735

ARTICLE
Damage to industrial structures due to the 27 February 2010 Chile
earthquake1
Robert Tremblay, Denis Mitchell, and René Tinawi

Abstract: This paper provides a summary of the damage to industrial facilities in the Mw 8.8 Chile earthquake of 27 February
2010. The types of damage observed include failure of elevated tanks, collapse and cracking of concrete silos, buckling of steel
silos, collapse of conveyor systems, failure of steel bins, and failure of anchor rods. Damage to industrial buildings included
buckling of bracing members, failure of brace connections, shear failures of reinforced concrete columns, and shear failures of
heavily loaded steel girders. Aspects of the current Chilean design code for industrial structures are reviewed and discussed.
Recommendations are proposed for the development of Canadian seismic design provisions for industrial structures.

Key words: buildings, tanks, anchor rods, bracing members, connections, girders, concrete columns, seismic design, detailing.

Résumé : Dans cet article, on décrit et commente les dommages que les bâtiments industriels ont subis lors du séisme de
magnitude Mw 8,8 survenu au Chili le 27 février 2010. Les différents types de dommages observés incluent la rupture de réservoirs
en hauteur, la fissuration et l'effondrement de silos en béton, le flambage de silos en acier, l'effondrement de convoyeurs, la
rupture de réservoirs en acier et le bris de tiges d'ancrage. Des dommages ont également été observés dans les bâtiments
industriels tels que le flambement de contreventements et la rupture d'assemblages dans les contreventements en acier et la
rupture par cisaillement de poteaux en béton armé et de poutres en acier. Certains aspects de la norme chilienne pour la
conception des bâtiments industriels sont examinés. Des recommandations sont proposées pour le développement de règles de
conception parasismique canadiennes pour les bâtiments industriels.

Mots-clés : bâtiments, réservoirs, tiges d'ancrage, contreventements, assemblages, poutres, poteaux en béton, conception para-
sismique, détails de fabrication.

Introduction
The M8.8 Offshore subduction earthquake of 27 February 2010
occurred at 3:34 a.m., with its epicentre located off the Pacific
coast approximately 100 km North of Concepción and 340 km
South of Santiago. More than 280 aftershocks of magnitude 5.0
and larger, including 22 between 6.0 and 7.0, were felt in the
epicentral region during a period of three months after the main
shock (Barrientos 2010).
In April 2010, the authors visited damaged industrial structures
in the Concepción area, between the city of Teño, approximately
80 km North of Concepción, and Auroco, approximately 80 km
South of Concepción. Accelerograms recorded in the Concepción
downtown area, shown in Fig. 1, indicate that peak accelerations
in the order of 0.6g, in both the horizontal and vertical directions,
were recorded (Boroschek et al. 2010). The ground motion is of
long duration and relatively short predominant periods Tp, in the
order of 0.2 s for the horizontal motions and 0.16 s for the vertical
motion. It is noted that there were high spectral accelerations in
the East–West direction in the range of 0.6 to 1.0 s.
The observed damage included failure of elevated tanks, col-
lapse and cracking of concrete silos, collapse of conveyor systems,
failure of steel bins, buckling of steel shells and pull-out of anchor
rods. Damage also occurred in industrial buildings including
buckling of bracing members, failure of bracing member connec-
tions, shear failures of reinforced concrete columns, and shear
failures of heavily loaded steel girders. The more recently con-
structed industrial facilities generally performed exceptionally
well given the severity of the horizontal and vertical ground mo-
tions and the relatively long duration of the ground motions.
Chile has a history of large seismic events, with most damaging
earthquakes occurring along the subduction zone that runs
North–South along the coast. Since 1960, more than 10 M7.5 and
greater events have occurred, including the giant M9.5 Valdivia or
Great Chilean Earthquake (largest in modern history) of 1960 and
the strong M8.0 Valparaiso earthquake of 1985. Based on the ex-
perience gained from the performance of industrial structures in
these relatively recent severe earthquakes, the Chilean engineer-
ing community developed NCh2369 standard (INN 2003a), for the
seismic design of industrial structures and facilities. Issued in
2003 it has since been applied, complementing the more general
NCh433 standard (INN 2009) used in Chile for the seismic design
of building structures. Most of the damaged structures described
herein were designed and constructed before the introduction of
the NCh2369 standard. The observed structural damage is de-
scribed in the context of the provisions in this design code. Due to
the absence of such a similar Canadian design document, key
provisions of this unique code that could be considered for possi-
ble inclusion in Canadian design practice that surpass normal
building code requirements are briefly introduced.
Chilean seismic design provisions for industrial
structures
Design objectives
The main objectives of the NCh2369 standard (INN 2003a) are:
(1) to protect life by preventing structural collapse under seismic

Received 17 May 2012. Accepted 4 September 2012.

R. Tremblay and R. Tinawi. Department of Civil, Geological and Mining Engineering, École Polytechnique de Montreal, Montreal, QC, Canada.
D. Mitchell. Department of Civil Engineering and Applied Mechanics, McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada.
Corresponding author: Robert Tremblay (e-mail: robert.tremblay@polymtl.ca).
1This paper is one of a selection of papers in this Special Issue on Lessons Learned from Recent Earthquakes.

