Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Eufor 364 0265
Eufor 364 0265
REGION
© Centre international de formation européenne | Téléchargé le 02/08/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.95.3.226)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
https://www.cairn.info/revue-l-europe-en-formation-2012-2-page-265.htm
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
La reproduction ou représentation de cet article, notamment par photocopie, n'est autorisée que dans les
limites des conditions générales d'utilisation du site ou, le cas échéant, des conditions générales de la
licence souscrite par votre établissement. Toute autre reproduction ou représentation, en tout ou partie,
sous quelque forme et de quelque manière que ce soit, est interdite sauf accord préalable et écrit de
l'éditeur, en dehors des cas prévus par la législation en vigueur en France. Il est précisé que son stockage
dans une base de données est également interdit.
Jan Husák, Ondrej Schütz, Michal Vít are Ph.D. students in the Political Science and Euro-
pean Studies at Masaryk University in Brno and University of Economics in Prague, Czech
Republic.
© Centre international de formation européenne | Téléchargé le 02/08/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.95.3.226)
© Centre international de formation européenne | Téléchargé le 02/08/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.95.3.226)
In recent years we have been observing a growth of verbal assaults addressed
to all the Visegrad countries and their politicians suspecting them to be Euro-
sceptic, Nationalistic, Europopulist, Anti-European, Non-European etc. It is
also connected with the increasing importance of the region following its deeper
integration in the EU. Therefore, we have decided to find out if there are any
common elements in the countries’ politics about national related issues and how
these issues are perceived by the most important collective political actors in the
systems—the political parties. In this article we strive to describe the way po-
litical parties understand and deal with issues connected with nationalism and
nationalistic ideology. Additionally, we tried to figure out which connotations
these national related party patterns bring toward the party positions to European
integration, EU and actual European issues and if there are any links between the
national related approaches.
Political parties are one of the most important actors in the social discussion
on public issues. In the political system, they are representatives of peoples’ opin-
ions as well as they significantly shape public discourses toward various issues.
Therefore, their identities and ways of thinking as well as electoral support are im-
portant indicators of their states, citizens and the politics. Therefore, we tried to
focus on these indicators to analyse how the situation has evolved in recent years.
We focused on the period from 2005 to 2010 to get the most recent pic-
ture. This limited period is important because of the political context. In this
time frame, all the countries became members of the European Union and are
enjoying the status of ‘full Europeans’. They are integrated in all European and
Pan-European international organisations and institutions, therefore, they have
full access to all instruments of European politics. The Czech Republic assumed
even the EU Presidency country in 2009 and Slovakia joined the Eurozone the
same year. Just after our research period, Hungary and Poland also assumed the
Presidencies of the EU.
Methodology
We have researched both the relevant parliamentary political parties and sig-
nificant nonparliamentary nationalistic and extreme right parties. The inclusion
of these parties allows us to be more aware of the political environment in each
country regarding the nationalistic and extreme political streams and identities
and helps us refine the whole situation. In some of the Visegrad countries these
© Centre international de formation européenne | Téléchargé le 02/08/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.95.3.226)
© Centre international de formation européenne | Téléchargé le 02/08/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.95.3.226)
parties are even members of the Parliament or play the role of the black sheep in
the political spectrum, having electoral support under or just around 1 per cent.
Still, we have included nationalistic and extreme right parties, which are expres-
sively significant in the public context and have direct or indirect influence on
the country actions toward their ideologies or activities. To summarise, we have
included 37 parties from the four Visegrad countries to analyse them in common
patterns.
Ideology approaches and attitudes of the political parties are a phenomena
that is constantly changing and it is difficult to catch them in the form of stable
variables. Every political party and its ideology or messages are in the constant
process of definition and redefinition in the actual politics. However, this uncer-
tainty does not mean that parties and their basic opinions or ideologies are inde-
scribable. We can lean on the written programmatics to analyse the most stable
and relevant inputs of the parties—how they present themselves to the public,
how they think in the internal party discussion about the main directions, what
are the important aspects by the parties to mentioned to the public and how they
reflect the social view on the actual issues.
The basic research materials are the electoral manifestos of the political parties.
We have chosen electoral manifestos for four main reasons. Firstly, we wanted to
analyze a long-lasting framework of the parties’ politics and identity. Secondly, we
wanted to focus on the documentation, which has a direct impact on the elector-
ate and, from the other side, is a reflection of the actual society feelings, needs and
opinions expressed and ratified by the electoral results. Thirdly, electoral mani-
festos are repeatedly issued by all relevant political parties for the occasion of the
L’Europe en formation nº 364 Été 2012 - Summer 2012
elections and, therefore, are easily obtainable even in the case of smaller parties.
