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f~)
VIA
POUR LA MATRISE
DES INCENDIES ET DES FUMES
VITA
PIARC
PREAMBULE 10
INTRODUCTION 14
FOREWORD 11
INTRODUCTION 15
PIARC 3 . 05,16,82006
3.4 PREMIERS ENSEIGNEMENTS TIRES DE CES INCENDIES 86
3.5 CONCLUSIONS 94
4 VENTILATION : 96
4.1 INTRODUCTION 96
4.2 TRAVAUX ANTERIEURS DE L'AIPCR. 96
4.3 VENTILATION TRANSVERSALE 96
4.3.1 Objectifs 96
4.3.2 Rgles de dimensionnement 98
4.3.3 Exigences pour la stratification des fumes 100
4.3.4 Spcifications concemant les quipements 104
4.4 VENTILATION LONGITUDINALE 106
4.4.1 Introduction 106
4.4.2 Impact sonore des acclrateurs dans un tunnel 106
4.5 ESSAIS 108
AlPCR. 4.05.15.8-2006
3.4 PRIMARY LESSONS LEARNED FROM THESE FIRES ......................................... 87
3.5 CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................... 95
4 VENTILATION 97
4.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 97
4.2 PREVIOUS WORK BY PIARC ...................................................................... 97
4.3 TRANSVERSE VENTILATION ......................................................................... 97
4.3.1 Objectives 97
4.3.2 Dimensioning Rules 99
4.3.3 Requirements tor smoke stratitication 101
4.3.4 Equipment Specitications 105
4.4 LONGITUDINAL VENTILATION ........................................................................ 107
4.4.1 Introduction 107
4.4.2 Sound Impact ot Jet Fans in a Tunnel 107
4.5 TESTS ...................................................................................................... 109
9 L'AVENIR 230
10 REFERENCES 234
11 BIBLIOGRAPHIE 242
AlPCR. 6 . 05.16.82006
7 DESIGN CRITERIA FOR STRUCTURE RESISTANCE TO FIRE ...............191
10 REFERENCES 235
11 BIBLIOGRAPHY 243
AIPCR .10.05,16,8-2006
FOREWORD
This report complements the previous PIARC report "Fire and Smoke Contra I
in Road .Tunnels" publlshsd in 1999and re-printed in 2004 [2]. It goes more
in depth for a number of aspects andgives additional information. It has been
prepared under the auspices and with theapprovalof the PIARC Teehulcal
Committee on Road Tunnel Operaton.~st ofthe work was performed
during the 1999-2003 PIARCYclebylheformerWorking Group No.6
devoted to "Fire andSmoke Control" with jointcollaborative input in the areas
of ventilation systems, equipment andsystemoper",tion in Sections 4 and 8
fromWorking GroupNo. 2 thendevotedto "Emissions, Pollution and
Ventilation". As most findings andconlU$lons reached by the technical
expert members of both workinggroupSWerernade and developed in the
period between 1999 and 2003,thisrep()rt represents the technology of that
period.
Grol.lpe detravail.Emissions,PollutionetVentilatic>n :
Animateur: Yves DARPAS (France) Chapitres4,8
Secrtaire : Bill GRAY (Royaume-Uni)
Membres : Enrique ALARCON (spaqne) Chapitres 4, 8
Roberto ARDlTI(lta1ie)
Carlo BARBETT A (Italie )
Herve BIOLLAY (France)
Vincente GARRASCO ARIAS (Espagne)
Arnold DIX (Austral ie) Chapitre 8
Vincenzo FERRO (Italie )
Bernt FREIHOLTZ(Sl,lde)
Salvatere GUIA (Italle)
Jan Erik HENNING(Norvge)
Hans HUIJBEN (Pays-Bas) Chapitre 4
KatsuhikoIWAJ(Japon)
Eddy JACQUES (Belgique) Chapitres 4,8
Alain JEANNE isse) Chapitres 4,8
Gary KILE(Etat~- ) Chapitre8
Rafael LOpe~GUARGA(Espagne)
Claude MORET (France) Chapitres 4,8
Ignacio del REY(sPlilgne)
Johannes RODLER(Autriche)
Peter STURM (Autriche)
Dieter TETZNER (Allernagne)
Jiri ZAPARKA (RpubliqlJetchque)
Franz ZUMSTEG (suisse)
Chaque section a t rdige par le(s) rapporteur(s) mentionn(s) prcdemment,
utilisant les informationsprovenant de sonpays, de la littrature spcialise et des
autree membres du groupe de travalt . Les projElts .ont t revus au cours des
runions successives du groupe et ..harmoniss parun comit de rdaction
compos de Norman Rhodes (Royaume-Uni) et de Art Bendelius (Etats-Unis).
Among .the possible risks, .vehiclefires. give. rise .'to concern because their
consequences might ibe .'.farlarger .I.mderground than in .theopen, if no
appropriate mitigation measureS are taken. The continuous decrease in road
vehicle pollut<:\t1temissionsis suchthat today'sventilatiohequiprnent is, in
most circllmstances,determined byfireandsmokecontrol considerations.
Thus, the planning and design decisions regarding fire emergencies are
extremely critlal.
Untll. the .Marrakech Congress these topics. have been .exarnined, among
other matters,. by .varioUS.workinggroupswithinthe. techniCf:1l.committee,
especil:\lly. th()se .devoted ..t().:Qperation-Mlilintenance-Man(;lQernent and to
PoUution-tanVironment~\lentUation.ln. 1992the Committee on.R.0ad Tunnels
deBidedthatthe. promin~nce 9f tl1issubJectjustifiedJhe creation of aspecific
W0rkinQ gr()lIP devotedtoFireandSmoke (;ontroL(Working Group No. 6).
Sinceitsinception,WorldngGrpup 6has . participated .in }l1eCongress
Reports for the Wortd Road CongressesinJvl()ntreal (1995) and Kuala
Lumpur (1999).
Afin de faire progresser tous les aspects de la rsistance au feu des tunnels,
Ie Comit AIPCR des Tunnels tQutiersa mis enplace une CQQprationavec
I'Association internationale. des Ttavauxen SQuterrain (AIJES).Le Groupe
de' Travall 6 del'AIPCR ad~finietptsentplus spcifiquement les
incendies de dimensionnement. at les objecfifsde .rsistance,alors que Ie
Groupe de TravaU6de I'AITES .sur.1'EntrtienetRparationcles. Ouvrages
Souterrains a examin et foumi' des informations SUl' les mthodes et les
matriauxde constructionpermettant de rpondre ces objectifs.
A very important risk factor when dealing withfire. safety in tunnels is whether
or not-te allow vehiclestransporting dangerousgoods. The criteria to deelde
when sucn transport should be allowed are not examined in this report. The
PIARC cornrnlttee on Road Tunnels has another working group which deals
with this issue. A joint research project on Transport of Dangerous Goods
Through Road Tunnels wascarried .out withtheOrganisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). The resutts: of these works have
been publishedjointly by OECD and PIARC. [3]
PIARC.17.05.16.8-2006
FIT (Fires in Tunnels) tait un rseau thmatique qul s'est achevau dbut
de 2005 et dont Ie but tait de diffuser Jes rsultatsdes tudes et des
recherches par:
PIARC.19.05.16.8-2006
Le chapitre 7 contient les rsultats foutnis par I'AIPCR l'AITES dans Ie
cadre des accords mentionnsprcdemment etconcernant les critres
appliquer pour Ie dveloppement de mthodes visant assurer la
rsistance au feu des structures. La question des responsabilits
oprationnelles pendant lesinterventions de secouts au COUrsd'un incendie
est traite dans Ie chapitre 8. Celal-cl inclut une dlsusslon des objectifs de
la matrise desfumes et de lafaoh dontees objectifs'peuveht tre raliss
par les concepteurs et les exploitants, les facteurs affectant les quipes de
scours, la ncessitd'Uh plan d'intervention d'urgence, ainsi que
l'irnportnce de I'ehtretienet desessaisdes quipements.
les mcendlesrcents dans les tunnels du Mont Blanc, des Tauernet du St.
Gothard au cours des derniresannesontconduit une sltuatlon dans
laquellelascuritdestunnels et les concepts d'vcuationet de. secours
sont devenus. une proeoupanon. majeure; ..aussi bien dans .les pays
concerns que sur Ie plan international.
The tire incidentsin theMont Blanc, Tauern al1dSt. Gotthard Tunnels during
the last years have led to a situation wheresafety in transport tunnels and
evacuation and rescueconcepts arebeing scrutinised both in the affected
countries as weil as internationally.
Flgure1.1.Progresslondes fumes
dans "In tunnel hol'izontalaveC vitesse de I'airnulle dans la zone du foyer
::::zrt ~r;:;:;:
Figura1.1 .Smoke progressin af!attunnal
wlth no alrvaloclty In tha fira zone
(a)
Vitesse longitudinale de I'air infrieure la
vitesse crinque (ZoOeexempledefume prs
du sol, en aval du foyer")
(b)
Vitelillile loogiludinalede I'airgale la
vilelillilecrltique (zone exempte de fume prs
du sol, en aval du foyer")
{cl
Viteslilelongitudinale de I'air suprieure la
vitessecrltique (pas dezoneexempte de
furne, toutela secon transversale est
enfume)
(a)
+-- backlayarfng Longiludinal air velocity lower Ihan the critical
valocity (srnoke-free zona naar the bottorn.
downsiraam of flre")
~ upstreem downsiraam
---.
---.
upstreem
downsiraam
(b)
Lonqltudinal air veloclty equallo the crilical
velocity (smoke-free zona naar lhe bottorn.
downstreem of fira')
...--.. (c)
---.
Longiludinal air velocity grealer lhan lhe
upstream critical velocity (no smoke-tree zone, enlire
cross section ls fled wilh smoke)
Figure 1.2 Influence of longitudinal air velocity on smoke progress in the fire zone
If the longitudinal air velocity In thetunnel is low (say <1m/s) before the fire
starts, then. me .smoke wIU propagate in. a- manner similar te tht shown in
Figure 1.2a. This has two important advantages:
there is a smoke-free zone under the stratified smoke layer, allowing the
tunnel user to escape;
smoke propagation is slow, so tunnel users have more timeto escape.
Similar to the idealised behaviour shown in Figure 1.1, the srnoke progresses
in a nearly symmetrical way on eitherside of the fire. ,It remains stratified until
itcoolsdown due to thecombinedeffects ofthe convective heat exchange
with the walls and the mixing between the srnoke and the fresh air layers.
If the longitudinal air velocity islower thanthe critical velocity, the smoke
progresses upstream of the fire. In this case, and under the restnetton that no
aerodynamic perturbation occurs (for instanee, that caused by the start up of
a jet fan within the smoke zone), the smoke layer upstream of the fire
remains stratified.
PIARC. 27.05.16.8-2006
1.6 Rledusystmede ventilation pendant la phased'auto-
vacuation
Le chapitre 4 dcritles caractristiques du systme de ventilatlon et de son
exploitation. Mais iI est bon de mentionner iciquels sont lesbjectlfs d'un
systme de ventilation pendant un incendie, sans trop entrer dans Ie dtail
de lafaon dontils sont attents.
AlPCR. 28 . 05.16.82006
1.6 Role of the Ventil,tionSY$temdudngtheSelf~Evauation
Phase
During the self-evacuation phase (also cal led the self-rescue phase, during
which tunnels users would ,oftheir ownvolition, attempt to evacuatefrom the
tUi'1nel),the ventilatlonsystem aims to reate aOd maintain a tenable
environment tor theevacuatinoftul'lneLusers. SpecificallY,this environment
conslsts ofacceptable visibilityandalr quality levels.
2.1 Introduction
The group of experts of the United Nations EcoOmic Cmmission for Europe
__UNECE [7] - .has c1assified .the various.factors .influencing ..the level of
safety in.Joad .tunnels .intO four rnain .groups .as shown .,in}hediagram
(page 33). ()nly the cooperative action ofallfourgroups can guarantee
safety in tnnel.
.'..,
.l
/
.l
,/"
'O :.; .
La scurit dans les tunnels routiers a pour but premier de prvenir les
accidents et de rduire les consquences d'accidents ventuels.
AlPeR. 32 . 05.16.82006
,..-/
....>"
2.3.1 ObjectifsdelscUritincendie
Les objectifs sUVantsont t att1einldreIe niveau optimal de
scurit dans les tunnels routiers:
AlPCR. 34 . 05.16.62000
The tunnel, from a statistica I point of view, is generally deemed the safest
part of the road network. In fact, most statistles show few serieus tunnel
accidents as compatE~dtoopen road.accidents, However, the consequences
of a tunnel incident can faf outweigh those of an open road incident.
One of the most important factors in maintaining the designed safety level is
an adequate, thoroughly plannedahd systematic operanon and maintenance
scheme -.Maihtainable con$truction, details and safety eqipment, should all
be Considered at ah earty stage in the planninglifld design phase.
PIARC 35 . 05.16.82006
I
1
-.-:.:.:.-.-.:.:.:.:.:.-.-.-.-.:::.:.:::.:.
:::u:::~t~
m:~:" 1.$J.JitJff.4
C(l~/J~l!l'
;"t.
.lij' ~'l!l.r
...
~r 'il'&$l!l!'\l;C~
1111.
~:~
.>Fti;lf}d'1E\Wn~
~J
Figure 2.2 -Concept d scurit global
AlPCR. 36.05,16.8-2006
:::......Oe
i:I: ...............
S~!l' ~ : ~.... ..~f.,;...............................
t.~..
d..........
~..........
~_...............
.m:lllqls::p~r.<l
il;.~.:
. , j'.
I
~~~. ieClI1'!'li~ irll!t.lilEria;rm 1
:~::. MBi:n.lellllllClil1 .end ... .. j
:~:
.Opat:;MlI!;l~QmQ 1
r"tR!fa1maiilim .. l
\. TI.a'lf::ll Q~l'lr<tc:n . .. I
l~~~~ .'Ea>v.,;,ljf;nf:,
c.. -
1lr:4w~nilJli 1,
:.:~. "'OW ,
tONCEPT10N CON$1'RUCTlON
"Cholx de .uril.
Figure 2.3 Choix de scurit
AlPCR. 38 05.16.82006
Independent advance of the various aspects should be prevented in the
design phaseto avoid costly extras during construction andioperatlon,
Peri()dic reviews are generally conducted during design stages.The same
procedures shouldbeadoptl;ldaUthroughthe developmentof the project and
construetion inordertochecktheiprojeet from the operation,maintenance
andsafetypoints ofview;
The safety features of a tunnel are mainly established during thefirst phases
of design (i.e., conceptual development). The possibility te make safety-
related oholees become.s moreand more diminished as theplanning, design,
constructionand operation phasesadvance (see Figure 2.3).
~
Figure 2.3 SafetY cholcfls
Date- I Longueur
du tunne!
I Lieul
Pays
Vhieule dans
lequell'ineendie
Cause la plus
ptObablede
Dure
de
Consguences
Usagers 1 VhlclJles
I
s'est dclar "incendle "ineendle endOfllmags
13mai Holland . NevilYork Camion avec 11 t. Charge tombe 4h 66 blesss 10 camions
1949 2550m USA de disulfide de du camlori- inhalation 13 voitures
I
21 jours
I
11 aot Croisemenl Pans Camion avec--htitesse leve Dommages
1976 BP-A6 France lambours de 16 I. de graves
430m film nolvester sur150m
11 aol Velsen Velsen 4 camions Domma;ges
1978 nOm Pays-Bas 2 vollures
30m
11 juillel Nihonzaka Shitzuoka 127 camions Dommages
1979 2045rn Japon i 46 voitures graves
-- sur 1100 m
17 avrU Kajiwara Japon 1 camion, 4t Dommages
1980 740m 1 camion, 10t gravessur 280 m
unnel
!Date
ILength
13 May 1949
14 August 1975
11 Augusl11l76
11 August 1978
11 July 1979
17 April 1980
15 July 1980
17 April 1982
February 1983
5 mai 19831 Frjus F rance-ttalle Camion de rnatlres 1 Moteur 1-2 h I Aucun 1 1 camion
I
i
12870m plastiques
9 sept.
1986
L'Arrne
1105 m
Nice
France
Camion avec
remorque
I Freinage aprs
vitesse leve
I N/A 13morts
5 blesss
1993 Serra Ripoli Blogne- tvonure el camion Collision 2h 30 min 4 morts 5 camions
442m Florence avec rouleaux de 4 blesss 11 voitures
I
ltalie oaeter
13 juin Hovden Hlilyanger Moto Collision par 1h 5 blesss 1 moto 1111 mde
1993 1290m Norvge 2 voitures l'arrire 2 voitUres rnatriau
I
d'isolation dtruit
27.fvrier Huguenot Afrique du Busavec Dfailtance 1h trnort 1 autocar Dommages
1994 3914m Sud 45 oassaoers lectrioue 28 blesss araves
he Camionavec Collision 1h 3morts 1 camion Dommages
6719m remorque 4 blesss 1.van graves
I 1 voilure
18 mars llso'adelle Palerrno 1cileme avec ga<: Coilision par 2h 5 morts
1996 Femmine ltalie liquide + 1 petit bus I'arrire 20 blesss
148m
IJ
10 April 1995
18 March 1996
31 octobre St Gothard A2 Transporteur avec Moteur 3h 2 blesss 1 camion NlA
1997 16.918 m Suisse 8 voitures prives 8 voitures
cbarqes
24 mars 99 MontBlanc France-italie Camion avec farine Auto-inflammation 53 h 39 morts 23 camions Dommages
11.600 m et margarine 10 voitures graves.
1 moto Tunnel
2 camions rouvert
pompiers en mars 2002
29 mai 1999 Tauem MO Camion de peinture Collisionpar 14h 12 morts 14 camions Dommages
6401 m Salzbourg- I'arrire 49blesss 28 voitures graves
Spittel 4 voitures et
.... Autriche 2 camions
14 juiUet 2000 Seljestad E 134 Unincendie de diesel CoJlisionpar 45 min 8 blesss 1.camion Dommages
1272 m Drammen - s'tait dclar avant I'arrire. Un semi- 6 voitures graves.
Haugesund lacolllslon dans Ie remorque a 1 moto NOK 1 mill.
Norvqe compartiment moteur poussune Tunnel fenn
du seml-remorque vonure.sur pendant
qufaprovoqu les 4 voitures arrtes 1,5 jours
collisions multipies. derrire un autre
....
camion.
28 mai2001 Prapontin A32 Torino- Camion charg de Auto-mise feu 15min ... 11 blesss 1 camion Ferm
4409m Bardonecchla lgumes des pneus parlafume jusqu' 6/6 en
ltalie direction de
. Turln.test)
6 ao012001 Gleinalm A9 prs de Voiture Colfision frl1tale 50 min smorts 1 voiture Dommaqss
8320 m Graz van - voiture 4biesss 1 van graves.
Autriche R-ouvert ie
.. 07 aot 2001
24 oct. 2001 St Gothard A2 Camion Collision frontale 6h 11 morts 2 camions Dommages
16918 Suisse
~!!
I
2.3.4 Plansd'interventiond'urgence
Le projet doit prendre en compte les activlts quise droulront sur Ie site et
celles qui se drouleront ailleurs. Le .schmagnral. dolt inclure des
instructions pour Ie rem placement priodiqueet I'amlioration des
quipements.
2.3.5 RiskandRiskAnalysis
The risks assoclatd with a tunnel shouJdb;lsystematiallyidlilntified and
evaluatedduring the design stage. A risk analysis is an estlmation of both the
cQnsElqLJen9Ell>Qfan/:icc;idlilntandth~ .lkelih()Qd (probabjljty)thatsuch an
~ccider1tlNinocc;ur. Tt1lilam Qfthe/isK al1alyss S Joidentify and .possibly
quantlfythensksinordertobe abletoelimihate orreduclilt1le01, as weil as
tocqmP<lrealternatiVe metheds a\) a basis for. decision~making processea
during the construction andoperation phases,
accidants de la route,
incendies de vhicules,
accidents rsultant du transport de marchandises dangereuses,
incendies de bments et ouvrages adjacents,
effondrement totalou partiel de la structure dutunnel,
interruption des fonctionsde scl.Jrit,telies qu'clairage, ventilation,
rseaux de signalisatih,
effetdes accidehts et vhementsextemes.
road accidents;
vehicle fires;
accidents due to the tr:ll1sportationof hazardous goods;
adjacent building agclstrt1<#4r~fires;
collapse of the tunr~~m.lAtyr~gr partof it;
interruption of saf~tyf\.ll1<.;tiol1s such as Iighting, ventilation, signa I
systems;
effect of external acCidlltS<Jl'ldevents,
The input data used for a risk analysis may include accident statisties,
accident frequency ratlos. and costs of accidents. The input data, reference
objects and calculation rnodels should always be carefully selected and
properlydocurnented, In a road tunnel risk analysis, it is essential that the
specific relatlonshlp between road geometrical design, accident statlstlcs,
and user behavlour be treated in a proper way. More work on risk analyses is
being perforrned by the PIARC Technical Committee on Road Tunnel
Operation and will be publishedinthe nextyears.
[li5p~f:tiS
e~k?dV~'/~--~--~~~.'."~~-~~'"
/r~-~~~'
+7"~!>\\
t /.:l.i .....................
\, \. '\
I~''r
..\.\ .... > ) }!
\\"'
\\"",
,--,
.. /'/
_//J ..
~~;ttumf~d~-:~~~;;,~~;i~~~~.=~
/;::;:"J:-_ ~ -,
'fu~ne:'
t-. j;
\\~ .. / /J/
EmE!~s:ent.~at;~ng i .1 'i I
....................
,..
_,
--~_-~--. ...
//'
/
I
" ",.r
~ .....,
,-~ '---". -'-'. ............. ".. _/ .
... ....~.. - "--' --- ....."" ..,.,
~"'"~/
,..,.". ~,~
PIARC 51 . 05.16.82006
Toutefois, ramener Ie niveau de rlsque en cas d'accident grave I'intrieur
d'un tunnel celui d'uneroute I'air libre n'est pas facilement ralisable.
Ene nglige cependant I'une des contraintes pratiques .les plus importantes -
I'argent. Ene place egalEll"tlentla scurit I'cart d'autres questions
importantes, cornme les av~ntages et/ou leslnconvnients rsultant de la
prsence d'un tunnel. Cett~ mme approche peut vlser un objectif plus
lev : on peut dsirer que lesacc:ldents solent ramens un niveau
infrieur celui de routes cernpersbles I'air libre, L'quilibre n'est pas facile
tablir, mals, dans tous I~ cas, iJ doit tre bassur une comparaison des
cots et de I'efficacit des rnsures.
Une approche alternative, que certaines autorits prfrent, est connue sous
I'acronyme de ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicabie). Dans cette
approche, Ie but est degarantirquelesrisques sont aussi faibles qu'iI est
raisonnable en pratique,lemot-cltal1t raisonnable , L'interprtation
de "raisonnble en pratique dpendinvitablenient du point de vue de la
persenne qul oprece jugement (exploitant,usager, juriste, etc.) .: Une telle
approche est limite par Ie fait qu'une 'analysecot/bnficen'est jamais
favorable si I'on cornpare les investissernents en tunnel er les autres
investissements I'air libre.
Deux mois plus tard, Ie 29 mai 1999, unautre incendiegrave s'sst produit
dans Ie tunneldes Tauem. IJ a rsultde la collisionavant-arrire de
plusieurs vhicules lncluant un poids lourd transportant des bidons de
peinture. L'ineendie a fait 12 victimes, dont hult sont mortes dans la cellision
proprement dite.
