Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Solution Manual
to accompany
Contemporary Issues in
Accounting
Michaela Rankin, Patricia
Stanton, Susan McGowan,
Kimberly Ferlauto & Matt Tilling
PREPARED BY:
Sue McGowan
CHAPTER 7
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Contemporary issues 7.1 Audit committees put risk management at the
top of their agendas
There is no correct answer here and students may have different views. Points to
make could include:
An essential part of any audit committee, even if focussing primarily on
financial reporting issues, would include an assessment of risk as this would
impact on issues such as going concern, impairment, values in financial
statements etc, so the committee does need to understand the company‘s risk
profile.
Given significance and importance of risk management (and failures
associated with this in the global financial crisis) there is a need to manage and
control risk. It could be argued that given its other functions, that necessarily
require an understanding of this risk, that the audit committee is well placed to
provide such control and oversight.
Alternative views are:
o This could overburden audit committees and impede its effectiveness.
o It could be preferable to have a separate risk committee who can
therefore concentrate on business risk
be interpreted by employees and what actions they will encourage (and discourage). If
compensation structures for example reward risk (for example, focusing on short term
targets and not considering long term impacts) then these would be expected to
increase the companies risk profile.
Students may think of some specific examples:
If a bank pays bonuses on the basis of loans granted but does take into account
the risk associated with the loan (i.e. whether there is likely to be a default by
the customer) this would seem to explicitly encourage granting of loans even
where risk of default is high. (A compensation package to deter this could
either have a ‗claw back‘ provision – so if loan goes ‗bad‘ bonus needs to be
repaid, or have a large part of bonus paid at a later time when the likelihood
of default can be more accurately assessed).
Contemporary issues 7.2 The individual must take responsibility for doing the
right thing
Every organisation has its own unique culture or value set. Most organisations don‘t
consciously try to create a certain culture. The culture of the organisation is typically
created unconsciously, based on the values of the top management or the founders of
an organisation.
However, as noted in the article, it is also important that the code is supported and that
senior company members are committed and also adhere to the code.
For example, in the case of Enron (as noted in the text) the company was perceived to
have ‗best practice‘ in terms of codes of conduct and corporate governance yet in
reality the culture and actual company practices were less than ethical.
Students may find it useful to look at some examples of codes of conduct. It is likely
that their own university will have one. My own university has a code for staff (and
also one for students) that outlines specific issues (such as respect for others, conflicts
of interest, confidentially) but has a final guideline that staff should consider:
2. The article states that it is impossible to legislate for ethics. Do you agree
with this? If this is the case, does this mean regulation is ineffective? (J, K,
AS)
Ethics relates to people and how they behave. If people are to act ethically they need
to first, appreciate their actions and decisions involve ethical choices and second, be
willing and able to then make the ‗right‘ decision.
The fact that crimes are committed, and we have gaols full of prisoners, is clear
evidence that legislation (law) itself does not prevent people from acting
inappropriately.
An alternative view is that legislation can lead to a ‗rules based‘ approach to ethical
behaviour – where the perception is that as long as acts within bounds of legislation
(i.e. to letter of the law) then that behaviour is acceptable.
Review questions
The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities
among the different participants in the organisation — such as the board, managers,
shareholders and other stakeholders — and lays down the rules and procedures for decision-
making. By doing this, it also provides the structure through which the company objectives
are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance.
To have a good corporate governance system ensures that the corporation sets
appropriate objectives, and then puts systems and structures in place to ensure those
objectives which are set are met. It also provides a means for persons both within and
outside the corporation to be able to control and monitor the activities of the
corporation and its management.
With the increasing globalisation of business and competition for capital, companies
that can provide assurances of good corporate governance will have a competitive
edge in the market place and facilitate economic growth.
(a) Traditional — the role of the corporation from a traditional view by Milton
Friedman is that ‗corporate governance is to conduct the business in accordance
with the owner or shareholders‘ desire, which generally will be to make as much
money as possible while conforming to the basic rules of the society embodied
in law and local customs‘.
(b) Pluralist model — the responsibility of corporations goes beyond the narrow
interests of shareholders and should be extended to a wider group of
stakeholders.
practice good corporate governance and these entities would not have ‗traditional‘
shareholders. Students may wish to consider whose interests would be of primary
focus with such entities.
