Culture and Daily Life in the
Ottoman Empire, the most important study to have adopted the concept
of “the everyday” in Ottoman studies, Suraiya Faroqhi points out that
the role of religion in the public sphere generated embarrassment among
Ottomanists, Turks in particular, that had turned their attention mostly to
political, economic and social structures. During the previous decades,
however, religious movements in Turkey — and I would add every-

1
A version of this paper was also presented at the Ottoman Urban Studies Seminar,
organized by Nora Lafi and Ulrike Freitag, at Zentrum Moderner Orient, in Berlin, in
November 2008. I would like to extend my compliments to both organizers for the invita-
tion and their comments. That same version has also been translated into Turkish and
published at Toplumsal Tarih, 184, Nisan (April) 2008, pp. 18-27.
296 VANGELIS KECHRIOTIS

where — became increasingly visible, and there was also a growing

skepticism towards the state itself, both cultural factors that must be
taken into account. Faroqhi sets out to examine the “everyday culture,”
which covers “a wide range of phenomena from the etiquette of visiting
a neighbor to the ways in which food is prepared or children are brought
up”2. She explicitly abstains, however, from dealing with the period after
1908, acknowledging that “it offers only literature and everyday culture”
as opposed “to cultural activities requiring any significant expenditure”3.
My use of the notion of “everyday” might be perceived as dwelling on
the ritual aspects of public celebrations or social insurgency as well. It
mainly refers, however, to social interaction through economic transac-
tions, purchase of commodities, transportation, and to social trust required
for the carrying out of similar activities. In this respect, I am using the
notion of the “inventiveness of the everyday” as expressed by Michel de
Certeau that allows groups and individuals a certain space to renegotiate
their position within this interaction, forging new values as a result of
changes in the political realm.4

The emergence of Izmir and the constitutional revolution

The last twenty five years have witnessed the publication of important
studies with respect to the economic, social and cultural aspects of the
Smyrniot society. These studies have considerably altered our insights
into the specificities of port-city economy in the Ottoman realm5. The
significance of the transformation in export trade that took place in the
18th century, or according to Dany Goffman already in the 17th century6,

2
Suraiya Faroqhi, Subjects of the Sultan: Culture and Daily Life in the Ottoman
Empire (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005), p. 3.
3
Ibid, p. 20.
4
Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, translated Steven Rendel (Berke-
ley: University of California Press, 1984).
5
The most significant among them are Helena Frangakis-Syrret, The commerce of
Izmir in the 18th century (1695-1820), (Athens, CAMS, 1992), Hervé Georgelin, La fin
de Smyrne: du cosmopolitisme aux nationalismes (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2005), Marie-
Carmen Smyrnelis, Une société hors de soi: identités et relations sociales à Smyrne au
XVIIIe et XIXe siècles, (Leuwen: Peeters, 2005) and Smyrne, la ville oubliée? Mémoires
d’un grand port ottoman, 1830-1930, Marie-Carmen Smyrnelis (dir.), (Paris: Autrement,
2006), Sibel Zandi-Sayek, Public space and urban citizens: Ottoman Izmir in the remak-
ing, 1840-1890, (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Berkeley, California, 2001).
6
Daniel Goffman, Izmir and the Levantine World 1550-1650 (Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 1990).
 THE ENTHUSIASM TURNS TO FEAR 297

no longer concerned transit goods but the agricultural products of West-

ern Anatolia. In other words, Izmir evolved from a transfer point for
products from the East to a center of export for local products, increasing
immensely the agricultural production of the region. The merchants com-
missioned by British, and later by other European powers, were working
with local intermediaries, overwhelmingly non-Muslims, who were indis-
pensable for their purposes. This development contributed to the reor-
ganization of the internal hierarchy of these local communities. The
Greek-Orthodox, for instance, involved both in agricultural production
and trade, gained influence and replaced in importance the Jews, who had
in the past more intimate relations with the Ottoman government that
were no longer helpful. The Armenians retained their position while
profiting in certain cases at the expense of the Jews7.
The Greek-Orthodox merchants took advantage of their local networks
and mobility within and beyond the Empire, while managing to take over
the fulfillment of shopping orders of prominent European families. This
meant that, apart from spreading commodities, “they became the inter-
mediaries of also a certain kind of bourgeois culture that united in out-
look people who were in a similar position in other major commercial
centers of the Southern Mediterranean and the Near East”8.
This boom of commercial activity resulted in the unprecedented
development of the city. By the end of the 19th century, its population
was at least twice what it had been a century before. The fact that this
activity was controlled by locally based groups meant that the city-port
itself controlled the whole region. Indeed, every sort of financial institu-
tion, from banks and insurance companies to commercial firms and stor-
age and processing facilities could be found in the Izmir of the period.
These institutions sheltered the local economic activity and formed both
the core of the commercial network and the site of collection and trans-
ference9. Moreover, as a result of this boom, the city’s old organization
into ethno-religious neighborhoods gave way to a new arrangement,
whereby the criterion tended to be social status rather than ethnic affili-
ation, transforming the old “oriental” planning of the city into a modern
Western one10. This enhanced contacts among different communities,

7
Re≥at Kasaba, “Izmir” in the special issue: “Port-Cities of the Eastern Mediterra-
nean, 1800-1914”, Review, XVI, 4, Fall 1993, pp. 387-410, esp. pp. 397-398.
8
Ibid, p. 398.
9
Ibid, pp. 400-401.
10
Aleka Karadimou-Gerolympou, “J pólj-limáni tjv Smúrnjv sto télov tjv
298 VANGELIS KECHRIOTIS

contacts which despite the segregation that was typical of Ottoman cities
until the 1820s, had already been facilitated by the commercial and
social interaction in the bazaars and places of recreation11. Relations
between the local intermediaries and the Ottoman authorities were not
easy. These intermediaries lobbied for conditions favoring their com-
mercial activity. Moreover, as Kasaba points out, the impact of global
economic trends on the Ottoman Empire is related both to the activity
of local intermediaries and to the policies adopted by the Ottoman gov-
ernment12. In this respect, he argues, the interests of the local interme-
diaries and the representatives of European powers and traders con-
verged in promoting an unhindered commercial environment in the
Ottoman Empire13, even if for different reasons, each group wished to
promote its own economic hegemony,
These conditions describe the way the Belle Époque was experienced
in Izmir, as well as in other Ottoman port cities. Still, despite the fact that
Christians, in particular the commercial elite, had profited from these
conditions, the shadow of political authoritarianism lay heavy on urban
life. When the news of the uprising in Macedonia that led to the restora-
tion of the constitution spread throughout the city, they found fertile
ground. The French consul describes, with both surprise and relief, that
“the cafés are full of Muslims who are discussing the current events and
do not hide their hope to see soon the end of a regime which made them
suffer so cruelly for so many years.”14 These manifestations soon turned
into unprecedented festivities. In the Café de Paris, in the middle of the
famous Quai and the docksides of Izmir, Muslim Turks, among whom
many officers, ordered the barkeeper to play the Hamidiye (the Ottoman
anthem), the Marseillaise and finally the Greek national anthem, cheering
“Vive la Constitution, vive la liberté absolue, vive la nation”. In Muslim
neighborhoods, although no manifestations took place, people showed

