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CHEMER

Risk-based life-cycle infrastructure management


- Civil engineering decision support

Bruno CAPRA

1
Page
Page11
Agenda

1. Risk concepts

2. Case study

3. Discussion

Page 2
Clients
ENERGY

Nuclear Oil & Gas Hydraulic

TRANSPORTS

Harbors Railway - Highway Urban structures

PORT AUTONOME DU HAVRE

Page 3
OXAND Services

Risk-based life-cycle infrastructure management / Civil


engineering decision support

Risk management to support large project managers

Page 4
Oxand scope

 infrastructure, asset or project risk-based life


cycle management

Strategy Operation

new project study Project management

Feasibility Design Building Ageing Management


Basic design decisions ? ‘as built’ vs. ‘as designed’? Refurbishment ? Life cycle
Design specifications ?  construction gap studies Maintenance? extension ?
Communication with authorities? Surveillance?

Feasibility Management Plan Project management


Profitability ROI Organisation, responsabilities Indicators follow up and Final report
GO/NO GO Decision Objectives and performance reporting, alerts and
indicators recommandations

Page 5
OXAND services

Structure
Our strength:
Technical culture
&
Management vision

Materials
Laboratory Field
Page 6
Simulation: SIMEO TM technologies

Data management
Quantification Maintenance &
Risk identification (Ageing & strategies Decision making
Probabilities) Reporting

SIMEO - RISK SIMEO – CONSULTING SIMEO - MAINTENANCE


& MC2 Simulation de scénario de maintenance : scénario 1
Besoin total (somme des coûts d’actions de maintenance) 200 MFr.
Coût du scénario de maintenance simulé 10 MFr.
Voir Liste des actions du scénario simulé

Blessures Séquelles à Plusieurs 0 à 15 15 à 60 60 à 200 Plus de 200


IR Sécurité 1 mort IR Disponibilité
légères vie morts Minutes Minutes Minutes Minutes
[1-5]
<1 an
ans
[5-20] [1-3]
ans ans
[20-100] [3-6]
ans ans
[100-1000] [6-20]
ans ans 10 MFr.
[1000-10000] [20-50]
ans ans 5%

Offre
>10000 ans >50 ans

0
Attentat
terroriste
Séisme Chute d'avion Surcoût Surcoût de Surcoût de Surcoût Gêne non Gêne Sentiment de Sentiment de
IR Durabilité IR Confort danger non danger
> 30 % 30 à 100% 100 à 300 % > 300% persistante persistante persistant persistant
Vapeur d'eau Pluie
interne
<1 an <1 an

Risque Résiduel
Fa 19
Fa 18 Fa 20

Fa 5
Fa 6
Neige [1-3] [1-3]
Fa 4
Flux d'air ans ans
Fa 7 Vent [3-6] [3-6]
Fa 23
ans ans
Température Fa 24
interne
Fa 3 CO2
[6-20] [6-20]
DAMPIERRE 4
Fa 8
ans ans
Fa 22 [20-50] [20-50] 95 %
gel-dégel Fa 9 Ensoleillement ans ans
Fa 2
Fa 1
Fa 10 >50 ans >50 ans
Eau du circuit de Humidité relative
ambiante
refroidissement
Fa 11
Fa 17

Fa 14 Température
Fa 16 ambiante
Fa 15

Poids propre

Nappe Sol de fondation


phréatique Crue

53
SIMEO - MANAGER
27

10
7

FE simulations 7
SIMEO - ERM Page 7
Examples of OXAND clients’ needs

Should I carry on maintaining my infrastructure or is it more


profitable to rebuilt it?

Can I go beyond design operational life-time, with which action


plan?

Should I improve and reinforce my infra or can I still operate like


this?

How to improve my infrastructure’s design for a sustainable


operation life?

 OXAND Asset Management Services…

…including some needs about aging management


Page 8
 infrastructure risk-based life
cycle management

Basic Design & Build Long Term Operation


Basic design decisions ?  Refurbishment ?
Design specifications ?  Maintenance?
Communication with authorities? Surveillance?

“new structure” “ageing structure”

Feasibility Design Building


Commissioning End of initial life time Life cycle
extension ?
 ‘as built’ vs. ‘as
designed’?