Finally, electoral manifestos are convenient because of their comparability as they
are issued roughly at the same time, they respond to a similar state of the society
and international affairs, but simultaneously they cover all aspects of life in the
respective countries.
We did not include the statute documents and the long-term visions of the
parties out of the general election framework, even if they are important part
of the creation of the party identity. Inclusion of these long-term visions and
statutory documents would result in an analysis of the party ideal, and not a
social reflection on the factual resonation of the public positions. Most of these
documents issued by traditional parties are outdated and do not fully reflect the
actual reality. Real politics of party members is often far more from the statutory
documents and long-term visions than the election manifestos.
We have excluded popular presidential elections. It is mainly due to the fact
that such election took place just in two1 out of the four Visegrad countries, and
therefore, there is no space for comparison of the presidential candidates. We can
© Centre international de formation européenne | Téléchargé le 02/08/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.95.3.226)
© Centre international de formation européenne | Téléchargé le 02/08/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.95.3.226)
certainly not compare them with the declarations and statements of the presiden-
tial candidates who are elected by deputies as it is the case in the Czech Republic
and Hungary. Their primary audience is significantly different, which suggests
also different tactics and choice of vocabulary. We also excluded European elec-
tion manifestos, which are partly influenced by the EU-wide discussions about
the issues, and therefore, might present different positions of the parties or stress
different issues. Generally the European Parliament manifestos are also more pro-
European and they often use the EU vocabulary, which is regularly not the case
of general manifestos at the national level. Some of the parties, despite of being
candidates in the European Parliament elections, did not issue specific manifestos
for the European elections in 2009. European elections are also, as well as re-
gional elections, considered to be so called “elections of second order”2 because the
interests of the electorate are much lower than in the national general elections
and they have additional electoral patterns.
The research is done in a qualitative manner and we do not focus on the
quantitative result to say that a particular issue was mentioned in the manifestos
at some frequency. The meaning and the context of the political messages was the
most important for us. The quantitative indicators are used only for the overall
analysis of the approaches and their representativeness by the electoral gains sub-
scribed to the qualitative patterns.
1. Poland and Slovakia. In the Czech Republic and Hungary presidents were elected by the Parliament. In this
regard is worth mentioning that the Czech Republic at the beginning of 2012 agreed to implement direct Presi-
dential election, however this was still not the case during the research period of this article.
2. See e.g. Reif, K. and Schmitt, H.: “Nine Second-order National Elections – A Conceptual Framework for the
Analysis of European Election Result”, European Journal of Political Research, Nr. 8, (1980): pp. 3–44.
This article is based on the results of the research project ‘National Populism
in the countries of Visegrad’ conducted at the International Institute of Politi-
cal Science of Masaryk University, Brno, the Czech Republic, and supported by
Visegrad Fund and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.
© Centre international de formation européenne | Téléchargé le 02/08/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.95.3.226)
conceptualization in which eight different approaches appeared, however, three
of them were only ideologically or party specific and, in the regional framework,
they stayed alone without any counterparts in other Visegrad countries. Five of
those approaches were found to be more common at the Visegrad level. See the
Table 1 for basic understanding of the process, the country specifics and their
relations toward the common Visegrad conceptualization
Those approaches share basic convictions and opinions, which are not rooted
in the specific nature of the countries, but could be considered as the main ap-
proaches towards national identity in general politics. They form a polarized con-
tinuum between two extremes in the perception about nation and identities. One
pole, represented by the nationalist type of manifestos, sees nations as the focal
point of life, morality and politics. The second pole, called in our work ‘antina-
tionalist’, insisted that nations and other similar categories are just artificial and
even harmful social constructs that should be uprooted, and moreover that true
value lies in the differences between people and the diversity of society.
In the following paragraphs there is a more specific description of each of the
types and an exploration of their connotations toward Europe and EU issues are
presented.
3. The national conceptualizations are possible to follow in Černoch et all:. Political Parties and Nationalism in
Visegrad Countries, (Brno: International Institute of Political Science of Masaryk University, 2011).