3. What are risks of poor corporate governance and the advantages of good
corporate governance?
Ultimately students should realise that such actions can risk the wealth of
shareholders and other stakeholder groups (such as employees and customers), can
increase costs to the corporation and even put at risk the continuation of the
corporation itself.
4. Explain what is meant by the positive accounting theory and its relationship
to corporate governance.
Positive accounting theory, using as its basis contracting theory, views the firm as a
network of contracts or agreements. These contracts determine the relationships with
and among the various parties involved. A key relationship is the agency contract.
An agency relationship by definition has two key parties:
1. a principal who delegates the authority to make decisions to the other party
2. an agent who is the person given the authority to make decisions on behalf of
the principal.
In this context the agent is the manager and the principals are the shareholders. Whilst
the agent has a duty to act in the interests of the principals there is a common
assumption in economic theory which is, if individuals are rational, they will act in
their own best interests and this can lead to the agent making decisions to maximise
their own wealth, rather than the principals.
Principals are also rational and will expect that the managers will not always act
in the shareholders‘ interests. This leads to three costs associated with this agency
relationship:
• monitoring costs. These are costs incurred by principles to measure, observe and
control the agent‘s behaviour.
• bonding costs. These are restrictions placed on an agent‘s actions deriving from
linking the agent‘s interest to that of the principal
• residual loss. This is the reduction in wealth of principals caused by their
agent‘s non-optimal behaviour.
This theory also identifies ways in which managers can act against shareholders‘
interests known as ‗agency problems‘, and that these problems can be reduced by
linking management‘s rewards to certain conditions. Students should refer to Figure
7.1, page 191, which provides an overview of the shareholder–manager relationship in
agency theory. Chapter 5 also explains in more detail this theory.
Corporate governance involves ensuring that the decisions made by those managing
the corporation are appropriate, and providing a means to monitor corporate activities
and the decision making itself. It is primarily concerned with managing the
relationship between the shareholders, the key managers of the corporation (this is
usually the Board of Directors), other senior managers within the corporation, and
other stakeholders. Many countries have developed suggested (and sometimes
required) lists of rules or descriptions of the types of practices that should be included
in corporate governance systems. However it is generally acknowledged that there is
no ‗one‘ system of corporate governance. The practices and procedures required or
desired will be affected by:
The nature of the particular corporation and its activities. For example, in some
companies there are dominant shareholders whereas in others shareholding may
be more widely spread, and
The text identifies three key areas to be addressed by any corporate governance
system:
1. processes and methods to control and direct the actions of managers of the
corporation to ensure make appropriate decisions
– Specific examples of corporate governance requirements here are minimum
standards of experience for directors; requirements that at least some of
members of board of directors be independent.
Students may also wish to consider how these areas are addressed in the summary of
3 codes of corporate governance in table 7.1).
take into account the specific circumstances of the particular entity (e.g. such as
distribution of shareholders, nature of environment).
8. Explain the problems identified from the global financial crisis in relation
to risk management and how these relate to corporate governance.
A good corporate governance system ensures that the corporation sets appropriate
objectives, and then puts systems and structures in place to ensure those objectives
which are set are met. It also provides a means for persons both within and outside the
corporation to be able to control and monitor the activities of the corporation and its
management. A key role is to protect the interests of stakeholders (including
shareholders). To do this it is essential that risk is understood, monitored and
managed. However, historically most corporate governance models have not
highlighted the importance of risk management.
1. Ultimate oversight and responsibility for risk management lies with the board.
Risks can be wide ranging and as the ASX code states may include ―operational,
environmental, sustainability, compliance, strategic, ethical conduct, reputation or
brand, technological, product or service quality, human capital, financial reporting
and market-related risks‖. Hence it is important that the board considers the overall
strategy. Managing these risks in isolation (at activity level) is not sufficient.
2. Cleary the board needs information about risks the company faces and how these
are managed. Without sufficient information, and understanding of these, the board
cannot perform its duties. It is claimed this was problematic given the complexity
of the financial instruments associated with in the global financial crisis. The ASX
code now recommends that management provide a report to the Board about the
risk management systems implemented and their effectiveness.