Page 9
Risk-based life-cycle infrastructure management

OXAND Solutions

Diagnosis / Forecasting :

C = F*G

Risks= f(t) Performance = f(t) State = f(t)


Containment – Structural integrity Gap / Design
0m

1
195 m Formations
2
397 m
420 m 3
4 Melquart

762 m

5 Beglia
981 m
1031 m
6
Stakes: 7 Mahmoud

1418 m 8
Jetty availability
Ain Grab
1475 m

9 Kethtna

1744 m

Persons’ security 10 Cherahil B

2080 m
11
2240 m Cherahil A
12
2413 m

Simeo
Consulting

Actions plan

Page 10
Risk-based life-cycle infrastructure management

OXAND Solutions

Actions plan :

Risks mapping Actions plan Optimized actions plan


Réduire les incertitudes sur la corrosion du radier
Mode de défaillance ou cause
Parade initiale maximal associé C_init Coût (K$) C_fin Gain Coût/gain
(1) Vérifier l’enrobage
Inspections Bajoyers W Effondrement des bajoyers de 13 75 7 18 4,2
en face inférieure du radier de (2) Inspection visuelle W
manière non destructive (3) Mesures des taux
(pachomètre)
des défauts signes de Inspections Terre-pleins T Effondrement des terre-pleins 11 75 5 12 6,3
corrosion des aciers de chlorures et des
6 mois (épaufrures…) profondeurs de de T
20 carbonatation par carottage (4) Caractérisation de
Inspections Terre-pleins et Effondrement des terre-pleins 12 100 6 15 6,7
Nombre de scénarii de défaillance

l’état de fissuration du
radier Fonds W de W
Scénario Remise en Inspections Bajoyers T Fuite importante de matériaux 9 30 3 4 7,5
15 cause des de T
I.1 prédictions?
Inspections Terre-pleins et Basculement des quais de DG 11 100 5 12 8,3
Scénario Fonds DG
IV.1 Coûts Ancienne
Directives entrée + application stratégie
Impact de navire sur portes 10 30 6 3 10,0
10 1 an Affiner les prédictions de corrosion
Scénario
II.2 Inspection des portes WNouvelle
Blocagestratégie
de porte de W avec 10 100 5 6 16,7
navire coincé
6 Si nécessaire,
Inspection jetée "pleine" Ouverture de la jetée 8 20 2 1 20,0
Étude de nocivité intégrant les désordres et
Travaux Balisage Arrêt de fonctionnement 11 300 6 8 37,5
3 écarts d’enrobage constaté dans une étude
Travaux de protection contre la corrosion (ex:
injection de fissures, étanchement…)
probabiliste

0 3 ans
0 Années
mineur faible moyen élevé critique

Owner assistance
90

80
Profondeur de carbonatation (mm)

70

60

50

40

30
Dans une fissure 0,3 mm
20
Dans une fissure de 0,5 mm
10

0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Age (an)

Page 11
Agenda

1. OXAND presentation

2. OXAND services

3. Risk concepts
a) Context
b) Definition of a stake (or issue)
c) Definition of a risk
d) Definition of a consequence

4. Case study

5. Other references

Page 12
Context

Industrialised countries are at a hinge period:

Before:
• New infrastructure works;
• Society in full growth;
• Low damage: appropriate curative strategy;
• Maintenance budgets sized on recurrent costs.

Today, tomorrow:
• Levels of damage accelerate;
• Maintenance costs increase non-linearly, maintenance becomes a major part
of the engineers' work;
• Budgets are insufficient, Impossibility to renovate everything;
• Prioritise, rank, DEFEND.

Page 13
Importance of ageing

"Operation"

Risk,
costs "young age"
"Zero" risk
cannot exist!!

Exceptional or accidental
conditions Ageing
Earthquake Modification of
operation

time
Page 14
Origins of failures

- New failure modes associated


- Design with ageing
- Construction errors - Sequence of events not
incorporated in the design
- Changes in operating
conditions

Page 15
Traditional approaches

Education:
• Mainly new constructions.

Practice:
– Initial reflex:
• Detailed inspections cost money;
• Problem = visible deterioration;
• Solution = restore to original condition, "the standard";
• Urgent?
• Budget?
• Hierarchise = trust the inspector's or the expert's judgement
when taking the decision.

Page 16
Traditional approaches

Inspection is important but not sufficient:

- adds elements from the past;


- reveals a modification and a change in what is visible;

 what are the thresholds?


 does it provide elements on residual strength, on imminent failure, on
future changes?
 Which procedure do I need from measurement to decision?
 what about the non-visible, places that are difficult to get at,
uncertainties?