Country / Approach
Visegradregion
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia
right-wing
European liberal
liberal
liberal liberal-
homogenized protectivist exceptionalist
nationalst conservative
conservative- cultural- national-
populist
nationalist nationalist conservative
greater nation greater-nation
approach approach
religious-
© Centre international de formation européenne | Téléchargé le 02/08/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.95.3.226)
© Centre international de formation européenne | Téléchargé le 02/08/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.95.3.226)
nationalist isolationist nationalist nationalist
nationalist
minority
communist other
approach
Nationalist approach
Table 2: Parties and their electoral manifestos assigned to the nationalist approach
Party of the
Hungarian Justice HU X 2.2 X 0.03
and Life (MIÉP)
The League of
PL 7.97 X 1.30 X
Polish Families
Polish National
PL 0.29 X X X
Party
© Centre international de formation européenne | Téléchargé le 02/08/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.95.3.226)
© Centre international de formation européenne | Téléchargé le 02/08/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.95.3.226)
Slovak National
SL X 11.73 X 5.07
Party
Slovak People´s
SL X 0.16 X X
Party
People´s Party –
SL X X X 1.33
Our Slovakia
nation with a divine plan. The moral value of the nationalism and patriotism also
originates from the divine authority.
Even when nationalist documents claim their positive attitude towards na-
tional minorities, they usually approach non-Christian immigration with hostili-
ty. By the divine intentions nations occupy their respective lands. The connection
between the nation and the soil of its ancestors is also very important, especially
for Polish, but also for Slovak and Hungarian nationalist electoral manifestos.
Another feature common to all nationalist manifestos is threat. The nation
as defined in the previous paragraphs faces the grave danger of losing one of
its constitutive elements. Most prominently represented is the threat of losing
national values and the Christian tradition, which are systematically attacked
by the postmodern and liberal culture imported from Western Europe and the
United States. Nationalist documents criticize these influences and mark them as
materialism, commercialism and perversion. Most of the parties belonging to this
category call for more control of the state over the media and academic life of the
country in order to prevent the spread of these antinational values. Moreover, na-
© Centre international de formation européenne | Téléchargé le 02/08/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.95.3.226)
© Centre international de formation européenne | Téléchargé le 02/08/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.95.3.226)
tionalist manifestos were advocating the change of the educational system in or-
der to stress the spirit of patriotism and national pride in the educational process.
In economic globalization, a similar danger was perceived by the parties of
the nationalist category. Through the liberalization of commerce, for example, as
a result of membership in the EU, transnational corporations exploit the nation
while foreign powers and forces take control of the national wealth. These alien
forces are often linked to the mainstream political parties in the country. In this
regard, a very prominent issue is the ownership of the soil. Most of the nationalist
parties called for the prohibition of, or a moratorium on, selling national land to
foreigners. In the case of Slovakia, there was also the prominent fear of Hungarian
revisionism and of their attempts to take Slovak land and annex it.
The nationalist categories of all the four countries approached minorities and
especially immigrants with suspicion. They perceive traditional minorities as al-
iens that are allowed to stay in their host country. The nationalist manifestos
grant them human rights, (sometimes, conditionally, minority rights) however,
the members of the minorities were not supposed to have influence over national
government and state policies. Should the need arise, it would be completely
justifiable to strip them of their freedoms and privileges. Even less welcomed
were immigrants and members of nontraditional minorities. These were seen as
complete strangers with no connection and legitimate relation to the country,
state and its services, only the justified asylum seekers could be assimilated in the
country because of ‘its solidarity’. All parties belonging to the nationalist group
were advocating strict immigration laws in order to prevent a flood of aliens of-
© Centre international de formation européenne | Téléchargé le 02/08/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.95.3.226)
the internal issues. Either they do not speak about European values, or other soft
aspects of identity, or they directly reject them. They consider their countries as
integral part of European territory, but the Europe of Nations as a cooperative
concept is strongly promoted in opposition toward EU. The freedom of travelling
or settlement in Europe is mostly seen as a possibility to create respectful connec-
tions toward other European nations. Membership in EU is mostly rejected, as
well as most integration policies, common market, etc. Moreover, EU is often de-
picted as an economical colonizator. If the European integration should happen,
it should be based on the respectful and equal cooperation between the nations
and their states, basically for sustaining good conditions for the nation’s develop-
ment. They reject Euroregionalism as an instrument of national destructions.