Can. J. Civ. Eng. 40: 735–749 (2013) dx.doi.org/10.1139/cjce-2012-0197 Published at www.nrcresearchpress.com/cjce on 12 May 2013.
736 Can. J. Civ. Eng. Vol. 40, 2013

Fig. 1. Ground motion records (corrected) in the Concepción downtown area on soil Type 3 (soft soil) (Colegio San Pedro) (source:
http://www.sismologia.cl/seismo.html).

events more severe than the design level earthquake, preventing NCh433 (60 m = 15 storeys × 4 m), but static analysis in NBCC
fire, explosions and leakage of hazardous materials, protecting cannot be used for torsion-sensitive structures, regardless of their
the environment, and providing access routes for evacuation; and height.
(2) to ensure continuity of industrial operations by maintaining In the equivalent static force procedure in NCh2369, the design
essential services, minimizing downtime periods, and easing in- base shear force, Q0, is given by
spection and repair of damage. Life safety objectives can be
achieved by ensuring either ductile or elastic response, using stat- [1] Q0 ⫽ C I P
ically indeterminate (redundant) structures, and avoiding highly
irregular and complex structures. Operational objectives can be
achieved by limiting inelastic excursions in the structure, ensur- where
ing that anticipated damage will be visible and easily accessible,

共 兲(
2.75 A0 T
0.25 A0
n
and requiring high-quality safety equipment. As shown in Table 1, 0.05 0.4

structure categories and associated importance factors, I, are also

defined that depend on the use and potential hazard of the
structure.
Minimum seismic loads and method of analysis
The equivalent static force method is permitted in NCh2369
only for structures up to 20 m in height or structures that behave
like single-degree-of-freedom systems. The 20 m height limit cor-
responds to the limit specified in the 2010 NBCC (NRCC 2010) for
structures that have Type 1 (vertical stiffness), 2 (mass), 3 (in-plane
offset), 4 (vertical offset), 5 (offset), 6 (weak-storey) or 8 (non-
orthogonal systems) irregularities. However, the height limit in
NBCC 2010 is 60 m for regular structures, similar to that in
[2] C⫽
gR T∗ ␰ ) ≥
g
≤ Cmax
and C is the seismic coefficient, P is the building weight, A0 is the
peak horizontal acceleration, g is the acceleration due to gravity,
R is the structural response modification factor, T= and n are pa-
rameters that depend on the type of soil, and T* and ␰ are respec-
tively the fundamental period and damping ratio of the structure.
The importance factor depends on the structure category, as de-
scribed in Table 1. The peak acceleration A0 is 0.2g, 0.3g, and 0.4g
for seismic zones 1, 2, and 3, respectively. These three zones are
generally oriented parallel to the Pacific coast with zone 3 being
the closest to the ocean and zone 1 the farthest inland. The pre-

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Tremblay et al. 737

Table 1. Structure categories in NCh2369.

Category Description I
C1 Critical construction, which includes: vital facilities used for the control of fires, explosions or environmental disasters, and 1.20
for immediate health assistance; hazardous facilities posing risk of fire, explosion or contamination of air or water; and
essential facilities which, in case of failure, may result in long interruption and severe losses of production.
C2 Normal construction, which houses minor equipment that can be easily repaired without long interruptions and 1.0
significant losses of production, and that are not susceptible to endanger structures of Category I.
C3 Construction with minor or temporary equipment which, in case of failure, will not cause long interruptions nor 0.8
endanger Category C1 or C2 structures.

scribed accelerations have a probability of exceedance of 10% in

50 years. Table 2 gives R values for different structural systems.
The range (1 to 5) is the same as the range of Rd values in NBCC Table 2. Response modification factor R in NCh2369.
2010 (NRCC 2010) but the values are generally lower than those R
specified for the same systems in NCh433. For instance, the value
assigned to steel or reinforced concrete moment resisting frames, Steel structures
reinforced concrete shear walls and steel braced frames is 7 in Ductile frames separated from non-structural elements 5
NCh433 but limited to 5 in NCh2369. NCh2369 limits R to 3 for Ductile frames not separated from non-structural elements 3
isostatic (non-redundant) steel and reinforced concrete structures. Braced frames with ductile anchors 5
Single-storey buildings, with or without crane girders, 5
As shown in Table 3, NCh2369 recognizes that industrial struc-
with continuous roof diaphragm
tures may possess lower inherent damping due to the absence of
Single-storey buildings, without crane girders and 3
wall cladding, partitions, etc. compared to the 5% value assumed
continuous roof diaphragm
in the design spectrum. The ␰ factor accounts for the effect of
Isostatic structures (no redundancy) 3
damping in eq. [2], increasing the seismic design forces by 23% or Plate or shell structures with behaviour controlled 3
44% when the damping ratio is reduced from 5% to 3% or 2%, by local buckling
respectively. Reinforced concrete structures
The building period, T* in eq. [2] is obtained from analysis or an Ductile frames separated from non-structural elements 5
empirical formula but contrary to NBCC 2010 (NRCC 2010) no Ductile frames not separated from non-structural elements 3
upper limit is prescribed. An upper limit of C, Cmax, applies for Shear walls 5
short-period structures while a lower limit 0.25A0/g governs for Single-storey buildings, with or without crane girders, 5
long-period structures. The latter is 50% higher than the corre- with continuous roof diaphragm
sponding minimum value specified in NCh433. Values of Cmax are Single-storey buildings, without crane girders and 3
specified in NCh2369 as a function of the seismic zone, R factor, continuous roof diaphragm
and damping ratio, ␰; these values are based on observations and Isostatic structures (no redundancy) 3
experience in five large earthquakes that occurred between 1960 Precast concrete structures
and 1985. Values of T= and n depend on the type of soil. The influ- Gravity only load system (R factor used to factor 5
ence of these parameters is shown in Fig. 2. For intermediate displacements)
ductility and damping values (R = 4 and ␰ = 0.03), Fig. 2a shows that Structures with cast-in-place connections separated 5
the upper and lower limits on Q0 are equal to 0.68 and 0.25 A0P/g, from non-structural elements
respectively. The site type has a significant impact on the length of Structures with cast-in-place connections not separated 3
the plateau at short periods and, thereby, on the Q0 value for the from non-structural elements
intermediate period range. Figures 2b and 2c show that the R Structures with bolted, welded, or embedded bar connections, 4
factor and the damping ratios affect both short and intermediate- separated or not separated from non-structural elements
period structures. Isostatic structures (no redundancy) 3
When modal response spectrum (dynamic) analysis is used, the Masonry structures
parameter C from eq. [1] is multiplied by I and g to form the design Reinforced masonry with all voids grouted 4
spectrum, Sa, and the period T* is taken as the period in the mode Reinforced masonry without void grouting 3
Confined masonry 4
considered. The Cmax value applies but the minimum value corre-
Tanks, reservoirs, chimneys, and silos, and hoppers
sponding to 0.25A0/g is not applied when determining modal con-
Chimneys, silos, and hoppers with walls extending to ground 3
tributions. However, member forces and drifts from dynamic Silos, hoppers, and tanks supported on columns, 4
analysis must be multiplied by the ratio Qmin/Q0 when the base with or without diagonal bracing
shear from analysis, Q0, is less than Qmin = 0.25A0IP/g. Vertical steel tanks with walls extending to ground 4
Both static and dynamic methods of analyses can be performed Vertical reinforced concrete tanks with walls 3
independently in each orthogonal direction. For structures that extending to ground
exhibit torsional irregularities or columns that form part of two Tanks and pipes made of composite materials 3
intersecting moment resisting frames, earthquake effects along (FRP, GFRP, HDPE, etc.)
both orthogonal directions are combined using the 100% + 30% Horizontal bins or tanks supported on frames with 4
rule as described in NBCC. It is noted that NCh2369 does not provide ductile anchors
definitions for torsional and other structural irregularities. Towers, pipes and equipment
Process towers, electrical cabinets supported on ground 3
Lateral deflections Wood or plastic cooling towers, storage racks 4
Lateral deflections from both seismic analysis methods must be Steel pipes, except their connections 5
multiplied by R1 to account for inelastic response, where R1 = Rack structures 4
R(Q0/Qmin) with 0.5 <R1/R < 1.0. The resulting lateral deformations Other structures not defined above 2
must not exceed values that can damage piping or electrical sys- Structures designed to remain elastic 1
tems. Drifts must also be limited to: 0.2% for precast concrete wall