Oqwmanikßv Autokratoríav, morfév xwrikßv orgánwsjv kai elljnikß parousía"

(The city-port of Izmir at the end of the Ottoman empire, ways of space organization and
the Greek presence), Praktiká sunedríou: J pólj stouv neóterouv xrónouv (Confer-
ence: The city in modern times), Athens: EMNE - MNIMON, 2000, 19-50.
11
Marie-Carmen Smyrnelis, « Colonies européennes et communautés ethnico-confes-
sionnelles à Smyrne, coexistence et réseaux de sociabilité (fin du XVIIIe - milieu du
XIXe siècle)’ in Georgeon Francois, Dumont Paul (dir.), Vivre dans l'Empire Ottoman,
Sociabilités et relations intercommunautaires, Paris, 1996, 173-194.
12
The most important being the Hayriye Tüccarı Edict initiated by Selim III.
13
Kasaba, « Izmir », p. 402.
14
A.M.A.E (Nantes), n° 133, Surexcitation des esprits en Turquie, Blanc (Smyrna) to
Constans (Constantinople), 21 July 1908.
 THE ENTHUSIASM TURNS TO FEAR 299

evidence of being relieved and congratulated each other15. The manifes-

tations were soon widespread and full of enthusiastic crowds16. Students
of the local Sultanic Idadi (High school), sporting red and white ribbons
on their chests, gathered in front of the Saat Kulesi (Clocktower) in the
middle of the square leading to the prefecture (vilayet) building, the
Konak, and started parading towards the Kordon17. Soldiers and officers,
previously not allowed to stroll in the European quarter, now invaded the
cafés, holding flags and badges hailing freedom and the army.

Rumors of imminent massacres

In the months following July, 1908, things deteriorated quickly. Enthu-

siasm turned to fear and apprehension. Already in early October, the local
authorities’ inertia regarding significant events had brought the city to
the brink of anarchy; these included the strikes in the Aydın Railway
Company and their impact on the city’s economy as well as the riots that
followed the sinking of the Hamidiye Company’s motor vessel Istanbul
at Kordelio (Tr. Kar≥iyaka, Gr. Perea), which cost the lives of two hun-
dred Smyrniots. It was clear that the authorities did not dare impose law
and order from fear of the reaction of the Committee of Union and Pro-
gress leadership, whereas the latter obviously did not have the power
necessary to do that on their own. This state of affairs prompted the
French consul, Paul Blanc to complain: “We do not know today if it is
the Vali or the Committee which holds the power in the city or if there
is any authority whatsoever.”18 In the meantime, according to rumors
spread throughout the city, the Muslims had bought guns and ammunition
and were prepared to massacre the Christian population, a rumor that
instigated a Christian delegation to visit the consuls and to request the
intervention of their navy. Some of them addressed the French consul in
his capacity as a dean of the consuls, claiming that 500 Cretan Muslims,
15
A.M.A.E (Nantes), n° 137, Blanc (Smyrna) to Constans (Constantinople), 27 July
1908.
16
Aykut Kansu has argued that the manifestations of extreme joy in support of the
Revolution and against the absolutist regime prove “the popular aspect of the Revolu-
tion… People knew what was at stake, and fully appreciated what the Revolution was all
about. Suggesting that they were not conscious of the enormous changes that they them-
selves had been instrumental in bringing about is an insult on a grand scale". Aykut
Kansu, The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey (Leiden: Brill, 1997), p. 113.
17
Nail Moralı, Mütarekede Izmir Önceleri ve Sonraları (Istanbul 1976), p. 46.
18
A.M.A.E, (Nantes), n° 192, Situation à Smyrne, Blanc (Smyrna) to Constans (Con-
stantinople), 6 October 1908.
300 VANGELIS KECHRIOTIS

fully armed, were ready to attack the Christian quarter. Paul Blanc did
not lose his temper and, after a proper investigation, it was found that the
group of armed Cretans was only a gathering of workers and engineers
of the Hamidiye Company who, having lost their jobs upon the suspen-
sion of the company’s activity, had gone to seek jobs at the Aydın Rail-
way Company. Out of fear of being attacked by the striking workers, they
marched to the railway station in rows. As for the ammunition obtained
by the Muslims, it seems that it was a combined reaction to both the
prohibition of carrying guns during the old regime and a sense of
insecurity that became widespread among the Muslims as well as the
Christians. At the same time, while many shops in the bazaar and the
Christian quarter were closed in mourning for the victims of the ship-
wreck, the rumor was spread by “ill-willed people” that the Christians
were preparing to attack the Muslims.
The CUP, of course, accused certain Greeks of deliberately instigating
fear among their compatriots and thus disturbing the “public order”. In
an open letter to the public prosecutor’s office (adliye-i müdde-i umu-
miligi) that was published in the CUP’s local newspaper, Ittihad, the
anonymous author accused certain despicable individuals (e≥has-ı leime)
who had favored the absolutist regime (idare-i müstebide) and who were
sowing confusion and intrigues, pretending to behave amicably (a≥ir
delaletiyle) to the new regime. However, this “nest of snakes” had been
discovered. The primary secret purpose of these individuals was to
foment friction among the Greek-Orthodox: “When the boat Istanbul had
sunk, they took over the leadership of the people and burnt the docks of
the company. Later, with lies that the Muslims will massacre the Chris-
tians, they instigated a miserable incident, spreading terror and irritation
among the people and achieving the closing down of the shops in the
≤i≥eciler (Gr. Yaladika) quarter. However, they did it so skilfully that it
was impossible that the people would not be afraid or the shops would
not be closed down”. The letter concludes as follows: “We hope that
those in charge will immediately order the legal prosecution of the indi-
viduals who wish to disturb the public order (asayi≥-i umumiye) and con-
stitute a permanent danger for the peace of the people (istirahat-ı
ahali)”19.
Accordingly, when the strikers of the Aydın Railway Company cut the
telegraph wires in order to instigate a wider general strike, their action was

