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THE THEORY OF THE UNITY OF GOD

IN AL-rowAYNI's AJARSHAD
by
Abdc1 HakimAjhar
Athesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Master of Ans
Institute of Ts1arnic Studics
McGill University
Montreal,Canada
June 1995
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ii
ABSTRAcr
AUTIIOR:
'l'ITLE:
DEPARTMENT:
DEGREE:
Ahdel Hakim Ajhar
The Theory of the Unit y of Gnd in al-Juwayn's al-Irshiid
McGiIl University - Institute of !slamic Studies
Master of Arts

The conception of the unity of God in al-Juwayn. one of the latest thinkers in
the carly Islamie kaliim. is the subject of this thesis. AI-Juwayn. though an Ash'arite
thinker was quite open to Mu'tazilite thought. particularly that of Ab Hashim al-
Jubbli'i. He was also inlluenced by the philosophers.
With al-Juw<lyn the kaliim's theory of the unity of God reached its ultimate
resolution. That is to say. the theory of the unity of God was based on specifie
epistemological grounds. in the early period of the kaliim. It had assumed its shape. and
was thercforc open to the possibility for establishing a new approach to the unity of God
in the ontological sense.
The first chapter deals with the long historical debate about the unity of God. It
introduces many aspects of alJuwayn's thought. and touches on how alJuwayn.
proceeding from an Ash'arite background adopted many of the Mu'tazilite's themes. in
its BU\irian braneh.
The second chapter analyzes the theory of al-Juwayni on these issue and shows
his contribution to the notion of the unity of Gad in his book a/-Irshiid.
The third is a conclusion whieh throws Iight on the possibilities openecl by al-
Juwayni to approaehing the unity of God from different ontologieal angles. Such
possibilities had. in faet. emerged in a1-Juwayni's thinking when he began to use

III
dirrerent concepts. particularly in his hook .1I-''Aqi<1l1iJ .1I-Ni;rllmi.l'lIiJ. T'IlIS 1I1kr
proved in ul-/rshii<1 Ihat God is exislence he generally avoided lISilig
'110ms and accidents. Instead. he viewed the lIniverse as of Iwo kinds. neccssary Ilcillg
and possible beings. In this conlextthe allrihules of God as :.speels of 1lis essence wOllld
play li dirrerent ontologieal l'Ole. eomprehended in Ihe term .

i
v
RESUME
AUTEUR:
TITER:
Abdel Hakim Ajhar
La Thorie de l'Unicit de Dieu selon ('al-lrslJad
DEPARTEMENT: Institut des Etudes Islamiques, Universit McGiIl
DIPLOME: Matrise s Ans

La conception de l'unicit de Dieu selon al-Juwayni, le dernier penseur du dbut

de la priode du kalam Islamique est le sujet de ce mmoire. Malgr qu'il fut un penseur
Ash'arite, al-Juwayni tait rceptif la pense Mu'tazilite, plus paniculirement celle
d'Ab Hiishim al-Jubb'i. De plus, il tait influenc par les philosophes.
Avec al-Juwayni, la thorie de l'unicit de Dieu selon le kalam a atteint son
apoge. Ce qui veut dire que la thorie de l'unicit de Dieu tait base sur des
fondements pistmologiques spcifiques pendant la premire poque du ka/iim. Elle va
s'arroger sa forme et par consquant, la thorie sera rceptive la possibilit d'tablir une
nouvelle approche de l'unicit de Dieu dans le sens ontologique.
Le premier chapitre se concentre sur le long dbat historique concernant l'unicit
de Dieu. Il prsente plusieurs aspects de la pense d'alJuwayni et retrace comment celui-
ci a adopt cenains thmes Mu'tazilite de l'cole de B ~ r a partir d'lments Ash'arites.
Le second chapitre analyse la thorie d'al-Juwayni ce sujet et dmontre sa
contribution dans son livre aJ-Irshifd la notion d'unicit de Dieu.
Le troisime chapitre termine ce mmoire en mettant en lumire les possibilits

\'
dgages par al-Juwayni dans l'approche de l'unicit de Dicu selon diffrents
ontologiques. En fait, de telles possibilits ont au sein de la pense d'al-Juwaym
lorsque celui-ci a commenc utiliser diffrents concepts: particulirement dans son Iivrc
Ill-'Aqidah al-Nir-iimiyah, Ainsi, aprs qu'il et prouv dans son Ill-/rslwd que Dieu cst
l'existence mme, al-Juwayni va gnralement viter d'utiliscr Ics termes d'atomes ct
d'accident. A la place, il voyait l'univers comme tant de deux sortcs, soit l'Eu'c
ncessaire et les tres possibles. Dans ce contexte, les attributs de Dieu en Hmt qu',\spects
de Son Essence pourraienjouer un rle ontologique diffrcnt, compris d.ms le tcrme IlI-
takh$i$ .