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738 Can. J. Civ. Eng. Vol. 40, 2013

Table 3. Damping ratios ␰ in NCh2369. Fig. 2. Normalized base shear forces as a function of the building
period and: (a) site type; (b) R factor; and (c) damping ratio ␰. Notes:
Damping
site types I, II, III, and IV respectively correspond to rock, very dense
Seismic force resisting system ratio
soils, stiff soil, and soft soil; values for I, R, and ␰ are given in
Welded steel shells, chimneys, silos, hoppers, 0.02 Tables 1, 2 and 3 values, respectively.
pressure tanks, process towers, pipes, etc.
Steel shells — bolted or riveted 0.03
Welded steel frame with or without bracing 0.02
Steel frame with pinned base connections, 0.03
with or without bracing
Reinforced concrete and masonry structures 0.05
Precast reinforced concrete gravitational frame 0.05
Precast reinforced concrete with connection to 0.05
non-structural elements that are included
in the structural model
Precast reinforced concrete with joints with to 0.03
non-structural elements
Precast reinforced concrete with joints and no joints:
With bolted and grouted embedded bar connections 0.03
With welded connections 0.02
Other structures 0.02

structures with no cast-in-place connections; 0.3% for masonry

wall structures with partitions not separated from the structure;
0.75% for un-braced frames with in-filled masonry walls separated
from the structure; and 1.5% for other structures. These limits are
generally more stringent than those prescribed in NBCC 2010
(NRCC 2010).

Vertical accelerations
Vertical acceleration effects must be considered for the follow-
ing cases:
1. bars and rods supporting hanging equipment, including their
supports, and steel beams in seismic zone 3 when the specified
dead load represents more than 75% of the total specified dead
and live loads;
2. prestressed concrete structures;
3. foundations, anchors, and bearings for structures and equip-
ment;
4. structures that can be affected by vertical seismic motion such
as cantilevered structures; and
5. seismically isolated structures sensitive to vertical effects.
These effects can be treated as static forces equal to ±A0IP/g for
cases 1 and 2 or 2/3 this value for cases 3 and 4. Alternatively,
modal response spectrum analysis can be performed for cases 1–4
using the design spectral acceleration, with R = 3 and ␰ = 0.03, thus
implicitly assuming inelastic vertical response. Vertical and hori-
zontal acceleration effects need not be considered simultane- rails; attachment of masonry walls to structures; details for move-
ously. Special requirements apply to seismically isolated able crane equipment including counterweight and self-centering
structures (case 5), including compliance with the design standard wheel-rail details; moment-resisting frame connections; and ver-
for base isolated buildings (INN 2003b). tical and lateral supports for heavy suspended equipment. Several
Special requirements and details of these components were found critical during the 2010 Chile
The NCh2369 standard contains special requirements for non- earthquake, as described below.
structural components, steel structures, reinforced concrete
Silos, tanks, and bins
structures, foundations, and special structures. For non-structural
components, the determination of the seismic design forces takes Concrete silos and tanks
into consideration the respective periods of the component and Figure 3a shows a large concrete silo at a cement plant near
the structure. Special requirements for moment-resisting and Teño. Its base is stiffened around the truck openings by large thick
braced steel frames are based on AISC (1999) . For example, the rectangular concrete walls. The silo is supported by a large mat
storey shear in braced frames must be shared between tension foundation. Only minor inclined cracking (0.1 mm maximum
and compression braces and the design force for the connections width) was observed on the silo walls and very minor settlement
must be equal to 100% of the tensile yield strength of the braces. of the mat foundation was observed. Figure 3b shows a smaller
A distinctive feature of NCh2369 is that it provides useful con- silo at the same site without stiffening around the base openings.
cepts and details for designers of industrial facilities, including: Inclined 0.2 mm wide cracks can be seen on the sides of the
column base details for yielding of the anchor rods and shear openings, and flexural cracking was observed on the opposite
transfer; seismic restraint details for overhead crane wheels on face, near the base of the silo. The performance of these two