Page 17
Difficulties inherent
in civil engineering constructions

Inherent difficulties:
• high costs,
• uniqueness of design,
• long life cycles, low recurrence of failures;
• high levels of uncertainty about some
components,
• complexity of mechanisms of ageing and
failure,
• threshold effects,
• major stake,
• etc.

Management of civil engineering constructions =


very complex task
Page 18
Definition of a stake

Exercise 1: identification of clients stakes

• Examples of stakes that may guide decisions ?

•Brainstorming:

Page 19
Definition of risk

Exercise 2: definition of risk


Participatory work (2)

• Define what a risk is?

•Brainstorming:

Page 20
Definition of risk

It is what threatens the


stakes.
Possibility of non-
achievement of
objectives due to
random disturbances or
uncertainties.

 Frequency ?
(probability)

Page 21
Definition of a consequence

Consequence:

• Loss of performance, impact of a threat on a stake

Examples:

• One lane of the motorway is closed for 6 hours;


• Operating end due to gap / standards or requirements;
• A car is destroyed following the fall of a lump of concrete;
• The roads are blocked with snow;
• Etc.

Page 22
Risk analysis

Risk = Probability x Consequences

-Health, Safety
1 overall approach -Availability
-Asset
-Environment
-Financial, economic
-Political

Page 23
Risk analysis

Risk = Probability x Consequences

- Rebuild the background events


- Detailed analysis of the causes
- Inventory of failure modes
- Exhaustivity
- Quantification

Page 24
What is risk management?

Risk management aims to reach or overtake the


objectives of a company while taking into account risks
and opportunities in a conscious way. Events, actions
and evolutions likely to prevent company from reaching
its objectives or allowing it to overtake them have to be
controlled and managed.

The main objective is to implement with success the


action plans of risk mitigation
Page 25
Risk management reference framework

ISO/IEC 31010:2009
Risk management-
Risk assessment techniques

Page 26
Identify

- Workshops (brainstorming)
- Experts’ opinions
- Functionnal analysis, PDA, FMEA
- Fault trees, events trees

Page 27
Risk Identification :
Space of risks
method
Impacts

Page 28
Estimate

- Experts’ judgements (qualitative indicators)


- PRA, FMECA (qualitative or quantitative)
- Fault trees, events trees (quantitative)
- Probabilist analysis, Markov models (quantitative)
- P&R methodologies
Page 29
Estimate

Probability ?
Severity ?

Criticality (Risk) !

Page 30
Qualitative methodologies
Description Level
Probability: Unlikely:
A
very rare.
Possible:
B
can be observed, feared.
Likely:
C
already observed, will probably occur.
Very likely:
D
expected to occur (almost certain).
Severity:
Performance Sustainability

Stakeholder satisfaction Planning Organizational Reputation Know-how

All criteria fulfilled in appropriate Technical questioning of the CO2 project


1: Minor Delay < 1 month No need for reorganization Slight impact
way. from CO2 project management

Not all criteria met, but Technical questioning from RWE Dea
Severity levels

Reorganization of part of a sub Reputation of RWE Dea affected


2: Medium workarounds or alternatives can Delay < 3 months (solutions to pilot issues exist within the
system on a short term
easily be found. project)
Some criteria can only be
Reorganization of one sub Reputation of RWE Dea affected Technical questioning from RWE Dea (no
3: Serious fulfilled with additional clients, Delay < 1 years
system on a long term solutions to pilot issues)
by partners or new solutions.

Cooperation/concensus cannot Reorganization of the whole Technical questioning from RWE AG


4: Critical Delay > 1 years Reputation of RWE AG affected
Page 31
be realized. CO2 project team and/or authorities
Evaluate
Probability
Probabilité

- Acceptable ? For who ?