19
Ittihad, 23 October 1908 (10 Te≥rinievvel 1324).
 THE ENTHUSIASM TURNS TO FEAR 301

interpreted by certain Muslims as a Christian plan to prohibit communica-

tion with the battalions of the interior, in the event that they were asked
by the local authorities for their support. Then, the strikers would attack
their Muslim neighborhoods. Similar fears had instigated the Muslims to
arm themselves, judging that the 250 soldiers of the local garrison did not
appear adequate to protect them. Reinforcements eventually arrived to
suppress the Aydın railway strike, but again the danger of a general explo-
sion in the course of this suppression seemed always pending20.
Paul Blanc, an experienced diplomat who had spent eighteen years in
the Ottoman Empire and was married to a local Greek woman, had filed
a report on September 10, before the above-mentioned tensions surfaced.
His report concerned the overall reaction to the constitutional movement
of the Greek population within his jurisdiction, which covered Izmir and
its periphery as well as the vilayet of Adalar denizi (Archipelagon).
Based on his discussions with several notables, he reported that he
strongly believed that all of the Greeks demonstrated a similar attitude.
They seemed anxious, afraid of what was happening, and they certainly
welcomed with relief a movement that would spare them from the oppres-
sion of the old regime. As a consequence, they were happy to fraternize
with their Muslim compatriots while also apprehensive about the future.21

The Sunday holiday

Developments would soon justify these initial concerns. Following the

decision of the Adliye ve Mezâhip Nezareti (Ministry of Justice and Reli-
gious Sects) to change the official weekly holiday from Sunday to Friday,
Blanc reported that discontent had spread among the Greek-Orthodox
communities, whose authorities argued that if there is an official holiday,
it should be Sunday, since Christians were obliged by their religion to rest
on that day, whereas the Quran did not mandate rest for Friday. It thus
seemed to them that the decision was an attempt on the part of the new
regime to prove the superiority of the Muslim religion. The French consul
reports that the Greek-Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul issued instruc-
tions to the congregations of local metropolitans to affirm through public
manifestations their will to maintain the Sunday holiday22. The circular
20
A.M.A.E, (Nantes), n° 192, Situation à Smyrne, ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
A.M.A.E, (Nantes), n° 179, Les Grecs et le régime constitutionnel, Blanc (Smyrna)
to Bompard (Constantinople), 17 September, 1908.
302 VANGELIS KECHRIOTIS

sent by the Patriarchate did stress the importance of the Sunday holiday,
but it made no reference to the government’s initiative and used totally
religious arguments, the most important being that “Sunday is the day of
the Lord (Kuriakß), when He chose to save humankind from deca-
dence.” The circular concludes: “Since recently, while, on the one hand,
a praiseworthy effort is made in noble competition in many places, for the
most punctual observance of the Sunday holiday and its most beneficial
celebration, on the other hand, there is evocation of diverse reasons which
might lead to the loosening and challenging of this duty in people’s con-
sciousness, we find it appropriate and necessary to remind and compel all
the faithful Orthodox Christians to remain firm to their piety and our holy
traditions and not cease to honor and celebrate as they always did the day
which bears the name and the glory of the Lord, continuously frequenting
the sacred temples, while spending the rest of the day in a respectful and
god-loving manner, remaining astray of the usual everyday cares and
employments, as well as financial dealings and transactions”23.
These sentences attest, it seems, to the unwillingness of some Greek-
Orthodox to abide by the patriarchal instructions, since profit was more
important. Indeed, two years later, the most well-known Greek newspa-
per in Izmir, Amalthia, complained that the Sunday holiday had been
abolished in practice and that the markets were as lively on Sundays as
on any weekday. Some shop-owners were even accused of behaving
hypocritically, keeping their shop-windows closed but the doors open.
Eventually, all shops opened their doors. Consequently, those employed
in the shops would eventually work like slaves, every day all year long
without a single day of rest. This situation prompted more comprehensive
criticism against the Greek-Orthodox, who were accused of not being
able to hold firm to any decision. Two points are highly interesting with
respect to these accusations. First, the arguments employed have nothing
to do with religion but are of a social nature. Second, state authorities are
not held responsible for violating communal autonomy24.
At the beginning, however, the instructions issued by the Patriarchate
had been respected. The closing of baker’s and butcher’s shops incited
deep frustration among Muslims, unaccustomed to shopping for provi-
sions the day before. The Muslim notables consequently held a meeting
and decided to ask the authorities to urge the shop-owners to open. As
23
P.A. Codex A’/ 82, 6978, 13 Sept 1908, p. 399-400, “Apódeiziv patriarxikß
perí tjv argíav tjv Kuriakßv", (Patriarchal declaration on the Sunday holiday).
24
Amalthia, «Smurnaflkß JxÉ» (Smyrniot Echo), 13 April, 1910.
 THE ENTHUSIASM TURNS TO FEAR 303

the French consul reports, the authorities “had a hard time to convince
them that Christians had the right to rest on Sunday and that in the future,
they should take care to make provisions on Saturday”25. However,
spirits in Izmir seemed once again to be more easily controlled than in
the islands such as in Mytilini (Tr. Midilli), where, according to Blanc,
although the Muslims had not experienced many hardships during the old
regime, the equality proclaimed by the new one rendered their position
more precarious. Blanc apparently assumed that they would resort to
instigating disorder in hopes that the CUP would intervene and suppress
the Christian element. He expresses fears that even in Izmir there was
always the danger that on some Sunday morning, the Muslims would
invade the bazaar and loot and destroy Christian shops. One way or
another, the incidents in Izmir, according to the consul, demonstrate “the
intentions of resistance of the Greek element against all the initiatives
which might be done against its rights and its privileges and indicates the
little confidence that they have to the sincerity of the new regime”26
This kind of tension increased the sense among Muslims that the eco-
nomic and commercial life of the city was controlled by the Christians
and would be paralyzed if they decided to abstain. However, it was not
only a matter of whether shops would be closed down on Sundays, but
whether they would open on Fridays. The authorities did not abandon
their efforts to introduce Friday as the official weekly holiday. The
offices of administration used to be closed on Friday, but this did not
affect social life. In 1911, however, the French consul describes the para-
lyzing effect on local commerce, when one Friday, ostensibly responding
to the Vali’s veiled encouragement, the customs office personnel refused
to work. Following them, the fayton drivers and porters abandoned their
work, as well. Blanc concludes: “In a city like Izmir, where the Christian
element represents the three fourths of the population, the tendency of
the Young Turks to replace Friday for Sunday is doomed to fail com-
pletely, the shops could only be closed down upon order, and it is doubt-
ful whether the authorities would dare go so far”27. Interestingly, as was
seen later during the boycott, this awareness fueled the sentiments both
of those who persecuted the Greek shop-owners and of those who con-
tinued to support them.
25
A.M.A.E, (Nantes), n° 179, Les Grecs et le régime constitutionnel, ibid.
26
Ibid.
27
A.M.A.E, (Nantes), n° 167, Tentative des autorités pour faire du vendredi un jour
férié, Colomiers (Smyrna) to Bompard (Constantinople), 6 June 1911.
304 VANGELIS KECHRIOTIS