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Tremblay et al.
Fig. 3. Reinforced concrete silos in cement plant near Teño: (a) large silo with stiffened base around openings; (b) small reinforced concrete
silo with unstiffened openings exhibiting shear cracks adjacent to the opening.
different silos illustrates the benefits of adding stiffness and
strength around large base openings.
A 34 m tall reinforced concrete grain silo part of a set of
12 similar silos failed during the earthquake (Fig. 4a). As shown in
Figs. 4b and 4c, collapse occurred due to flexure-shear failure prob-
ably initiated by crushing of the concrete at the transition be-
tween the thinner and the thicker walls at a location 3.2 m from
the base of the silo (see Fig. 4d). That transition is also located at
the elevation where interior walls end abruptly in the silo, mak-
ing the discontinuity even more severe. Other factors that may
have contributed to the failure were the relatively low strength
concrete (specified compressive strength of 22 MPa) together with
the fact that the concrete was of poor quality as voids could be
easily observed on the outer face of the undamaged silos.
The silos were built in the early 1970s. The 150 mm thick exte-
rior walls had two layers of horizontal and vertical reinforcement
resulting in reinforcement ratios of 0.0052 and 0.0026, respec-
tively. For the 400 mm thicker exterior wall at the base, the rein-
forcement ratios were 0.002 and 0.0026 for the horizontal and
vertical directions, respectively. ACI Committee 313 (ACI 1997)
requires a minimum ratio of horizontal reinforcement of 0.0025
and a minimum ratio of vertical reinforcement of 0.002. The draw-
ings indicate that the horizontal hoop reinforcement was tied
through the thickness using crossties at a large spacing but the
vertical reinforcement, which was outermost, was not tied. It is
noted that if any significant ductility is being relied upon in the
design, the details of the reinforcement must be such that vertical
bar buckling does not occur.
For pressure loading of silos, ACI Committee 313 (AIC 1997)
requires that as a minimum the horizontal reinforcement inter-
rupted by an opening must be replaced by adding 1.2 times the
area of the interrupted reinforcement, one half below the open-
ing and one half above the opening. In addition, added vertical
reinforcement should be placed in narrow strips on either side of
the opening with a width of 4 times the wall thickness. The
amount of reinforcement on each side of the opening is equal to
half the interrupted reinforcement. Similar provisions are given
for non-pressured zones except that for horizontal reinforcement
the 1.2 factor becomes 1.0. No guidance is provided by ACI for the
seismic design of silos. It is essential to account for discontinui-
ties, abrupt changes in wall thickness, and the presence of signif-
icant openings near the base. This major discontinuity together
with the lack of additional wall reinforcement around the open-
ing, as required by ACI Committee 313, were major contributing
factors to the collapse.
Link beams interconnecting the columns in an old elevated
reinforced concrete water tank in Teño experienced shear failures
(see Fig. 5). These beams lacked shear reinforcement and the top
and bottom haunches at their ends reduced the clear spans result-
739
ing in higher shear forces due to flexural yielding of the beams.
Failure of the link beams increased the slenderness ratio of the
columns significantly, necessitating repair and retrofit to resist
future earthquakes.
Many elevated steel water tanks were inspected. Some, as
shown in Fig. 6 experienced no or relatively minor damage such as
the local bending of the tower leg base plate due to uplift (see Figs.
6b). A similar tower South of Concepción collapsed as a result of a
member buckling and failures of connections. Several collapsed
light gauge steel grain silos were observed in the epicentral re-
gion.
Conveyor systems
Damage and collapse of a portion of an elevated conveyor sys-
tem servicing three main steel silos was observed (see Fig. 7).
There is evidence that the longitudinal movement of the conveyor
structure led to collapse of the missing span shown in Fig. 7a. In
particular, the knee bracing imposed localized lateral loads to the
brace at the column junction, creating plastic hinging in the col-
umns, as can be seen in Fig. 7b and shown schematically in Fig. 7c.
This detail resulted in the failure of the supporting columns at the
end of the conveyer system. In the NCh2369 standard, as is the
case in the CSA S16-09 (CSA 2009) steel design standard in Canada,
K bracing where braces intersect columns between floors is not
permitted in steel braced frames in view of the detrimental effect
of the unbalanced horizontal forces acting on the columns after
the compression braces have buckled. As shown in this example,
a similar force scenario exists in the knee bracing and this unde-
sirable situation should be explicitly addressed in design stan-
dards.
Special process structures
Steel mill
Several types of failure occurred at a steel mill in Talcahuano.
This plant started its operations in the 1950s and is one of the
main steel-production facilities in Chile. The plant was shut down
after the earthquake and operations had not been resumed at the
time of the visit (9 April 2010).
Figure 8 shows a blast-furnace bin that collapsed during the
earthquake. The bin was supported by steel I-shaped column legs,
butt welded to the columns framing the vertical walls of the bin.
The bin collapsed as a result of yielding, local buckling and weld
failure of the column connection just above the column legs (Figs.
8a and 8b). At the time of the earthquake, two of the five compart-
ments of the bin located at one end were filled while the others
were empty, causing torsional loading on the bin structure.
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740 Can. J. Civ. Eng. Vol. 40, 2013

Fig. 4. Shear failure of concrete silo: (a) overall view (5th silo on the foreground has collapsed and has been demolished); (b) and (c) cracks at
the base of the silo before demolition; (d) silo cross section along the elevation.