- Responsabilities (Top management)
Gravité - Mitigation level (ALARP)
Severity
Page 32
Evaluate

Potential savings Watch out

Risks overcontrolled Risk control level


adapted to criticality

Survey
Not enough Risk
Risk control level control
adapted to criticality

Consider the couple control – criticality to be sure ressources


are well allocated
Page 33
Level of Risk control

Indicator: 1 2 3 4
(None) (Low) (Middle) (High)
Actions No Only few Preventive and All the actions
implemented mitigation preventive protective reasonably
action actions actions implementable
implemented implemented have been taken
Level of No transfer Part of the risk Risk partially Risk totally
transfer can be transfered transfered
transfered (insurance, sub-
contractor…)

Page 34
Treat
Prevention Protection

Page 35
Treat
Separation

- Duplication (spare part, …)


- Transfert (assurance)
- Abandon

Page 36
Agenda

1. OXAND presentation

2. OXAND services

3. Risk concepts

4. Case study

5. Other references

Page 37
Case study– harbor quay

• Harbor structure
• Equatorial climate
• Heavy traffic
• Age: 25 years

A : zone submergée C : zone d’aspersion


B : zone de marnage D : zone d’embrun
air + Cl-
embrun
Cl- D
embrun D
embrun
Cl-
aspersion C
embrun
marée B air + Cl-

Diffusion

H2O + Cl- Cl- C


A aspersion

H2O
Séchage Cl-

mer aspersion
H2O + Cl-

Dépôt Diffusion

Page 38
Case study– harbor quay

Ground

Page 39
Case study– harbor quay
EAST
Ground

sprays

WEST

Main winds

Page 40
Case study– harbor quay

400 m
South (Sea)

Zone 6 Zone 5 Zone 4


31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

F
East

Ouest
E

Y
B

? ? ? ? ? M

PARTIE DEJA TRAITEE ?


? L
?

ZONE DEJA TRAITEE K

Nord (Terre) H

Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3


Cl- < 0,12%/béton
soit 0,8/ciment Cl- > 0,12%/béton démolition béton éclaté (relevé UDECTO-Mr GOUT)

Page 41
Case study– harbor quay
Which management strategy? What would you do?
Stake: rebuild-> 80 M€ + operation loss, what else ?

Initial solution considered:


•Inspection and characterization: more than1000 mesurements
(concrete cover, chloride ions, …)
•Décision: concrete cover replacement and steel treatment
•Tiem:12 months

Problems ! :
•Time underestimation
•Strong penalties

Solution 2 : structure reassessment-> main zones,


risk analysis and action plan

Page 42
Case study– harbor quay
1,6

1,4
Taux de chlorures totaux par rapport au poids
de ciment pour un dosage de 320 kg/m3 [%]

1,2
19 ans

1,0
51 ans

0,8 OXAND 0,85%~0,93%

26 ans
MCI 0,8%
0,6

0,4 UDECTO 0,4%


Chlorure en Zone 4 (% en ciment)
0,2 Chlorure en Zone 5,3 (% en ciment)
Chlorure en Zone 6,2 (% en ciment)
0,0 1,0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0,9
Age de Port d'Owendo (an)
0,8

0,7
75%

Probabilité (-)
0,6

• Interpretation of existing experimental 0,5


57%
data thanks to simulation 0,4

• Use of uncertainties, rebuild of past and 0,3

0,2
Prediction of futur behaviour 0,1 20%
Zone 4
Zone 5,3
Zone 6,2
0,0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Age de Port d'Owendo (an)

Page 43
Case study– harbor quay
400 m
Sud (Mer)

200 m

Eclatement : 55 ans
Zone 6 Eclatement : 32 ans
Zone 5 Eclatement : 25Zone
ans4
31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
20% Perte : 93 ans
32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 20% Perte : 63 ans
46 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 20% Perte : 54 ans
31 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

surveillance Réparation légère Réparation lourde E

Ouest
6 5 4
Est

Y
B

Eclatement : 55 ans Eclatement : 32 ans A

20% Perte : 93 ans 20% Perte : 63 ans


? ? ? ? ? M

PARTIE DEJA TRAITEE ?

surveillance Réparation légère


?
?
L

ZONE DEJA TRAITEE K

1 2 3 J

Nord (Terre)
H

Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3


Cl- < 0,12%/béton
soit 0,8/ciment Cl- > 0,12%/béton démolition béton éclaté (relevé UDECTO-Mr GOUT)

Gains : unavailability period respected, maintenance schedule


Page 44
Concrete ageing model

Corrosion of concrete structures


(from material to structural effects)

When will we reach the


limit of service ability?

How much time do we


have?

What about uncertainty


in the remaining service
life?

Page 45
Concrete ageing model

Limit states? End of incubation period, x% of steel loss?