This sectioll,. iS< separated '.'into '.' three . suhsections, The ,first subsection
C()1l1pj:lres.tl'letul1nelsiR terll1l> of geOlIletry,.,trafflc,., s;;ifety'.,JaciHties,,and
operation. ,The sElcondsubsection considers the., responsEltothe fires,
managementby the.tunnel. operatorsand fire rescue foroes, as weil as the
behaviour onhe users, Thethird subsection discusses andanalyses wh at
was oomparabie andwhat was different in thethreefires, to extractsome key
points to explain the differences in the oonsequencesof the three fires,
3.2.1 Gomtrie
Les tunnels du Mont Blanc, des Tauem et du St. Gothard sont tous les trots
dsmon-ubes. Letunnel duMont-Blanc taiten son ternps Ie plus long
tunnel routier aU monde. nat mis en ser'liceel1 jUillet 1965. Letunnel des
Tauern a t ouvert en 1975, celui du St. Gothard en 1980.
AlPCR. 56 . 05.16.62006
Mont Blanc Tunnel is a bi-national tunnel located partly in France and partly
in Italy. It was built,financed and operated in coordination by one French
company and one Italian cornpany, Mont Blanc Tunnel was and still is under
the overview control of a French-Italian Intergovernmental Committee that
fixes the standards to be applled. St. Gotthard Tunnel isfully located in
Switzerland, however, on the borderline between two reglons. The Tauern
Tunnel is fullylocated in Austria. Both of these tunnels have to comply with
the regulationsof their country. The St. Gotthard Tunnelisoperated in turns
by two operating teams from the two regions, only one being on control at
any given time. The Tauern Tunnel is operated bya unique operating team.
References to facilities and systems in this section are to the facts before the
fires, and do not reflect subsequent refurbishment of the tunnels. A large part
of the information used to write this section was found in references [8]
through [14].
3.2.1 Geometry
The Mont Blanc, Tauern and St. Gotthard Tunnels are all mono-tube. Mont
Blanc Tunnel was the first long road tunnel built in the world. It was opened
to service in July 1965. The Tauern Tunnel was opened to service in 1975,
and the St. Gotthard Tunnel in 1980.
The St. Gotthard Tunnel is the longest one (16,920 rn), followed by the Mont
Blanc Tunneland the Tauern Tunnel (11,600 mand 6,400 m, respectively).
The Tauern presents a 1.5% uniform slope from the north to the south portal.
In the Mont Blanc andSt. Gotthard Tunnlls, there are high points in the
longitudinal tunnel profiles. located approximately at the middle of the tunnels
(see Figure 3.1). The portal elevationsare()fthe same order, about 1,200 rn
above the sea level. The maximum slope gradient is 1.4% in the St. Gotthard
Tunnel and 2.4% in theMont BlancTunneL
Ij
lt':t<ll OM1 i ~ ,wt;~1
1
l:l
"I
lll:lll /lurd { Nort1;, l1(}~t':l!
1l:l~1
+~" GliIIdNtl<ellll
In the Mont Slanc Tunnel, lay-bys are located every 300 malternating on
each side of the carriageway and numbered 1 to 36 from France to Italy. In
front of each one, a gallery makes lt possible for HGVs to do U-turns. In the
TaueI11T(jill'il,lay~byslocatdevery848mlso createthe capacity for
HGVs to execute u-turns. Lay-by spacing in the St. Gotthard Tunnel varles
between 650 and 800 m.
Les tunnels du St.Gthard,des Tauern )tdu Mont Slanc ont tous les trois
une ventilation transversale ou .semi4r$l'1Sversale. Les Figures 3.3 3.5
donnent les caractnstiquesdesdiffrents~ystmes de ventilation.
UsiMd.e
'Mulation
ii:llie_
F.l\F4 IAF4
Fm .",..
UIn
IJ\F.l
FJ\F.l
FMl lFl
FAV'5 IAV$
Trafflo flow in all of the tunnels is bl-directlonal. Including all vehicles, the
traffic is more thantwo times higherintheTauern Tunnelthan inthe Mont
BlancTunnel. (see Table3.1)' ..Because they are .all transalpine tunnels, a
significantprcentageofthetrafficiSl'riade up ofHGVs. The proportion of
HGVs iSrt'luchhghr in the M<:>ntBlancthanintheTuern (39% versus 25%
ofthetotl traffic).Beforeth accidents,dangerolJs goods were allowed in
theTauern Tunnel, withsort'lerestrictionsintheSt.GotthardTunnel, and not
at ll In the Mont BlancTunnel. The .Monr Blanc testrietion was enforced by
the cuetorn authoritis betre trucks entered the tunnel.
3.2.3 VentilationCapacities
The st. Gotthard, Tauern and Mont Blanc Tunnels are all transverse or semi-
transverse ventilated. Figures 3.3through 3.5 present outlines of the different
ventilation systerns.
V~
pkl1lltJWion
ptlll
nR
hl)
1');11)
1'\UIl.
PIARC 61 .05.16.62006
Le systme de ventilation du tunnel du Mont Slanc comporte deux longueurs
gales de tunnel de configuration identique - une moiti du ct franals,
I'autre moitidu ot italien. Quatregaleries d'airfrais, numrotes de 1 4,
partent de chaque tte,chacune<:l'elles desservant un quart (1 450 rn) de la
demi-Iongueurdu tunnel (voir Figure 3.3). Chaque conduite peut fournir
75 m3/sd'air frais. Une cinquimeconduite at construite l'origine pour
extraire I'air pollu par les missions des vhicules alnsl que les fumes en
cas d'incendie (bien que ceci ne fOt pas uncritre de dimensionnement).
Cette cinquime conduite.a t transforme plus tard en conduite rverslble
utilisesoitpouraugmenter led~it d'inSl,lff'lationd' airfrais, soit pO\Jr extraire
les fumes en cas d'incendie.
.........
AlPCR. 62 . 05.16.82006
The MontBlarn; Tunnel ventllatlen "systemcomprises two equal lengths of
identicaUyconfiguredtunl1elonehalffromtheFrench side, theother half
trom theltalianside.Foursupply airducts,numberedfrom1to4, start from
eachp0rtatandeaeh. one. serves onequarter (1 ,450m) of the half"length of
tunnel (seeFigure 3.3). Eaehduet can supply75 m3/soffresh air. Afifth duet
was orginallybuilttoextraet the air polluted by the vehiCleemissions as weil
assmokeineaseof a fire (althoUghthis wasnotadesigneriterion),The flfth
duet was later tral1sforrned to ereVet$ible duet used to "either improve the
freshalrsupplycapacity orextractsmoke in case offlre.
Le Tableau 3.3 rsume les installations de scurit disponibles dans les trots
tunnels. Deux des cliffrences lesplusapparentes sont la prsence d'abris
pressuriss dans Ie tunnel duMontBlancetunegaleriedesecours parallle
au tube de circulation dans Ie St. Gothard. Les systmes de dtection
d'incendie dans les trots tunnels sont bass sur la mesure de I'lvation de la
temprature de l'air,
AlPCR. 64 . 05.16.82006
The Tauern Tunnel's ventilation . system eonslsts offour independent
ventil~tion sections (see Figure3A). Sections .i, 2,and 3 are 1,500m long
andSection 4 is1,900mlong.~qtions2and .3areventilated througlla590-
rnhighshaft, whereas Sections1:and 4aresuppliedby ventilation plants.at
theportElls. The Tauern Tunnel's maximum fr~h.air supply.rate (per km) is
morethan twice that of the Mont Blanc Tunnel (see Table3.2). It is more
difficUitto oompare tne maximum extraction airflows beeause in the Mont
BlancTunnelitispossibletoconcentratetheextraction .However, for. a 900-
m-Ic)[lgsmokepluglo~tedbetween Laybys19and. 21. (the flrst HGV fire
tookplace at Lay.by21),the rnaximumsmoke. extraetion .capacity of the
MontBlanc Tunnel is about50m3fs, versus103rn3/sfora sarne smoke plug
length in the Tauern Tunnel.
3.2.4 Saf~tyFacilltiesintneJunnelS
Safety facllities .:inStlled in. the Wee. tunnels are surnmartsd in Tabla 3.3.
Two of the .mostapp~rent. differences ..are the ..presence of. pressurised
shelters in theMont BlancTunnel, and an emergencygalleryparallel to the
trafflc tube n the St Gotthard Tunnel. The fire detections systems in the
three tunnels are basd on air temperature elevatiOn masurernent,
PIARC. 65.05.16.8-2006
Tableau 3.~- Eauipements de scurit
MontBlanc Tauern ..
St. Gothard
Itinraires Des abris aliments en air Pas d'itinraired'vacuation Galerie. de secours parallle au
d'vacuation- frais et protgs du tunnel spar, sauf la sortie normale tube decirculation, Cette galerie
abris du tunnel.
... par une paroi coupe-feu
2 heures sontsitus tous
est ventile et pressurise en
oas d'lncendte. Des passages
les 600 m. transversaux tous les 250 m
Pas d'itinraire raceordent Ie tunnel la galerie
d'vacuationspar. de secouts.
Niches de Les niches descurit tous Les niches dl' scurit tous les Les nlches d'appel de secours
scurit les 100 mcomportentun 212 mcomportnt un beutOl'!" tousles125 m oomportent un
... bt:JtJ!on-possoitd'alarme, pouSsolr.d' alarme,.Ul'! bOljloncpoussoir d'alarme, un
un tlphonetdeux tlphneet.deuxextincteurS. tlphoneetdes extincteurs.
extincteurs. Des niches Des nicbestousIs 106m Les raccordements au rseau
distinctes tous les 150 m procursnt l'arnentatlon en eau hydrauque pour les pompiers
procutent r alimentaonen pourles pompiers.l;lI~s sont tousles 125 m
eau pour les pompiers comportnt.un tuyau de
120m,une buse rilousse et
une.rserve.d'mulsiflant. ... ...
Systme de Deuxsystmes de Lesystmede dtectionest Systmesde dtection de
dtection dtection diffrents ontt bas/surun c~bl$--capteurde fume,detemprature, de gaz
d'incsndle installS dans lesdeux lemprature,avecdl's et visul'!. instalts dans Ie tunnel.
... rnoltis du tUnnel. Sur Ie capterstous ls.8m,plaCs LesYsWn~de dtection
ct italien, Ie systrne est sous Ie faux-plafond,et lncendleest bas sur une
bas sur une dtection de consults tour de rle par Ie dtection de !'lvation de
I'lvation de temprature systme..Unealarme.est temprature. Capleurs tous les
sur la base d'une mesure dclenche en cas d'lvatlon 2501.
de variation de preesion locale delatemprature par
d'un gaz dans des rapport la temprature
conduites de.70mde long moyenne des capteurs
au niveau de la voOte. Sur adjacents ou si la temprature ...
Ie ct franais, Ie systme mesure dpasse50C.
estle mme que celui
install dans Ie tunnel des
Tauern.
Feuxde Aux entres et.tous les Aux entreseHous les 848 m Tousles 250 m I'intrieur du
circulation 1200 m l'intrieur du !'intrieur du tunnel tunnel.
tunnel.
Camras Tous les 300 rn, crans Tous les.212 m, crans dans 85camras vido (tous les
dansles eentres de Ie centre de controle 200 M, crans dans les eentres
controle decontrle
Radio Lecble ryonnantssrvant Au moyen duanalradio- Entlremnt FM, service radio et
communications retransrnettre la radio lrafie, desm/ilssagesp/iluvent couverture GSM.
peut tre ulilispour relayer tre envoys dans letunnel en
des messaqesaux usagers cas d'urqence.
en cas d'urence.
-
---
Fire detection Two different fire detection Thefire detecnonsystem was Smoke,temperature, gases and
system systems were installed on based on temperature sensor- visual detection systems
the !wo tunnel halves. On cable with sensors every 8 m installed in the tunnel. The fire
the Itallan side, the fire placed under the intermediate detection system is based on
detection system was ceiling, which were temperature elevation detection.
based on the ternperature sequentially called by the Sensors are placed every 25 m.
elevationdetection based system. An alarm was
on !he pressure variation generated in case of alocal
measurement of a gas temperature elevation
placed in 70 long ducts compared to the mean
placed along the tunnel temperature of the adjacent
vault. On the French side, sensors or in case of a
the fire detection system is measured temperature higher
the same as the system than 50C.
installed in the Tauern
Tunnel.
Traffic lig hts At portals andevery At portals and every 848 m Every 250 m inside the tunnel.
1,200 m inside the tunnel. inside the tunnel.
Cameras Every 300 m, screened in Every 212 rn, screened in the 85 video cameras (every 200 m),
the control centres. control centre. screened in the control centre
Radio The radiatingcable for By meansof traffic radio Full FM, service radio and GSm
oommunlcafions radio channels rebroadcast channel alarm messages can coverage.
can be used to relay some be sentinto the tunnel durlng
messages to the motorIsts an emergency.
durinq an emeraencv.
-
3.2.5 TunnelOperation
The Tauern Tunnel has one control centre. The Mont Blanc Tunnel has one
control centre located at each portal, each responsible for one-half the
tunnel. The St. Gotthard Tunnel has one control eerure at each portal. Each
control centre is used alternately, so at any given time only one control centre
is in operation. In each of the three tunnels, the control centre(s) is (are)
operated 24 hours per day.
AIPCR.68.05.16.B-2006
In all of the Mont Blanc, Tauernand St.GotthardTunnels,there was na
automatic incident detection systern in operatien at the time of the incidente.
These iast procedures are not in accordance with the 1999 PIARC
publication [2J thatrecommends, in the event of a fire, reducing the fresh
airflow when the supply inlets are located near the road surface, and
stopping it when the inlets are located in the celling. In the Tauem and the St.
Gotthard Tunnels, the ventIIation .systems are automatically activated by
means of the fire detection systems, whereas in the Mont Blanc Tunnel the
ventilation is manually activated.
TheMont Blanc. Tunnel. hasa private rescue team at the. French Portal for
immediateintervention ..
consisting..of oneprivate .fire-fjghter. and a
mo~orcyclist. Afirevehi(lleequippedwith 2,000 I QLwater .extinguishers and
indivj<:lu<:llbreatl1ingappar(ltus a500 I.watertanklorry.(lndanampuJance are
alsoav<:lilableaUheFrel1Chportal.TheM9nt al<:lncTunne{sl;lfetypll:jn is also
based on. the intervention of the fire brigades from Chamonix(frE'lnch stde)
and Courmayeur (Itallan slde) mat arslocated approximately 6 km frorn the
tunnel .portals; -.The Tauern .:Tunnel .hasno privaterescue frces..but.well~
trainedcommunal fire .brigades are at. ea(lhportak The St. GotthardTunnel
hasa priva~~rescueteam9~mposed .
offour f1re><fjghters
present.24hollrs
perday at.eachPortal.8nd .fou[fire-fightingVElhicles.
PIARC 69 . 05.16.82006
3.3 Lesincendiesetleur gestion
Tableau 3.4 Nombre de v$hlcules rsents dans lestullnels ouOnt eulleu les
Mont.Blanc Tau~j;n
Avant latermeture du tunnel, 29vhioules Au moment de l'accident, iI se oompris
(16 PL, 9 voitures, 1 oarnlonette ett moto) ont trouvaitenviron140 vhloules 13 PL. ont t pigs sur Ie
pntr dans Ie tunnel par la tte franatse. dansletunnel. 70 vhioules ct nord de I'aocident. On
Ouatre PL ont doubl Ie PL en feu aprs qu'il environ ont pntr dans Ie estime 30 35 les usagers
s'est arrt. Les 25 autres vnlcutes ont t tunnel aprs l'accident, mals qui ont pu s'chapper par la
piqs par la furne, puls ont pris feu, ne se sont pas approohs du galerie de secours.
Dans Ie rnrne tem ps, des vhicules sont entrs foyer. 170 vhicules environ
par Ie ct italien. Certains d'entre eux ont crois ont quilt Ie tunnel aprs
Ie PL en feu, 8 PL et quelques VL se sent arrts I'aocident.
prs du garage 22 paroe qu'i1s voyaient de la 24 voitures et 16 camions ont
fume devant eux. Les voitures ont pu faire demi t pris dans l'lnoendie, y
tour et sont sorties du tunnel. Les 8 PL ont oompris les 2 camions et
eneuite pris feu. 4 voitures irnpliqus dans
l'accident d'ori ine.
In the Mont Blanc Tunnel, the traffic was tree f10wing before the fire alarm
sounded. In the Tauern Tunnel, thetraffic conditions bfore th accident
were unusual, Due to repair work on a 500-m length of tunnel just inside the
north portal, circulation was only posslble on the north direction lane (see
Figure 3.6). Traffic lights had been placed on the north direction lane inside
the tunnel 630 m from thenorth portal to alternate circulation in the work
area. For the south directin lane, traffic lights at the north portal were used.
The speed limit in front of the constructlon site was 50 km/h and the speed
limit along the work site was 30 km/h. The traffic was heavier in the southern
direction than in thenrthern.ln the St. Gotthard Tunnel, the south entrance
of the tunnel was already closed to traffic at the beginning of the fire because
of an HGV exceedingthe allowed height. The traffic in the other direction was
flowing.
In the Mont Blancfire, the tunnel was closed to traffic three minutes after the
beginningof the fire. At theltalianportal,the tunnel was closed with barriers,
and on the French side it was ciosed by red traffie signalsand sirens at the
toll. Three cal'S entered the tunnel despite these alarms. In the Tauern fire,
the tunnel was closed three minutes afterthe fire alarm by red traffic lights at
the north' portal. A vehicle queue was already formed on the north side
outside the tunnel. In the St. Gotthard Tunnel fire, the operators activated the
closure of the tunnel five minutes aftel' the beginning of the fire.
PIARC.71 .05.16.B-2006
:.;.::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::;::::::::::::.:.: .....
3.3.2 Les incendies
Theorigin .of tl1einitial. fireis .very different in the threetunnels.ln. the Mont
BlancTunnel,. thefirstfire\iVas capsed'. by thespontaneous. ignition of an
HGV'scab . In the. Ta~rn Tunnel,the .origin.of thefire .was afront-rear
COIUsionbetweenanl-tGVand several vehicles, among which was an HGV
transporting Iacquertins.
The Mont Blanc, Tauern and St. Gotthard Tunnel fires were under control
after 53 hours, 14 hours and 6 hours respectively.
The maximum heatrelease rate hasben estsnatd at 180 MW for the Mont
Blanc fire (average 15t0100 MW),120 MWfor the Tauerh fire, and 120 to
200MW for theSt.Gotthard fire.
Fire CJetection
In the Mont Blanc fire the main difficulty for the operators was to locare the
fire.lndeed, the firedetection. systems. serving both tunnelhalves did not
provide useful information on thelocation of the fire. The smoke also
rendered the camera images useless. The.firstalarm ""asglven by tunnel
opatimetersthat. announcedanabnormal opacity resultingfromthe emission
ofwhitesmoke bythe lorrymovinginthetunnel(1 to 2min beforethe lorry
stopped afLay-bY21) .. Thefire .alarm was gIven by an.operation team
memberperforming routine patrol inside the tunnel. The patrollerinformed
the .control room of lhe.fire .and fire. positionusing the internal radio
transmission network; The Italian fire detection systern was under
maintenance,and therefore .could not dtct th .fire ..rhe fire .detectIon
system on the French slde gave an alarm when the spreading heat reached
the French part of the tunnel, but it was too late to be useful.
In the Taurn Tunnel, the flre detection system gave an alarm with the
precise fire location within 2 minutes of the incident.
Ventilation Operation
In the Mont Btanc Tunnel flre, Italianoperatorsdidnotfollowtheir fire
emergency ventilation procedures: the reversible duet was maintained in
supply mQde instead of being turned toextraction. TheoPerator s:Clldthat he
aeteddeliberately. in this way beC$use he believed t wasthe best way to
protectthepeople ontheltalian sideofthe fire fromsmoke(seenthrugh his
camerascreens}.
On the French side, the fire emerency ventilation procedures were applied,
However, these procedures ledtoan increase in air velocity toward the
Freneh .port:Cl1because Jresh air was beingblown atfullcap.acity. This
acceleratedthesmokepropagation tow:c!rdstheFrenehportal.
PIARC 77 05.16.82006
Dans les deux incendies, Tensemble des forces de pornpiers (y cmprls les
secours privs dutunnel duMontBlanc) n'ontpas pu attendreles foyers en
raison dladllsltdes fumes. En fait, danslesdeuxcas, les pompiers
parvenus dans Ie tunnel les premiers sont arrivs par Ie ct Ie plus enfum.
DanslTauerni unrnalentendu au sujetdel'ernplacernentdufoyera retard
I'amvdes pompiers duct'nrd du tunnel.
~!3Il<In
~
PIARC 81 . 05.16.82006
Dans les trots incendies, .toutes .les persennes .piges. par la fume sont
rnortesdu fait de la toxicit des gaz plutt .que de la temprature leve
( I'exceptiondes pereonnes tues dans la colli sion elle-mme dans Ie tunnel
des Tauern). Dansje st. Gothard, les enqutesont conclu.que.les.vlctirnes
avalent t piqes : par ..Ia fume dansles 6 7 mmutes. aprs Ie
dclenchement de I'incendie, etqu' elles sonteertainement mortee dans les
12 15 minutes. Trots pereonnes qui avalent trouv refuge dansune niche
de scurit pendant I'incendie du tunnel des Tauern ontt protqes
partiellement de la fume.
3,3.6 Comportementdesusagers
On a constat des diffrences fondamentales dans Ie comportement des
usagers au cours des troisincendies. L'incendie du Mont-Slanc at Ie
premi.erseproduire,suivi de.celui.du tUl1neldesTauern, puis decelui du
St. Gothard. L'incendie du Mont-Blanc atelIement impressionn la
communaut europenne que les usaersdu tunnel des Tauern etdu st.
Gothard talent fortement consclents du risque qu'i1 v: avait rester dans
leurs voitures etde Ja ncessit de sortlr du tunnel par leurs propres tnoyens.
During theTauern fire, some ofthe taequer uns Ming transported by one
HGV exploded due to heat. The blast from the explosion was low, and did not
have any direct consequence on the safety of people in the tunnel. However,
it didcause the srnoketodestratity.
3.3.6 Users'Behaviour
There were fundamental differences .in users' behaviour duringthe three
fires.The .Mont Blanc Fire wasthe. flrstfireto. occur, followed by the Tauern
Tunnelfireand thenthe St. GotthardTunnelflre. The fire in theMont Blanc
Tunnelso .hlghlylrnpressed the Eurpeancommunify thaftheusers of the
Tauernand St. Gotthard tunnels wereacutely awareofthe risk ofstaying in
their cars and of th needtoselfevacuate.
In the Tauern Tunnel, 80 people left the tunnel either on foot or onboard a
vehlcle.Threepe6plet06k retugeinasafety niche700mfrom fire locatlon in
the directionof Villaeh, They were trappedby dense smokeand were
rescuedbyflre-fightera.
In the . St. Gotthard Tunnel, one estimate is that 30. to 35 tunnel users
escaped from the ..tunnel .. through emergency .: exits and ..the. parallel
emergency gallery.Somepeoplealsoescapedonfoot through the south
portal, Somecardriversused thegaragesVllhereas others,circulating from
south to north, madeU-turns in their cars toescape through the south portal.
In all three> fires, tunnel. users could .notfighL the fires with powder
extinguishers ..becausethe fires .were. too .large In the .Tauern ..and St.
.
pendant I'incendie sur toute la longueur du tunnel, alors que les quipements
installs dans I'espace de circulatlon ont d tre remplacs,
The Tauern Tunnel was c1eaned and repaired within three months,ineluding
important improvements to the exhaust ventilation system that now make. it
possible to eoncentrate the whole exhaust capacityabovethe region of a fire.
The St. Gotlhard Tunnel was closed to traffic for two months. The direct oost
assoeiatedwlthrepairsand traffic intrruptlon was 1.2 millionEuros. It was
reopened with alternatetraffic for HGVs. The legal enquiry concluded that the
only party.responsible for the fire and itsconsequences was the HGVdriver
who caused the accident. As he died in the incident, no further aetion was
taken.