Fig. 5. Shear failure of beams interconnecting columns supporting an elevated water tank: (a) overall view; (b) shear failure of beams.

Pulp mill
Several examples of distress and failures were observed in a
pulp mill near Auroco, South of Concepción. The plant was
built in the early 1990s and has a capacity of 800 000 tonnes/
year. Buckling with large plastic deformations occurred at the
base of a steel concentrator tower, at the location of an opening
for a connecting pipe, resulting in significant rotation at its
base (see Fig. 9).
Figure 10a shows the 50 m tall recovery boiler building that
was severely damaged, resulting in the shut-down of a pulp
production line. The 3800 tonne recovery boiler is suspended
by a large number of 50 mm diameter steel rods from a girder–
beam framing system (Fig. 10b). The girders and beams are
built-up shapes with stiffened webs approximately 3 m deep.
The shear failure exhibited web buckling (Fig. 10c), yielding of
the tension field and shearing of the bolts connecting the web
to the columns (Fig. 10d); however, the structure was still capa-
ble of supporting the boiler in this damaged condition. As
shown in Fig. 10e, the tension field developing in the secondary
beam locally pulled the web and top flange region of the pri-
mary girder inward and downward (Fig. 10f). The design of these
girders and beams is typically governed by stringent deflection
limits and, hence, the flexural capacity of the beam exceeded
its shear capacity. The exceptionally high vertical ground accel-
erations (about 0.6g), likely further amplified by the vertical
dynamic response of the structure, probably contributed to the
failure. NCh2369 would require these effects to be explicitly
considered in the design of new structures. Shear failure of the
supporting girders caused a marked downward vertical move-
ment of approximately 500 mm, resulting in relative move-

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Tremblay et al.
Fig. 6. Elevated steel water tanks: (a) overall view of a lightly damage tower; (b) bending of base plate due to uplift.
Fig. 7. Failure of a silo conveyor steel structure: (a) overall view; (b) damage to steel columns imposed by knee braces; (c) plastic mechanism
with hinging in columns.
Fig. 8. Failure of a steel bin next to the blast furnaces (temporary
lateral supports and shoring can be seen on the figure): (a) overall
view showing bin lateral displacement; (b) bending and failure of
the steel legs, with local buckling and weld failure at the splice
connection at the upper end of the steel legs (temporary vertical
support in green).
ments and damage to the lateral restraining system for the
recovery boiler. The lateral restrainers were detailed to allow
the boiler to move vertically relative to the building structure,
as specified in NCh2369, and the boiler and the structure there-
fore suffered only minor damage at the locations of these re-
strainers. The repair work to the boiler facility was completed
approximately one year after the earthquake.
741
Fig. 9. Failure of a concentrator by local buckling and plastic
deformations at location of pipe opening near tower base.
Anchorage systems
There were numerous examples of well detailed anchorage sys-
tems as well as several examples of anchorage systems that failed
or suffered significant damage. Figure 11a shows a typical detail of
anchors that were designed to undergo inelastic deformations
under uplift forces. In the case shown, the anchor rods elongated
by a length equal to about the rod diameter (see insert). This
elongation resulted from the deformation in the exposed length
as well as from slippage of the anchor in the concrete base. As a
temporary measure after the earthquake, the nuts were retight-
ened to secure the tank to its foundation.
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742 Can. J. Civ. Eng. Vol. 40, 2013

Fig. 10. Failure of the supporting structure of a recovery boiler: (a) structure exterior view; (b) and (c) shear failure of girders through tension
field action; (d) failure of bolted end connection due to tension field action; (e) shear failure of a secondary beam through tension field action;
and (f) lateral deformation of the upper part of a supporting girder due to tension field action in the secondary beam in (e).

In some cases, anchor rods ruptured due to excessive uplift
forces as is evident from the necking of the broken rods that
were removed as shown in Fig. 11b. These rods had been care-
fully machined to reduce the section below the threaded por-
tion to avoid failure in the threads. Furthermore, they had also
been greased to prevent bonding to the concrete over a pre-
scribed length to allow plastic deformations to spread along
the unbonded length. These rods anchored a tank with a high
aspect ratio (overall height to diameter) that was subjected to
significant overturning moments.
To permit inspection and repair following a significant event,
NCh2369 requires that the anchor detail shall have an exposed
anchor length of 250 mm, but not less than 8 times the diam-
eter of the anchor rod (see Fig. 12a). The minimum length-to-
diameter ratio requirement also provides ductility. This code
also requires that the ratio of the ultimate stress to the yield
stress of the anchors must not be less than 1.3 for threaded
connections to achieve ductile response, unless the diameter of
the shank is reduced to ensure yielding and prevent brittle
fracture at the threads. In addition, there must be a minimum

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Tremblay et al. 743

Fig. 11. (a) Stretched anchor rods at the base of steel tanks (insert: detail of the elongation of anchor rod); (b) detail of the ruptured machined
and greased segments of anchor rods used at the base of a steel tank with a high aspect ratio.