In the fall of 1908, though, as I previously described, the tensions were

such that a dispute between two soldiers in a bazaar of the European
quarter (Frenk mahallesi) triggered panic. Shops were closed down,
people sought refuge in the churches, and women fainted in the middle
of the street28. The local CUP leaders realized that they needed to act to
restore calm, so they organized a parade of pupils from Muslim, Greek,
Armenian and Jewish schools. The children walked through the city and
stopped at all the important consulates in order to “publicly affirm under-
standing among the different communities and condemn the intrigues of
those who seek to spread discord and fear”29. The Hellenic consul
informs us of the participation of the Evangelia Gianniki school in this
parade. The pupils visited the consulates of Britain, France, Germany,
Italy, Greece and Russia in order to express their gratitude for the attitude
of their governments vis-à-vis the new regime. Upon reaching the Hel-
lenic consulate, in his speech, Evgeniadis denounced the rumors of mas-
sacres that had triggered the panic. This public demonstration, the French
consul claims, definitely had an impact on the population of the city, but
beyond its boundaries the tensions remained the same.

Violent state, incompetent municipality

In the meantime, the tensions between communities was fueled by the

use of violence by local police. The gravest events took place in January,
1909, very close to Izmir, at Sevdiköy, whose population was primarily
Greek-Orthodox. Four peasants were killed, and four were seriously
wounded. The origin of the incident was a petty one: A crowd had gath-
ered to watch a spectacle with acrobats, and a boy removed the fez from
somebody’s head, which fell on the ground. One of the gendarmes pre-
sent wanted to arrest the little boy for what he perceived as an insult
against Ottoman head-gear, whereas one of the spectators indicated that
this was only a child’s joke. As the French consul points out, for weeks,

28
A.M.A.E (Nantes), n° 207, Situation en Asie-Mineure, Blanc (Smyrna) to Bompard
(Constantinople), 29 October 1908, ibid. This incident is also described by Hervé George-
lin in his book on Izmir which was also recently translated into Turkish and published as
Hervé Georgelin, Smyrna’nın Sonu: Izmir’de Kozmopolitizmden Milliyetçilige, Istanbul
(Birzamanlar Yayıncılık), 2008, p. 232-233.
29
Ibid. Later in the evening, a dinner was held and a speech was delivered by Pavlos
Carolidis who was a candidate for the parliamentary elections, AYE, 1908, MA (1), III 3,
Smyrna Consulate, ibid, 6211, Evgeniadis (Smyrna) to Baltatzis (Athens), 14 October,
1908.
 THE ENTHUSIASM TURNS TO FEAR 305

gangs of Muslim boycotters against Austrian products, who patrolled in

the harbor, did exactly the same to anyone wearing a fez, and the police
had done nothing to prevent them. The naughty boy had only imitated
their behavior. The peasant protest caused the reaction of the police
officer, and this led to a large protest. The head of the police squad then
ordered his men to shoot, resulting in general panic among both the
peasants and the police officers who, fearing a counter-attack, fired indis-
criminately. Troops were sent to restore order, and the officer responsible
for the incident was arrested and sent to Izmir30. It was subsequently said
that certain Muslim peasants who happened to be present joined the
police and “out of pleasure and fanaticism” also began firing on the
Christians. According to Blanc, this incident is proof of anti-Christian
sentiment31. Muslim peasants from a neighboring village had also armed
themselves and headed to Sevdikoy, where they had heard that a conflict
had broken out. They were promptly discouraged, however, by two Mus-
lim notables who informed them that the village had been occupied by
the army.32
The Christian population, on the other hand, had begun to provision
themselves in arms and ammunition. Three small boats whose prove-
nance is unrecorded had unloaded their cargo at Göztepe, a suburb of
Izmir. The attitude of the authorities and the Turkish newspapers who
tried to hold both communities responsible infuriated the Greek popula-
tion. The Greek newspapers revealed that the officer who ordered the
massacre was someone called E≥ref, the reknowned old leader of the
brigands who had been given amnesty and appointed to that position. He
was also the one who had ordered his soldiers to open fire against the
Aydın Railway Company strikers, resulting in the death of an Italian who
happened to pass by. However, when he was arrested by his superiors,
he was released upon the personal intervention of Enver bey, the hero of
the constitutional revolution. This incident triggered such a fury that the

30
A.M.A.E (Paris), n° 16, Conflit sanglant à Sevdikioy, anatagonisme de l’élément
Grec et Musulman, Blanc (Smyrna) to Pichon (Paris), 25 January 1909. This incident is
also described by Hervé Georgelin.
31
A.M.A.E (Paris), n° 11, Excitation entre Turcs et Grecs, Blanc (Smyrna) to Pichon
(Paris), 3 February 1909.
32
This was not the only incident, though. For instance, in Alatsata, police broke in the
house of an Orthodox family who had a banquet, when the latter refused to open and let
the police join them. The authorities tried to defend the police in this case, as well.
A.M.A.E, (Paris), n° 24, Situation en Asie Mineure, Blanc (Smyrna) to Pichon (Paris), 9
February 1909.
306 VANGELIS KECHRIOTIS

Greek press is said to have declared that they had no trust in the new
regime, which was persecuting the Christians just as had the old one.
Similar sentiments between Greeks and Muslims also prevailed in the
Aegean islands. The French consul therefore called for special attention
to be paid to these events and, in order to restore the confidence of the
Christian element, he contended that the officers responsible for the event
at Sevdiköy should receive an exemplary punishment despite the Turkish
newspapers’ campaign on their favor33.
This is the period during which the debate in the Ottoman parliament
regarding the churches and schools in Macedonia had spread disappoint-
ment among the Greek Orthodox population. Moreover, a series of mea-
sures that had been removed after the Young Turk movement were
restored. For instance, the tezkere necessary for moving from one vilayet
to another were re-implemented. The fez, which had been fiercely boy-
cotted, was now reintroduced, this time being made compulsory even for
those non-Ottomans who work for Ottoman firms. Bribery of judges pre-
vailed, while it was the local CUP branch which had gathered all author-
ity in its hands. Thus, trust in state justice had been shaken34.
The atmosphere of the new regime had such an impact on the popula-
tion that the city’s population no longer took municipal regulations seri-
ously. Therefore, as Erkan Serçe, who has studied the history of the Izmir
municipality, points out, this institution needed the support of the vilayet
authorities and the police in order to impose its rules35. It also “begged”
the citizens to pay their taxes. The tax for the maintenance of the streets
which was previously paid with a delay had become completely neglected.
Despite the annnouncements that measures would be taken against those
who did not comply, nothing changed until some members of the munic-
ipality council submitted their resignation. Parallel to this, all the activi-
ties of the municipality were scrutinized by the local newspapers. The
presiding view was that things went wrong basically due to individual
ineffeciency and not to institutional errors. This could be amended, and
the functioning of the municipality was considered an area that could
easily be improved36.