AlPCR. 88.05.16.5-2006
However,thElconsElquencesofthe Mont Blanc Tunnel fire weremuch more
seri()u~
than.those.oftheothert\N'0fire$due.to various .factors ..
Firstotan,.the
tunnel.'.Ul>~r~in.the T~uern 'firewere '-.aware .ofthe previousl'v1ontBlarlC
catastrophe,giving them.the knowledge to react properly and f1ee.Anotner
favourable condition for this scenario was that the fire Was locatecLrelatively
close to a tunnel portal. In the St. Gotthard fire, the emergencygalleryplayed
a significantrole in the evecuation. In the Mont Blanc Tunnel fire, thefirewas
located a!most in the middle of the tunnel, making it unfavourabl~forJ)6th
srnoke extraction and user evaouaton. Morsover. the two separatEld Chtrol
eentres compltcated the tunnel operational procedures. . ...
SAFETY FACILITIES
Fast and precise
fire locatlon
detecon
Flfe detection
system out of wor\<
Firsl fire.flghters Could not reach the fitEl Needto-inform the fire-fighters on !he
arrivee frorn the extend of the smoke plug Inthe tunnel
most smoked
tunnel slde
Misunderstanding
aboutthe fire place
- - Arrived al !he tunnel late Need to trainlhe fire-fighters
----,~-~
Fire-fighters -- Fire-fighters were trapped in the Need to train the fire-fighters-
enlered thetunnel tunnel.Onedied, andthe Cooperation needed betweenthetunnel
with inappropriate evacuatton of the ethers needed operatorsand tne fire.fighters toinform
equipment svralhours themonthesituatlon insideJhetunnel
---
Fire-flqhters + Even with this short reactlon In the eventof a large fire, users haveto
reached thefirein time, the fire was alreadyvery self-ellacuate in a very short time period
the .snortesttlrne large anddifficult to fight
technicallypossible
.
USERS'IiIEHA;VIOt.JR
++
...
Users had.the ..
Fewervictims Need to inform the users on the
knowledge toflee behaviour expected from them
PIARC 91 . 05.16.62006
Les usagers ont ++ Molnsde viclimes Besoin d'informer les usagers sur Ie
utilis les sorties comportement tenir en cas d'incendie
de secours
Les victimes -- Lorsque ces usagers ont vu la On aurait d dire aux usagers qu'en cas
taient des fume, Ie temps de raction d'un arrt du trafic dans Ie tunnel, sans
conducteurs qui se restant pour atteindre les sorties inforrnation sur ce qui se passalt. ils
sont arrts de de secours taittrs court. devaient quitter leurs vhicules pour
300 600 m de rejoindre les sorties de secours ou les
I'incendie, abris.
apparemment
parce qu'lls ne
pouvaient pas voir
---------
TION OU TUNNEL
Deux eentres de - -
- Manque decoordination entre Un seul centre de contrle auralt d
contrOle dlstlncts, les oprateurs des deuxcentres exploiter Ie tunnel
chacun exploitant - Complexit de l'explltation de
une moiti du la venlilation de secours et de la
tunnel communication avec les secours
---
Apport d'air frais -- - A acclr la vitesse de la - Rduirel'appQrtd'airfrais si lavitesse
plne capacit furne vers les entres longitudinale n'est pas ma1trise
( partir du bas) - Bouchon de fume plus long - Les modes de ventilatlon doivent tre
vrifis priodiquement la lurnire des
recommandations existantes.
L' apport d' air ftais ++ Aperrnisla stratification des L'apportd'air frats dolttrrdutt dans
partir du plafond fumes dans les minutes qui ont la ZOne du foyer pour favoriser la
s'est arrt aprs suivi I'incendie stratification des fumes
I'alarme incendie
---,----
Les procdures de
ventilation n'ont
- ~ Pas d'extraction de furne dans
la zone du foyer
Besoin de former les exploitants du
tunnel raglr en cas de sltuatlon
past sulvies Lesaufflage partir du plafond d'urqnce
(soufflage au Iieu a contribu dstratlfier les
d'extrsctlOn) furnes
Unequeuede -- - Beaucoup d'usagers dans-Ia La dlstance de scurit en cas
vhicules s'est zone dangereuse d'lncendledolt tre respectelorsque
forme I'arrire - Le feu s'est transmis d'autres les vhicules ont s'arrter dans un
du foyer. vhicules tunnel. 6esoin d'informer les usagers.
- Des barrires dolvent tre Installes
dansles tonnets lonqs pour vlter
I'accumulalion des vhlcules dans les
zones danoereuses .
Le tunnel a t ++ A Iimitle nombre de - Les usagers dolvent tre duqus
ferm rapidement persennes prsentes dan Ie - Utiliser des barrires physiques au lieu
la circulation tunnel des feux de circulation pour fermer Ie
(3 mln aprs Ie tunnel
dclenchement de
l'incendie)
Les oprateurs ne - Cornpter les vhicules entrant et
pouvalent pas sortant ?
savoir combien de
personnes taient
prsentes dans Ie
tunnel au moment
du dclenchement
de I'incendie et
aprs
AlPCR. 92 . 05.16.62006
Users ++ Fewervictims Need to inform users on the
emerqency.exlts behavtour expectedin case of a fire
The victirns were As these tunnel users saw the smoke, The tunnel users shoitfhe told that
drivers who the reaction time to reach the in case of a traffic stop in a tunnel
stopped in the emergency exits was very short with no information on whatis
tunnel 300 to happening, they must leave theit
600 m away from vehicles to reach emerqency exits
the fire, apparently or shelters
because they could
not see the fire
TUNNEL OPERATION
Two separated - Lack of coordination between the Only one control centre should be
control centres, tunnel operators of the two eentres operating the tunnel
each operating 'Complicated emerencyventltatton
one-halt otthe operatlonand.cornrnunicatton with
tunnel reecue forces
Fresh air supply at - Accelerated the smoke velocity - Reduce fresh air supplyif th-
full capecity (from towards the portals lonqitudinal velocity is not
the bottorn) - Longer smoke plug controlled
-Venlationprocedures have to be
checked periodicallyin the light of
aV13ilable recommendations.
Fresh air supply ++ Permitled smoke stratificatlonlnthe Freshair supply must be reduced in
from the ceiling minutes following the fire the fire zone to favour the smoke
stopped after the stratloaon
fire alarm
3.5 Conclusions
3.5 Conclusions
The Mont Blanc, Tuern and .St. Gotthard firesshowthafa serlous HGV fire
in a transverse ventilated tunnel can lead todifferent consequences,
depending on:
traini~gtunm~lo~~rators
trainingfire4ghtingandrescueforces
ha\lingnintii11ateunderstandingOfand thebiliIY tooperate emergency
ventilationsystemsinaccordance withemergency ventlation procedures.
4.3.1 Objectifs
L'objectif de la ventilation transversale est de protger les usagers en
maintenant la fume stratifie dans unenappechaudesousle plafond du
tunnel et en I'extrayant ce niveau. Cettestratificationn'estpas trs stabie
et peut. facilement tre perturbe par Ie courant. d'air Jongitudinal indult par
les vhicules en mouvement, par les diffrences depresslonentre les ttes
du tunnel, la ventilation, etc. Par consquent il est forte ment conseill de
matriser Ie courant d'air longitudinal au moyen de la ventilation du tunnel.
4.3 Tran$venit.EtVentilatiQn
4;3.1 Objectivs
The aim of transverse velltilation is to protecUtletl.loneluse(s .bykeeping the
smoKe .str/iltified in a .hotlaYer .l.ll'lderneaththeaillngQfth~ tunnel and
extracting it attheceiling.Smokestratificationisllot a very robul>t effect; It
can ....
easily .. be. distu.'pedbythe ..
longitudinalairflow induce(l 1>)1 mewing
vehicles;pl"e$8Uredifferl:)ncesbetween partals, ventilatiorl,etc. As a
conseql,lenceitis highlyadvisaPle to contrpl the longitudinalairflow by
rnesne of the tunnel ventilation.
au
ec/flent:~
cQncemant.l'altff'tJl$
cap.a(;lt$$d~s
l..esr~gle$ d~dimersI9hn~ment ges . ~i11~~~t.
d~$ \le.htilateurs
d'alr fraissom.glr~mel'l'l~J1t.J~~~
~q~
Be~in$ 9~.9ill,l~k~1'l.(f~
I~P8Il\.ltlon.Les
polluants contrlsordinairement.sontle.monoxydede.carbone(CO) et les
pafticules qui ont un effet ngatif sur la visibilit. Certainspayscontrlent
aussi les oxydes d'azote (NOx).
AlPCR. 98 . 05.16.62006
In the following.text, the wording "transverse ventilation system" includes
both full transverse and serni-(partial) transverse systems. The specific
name of the system employed isafunetlon of the presenee of fresh air and
extraction air ducts and/or the operational imbalance of injected and
extracted airflow rates as explained in referenee [2].
Generally, transverse ventilation uses ducts that run parallel to the tunnel.
Two kinds of duets are utilised:
Fresh air duets are used to injeet fresh air into the tunnel in order to dilute
the polluted gases produced byth vehieles;
Extraction or exhaust duets are used to extract air from the tunnel volume.
The mainpurpose of extraction isto rsrnove thesmoke and hot gases
produeed by a fire. .ln some cases, theextrEletion capaeity. may be used in
order to limit thelongitudinal velocity in the tunnel under normal operation.
4.3.2 DimensioningRules
Fresh Air requirements
The dimensioning wies for the freshair fancapacities and duets are direetly
Iinked to the pollutiondilution requirements ..The. pollutants that. must usually
be controlledarecarbon rnonoxide(CO}, and particulaternatter that
negatively affects visibility. Some countries also control nitrogen oxides
(NOx).
Ie dbit de fumes,
les exigences de rnattrtse du courant d'air longitudinal.
Equipement de la gained'exuaeti()n
lncrease the thermal exchange between the individual srnoke layers and
between the srnoke and the walls.
PIARC.101.05.16.8-2006
D'autres causes importantesde la destruction de la stratification sont ;
the injection of fresh air intothe tunnel, which can induceaswirl along the
tunnel and/or, in the case of vents located aUhe ceiling, cause smoke
convection to thetunnelfloor;
the 'turtnnenee oaussd: by jetfansactivated in the vicinity of the stratified
layer.
PIARC.103.05.16.6-2006
:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:.:;;.:.:.: .
4.3.4 Spcifications concemant les quipements
Ventilateu(s d'extraction
Trappes d'extraction
On trouvera des informations plus dtailles sur les trappas d'extraction dans
l'Annexe 12.4.
AIPCR.104.05.16.8-2006
4.3.4 EquipmentSpecifications
Extract/on Fans
Thethermal resistanceof the fans must ensure thatthe extraction of the hot
smokeis possible with any configuration. .The PIARGreport[2] refers to the
Memorial. Tunneland the Zwenberg . Tunnelfiretestsinwhich semi-
transverse ventilation systemswereused. The temperature rise at the fans
hardlyreached 200 G with uniformlyspacedextract/on
0
ports. However, when
thefire locacn is relatively close tothe extraction point, theexhaust
temperature may be significantly higher than 20()OC.This was thereason for
increasing the thermal resistance of exhaust fans in Austria and Germany to
4()()oG for 90 minutes,and in France 20()orAOOoG fOr 120 rnlnutes
dependingon the locatio.cf.the.fans relat/veto the traffic room.
Smoke Dampers
PIARC.105.05.16.8-2006
4.4 Ventilationlongitudinale
4.4.1 Introduction
Dansles systmes de ventilation longitudinale, Ie tunnel estutilis comme
une conduite pour I'extractiondes fumes. On considre que ces
systmes assurent unbon niveau de scurit en cas d'incendie dans les
tunnelsunidirectinnels. Blenqusltpossll, mals peuprobable, que des
usagers puIsseht treaffectspar la fumi1lpousSe par li1lsventilateurs (par
exemple s'ils setl'ou\iht eh a\ialde l'inl1die en tai$nd'\.lnembooteillage),
on considre que la plupart des usagers se trouvent dans la zone amont
(exempte de fume),
Le prsent- chapitre apour. but -de. -dvlopper -.plutt. que derpter les
informatiohsdohnesdahsls rfrenCs[21et[15].Ledimensionnement
des acclrateurs doit prendre en cornpte I'influence de l'ncendle sur Ie
systme d'acclrateurs, les etfets mtorologiques aux ttes du tunnel
(principalement Ie vent), !'implantation optimale des ventilateurs, leur
efficacit, ainsi que les niveaux sonores crs parlesystme
d'acclrateurs.
4.4.1 Introduction
Longitudinal ventilation systems utilize the tunnel tube as the "duct" for
smoke extraction. Such systerns are seen as providing reliable safety in case
of a.flre accident for unidirectional tunnel tubes. Although there is a slight
possibilitythat roadusersean beaffected by thesmokebeing pushed by the
fans (for exarnple, if they cannot leave the tunnel downstream ofthe fire due
to a traffi jam),most road-users ean be expeetedto be located in the
upstream (smoke free) area of the tunnel.
The two basic equations required for the proper SIZll1g of jet fan-baeed
longitudinal ventilation, along with examples of such, are shown in
Appendix 12.3.
Reception (factory) tests are aimed at checking that the equipment actual
performance ..rnatches .the .specified .requlrements ..The .test guidelines
generally point out the. procedures tor these test operations.
Des vnements qui peuvent s'avrer trs dangereux pour les usagers sont
susceptibldse produlre dans les tunnels.Un irtcidentuun accident qui
engendre ...un ...incel1die .>et/ou Un .:d~gl;lgeT~nt(if;l ..~<lIztAxJql.les est un
Vnement particulirement(jatlg~r~l.Ix.l..'auto~vacuattonest I'action de se
mettre sot-rnme en scUrlt. Dijns cefuiinscas,l'el1~otila sortie du
tunneln'offrepaslarnEJillelireiSSuEJde.s~cours PQl.Irl'ens$l'lible des
personnesimpliques dansl'incident. Dans Ce css, lies! ncessaire de
disposerd'lssues .de .SaCQUI'$ .supplrnentiresp<:>ur racootlrclssent Ie
cheminement d'vacuation horsdelazol'ledangereuse.
Vienne 1979
Montral 1995
AIPCR.112.05.16.6-2006
In short tunnels the portals are adequate. In long er tunnels, the length of the
escape route depends on the type of traffic and the ventilation system. The
more the limited .survival zone and me, bad. visibility conditions can be
diminished by the ventnatton systern, the longer the escape distance for
tunnel users (l.e., interval between emergencyroutes) may beo
Montr&al1995
With all structure types, it is assumed that without special provlslons, there is
typically no chance for. a road user to depart directly from the roadway. The
more enclosed a structure, the greater the effects of a fire inside the
structure. Since smoke rises during a fire, it can escape through gaps in the
ceiling. The larger the gaps, the slower the smoke wHi accumulate and
spread longitudinally along the tunnel. Depending on size and position
(height), this will hold true for gaps in sidewalls, too. Of course, provisions for
smoke extraction will help to limit the length of roadway being filled with
smoke, In general, the more a road structureis enclosed, the greater the
need for adequate escape provisions. This is demonstrated in Figure 5.1.
Toxic gases and vapours can be released during certain accidents, such as
when a tankerisdamaged. Since the specific gravity of a gas or vapour is
typically higher than that of air, it will spread over the road surface whether or
not the structure has a roof. Theextent of enclosure is therefore less
significant for toxic gas and vapeur. release than fora fire and smoke
situation, with the exception that sideopenings can help to dilute the gas
concentration if wind pattems are favourable.Jntunnels with significant
longitudinal slopes, Iike underwater tunnels, toxic gases can cause severe
problems.
PIARC.115.05,16,8-2006
Puissance de l'incendie
11'l1:11lldil'1
dml'll un OlJ\If!'l~ Ga;! t<i':lJl:i(\l~lI
filmni! "'_ ~,aJ:i<l11 11_ !In (l\."flafl'1' I\l!r,~
Many potentiel values for tire size can be found in existing Iiterature. The
PIARC document "Fit$hdSmoke Control in Road Tunnels" [2] shows the
following values:
PIARC.117.05.16.6-2006
La Iittrature en provenance des Pays-Bas donne les puissances maxima les
d'incendie suivantes :
Cela ne signifie pas que I'incendie n'sfjamais important dans Ie cas d'une
auto-inflammation de vhlcule, ni inversmentqu'i1 n'estjamais bnin dans Ie
cas d'un accident. L'incendie caus parJ'aut04nflarTlniation d'un vhicule
dans Ie tunnel du Mont Blanc at elctrmenientimportant. Les informations
qui prcdentn'ont pour but que de donner une ide de ce quoi on peut
raisonnablement s'attendre.
Dveloppement de l'incendie
AIPCR .118.05.16.8-2006
Uterature from the Netherlands provides the following maximum fire sizes:
Since the typical traffic mix is comprised mostly of cars, the probability of a
car fire is the highest It is estimated that 95% of all car fires are caused by
breakdownsrather than accidents. Therefore,in the majority of incidents,
only one car is involved in thefire. A car fire is typically not verylarge, but
can still produce a lot of smoke. While not very high in temperature, the
smoke can be toxic enough toinjure. people. Very largefires that produce a
lot of heat andfoxic smoke canoccur wh en lorries are involved. An
investigationoftheElbe Tunnel in Qermanyfrom 1979t01985 indicated that
while lorries comprised only 15% of the total vehicle mix, 30% of all fires
were caused by lorries. Almost all of tbe fires in this investigation were
related to a vehicle breakdown.
If the cause of the fire is an accident, it often happens that more than one
vehicle is involved. In such events, the fire size is likely to be larger and
depends on the composition of the vehicles involved in the incident.
This is does not mean that the firesize will never be large in the case of a
vehicle breakdown, and conversely will never be small in the case of an
accident. The fire caused by a vehicle breakdown in the Mont Blanc Tunnel
was very large. The above information is only intended to give an idea of
what can reasonably be expected.
Fire Development
A vehicle fire is never immediately at lts maximum size -- it takes time for the
fire todevelop. In fact, almost all firesfollow the same fire development
pattern, trrespectlve of th finalfire site. An investigation including 30 car
fires ina closed parkingfacUity [22]andafire test in the Netherlands'
Beneluxtunnel indicated thefollowingtypicalscnario for a passenger car:
the fire remains small in the first 5-10 minutes after ignition;
the windows break, and the fire reaches its maximum size within 2-
5 minutes;
PIARC.119.05.16.8-2006
Ie feu brle sa puissance maximale ou prescue pendant 10
15 minutes environ,
Ie feu s'teint lentement.
DimM.~oo
F~~g,iz0
N;~':!il!t {~ .; WiM
4"'~~""-'"
AIPCR .120.05.16.8-2006
the fire burns at or near lts maximum size tor about 10-15minutes;
thefire slowlyextinguishes.
PIARC.121.05.16.8-2006
5.3.3 Comportementhumain
Un facteur important pour concevoir les dispositions d'vacuation est Ie
comportement humain. Un rapport sur Ie comportement humain dans des
situations dangereuses [24 ; 25]indique que les ractions les plus courantes
vis--vis d'un incendie sontl'lncrdulit, la sous-estimation et/ou Ie refus d'un
danger potentiel. Cessentiments se-trouventrenrorcslors de la premire
phase d'un incendie s'U est faible et sans beaucoup de fume. Le rapport
conclut qu'environ 37 % des persennes prsentes essaient d'teindre Ie feu,
24 % avertissent les autres usagers, et seulement 16 % tentent de
s'chapper. Unegrande partie des.personnesquirestentsurplace se
contententde regarder l'incendie, certaines courtedistance.
Other people will be unaware of the severity of the situation because they are
at.sorne distancefrom theaccidentlocation, waiting.intheir.carsuntil they
ean drive on. Theymay bealerted bysomekind of emergencycaUor when
theyarecoveredby smoke, bothof which maybetoo late. Whna small fire
suddenlygrowslarger, meny.peeple are in dangerbecauseofthe srnoke and
heated gases.
Le temps total d'vacuation est la somme des dures des trois phases. Le
temps d'vacuation disponible dpend de la vitesse laquelle I'incendie se
dveloppe et de la propagation de la fume dans cette situation particulire.
5.3.4 Ventilation
Un objectif important du systme de ventilation pendant un incendie est
d'assurer que les voiesd'vacuationrestent exemptesde fume. La
publication Matrise des incendies et des fumes dans les tunnels
routiers de I'AIPCR, 1999 [2J donne des recommandations pour la
ventilation en oas d'incendie. CeUes-cisont compltesparlechapitre 4 du
prsent rapport.
the action phase includes the time to escape as well as to take other
actions.
5.3.4 Ventilation
Animp0rtantgoalofthe ventilationsystern<:iuringaflreis tOPrqvide smoke-
free escape rQutes'": The ..publicatioo"FireandSrnoke .ControL In Road
Tunnels" by PIARC, .1999 [?l, ..provic\El$recolTunendations forventilation in
oese.fa flre.These are cOrnplernented by section 4 of the present report.
PIARC.127.05.16.8-2006
Figure 5.4 Comportement de la fumedans un tunnel court sans ventilation mcanique
Smoke behaviour in a tunnel without mechanical ventilation
AIPeR .128.05.16.8-2006
Figure 5.6 - Comportement de la fume dans un tunnel aveceJC;tractic)Odes fumes
Smoke behaviour in a tunnel with smoke extraction
r<>,~~"" 1;;;;:'.'l~""':I!
;:;"";.l'~<;<> ~::::';*~~:","j
,t<:;:;::t.' t-t.:::~?:.r.Jt~~~!
't~,;:< S'::>~t:~~~:f.-:):t*-;:,
~~(lf~
..................................................................... +~.~ .~ ~"' ~...................
~_.....
,-
et "enltllal:lon transversale
t~~:'lf;K<?&:ft:~:~~~ ~~::~::~
...................................................................... ... ....._ ...~_..~ _.....~
,~
~~~~.s-~y~~{$~
, '"
PIARC.131.05.16.82006
5.3.6 Controlesen tunnel
Dans un tunnel surveiU 24 heuressur 24, iI esthabituellementpossible de
dteoter rapidement un inCendie(bouClesdans la chaussa, tlvision en
circuitferm ouautres dispositifs), et des lnstructlons peuvent normalement
tre donnes rapidement auxusagers (par haut-panurs.fransmlsslon radio,
panneaux vtsuels, eto.), ce qui rend plus efficace I' vacuatlon:
Interdistance
Les ttes d'un tunnel constituent elles-mmes des issues de secours, Ainsi,
pour un tunnel nepossdant pasd'issues de secours supplrnentalres, la
longueur de l'ltinralre d'vacuation est gale la longueur totale dutunnel.
Ce sont Ie type d'ouvrage et la longueur de I'itinraire d'vacuation qul
dcideront de la ncessit ou non d'itinraires d'vacuation et de sorties de
secours supplmentaires.
5.4 ErnergencyEgress
5.4.1 EmergencyExits
Spacing
The snorter the distance between emergency exits, the higher the safety
leveLProvidingemergency exits (crosspassages)from tunnel tube to tunnel
tube is rather easyifthe tubes aredivided byonlya walloran escape
corridor. Howaver, providingemergency exits forbored tunnels (in rock or
soft grOl.lnd) canbecomea major task:Basedon dscussions inthe prsvlous
sections,thefollowing. should beconsidered:
a fire needs sorne time to develop, thus giving road users time to escape.
The development time is someWhat Independent of the uftimate fire slze;
The optimaI distance between two emergency exits is gene rally estimated to
be between 100 and 500 m.
Cependant, dans certains cas,on prfre verrouiller lesportes pour viterles actes de vandalisme.