3. Every organisation has its own unique culture or value set. Most organisations
don‘t consciously try to create a certain culture. The culture of the organisation is
typically created unconsciously, based on the values of the top management and
influenced by reward systems, management actions attitudes. A culture of growth
needs to be balanced with consideration to the any attentive risks.
9. Explain the problems identified from the global financial crisis in relation
to remuneration and how these relate to corporate governance.
There can be really 2 concerns here. First, often there is a perception that
remuneration to some executives is excessive- how can these people warrant such
huge payments. In good corporate governance directors/executives are supposed to
act in the best interests of shareholders. Yet paying what seems unjustifiable amounts
to themselves could be seen as a conflict of interest. Second, remuneration packages
are supposed to be tied to company performance; this is what the Board and other
executives are responsible for and hence what they are rewarded for. Yet despite poor
If a bank pays bonuses on the basis of loans granted but does take into account
the risk associated with the loan (i.e. whether there is likely to be a default by
the customer) this would seem to explicitly encourage granting of loans even
where risk of default is high. (A compensation package to deter this could
either have a ‗claw back‘ provision – so if loan goes ‗bad‘ bonus needs to be
repaid, or have a large part of bonus paid at a later time when the likelihood of
default can be more accurately assessed).
10. ‘Any corporate governance system is only as good as the people involved
in it’. Discuss.
As the text notes decisions in, and about, corporations are made by people. The
quality of any corporate governance is ultimately affected by the people involved in it.
The following points could be discussed:
Competence — clearly, if individuals do not have the requisite expertise or
experience then this will adversely impact on decisions they make and reduce
the quality of corporate governance.
Integrity (ethics) of individuals. Whether or not individuals will act ethically is
affected by a number of factors. These include:
– the individual‘s own moral code
– the culture of the corporation and of peers. This is particularly important
in relation to top management. In a number of corporations it is argued
that either ethical or unethical behaviour permeates due to the stance taken
by the ‗leaders‘.
– the consequences of the decision. For example, if asked to do something
that is not ‗right‘ by a manager and refusing could impact on
employment/future promotion; how ‗wrong‘ is the decision and will it
have a significant impact on others; what is the likelihood of being caught
and what are the consequences if found to be acting unethically).
Does the quality of individuals become more or less important if you have rules-
based or principles-based corporate governance codes?
Application questions
7.1 Obtain the annual reports of a range of companies in the same industry and
country and search for any disclosures in relation to corporate governance
principles and practices. In relation to these disclosures:
(a) Identify the key areas considered by these companies.
(b) Are there any differences or similarities in corporate governance
practices?
(c) Do you believe you could judge or rank the relative standard of
corporate governance of these companies based on the information
provided? If not, what other information would you need to do so?
(d) Which company would you rank has having the best (or worst)
corporate governance from these disclosures? Explain how you have
arrived at this decision.
(e) Compare your rankings with those of other students. Identify and
discuss the reason for any discrepancies between rankings (J, CT)
No specific answers can be provided as this will depend on the companies considered.
Go online and download a couple of annual reports in the same industry, from 2007 to
2012 and see the differences. Discuss the following in class:
(a) What have you found out about the key areas?
(b) Explain the differences and similarities in class, on your Blackboard or WebCT.
(c) Discuss the judgement you have made.
(d) Did you identify the best and worst cases or corporate governance?
7.2 Obtain the annual reports of a range of companies in the same industry in
different countries and search for any disclosures in relation to corporate
governance principles and practices. In relation to these disclosures:
(a) Identify any differences or similarities in corporate governance
practices.
(b) Can you provide any reasons from the business and regulatory
environments in the countries that would explain these differences? (J,
AS)
No specific answers can be provided as this will depend on the companies considered.
Again go online and download annual reports from various countries to discuss in
class. It may also be useful to consider, identify and compare:
country economic and business environmental factors
any specific corporate governance guidelines or requirements issued for
companies in the specific countries considered, for example by local stock
exchanges, as well as considering enforcement mechanisms.
In class, explain the differences or similarities in corporate governance practices.