Fig. 12. Column base details proposed to accommodate stretching

of anchor rods with: (a) anchor chair and exposed stretch length as
prescribed in NCh2369; (b) anchor sleeves as recommended in ACI Fig. 13. Damage at the base of tubular braced supporting structure:
(2011). (a) overall view; (b) large rotation and elongation of anchor rods; and
(c) large horizontal displacements and rupture of anchor rods.

length of 75 mm of thread left under the nut, allowing the

anchors to be retightened immediately after a seismic event. As
shown in Fig. 11a, these details were effective in providing rapid
repair after the 2010 event. In Fig. 11b, when the anchor rods did
not have an exposed portion above the connections, a
debonded stretch length was provided by greasing the ma-
chined length of the anchor rods in the concrete to achieve
similar inelastic deformations.
The 2009 update to Appendix D of CSA A23.3 (CSA 2004) pro-
vides seismic design requirements to achieve a ductile steel ele-
ment for the anchor rods based on the 2005 ACI-318 code (ACI
2005). These requirements distinguish between ductile limit
states in steel elements and concrete failure modes. The American
Concrete Institute (ACI 2011) recently introduced additional re-
quirements for anchors that require a stretch length of at least
8 anchor diameters, which could be achieved using an exposed
stretch length, as illustrated in Fig. 12a, or in an unbonded sleeve
(Fig. 12b). It is also specified that if the steel ductile element is not
threaded over its entire length, then the ultimate stress of the steel
must exceed 1.25 its yield strength to ensure that yielding occurs in
the gross section. These details are consistent with current design
and construction provisions of NCh2369. The 2011 ACI code also
introduced requirements for the design of adhesive anchors.
While the connection is typically designed to promote yielding
in the superstructure (e.g., columns in building frames), this may
not be applicable or practical for some tanks or heavy equipment
for which the ductility is derived from the plastic elongation ca-
pacity of the anchor rods. Therefore the stretch length needs to be

Published by NRC Research Press

744
Fig. 14. Repair of a damaged existing anchor system.
Fig. 15. Retrofit of an existing anchor system to increase its strength and stiffness.
carefully designed such that the deformation capacity of the rod
exceeds the anticipated inelastic deformation demand deter-
mined from the design seismic loads and the height to diameter
ratio of the tank or aspect ratio of the equipment. Although the
anchor rods with machined stretch lengths of about 500 mm in
Fig. 11b exceeded the minimum 250 mm and 8 diameter length
requirements, failure occurred. This demonstrates the need for
such a design procedure accounting for the expected elongation
demand on the anchor rods.
NCh2369 also requires that a shear stop be provided to take
100% of the shear at column bases, as shown in Fig. 12a, unless the
interaction of shear and tension is accounted for in the design of
the rods. Figure 13 shows an example of rupture of anchor rods
subjected to combined tension and shear. Two base plates were
provided at the bases of each column in a tubular steel braced
frame. The bottom base plate had a spherical seat that fitted into
a matching recess underneath the upper base plate, allowing
multi-directional rotation at the column bases. As shown, the
large rotation ruptured the anchor rods that were preventing
uplift, resulting in lift-off of the upper base plate and subsequent
sliding. In this case, the lack of stretch length for the anchor rods
likely contributed to the observed failure. Additional inelastic
deformation may also have been imposed due to vertical acceler-
ations. NCh2369 does not require simultaneous vertical and hor-
izontal acceleration effects to be considered in design, which may
underestimate the demand on the anchor rods.
Figure 14 shows one of the retrofit strategies that was adopted
to increase the strength and stiffness of anchorage systems. A
heavily stiffened steel bracket, designed to bear directly on top of
the original anchor system, was welded to the steel tank (Fig. 14b).
Can. J. Civ. Eng. Vol. 40, 2013
The added bracket permits the addition of two new anchor rods to
increase the uplift capacity. The existing anchor rod shown in the
centre of Fig. 14a experienced inelastic deformations and area
reduction at the threads and the existing rod at the upper right
hand of the figure had ruptured at the threads. Although in this
case the new anchor rods did not seem to have a stretch length,
this retrofit scheme would increase the strength of the anchorage
for damaged or deficient anchor rods.
The tank shown in Fig. 15a had been heavily reinforced and
stiffened with vertical steel shapes and horizontal steel bands
acting as hoops. The reinforcement around openings was care-
fully designed for overturning to permit the flow of tension forces
to the base. At the base of the tank, the original and added anchor-
age systems can be seen in Fig. 15b. For the added system, each
vertical leg was carefully detailed with pairs of anchor rods with
longer exposed lengths, while maintaining the original anchor
rod system. No damage was observed in this structure.
Figure 16a shows the special detailing used at the base of a
non-metallic fibre-reinforced tank for which welding of anchor-
age devices was not possible. The tank had a thickened fibre-
reinforced band at its base to provide a seat for the tension anchor
devices, together with shear brackets that prevented horizontal
movement. No damage was observed, indicating that the combi-
nation of the two independent anchorage systems provided ade-
quate anchorage.
Figure 16b shows the base of a column of a steel braced frame
supporting a tank that experienced severe damage and large
lateral movements relative to the base plate. The column was
cut and a new base plate with stiffeners was welded to the
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Tremblay et al. 745

Fig. 16. (a) Addition of a base plate and stiffeners required to reuse anchor rods for the repair of the base connection of a steel column;
(b) special anchorage system at the base of a fibre-reinforced tank.

Fig. 17. Damage to the lateral restraining system at the base of a tank in a cement plant: (a) damage to steel restraining column placed next
to the load cell weighing system; (b) temporary retrofit using vertical channel sections.

Fig. 18. Foundation and base anchor for a transmission tower: (a) tie beams spanning between the column legs; (b) column base detail
allowing stretching of the anchor rods.

Fig. 19. Examples of buckled bracing members: (a) single angle brace; (b) starred angle braces (out-of-plane buckling); and (c) I-shape brace
(in-plane buckling).