Dans de tels cas, les portes doivent tre dverrouilles immdiatement distance lorsqu'i1
constat qu'un incident s'est produit.
the luminance of access f1oors, doorsteps, etc. and the room just behind
the emergency exit should ba "inviting" and ba designed to prevent
people fromfalling or stumbling;
5.4.2 EscapeRoutes
Escape routes should be large enough to handle the capacity of people
expected tobe present in thetunnelduring anincident.Escape routes in
enclosed spares (corridors) should be at least 1.2 m wideto allow two
people: walking besic:teoneanother. This allows faster people to pass slower
people who may be handicapped or injured.
An escape route should lead to a safe place, and not to a closed area, a
smoky area or an area with moving traffic. If an escape route leads to
another tunnel tube, provisions should be made to stop the traffic in that tube
before escaping people reach it.
Some escape route solutlons for rectangular two-tube tunnels are shown in
Figure 5.9 and for two-tube bored circular tunnels in Figure 5.10.
However, in some cases locked doors are preferred to prevent vandalism. In such cases, doors
should be remotely unlocked immediately upon deterrnination that an incident has occurred.
AIPCR .136.05.16.6-2006
5.4.3 Shelters
escape routes and doors should wideenough for stretchers and nursing
personnet as weil as flrernen with their equipment;
when .an escape corridor between two tunnel tubes. is utilized for
evecuanon, thedoorfrmonettlbeshouldopen opposite to the door from
the other tube. Thlsmakes it easier to pass from tube to tube;
doors that c10sebyspring should not impede the. passing of the fire
brigade's water hoses;
doors should be visible and clearly encoded also in the direction of rescue
access.
Des panneaux trs solides et clairs doivent tre prvus pour alerter et guider
les usagers impliqus dans un incident en tunnel. du fait que les personnes
ont normalement des difficults pour modifier leur action lorsqu'elles se
trouvent places dans une situation trs diffrente de la norme [24]. Les
avertissements et lesinstructions doivent tre donns.de faon officielIe. afin
d'tre reconnus comme srieux et non comme de fausses alertes. Cela aide
les usagers ragir et comrneneer I'vacuation sans craindre de mal
ragir. IJest recommandcnaquf9is que possible de donner au moins deux
sortes d'avertiS$ements ; par exemple. une alarme visuelle et une alarme
audio. ou deux alarmesaudiodiffrentes. Si des systmes dehaut-par1eurs
exisfht.UsdWhtfr
sllffisarnrnhtdibles. PluslsihStructions pour
quitter Ie tunnel sont dnnes tot. plus les personnes auront de temps pour
vacuer effectivement Ie tunnel (voir flgure 5.3).
U est prfrable que ces panneaux soient clairs et visibles. dans les
conditions .dexploitation -:normales. afin que les usagers apprennent la
pr!$li}nce~tl'el11pl~~m~ht de$i$sues gli}s~cours.
PIARC, 141,05,16,6-2006
6 QUIPEMENTS SPCIFIQUES
POUR LES INCENDIES
6.1 Introduction
Vienne 1979
Dtecteurs
Le Comit a recornrnand que les program mes concernant I'incendie
couvrent galement la formation du personnet et l'informatlon du public,
AlPCR. 142.05.16.82006
6 FIRE SPECIFIC EQUIPMENT
6.1 Introduetion
Vienna 1979
Detectors
The Committee recommended that fire alarm programs also cover staft
training aOd dlspensation of publicinformation.
N Pays Commentaires
SprinkJersdans tous les tunnels routiers urbatns (dluge), en liaison avec des dtecteurs linaires et/ouboucl~ et/ou tlvision en
Australie circuit fermet/ou dtection automatiquedes incidents(DAI) ..Utilis.scommeinhibiteursd'incendie (aux premiers stades) et/ou
rotection .del'infrastructure aprs vacuation. Dtectionautomatique d'incendie.
2 Autriche Pas de sprinklers. Dtection automatiaue d'il1C6l1dl.
Rpublique
3
tchaue
4 I Danemark
5 I Egypte
6 I Finlande
7 France
8 Allemagne
9 I Grce
10 iltalie
~
12 I Pays-Bas
13 I Norvge
::
Sprinklers in allllrb1!lnroad tunnels, (deluge)inconjunction withlinear detectors and/or loop systems and/or eeN
and/QraUtomatic incident
Australia detecton (AID).Usoo1!lS fireinhibitor (earlystage of fire) and/orinfrastruclure protectiQnfoUowingevacuation. Automatic fire detection.
2
,1
4
:
6 rsesan.d underoroundcar
"7 els;
,tection:thnnali;ystems preferred.
,
,8
No automatic firesUppression faciltie$in Use otplanned,Unear fire detectl()n.systems, no point detectors in use (but
No SJ?!i.t!<!ers.
$omelnnelswith automalic fife detectionandautomcnlcincident detectionlike France.
$prinklersusedjnn;>adtullhels (cl1!lssesMandAl. Autoinatlcflre detecti<ln(c1assesAAand A).
Testingofsprin~lersysten'ls. No fll'~dete<:;tionequlpment-firedete~dbysurveillanceassistedbyother means like traffic detection (loops
12 Nethertands in roadsurface}and videQ cameras{noautomaticimage-processing);
$prink/tr SYStflmjnOnfl road lunneUnBergen. Tesng ofwatermist systerns for roadtunnels. About5 tunnels with Iinear heatdetector
13 Norway sensOl'll,firedetElc!orsalso in a high speed railtunnel undemeath thenew Oslo airport; nofire detectingequipment in other raad, railroad
and metro turmels.
14 i Saudi Arabia Nosp@klers.
15 Slovenia No sprinklers. Alltomatic fire detecon.
16 South Africa Automatic fire detecton.
17 Sweden No sprinklers.
No
18 Switzertand
19 Turkey
20 UK No sprinklers. ccrv eguiprrient.
3 tunnelsequipped with sprinklers, but sprinklers not generally recommended [35].
21 USA
Sydney 1983
Dtecteurs
Comme une dtection prcoce de l'incendiEJestnCEl~aire, il esfgalement
recommand que less~lIes de co01mal'ldep()ssdel'1tg~salanils auditives
actives par les bouton-alerme, lestlphnElsd'urgenceet les extincteurs.
Sprinklers
Les sprinklers sont flxs au pll:ifond ousurles parois et prvus peur refroidir
lmmdiatementle foyer lorsqu'unincendiedmarre. .nsoolvent donc tre
capables de. dverser de grandesquantits d'eauou de mousse. Les types
de sprinklers. installs. dans les immeubles conviennent moins blen que ceux
utiliss dans les hangars pouravions.
Sydney 1983
Detectors
Sinceearly deteetlon.of a.ftre.Is required, it.tsfurther reeommeneed that
control rooms have. audible .alarms .activatedby. alarm buttons, emergency
telephones and fire extinqulshers.
Sprinklers
Sprinklers are .fixed to the ceilingorthe walls and areintended to
immediately cool the souree when a fire starts. They must therefore be
cap:)ble ofdischarginglarge quantitiesof .water orfoam.lhe types of
spril1klers -.installed .inbuildings. areless .suitable. than .those used in aircraft
hangars.
PIARC.147.05.16.82006
mme si les f1ammessonttelntes, les parties mtaillques du vhicule ne
refroidissent pasrapidement,
I'essence continue se vaporiser et peut produire un mlange explosif,
les surfaces chaudes peuventenflammer I'essence qui sevaporise ou Ie
GPL.
Bruxelles 1987
Otecteurs
Les dtecteurs d'incendie transmettent un signal d'alarmeensalle de
commande qund Ia. tempratlJre dpasse .lJnecertalne limite uaugmente
avec une vitessesuprieore une valerdtermine.
L'installation de dtection peut tre constitue par un tuyau mtallique
continu dans lequell'air ou nga:z 8$. dilate quand ltempratoreaugmente
(systme rparti) oupardesappareilsespaMsentre eux de 25 m au
maximum (systme ponctuel),trallaillantdans lemmeouvrage;
L'intrt d'un tel quipement est vident. Cette installation est prvolr dans
les ouvrages prsentant des risques importants (tunnels trafic intense de
pids lolJrds,.tunnels dans'lesquelsle transit.dematiresdangereuses est
admts, tUnnels sous-f1uviaux sous-rnrins).
Sprinklers
.Les .sprinklers .sont fixsla voteou aux pidroits. lis dversent dans Ie
tunnel une certainequantitd'eauou detnousse.
I'eau peut propager sur une large surface les llquides inflammables en
oombusnon.
au contact de certinsproduits, I'eaupeufprovoquerdes ractions
dangereuses,
mrnesiles f1ammElssonfteintes,lespartiesmtalliquesdes vhicules
ne se refroidissent pas rapidement ; les produits inflammables continuent
dgager des vapeurs qui peuvent produire un mlange explsif,
Ie dbit d'eau (ou de mousse) peut, comme iI est arriv au tunnel
hollandaisde Velsen, ne pas tre suffisant pour teindre l'incendie d'un
vhicule ayant une charge combustible leve.
AIPeR .148.05.16.6-2006
even if the flames are extinguished, the metal in thevehicledoes not cool
quickly,
petrol continues to vaporise andrnay produce an exploslve mixture,
hotsurfaces rnay ignitevapoiising petrol or LPG gas.
Bru$sls1987
Detectors
Firedetectorsare designEld to transmlt a signa I to. the. control centre wh en
the temperaturerisesabove acertainlevel orincreasesatarate in excess of
a.predEltermined value.
The detection system can consist of one continuous rnetaltube in which the
enclosed air or gas expands as the temperature lncreases (dlstributed
deteftpr). or ofindividual. devices, .~paced notrnore man 25 metres apart
(isolated detectors), which wor'k on the same premise.
SQrinklfi!rs
Spiinklers are installed akmg. the roof or walhlofthetunnel. They are
deslqned to distribute a certain quantity of waterorfoam.
Sprinklers
Aucun pays europen n'utilisedes sprinklers de faoncourante. Au Japon,
ils sont utiliss dans les tunnels de grande longueur ou fort trafic, pour
refroidir les vhicules en feu.
Par consquent, les dispositifs d'arrosage ne dolvent pas tre utiliss dans la
zone d'incendieavant que toutesles personnes aient tvacues.
AIPCR.150.05.16.8-2006
Montreal.1995
Qetectors
There is significant, ongoing developrnent in thefield of automatic incident
detecnon, Detection of incidents can be simplified by means of CCTV
monitoring; Fire detectonsystems canbe usedin tunnelsthatare long,
complicated or that allow passage of \lehicles carrying daogerousgoods, and
where it is necessary to have a quick alarm or to know the exact location of
the flre, Fire detectors are also; very. helpful. in. unmanned .tunnels .with
transverse or semi-transverse ventilation, because without them, the CO and
opacity sensors used for normal ventilation would automati~lyactivate the
freshair <supplyat maximurncapacity.This operationis contrary to
emergency (fire condition)operatiOI'l,whichreducesor stops.fresh air and
starts smoke extraction. Therefore, fire detectors are used for this appllcation
in many countries.
Sprinklers
No European country usessprlnklers onaregular basis. In Japan, sprinklers
are used in long and heavily traveled tunnels to cooldownvehiles on fire.
As a consequence, sprinklers must nor be used inthe area ofthe fire before
all people have been evacuated.
6.3 FireDetection
6.3.1 Purposeof Fire Detectors
Autorn<iltic fire detectorsin roadtunnelsaredesignedtodeteet vehicle fires
aS9\J.i~lyasposl:liblel>0 .thjtgafety. equipment and procedures can be
.direetlyactivated.Thell'l1rne~ilate.aimsl:lre.to:
General
Firedetectors inroad tunnels must bedesigned to withstand the following
environmental eondltions:
mixed vehicular trafflc (l.e., cars, small.lorries, heavy .Ioad lorries, buses
and. tankers) .that wll result in varying degrees of tunnel cross section
obstructin;
f1uctuating pressureloads resultingfrommoving traffic.
Paratnete~D1ctatedby CodesandStandards
ThefoIlOV1iit19pararnetersfurautomaticfire detectors are specified in national
and international. codeS and standards (Table6.2):
Fire leads and smoke quantities tor full-scale flres (e.g. a 30 MWlorry fire)
provided in the codes of praenee for sizing ventilation plants and tunnel
Iinings are not appropriate for sizing automaticfirealarm installations,
becausefirealarmsmust be activated Jong beforethe fire .reaches full-
scale. Thus, for exarnple, the AUl~trian guidelineRVS 9.282 [33Hndicates
that a reltable alarm is required during the smouldering stage of the fire.
Autres paramtres
Les installationsd'alarrne incendieautmatique doiventaussirespecter les
paramtres suivants:
OtherParameters
Autol1'laticfirealarminstallations within a tunnel should also adhere to the
following parameters:
AccordingtoRABT [32], the design fire isa fire lnvolvig 20 Iitres of petrol
overan areaof4square metras. With .air velocitiesof up to3 rn/sec, the
maximum response time to thisfire is 60seconds [32].
For semi-transverse and transverse ventilation systems, the fire site must
beidentified to within 50 metres [32].
Safetyagainst false atarms
The automatic fire. alarm. system must avoid falsealarms triggered by
possiblesourcesof disturbance. Depending onthemethod ofdetection,
false alarm oocurrencesean be redeeed by:
PIARC.157.05.16.82006
lements
Mthode de dtection Emplacement
defixation
RABT, projet s o e
5MW (1) Des capteurs thermlqus linairs ragissent Plfond
1.3.2002 VLuft jusqu' 6 mis (20 I d'essence SUf 4 m2) I'augmentation d$t$rnpratureet au niveau de dutunnei
[32] temprature au-dessus
i (2) Les capteurs th.ermiques complts de la zone
par des mesures dvisibllit (tous les de circulation
150m}
(3) Approuve commealtemative :camras
thermiques. et units vido avecdlection d'image
21 A RVS 9.282, (1) VLuft< 3 mis: s 10m (i) VLuft< 3. mis : Afarme maximate et dil'f'rentiell~tou autre systme
7.2002 a) pr-alarme: env.1,5MW techniquernent.quivafent
[33] s sos (2incendies cnacun de (2}Points demesuratousJes 10 rnmax,
b) alarme : s 90s 10 I d'alcool rm2par (3) Alarme fiable requise pendant la phase o
(2) VLuft., 3 mis : bouteillell VLUft l'incendle.couve
a) pr-alarme: .,3 mis: env. 3,5MW Distinctioll ncessaireentre lesfumes d'incendie
s 120s (2incendiesavec et les facteurs de gne tets quepoussires et
b) alarme : s 150s mlangedelOt diesel fume
et5 lessence, 1 m2 par
~~ I j
31 F Circulaire Exigs uniquement pour les tunnels qulnesont pas surveills en permenenee etqulsont qulps d'une ventilatlon transversale ou semi-
interminist- transversale.
rlelle n'2000- Exigences techniques fixes au cas par cas ; pas d'exigencas. fixes par les textes
63 du Dtection automatique d'incldents obligatoire dans les tunriels survets
25.8.2000
34
41CH 6irective: s60 s s20m Directive POUI essais (i) Touslescepteursapproprls sant approuvs, y Tempratures:
Ventilation inceridie en prparation Cornprisls units vidP au-dessous
des tunnels (2}Lestunnels avec v~ntlationmla~ique dolvent duplafond
routiers, avoir .unedtecl.ionincendiecontiOue 1 dutunnel
projet avrll (3}Fourc~ette de mesure des templ3ratures des
I
2001 dtecteurs de ~2O"C +100PC(prclsion 2"C)
[36] (4) Tempsde.comrnurilcation desvaJUrs mesures
encasd'incendle :i0s (lemPrature, visibilit,
CO,VLuft)
51 USA NFPA502 s 15m 5MW (i) SystmevidP approuv pourl$.dtection
Edition 2001 (incendie d'essence de incendie,galement pour tunnels surveifls en
[35] 2m2) permanence
Les svstmes dolvent treconformes NFPA 72
Detection Method Assembly
Point
D RABT,Draf! sat 5MW Line ternperatere sensors react to rise in Tunne! ceiling
1.3.2002 up tos mis (20 I of petrol over 4 m2) ternperature andtemperaturelevet abovethe
[32] Temperat!Jre sensors must be Clearance
supplell1ented by.visibilitymeasurements zone
of traffic (at 150mgaps)
,6,pprovedas analtemative: Heat
carneras and video units with image
detection
I'
A RVS 9.282, (1) V4uft< 3 mis: $10m VLuIt< 3 mis: Maximmand differentialalarm prooess
7.2002 a) pre-alarm: 5:605 ca. 1.5 MW (2 tires or other technically equivalent systern
f33] each wilh 10 I of Measurement pol nt gap max:1 0 m
.... b.tal.a.
rm: $9. Os
....
(2)V4uft~3 mis: pmts 1 m2 per bottle) Reliablealarrn required during the
1
. a)prlralarm: $ 120s VLult2. 3 mis: smoldering fire phase of a fire
b)alarm: s 150s ca. 3.5 MW (2 fires Distinction between fire smoke and
with mix of 10 I disturbance factors such as dust and
diesel and 5 I petrol, fumesrequired
2
.... m.. . ~_m __ . _ 1 rn perbottle) I
3 F Inter-Ministry Ortly required tor tunnels not permanentty manried byoperating personnet end equipped withtransverse or semi-transverse
Clrcular No. ventilation
2000-63 from Technicairequlrernents decided on a
caseby case basis; no technica I requirements imposedin the regulations
25.8.2000 Automatic incident detectionls compulsory in mannedtunnels
'~
4 CH GuideJine: ~20m Ansu[tabla sensors ii1Cludlng video units Temperatures:
Road Tunnel areapproved beneath \he
Ventilation, Tunnels with meshanical ventilaonrnust tunnel ceilng
Draf! April conleln.continuous.fire.detection
2001 Temperature measurement range for
[36] firedetectors -20C to +100oC (accuracy
Zoe)
Cornmunieatlon times for meesurement
valnes in Ihe eventof a fire: 10 s
temperature>visib~ity,. CO,. V Lult
5 USA NFPA502 $15m 5MW Vid~monitoring approved for fire
Edition 2001 (2 m2 large petrol fire) detection also for tunnels supervised full-
[35] time by personnel
Svstems must conform to NFPA 72
o En comparant les valeurs mesures avec
les mesures d'un second systme d'alarme incendie [38 ; 45],
les mesures des capteurs voislns,
dans Ie cas de capteurs infrarouges, les mesures de deux sries
de longueurs d'ondes influences des degrs divers par des
facteurs de perturbation [38 ; 45].
Fonctionnement des tempratures environnantes aUant d'environ - 30 G 0
C~blfibre de verre
Dans Ie cas des dtecteurs d'incendie flnaires flbre de verre, des lmpulslons
laser sont conduites Ie long du cable en fibre de verre (voir figure 6.1). U
existe deux types de dtecteurs en fibre de verre :
Variante1: la fibre de, verre est place dans un tube rempli de cire et
enveloppe de fibres aramide [42].
Le tube rempli de cire gonfle lorsqu'il est expos une temprature
lsve et les flbres aramldesdforment Ie cble de flbre de verre. Cela
provoque la dispersion des impulsions laser par la ebaleur.
Variante 2 : moditication dans la fibre de verre par influence directe de la
temprature [41 ; 42 ; 43 ; 44].
Dans ce systme de dtection, Jalumirelaser debrillance module est
conduite dans une fibre optique de quartz pos au plafond. Les
tempratures levesaltrent l'interaction entre la lumire laser et la
structure cristaUine du quartz. La lumire laser est rflchie partieUement
et son spectre de longueur d'onde Se modifie. Le signallumineux rflchi
et briUance module contient des donnes concemant la temprature Ie
long du cble ainsi que sur les points o la temprature a augment.
Chaque cablecomportedeux fils de flbre de verre qui fonctionnent
indpendammenti'un del'autre, si bien que Ie systme de dtection est
redondant. Un seul systme peut surveilIer environ 4 km de tunnel.
AIPCR.160.05.16.8-2005
o Comparing the measurement values with
measurementvalues fromasecond fire alarm system [38; 45]
measurement values from neighbouring sensers
in the case of infrared sensor measurements in two wavelength ranges,
whichare lntluencedto varying degrees bydisturbance factors [38; 45]
The fire detection systems must be fitted with automatically. operating test
equipment that can determine disturbances affecting the plant [42].
Fibregla$$~Supported Line
With fibreglass~supportedlinefire detectors,laserimpulses are conducted through
the fibreglass cable (see Figure 6.1). Twotypes of fibreglass-supported line fire
detectors are described below;
A1PCR.162.05.16.8-'006
Fibreglass technology can be applied within a temperature range of approximateiy
30C to +90C. The advantages of fibregiass include:
Tube$capt~ursremp'i$dega~
Un tube capteur rernpll de gaz est fix auplafonddu tunnel [42] par sectlons
de 130 mtres maximum. Un capteurde pressioncontrle la pression dans
Ie tube' et dclenche une alarme si latemprature/pression augmente. Le
foyer d'incendie est locas en fonction de la poeltion dutube capteur dans
Ie tunnel. Aucune mesure supplmentaire de temprature n'est effectue. Un
moteur test avec pompe de pression produit une surpresslon dfinie de faon
prcise dans Ie tube capteur interval les rguliers. Si la mesure de la
pression ne conclde pas avec la plage dsire, en raison par exemple d'un
dfaut dans Ie tube, un message de dysfonctionnement est envoy.
AIPCR.164.06.16.6-2006
Figure 6.1 -Sonde de tempraturelinaireavecfibres optiques[42] I
Linear temperature sensor with optical fibres [42]
PIARC.165.05.16.8-2006
Systmes par cable capteur
Les capteurs thermiques [42 ; 44] sont placs selon des intervalles dfinis
dans un cble capteur entirement ferm. La temprature en chaque point
de mesure est fournie de faon squentielle au moyen d'un contrle
lectronique et la valeur transmise I'unit d'valuation. Les valeurs
mesures sont c1airement attribues chaque capteut thermique sur la
longueur du tunnel. Un logiciel de contrle divise I'ensemble de la secnon de
mesure en diffrents secteurs .pour permettra de dfinir les diffrents seuils
d'alarme .
Valeur absolue
Une alarme estdclenche lorsquelatempratureabsolue est atteinte.
Cette valeur absolue est pr-dtermlne ou pr-rqte lors de
I'installation
Valeur diffrentielle
La .val~ur de}a temprature releve en chaque point de mesure est
compare une valeur de rfrence. Une alarme est dclenche lorsque
Ie diffrentiel de tempratureentre la valeur mesure et la valeur de
rfrence est atteint ou lorsque I'on enregistre une augmentation de la
temprature de quelques degrs pendant une certame priode (mthode
diffrentielle). Cette mthods .. permet . de prendre ..'en compte les
fluctuations de temprature [ournares ou saisonnires.
Le cble sond~p~rmetd~mel>lJrerd~~ternpr~tlJr~l> c18l1suneplage
comprise entre + 40"C eLt 85"C (etpourul'1 laps de temps rcluit jusqu'
+ 120C). Les tempratures sont traites selon une rsolutlon de 0,1C.
Le cble est normalement accroch I'aide de fixations espaces d'un
mtre environ. Une section de cble endommage peut tre facilement
remplace et Ie oble reconnect avec des systmes de couplage.
llIIesure de vlslblut"
Del>.meslJresde visibHitsont effectuesdans les. tunnelspour commander
lesquipements. de veotilation.Cesmesuressontbasessur .run des deux
principessuivants[32;39 ;40 ; 42]:
Lumire diffuse
On mesure la lumire diffuse par un chantillon d'air asplr dans une
chambre Une .I,Jnit.de .chauffagePlaceau
pointdeprlvernent de
I'chantillon .rduit I'influeocede facteI,Jrs tels quel'hurnidithLa lumire
diffuse sous un angle donn (par exemple, 30degrs) est compare la
lumire directe. On limine ainsl les f1uctuations dans la souree lumineuse
ainsi que les effets du vieillissement et la dependance vis--vis de la
temprature du systme lectronique.