Interesting is the fact that the Slovak nationalist manifestos are more Europe-
and EU-friendly than the others. There is also some optimism seen by some Pol-
ish nationalist manifestos, mostly in their pragmatic approach towards using the
EU funds or their claim for Polish as one of the main leaders in the EU. Czech
and Hungarian nationalist approaches are the most rigid and strict and consider
the EU funds as dangerous and as a tool for colonization. There is only the popu-
list tolerance toward EU because the national referenda agreed on it, but at the
same time, they advocate that it was a wrong decision and would be preferable if
the people review it.
The electoral support to these approaches is very low, as we can see in the
table above. Only the Slovak National Party is represented in the Slovak Parlia-
ment with seven MPs. On the other hand, Slovak National Party is one of the
very positively changing with their approach to Europe and even EU. However,
they still remain as a nationalist opposition within European Union discussions.
National-conservative approach
© Centre international de formation européenne | Téléchargé le 02/08/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.95.3.226)
patriotism and national pride among the members of the nation and citizens.
This approach proved to be very influential especially in two countries—Po-
land and Slovakia—where it was represented by the senior government parties:
PiS and Smer-SD. Even the Czech Public Affairs are part of the government.
However, the ideology of this party is very fluid and opportunist in many aspects.
Therefore we can classify them also as a populist party combining publicly reso-
nating solutions and issues. In the case of Public Affairs, national-related issues
have also been mentioned in the manifesto, but they are not used as much in the
practical politics as by the Polish and Slovak examples of this approach. A full
list of the parties in this category and their electoral supports are presented in
Table 3.
The national-conservative approach is not hostile to other nations or national
minorities. The nation and security of the national state are the primal goals of
national conservatives but as long as these are secured, their policies towards mi-
norities are (on paper, at least) conducted in accordance with minority rights and
freedoms. This is clearly evident in the way national conservative manifestos ap-
proached the Roma minority. The main concern of these documents was integra-
tion—normalization—of the Roma people, not their assimilation or exclusion.
The parties of the national-conservative approach tend to advocate assertive
and confident foreign policies in their electoral manifestos. Respectful treatment
and high credit in the eyes of other countries is of great importance. They reject
being vassals of the great powers, be it Washington, Moscow or even Brussels. The
need for their own autonomy and sovereignty is evident. National-conservatives
demand a dignified position in the international community and especially in the
L’Europe en formation nº 364 Été 2012 - Summer 2012
EU. In this respect, the manifestos belonging to this group tend to be sceptical
towards further integration of the EU. In the case of Poland—the biggest of the
four Visegrad countries—this tendency is the most apparent. However, while
expressing their independence and sovereignty from western European coun-
tries, national-conservative documents also emphasize the rightful membership
of their respective countries in the EU. In their understanding, central Europe is
an integral part of European civilization that was wrongfully separated from it for
more than 40 years. It is important that other countries acknowledge this fact.
Positions toward the specific EU policies depend on the (economical)-pragmatic
reasonings. The spirit of building a common Europe is not present.
© Centre international de formation européenne | Téléchargé le 02/08/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.95.3.226)
Sovereignty CZE X 0.46 X 3.67
People´s Party
Movement for SL X 8.79 X 4.32
Democratic Slovakia
Direction– Social
SL X (29.14) X 34.79
Democracy (2010)
From the electoral support, we can see that the national-conservative ap-
proach resonates significantly in the societies. Except for Hungary, where it is
more specific and therefore the main political party belongs to the autonomous
greater-nation approach, which is also similar in many aspects to the national-
conservative one. Moreover, the public resonance toward European related issues
is even stronger, it is very similar also to the European dimension of the next ex-
ceptionalist approach, which is more liberal in the general national related issues.
Exceptionalist approach
The exceptionalist approach contains electoral manifestos that are fully dedi-
cated to liberal and democratic principles of governance. At the same time, they
Table 4: Parties and their electoral manifestos assigned to the exceptionalist approach
Czech Social
Democratic Party CZE X (32.32) X 20.08
(2010)
Christian Democratic
© Centre international de formation européenne | Téléchargé le 02/08/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.95.3.226)
© Centre international de formation européenne | Téléchargé le 02/08/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.95.3.226)
Union – Czechoslovak CZE X 7.22 X (4.39)
People´s Party (2006)
Hungarian Democratic
HU X (2.85) X 2.67
Forum (2010)
Hungarian Socialist
HU X 48.19 X (19.3)
Party (2006)
Direction-Social
SL X 29.14 X (34.79)
Democracy (2006)
The parties and their respective manifestos embracing this approach primarily
address the citizenry of the state, rather than ethnic or national group in particu-
lar and fully embrace the idea of equality and rights for all citizens. At the same
time, however, they tend to be cautious about cultures and influences with which
they are not familiar. This mixture of formal liberalism and informal suspicion
towards the outside world is the defining and distinctive feature of the third ap-
proach.