v
i
TRANSLITBRATION
The Arabie to English transliteration system used in this thesis follows that of the
lnstitute of Islamic studies. Il must be noted that hllmzah in the initial position is omited.
and simply appcars in the forms of a,i,u, according to its vocalization.
t = , 'ain
!> = 'bamzab
? = db
t:=gh
ut' = ,
- = c.g Hishim, al-]uwaynI, Saljllk.
b = t
oP = Q
o =q
b' = ~
CS = Y
CJ = th
o = h IF.IDIIlbtJrsb
e =I.t

vii
Acknowledgments
It is hard to express in a few words. the v:lluable effort of support ami full
participation 1 have received from Sausan. my wife. or more precisely illY partner in
allthings. To her 1 owe my gratitude.
1would Iike to thank Professor U. Turgay. Director of Institute of Islamic Studies for
providing me with a fellowship for the academic year 1993-94; special thanks tll
Professor E. Ormsby. my teacher weil as my adviser; Professor 1. Boullata for
giving me sorne of his vaIuable time; Professor H. Landolt. and M. Estahlmi.
My greatthanks go also to the staff atthe Institute of Islamic Studies Iibrary for their
assistance. especially S. Ferahian and W. St.
The secretary of lnstitute V. Masse cannot be forgotten, thanks to her and to the
editors of this thesis Richard Cooper. Elizabeth Abbot, and Sh. Nanji in the computer
lab.
My friends deserve a1so my thanks for their constant care and help. And special
gratitude must he admitted for a Httle guy, my son Manar. who was understanding of the
importance of his calm during my work on this thesis. He waited till 1had finished my
work to start his demands and even cry.

Abstraet
TABLE OF CONTENTS
........................................................................................ '" ii
vi

Resume iv
Translitcration v
Acknowlcdgmcnts vii
Introduction- 1
Chaptcr I- The Historieal Devclopment of the Problem 13
1.1- The Attempts at Creating One Method for Determining
ail Beings 14
1. 2- Other Aspects of the Problem 21
1. 3- The Logical Aspect 23
1. 4- New Strategy in the Mu'tazilite School 30
Chaptcr ll AIJuwayni's Theory in K. aJ-Irshiid 45
II. 1- The Theory of States (AQwiil) 49
II. 2- What it is Necessary to Say of God 52
II. 3- The Essential Attributes 57
II. 4- The Truth of Similarity and Difference 58
II. 5- The Negative Essential Attributes 64
II. 6- The Affirmation of Knowing the Attributes of Ma'iini 66
II.7-The Attributes that Necessitat their Qualifications 69
II. 8- The Benefit of Using Ma'iini 74
II. 9- The Meaning of God's Names 75
II. 10-The Traditional Attributes (aJ-$iliir aJkhabaryah) 77
Conclusion 83
Select Biblography 91

Introduction
. ;

2
ln dealing with the history of the Ash'arite ka/m, two thinkers reecive most of
the atlention, Ahu all;lasan alAsh'ari (d. 324/946), the founder of this sehool, and
Ahu 1:lamid alGhazali (d. 5051111), who is considered most often as the great exponent
of his school against many others, philosophers, Mu'tazilites and Balinites. This
common understanding was in fact imposed by certain historical circumstanees duc
to the political and religiou\ clements. AbO all;lasan alAsh'ari appeared in a very
anxious moment in Islamie history when there was connict hetween the Mu'tazilites,
who had fallen l'rom power but had not disappearcd l'rom the cultural and religious
presence, and the l;Ianbalites, the orthodox Muslims, who were resisting, both
religiously and politically their opponents' atlempts to summon.
Although alAsh'ari's thought ean he traced baek in many points to the
previous tradition, his importance cornes l'rom his effort to formulate these issues
into one coherent theory. The theory of mll'iini, for instance, whereby the additional
and etemaJ attributes of Gad are different from His essenCe as weil as from each other,
is to he found in his predecessor Ibn Kulliib (d. 240/862) who was the lirst creator
of such theory. t The notion of uncreatedness (ghayr makhlq) of the Holy Qur'iin ClIO
aJso he found as one of the Ibn Kulliib's views, as weil as Al;1mad Ibn I;IanbaJ.
With respect to the theory of how to interpret the arnbiguous passages in the
Qur'iin coneeming those passages which extemaJly, ?ahiran, Iiken Gad in sorne way to
His creatures, alAsh'ari also adopted the view of Anas Ibn Miilik, the lirst to helieve that
these passages must he taken as they arc without asking how (bili kllyf). AlAsh'ari a1s0
recognized the issue of the possibility of the vision of Gad, which was pronounced by
aJI;Iiirith b. Asad aJMul;tasibi (d. 243/665) in his book aJTllwahum.2
Il is needless to seek here for the sources of aJl the issues that aJAsh'ari
mentioned. The conclusion we arc Irying to arrive at is that the great position aJ
Ash'ari holds in Islarnic history is to he found. lirst, in his capacity to create a
baJanced view, taking into account bath revelation and the reason, with sorne