Extinction
Les metteurs et les rcepteurs de lumire sont installs sous Ie plafond
du tunnel des intervalles preserlts. On mesure I'extinction de la lumire
entre un metteur et un rcepteur.
AIPCR.166.05,16.8-2006
Sensor Cable Systems
Temperaturesensors [42; 44] are located at defined intervals in a completely closed
sensor caole, The temperature at eachindividual rneasurement point is obtained
sequentiallyby means of electron ic control, and the valueis transferred to the
evall,iat(>n unit. The measured values are clearly alloctd joth individu al
temperature sensors in the longitudinal direction of the tunnel. Control software can
divide the entire rneasurement sectien into various sectors so that various alarm
threshold values can bs defined.
Absolute value
An alarm is activated when the absolute ternperature is resched. The absolute
value is pre-determined and pre-set based on thl'i!applloation,
Differential value
The temperature value for each measurernent polht is compared with a reference
value,Analarm is activated when the temprature differential between the
measuredyalue and the reference value is reachl'i!d or an increase in temprature
a.lYlOuntimltO
.
~fe'<V.
d~gre~s ....is. regi~ter~d '<Vithin
a.~rtain ....
period ...
(differential
ml'i!thqd)Tllis rn~tllq<:lallovvs.daUyi:lnd ..lil'i!asql1alternPerature f1uctuations 'to be
takenihtC6hsideratin,
VisibilityMeasurement
\li~ibilitxm~lilswemem~areCQl1d~tedil1 [oa9. tunl1f)lstq.controltheyentilation plant
eqlJipmel1t.TtTes~rn~"'liurernel1ts",rl'i!b",sed. on oneofthe !Wo fqllowing functional
principls[32;39;40; 42]:
Diffusecllight
The9iffu~edllghfofan airsamPlepraWflintA",ch~rnberi~me~sured. A heating
~nit ahm~~ifslilmple inti:l~~..reduces th~.infllJf)np~.()ffactorsslJch.as humiditY, In
thelTl~",~uremf)ntPtTambl'i!r,thelighftlllilfisdiffused"'fa given an91e (e.g.
~9.l~gr~~sJ il).CQmware9'<Vithc fImc:tC()nWl~OlJ.l)
1j~m,.
II1.mi~ .Wlily,.
f1uctuations in
~gHt~.~~
theli{}ht '<Vll
aS{}ing.l'i!ffe9t~lilnd
trnperi:lture <lePendency of the
eletrohic systern are eliminated. .
Extinction
Light transmitters and light receivers are installed beneath the tunnel roof at
prescribed intervals. The light extinction along a sectlon between a transmitter
and a receiver is measured (Figure 6.2).
PIARC.167.05.16.8-2006
(~7~~:~~"~~~
iJ;:!:;..~::~~-~
'!W"-t.i'i;~'>5:~:'~. -!"J.:(:':'tW:'15;~~~8-~,
f~f~E;:fli~: Z~>;~';li!!""~;~;~jl~
AIPCR.168.05,16.62006
These units can be utilized for early identification of fire. An alarm is triggered once
the pre-set limit value is attained.
RadiatinHeatDetection
The infrared radiation(continuum) emanatingfrom a fire is used .to identify the fire.
Systems of this kind are mainlyinuse in Japan [38;45].
Newer generationunits areabie to compnsata for poltution of the light intake window
up te a Iightabsorptionof 75%; Disturbancescaused by naturallight, fluorescent light
and light produced by sodium 'vapourlarnpsupto rt 0,000 lux ineach case and light
produced by headlampsupt05,OOOluxdonotintertere withlhe infrared detection
system. Furthermore, rotating sourees of light in the visible spectrum (red to violet) do
not influence the ability to detect fire. [38; 45]
Gas Detection
Thesefiredetection systemsmeasurethe CO or C02reieasedduringa fire [38; 40;
42]. Thetechnologyutilizesthefact thatgases producedduringafire,such as C02
and CO, aceemulate in sizeable quantitiesIn shbrtperiodsoftirne; COrneasurement
units are already insta lied in a rnechanically ventilated tunnel to regulate the
ventilation system during norrnaloperatioriS [32:42]/However,theamount of CO
producedby .a. vehicle .fire. is extremely ..variabie because large > amounts are only
producedasaresultof incomplete combustion;The production OfC02 is far more
predictabie during anytype of fire.
VideoSmokeDetection (VSD)
VldeosmokeDetection(VSD)is one oHM newer toolstor providingtunnel safety. In
conjiJriction withtheCCTVnetwork and Autornatie Incident Detectlonsystem, VSD
can automatically:
detect any traffic incident: seemingly insignificant traffic incidents can often
degenerate into much more serious events or accidents,
detectanobjectseparatedordroppedfroma vehicle,
detect and track the start of a fire(i.e.,smokeernissiOn).
l'imagevolue.
VSD. isadvantageous ir that it.can detect theearlY developmentof fumes and smoke
before anysignificanUemperature change tlkes pJace. Thisliystem ls.lso capable of
identifying sourees of traffic delays, such as broken down vehicleliJ32;33; 37; 46]. To
date, there are no standards nor test regulations for video early identification systems.
Several tunnels in Switzerland have digital videoimagEl ana1ysisunits that are being
tested to detect smoke. InFrance,.videQ-basedautom<lticinci~ent detection is
intalledinnElw tunneJs,andinrenovltedtunnels thathave. lPElrmanent supervisory
control TOQmandpElrmanel1tstaff;however lt isnotalwayscomplemented with VSD.
VSDls usdinmosfl.lstraliantl.lOhels.
6.3.4 TesfResults
In combination with an airflow speed less than 1 mIs, a slowly developing fire will
be detected within 1-3 minutes if it is located right beneath the detection cabie.
If a slowly developing fire is not located right beneath the deteetion cable, or if the
airflow speed is higher than 3 mIs, a time delay of at least 5 minutes can be
expected before an alarm is generated.
Des essais sont en cours dans d'autres pays (par exemple, Allemagne, [49])
et il n'est pas eneere possible de formuler des recommandations finales.
6.4.1 Exprienceinternationaleactuelle
L'enqute meneparl'AIPCR en 2000 montre que les systmes
automatiques de lutte contre Ie feu ne sont pas utiliss de faon courante
dans la plupart des pays (voir tableau 6.1). La discussion qui sult est centre
sur I'utilisation des systmessprinklers/dluge. Les sprinklers posent un
certain nmbrede problmes,rsumsdansle rapport AIPCR surla matrise
des incendies etf1.Jmes dansles tunnels routiers de 1999 [2], et qul
comprennent :
Si des sprinklers sont installs dans un tunnel, ils ne doivent pas tre
dclenchs avant que toutes les pereonnes prsentes aient t vacues.
reduced visibility,
destratification ofthe smoke layer,
nOeffetiyenessforfiresioside vehicles,
dahgeroShemi~Lre~ctions with burning Petrol .or ther chemicElIloads of
vehiclesifnofsuppressedwith appropriated additives;
If sprinklers are installed in a tunnel, they must Ilot be starteduntit all the people have
been evacuated.
The Iimitedexperience sofar (e.g. in Australia, the Netherlands [48] and Japan [29] )
shows that sprinklers may be effective in cooling downthe area around thefire, so
thatfire-fightingcan be more effective andthe risk ofthe fire spreading to other
vehicles can be reduced. Zone lengths of about 50 mare typically used for sprinklers
(see Figures 6A,6.5and6.6).
:.:.:.:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.: .
Figure 6.4 Equipements descurit du tunnel traversant la baie de Tokyo [50]
Figure 6.5 Mthodes d'valuation des incidents par image$ vido [47] 1
Methods tor incident evaluation ot video images [47]
Australie
Les informations sulvantss concernent un certain nombre de tunnels
australiens :
Les sprinklers ne sont installs que dans des tunnels routiers urbains
d'une longueur significative. Ces tunnels ont moins de 11 ans d'ge.
Ce sont des systmes de sprinkler I dluge (volume extrmement
important I gouttes d'eau de grande dimension) qui sont installs dans
tous ces tunnels.
Australia
The followng information perteins to a number of Australten tunnels:
dstratificationdesfumes,
augmentation du flux de chaleur par I'air humidifi,
production de vapeur.
En outre, on pense en Australie que les petlts incendies- s'ils sont pas traits
par sprinkler I dluge - peuvent se dvelopper et donner Iieu des incendies
importants (et non contrlables), en particulier parce qu'ils se produisent plus
souvent que des incendies immdiatement d'une grande am pleur.
On est bien entendu conscient que, dans certains cas, I'utilisation d'un
systme de sprinkler I dluge peut tre dfavorable pour la gestion de
I'incident. On considre cependant que cela est molns probable que Ie
scnario prcdent pourcertalnes configurations particuliresdetunnel.
AlPCR. 178.05,16,8-2006
Sprinklerswere.originallyinstalled for lnrestruetureproteettn, but are now used
for human Iifeprotection in special ceournstanoes in sometunnels as follows:
In circurnstances where the incident has been positively identified and lts exact
location determined, imrnediate deluge eperatton can be anticiptd(prior to or during
evacuation) in some tunnels. This decisionis baseduponthefollowingrationalisation:
Smoke destratification
Increased heat flux from.humidified air
Steam generation.
Furthermore, it is the Australian opinion that smaU fires could - if not deluged
developlnto large (and uncontrollable). fires,espeCi;;illybecause. they occur more
frequently thanimmediatelylargefires.
P~Y$~8~$
Lesesa;is de sprinklers ralissaQxPaysSas ont
suivantes [48] :
Japon
On peut rsurner de la faon suivnte i'exprience .et I'opinion japonises
actuelles [29] :
The Netherlands
Sprinkler tsts.conducted in the Netherlands draw the following concluslons [48]:
Large arnounts of stearn are not expected for fires smaller than 15.MW.
Japan
TM current Japanese xperierice and point of view can besummarised as follows
[29]:
Video recordlnqs of tunnel tires in Japan have shown that sprinklers cannot be
expected to extinguish the tire. However, it has been adequately contirmed that
sprinklers can prevent the fire from spreading.
Recent research work on fire suppresslon has shown the promising potentialof
fighting fire with water mist. The water mist may be produeed by either low- or high-
preesure systems (see Figures 6.7 aI1d6.8).
A list of detailed ..reference material regarding recent research work on fixed fire
suppresslon systems in tunnels can be found in Seetih10 [41; 42; 51; 53; 54; 55].
Figure 6.7 Syst~me de lutte contre j'lneendie par brouiUard d'eau peur un tunnel routier
[42] r Water m,istfirf~suppre$$iOnsystem fcu a roadtunnel[42]
Figure 6.8 .Systr'nede brouiUatd d'eau' haut pre$sion lntgrdans un vhicule delutte contre Ie
feu [53J I High-pressure water mist system Integratd in a fir-flghting vehicle [53J
highlytniisdl1atlJr'l water;
atomisation is attained throUghwaterprE:issure and nOZ4let~chnology;
99% Of watervolume is transformedinto drop lets smaller thal1tOOO microns;
the eX1:inguishingagent in useis water, which is ecologicaland will remain free of
future-'r'estflti()ns:
harlTllesst? p~?ple and~quiprnent;
high cooling capacity and a large surface area for heat piek-up;
effectofcleaningsmoke andgasfromcombustion;
high dielectr'icr'igidity;
reduced water damage.
PIARC.185.05.16.82006
Par ailleurs, Ie rapport cot-efficacit des systmes brouillard d'eau (c'est-
-dlre la comparalson entre I'amlioration de la scurit et les cots
d'installation et d'entretien) doit encore tre tudi. Jusqu' prsent,
plusieurs essais ont t raliss dans des installations tests (Hagerbach,
Suisse[41; 55]) et des tunnelsrels (tunnel sous I'Elbe, Allemagne [29] et
tunnel d'Akrafjord, NorvgeI29 ; 42]).
Dlil~.$$~.$ .9m
91ll1~meflt.$: t$ ..r$IlIIj:s$s...QllIn:s.Q
. e:s.v~hil.lIIil:s.{M~tf9..<llil Madrid
I~J.na"ttQe l'Eiuro-TUnnel) .:Pourl mtro, le$ystrnee$tlnsfuU au-
d$sousQuWl:l90nlltermdiaire pour une rame de $ Wagons {Figures 6.9 et
6.1Q).Qesystrnee$t pourvu de 12 buses capablesd traiter trois incendies
simultann1ntpendant une ours d'au rnoms 10@inutes. L'aircomprim,
stock dans des bouteilles de50litres, transforrn les 300litres d'eau
stocks en brouillard d'eau.
Figure 6.9 Unit d'extintionpar brouillard d'eau dans une rame (Mtro de Madrid) [54] I
Mist extlnetlon unit insta lied in a arriage (Metro Ml'!drid) [$4]
The results of water. mist system. research conductedso far. are. encouraging. More
systematic research work on this relatively new technique should be conducted,
specifically regarding its applicjbility to road tunnelsand inherentlimits with regard to
rescue and fire-fightingoperations.
Figure 6.10 Principe de I'unlt de broulliard d'eau peur une rame de mtro [54]
Principle of a water mist unit for a metro carrlage [54]
Les .
systrnes
.s~rirklers/d~lugl'J
d'e~u.
s()nt. leS
courants .dars. 1t1nnels
australiens etjaponais .ActuellementauxPb1ts~Yris, ~Uls quelques tunnals
parttoullers, dans lesquelsle transport desmatires dangereuses est
autoris, ont des systrnes de sprinklers. Depuis les dernlres
reComrnand~tions publies par I'AIPCR .dans. son. rapport intitul"Matrise
des.incrndl(:')~etdesfumes"en499~ [21.d~stravaux derechwche .et de
dveloppelTlentprometteurssontencQurs, .en P2lrticulierau nive~unational
enAliemagne.auxPays"Baset auxEtatsUnis, et sur Ie plan international en
Europe (par exemple les projets FIT Incendie$eh tnhltUPTUN
Amlioration de la scurit incendie des tunnels existants ).
Actyrllrmrnt, ...
un ...1Tl2ltrr....
d'PHvr2l~e..;()u..'.ur ..~xploit~nt ..qui ...dsire ....
inst2lIler de
nouveau~quipemants de dtection et de Jutte contre lefeu dolt vrifier
soigneusement que leurs condltionsdinstall;ati()n.dutl~ationet d'entretien
contribuent la scurit gnrale[4~lets()rtpoITlP~tibl~s~Vecleconcept de
sourit~d'ensemble pour ca tunnel spcifique; 11 doit galement s'assurr de
I'afflcaoit des rnssures proposes,
For automatic fire detection, several systems are available and in use, but can
certainly be improved upon with respect to reaction time.
Vienne1979
Sydney, 1983
Bruxelles, 1987
Une conclusion intressante est prsente: Dans la pratique, tout, dans un
tunnl..' peut contribuer .la scurit .. La recommandationsuhiante est
galement donne : "Le mme niveau de scurit dolt dono tre assur pour
les diffrentes structures et les diffrents quipements . Aucune autre
recommandation n'est donne sur la rslstance au feu des struetures et des
quipements.
Vinna 1979
the temperature and lts development is the only criterion for structural fire
resistance:
the temprature strength charactensos of the structuralelement matertals are of
decisive importance. SOme examplS aregivM;
Sydney, 1983
Brussels, 1987
An interesting conclusion is shown in this paper: "in praetice, everything in the tunnel
can contribute to safety". Inaddition the following recommendation is given: "Th us the
samlvlfsafety shuldbe providdfor the diffrntstructursand mstaanons".
No other recommendatlonon the fire resistance of the struetursa.l1dinstallations is
given.
Montral,1995
7.3 Contexte
On p~ut rsumer de la faon.suivante les objectlts de la rsistanoe au feu
des struotures de tunnels :
La proteetion des bleus signifie que Ie tunnel ne dolt pas s'effondrer pendant
une dure spcle. 11 est particulirement important d'viter tout
effondrement de la structure pour les tunnels immergs et les tunnels situs
sous des btirnents. La proteetion des biens comprend galement les cots
associs aux interruptions du trafic pendant les travaux de reconstruction.
Montreal,1995
7.3 Background
1400
------
-- ::-- ':.= .
-~ ..::::- -- - '-- -
1200
,&,r"'"-
....
1000
t .
.. j ~ . ,. -
_.- -
QI ISO
...
.#
800
tt i/
HeM I !'4Cino
..,.,,~ RWs [Hl)
600
'I . .. ., zrv 10]
- .
"
QI
400
,.
...
.-
200
o
o 30 60 90 120 150 180
Tetl9s f 1 (.ut)
Figure 7.1 Courbstemf)rature-temps ZN, RWS, HClnc (ou HCM) et ISO
7.4.1 Time-TemperatureCurves
Thl;lreareseveraltime-temperature curvl;lSptepcsed to date. Figure 7.1 sketches the
ISO 834, . RWS ZTV-Tunnelanda modified Hydrocarbon curve.. HCinc. in which the
temperatures aremultipliedby a factoroft3001110Qfrom thehydrocarbon (HC)
curve of Eurocode 1 Part 2-2.
--
1400
~-
1200
cr
c, 1000
i 800 HcM1Hetl'l<l
t 600
RllVS INl)
, ZTVfO)
~ 400
200
9Q 158
TerJ1)s! Time (mut.)
Figure 7.1 - Temperature versus time curvesfor z:rv, RWS. He1nc and ISO standards
7.4.2 Recommandations
Le Tableau. 7 .1..presente .les .recommandations. propcses.pour Jescritres
de dimeQsionnement. Ce tableau opre une distinction en fonotion du type
de trafic (et par consequent de la puissance thermique possible) et des
consquences d'uneruPture deJastWctute due I'incendie. Par exemple,
lorsque les consquences sont inacoeptables (par exernple tunnel irnmerq
ou creus dans un sol instabIe), UE!stneeessairedeprvoiruneprotection
contre un incendie trs grave; lorsque les consquences sont limites (par
exemple tunnel creus dans un terrain stapte), aucun proteetion n'est
necessaire.
Spalling of the structure can occur fromthe early stages of a fire but no il1Cdents
have been. reported where spalling has had major consequences for fire-ftghters,
although it can cause rapid deterioration of the structure. On the otherhand, a
concern atthe.timeoffireservice intervention would bethe collapseofitems such as
jet fans, signs or lights from the tunnel celling or wall$. Thi$questionof fireresistance
has been addressedil1the PIARC 1999 report [21, whlch states:
Shelters shoirldonly be provided in a tunnelifthere isa way for rescuersto reach the
users waiting in the shelter and assist them to theoutside.lfsuch shelters were
available, then a fire reststance of approximatelytwohours would berequired.
7.4.2 Guidelins
The propesd guideJines .for .design . criteria .are presented. in .Table7.1. This table
makesadistinctionaccordingto the type of traffic (and consequently. tne posslble fire
lad).andthe conssquencesofastructural.failure dueto aflre; Forexample, when
the oonsequences are unacceptable(e.g.asubmergedtunnelorbne in unstable
ground), protection against a very severe fire is required; when the consequences are
Iimited (e.g. a tunnel in stabie ground), no protection is needed.
Notes
(1) Une dur{Ie de 180 minpeut tre ncssairepour unedsnsltde trafictrs lrnportanted camions
transportantdeslrlatitJ9s com1)ustipJes
(2) La scurit n'est pasun critre etne <lemandeaucunersist;lnceaufeu(autrequeviterun
effondrement progressif). .Prendre en compte d'autres objectifs peut conduire aux exigences
suivantes:
ISO 60 min dans la plupart des ces
pas deproteetion dutout siune protectipn delastructure serait troponreusecompare aux
coOtsetinconvnlents detravaux derparatlon aprs un incendie (parexemple couverture
lgrepour une.ptotecnorrcontre lebtl,llt)
(3) L.ascurit n'sst pas un critre et ne demandeaucune rsistanee aufeu (autrequevlter un
effondrlilment progressif). Prsndreen eompted'autres objectifs peut.conduire auxexigences
SuMilnt$s:
RWS/HCino 120 min si une forte protctlnestrquisepourta conservetton desblns (par ex.
tunnel sous un btiment) ou causa d'une grande influence sur Ie rsesu routier
ISO 120 min dans la plupart des cas, lorsque cela permet de limiter les dommages sur les biens
pour un cot raisonnable
aucune proteetion du tout si une protection de la structurel seralt trop onreuse compare aux
cotset lnoonvnientsde fravaux.de.rparaonaprsun ineendie (p;lr exemple couverture
lgilrePQurune prot~tion contra lePruit)
(4) Autre~struqturlilssecondalres.:d~fil1jrau cas par cas
(5) Dans Ie casd'une ventilation transversale
(6) Les abris doivent tre relis avec l'extrieur
(7) Une dure plus longue peut tre envisag si Ie trafic de camions transportent des matlres
combllstibles est trslmportant.etsi l'Wlcuation des abris n'est.pasposslble dansles
120.mlnutes.
Notes
(1) 180 min may be required for very heavy traffic density of lorries carrying combustible goods
(2) Safety is not a criterion and does not require any fire reststance (other than avoiding proqresslvecoapse).
Taking into account other objectives may lead to the followingrequirements:
(3) Safety is not acntenon and does not require.enyflrerslstance (otherthanavoidlng progressive collapse).
Taking Into account ether objecnves may lead to the followlng requlrements:
RWSfHC1nc120min ifstrong proteetion is requlred because of property (e.g. tunnel under a building) or
large Influence on road network
ISO 120 min In most cases, wnen thisprovidesareasonably iflexpel1sive waytoJirnitproperty damage
no protection at all If structural protectton WoUldbetoo expenslve compared to cost and inconvenience of
repair INorks aftera flre(e~g,light cover ror noise protectlon)
Consideration has been given toprpsirrg the inClusidn Tsdme Torm of the results
of the collaborative work presented here in standards such as the CEN/TC 250
"Structural Eurocodes", the CEN/TC 127 "Fire Tests" and the ISO/TC 92/SC4 "Fire
Safety Engineering". Such liaisons are potentlal future wrkftthePIARC Technical
Committee on Road Tunnel Operation.
type and denslty of .traffic, and consequently the .fire ..Ioad and its distribution
(area), as weil ;isthEilpossiple fire sprEilal
cross,.sEilcti()nalcnfiguratipn, Jength;ind inclination {slopEil)()f the tunnel
verrtUiiltiotl <:IEllsigo
M(l verrtiliiltir) 9ii1pacltyOf tM tunnEilI
possibll') u&l')ofElctive ml')asUressUch ii1sspnhkIEllrl>orwatMmlst
advance planning is required tocreate clear instruetions on how to deal with a fife
for those responslble tor the operanon of the tunnel, including emergency
services;
these plans must ensure that coordinatlon of the varleus emergency response
units takes place in the shortest posslble time;
instructions should be prepared before commissioning the tunnel and amended in
the light of lessons learned during trial exercises and actual incidents.
.;';'.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.: .
Les actonsprioritaires la base. des plans d'intervention. sont: la
sauvegarde des vies t'1l,.1tr1aihes,l'interventionrapide desservicesdeset~ours
sur Ie lieu de I'incendie, l'tabllssrnent de la meilleure coordination possible
entre les diffrents services de seCOUrSet Ie maintien des communications
entre la salie de commande et Ie lieu de l'accident.
Instructions within each plan rnust.take.lnto account the methodof ventilation and the
charactersticsof thetunnel, e.g.length andone .. wayor two"way trfflc; nature of the
alarm and emergencyequipment, urban. or rural locatlon, existenca. of a.control room,
problems of access and difflculties for the interventionofemergencyservices. To test
the plan, fire tests and trial exerclses should be catried out.
The -General .Report .on -Safety -presentedto the XIXth. World -.Hoad Congress in
Marrkech [58]emphasized the needfororganjzatonof rescue services and the
important elements of a rescue system,firstaid,emergencycall,rescueservices and
clinical help. This report also indicated that a weakness in any one element could not
becompensatedfor by astrength inanother. Thereporton"FireandSmoke Control
in -Road -Tunnels" -[2]devotesa seetionto Fire Response -Management.