The basic principles of corporate governance would appear to apply to all companies,
even smaller and medium-size companies. As discussed in question 1, corporate
governance in very simple terms is ‗the system by which business corporations are
directed and controlled‘ (Cadbury, cited in Cowan, 2004, p. 15.).
To have a good corporate governance system ensures that the corporation sets
appropriate objectives and then puts systems and structures in place to ensure those
objectives which are set are met. It also provides a means for persons both within and
outside the corporation to be able to control and monitor the activities of the
corporation and its management.
The basic principles would apply to all corporations, large or small. Although it could
be argued that the mechanisms to achieve these would vary as these issues become
more critical in larger companies with greater separation, and also in smaller
companies cost efficiencies would need to be more carefully considered.
Students answers here may vary. It is suggested that the same principles apply but the
practices may vary. For example, PCW have produced a toolkit for corporate
governance in small and medium enterprises. This suggests that similar principles (as
per ASX) apply however there may be reason for vary specific practices.
This is link to tool kit http://www.himaa.org.au/Governance/toolkit_print.pdf
These were noted in question 3 above, that risks of poor corporate governance can be
from:
7.4 A friend cannot understand why executives and directors of companies are
often paid bonuses and not simply paid a set salary.
(a) Using principles from positive accounting theory, explain the reasons
for, and nature of, bonus plans offered to directors and executives. (K)
Need to first explain agency theory which is a key principle in positive accounting
theory. An agency relationship by definition has two key parties:
1. a principal who delegates the authority to make decisions to the other party
2. an agent who is the person given the authority to make decisions on behalf of
the principal.
The separation of ownership and control means that managers can act in their own
interests which may be contrary to the interests of shareholders. Managers have
variety of ways of reducing wealth to shareholders for the benefit of themselves.
These problems include risk aversion, dividend retention and horizon. Given these
specific difficulties (the problems discussed below) to alleviate these problems
managers remuneration is not simply paid as salary but by a bonus linked to variables
that try to reduce these problems. The problems are:
i the risk aversion problem — managers prefer less risk than shareholders because
their human capital is tied to the firm. Shareholders are more diversified because
their human capital is not tied to the firm. Managers can reduce their own risk by
investing in low risk investments rather than maximising the value of the firm
through higher risk projects.
A bonus plan that relates managers’ salaries to profit may encourage less risk
aversion.
ii the dividend retention problem — managers prefer to pay out less of the
company‘s earnings in dividends in order to pay for their own salaries and
perquisites (big offices, expensive business trips).
iii the horizon problem—managers are only interested in cash flows for the period
they remain with the firm whilst shareholders have a long term interest in the
firm‘s cash flows.
Principals may relate part of managerial compensation to share prices,
particularly for managers whose tenure is nearing completion.
Bonus schemes can reduce these problems by tying manager‘s remuneration to some
index of the firm‘s performance, which has a high correlation with the value of the
firm (share prices, earnings). This ties managerial compensation to performance.
Remuneration can also be tied to dividend payout ratios or to options or share bonus
schemes
7.5 Obtain the annual report for a listed company and examine the
remuneration packages provided for executives. (J, AS)
Note: these are disclosed in annual reports (or available on the companies web page as
a separate remuneration report) and see how these principles are reflected in the
packages.
A suggested example is the 2010 annual report for AMP — this includes details of the
remuneration package and related benchmarks. You can access this from links from
http://www.amp.com.au/ or the 2011 annual report for Crown Ltd which includes
details of the amounts of potential cash bonuses. You can access this from links from
http://www.crownlimited.com.
Relate the key components of the remuneration packages identified to the three
problems of agency theory identified. These problems include risk aversion, dividend
retention and horizon and are discussed in the answer to 7.4.
(c) How much information is provided about any bonuses paid? Is this
information sufficient to allow shareholders to determine if these
packages are reasonable?
This will depend on the reports that you have found. You will probably find that in
many cases there is limited information (in particular about benchmarks — often
generic information about benchmarks is included rather than specifics). This makes it
difficult for shareholders to consider however there could be legitimate coemptive
reasons for not disclosing this information.