33
Ibid.
34
A.M.A.E. (Paris), n° 39, Situation en Asie Mineure, Blanc (Smyrna) to Pichon
(Paris), 15 March 1909.
35
Ittihad, 3 Nisan 1909, in Erkan Serçe, Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Izmir'de Belediye
(1868-1945) (Izmir: Dokuz Eylül Yayınları, 1998), p. 90.
36
Erkan Serçe, p. 90-91.
 THE ENTHUSIASM TURNS TO FEAR 307

Celebrating public holidays

The resentment among the Christians increased as the incidents of

mistreatment of the local population increased. The description of these
incidents in the local Greek press is always followed by the assertion that
they are a disgrace for the constitutional regime37. The complaints
become even harsher when the intervention concerned the community’s
religious practices. Following the Easter celebration of April, 1910,
Amalthia accused the government of prohibiting the firing of weapons as
part of the ritual in order to humiliate the Orthodox population: “The
Christians believe that through bell-ringing, through shootings, through
these splendid ceremonies, according to traditional customs, they de-
monstrate their respect to their divine religion. If this is right or wrong,
it is their own business; a state of a different religion which is obliged to
respect the beliefs and the customs of the other religions should not be
involved in the practices of these customs”38. Moreover, it is claimed that
while the authorities banned celebratory weapons fire ostensibly in order
to protect public order, they participated in the celebration of Bayram
with canon shooting. Therefore, the Christians cannot but believe that the
state’s purpose was solely to diminish the grandeur of the Christian
rituals. In the same article, it is mentioned that the Orthodox respected
the banning. Still, the gendarmes behaved brutally towards Christians during
the ceremony in Kerasohori, a village close to Izmir, and it was only
thanks to the latter’s prudence that a massacre was avoided which, as
Amalthia claims “would defame in the eyes of the Christian Europe our
liberal regime for not defending the free practice of the religious duties
of the Christians”. Interestingly enough, a year later, the new Greek-
Orthodox prelate, Metropolitan Chrysostomos, issued instructions regard-
ing religious ceremonies. One of his stipulations regarded the shooting
during Easter celebrations. According to Chrysostomos, this was a “bar-
baric custom” that was part of Turkish weddings and celebrations of
37
In Amalthia, it is reported that in Bayındır, the authorities urged the shopkeepers to
close down their shops and clear the fields from the birds which had burst in. Certain
shopkeepers who did not abide were forced by the authorities to do likewise. This is
considered as angaria (corvé) similar to the ones that the janissaries used to impose on
the Christians. Another incident refers to the decision of 100 members of a Smyrniot Club
to visit Istanbul with their families. They were not allowed to do so, unless they were
provided with the appopriate tezkere. It is considered a shame that “constitutional” citi-
zens were hindered from visiting their capital. Amalthia, 7 May 1910.
38
Amalthia, “Skaiótjv xwrofulákwn” (Obscenity of the gendarmerie), 22 April
1910.
308 VANGELIS KECHRIOTIS

Bayram and had no place in Christian ceremonies and celebrations. This

ritual had already become the target of criticism among secular circles in
the capital. The newspaper Tachydromos had proposed body searches of
those entering the churches during the ceremony, and it pointed out: “We
do not forget that the churches particularly during thoses days are
crowded with masses deriving from diverse social classes among which
brutal people can be found and this makes the order and the glorious and
solemn peace really impossible”39. Despite the edicts of their Metro-
politan, the Smyrniots did not abandon the practice. According to Chris-
tos Solomonidis, whose accounts of an amateur historian are a major
source of information, “for the unredeemed Greeks of Smyrna (sic), it
was an outbreak of joy and protest against the tyrant”. It is for this rea-
son, he continued, that at Easter, all the parishes of Izmir and especially
in Kerasohori, where the incident had taken place and Fasoula, were
shaken by all kinds of small arms fire40.
This social discontent could hardly be concealed during the celebration
of the second anniversary of the Constitution in July 1910. The celebra-
tions aimed at retaining the atmosphere of enthusiasm41 and took place
as programmed “with all due magnificence”42. However, certain inci-
dents took place when Greek flags became the target of attack. According
to Amalthia, despite the anxiety prevailing among the Hellenic subjects
due to the boycott, to which I will refer further on, they did not want to
show themselves indifferent to the celebration of the proclamation of the
Constitution and many of them decorated their shops with Greek and
Turkish flags. However the “well-known tramps” who patrolled the mar-
kets molested the flags and demanded their removal43. The newspaper
criticizes these attacks by remarking: “Aren’t the officials concerned
about what could happen when a Hellenic subject, or French or English
sees the object he considered the most untouchable and even more sacred
than an icon being insulted?”44 In other locations, such as Manisa
39
Tachydromos, 29 March 1903.
40
Erkan Serçe, p. 93.
41
Every citizen “was encouraged to do his best to celebrate the restoration of the
constitution”, Amalthia, “J Eortß tou suntágmatov” (The celebration of the constitu-
tion), 7 July 1910.
42
Amalthia, “J Eortß tou suntágmatov” (The celebration of the constitution),
July 12 1910.
43
Amalthia, “Hjtßmata sjmaiÉn” (Issues of flags), 12 July 1910. There were even
cases when boycotters themselves brought the flags down. Amalthia, “Ezúbrisiv
sjmaíav” (Insulting of the flag), 12 July 1910.
44
Amalthia, “Smurnaflkß JxÉ” (Smyrniot Echo), 12 July 1910.
 THE ENTHUSIASM TURNS TO FEAR 309

(Gr. Magnesia), the Greek-Orthodox celebrated with “the due decency

and without inopportune activities of enthusiasm”. The Metropolitan of
Effesos, in his message at Manisa, pointed out that especially after the
recent law regarding churches and schools in Macedonia, there were
those who claimed “that our nation should abstain from today’s celebra-
tion for the proclamation of the Constitution. Luckily, these ideas did not
prevail"45.
A few days later, the community’s discontent was also mirrored in the
celebration of July 14. This day was always an opportunity for celebra-
tion and for challenging the restrictions imposed by the regime. The
Marseillaise was performed in cafés and theatres, while banquets were
given in honor of France. The local authorities, who could do nothing to
prevent the festivities, were scared that the Palace would be frustrated
by such enthusiasm for an anniversary of what was basically an anti-
monarchist revolution. As a consequence, they resorted to censoring the
news about the events in the next day’s newspapers46. Whereas previ-
ously the Greek Orthodox element had played a particularly lively role
in the celebration, either as a form of implicit protest against the regime
before 1908, or as a sign of emancipation afterwards, it totally abstained
in 1910, because they disapproved of France’s policies in the Orient47.