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746 Can. J. Civ. Eng. Vol. 40, 2013

Fig. 20. Damage to a steel braced frame building: (a) overall view showing in-plane buckling of a large size single I-shaped bracing
member in the side wall (arrow points to the buckled brace); (b) close-up of local buckling in plastic hinge at brace mid-length;
(c) in-plane buckling of the single bracing member on the opposite side of the building (arrow points to the buckled brace); (d) and
(e) detail of tension failure of brace connections in the end wall in a brace in compression (d) and in a brace in tension (e);
(f) schematic of the brace connection detail showing failure planes in tension and shear; (g) overall view of end wall showing
bending of columns after brace connection failure and plastic hinges at column bases; and (h) detail of plastic hinging at the base
of a column.

existing column to permit the reuse of the existing undamaged
anchor rods.
Damage occurred to various types of equipment support sys-
tems. Figure 17 shows the failure of the lateral support at the base
of a tank in a cement plant. The support system included a vertical
load cell to weigh the tank contents and a vertical I-shaped steel
column to limit its lateral movement. The steel column experi-
enced yielding (Fig. 17a) and loss of anchorage to the concrete floor
(Fig. 17b). A temporary repair using a steel channel section bolted
to the floor and welded to the tank was adopted (Fig. 17b).
Failure of bolts, anchoring vertical insulators, in an electrical
substation was observed. These failures were similar to failures
that occurred during the 1988 Saguenay earthquake (Pierre 1989),
indicating the need to properly secure or isolate key electrical