The ASX principles of best practice do not seem to specifically refer to minority
shareholders. However general principles regarding shareholders and
requirements of independent board members may assist. Link to ASX if this
needed is http://www.asx.com.au/governance/corporate-governance.htm
There is no correct answer here. However, should consider issues such as:
Even where codes specifically address issue of minority shareholders how can it
be ensured that rights considered given influence that any dominant
shareholders will have.
Given that investment is choice and minority shareholders would know of
limitations to their power/influence when investing does this justify should
corporate governance be focused on majority concerns.
Students may also wish to go online and download information on Pacific Century
Regional Developments and consider the specific circumstances of the company.
7.7 Each year various bodies give corporate governance awards. Examples are,
in Malaysia, an annual award is made by Malaysian Business, sponsored by
(a) Locate the criteria on which these awards are based and compare these
for different awards.
For example, the Australasian Reporting Awards and criteria for corporate
governance awards states that ―These Awards seek to recognise the quality and
completeness of disclosure and reporting of corporate governance practices in the
annual reports of business entities in the public and private sectors.‖ for private sector
entities states. Review the criteria section at http://www.arawards.com.au/
This will depend on information available. For example, the Australasian Reporting
Awards identifies companies that have been ranked as gold, silver or bronze and
specifies what the differences are in being awarded this rating. So it may be useful to
look at reports for companies in these different rankings to identify any differences.
For example, one difference between gold and silver is that gold requires ‗full‘
disclosure whereas silver requires ‗adequate‘ disclosure.
(d) Does the wining of an award for reporting necessarily mean that these
companies have best corporate governance practices?
7.8 Australian companies listed on the ASX must report on their corporate
governance practices on the basis of ‘comply or explain’. That is, they are
not required to comply with all of the specific corporate governance
practices detailed by the ASX but if they choose not to comply, they must
identify which guidelines have not been ignored and provide a reason for
their lack of compliance. (K, SM)
Examples are in questions 7.9 and 7.10. Students should be able to find own
examples.
See responses to questions 7.9 and 7.10. Responses will depend on the nature of non-
compliance and also circumstances and reasons given by particular company for non-
compliance.
7.9 In the 2009 annual report of Boral Ltd (an Australia-listed company), the
corporate governance disclosures include the following note:
(a) Examine the ASX corporate governance principles and identify the
best practice recommendations in relation to nomination committees.
Students should see that given the role of the Board of Directors is it essential that
those on the board are the ‗best‘ people for this role. Also the responsibility to ensure
that the composition of the Board is of the right level of expertise, experience and
independence to ensure that it can meet its obligations, lies with the Board itself, a
nomination committee assists in this by specialising in the recruitment (so ensuring
that the company is able to recruit the ‗best‘ people for these positions) and also
should assist in ensuring a balance of executive and non-executive directors (o to
avoid potential dominance. bias and protect shareholders interests).
(d) In March 2010 (see 2010 annual report), Boral did introduce a
Nomination Committee (as part of the Remuneration Committee)
although it is noted that the number of directors remained the same.
What reason can you think of for this change, given Boral’s previously
stated reason for not complying with this best practice
recommendation previously? (J, K)
In March 2010, the Board decided that it would be desirable to have a committee to
assist the board with its nomination responsibilities. Accordingly, the responsibilities of
the Remuneration Committee were expanded to encompass nomination responsibilities,
and the Remuneration Committee was reconstituted as the Remuneration and
Nomination Committee. In addition to responsibilities relating to remuneration, the
Committee now has responsibility for making recommendations to the Board on matters
such as succession plans for the Board, suitable candidates for appointment to the
Board, Board induction and Board evaluation procedures. P34
It should be noted that in 2010 although the number of directors remained the same
(at 8) there was a change in 2 directors. Also a comparison of the 2009 and 2012
annual reports reveals that more information is provided about this corporate
governance area in the 2010 annual report and it is also apparent that a review of
company policy in this area was undertaken. For example:
The Directors believe that limits on tenure may cause loss of experience and expertise
that are important contributors to the efficient working of the Board. As a consequence,
the Board does not support arbitrary limits on tenure and regards nominations for re-
election as not being automatic but based on the individual performance of Directors
and the needs of the Company. (p 33).