inclination towards the former; and secondly, in his uhility 10 rcfute und criticil.e
his opponents ut u time in which u speciul son of person, polilieully und rcligiously
speaking wus needed.
Ab I;\iimid ul-Ghuzali cume inlo view in Islumic hblOl y us u grcut Ash'urile
Ihinker when he fuced two fronts Ihat becume dangerous l'rom Ihe Sunni-Suljuk
state's point of view, Ihe Ismu'iIiles and the philosophers. AI-Ghuzlili's llehievemenl
can bc found in his reeslablishing the Sunni doclrine Ihal wus the ideology of the
Saljk stale, and in his criticism of the Balinites and philosophers. But l'rom u
different point of view al-Ghuziili did not present a syslemutie and coherent theory,
rather he offers many theories--whlch mostly contradict each other--in different fields
in the context of his evolving refutation of other groups. As Ibn Sab'in notes
describing al-Ghaziili: "He is mixture combining the contraries, and confusion
undermines people's hearts. Sometimes he is a mystic, at another he is a philosopher,
the third an Ash'arite, the fourth a jurist, and the fifth time he is confusing" 3.
Although al-Juwayni Iived in anxious times bctween two differcnt kinds of
states, the Buwayhi and the Saljk. and though he was Iike ail the Ash'arites ut that
time subject to the inquisition (miPnal. most of his writings werc completed in a
stable political situation, after Alb Arsliin and his vizir N i ~ a m al-Mulk had
rcconsidered the Ash'arites and brought them to their high position.
AI-Juwayni occupied a very important role in the Saljk-Sunni state. He
was. bcsides others Iike Ab al-Qasim al-Qushayri (d. 4bS/I072l. head of the
education system instituted by N i ~ i i m al-Mulk. The importance of al-Juwayni
cannot, therefore. bc sought chielly in his historical circurnstances nor in his
ability to attack bis opponents. ln other words. the historical position of alJuwayni
alone does not help us so much in our attempt to understand his importance a . ~ a
thnker
It might he said that because the most dominant method in the studies dealing with

4
the history of Islamic thought still relies either on analyzing such thought in terms
of historical or searching for the foreign clements that inOuenced this
thought, alJuwayni has not had a great attention from the scholars. Apart from
these methods, which- in our view- arc not proper to discover the special structure
that any discourse trics to build. al-Juwayni should be studied in terms of his
position in the carly kll/m's discourse. This is bccause. he represents the climactic
point of this discourse in the Ash'arites' line. Thus, in analyzing the contribution of
al-Juwayni to the carly kIl/m with reference to the kIl/m discourse itself. not
through historical or foreign elements, wc can arrive at a measure of his great
importance.
Needless to say. when we talk about the kll/iim discourse in this study we mean
the metaphysics of the ka/am from its establishing by Ab a1Hudhayl a1'Alliif (d.
235/857) to Ab a1-Ma'ii1i a1Juwayni. The metaphysics which is built on the same
epistemological basis, namely bcings and their attributes.
By the method of analyzing the discourse in terms of the discourse itself is
meant seeking for the way that the discourse builds and arranges itself according to
certain principles. The aim here is to disclose the consistencies, harmonies and
contradictions. as weil as the disparities, whatever they may be. that the discourse
contains. That is to say, every discoursephilosophically speaking--even though its
attempt to create its own coherent system still suffers from the contradictions
bctween the concepts within it, from the gaps and inequalities bctween its levels.4
The development, evaluation or creation of a different system proceeds mostly from
these sorts of disparities. which are not overcome in the available discourse that is the
subject of this criticism. In other words the criticism, whether it cornes from the
adherents of a particular discourse or from other fields of thinking, emerges from the
defects or disharmonies that this discourse a1lows to creep tbrough.
In elaborating the kalfm's thought according ta this type of analysis, we shall,