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Tremblay et al.
components. Figure 18 shows the foundation of a recently con-
structed transmission tower designed with perimeter tie beams
connecting all four tower legs. The base anchorage, which was
detailed to provide shear resistance as well as yielding in tension
of the anchor rods over their exposed length, was not damaged
during the earthquake.
Performance of buildings
Steel braced frames
Steel braced frames were extensively used in the industrial fa-
cilities visited. Buckling of braces in compression was observed in
many instances, as illustrated in Fig. 19 for three different bracing
members. For the single angle brace of Fig. 19a, buckling occurred
about the minor axis, inducing local buckling in both legs.
Figure 20 shows photographs of a damaged steel concentrically
braced frame building. In-plane global and local buckling of a
large size I-shape single diagonal bracing member in the building
side wall is shown in Figs. 20a and 20b. Similar response was
observed in the bracing line resisting lateral loads along the same
axis on the opposite side of the building (Fig. 20c). In this case,
with the two braces resisting lateral loads in the second storey
inclined in the same direction, the lateral deformations progres-
sively built up in the direction inducing compression in the
braces. This behaviour is expected due to the inherent difference
in the brace tension and compression capacities and the degrada-
tion of the buckling resistance with cycling. This also resulted in a
lower tension demand on the braces and their connections. For
Types MD (moderately ductile) and LD (limited ductility) concen-
trically braced frames in CSA S16 (CSA 2009), tension braces with
comparable resistances must be provided in both directions in
braced bents at every level to mitigate this undesirable response.
In the structures investigated, there were no observed brace fail-
ures in the brace plastic hinge regions; however, several examples
of brace connection failures were observed. For the same struc-
ture shown in Fig. 20a, connections of braces in the other direc-
tion failed. As shown in Figs. 20d to 20f the two flanges of the
braces were bolted to side plates that were welded to transfer
plates which, in turn, were welded to the gusset plates. Failure of
the connections occurred in tension due to tearing of the transfer
plates in tension and shear that connected the brace flange plates
to the gusset plates (Figs. 20d to 20f). The failed connections were
still able to carry loads in compression through bearing, but re-
sponse in subsequent cycles caused impact damage to the col-
umns, as shown in Figs. 20d and 20e. These connection failures
caused large lateral displacements of the storey just above the
concrete bin (see Fig. 20g) causing severe bending of the corner
column that was continuous over the structure height (Fig. 20g).
In Fig. 20h, significant plastic hinging and local buckling are evi-
dent at the base of the columns supported on the concrete bin due
to the deformations imposed at that level. The excellent base
column details allowed for the development of the plastic mo-
ment capacity of the columns together with transmitting axial
forces and shears.
Figures 21 and 22 show examples of brace connection failures
and consequences of these failures in the same industrial facility.
In the building shown in Fig. 21a, the connection failure took
place at a brace connection at the top of the first storey (Fig. 21b),
resulting in excessive deformations that imposed large bending
demand in the continuous columns of the structure. The ability of
the continuous columns to resist weak-axis bending moments,
not intended originally in design, probably saved the structure
from collapse. As a temporary measure, external braces were
added after the earthquake to provide stability to the structure
(see Fig. 21a).
The effects of pounding from the pipe supporting bridge struc-
ture, that frames into a four-storey braced frame structure, are
illustrated in Fig. 22. The combined effects of the brace connec-
747
Fig. 21. Severely damaged multi-level steel braced structure:
(a) large first-level drift due to brace connection failure; (b) failure of
brace connection at top of first level (arrows point to failed gusset
plate and brace ends).
tion failure in the structure on the left-hand side, below the level
of the bridge bottom chord, and pounding resulted in severe dis-
tortion of the building column at the bridge top chord level
(Fig. 22b).
Other examples of failures observed in steel-framed industrial
buildings include failure of welds in brace connections (Fig. 23)
and buckling of gusset plates in brace connections (Fig. 24). In the
1995 Kobe earthquake, there were examples of similar buckling of
gusset plates that, in several cases, resulted in tearing and fracture
of the gusset plates (Tremblay et al. 1996). It has since been re-
quired in CSA S16-09 that gusset plates be provided with sufficient
resistance to develop the probable compressive strength of
braces. Limited guidance is provided, however, on achieving this
objective for connecting plates at the intersection of X-braced
members or when braces frame on only one side of the gusset
plates introducing eccentricity in the connections.
Reinforced concrete structures
A column of a collapse reinforced concrete industrial structure,
designed in 1965, is shown in Fig. 25a. The structure consisted of a
series of reinforced concrete portal frames spanning 24.7 m
centre-to-centre of columns and spaced at 9.15 m. The columns
had cross-sectional dimensions of 800 mm × 800 mm at the foun-
dation level, tapering to 800 mm × 400 mm at a height 2.2 m above
the foundation. Above this level a constant cross section of
800 mm × 400 mm was used. The 36 mm diameter vertical bars in
the lower tapered portion were lap spliced with 26 mm diameter
vertical bars just above the top of the tapered section. Shear fail-
ures occurred in several columns in this critical lap splice region
(see Fig. 25b), which led to collapse of the entire structure. The
failure region after demolition of the structure is shown in Fig. 25c
at a location just above the top of the tapered portion. The trans-
verse reinforcement consisted of 8 mm diameter column ties at a
spacing of 400 mm. These tie reinforcement details do not even
satisfy the details required for conventional construction in the
2004 CSA Standard A23.3 (CSA 2004) because the tie diameter is
not large enough to restrain the large diameter vertical bars and
the spacing between laterally tied vertical bars exceeded 150 mm.
The seismic design provisions of CSA A23.3 would require even
more stringent details. The change in cross section at the top of
the tapered region contained lap splices and had inadequate con-
finement and shear reinforcement that contributed to the shear
failure at this critical section.
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748
Fig. 22. Damage to a steel braced frame due to pounding: (a) overall view showing the pipe supporting bridge structure; (b) brace connection
failure and damage in column.
Fig. 23. Failure of welds in connections between tubular brace and
column in structure shown in Fig. 13.
Fig. 24. Buckling of gusset plates in braced frame connections at
brace ends.
Conclusions
The damage caused to industrial facilities by the 2010 M8.8
Chile earthquake has been described and the current standard
NCh2369 for the seismic design of industrial facilities in Chile has
been reviewed. Industrial activities play a key role in the economy
and industrial structures have special features that pose a poten-
tial seismic risk and hence require special design and detailing
provisions that differ from standard building structures. The dam-
age observed after this 2010 Chile earthquake and the experience
gained by Chilean engineers in previous earthquakes, as reflected
in the NCh2369 standard, indicate the need to develop specific
design provisions for industrial facilities in Canada. From this
Can. J. Civ. Eng. Vol. 40, 2013
survey, the development of such design provisions should ac-
count for:
• Specific characteristics of industrial facilities that may affect
their seismic response such as periods of vibration, structural
irregularities, effective damping ratios, and frequency content
of the ground motion.
• Consequences such as fires, explosions or environmental disas-
ters resulting from damage sustained by industrial structures
should be considered when determining design criteria and (or)
methods of analysis. Design provisions aiming at reducing
downtime periods should also be developed and implemented.
The capability for retightening yielded anchor rods immedi-
ately after an earthquake is an example of such a measure.
• The performance of all structural and non-structural compo-
nents along production lines, including material handling and
storage equipment and moveable crane systems, as failure
of these components may detrimentally impact the operation
of the facility.
• The deformation capacity of structures (drift limits) or non-
structural components, including piping and electrical systems
that are supported by or attached to structures.
• The necessity to mitigate pounding between structures or be-
tween structures and equipment.
• Vertical accelerations should be accounted for in design, espe-
cially for suspended equipment and anchor rods. The necessity
of considering simultaneous horizontal and vertical accelera-
tions should be examined.
• Interaction between heavy equipment and their supporting
structures.
• Additional stiffness and strength around openings in concrete
silos.
• The significant flexural demand imposed on columns by knee
bracing, which may lead to complete column failure.
• The necessity of designing brace connections for the probable
axial capacity of the bracing members. Guidance is needed to
achieve this objective for gusset plates in compression, espe-
cially when eccentricity is present in the connections, and for
connecting plates at brace intersection points of X-bracing.
• Progressive drifting when the storey shear is resisted by diago-
nal braces oriented in only one direction. This issue is ad-
dressed in current CSA S16-09 seismic provisions.
• Design and detailing rules for column bases and equipment
supports. In particular, the detailing should provide for ductile
yielding of the anchor rods and horizontal shear transfer. For
the former, attention should be given to stretch lengths that
are consistent with the expected elongation demand based on
factors such as the geometry of the structures or connected
elements and the R factor used in design.
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Tremblay et al.
Fig. 25. Shear failure of columns in industrial plant: (a) Collapsed reinforced concrete structure and shear distress in column; (b) Shear
failures of columns; (c) Region of shear failure showing failed lap splice.
Some of the observed failure modes, such as shear failure of
columns or failure of brace connections, may lead to partial or
complete collapse of structures and pose a serious hazard to build-
ing occupants in case of a severe earthquake. These failures are
typically due to lack of proper seismic design provisions at the
time of construction and similar situations are likely to be present
in industrial structures built in Canada prior to the implementa-
tion of seismic design requirements. There is a need to develop
and implement effective retrofit strategies to improve the seismic
performance of existing seismically deficient structures.
Acknowledgements
The authors gratefully acknowledge the expert guidance and
invaluable assistance provided by Julián Aránguiz Burgos of
Macro Steel Project, Concepción, Chile, during the site visits to the
industrial facilities in Concepción and surrounding areas. Jaime
Alegria of Hatch Ingenieros y Consultores Ltda, Santiago, Chile,
also contributed to the organization of the reconnaissance visit.
The input from Mr. Joe Tam, Philip Zeil, and Jack Dosenberg of
AMEC, Vancouver, BC on the design of supporting structures for
recovery boilers is also appreciated. The financial support for the
site visit was provided by the Canadian Seismic Research Network
(CSRN), funded by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research
Council of Canada (NSERC).
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