Needs for models able to describe the evolution of degradation vs
time for service-life estimation
Page 46
Durability and reliability approaches:
SIMEO® Consulting 2.0

Durability of concrete: carbonation, chloride


penetration, corrosion, leaching,…

Evolution of degradated structures elements


with time

DETERMINISTIC ET PROBABILISTIC
APPROACHES
Page 47
Models:

Carbonation: diffusion process

x   . f ( HR).k ( Rc 28). t
Compressive strength
Carbonation depth
Relative humidity

Exposition factor to Physical parameters


CO2  Valorization of
• Chloride penetration: modified Fick’s law existing data

   x   1
c( x, t )  cini  (csurface  cini ).1  erf   
   2  ..D .t   M cl
 Cl  

Diffusion coefficient
Chloride concentration
at depth x and time t

Matrix and [Cl]


interactions

Page 48
Concrete ageing model

Numerical simulations
SIMEO Consulting

Data:

• Concrete: 30 MPa
• Cement: CEM I 300 kg/m3
• Porosity: 15%
• DCl=10-12 m2/s
• RH=80%
• T=25°C
• Cl surface=20 g/l
• Conc. Cover= 30 mm
(Chloride and carbonation)
Page 50
Chlorides profile

Convection area in a RC
structure submitted to hydrous
and chloride transferts

Page 51
Concrete ageing model

Results
Free chloride vs time at rebar surface Chloride profile after 50 years

Corrosion current vs time

Limit state: end of incubation period

Service life: 23 years

Page 52
Concrete ageing model

Uncertainties
Probability density
Stress function of R(t) and S(t)
R(t): mean value of resistance
S(t): mean value of sollicitation

R(t)
fR(t1)

fR(t2)

S(t)
fS(t2)
fS(t1)

Joint density function fR,S(t)

Time
t1 tk t2 tm
Designed Mean life-time
life-time S(tm)= R(tm) Page 53
Concrete ageing
model

Probabilistic simulations

Concrete cover: DCl:


Lognormal law Normal law
(30 mm, CV=15%) (10-12 m2/s, CV=10%)
Page 54
Concrete ageing model Concrete ageing
model

Deterministic approach

Results:
P(ICl > 0)
Vs. time
Acceptable prob. of fail.: 5%, 10%, 30% ?

Related SL: 13, 15, 20 years

Page 55
Risk management and maintenance
optimization of nuclear reactor cooling piping
system

Revue technique du 11
décembre 2006

Page 56
Seaside Nuclear Power Plants

Nuclear Power Plants NPP, using seawater for their nuclear reactor
cooling piping systems

Page 57
Seaside NPP : piping system

Cooling piping
system using
seawater

SEA SEA

 Some NPP use reinforced concrete pipes


Page 58
Cooling piping system : description
A B

 2 lines (A and B)

redundant system
both have to be operational

Page 59
Concrete pipes : description

 Made of concrete pipes with internal steel core cylinder

Internal concrete Reinforcement


layer Global piping system here
concerned :  10 km

Straight pipes:  90% of


total length
External
Cylindrical steel sheet concrete
(2 mm) layer

Page 60
Context

Cooling piping system = Strategic equipment

• Reactor in service
Heat generation
• Reactor stopped

Cooling pipes must be


operational

Strict operation constraints : intervention only possible during


unit shutdowns

 Planned outages : DV / every 10 years / last : 3 months


PV / every 3 years / last : 1 month

Page 61
Operational feedback

Signs of deterioration due to ageing (cracks, rust, seepages)


leading to punctual replacements of pipe elements (3m)

Investigations on replaced pipe


elements results: After removal
Corrosion of the steel sheet:
(1) local steel sheet thickness
losses or even holes in steel
sheet
(2) start of a generalized corrosion
affecting the whole internal
surface of the steel sheet

Page 62
Problematic

Should I carry on maintaining my infrastructure or is it more


profitable to rebuilt it?

Page 63
Risk management approach: What are the owner’s
stakes in this case?

Owner’s stakes:

• Safety: Enable the cooling of the reactor

• Availability of the two lines (redondant system)

• Determine optimum intervention dates for maintenance to minimize


unit shutdowns (Availability) and Costs

Page 64
What are the main risks and their causes?