The state represents not just the national majority, but all citizens, and there
is no reason for the preferential treatment of any particular culture, language or
tradition. The state serves all without regard to one’s background. This does not
mean that it should neglect a cultural policy aiming at the conservation and cul-
tivation of tradition and heritage—support for culture and art should be focused
on all the segments of society.
At this point, however, one would notice that while the exceptionalist docu-
ments stress liberal values, rights and equality among citizens, they are not so
supportive of importing new and strange cultural influences and value systems.
To be clear, they express concerns over cultures which are not based upon gener-
ally familiar, traditional European values. Influences that are strikingly different
and exotic are not considered by exceptionalists to be applicable and appropriate
for their countries, their realities and they mention it openly. They consider Eu-
ropean civilization, with its successes and liberal tradition, to be the most suitable
and even the best in general. Their suspicion transcends itself into strict immi-
gration rules and, more importantly, in foreign policy issues. In general, we can
© Centre international de formation européenne | Téléchargé le 02/08/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.95.3.226)
© Centre international de formation européenne | Téléchargé le 02/08/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.95.3.226)
speak about latent xenophobia.
Exceptionalist parties emphasize autonomy and sovereignty for their respec-
tive countries, in the international arena, as an irreplaceable condition for inde-
pendent acting in foreign affairs. They support membership of their countries in
the EU, but at the same time they tend to be rather pragmatic and thoughtful
about further EU integration. First and foremost, they pursued their national
interests in the EU, not any ideological goal of achieving an united Europe as
such or in the federative manners. However, even in this aspect we can find more
readiness for continuing and strengthening European integration, but this should
be based more on consensus and common goals than on more binding proce-
dures. This could be illustrated in the fact that around half of these manifestos
decline the European Constitution or Lisbon Treaty. The same pragmatic opinion
is related also for the Visegrad and central European cooperation even if most of
them openly voice their central European identity. All these aspects could be also
illustrated by the approach toward Turkey’s accession in the EU, where pragmatic
privileged partnership is actively promoted, rather than membership, which can
mean the penetration of different cultural and external patterns to the EU.
The electoral results show that this is the main approach in the Czech Re-
public, including both main parties, The Civic Democratic Party and the Social
Democrats. Even in Hungary and Slovakia this approach was the most important
one by the constitutive function of the political parties, however, we can also
see that in Slovakia and Hungary this approach was significantly on the with-
drawal during the research period and the main representative parties (socialists
and social democrats) refined their approaches for the next elections. The Social
Liberal approach
© Centre international de formation européenne | Téléchargé le 02/08/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.95.3.226)
Table 5: Parties and their electoral manifestos assigned to the liberal approach
Christian Democratic
Union – Czechoslovak CZE X (7.22) X 4.39
People´s Party (2010)
Czech Social Democrat
CZE X 32.32 X (22.08)
Party (2006)
Slovak Democratic and
SL X 18.35 X 15.42
Christian Union
Alliance of a New
SL X 1.42 X X
Citizen
Most-Híd SL X X X 8.12
© Centre international de formation européenne | Téléchargé le 02/08/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.95.3.226)
The liberal approach is present only in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, how-
ever, the electoral support in the Czech Republic was a bit reduced with the shift
of Czech Social democrats toward the exceptionalist approach in the 2010 elec-
tion. On the other hand, in Slovakia we can see a slow increase in support, espe-
cially with the penetration of the new party Most-Híd to the Slovak party system.
Antinationalist approach
Table: 6: Parties and their electoral manifestos assigned to the Antinationalist approach
Alliance
of the Free HU X 4.66 X 0.25
Democrats
Politics can be
HU X X X 4.15
Different
Hungarian
Socialist Party HU X (48.19) X 15.28
(2010)
Democratic 13.5 in Coalition
Left Alliance PL 11.31 X with LID, SDPL, X
(2005) PD and UP
© Centre international de formation européenne | Téléchargé le 02/08/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.95.3.226)
© Centre international de formation européenne | Téléchargé le 02/08/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.95.3.226)
Left and 13.5 in Coalition
Democrats PL X X with SLD, SDPL, X
(2007) PD and UP
and positive situation in this regard. However, in Hungary, the increased support,
around 20% by last election for antinationalist approach indicated that there is
an important community in Hungary representing this opposition toward other,
mainly nationalistic and greater-nation tendencies that are strongly present.