8A.1lntroduction
Pour tout tunnel. Ie plan d'ihteNention d'urgencedot inclure des procdures
pour appeler les services d'tnterventlon. Cela peut tre ncessaire si les
systmes de scurlt prvus dans Ie tunnel sont dfaiUants et si l'exploltant
esfincapablede traiter un incidenfseloh les rnthodeshabituelles.ou si
l'incidentestsufflsammentgravepour nCessiter 'I'assistante lmrndiate sur
plaCdes sNicesde seoours(cjst~"dire pompiers.' servicesdscours.
police etseNicesmdicaux).
8.4.2 Communications
AlPCR. 210.05,16.62006
Theinterface between ventilation design and actual operanon is fundarnental, not
only tooptimizetheventUationresponse intheeventof anemergency, but also to
ensurethat tunnelmaintenanceand/or refurbishment do not prohibit the operational
anddesign requirementstrombeing meLf3ecause .long perices of time usuauy pass
without incident, tunneloperatorstendtotorget mat there aredifferences between the
originaidesignintentionandthe actualoperating. characteristics. They must remain
cognizant ofthisfaet incasethe seeminglyunlikelyemergencyaetually occurs,
8.4.1 Introduction
Theemergency response plan for any tunnel should includ procedures for bringing
in.emergency services. Thls may be .required iftheplannedsfty systerns in the
tunnelfailandthe operator isunable todealwiththeincident on a routine basis, or if
the incident is severe enough to requlrs the lmrnedlte-ssistance of ernerqency
services (i.e.,Fire Department, R$sCoeDepartment.PoliceandMedical Services) on
thescene.
8.4.2 Communications
RegardIess ofth sourceotthe firstalarrn eall,. itisimportant thaf the. Alarm Centre
obtainsalltheessential informationassQonas possibIe. ThisenabI~s authorities to
rn~k~m~ ..rillht ct~Ci~l~rr~..
~s f~r~~.mErtyp~ an~.911~ntio/.Of.r~s9u~fc>r9~~to be alerted.
Oependin!lon.the.$tandardtocal.opertrting pro~dW~~, it.~n ;aHt~l'Jl~ticaIlY.aetlvate
reacue toroes to deal with the situation. Wrong infrmation,however,can cause fatal
delays.
Le responsabie des secours doit tre au courant des conditions qui rgnent
dans Ie tunnel:
Une fols que la premire unit est arrive l'extrieur du tunnel, il est
important .quel'exploitantdonne. des. informationsplus. dtaillessur.la. zone
de l'accident, Le meilleur moyen est une discussion en face face, la
direction desoprations de. secours tant. alorstransmise .la brigade de
pompiers ou d'autres services de secours, selonce quieonvlent,
Si Ie tunnel n'a qu'un seul tube, les units du service d'intervention dolvent
choislr la tte par laquelle I'air frais pntre et entrer dans la mme direction.
car il est pratiquement impossible de progresser contre la fume en raison de
la chaleur et de la mauvaise visibilit. On sait qu'en gnral les appareils
respiratoires ne fonctionnent pas suffisamment longtemps, en particulier
pendant les grands ineendies.
AlPCR. 212.05.16.8-2006
ThenextchaUenge is howresponders can obtain further information on their way to
thescene(i.e.,by using theemergency radiosystemor mobile phones), In many
cases, the respondersdo not havethecapability of using. the. emergency radio
system to comrnurncate with the tunnel control operator. Some rescue forces have
foundmobil phonesto be very useful, butthere is always the risk, especially during
emergencies, that the mobile network can beoome overloaded.
What has happened (i,e., collision, vehicle fire, leakage of dangerous goods, etc.)
What is the reliability of the information (i.e. how many calts, by whom, etc.)
If there isonly a.single tunnel tube. Emergency. Service units must choose an opening
where fresh air is ftowing in and enter in the same directionas it is almost lmpossble
to advanceagainst srnoke due te theheatand .lImited visibility. Breathing apparatus
typically does not work long enough, particularlyduringlarger fires.
PIARC. 213.05.16.82000
S'U n'existe pas de centre de commande, Ie responsabledes secours doit
attendre de recevoir ces informationsde la part des units de secours pour
prendre les dcisions appropries et donner ses ordres.
Thedata indicated ln Section 8.4.1 wil! serve as the basis for establishing possible
operating scnaris:
These scenarios wil! serve~s the basisfor drawing up and: documenting the
correspondingoperatingprocedures. The. scenariosandprocedures have to be
regularlychecked, particulany ifeventual changes in basic data take place.
8.6.1 Introduction
Dans un tunnel ouil ne se passe rien, on peut, au ftl des annes, perdre la
notion ou la comprhension des capacits techniquesd'origine. permettant
de ragir vis--vis des exigences complexes d'unincident. L'entretien
prventif, les inspections et les essals sont la c1 d'un outil qui fonctionne
lorsqu'il en est besoin. 11est essentiet de proceder intervalles rguliers
des travaux d'entretien prventif, des inspections et des exerclces sur
tous lesquipements de scurit, lescornmandes, les portesd'vacuation,
les communications, I'clairage, lasignaHsation, les eourroleset, chatnes de
transmiseion. etc., pourqueles composants de lascurit continuent
atteindre les objectifsdelaconception en cas d'incendie.
AlPeR. 216.05.16.8-2006
8.5.3 Training
TM. integrated .Emergency .Response .Plan should include provisions for regular
trainingto ensure that all pa~ies understand every aspect of theplan, and to make
surethatanpossible. variations incircumstances. are be ing.take~into. consldsratlon,
Training rrtustinvolvealloperatingpersonal .andallanticipated responders from
external ageneies. A regular training program me schedule shouldbe established and
all trainingconductedasscMduled.
8.6.1 Introduction
The Tunnel Maintenance Plan shouldbe developed atthe beginnhigof the project
design to minirrrise the occurrenceof such discrepanties during thelif of the tunnel.
PIARC. 219.05.16.62006
8.6.3 Archivageexhaustif
11 est essentiel deconserverIa trace de tous les rapports concernant les
inspections, I'entretien et les exrotcs.vOes archives permettent aux
gestionnaires d'identifierles picesqui s'usent Ie plus et de ciblerlesefforts
d'entretienvenir. Un archivaqeexhustit-alde galement budgtiser les
eots d'exploltatlon etd'entretien.
ttts essenal to. keep track of all reports conceming inspection, maintenance and
exercising .:This record keeping enables the managingauthority toidentify parts that
are wearing most and to focus future malntenance efforts. Comprehensive record
keeping also aids in budgetingtheoperatingandmaintenancecosts.
8.7 VentilationSystemTests
This sectionaddresses the monitoring and maintenance of road tunnel ventilation
systems. Because the ventilation system plays a majorrole in tunnel safety, it is
essential that it operates properly andeffectively at all times.To achleve this goal,
sets oftests have to be defined and adaptedtospecifictunnel specifications.
PIARC.221 .05.16.B-2006
Pour parvenir ce but, les exploitantsdolvnttabllr unedocumentation
complte sur tous les aspects des systmes de ventilation, depuis
I'environnementtechniqueetnaturel jusqu'ausuivi detoutes les
modificationset adaptatlons (procdures d'assurance de qualit),
Donnes de base
Les essais dolvent s'accompagner d'une docurnentation exhaustive sur tous
les aspects du tunnel concernant Ie systmedeventilatiol1
The whole system and its component parts must undergo comprehensive testing
before coming into service, and again at intervals of four to six years thereafter,
Simplifiedroutinetests must be cartled out annually. Thedetails of the
COmprehensive testsand the simplified routine tests must take into account the
nature of the tunnel and its ventilation system.
Bas/cData
The tests must be accompanied by .comprehensive dooumentatlon on all aspects of
the tunnel relevant to the ventilation system:
Suivid~svnementsaucoun>de I'~xploitation
La collecte des donnesconcernantunvnementquis'estproduit dans Ie
courantde I'exploitation permetdemettreenlumlre.certaines tendances ou
dfauts et de vrifier r efficacit des rnesures correcves,
Les donnes dolvent tre rassembles, par catgorie, pour les vnements
concernant tous les domaines del'exploitation. En ce qui concerne la
ventilation, les principales donnes sont les suivantes :
The, design ,limits will ,determine, the required performance of theventilation system
and 'allsystem components' (fans, valves, ,command 'and entrolelements, etc.) for
eachoperatingscenario.
MonitotingofChang$sinBasicData
Thebascdata, referredtoabove" determine', the .choiceand ' dimensioning, of the
ventilationsystem.Changes .inany '.of these data (pal1icularlytraffic characteristics )
couldhave a significant impact on the designandloroperationofthe system, It is
necessary,therefore, toregularlycheckthe data andto evaluate,the impact of
modifications. "
Monitoring of the basic data lnCludes monitoring the development of knowledge and
technology in the field of ventilation.
Data must ba gathered, per category, for events relating to allfields of operation. For
ventilation, the main data points are as follows:
PIARC. 225.05.16.82000
Suivi des modifications de I'ouvrage
Mis partle systme de ventiJation, les . qulpernents lectriques et
rncaniques d'un tunnel (par exemple, clairage, signalisation, mstrurnents
de rnesure) sont rgulirement modifis et/ou remplacs au furet mesure
qu'lls s'usent ou deviennent obsoltes.
Contr/es visue/s
Les controles visuels s'appliquent tousles lments du .systme de
ventiJation et aux gaines de ventilation.1I s'agit notamment de vrifier I'tat
des lments sulvents :
Mesures /ectriques
Les rnesures lectriques s'appllquent la tension, I'intensit du courant, et
lapuissanc absorbe,
8.7.3 Ventilation8ystemTests
Fllwing are ventilatlonsystemteststobeconducted. Theinitialstate corresponds
to tests that are to be performedat thebeginning of tunneloperation (in-service
testing). In case of modifications, the tests at initial state must be repeated. Some
tests do not have to bs performed according to aregularsChdule. These are
performed in the .event of .works withconsequences on .installations or special
verifications.
Visua/Cntro/s
Visual controts apply to every part of the ventilatlonsystem and to the air ducts. The
condition of the following should be verified:
E/ectrica/.Measurements
Electrical measurements apply to tenslon, current intensity, and absorbed power.
Mesurti}s de bruit
Lesmesures de bruit doiventse.faire auxendroits suivants:
sur les prises d'air et aux sorties des quipements de ventilation, pour
dterminer I'tat etle viellllssementdeSJsilencieuxet desventilateurs,
dansles salles desmactllnes,pour vrifier la protection desouvriers.
Essais d'incendie
Des esaais d'incendie dolvent tre organiss en cas de modification des
procdures d'incendle ou lorsd'exerclees.avec les services deseeours.1l est
lmposslble de dfinir un planning ear iI doit tre adaptauxconditions locales
du tunnel.
Airflow MeiJsurem$nts.atSmokeDiJmpers
It is possibletoeither pro~ed as described previouslyor to directly explore the speed
field jf it is sufficiently regular.
Fire Procedures
Thefire procedures to. be. implernented. are aften numerous .and depend on the flre
location ..Thet~sts. have tobe ()rganl.>ed.in a. manner such. thataU components wil!
regularly. be.set infunction .. Fwexarnple,. in. thecaseof transverse ventilation, all
smoke dampers. should ba tested,. thensomeprocedure aUowing the test of the
extraction fansand ofthelogicalprogramsshouldbeJaunched.ltis possible to
subdivideth~test$into shortertime periods(weekly, for example) to minimise the
overalltestingperiod.
Noise Measur$m$nts
NoisemeaslJrementsshuld be taken at thefollowlng locatlons:
SheitersandSypassVentiltAtion
Controls activated during these tests should conform tothe regulation of the
appropriate country.
Fire Trials
Fire trials haveto be organisedbyfjrepro~dure modlficationsor by exercises with
rescueservices. Atimetablecannotbedefinedinthepresentdocument, smce it has
to be adaptedtolocal condltionsof thetunnel.
standardisation of in-situ fire tests for all tunnel ventilation system types to permit
easy cornparison of results, including development of standard minimum
measurement procedures, techniques and requirements for bath training and
scientlc tests;
evalustion of the ability to control and rneasure tunnel airflow velocity and direction
during a fre:
study of srnoke confinement velocity requirements;
development of clear definition of tenable environment in case of fire;
. "."._._---_ ~
.. -.-.-.-.-.-.- ..,., ,., ;.; ;.;.;.;.;-;-;-;-;-;.;.;.;.;-;.;.;.;.;.;.;.;;;-;-;-;-;-;-:-;-;-:.:;:;:.:.: .
poursuite des tudes des procdures d'vacuatlon, en particulier pour
tenir compte de la prsence d'usagers handleaps dansles tunnels
routiers;
tude de diffrents exemples de plans d'intervention d'urgence ;
tude des tunnels hors sol (tunnels lgers constnnts pour la lutte
contre Ie bruit, Enceintes routires. selon RTC et uvrages
ariens selonNFPA502)vis vis du risqueincendie :
sPci~ca~iordfil~ptopri~t~s de~ rn~tri~l,l~yi~ .yis du felJ,POmme la
combustibilit (cela pourrait tre fait en collaboration avec I'AITES) ;
examen des critres de rsistance au feu des portes coupe-feu ;
tude des proprits des marchandises danqereuss vls--vts des
explosions (concentration~, vollJmes,pointsd'inflamrnation,etc,) ..;
dfinition des techniques d'valuation desrisquesquipeuvent tre
appliquespouranalyser unJunnel etparvenirlameilleure solution
dans Ie cadre des meilleures pratiques actuelieS ;
tablissement de normes de scurit en exploitation, utiliserdans les
mthodes d'v/:lluation des risques ;
mise au point d'une dfinition c1airedestechniques de modlisation.
PIARC.241.05.16.8-2006
11 BIBLIOGRAPHIE
Ce chapitre prsente une liste de documents -livres,manuels, textes
professionnels et articles - donnantdesrfrencessupplmentaires pour les
prsermes intresses.
HUIJBEN, H., "Design Report: Tunnel Ventilation 2nd Benelux Tunnel", (in
Duteh), Bouwdienst Rijkswaterstaat, 1998.
HUIJBE:N,tt, ..
'OesignReport:Tunnel. Ventilation21dBenelux TtJnoel", (in Dutch),
Bouwdienst Rijkswaterstaat, 1998.
VARDY, A., "State of the Art on Safety in Rail Tunnels", Proceedings of the
Conference on Protection from Fire in Road and Rail TUnnels", Rome,1996.
VARDY, A., "State of the Art on Safety in Rail Tunnels", Proceedings of the
Conference on Protection from Fire in Roadand Rail Tunnels", Rome,1996.
Les accldents par rarnre se produtsent Ie plus souvent dans des tunnels
larges,avecdes volumes de circulation imprtants, alors que lscollisions
frontales .sent plus. eourantss .:dans les .tunnels ..trolts, Les tunnels deux
voies (avec une largeur de chaussee de 6 7 m) presentent Ie plus grand
nombre d'accidents lors du dpassement.
Accident rates. (Ar) were estimated based on .Iength andaverage annual daily traffic
(AAOT).(inannu/il.lpersol1 II1JuryaciclElntll.perrnillion .vehicle--kllorneters):
Les donnes sur les accidents et leur localisation ont t divises en quatre
catgories :
The accident rate in Zone 1 is threetmes higher than thatof Zone 4, and the
accident rate in Zone 3 is' nearly hall of that of Zone 1. This is an indication that the
transition zone actually extends frorn 75 to 100 m lnto the tunnels.
Thereis a cleardecline in theaccidentrate when proceeding into the tunnels from the
outside to theinnerpart.
For both tunnel types, the proportion of accidents between vehicles moving in the
same direction increases with traffic volume. With two-waytraffic,the perCentage
lncreases frorn 16% for traffic below 2,000 MDT to 50% for traffic exceeding
5,000 MDT,whilewithQne-waytr<.lfficthepercent<.lge increases from 48% for traffic
below30,OOO MDTto 79%furtrafficexceeding 50,000 MDT.
D'une faon gnrale, les accidents sontun peuplusgraves dans les tunnels
que sur Ie rseau routier national dans son ensemble. Cela est Ie oas plus
particulirementpour la zonemdlane du tunnel et peut rsulter du taux plus
lev d'accldentsftontaux, quisont plus graves.
12.2.1 Introduction
At present, about 25% of all tunnel accidents studled took place in the first 50 rn,
about25%in the next 100m andthe remaining50% in themid-zone.
In general, accident severityis. somewhat higher in tunnels thanon the national road
network. Thisis espe.ciallythecasefor thetunnel mld-zone, This might be the result
of the higheraccidentrate ofthemore severe, head-onaccidents.
12.2.1 Introduction
The former Mont Slanc tunnel ventilation system was a semi-transverse system
includingeight. fresh air injectionsections. Extrlictionofsmoke(lindpolluted air) was
performedthroughopen ventsJocatedevery300m;These ventswere connected to
twoducts: one.on the Frenchsideandone on theltalianside.
On March 24, 1999, a catastrophic fire in the Mont Slanc Tunnel caused the death of
39 .Peple,E:i.sWell.E:i.s
vary.$ignifl(;Mt$tructural daO'iage.
The tunnel was renovated before it: was reopenedtotraffic; The ventilation system
compriseda signiflcantportion of therehabilitation design work,since the original
system wasfoundtobe inadequate in capacity and operational abilityduring a major
fira.
.'.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.::::::.:.; .....
12.2.2 Rnovation
Les tudes de rnovation ont t fondes sur les recommandations officielIes
des Italiens et des Franais. Les recommandations de I'AIPCR [210nt t
prises comme rfrence tierce, puisqu'elles dcrivaient de faon claire les
principes de scunt.
12.2.3 Dimensionnement
AlPCR. 252.05.15.8-2006
12.2.2 Renovation
Post-renovatlon, the Mont Blanc Tunnel remeins a bi-dlrectional tunnel. The main
consequenceof thisisthat people will he on both sidesof a fireif oneshould occur.
In Ihis case; PIARCrecommendspreservingthe conditions of hot srnoke
stratificatiOn; The. Mont .Blanclnternatonal.Safety Committee also recornrnends
controlling the longitudinalextension of hotsmoke.
Thus,in case of afire; theprlnciple is to focus theextraction capacity on the fire and
to controlthelongitudinalvelocity in the fire area. The practicairesults are:
12.2.3 Dimensioning
The extraction flow rate was designed to prevent the stratifled smoks layer from
extending beyond the extreme openextractionvents.Recentresearch shows that
this condition can be fulfiUed by creating sufficientadverse longitudinal velocity (18].
The calcu1ationofthe.extraction rate is thereforequite easy,
Phase 2: Alert. The operator has locatedthefire and "c1icks"on the fire location on
theWnpellilynpptif.grp!.'1SQmplementary.operating.modes are activated (l.e., the
dam~lilr~()fmE:l~i)(VlilN~l9sest to the fire are.opened, theextraction capacity is
increasi;ldto1QO%).ThElJliltfans are operated accordiog to a regulation loop:
12.2.5 Full-ScalFireTests
At the request of the Safety Committee, full-scale fire tests involving significant heat
release rates (8.4 MW, gasoline fire) were perforrned on January 30, 2002. A
preliminarysetof small,caUbratedfires(t.4 MW,gasolinefire)was first pertormed in
order to checktheeffectiveness oUhe automatic control.
The test results presented are from a CFD simulation of the 1.4 MW fire. They are in
agreement with the observations made during the reference test. The phases are
described below:
t = 120s: Tne longitudinal velocity is equal to 4 mis at the beginning of the fire.
The automatic control is activated and the velocity decreases quite rapidly to
2 mIs (t = 120 s). The smoke is not stratified and is transported downstream of the
fire by the longitudinal flow;
t = 240 s: The longitudinal velocity at the fire is equal to 0 mIs. The velocity
regulation target is achieved. The smoke is drawn back to the fire area by the
extraction rate (arrows), The punching effect of the extraction is visible. The
backlayering develops slowly;
PIARC 255 . 05.16.6 - 2006
t = 360 s : la remonte des fumes est stoppe sur la premire bouche
d'alr vici ouverte et ne peut plus progresser ( vitesse de
confinement ). En aval du foyer, la vitesseest ngativeet I'air frais se
dplace vers les bouches d'extractlon e . La stratification s'opre dans cette
zone;
t = 480 s 720 s: Ie mcanisme de la stratification progresse vers
l'incendie. At = 720 s, I'tat final stableest atteint.
Figure 12.2.1 Evolution of theopacity field durlng a full-$cale fire te$t n the Mont Blanc Tunnel [61]
AdditionalIy, these tests have shown that it wouldtake twoto four times the amount of
time Jo reachthe>same. veJocity controlwith thesameprocedurebeing applied
manually bY a traind operator
12.3.1 Introduction
Les rfrences 2et 15 donnent la frmuledebase. du dimensiorw~meht des
systmes avec acclrateurs.Nousla redonnns ici pourillustrer les
influences._dnt._il.-sEilra
9uEil~tion(jllllls.ge~EI.J.\one)(e.La rft!Eilrpe_t donne .des
informations qualitativessurles influenceSnltorologiques. etl'impact d'un
incendje~Hrl~P9YflJlqt(j'~rIEil(long ---d'un --tunnel. Les informations
quantitatjves~8rtp$pQqjbl~$~~t~sent. La rfrenpe2 donne :galement
des recommlllndatjOl'l~$\.!rl~pi~p()$ition des ventllateurs lelongdu tunnel.
Des informationssupplm(Jnfaires sur l'optirnlsation de la disposition des
ventateurs sont.l11ail1fehanfdisponibles.
12.3.2 Equations
Equation d'quilib~~#tJ,,'~clilrence$depre$$iQn
On trouvera danslrfrnc15 unequationpour l'qulllbre des
diffrences de pressin .
avec:
avec:
12.3.1 Introduction
In references 2 and 15 basic formulae are presented for designing jet fan systems.
They are repeated here to iIIustrate the type of influences discussed in this appendix.
In reference 2 qualitative information IS glVen about meteorologicai influences and the
effect of fire on the airfloWthoughth~tunnel.Qul:\ntltati\ieinfCirmation Is currently now
available. In reference 2 reoommeMi:!ationsaregiVenforJan. disfribution along the
tunnel ..Additional. infQrmatlononoptlmlsingfndlsfrlbtJtlon iscurrently now available.
12.3.2 Equations
Balance Equation tor PressureDifferences
In teference15 nequationfofthe balanceof pressure' differences isgiven:
with:
with:
avec:
=.P9Us$e.p",r.yn.seul.aoo*rateur
"'.aliQl1lentationde ol1rgElParunslil13t:l()1rateui
1')1 ee performance.()uefficacitdesacolrateurs
I')~ = friction desparis(fficacildel'instanatip)
1')3 = intluenceel1traccelraturs(effieacltde f'ensernbledu systme)
p = densit du milieu s'coulant au travers de l'acclrateur (air ou fume)
q = courant d'air au travers de racclrateur
Ut = vitesse la sortie du ventilateur
u = vitesse de l'air du tunnel (ou vitesse de la fume)
Ar = section transversale du tunnel
with:
ConsideratJcmof'nfJuencs
Because the influences dependon .thefiresite withinthe tunnel,calculations should
be made forseveralfirepsitins:
ifthe fire. is .naar the entranceof the tunhel,the vehicles will have no significant
infll.lence:
if the fire is near the tunnel exit, almost no inttuences downstream of the fire have
to be taken into account;
chimney effects can be positive on rsing gradients and negative on falling
gradients;
inshqrter tunnelsthe effec1s of wind and. meteorologiC$linflu~ncesare important,
whereas.in longertunnelsthewall frictionplays amore.importantrole.
the thrust of a jet fan decreases as the air temperature increases ~ jet fans may
even fail bscause of high temperatures;
If a tunnel has a slope, then chimney effects will occur: a positive inclination
downstream of the fire is in favour of the jet fan system, and a negative inclination
works against the jet fans.