The Directors have adopted a policy that the tenure of Non-Executive Directors should
generally be no longer than nine years. A Non-Executive Director may continue to hold
office after a nine year term only if the Director is re-elected by shareholders at each
subsequent Annual General Meeting. It is expected that this would be recommended by
the Board in exceptional circumstances only.(p 35).
There is no correct answer to why Boral has changed this practice. Possible
reasons/motivations could include:
The changes in 2 new directors may have motivated the board to review this
policy. They may have decided that the task was more appropriately and
efficiently handled by a committee.
Increased scrutiny (or expected) on corporate governance practices following
the global financial crisis. In particular in Australia the changes relating to
shareholders voting and rights in relation to directors remuneration could have
prompted company to undertaken these changes.
It is also likely that the company overall would be under increased scrutiny due
to its performance. As company operating in the building industry, the company
has been adversely affected by the global financial crisis (particularly the impact
7.10 In the 2010 Annual report of Biota Ltd (an Australia-listed company), the
corporate governance note disclosed an audit committee composed of two
directors (chaired by an independent nonexecutive director and supported
by one other nonexecutive director). (J, K)
(a) Examine the ASX corporate governance principles and identify the
best practice recommendations in relation to audit committees.
(c) Does Biota’s audit committee meet these guidelines and if not, is any
deviation from these best practice recommendations justified?
Information about the company‘s ASX Corporate Governance Council Guidelines can
be found in the 2010 Biota annual report (www.biota.com.au)
Obtain the annual report for Biota and answer the questions.
Clearly Boral has not met the minimum three membership requirements
as recommended by the ASX, although both members are non-executive
independent directors.
It states (p. 12) that ―The Board is of the view that the composition of the Audit and
Risk Committee and the skills and experience of its members are sufficient to enable
the Committee to discharge its responsibilities with the charter. All other non-
executive directors are able to attend meetings at the discretion of the Committee
Chair as observers.‖
Biota could argue that have reduced membership on basis that it is a smaller company
with only 7 directors. Also 6 of the 7 board members are independent, including the
Board Chairman, and it is noted that ―The Board Chairman attends most meetings as
an ex officio member of the committee.‖ The fact that is chaired and supported by
non-executive directors could be argued to alleviate any concerns, as well. Also the
fact that auditor has policy of rotation also may alleviate concerns.
Students may arrive at different views as to whether deviations from best practice
guidelines are acceptable.
7.11 At times there are problems (and subsequent investigations) with corporate
governance, which include deficiencies in financial reporting. (J, K, AS)
The ASIC annual report provides a summary of major cases and the media centre
often provides summaries of cases considered or investigated (access from
http://www.asic.gov.au). The ‗key matters‘ section at
http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/ASIC.NSF/byHeadline/Media%20centre has information
on major investigations/cases.
Students will find other cases. For example, on the SEC (US) http://www.sec.gov/
site:
(b) Briefly discuss the corporate governance issues and what part financial
reporting played in these.
This will depend on the cases found by students. It may be useful to look at the annual
reports of companies involved in investigations and consider their corporate
governance disclosures (and practices).
Gain, this will depend on the cases found by students. It may be useful to consider the
nature of cases and problems: e.g. did these require collusion (i.e. involvement of
more than one person); how were problems detected (this may give hint of how could
be prevented and whether corporate governance processes could have assisted); what
corporate governance disclosures did these entities make (do these indicate systems
acceptable).
Student may have different views whether these principles would be effective. The
principles themselves are broad and so it would be assumed that if adhered to these
should be effective in addressing the types of problems identified in the extract. For
example, the extract identifies:
Trying to use company cash to acquire other family members businesses
Threat by chairman to employee leaving company
The CEO‘s wife giving (presumably) non-company work for employee to do
Employees misusing information from previous employee
The extract also notes that some of these could have been avoided by good corporate
governance practices (such a clarifying roles, and internal controls that prevent
employees who have left from accessing information).