Recommended method:
• Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
1
Functional
analysis

Functions of Stakes
the system (issues)

2
Risk inventory

System failure modes

Causes Impacts

Page 65
Fonction Failure Mode Cause Impact

Page 66
Problematic through risk analysis

Causes Manifestation Maintenance actions? Unwanted Global


Survey? Event Consequence

Localized
corrosion Holes,
seepages
local
phenomenon :
only concerning
some pipes
punctually
Local pipe Cooling source
break loss

Generalized
internal Steel sheet
corrosion residual
thickness
Global
phenomenon :
concerning whole
circuit

Page 67
Risk management: decision-making process

10-years visit (VD)


Plant unit shutdown
Year N-2 Year N Year N+3 Year N+10

Punctual curative maintenance ?


Investigations?
Feedback? DECISION Intermediate
works at PV?

Heavy works
at DV ?

DECISION PROCESS DECISION-BASED ACTION

Page 68
Operational feedback

During the 10 years after initial priming, steel perforations


have never caused a tightness loss : no seepage has been
observed

After 10 years of use, one steel perforation on average


has been recorded per production unit and per year

After 20 years, removed and inspected pipes may present


some signs of internal generalized corrosion

Page 69
1st cause of degradation : Pitting
-> How to handle it?

Pitting:
- determination of the critical hole size acceptable under
worst mechanical loading (Scorr)
- feedback on maximal hole size detected through
seepages / sweatings (Sseep)

 Sseep << Scorr ( 400 cm2)

Conclusion / recommendation :
- perforations can always be detected before reaching
critical size
- the defect can be punctually repaired by setting a pipe
reinforcement when unit is in service

 CURATIVE TREATMENT
Page 70
Finite Elements Simulations
FE Meshes

Pipe
Concrete

Reinforcement

Steel sheet

Deformed mesh Principal stresses

Determination of Scorr
Page 71
2d cause of degradation : Generalized corrosion
How to handle it?

Generalized corrosion:
- critical thickness reduction acceptable under worst
mechanical loading = 60% of initial thickness
- corrosion model prediction (simulation tools):
 system acceptable until 2020 (conservative), before
whole replacement

Conclusion/ recommendation:
- span life expansion
Uncertainties, how to control the evolution ?
- use of a dedicated monitoring (OXAND’s patent)
- updating with data fields

 PREVENTIVE TREATMENT
Page 72
Monitoring process

Corrosion de l’âme Mesures continues Outils d’aide àdes


Traitement la Outils d’aide à la
Ageing pipes Targeted continuous Datadonnées
treatment Decision-making
tôle ciblées décision
-> corrosion measurements indicators

5_1(-T)
43.010
43.000
42.990
42.980
Dilatations (mm)

42.970 NPP owning reinforced


42.960
42.950
5_1(-T) concrete system monitored
42.940
42.930
42.920
42.910
20-sept- 25-sept- 30-sept- 05-oct-05 10-oct-05 15-oct-05 20-oct-05 25-oct-05
05 05 05

Page 73
Strategy:

Monitoring Maintenance Unwanted Global


Cause Threats Manifestation actions Event Consequence

Visual
Localized inspection Reinforcement
Holes, Service criteria:
corrosion
seepages hole size
local Potential Local (observable seepages
phenomenon : measurements replacement conservative)
only concerning
some pipes
Seism, overpressure

punctually Curative management


Local pipe Cooling source
bursting loss

Generalized Removal
internal + expertise Service criteria:
Steel sheet
corrosion Complete thickness
residual
replacement
thickness reduction (<60%)
Permanent of circuits
Global
phenomenon : monitoring
concerning whole
circuit
Preventive management

Page 74
Risk management:
decision-making process

10-years visit (VD)


Plant unit shutdown
Year N-2 Year N Year N+5 Year N+10

MONITORING
LIFESPAN
?
REPAIRS / PIPE
REMOVAL
PROLONGATION
Not
OK
Can we wait another 10 years before
carrying out heavy works??? INITIATION OF
REPLACEMENTS

DECISION PROCESS DECISION-BASED ACTION

Page 75
Owner’s benefits

Owner now holds decision support indicators and


service criteria to defend its maintenance strategy;

Owner decided to postpone the replacement of a cooling


piping system to the next Decennial Visit, with
recommended strategy;

Saved expenses : 12 M€

Page 76
Conclusion

Risk-based management allows an optimized


maintenance of structures considering
various stakes

Thank
It is a powerful you for
and dynamic your
methodology
involving numerous actors
attention
But nevertheless, sometimes…

77 INSAS, 25/01/08
Page 77

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