In order to design a jet fan system, it is necessary to estimate the evolution of the
temperature downstream the flre,
PIARC 261 . 05.16.B 2006
Temprature en aval du foyer
Pour dterminer les tempratures en aval. iI fautconnatre : la localisatlon et
la puissance thermique de I'incendie, la temprature et la vitesse du courant
d'air en amont.
T
Po
(I> conv
avso :
q coov = f1uxthermiquespcifique.dec<mvecticm
P = primtre de la secnon transversale du tunnel
.e = longueur de la secnon considre
The air temperatere downstream of the fire depends on the thermal exchanges
between the flre, the tunnel walls and the air.Sincethese exchanges are still not
cornptetely understood , especially those etosest to the fire, a more accurate, three-
dirn(;)nsional(3[))analysi~is usually required ...I-10'JVl:'lver,
itis possible to conduct a
one-dimensionaiargurnent, whihis prposed below.
.
ConvectiveHeatFluxrocoov
Theheatfluxexcha~gedbY enVectiOnbetweenak/srTlOkeand the tunnel wa lis on a
sectionof lengthtisexpressed as follows:
where:
q ccev = speciflc.convective heat flux
P = perimeter of the tunnel cross secnon
i! = length of considered sectien
PIARC. 263.05.16.8-2006
.... "._-----_ ~
...............................
.. -.-.-.-.-.-.-."." ............ ,.,., ;.; ;.;.;.;.;.;.;.;.;.;.;-;.;.;.;.;.;.;.;.;;;;;.;.;.;.;.; .
Parmi la documentation disponible pourexprimer Ie coefficientd'change par
convection hC,'nous retiendrons la proposltlon suivante dePetukhov [19]
avec:
E missivit de la parel
0'0 = constante de Stefan Boltzmann (5.68 x 10-8 W/m2 K4)
P = primtrede.lasectiontransversaledu tunnel
f =Iongueurde la secnon.considre
F = coefficient de forme entre la fumeetlesparois, suppostre F=1
avec:
hl' = 8'0'0 (T + To)(T2 + T02)
-c -o-u "
he= 8 p
<Dmd = qrad
P.l
= 8.0'0.F .(T4 -T,,;,u)
with:
E = wall emissivity
0"0 = Stefan Boltzmann constant (5.68 x 10-8W/m2 K4)
P = perimeter of the tunnel cross section
= lengthof considsred.sectlon
= shape factor betweensmoke and walls, assurned to be F=1
The temperature downstrearn of the fjredepends on the wall emisslvity E. This wall
emlssivity depends on the kind of tunnel linlng, which can be cornposed of several
different materlala. Asa starting point Ecan be ohosen aSE = 0.7.
with:
hr 8'0'0 .(T+To)(T2 + T02)
This latter factor depende onthe temperatures of the hot air and the wall. Calculatlng
the temperature, therefore, requires aniterative solutionof the equations of the heat
balance.
OT/8x=- P.(hc+hr)(T-Twall)
Po . cp' Ar . u;
avec Me-p-u-Ar
Le dbit massique Mest considr comme constant dans Ie cas d'un calcut
permanent.
2 T
/1[J waU .downstream Po 'uo .(-)
t,
AiPCR 266 . 05.16.8 - 2006
Taking into account theheat flux variation along a tunnel element of length AI, the
corresponding temperature decrease downstream of the fire is as follows:
0I'11ix=- P.(hc+hr)(T-Twall)
Po . cp' Ar . u~
with X being along the length of the tunnel and x = 0 at the fire site.
It can be considered, as a first step, that Twall "'" To . However, after the fire starts, the
tunnelwlls will Maf progressivly and the thermal transfer by convection and
radiationwiUbereduced.This will happen quicklyinthecseof8largefire.
with
.
M=pu:Ar
Norrnally it is assurned that only traffic upstream of a fire is blocked, and there is no
tempersture influence on thepressl,lredropApveh. Qnlyiftraffjc isassumed to be
presentdownstreamofth~firshOUidthis iilfll.in bcalcl.Ilat$d.
At the entrance, fresh air enters the tunnel and flows towardthefire. Only in the latter
part. downstreamof the fire. wiUthe walL frictionandtheexit pressure loss be
increased.
/},pexit
I
=2' Po 1:
-v:2 (T)
o
Effets de la tempraturesurJesacclrateurs
Si I'on corinatles cOl'lditionS dforiclionnernent dechaque ventilateur, on
peut dterminer la puissance totale de propulsion exerce sur I'air du tunnel.
(1) Plus la temprature desfumes est leve, plus leur densit des
fumes est faible, avec pour consquence une faible pousse de
I'acclrateur.
(2) Les acclrateursen aval du foyer peuvent tomoer en panne en raison
des fumes chaudes.
In aceordancewithreferenbe 2, the pressure drop at the tunnel exit can be written as:
An _ (T)
Po -u; 'T.
1 . 2
'"'l'exil - 2"
o
Due to the thermal release rate of the fire, causing turbulence and an acceleration of
the airlsmokeflow, the fire causee a pressuredrop.
The best way to determme this presSure loss is to use a numerical model.
Calculationshaveindicatedthatthepressureloss APfirecan rangeJrom10 Pa - 20 Pa
for a 30 MW fire to 40 Pa - 100 Pa for a 200 MWfire. However, there wiil ba an
influance oftunnel airflow velocityand crosssection.
The chimney effect for a tunnel element of length .e canbe written as:
where dis the gradient of the slope (+if upgrade, ...if downgrade)
(1) The high temperaturesofthesmoke the density of the smoke islow, causing a
low jet fan thrust
Due to a temperature rise the density of the alr-srnoke mixture will decrease and, at
the same time, the velocity of the air-smok mixture u' in the tunnel will increase. Both
effects wililower the jet fan thrust as can be seen in the formula for jet fan th rust.
Un exemple:
SI la pousse de I'acclrateur est de 500 N et la vitesse de sortie de 35 mis
dans des conditions de20C,ce quldonne unevitesse de I'airdans Ie tunnel
de 5 mis, Ie mme acclrateur dans un tunnel 400C fournira une
pousse qui peut tre calcule comme sult:
3
La densit sera p = (273+20)/(273+400) . 1.2 kg/m3 =0,74 kg/m .
En raison de la densit piusfaibie, u" sera 1/0,74' 5 mis 6,75 mis =
La vitesse de sortie de l'acclrateuJUjestencored'environ 35 mis
lorsque I'apparell est pourvUd'uhrn6teUr cage d'Cureil
La pousse Fj est alors 58 % de la pousse d'origine.
It is clear that the temperature rise downstrearn of the fire should be calculated in
relationtotheposition?fthejetJansinthetunnel.Aconfusingelement is thatthe hot
smoke wil! be cooledbythewallsand ceilingofthe tunnel. AS aresuit the density will
increase and therefore the jet fan thrust increases.
Figure 12.3.1 iIIustrates the situation. Jet Fans 2 and 3 will fail because of high
temperatures.Jet Fan4 will not fail, but has a much lower thrust than Jet Fan 1
because of the lowerdensity;
,
1
::
..
:,:
/'
""";"
: ,.... R~"'::~"""~"'il!:~
t\'i:~i'f~~.lr0
::.:;:~:::::~~~::.*::. / -.... R~:::::::-~::i<::<:~1:~~"::~~::::~~~"<~
... t,, .~
."~""~at:.:?" ~ ~ ~..:,,:
.._<.,."'" "~~~:.::~::::;:::;.~:;r
., j
.... ..1
~igre12:3:f.EffiSdea:tmprtor &ur'i'flabit4'et'efflqi,'desirateorsi '.
eff~cts of t~m~rature onjeUan reliabiUlyand effjcilJr\cy
11est vident qu'i1 seralt bon de positionner les acclrateurs aussi prs que
possible de I'entre du tunnel ou grande distance les uns des autres,
longitudinalement le risque d'unepanne.dufl:iit de I'incenieoudesfumes
chaudesestalors ,aussifaible qUELpossible., Et, dam'; Ie .mme. tem ps, les
acclrateurs .fonctionnentdansune .ZOne de .temprature .:basse et de
densit normale2 Gela n'est malheureusement possible que si Ie nombre
d'acclrateurs installer est restremt.
Aux Pays-Bas, pratiquement tous les tunnels construits depuis 1970 sont pourvus d'une
ventilation longitudinale par acclrateurs. Cela semble tout fait raisonnable, compte tenu du
fait que tous ces tunnels sont unidirectionnels, avec des longueurs comprises entre 600 et
900 m. Depuis 1996, des acclrateurs ont t positionns la tte d'entre ou aussi prs que
possible de I'entre du tunnel.
AlPCR. 272 .05.16.6 - 2006
lt is clear that it would be wise to position the jet fans as closely as possible to the
entrance of.the.tunne] or with a large JongitudinaLspacing. Thechance of failure of jet
fans by fire or hot smoke is then as low as possible. And at the same time the jet fans
will work weil in a region with low temperatures with normal density. Theefficiency will
be as high as posslble," Unfortunately, this positlon is only available for a small
number of all the jet fans to be installed.
In accordancet the earlier mentioned formula tor the jet fan thrustthe thrust in hot
gasescan bewrittenas:
In the Netherlands. almost all tunnels built since 1970 have Jet fan-driven longitudinal ventilation systems.
This is quite reasonable because all of these tunnels are unidirectional and lengths of 600-900 m. Since
1996. Jet fans are posltioned in the entrance portal or as near as possible to the tunnel entrance.
PIARC 273 05.16.8 - 2006
On peut supposet que levolurne passant dans Ie ventilateur Qj et les
rendements q?~sontpasEiffect~~pE:lrl'augmentation de temprature. De la
mmefaon'iLJjf\)~$tpa~affct~p~r)E:ltjill1prature.: la rduction de pousse
due la ternp~r,:*lr~rsl,Jlt~(jel'ilifluence dela densit et de la vitesse de
l'alr du tunneL
Inf/uences .m(pt1()JJiqlJi~(\fef!t) .
I,,'krlP9ttan?e(jjil"hfluence duvetltd~p'm~largernent~urliy'auauquel la
W~dHtt.lrr,,~,J!'9uve : une t~~ji~'tq~~~~'lWl,1~(jf,ll1i,,~gI'.1LJsol capte
(Ja\lEltlti!lQedeVemqu'une tte situ.Elj@(l~l3()l.Jsl:JlJ$Qk ..
:-:.::-:-:-:-:-:-:.:-:-_:::::}:::::::::::::
.- .--/::><::::.:.>
tl~lJtrEl~.fat~lJrslrrlPortants sont I~ ~itll~~~~tl!
forme, "/nelinaison des parois ou destlusllongdela
I.'~~~~I
~~
'~. tte, sa
route et la. prsence
demurs anticbruitlelongdel roote,deblUimnts et d'arbrSalJtour des
entres.
avec:
p = densit de I'air
Uw = vitesse du vent
l;Wind = coefficientreprsentantlesconditions.tellesquedcrites cidessus.
2
pwind = Y:. . Swind p Uw + Y:.. SWind&tunnei p Uw Ut
o :
l;Wind et l;Wind&tunnl dpendent largement de la forme et des dimensions des ttes.
Meteorologicallnfluences (Wind)
The preesure difference between the tunnel portals (difference of barometrio preesure
and/or effectoftheoutsidewind) must be detElrmined forthe percentage of time
beyond which it is acoptable to have a reduced airflow velocityupward of the fire
(95% of the time for exarnple),
Wind InfluencesooPortals
with:
p :;:;density of the air
Uw .= .wind speed
Swind = a faotor representing the crcumstances as rnentionedabove
with:
Swind and Swind&tunnel depending largelyon the shape and dimensions of the portals.
Because it is difficult to establish a value for Uw on portallevel taking in account all the
surrounding clrcumstances it is recornrnended to take a value 10 meters above
ground level. Wind speeds are commonly measured at this height and can be
established for several directions and frequencies at a particular place.
Les graphes ne sont valables que pour un flux dans Ie sens de circulation.
Dans ces graphes, y est I'angle entre la direction du vent et I'orientation de
I'entre par rapport la tte de sortie.
La valeur de I;wiM&lunnel
peut tre trouve en calculant Ie taux utluw. Pour des
valeurs de taux comprises entre 0 et 1, lescoefflclentSsol'1ttrouvs par
interpolation. Pour des taux suprieurs 1, on peut prendreles valeurs de
=
Ut/uw 1 :si Ie tauxest suprleur 1 ,I'influence du ventestfable etTerreur
decalcul inslgnifiante.
On considre que les vhicules en aval du foyer quittent Ie tunnel par la tte
de sortie sahsdifflcult.
The graphs areonly valid for a tunnel f1owin the traffic direction. In these graphs y is
the angle betweenthe winddirectionand the orientation of the entrance versus exit
portal.
The value of Swlndcan be found for the graph according to ut/uw = 0, in other words
when Ut= 0 mIs.
The value of Swlnd&tunnel can be found by calculating the ratio ut/uw. For ratio values
between 0 and 1 the coefficients can be found by interpolation. For ratios larger than
1 the values for ut/uw = 1 can be used: ifthe ratio is larger than 1 the wind influence is
small and the calculation error is insignificant.
These graphs may be used for a first approximation. For detaIled calculations specific
model tests must be done. It is recommended to use available meteorological wind
data; if this is not available it is recommended that site measurements be made.
It is oonsldered that the vehicles downstream of the fire will proceed to the tunnel exit
portal without difficulty.
In accordance with reference 15 the formula for the pressure loss caused by blocked
vehiclescanbe writtenas:
Si les acclrateurs sont rnonts par groupes Ie long du tunnel, iI ne faut pas
s'attendre ce que tous les ventilateurs l'lntrleur du mme groupe solent
moins efficaces. Le risque d'un camion stationnant sur chaque voie, dans la
mme posltlon, juste dans Ie trajet de la propulsion d'un acclrateur, n'est
pas raliste. 11 faut s'attendre ce que seulement un ou deux acclrateurs
du groupe solent moins efficaces.
Wh en the jet fans are located within a short height above the traffic room in
combination with a downward-directed jet stream high lorries can block the jet
propulsion of jet fans.
In case the jet fans are lengthwise mounted one by one in many cases the jet
propulsion of only one or two jet fans will be disturbed. This will not cause a severe
diminishing of the total jet thrust.
lf the jet fans are rnounted in groups along the tunnel lt is not to be expected all jet
fans within one group are less effective. The chance of a stationary truck on each
lane at the same position just in the jet propulsion of a jet fan is not relevant. It is to be
expected only one or two jet fans in a group are less effective.
Even the 'blocked' jet fans still cause a pressure rise in spite of the disturbed jet
propulslori.
C~i'it*d$tlqi.lM.~rXlynmlqJ.l~$
T\\\#m\\l;lslq\)lit dlitfar
Coeffc de perte decharge Iinaire ou
coefflclntdeMoody ;\;=0,020
Pel't~,decharge J'entredu tunnel <;=0,4
Nombre,de.prandtl.(l:lir) Pr=0,7
Contre;,charge atmosphrique APa =,50 Pa
Acclration de la gravlt 9 = 0,Mlrnls2
Cl1rll.ctl!rl$tlqUflS"themtlques
Puissance thermlquede I'lncendle = 200)( 106W
Chaleur massique de I'alr cp = 1009 J/kg'K
Emissivit des parois s = 0,7
Constante de Stefan-Boltzmann ero = 5,68 X 10-8 W/m2 "K4
Temprature superficlelIe du tunnel .=
Twa II 288'K
Aerodymanie Charaeteristies
air rate mass p = 1.225 kg/m3
linear preesure loss factor or Moody factor ,,= 0.020
=O.4
pressure loss at the tunnel entrance
air Prandtl number Pr 0.7
atmospheric counter-pressure L\Pa: 50 Pa
gravity acceleration 9 : 0.981 m/s2
tunnel flow speed uo = 4 mis
Thermal Characteristies
fire heat release rate Q = 200 X 106W
rnass heat of air cp: 1,009 J/kg"K
wall emissivity &: 0.7
Stefan-Boltzrnann constant 0'0: 5.68 X 10-8 W/m2,K"
tunnel surface temperature T wolls = 288 'K
i
491
470
452
436 ..400
422 450
409 500
398 550
387 600
379 650
372 700
364 750
358 800
352 850
346 900
342 950
337 1000
333 I 1050 I
329 T 1100 I
326 T 1150 I
323 T 1200 I
Tableau 12.3.2 Variation des diffrentes pertes de charge Ie long du tunnel en fonction de
I'emplacement du foyer d'incendie
436
..
400
.
422 450
. ..
409 500
398 550
387 600
379 650
372 700
364 750
358 800 I
352 850
346 900
342 950
337 1,000
333 1,050
329 1,100
326 1.150
323 1,200
Table 12.3.2 Variation ofdlffrent pressure lesses along thetunnel according tothe location of the fire
Confine smoke, in longer tunnels, to a section of the tunnel near to the fire, by
applying higher pressores inthezonessituatedtoeachside o1thefire.
Smoke removal systems of this type will usuallyhave a smokeextract duet, with
openings for the capture of srnoke, connected to extract fans.
Hlstorlcally, polluted air Was extracted inthe\Nhole ventilation .section _through small
openingsin theextractduct,each with afa?e areaofabolJtO~1 rrr,and set at intervals
of2 t015m.Thissystem was designedforauniformil1-tl.innelairquality. It was also
used,intheeventoffire;toextractthe smokebutit hasbeenshownthat the capture
efficiency of this type of systemis loW,asthecapadtytoexfract smoke at certain
distinetlocaticmsistoosmall. In such cases itis better to use openings with face
areas up to 15 m2 and set at intervals of 50 to 100 rn, and to open in theincident case
only those at the fire location. Remotely controlled dampers handle the opening and
closure of each of the openings.
Les trappes d'extraction doivent tre distingues des dispositifs que 1'01'1 peut
il1~taUersurdesouverturesd~ ~randedimel1sion (100m2 ou/plus), .qul sont
pal'foisutilisespour tablir une ,liaison entre Ie tunnel ell'air libre extrieur.
Ces ouvertures sont quipes d'un dispositif defetmeture,ferm en
exploitation .normalepour viter, tout change <lepolluflonet protger
I'environnement, et ouvert en cas d'incendie pour limiter les mouvements des
fumes l'irttnurdu tunnel.
Les lncendies qui se sont produits rcernrnent dans des tunnels ont mis en
lumire les points suivants':
les fumes produltes par les ineendies sant trs toxiques et peuvent tre
la causeprincipalededcschez: lel!iusagers,
la stratificationest une. caractristique utiiedesJumeschaudes dans les
tunnelsbidirectionnell!i,mais ellene peut palStremaintenuesur une
grande partiedu tunnel et ne se produitque si la vltesselongitudinale de
I'air reste infrieure 2,5 3 mIs.
The primary purposeofthis .appendix .isto .describe the smoke dampers typically
employed in srnoke extractionsystems,and theircharacteristics,specifications, rules
of installationandteststhey must pass; Inadditiontogive some examples of their
application.
Thesmoke dampers are typically instalied in an extract duet, .The control of the
dampers may beessceiatsd with oneor more ventilationzones, depending upon the
lengthofthe tunnel.
12.4.3 SmokeDamperObjectives
Recentfires intunnels highlight the fOllowing points:
smoke produced byfires is very harmful and is themain cause of death among
users,
stratification is a useful characteristic of hot srnoke in bl-dlrectionltunnels, but it
cannot be maintained throughout a larger portion of the tunnel and occurs only if
tne longitudinal air velocity is maintained below 2.5 to 3m/s,
The most efficient extraction in the vicinity of fire is achieved by opening smoke
dampers in the selected firezone.
Base de dimensionnement
11 est ncessaire de dfinir les caractristiques de fonctionnement des
trappes afin d'optimiser I'extraction des fumes en Iimitant Ie nombre de
trappes utilises.
Donnesexprimen.tales
Essaillsur modlsQhysigues
Des ssalsur modles physiquesont traliss en France en 1993.
Basis of Design
It is neeessary to define the funetional eharaeteristics of the smoke dampers in order
tb optimisethsmokeextraction bylimitingthe nurnber of srnok dampers used.
Experimental Data
TestsonPhysical- Models
Tests on physical models were made in France in 1993.
Two models at 1/15 scale have been made, one in the series of studies for Highway
A14 for the "Etablissement Publie pour I'Amnagement de la Rgion de la Dfense"
(EPAD),the otherwithamoregeneralpurpose in the researchprogramme of Centre
d'Etudes des Tunnels {CE:TU) [62].
An earlier study was earried out ona hydraulie model at 1/68 seale inwhieh smoke
was simulated by salt water injeeted into pure water. The eonsideration of dynamie
_sim_i_larityle<.l-.tQ-.this
ITlQ~.l:leing repla~dby a$"o(jyn$llli<:;.-m~$-at.-1/15 scale. The
aerodynamiernodelsprovided.equvalen;tratio$ of derlSity-and-.Froudenumber while
maintaining a high Reynolds -number; Smoke was slmulated bya -mixture of helium
and nitrogen at thesame denstyas thehot air produced bythefire.
puissancedefeu: 30 et 100MW
section duclapetanMume:2mZ, 4mz, 8 mZ
flux d'extraction : 120 m /s, 160 m /s, 300 m3/s
3 3
distance entre les cla pets anti-furne : 50 rn, 100 rn, 200 m
nombre de clapets ouverts : 23-57
longueur de section avec clapets ouverts : 200 m, 300 rn, 400 m
dclivit du tunnel': 0 %, 4 %, 6 %
Iieu d'extraction : au plafond du tunnel ou sur les cts
Essaisinsjtu
De .nornbl'euxtunnels sont -.quips ' prsent de clapets .anti~fume. tl-
commands (voir sous-chapitre 12.4.8 Exemples eoncrets).
Des essais de fumes chaudes ont t raliss sur Ie site pour vrifier les
performances des systmes d'extraction.
AlPCR. 294.05.16.8-2006
A .series of 130 tests has been made to test a range of conflgurations of smoke
dampersandflowsconditions in tunnels.
Tests on Site
Numerous tunnels are now equipped with remote controlled smoke dampers (see
Subsection "12.4.8 Case Histories").
Hot smoke tests have been cartled out on site to verify the performance of the smoke
extract systems.
AlPCR. 296.05.16.6-2006
In the Austrian tunnel, tests have been ondertaken to investigate the effects of
opening one or more dampers. In addition, tests have been undertaken on the
parallel bladed-darnpers toassess the effects of blade opening angle.
The ventilation strategy is to oonne the srnoketo a given length of the tunnel; the
incident zone. The strategy is complicated by alrflows induced by air temperature,
meteorological conditons.end traffic; aIrflowsthat can .causetne smoke to move
along the tunnsland tode-stratify.
The choice of the value oLthe extract flow and the design of the ventilation system
(nurnberofventilation sections, supplyandextractflows on ether ventatlon sections,
possible use of jet fans for air speed control) must therefore bearranged to optimise
the performance of the system.
The volumes of the extracted flow is an important point. For a 30 MW fire, extract
airflows at the far end of the exhaust duct of at least 110 m3/s and if possible 160m3/s
to 240m3/s should be used. The choice must take in account the tunnel section and
the consequence for the longitudinal air speed. Of course, the airflow at the exhaust
fan must be higher because of leakages in the exhaust duct as weil as in the olosed
dampers.