Boycotting ourselves

The principal issue that provoked resentment on both sides was the
imminent annexation of the autonomous principality of Crete to the

45
Amalthia, “J eortß en Magnjsía” (The celebration in Manisa), 12 July 1910.
46
A.M.A.E (Paris), n° 103, Fête de 14 Juillet, Blanc (Smyrna) to Delcassé (Paris), 17
July 1903.
47
A.M.A.E (Paris), n° 36, Witasse as gérant (Smyrna) to Pichon (Paris), 18 July 1910.
A year later, the absence of Hellenic subjects would be again commented on by the French
consul. His Hellenic colleague, Armondos Potten, had informed him that it was upon the
orders of the Head of Political Affairs of the Vilayet, Armenak Efendi, that the Hellenes
were compelled to abstain from the celebrations. Gendarmes were also sent to all the shops
owned by Hellenic citizens to prevent them from raising flags. The Hellenes abided by
the order. However, contention was triggered when shop-owners of French nationality
rejected instructions by the Vilayet according to which only the consulate was authorized
to raise a flag. A.M.A.E (Paris), n° 24, Colomier (Smyrna) to Pichon (Paris), 20 July 1911.
For the celebrations in Izmir on the anniversary of the French revolution see my article
“‘Allons enfants de la… ville’: National Celebrations, Political Mobilisation and Urban
Space in Izmir at the Turn of the 20th Century” in Ottoman Izmir: Studies in honour of
Alexander H. de Groot, edited by Maurits H. van den Boogert (Nederlands Instituut voor
Het Nabije Oosten, 2007), pp. 123-137.
310 VANGELIS KECHRIOTIS

Hellenic Kingdom48. During the spring and summer months of 1909, 1910
and 1911, as a result of the proclamation by the Cretans of this annexation,
Hellenic subjects as well as Greek-Orthodox merchants and entrepreneurs
were boycotted49. To this end, a “Committee of the Commercial War,”
(Boykot cemiyeti) was established in Istanbul and similar committees in
Salonica and Izmir, while sub-committees were established in the main
towns of the vilayet. According to the British consul, Bemham, their stra-
tegy was to hire the unemployed and to use them to form patrol groups.
The responsibilities of these groups were to prevent Greek vessels from
approaching the shore, to seal all exports with the sign of the Committee,
and to prevent the public from entering shops owned by Hellenic subjects.
On many occasions, boycotters marked storefronts with the word Yunani
(Greek) and, in the event that customers were not discouraged, they posted
guards outside in order to forcibly prevent customers from entering.50
48
The literature on the boycott is not very long. The first relevant work is an older
article by Zafer Toprak, where the author argues that the events until 1913 cannot really be
described as a boycott: Zafer Toprak, “Islâm ve Iktisat: 1913-1914 Müslüman Boykotajı”,
Toplum ve Bilim, 29/30 Bahar Yaz 1985, p.179-199. Hervé Georgelin, who is using exten-
sively French consular reports from Izmir, has published an interesting article entitled “Boy-
cottage des non-musulmans à Smyrne et dans le vilayet d’Aydın, d’après les archives diplo-
matiques”, Revue du Monde arménien moderne et contemporain, 4, 1998, p. 7-22. There is
also a nicely written book on the boycott against the Austrian products, by Dogan Çetinkaya
who is, actually, preparing his doctoral thesis on the anti-Greek boycott in all Ottoman ports:
Y. Dogan Çetinkaya, 1908 Osmanlı Boykotu: bir Toplumsal Hareketin Analizi, (Istanbul:
Ileti≥im, 2004). Mustafa Oral’s studies on the boycott in Antalya are worth reading: Mustafa
Oral, “Me≥rutiyet’ten Cumhuriyet’e Antalya’da Yunan Kar≥ıtı Sosyal Hareketler: Giritli
Göçmenler ve Kemalist Hamallar", Toplumsal Tarih, 138, June 2005, p. 60-69. Finally, a
very promising study seems to be that of Eyal Ginio, who focuses on the Balkan war years:
Eyal Ginio, “Port-cities as imagined battlefields: the boycott of 1913”, unpublished paper
presented at the workshop The late Ottoman port-cities and their inhabitants: subjectivity,
urbanity and conflicting orders, organised in the framework of the “Eighth Mediterannean
Reasearch Meeting”, on 21-25 March 2007.
49
Interestingly, the first incident of boycotting foreign products in the Ottoman Empire
was initiated by the local Greeks. Following the expulsion of Hellenic Greeks from Roma-
nia, Greek lighter owners in Mytilini refused to unload merchandise from a Romanian
ship, while due to the great excitement among the local population and the demonstrations
organised, military squads were patrolling the harbor to secure order. A.M.A.E (Nantes),
n° 51, Incident Gréco-Roumain, Blanc (Smyrna) to Constans (Constantinople), 26 June
1906. The Ottoman authorities are described as unwilling to take any further measures to
suppress the boycott. A.M.A.E (Nantes), n° 49, Incident Gréco-Roumain à Mételin, Blanc
(Smyrna) to Constans (Constantinople), 22 June 1906. Moreover, the boycotters are encour-
aged both by this attitude of the authorities and by articles published in the newspapers
of Athens. A.M.A.E (Nantes), n° 52, Manifestation anti-Roumaines, Blanc (Smyrna) to
Constans (Constantinople), 30 June 1906.
50
PRO, FO 195/2360, Bernham (Smyrna) to Lowther (Constantinople), n° 75, 30 Aug,
1910.
 THE ENTHUSIASM TURNS TO FEAR 311

In Izmir, the most active agitators in harassing Greek economic acti-

vity were often Muslim Cretans migrants who had been expelled from
their island and found refuge at the outskirts of the city. Many of them
worked in the port, whereas many were unemployed and ready to offer
their services against any Christian. On the other hand, the active par-
ticipation of the rest of the Muslim population in the boycott appears to
have been rather limited. The British consul described one of the early
demonstrations organized by the local CUP branch with the aim of urging
the Government to take a strong position regarding the “Cretan Ques-
tion.” Twenty thousand people were reported to have participated, 12,000
of whom were Muslim Cretans, while they were also a few hundred
Jews51. Even if the numbers might be exagerated, it is significant that the
leitmotiv of the speeches was that everybody was ready to “shed their
last drop of blood” in order to protect Crete from falling into Greek
hands.”52
The local authorities, on the other hand, held the Boycott Committee
responsible for any damage and in certain cases, they intervened against
the boycotters.53 It was clear that they disapproved any kind of distur-
bance, which they perceived as a threat to the peace and order of the city,
particularly since Greek commercial activity was so interrelated to Brit-
ish, French and Austrian interests. Moreover, the boycott was used as a
pretext for actions of personal revenge, selectively addressed towards