3. The article argues that the larger issue relates to culture and ethics. Do you
agree? How critical is the CEO in this? (K, AS)
Corporate culture and ethics are important. Many articles and books have been written
in recent years about culture in organisations, usually referred to as ‗Corporate
Culture‘. The dictionary defines culture as ‗the act of developing intellectual and
moral faculties, especially through education‘. This writing will use a slightly
different definition of culture: ‗the moral, social, and behavioural norms of an
organisation based on the beliefs, attitudes, and priorities of its members‘. The terms
‗advanced culture‘ or ‗primitive culture‘ could apply to the first definition, but not the
latter.
Every organisation has its own unique culture or value set. Most organisations don‘t
consciously try to create a certain culture. The culture of the organisation is typically
created unconsciously, based on the values of the top management or the founders of
an organisation. Hence the CEO is critical in this. The culture of an organisation is
vital in corporate governance. It ‗sets the scene‘ as to what is acceptable and what not
is acceptable, actively can encourage and support either unethical or ethical
behaviours.
The article discusses changes in the US under the Financial Reform Act. These are
aimed at improving accountability and transparency.
The main features as described in the article are:
Increased rights of shareholders: e.g. providing shareholders with rights to
vote (although non-binding) on executive compensation and also to ability
(under certain conditions) to nominate potential board members.
Increased disclosure: e.g. of executive pay and how relates to actual financial
performance of the company; ratio of CEO compensation to median workers
pay
Increased control i.e. board compensation committee must be independent
approve the compensation package. The type of information disclosed (such as how
relates to actual performance and relationship to ‗median‘ pay) would presumably
‗highlight‘ more clearly any disparities or incongruities. It could be argued that as the
shareholders vote is non-binding, this could be simply ignored; however companies
(and directors) would presumably wish to avoid the situation where shareholders vote
against their packages, particularly if there are provisions to allow these same
shareholders to nominate their own board candidates.
(Further details of reforms can be found in actual legislation but students are not
expected to consider beyond article).
Although not asked in the question it may be useful to consider the Australian
situation where there is now a ‗two- strike‘ rule, where if more than 25% of
shareholders vote no to the company‘s remuneration report at 2 consecutive annual
general meetings then there is a possible ‗spill‘ of the Board.
2. The article argues that the effectiveness of the reforms is based on the
assumptions that shareholders will act. Is this assumption reasonable? What
are the barriers to effective share holder control? (K)
3. The article argues that other ‘incentives’ — such as taxation laws and
denying contracts — should be implemented. Do you think such measures
would improve corporate governance practices? (J, K)
The ‗incentives‘ raised in the article are essentially economic incentives. Such
incentives are used to promote or deter certain actions. The incentives mentioned in
the article are:
If such incentives were introduced this effectively places a potential ‗real‘ economic
cost on companies (for example, if tax deductions limited for executive pay then any
amounts over the limited cost the company ‗more‘ as no deductions would be
allowed).
Students could argue regarding possible effectiveness:
Case Study 7.3 Limits to governance; Corporate reforms often have unintended
consequences
The basic issue here is that in trying to ‗fix‘ one problem, other problems can arise
that were not expected or intended. The article mentions:
Change in tax laws to reduce excessive employee remuneration led to a shift
way from salary packages to stock options as a means of rewarding
employees/executives. As these points often required certain conditions to be
met (such as particular share price or earnings) to vest this encouraged actions
to realise these options (and resulted in changing attitude towards risk). Also
if tried to short term hurdles/targets then encourages a short term focus.
The rationale for having independent directors is outlined in response to
question 2 in relation to this case. However the article suggests given that the
independent directors will necessarily not have as detailed knowledge of the
specific business/company this can result in those executive directors in
practice having more influence/power. Particularly for complex issues (and it
was noted in relation to the financial crisis that the complex financial
instruments were not understood by a number of independent directors) this
would negate the benefits of having an independent director to effectively
review, monitor performance or make independent judgment. As the article
suggests, if the board has a large number of independent directors then the
information advantage that the CEO has could result in real authority being
concentrated in the CEO.
The article also notes that regulation itself can hamper good corporate
governance. For example, if regulation regarding compensation deters a
company from hiring the ‗best‘ person due; or if requirements for a certain
number of independent directors means that board overall has less knowledge
or expertise than required to effectively manage. In other words, the focus is
on meeting, for example, legislative requirements rather than engaging in good
corporate governance practices.