PIARC 297 . 05.16.B - 2006
On peut avoir recours des simulationssur ordinateur pour dfinir des
scnarios d'incendie et valuer lasensibititducontrle des flux d'extraction,
Ie nombre de trappes d'extraction ouvertes, les diffrents rglmes de
ventilation dans les autres sections du tunnel, !'utilisation possible
d'acclrateurs, en fonction de position de !'incendie et de laventUation
naturelle.
thefire Iocation. is not always known preciselyandthe system must maintain lts
efficiency considring this uncertail1ty;
Air .V~I.O~ityThrough
~ng..
.Srnoke. DamQers.. Qross~S~ctio~al Area
There~r(i}tw9:decisiv~ pararnetersin the.desgn ofdampers. one isthe cross section
oftheopening, and thescond is theairflow velocit}'throughthe dampers.
L'influence d'une vitesse ..du. courant d'air. dansles. trappes de. l'ordre de
3 20 mIs semble faible.L'efficacit de captagedusystme d'extraction
peut cependant diminuer lgrement.lorsque la.vltesse du courant sur les
trappes dpasse 10 mIs dans des cas particuliers de panaches de fume et
de configuration de trappe.
D'une faon. gl1rale, une vitesse du courant d'air d'environ .10 15 mIs
reste acceptable, mais on peut atteindre 20 m/ssansperteappreiable de
I'efficacit de captage.
In the case of opening only onedamper, the cross section of the open damper should
batleaSt equal tthecross sectionoftheexhaustduct. Ifmore than one damper is
opened, theresistancefthedampers mustbeadaptedto avoid most of the smoke
being extractedthroughthedamper nearest to the exhausHan. Tests in the
KaraWahkenand 8chmittetiTunnelsshWed thatoJ)ehingthreedampers, each with a
cross-sectionalratioof morethanone,andwithoutincreasing the reststance of
dampers, at least 50% to 60% of theextractedair passed through the damper
nearest tthe fan, Theflows<can be balancedbyincreasing the reststances at eaeh
damper as shownin subsection "HeadLoss Coefficienf'.
The reduced size of dampers and ducts minimises the impact on the civil works but
win result in increased air velocities.lt is proposed to reduce the number of srnoke
dampers, noting that high airspeeds atentryofthe dampersraises the risk of clean
air penetrating the smoke layer, the doughnut effect, and producing higher head
losses,
The risk of the doughnut effect is worth noting only in the case of thin smoke layers,
but inthis case the residual smokeflowis weakand is not: animportant risk for the
safetyofpeoplein thetunnel.
Si les trappes latrales se trouvent aux points les plus hauts des parels
latrales, il faut noterque leur efficacit de captage dirninuade lafaon
suivante selon la position :
L'efficacit est mesure en tant que taux de furne extraite SUf flux total
extrait.
(i) Extract duet in the soffit. When the soffit formsthe duct, smoke dampers are
placed direetly into the soffit, constituting the f100r of the duct.
(ii) Extract duet under road deck or separate gallery. When the extract duct is under
the road deck or when extraction is made throuqh a separate gallery, a junction
duct has to be installed to put the extraction point in the ceiling. In this case the
dampers can be placed in the junction duct or at the point where the junction
duet meets the main duct. The extract point and the damper are generally not
combined.
(iii) Lateral duet, Lateral ducts can be installed in cut-and-cover tunnels. Two
arrangements exist:
Ducts allow extracting smoke at a high level in the tunnel and the dampers
are not necessarily combined with the extraction.point
The vertical dimension of wall mounted dampers should be reasonably srnall so that
fresh air is not extracted from beneath the srnoke layer.
Where dampers are insta lied in the soffit, they should not be offset too far from the
centre-line otthe tunnel; Nevertheless; the design should not be complicated unduly
to put the damper in the centre if the tunnel is nottoo wide. The objective is to have
the damper extend over as much of the width of the tunnel as posslbte.
If lateral dampers are used at the highest points of sidewalls, it should be noted that
their capture efficiency reduces as toows for the locations:
The efficiency is measured as the ratio of smoke extracted to the total extracted flow.
12.4.5 Spcifications
12.4.5 Specifications
The maximum preesure difference depends on the speeltic case but the
recommended minimum value is 2,000 Pa. The value can exceed6,000 Pa in the
case of very long ducts.
It is recornrnended that limit switches are rnounted on the damper rather than on the
actuator.
:.:.:::::::::;:;:::::::::::;:::;:;:;:;:::::;:;:;:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::.:.:.:.:.:.::.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.: .
Les trappes situes prs du foyer sont normalement ouvertes pour extraire
les fumes. t.estrappes situes en amontsur la gainene sont pas soumises
des tempratures trs leves et il suffit d'appliquerles conditions cl-
dessus. 11est ncessaire en outre que les fixations des trappes soient
conues pour les tempratures de dimensionnement, afin d'viter qu'une
trappe proche de I'incident ne prsente un risque de chute prmature dans
Ie tunnel.
Dbitsde. fuite
On recommande que.: lestrappesanti-fume soient . raisonnablement
tanches I'air pourviter toutes. fuites par les trappes fermes. Ces fultes
psuvent rduire considrablement Ie flux de fume extrait, en particulier
aprs plusieurs annes d'exploitation.
Dlai de fonctionnement
11ne semble pas ncessaire que les opratlons soient rapides, et un dlai
d'activation jusqu' 25 secondes semble adquat.
Leakage Flow
It is recommended that smoks dampers be reasonably air tight to avoid leakage
through the closed dampers. Such leakage can appreciably reduce the extracted
srnoke flow, especially atter someyears ofoperation.
Operating Time
Quick operations do not seem necessary and an actuation time of up to 25 seconde
seerns sultable,
In the absence of calculated values, a head toss coefficient of 8 to 10, based upon the
dynamic pressure in the damper, can be taken. Balancing devices, such as grilles
that can beadjusted on site, can be used over each damper to achleve the required
balance of airflows.
Sy$tmes de fonctionnement
lIexisfe trots types de trappee d'extractlon, cornrnele montre lafigure 12.4.3
ei-dessous :
Figure 12.4.3 - Types de trappes d'extraction des fumes I Types of smoke dampers
AlPCR. 310.05.16.8-2006
12.4.6 Operation
Working Systems
The following three types of smoke dampers are available as shown in Figure 12.4.3:
In the case of dampers in a soffit, sliding dampers or parallel bladed dampers are
installed to minimize the head losses in the duet when in the open posltlon.
AlPCR. 312.05.16.8-2006
Wh en there isajunction -.duct;rotating dampers een be .easier to 1nstall. Sliding or
fotatingdampers have a lowef length of joint
AlPCR. 314.05.16.8-2006
Requirements for Operation in Case of a Fire
Dampers are essential for smoke extraction in case of a fire. But the dampers are
only oneplrtoLthewholesystem consi~tingofth~exhausLdu(;t, the fan, the
electrical supply,the control systems and the operating procedures fthe ventilation
onthewholetunOel.Although many. parts of the whole operatil1gprocedure and the
requirementsfor proper. operatin inc/ilseofa fire/ilre descrlbeddn. other documents,
those<parts which are essential forthe optimal perationof the dampers are
summarised beiow:
AlPCR. 316.05.16.8-2006
12.4.7 Tests
(iii) Leakage tests at low and high temperatureswith pressure.There are currently
only.a .fewlaboratorie.s.able t~. carry. out ..testsathigh .temperatures. This
situationshould improve in the future. lf it is net possible to carry out tests at
high temperature, onl}/ tests at lowtemperatul'e Willbe made. Tests should be
undertaken making reference to standard. EN 1366-2:1999 [63],. adapting tests
conditions to the specifiedcriteria of pressure, temperatureand leakage.
(iv) Wol'king tests under pressure. The fire damper is installed on a test supporting
box acting for the duct and is subject to pressure. For at least two values of the
appliedpressure,fiveopeningand closingcycles will beconctucted.
(v) Determination of head loss coefficient. The fire damper is put in an aerodynamic
rigequippedWithayariabl~~o""fanandccmnected by' section of dct. Head
losses in the damper are measured for several values of the flow up to the
maximum design floW for the damper.
AlPCR. 318.05.16.8-2006
Tests on Site
The following tests wm be made on site:
(i) Functional tests. Each damper wm be opened and closed usingthe instaUed
local and/or remote control system to demonstrate the correct operation of the
dampers, their limit switches; and the reporting of damper status through the
supervisory control system.
(ii) Extract tests with rneasurement of airflows. Extract tests, with the fansworking,
wm be made with measurements oLextractedfiows at the open dampers in
severalextractionconfigurations. The minimum requiredvolume flow must be
reached for the open datnpersat the far end ofthe exhaust duet.
(iii) System tests. Dampers wm be tested in the context of fire response procedures.
(iv) Fire tests; If fire tests are proposed,they will provide.an assessment of the
performance of the smoke extract system andof the fire response procedures.
Good maintenance of fire dampers is the best guarantee of their working in theevent
of an incident.
PIARC. 319.05.16.6-2006
.......... -.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.- ~
..,.,., -.-.-.-.-.-.-.-,.,.,., .. ;.; ............................ ; ;-;-;-;-;-;-;-;-;-;.;-;-;-;.;.;.;.;.;.;.;.;.;.;.;.;.;.;-;';-;-;-;-;-;-;-;':':.:.:.;.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:;:.:;:;:;: .
AlPCR. 320 . 05.16.8 - 2006
4 100 4 300
--5.1 200 2 300 200
50 7 -210 300
1.2 50 7 100 300
50 7 300
2*1.2 50 7 250 300
50
50
Caluire 50 8 80 350
Chamolse 100 5 150
------4"o---
Foix 50 8
----160--- 350
---
Orelle 100 7 110 600
Pu morens 200 3 00 400
Toulon 50 8 110 350
-
Cointe/Amont 50 8 200 350
Cointe/Aval 50 8 --zO 350
or ier 300
Sissach
Flims 200 300
Gotschna 4,200 200
Note:
(1) Tunnel for VL in longitudinal system
PIARC.321.05.16.8-2oo6
Longueur entre
Tunnel Situation la premire et la
dermre .trappe
2 100 6
4 100 3
4 100 3
tunnel existent
Notes:
(1) vacuanon directe vers I'extrieur lorsquela distance entre la cnaussaetle sol est infriel,lre
15m
(2) Ie plus souvent environ 25 cm, mals peut varier en fonctlon du type de tunnel
(3) dans un petlt nombre de tunnels
(4) seulement dansles tunnels faible traflc
(5) standerd
(6) seulement dans 2 anclens tunnels
(7) vla 9aine d'air frais au-dessus du plafond
Notes:
(1) dansles tunnels de grande longueur si la sortie par un tunnel parallle n'est pas posslble
(2) vacuation direete vers I'extrleur lorsque la distance entre la chaussee et Ie sol est infrleure
15m
(3) dans la norme, I'Itlnraire d'vacuatlon mettre en ptace en fonctlon de la longueur du tunnel et
du volume de circulatlon est present, mals Ie type de passage d'vacuatlon tel que galeries,
liaisons vers Ie tube parallle, etc., n'est pas prescrIt. Cela est dtermln en fonetion du type et
de la longueur du tunnel, du trafic, etc. Pour certains tunnels bidirectionnels de plus de 3000 m
fort traflc, des itinraires d'vacuaton supplmentaires sont prvus,
(4) Ie dimensionnement des itinraires d'vacuanon dpend de l'analyse de risque et du type de
trafic du tunnel spciflque. 11 n'est donc pas possible de dire d'une faon gnrale quels sant les
types d'itinraires d'vacuation, leur dimension et leur situation. Le code Tunnel 99 donne des
rgles gnrales suivre et la charge d'incendie qui sert de base pour Ie dimensionnement des
itinraires d'vacuation.
Notes:
(1) direct escaping to outside when distance between roadandground surface is less then 1501
Table12.5;2:Esca
sweden Switzerland Netherlands
COl'll'lecllOI'lS lopliraUel
tunnel tube
Walking pathat road Yes Yes No
Notes:
(1) in longer tunnels ifexitto parallel tunnel is nat possible
(2) direct escaping to outside when distance between road and ground surface is less then 1501
urn.
Spare ou Oui Voir Oui Oui Oui Oui Oui Oui
physiquernent (ju Note
tunnel (2b)
Dimensions 1,0 x2,2 111. 1,2 x 0,9 x 1,Ox2,Om Voir Non 0,9111. 1,(5 x 0,75 x
libres portes I 2,1 111. 2,0111. Note 1 donn 2,1 111. 2,0111.
entres
Portes Non Non Non Non Non Non Non Non Oui"
normalement
verrouilles
Rslstance 90 mln 2 heures 2 heure 90rnin' Face Non 90 min Non 2heures I
temprature/ s arrire donn speifi 13500C
ternps des partes <925"C
aprs
1 heure
Longueur max. Non speifi VoirNote Voir Nouvelles Voir Non Non Non voir.note
des galeries vers (1) Note directives Nota donn spcifi spcifi (1)
l'extrieur 111\ (1 )
.0.9 x: 2 m, passage of
T emperalureltime resislance
400m 150m
nonure. ramp
Physically Yes Yes See Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
sepatatedfrom Note
I
lllAne! (2b)
Free 1.0 x 1.2 x 0.9x 1.0x2.0m See Note Not 0.9m 1.5x2.1m 0.75 x 2.0 m
dimensiOns 2.2m 2.1 m 2.0m 1 given
dOarS I entries
DOQrs.normally No No No No No No No Yes"
locked No
..
Ternperature/
lime reststance <925"C given specified 1,350C
after
................
ofdOOr$ .. 1hour
.
Max length of Not See See New See Note Not Not Not See Note (1)
corridors to specified Note(1) Note (1) Guidelines (1) given Specified specified
outside
Normes
Eclairage
dans abris
Foumitllre Ininter.
en courant rom u rom u
Dure - 1 heure
d'alirnenta-
tion de
secours
Hauteurds 1mau- 1 rn au- 0,5to o.s m
I'clairaglil dlilSSUS dessus du 1,0 m au-
du sol, sol dlilSSUS
tous les du sol,
10m tous les
20m
MiSlilen Toujours Toujours Automan Automatic matique
route en fonctlon en -que que aprs aprs perte
fonction aprs perte de de I'alimen-
perte de l'allmenta- tetion
l'alirnen- tion normale et
tation normale et dtection de
normale dtection l'incendie
et de
dtection I'incendie
de
I'incendie
Note :
(1) Une nouvelle norme est en cours de rdactlon
AlPCR. 328.05.16.6-2006
Notes:
(1) depende on snuanon
(2a)connections betweenlunnels 1.8 X 2.2m wllhdoors t.4 x 2.2 m
(2b)if posslbie,corrldorsare separatd trom the tunnel tube through alrtocks of 5 m2 minimum
(3) wthincreaseddangerousgoods curvefor bomdoorsand.was, time is 1 hour for.doors direct
communicatlon tooutside
(4) with ISO curve
(5) depehdson riskanalysis
(6) Inexistlng situaon, will bechanqedln not-locked
Table12.S.6~$IQllS ventllatlon.fireISrnoke.detectlonwatllloosvstems ..
Finland France Getrnany Japan . Norway Swedr\SWit:z.llriand Netherlands
Standarde RVS EN 1838 DIN 67 R6<\uired in SNIJte(t) ENt838
9.27 524 every
tunnelfhat
isllt
Ughtlng In 2 lux In case Every4th 2 lux In case of fire In case of
tunnel min.; offire or 5thlight max. level fire max.
tube 10 lux normal lellel
maan lvel
Ughting in 1 cd/m""" 1 lux 2 lux 1011lX/ 2 lux 10 lux
corridors 5 lux min.; 20 lux
exits 10 lux
Ughtingin
mean
1501l,)x
..
shelters
Reliable
.... Unintlir-
Power Uninter- Uninter" Uninler- Uninter Uhihtr
suoolv ruPtablli ruptable ruptable ruptabl ruPtable ruptal:le
Duration
of
1 hour
... ,
2 hours 2 hour 2hlJrs
.
....
emergenc
11 nnwer
!-lelght of lm 11m 0.5 101.0 m 0.5m Nefceiling
Iighting
.... above above ... aoove oor,
floor, floer every 20m
every
t
Note:
(1) A new standare is coming
France Itinraires d'vacuation, emplacement des extincteurs, garages, abris doivent faire l'oblet
d'une signalisation spcifique. Les panneaux indiquantl'emplacement des tlpnones,
des itinraires d'vacualion et des extincteurs sont clalrs en permanence. Les
parmeaux. placs sur les pldroits du .tunnel.pour .;indiquer .la.dlreotlon- suivre et .Ia
dtstan Jsqu' I'itinraire d'vacuatlon sont souvent rflchissnts ou photo-
luminescents.
Allemagne Emplacement: conforme RABT, illustrations 1 3
Pictogramme blanc surfondvert: personne courant, flche pointe dans la direction de
la ported'vacuation la plus proche.
Appliqu sous ferme defeuillelumineuse ou de panneau de circulation clair
Misen route uniauementen cas d'accident
Japan Les panneaux pour I'itlnraire d'vcuaflon dpendent du tunnel. Ci-dessous un des
exemples adopts dans la plupart des tunnels.
Emplacement: sur la paroi
Dimensions : largeur 400 mm x longueur 1 200 mm
Couleur : vert
Type de pictoqrarnrnes : Ie panneau donne la distance/dlrecon vers la sortie ou
I'it!nraire d'vacuation, la position o I'on se trouve et d'autres informations
Hauteur : environ 1,5 m au-dessus de la chaussee
Visibllit : on adopte ausst bien Ie tvoe clair de rtntrieur oue Ie tvne rflexion
Norvge Taille minimum : 400 rnrn x 400 rnrn
Panneaux EXIT f1uorescents, monter paralllement sur la paroi, mais non clairs. Les
autres panneaux doivent tre monts angle droit par rapport la chausse et clairs
en permanence.
Sude Tunnel 99 ne donna que des rgles gnrales concemant . les panneux, Le
dimensionnement spcifique aux tunnels dpend desexigences du dimensionnement et
de I'analysedes risques. Tunnel 99 fait rfrenceauxrgles donnes par Ie National
Board of Occupational Safety and Health of Sweden.
Si les panneaux sont olairsde l'intrieur, lls Ie sont en permanence,
Suisse Au-dessus de la porte : panneaux clairs de I'intrieur montrant un homrne en train de
fuk,en blanc sur fond vert. Mmes panneaux sur la porte (luminescent). Mmes
panneaux tous les 50 m sur les parois du tunnel, avec indication de la distance sur la
gauche et la drolte.
Si les panneauxsont clairs de I'intrieur, ils Ie sont en permanence.
Pays-Bas Au-dessus de la perte et dans les galeries d'vacuation : panneaux clairs de I'intrieur,
homme en train de fuir, blanc sur fond vert.
Dimensions : 100 mm x 300 mm
Mis en route uniauement en cas d'accident.
Nether1ands
CO,N02 Depends on
meesure-
ment
Auto"byfire Manual by
incident situation detectors or operator I fire opening escape detectors or detectors or orvisibillty tunnel detectors or operator I fire
video brigilde doors Manualby Manual by detection situatlon, Manual by brigade
processing operator! fire operator decision operator! lire
brigade together wilh brigade
locat fire
brigade
Other Computeraidad Dampers are Computer aided
info al>olJt studied info about
eXtemalwind extemalwind
Notes :
(1) Le systrne de ventilation en cas d'incendie doit tre dimensionn pour qua les itinraires
d'vacuation et les abrls restent exempts de fume et de gaz toxiques en cas d'incendie
(2) Nouvelles rglementations I'tude
(3) Long =
Longitudinal
(4) Transv =
Transversal
(5) Semi-T =
Semi-Transversal
(6) Auto Automatique
Notes:
(1) Un systme de dtection incendie n'est requis qu'en cas d'absence de sUrl(eillanca humaine et si les
ordres d'extraction des fumes sont diffrents deceux appllqus dansje lilsd'une fortepoutton
dans Ie tunnel. 11n'existe aucunedirective quant au tyPe de systrne dedltectioninstallerdansle
tunnel.
(2) Aucunes dispositions dansles tunnels faible densit declrculation.
(3) Un systme de dtection lncendlsrainstall dans les tunnels. Spcifique pour chaque tunnel. Ce
systme sera par cantons et coordonnau contrledesfurnes. I-e systme de dltection incendie
dans la zone de circulation couvriratoute la longueufdu tunnel. Une dtection incendie dans les
zones annexes (c'est--dire ni pour la clrculationru pour l'vacuaon) du tunnel peut se faire par
dtection des fumes ou de la chaleur,
(4) Calibre pour ragir un incendie de 20 litres d'essence 14 m2
Chemical Yes
.
based
detection
Visibility Yes Yes Yes Yes
based
detection
Temperature Yes Yes, Yes
based preferred"
detectlon
.
Radiation Yes Yes
based
detection .
.
Notes:
(1) A fire detection system is only requiredwhEjnthereis nohuman penmanentsurveUlancaand the srnoke
exhaust ventilatlon's orders are differentfromth~seaf>plyinllinthecaseofhigh pollutionin the tunnel.
There is no prescription of the type ofdetection sY$lem to instellin thatunnal.
Allemagne
Japon
Norvge
j)j
Sude
Suisse
I
Pays-Bas
AlPCR. 336.05.16.6-2006
I
Table 12.5.10 Warningsystems
Austria
Finland
France
Germany
Japan
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
Netherlands
Instructions to road
users by:
Swilching of tunnel
ventilation
Unlocking escape
doors
NiS:
(1) depends on situation and
(2) Auto =Automatic
At a noise level of 98-100 dB(A), people within a distance of 50-60 cm can only
communicate by shouting. High noise levels wil I also cause ear damage: a person
subjected to 100 dB(A) will suffer permanent ear damage after about 5 minutes, and
a person subjected to 90 dB(A) will, suffer permanent 'ear damage. after about
45 minutes.Jet fan noise levels mayalso drown out warnings or instructions being
transmitted by tunnel loudspeaker systems in the event of an accident.
Thesizeof the requiredsound attenuators depends on the number of jet fans per
cluster, the size of the jet fans, and the tunnel lining type. In common practice,
however, sound attenuator lengthis typically 1;5t02times the internal diameter of
the jet fan. Experimentshave shown that a longer sound attenuator will slightly
imprv thejetfan'sefficiency.
Jet fans produce high noise levels in almost all frequency bands, but the 500 Hz,
1,OOOHzand2;000 Hzfrequency bands are important for speech. The speech
transmission of aloudspeakersystemwillbeintelligibleif a difference of at least
10dB is maintained betweenthespeechsignalandthe jettan nolse-Ievel at these
trequencies, andpossibly at 4,000 Hz as weil.
ConsldrationsaOU$tjqU~$pourl.Qon~ptiondes acclrateurs
En dfinitive, plus Ie nombre d'aubes est grand, plus Ie brult produit par
I'acclrateur est lev. 11 est donc recommand de ne pas prvoir plus de 3 ou
4 aubes en avant de la sortie de I'acclrateur.
The speech level shown is the maximum level recommendd for a loudspeaker
system. A higher level by a loudspeaker system would be difficult for road users to
understand. In the important frequency bands of 500 to 2,000 Hz, the difference
between the noise levels is smaU (less than 10 dB), thus the speech transmission is
poor, In this example, sound attenuators are needed to reduce the jet fan noise levels
in the 500, 1,000 and 2,000 Hz frequency bands. The speech signal could also be
amplified in thos;e same bands, but this would require a reduction In the other
frequency bands to reach the same dB (A)-combined loudspeaker sound level.
Attention must be given to lowering the internal sound sourees of the jet fan. Sharp
edges and smaU holes inside the jet fan should be avoided as much as possible.
because these are sources of noise when air velocities are in the range of 30-40 mIs.
If deflection blades are used, attention should be given to the noise produced by the
blades. Simple flat blades in an air stream of 30-40 mIs produce high noise levels,
mainly in the important 2,000 ~ 4,000 Hz frequency range, Good results can be
obtained by uslng wlngformed blades,
Impression ; IMB Bayeux
Dpt lgal n 22464 - Mars 2007