51
As Feroz Ahmad has shown, the Jewish population was the only one which remained
faithful to the CUP until the end. Ahmad talks about the common fate of the Jewish and
the Muslim population of the Empire as well as their rivalry against the Christians, see
Feroz Ahmad, “Unionist Relations with the Greek, Armenian and Jewish Communities”,
in Benjamin Braude & Bernard Lewis (eds.), Christians and Jews in the Ottoman empire:
the functioning of a plural society (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1982) p. 401-
436, esp. p. 434-35.
52
PRO, FO 195/ 2331, Bernham (Smyrna) to Lowther (Constantinople), n° 73, Aug
2, 1909. According to the same report, smaller demonstrations were organized in various
towns of the province. In Chios and Çe≥me (Krini), the Greek notables refused to sign the
telegrams sent to the Grand Vezier.
53
As the British consul infoms us, “the Government is keeping clear of the movement,
as it did during the Austrian boycott, and disclaiming all responsibility whenever violence
is used. The boycotters protest loudly that they mean it to be a peaceful movement. As
however they have the turbulent element of the Cretans among them, it may easily degen-
erate into brawls and worse. This morning, Greek shops were shut by the boycotters but
re-opened by the police. Foreigners employing Greeks have not so far been troubled”,
PRO, FO 195/ 2331, Bernham (Smyrna) to Lowther (Constantinople), n° 73, Aug 2, 1909.
A point of contention, however, regards the relevant statistics, since according to the Hel-
lenic consul, some 50,000 Smyrniot Greeks were Hellenic subjects, while the authorities
claimed that this population did not exceed the 26,000.
312 VANGELIS KECHRIOTIS

certain individuals. At the outskirts of the city, for instance, foreign sub-
jects related with Greeks protested that their properties had been harassed
by groups directed by the Boycott Committee, whereas Greek-Orthodox
or Hellenic subjects lived in peace.54 In addition to this, the boycott
became doubled due to the social discontent that was widespread before
this period. It is partly on these grounds that local authorities reacted to
what they considered a group of trouble-makers and a threat to public
order. The British consul referred to the Cretan porters who, in the midst
of the turmoil, had found the opportunity to organize a strike against the
shipping agents and owners of shipping transport watercraft. They
demanded a new agreement in order to replace the one signed in 1909
on their behalf by the government.
The same day, a group of Muslim Cretans visited the offices of the
Hellenic Pantaleon shipping company, who dominated maritime trans-
portation on the litoral of Western Asia Minor. They informed them that
they had launched a boycott against the Hellenic subjects and that no
cargo would be allowed to be loaded on the company’s ships55. It should
be noted, however, that the local authorities were prompt in persecuting
the culprits.
The way some incidents are reported in the local press from 1910
onwards nevertheless leaves no doubt that the more the turmoil around
the Cretan Question escalated, the more the local authorities turned a
blind eye to complaints56. Still, until early Spring months of 1910, Hel-
lenic interests seemed to withstand the harassments57. Further, at the
beginning the boycotters were restricted to the Muslim areas and did

54
PRO, FO 195/2383, Heathercot-Smith (Smyrna) to Lowther (Constantinople), n° 80,
31 Oct. 1911.
55
Amalthia, “Kßruziv mpoÓkotáh” (Proclamation of boycott), 27 May 1910.
56
We are informed for instance that a group of Muslim Cretans visited the baker’s
shop owned by Vasilis Manousos and threatened him. The shopowner complained to a
police officer who was passing but the latter refused to arrest them. Three days later,
Manousos was visited by other police officers who asked him to indicate the culprits. He
was, however, unable to do so since he did not know their names. Then, few days later,
two police officers appeared and arrested both Manousos and his secretary for spreading
revolutionary ideas and jeopardising public order. Amalthia, “Parádozov súlljciv”
(An awkawrd arrest), 27 May 1910.
57
On the occasion of the celebration for the Hellenic King George I’s name day, on
23 April, the consul Armondos Potten points out that the Hellenic colony had managed to
deal sucessfully with the boycott and stressed the need for a Hellenic Chamber of Com-
merce which would contribute to the enhancement of Hellenic commerce and improve
relations between the two countries. Amalthia, “Eortß Basiléwv Gewrgíou” (King
George’s Celebration) 23 April, 1910.
 THE ENTHUSIASM TURNS TO FEAR 313

not dare to appear in Christian quarters such as Fasoula. The practice

that they followed was to ask the shop-owners for their municipality
licenses and then to urge them to close the shop down so that they would
not destroy it. Many Greeks who complied did so to avoid risking their
property. Indeed, many violent incidents between Greeks and the boy-
cotters were avoided due to the intervention of Tevfik bey, the director
of Education, who was temporarily replacing the vali and who gave
orders to all police stations to safeguard all citizens’ property. This made
the city look as if it was under “military occupation”58. The Hellenic
consul protested to Tevfik bey and after receiving reassurance that riots
would be prevented, he himself crossed the market calling the Hellenic
subjects to reopen their shops59. Moreover, the vilayet authorities issued
an announcement claiming that “any individual can apply the boycott
over every product, however they should keep in mind that boycott
does not mean invasion into shops and restriction of the freedom of
merchants since this is against individual freedom”60. Despite these
measures and instructions, the boycotters were not discouraged. They
even managed to impose their rule, singling out for harassment the boats
of the Pantaleon maritime company61. It should be added that members
of the local police and the harbor civil servants were said to assist
the boycotters in their plans, which totally undermined the efforts of
the authorities to control violence62. Incidents also took place among
workers.
The increasing turmoil triggered the reaction of the foreign consuls,
who informed their governments of the need to invite the military navy
be prepared to intervene and protect their citizens. Amalthia deplores
this development, claiming that “The European public will now be
under the impression that the life of the Christian inhabitants of Smyrna
is in danger, that massacres are imminent and inhumanity reigns in our
city… The few barefoot troublemakers of last Thursday were enough
58
Amalthia, “To mpoÓkotáh” (The boycott), 28 May 1910. In certain cases, however,
the boycotters entered Greek shops and destroyed Greek symbols. In the restaurant owned
by Panagiotis Chrysafiou, near Basmahane, the portrait of King George was destroyed; in
the shop of Vasilis Vafiadis, they destroyed the crown over a commercial (zitofimia) of a
Greek cognac (it might be Metaxa). Therefore, many Greeks who were non-Hellenic sub-
jects raised the flag of their nationality.
59
Ibid. Due to the events, 30 boycotters were arrested as well as one Greek, named
Paraschos who beat a couple of them.
60
Ibid.
61
Amalthia, “O emporikóv apokleismóv” (The commercial blockade), 1 June 1910.
62
Amalthia, “Smurnaflkß JxÉ”, (Smyrniot Echo), 1 June 1910.
314 VANGELIS KECHRIOTIS