© Centre international de formation européenne | Téléchargé le 02/08/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.95.3.226)
sents itself as a party representing democracy and the interests of regular citizens
striving for social change toward socialism in a democratic way. According to the
political declaration of the IV congress of KSČM in 1995, “socialism is incompat-
ible with any social, national, religious or any other oppression or the violation of
human rights” 4.
The Czech communist approach to nation related issues combines a call for
international unity and cooperation with strong distrust of the international com-
munity and organizations. This seemingly contradictory scenario is the result of
the specific type of ideology embraced by the orthodox communist KSČM. On
the one hand this ideology stresses international cooperation, but on the other
hand, such cooperation is viewed in a class paradigm that is hostile towards the
liberal and capitalist version of globalization. The communist type of manifesto
distinguishes itself from the liberal and antinationalist approach by its references
to the nation as the basic constitutive body of international politics. It is against
the present form of the EU that was viewed as a delivery mechanism for capitalist
interests in Europe. On the other hand, the Czech communist type differs from
the national-conservative and nationalist approach due to its emphasis on the
equality of all people, social inclusion and human rights. If we look at electoral
results (see Table 2), we can find that KSČM holds (in the research period) sup-
port of around 12 per cent of Czech Republic voters.
If we look at concrete consequences of KSČM ideology and approach toward
European issues, we can see a rejection of the Lisbon Treaty, Common European
4. KSČM: Politická deklarace IV. Sjezdu KSČM [Political Declaration of IV. KSČM Congress], on-line http://
www.kscm.cz/nase-strana/dulezite-dokumenty-k-minulosti/40625.
© Centre international de formation européenne | Téléchargé le 02/08/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.95.3.226)
of Jobbik. Even the approaches of the smaller parties of Hungarian minorities in
Slovakia are in strong contrast with these in Hungary. After the election of 2010,
Fidesz-MPP created a unicolour two-thirds government and Jobbik is represen-
ted in the Hungarian Parliament as the third biggest party. An overview and the
electoral results are presented in the Table 7.
Table 7: Parties and their electoral manifestos assigned to the Greater-nation approach
the nation which was represented by the Hungarians who embrace the national,
cultural/historical heritage and their mother tongue is Hungarian. Among those
core Hungarians, there are also Hungarians from neighbouring countries. There
are also other members of the nation who belong to the minorities, which have
resided in Hungary (or the Hungarian Kingdom) for centuries. These minori-
ties—Roma people, Germans or Croats—inherited the cultural heritage of the
Hungarian nation and are part of it. Their interests overlap with the interests of
ethnic Hungarians and, therefore, are considered to be part of the nation as long
as they are loyal to it. In this respect, the greater-nation approach resembles more
the national-conservative group of manifestos.
The approach of the greater-nation group is mostly visible in the way all four
manifestos justified the policies they proposed. The most rightful cause, and also
the reason for the implementation of a policy or measures, is their positive effect
on the Hungarian nation. To put it in other words: the well-being of the Hungar-
ian nation is the moral value through which one should consider one’s acts. This
approach has a decisive influence on the policies and measures that are chosen
© Centre international de formation européenne | Téléchargé le 02/08/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.95.3.226)
© Centre international de formation européenne | Téléchargé le 02/08/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.95.3.226)
by the political parties. But let us first take a look at the reason why this is so and
how the documents of the greater-nation group portray the Hungarian nation.
For Fidesz-MPP, Jobbik and MDF (in the context of the 2006 manifesto),
the Hungarian nation is more than just the sum of Hungarians sharing the same
values, history and culture. The nation is a more supertemporal and complex
phenomenon. The nation and its identity is not primarily dependent on the char-
acters, values and achievements of living Hungarians. Hungarian soil and way
of life were so important for the nationalist parties that they even called for the
prohibition of selling Hungarian soil to foreigners. Christianity and its values also
had a defining influence on the character of the Hungarian nation. Affiliation to
Christianity and to the Christian moral code is especially stressed by MDF, which
suggested that even if the state is officially secular, it does not mean that the gov-
ernment could not be affiliated with the Christian church.
The state primarily represents its constituting nation. National identity, as it
was defined above, should be strengthened among the citizens of the state. For
this purpose, nationalist parties are willing to use state resources and even model
them in order to achieve this goal. In this respect, all available state resources
should be used for the education system, through public media and diplomacy
and for the armed forces.