so that our country was again discredited, despite Hakkı’s [Ismail

Hakkı, the Grand Vizier] reassertions that our country entered the
society of the civilized countries…?”63 Eventually, as a result of the
government’s instructions and the measures taken by the local authori-
ties64, the local Boycott Committee resigned65. The organizers, having
failed in their purposes, were ostensibly to be discredited in the mind
of the Turkish people: “Instead, Amalthia claims, we are afraid that the
demagogues are going to mislead the naive mob to other directions so
that they cover their failure and the culpable Turkish nationalism they
created.”66
These fears proved to be true, and the boycott persisted with even
greater fervor67. The new Boycott Committee posted announcements in
the market warning Ottoman Greeks that if they continued to support
the Hellenic Greeks, they would also suffer the consequences68. The
boycott was also extended to include Muslims somehow related to the
Hellenic subjects. Even the mutassarif (administrator of a sub-prefec-
ture) of Manisa, who was sitting in a café owned by a Hellenic subject,
was harassed by a boykotacı who therefore ended up in prison. On the
contrary, the Muslim arabacı (fayton drivers) who refused to transport
offıcials from the train station to the Konak were spared from any punish-
ment69. The Muslim Cretans who attempted to impose the boycott in
Kordelio, however, were obstructed by the local Muslims who com-
plained that a boycott would deprive them of provisions, since the shop-
keepers there were all Hellenic Greeks. The Muslim port workers had
also lost their jobs. To support them, a fund was established by the
newspaper Köylü; contributions were small, however, and the fund
amounted only to 261 kuru≥70.

63
Amalthia, “Ehßtjsan ploía” (They asked for ships), 2 June 1910.
64
Ahmet Refik, among the members of the Boycott Committee, in an open letter
published in Köylü, declared that he had resigned because the authorities had prohibited
the boycott. Amalthia, “O emporikóv apokleismóv” (The commercial blocade), 5 June
1910.
65
Amalthia, “PaidariÉdjv politikß” (Childish policy), 5 June 1910.
66
Ibid.
67
It seems, however, that the local Boycott Committee was in a dilemma about
whether or not they should continue and thus they decided to ask for instructions from the
Salonica branch: Amalthia, “O emporikóv apokleismóv” (The commercial blocade), 12
June 1910.
68
Amalthia, “O emporikóv apokleismóv” (The commercial blocade), 7 June 1910.
69
Ibid.
70
Amalthia, “O emporikóv apokleismóv” (The commercial blocade), 14 June 1910.
 THE ENTHUSIASM TURNS TO FEAR 315

Actually, Ottoman Greeks were asked to pay a fine for permission to

pursue their activity unhindered. However, incidents took place in which
some shopkeepers tore down the papers indicating their nationality that
boycotters posted outside their shops71. Amalthia reacts to the measure
and prophetically predicts that if the expulsion of the Hellenic Greeks is
discussed today, a time will eventually come when the expulsion of the
Ottoman Greeks will be also applied72.
These measures resulted in the domination of the markets by Muslims,
since all shops owned by Hellenic subjects were closed down. In order
to deal with the emergency, the vali Mahmut Muhtar ordered that cafés
and other shops except for certain kazino on the Quai should remain
closed after 9:00 p.m. every evening. This measure, however, was
applied without warning, instigating still more confusion73. Nevertheless,
Amalthia praises the efforts made by the vali to defuse the tension. In a
talk to the local club of the CUP, the vali advised the boycotters to be
cautious as many Hellenic Greeks were related to Ottoman Greeks
through family and friendly relations. For this reason, he argued, violence
should be avoided and the government has taken relevant measures. He
concluded in a tone cherished by the Greek newspaper: “Boycott is a
measure that the weak nations use against the mighty ones, so it doesn’t
suit Turkey”74. Actually, Amalthia, while paying tribute to the vali for
criticizing the boycott, commented that “the Young Turks, who have
studied French history, know very well the period of ‘sans culotte' and
did not forget the consequences brought about by this social garbage.
When the jobless and the barefoot come to surface and they replace the
authorities, then the social structure is shaken”75. The boycott would
ultimately continue unabated throughout 1910 and 1911.

71
Amalthia, “O emporikóv apokleismóv”, (The commercial blocade), 8 June 1910.
At least one Muslim Cretan is involved in each incidents described. Not all incidents are
necessarily related to the boycott, but are acts of violence, which could be attributed to
common criminal activity. However, the tension stirred by the boycott created conditions
of vigilance and violence was perpetuated. Amalthia, ‘Aimatjraí skjnaí’ (Bloody inci-
dents), 12 June 1910.
72
Amalthia, “Smurnaflkß JxÉ" (Smyrniot Echo), 12 June 1910.
73
Amalthia, “Smurnaflkß JxÉ” (Smyrniot Echo), 14 June 1910
74
Amalthia, “O nomárxjv perí tou mpoÓkotáh”, (The vali referring to the Boycott),
14 June 1910. Later on, when the French and German consuls intervened to protect their
subjects whose merchandise destined for a Hellenic shop were also boycotted, the vali
responded and ordered the gendarmerie to safeguard transportation. Amalthia, “O empo-
rikóv apokleismóv” (The commercial blocade), 16 June 1910.
75
Amalthia, “Smurnaflkß JxÉ” (Smyrniote Echo), 16 June 1910.
316 VANGELIS KECHRIOTIS

Conclusion

During the first decades of the 20th century, segregation within the
lower strata of the city communities resulted in tensions, tensions that
surfaced from time to time and eventually culminated in open hatred. As
Goffman points out, the notorious fire of 1922 was the fulfillment of this
process. Fires had occurred many times before and had been dealt with
by everyone, regardless of the community to which they belonged. How-
ever, nobody had ever thought of accusing a whole community for such
a calamity76. In the pages above, I have described a few contentious
incidents from the period 1908-1910. These incidents reflect aspects of
everyday life and popular culture, such as the purchase of commodities
and commercial activity and the celebration of Christian and other public
holidays. By analyzing the interethnic tension as it escalated during this
period from the point of view of rupture or discontinuity of long-standing
social practices, my intention was to demonstrate that there was nothing
essentially inevitable in the course of events that followed, and that par-
ticular socio-economic conditions should primarily be taken into account
in efforts to explain the violence. Moreover, it is important to study struc-
tures of violence deriving from the Hamidian period as well as modes of
resolution in the very turbulent second constitutional period, especially
at the level of everyday life. Studying riots, strikes and boycotts contri-
butes to an understanding of the resistance of patterns of local convivial-
ity and also the way these patterns had been consolidated throughout the
years.

76
Edhem Eldem, Daniel Goffman, Bruce Masters, The Ottoman City between East and
West, Aleppo-Izmir-Istanbul (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999),
p. 132.