As we already explained for nationalist manifestos, the nation is not defined
by national borders and consequently, the role and duty of the national state are
not limited by artificially drawn borders but, on the contrary, they have to tran-
scend them. The logical consequence of the nationalist world view was reflected
in an assertive foreign policy towards those countries which possessed significant
Hungarian minorities. For Fidesz-MPP, Jobbik and MDF it was a question of the
highest importance to reunite the Hungarian nation again. This goal was not ad-
vanced literally, at least not in public. Rather, the manifestos of these parties cen-
tred on the advocacy of autonomous status and powers for Hungarians abroad.
The nationalist parties were also ready to support foreign Hungarian communi-
ties without regard for the governments of the involved countries. However, they
deserve not only financial, cultural and political support from their homeland,
but since they are an integral part of the nation, and the Hungarian state is the
body and the tool of this nation, Hungarians outside Hungary should have the
right to influence Hungarian politics and public life. This is the reason why all
three parties in the examined manifestos supported the establishment of some
kind of preferential status for foreign Hungarians including civil rights.
Jobbik represents the more radical version of the category described above. All
of the features defining this group of manifestos are more explicitly present in the
Jobbik 2010 manifesto. Besides the already mentioned features, Jobbik also ex-
plicitly stressed its aversion for postmodern values which are destroying tradition-
© Centre international de formation européenne | Téléchargé le 02/08/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.95.3.226)
© Centre international de formation européenne | Téléchargé le 02/08/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.95.3.226)
al families. These were in sharp contrast to the values of the Hungarian identity.
Finally, Jobbik, more than the other two parties belonging to the ‘greater-nation’
category, emphasized its distrust towards foreign capital and investments. Jobbik
saw it as an attempt to take over the Hungarian economy and its national wealth.
However, these specific differences do not alter the common understanding and
world view of the parties classified as falling within this group.
European connotations of this approach then generally widen the logic of
their argumentation. However, there is a totally different perception of Europe
and the EU by Fidesz-MPP and MDF in their 2006 manifesto in opposition to
Jobbik. Jobbik is strongly against the EU and common EU policies, including
common market and currency as well as economical, political and external and
military policies. Fidesz and MDF 2006 manifesto declares respect for European
values, Europeanness and the Hungarian identity seen as naturally European.
Fidesz even advocates for a further identitary europeanisation of Hungarians in
contrast to Jobbik. Fidesz rejects the concept of Europe of Nations and embraces
also central a European and Visegrad identity. Jobbik sees the central European
countries only as partners for cooperation with no special moral or identity value.
In opposition to Jobbik, Fidesz sees the EU as a reunification of the Hungarian
nation, therefore, Fidesz also supports EU regionalism. The European demos is
also important for Fidesz, contrary to Jobbik, which rejects the European iden-
tity, Europeanness, EU membership and European values.
© Centre international de formation européenne | Téléchargé le 02/08/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.95.3.226)
of southern Slovakia, where most of the Hungarian minority lives. This aspect of
the SMK manifestos could be interpreted as nation-centric. The policies and pro-
posals contained in the SMK election documents are not just about implement-
ing and protecting the rights of minorities (especially Hungarian minorities), but
these are often set up to further promote the Hungarian language and culture.
Hungarian identity and heritage were considered to be in peril in Slovakia and
it was of great importance for SMK to ensure their survival. Assimilation of the
Hungarians was seen as a great threat. For SMK, this was not just a question of
minority rights, but rather in the interest of the Hungarian nation as a whole. It
should be mentioned that this element of the political program was developed
and emphasised in the 2010 manifesto, while it was of secondary importance in
SMK’s electoral document of 2006.
Due to the subtle fear of assimilation and possible discrimination (or even
assimilation), SMK policies were strongly focused on further European integrati-
on since the EU was seen as a guarantee of minority rights in the member states.
Moreover, European policies aiming at strengthening subsidiary and regional go-
vernance were in harmony with SMK’s goals. However, SMK saw the European
dimension of its program in terms of identity, not just policies. Hungarians, like
Slovaks, were considered by SMK to be part of the wider community of Europe-
an nations. The central European identity of SMK is also a logically promoted
principle.
SMK electoral support was 11.68% in 2006 and it declined for the next elec-
tion in 2010 when they even did not reach the 5% threshold to Slovak Par-
liament, they reached only 4.33%.
Conclusion
© Centre international de formation européenne | Téléchargé le 02/08/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.95.3.226)
becoming an Exceptionalist type with 20.8% of votes, while it used to be a liberal
type of party with 32.32% of votes in 2006. We can observe opposite trends by
the Visegrad socialists parties like the Hungarian Socialist Party, which was an Ex-
ceptionalist type with 48.19% of votes, but became an Antinationalist in 2010,
however, with only 19.3% of votes.
We can see a kind of ‘denationalisation’ of the parties’ identities along the
example of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, which changed from the ‘Greater-
Nation’ type to an Exceptionalist type, although the electoral support stayed more
or less the same. The Polish People’s Party changed from National-Conservative
to an Exceptionalist type of party. Furthermore, the Czech Christian Democratic
Union—Czechoslovak People’s Party changed from Exceptionalists to a Liberal
type, although they weren’t represented in the parliament in the 2010 election.
We can see also that there are no shifts among categories by the Nationalist,
Czech Communists and Slovak Minority approaches. These can illustrate longer
lasting additional tendencies for some specific ideological groups.
Following the content of the different types, it is clear from some frictions and
distinctions among the parties that issues related to nationhood are not directly
connected to the positions of the political parties toward European issues. In
some of them, we can follow some correlations, but generally we can see that na-
tionalism and perceiving European issues are not in correlation and are grounded
in genuinely different roots. Therefore, it is also impossible to speak in general
terms about some kind of Euronationalism based in member states. But it seems
that many of the negative political approaches toward EU and EU policies are
based on the pragmatic logic of politics, and only a very small range of issues are
influenced by nationalism and related issues. Nationalism is cultivated in ap-
L’Europe en formation nº 364 Été 2012 - Summer 2012
© Centre international de formation européenne | Téléchargé le 02/08/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.95.3.226)
even Hungarian greater-nation approaches do not mean rejection of some EU
policies, Europeanness or even fostering a European demos.
One of the few correlations which we can prove is that, as soon as there is a
feeling of belonging to the central European region and its identity, there is also a
feeling of belonging to Europe and EU. But it is different when the focus is only
on central European cooperation, without stressing a common central European
identity. Central European cooperation does neither include nor exclude differ-
ent positions on European integration or cooperation based on the preservation
of strong national states. The positions seems to be more rooted in the different
goals and aims of different party approaches and value ranking, even if we can
find some common types of them, at least in the so-called Visegrad region. It also
seems that the national-liberal approaches in relation toward Europe, and more
specifically toward EU, are freed from nationalistic tendencies. We can therefore
paraphrase the liberal theory that democracies do not fight each other by stating
that the liberal political approaches exclude nationalistic tendencies and are most
open for European integration and common EU policies.
Abstract
Parties´ identities often tackle the issue of nationalism, national feelings or appeals. Therefore, we fo-
cused on them and extract basic approaches and their special regard to national related issues. The ex-
amination of the political parties manifestos and election programmatic in the Visegrad region - the Czech
Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary helped to identify eight different approaches on how the nation
and the society are considered in the region. While five of these approaches are present in the political
parties in more of the Visegrad countries, three of them are more specific.
We have researched both the relevant political parties and significant nonparliamentary nationalistic
and extreme right parties in the period from 2005 to 2010 to get the up-to-date picture about the national
identities of the parties. This limited period is important because of the political context, when all of the
countries are already members of the European Union.
Résumé
Les identités partisanes prennent souvent en compte les questions du nationalisme des sentiments
nationaux. C’est pourquoi nous avons décidé de nous concentrer sur ceux-ci et d’en extraire les approches
fondamentales et leurs regards spécifiques sur les enjeux nationaux. L’examen des manifestes des partis
politiques et des programmes électoraux dans la région de Visegrad – la République tchèque, la Pologne,
la Slovaquie et la Hongrie – a permis d’identifier oui différentes approches de la nation et de la société
dans cette région. Cinq de ces approches sont présentes dans la plupart des partis politiques de la région,
alors que trois sont plus spécifiques.
Nous avons étudié à la fois les principaux partis politiques, ainsi que les partis nationalistes et d’extrême
droite sans représentation parlementaire les plus significatifs, pour la période allant de 2005 à 2010, afin
d’en tirer une image actualisée de l’identité nationale des partis. Cette période limitée est importante en
raison de son contexte politique, car tous ces pays étaient déjà membres de l’Union européenne.
© Centre international de formation européenne | Téléchargé le 02/08/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.95.3.226)
© Centre international de formation européenne | Téléchargé le 02/08/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 41.95.3.226)