5
surely. find out how the mutakallimn evalualed and developed Iheir discourse on the
basis of the same epistemological ground. We shaH further Cilld Ollt how the
mutakallimn (the Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites) criticized and innuenced each other
and. more importantly for this study. we shaH discover the real position and
contribution of each of the mutakallimn in this long Hne of thinking.
Furthermore. our concern in this thesis. is 10 show Ihe place of al Juwayni in the
philosophy of the ka/am in its relation to definite grounds and aims. We also intend 10
show how he treated the ka/iim issues. how he was open to both Ihe Mu'tazilites and the
philosophers and. more importantly how he overcame many of the kalm problems.
pushing this discourse to ils ultimate resolution. In this case. then. al-Juwayni will IlOt be
pictured as a skiHed debater and refuter of his opponents in disquieting historical
conditions. as his school's founder al-Ash'ari and his student al-Ghazali are viewed.
Rather. al-Juwayni's involvement in argumentation against other thinkers is a
subordinate factor used in terms of his proving and supponing his own idea.s. Il might
be said. therefore. that because of aJ-Juwayni's success in forcing obstacles out of the
ka/iim. especially the Ash'arite one. he is considered as the latest thinker in the early
ka/iim. This point may interpret partly. why his student al-Ghazali opened a new
beginning in the kaliim. a beginning which was disturbed and confuscd.
There is no doubt that since Ab aJ-Hudhayl constituted the cosmological
system of the kaliim. aJl the later activity of the mutakallimn was centered on this
system. either in amending or refuting il. This movement of the ka/am. which wa.s
working on Ab Hudhayl's system. couId be described as evaJuating and treating
the defects. lacks. disharmonies. and contradictions in Ab al-HudhayI's
metaphysics.
The basic issue in the kaliim as weIl as in the whole of Islamic thought wa.s
Gad. His unity and His relation to the attributes. Gad is the ontologicaJ foundation
of Islamic thought, and in every field of such thoughC mysticism. philosophy and

6
ku/iim_ God and His attribules represenl lhe firsl onlological principle lhal heslows
upon ail other heings lheir exislence.
ln lhe ku/iim, lhe issue of lhe unily of God was nol merely a religious issue,
il was, slriclly speaking, an onlological and a logical one. Thal is 10 say, every kalln
lheory aboullhe unily of God inevilably enlails a special underslanding of crealion, on
one hand, and involves a definile lheory aboul lhe judgmenls (ulJkim) lhat can he
asserted about God, on the other hand.
Ali the MuCtazilites, for instance, agreed that the attributes of God are directly
due to and hence identical with God's essence. They ail except for Ab aIHudhayl aI-
cAllaf, said that these attributes are not macini, additional to or identical with God's
essence. Rather, ail propositions applicable to God are due to God's essence, ail
predicates in these propositions find their origin in God's essence. God knows and
wills, by virtue of Himself. The theory of the unity of God according to the MuCtaziiites
rigorously relies on the absolute uni'v of God; they reject any other entities, whatever
lhey may he, in association with the essence of God.
Because of their helief that the selfattributes ( ~ j f i j t aJdhit) of God are identical with
His essence, the MuCtaziiites, therefore, were compelled to decide that the attribute of
will is a created attribute, not an eternal one. This helief in generated will was
necessary for the MuCtaziiites in order to justify the creation out of nothing. That is,
inasmuch as the physical world is created in time, the will as the means of creation
cannot he eternal. This is hecause the eternal attribute would necessarily entail eternal
creation as a result of God's action.
The MuCtaziiites, though they proved the absolute unity of God, were confused
about the logical aspect of the unity of God until the coming of Ab Hashim alJubba'i
(d. 321/943). The question was as follows: how can an additional predicate he put
heside the subject (God) in the propositions. God is knowing. powerful, hearing...etc.7
Different answers have becn advanced. as we shall sec in chapter one. to this question.

7
Only AbO Hshim under Ihe influence of Ihe Iheory of Ihe allrihulislS liS Prof. Wolfson
poinls oul,S admiled Ihal Ihe allribules of God lire stliles (u!III'II/) differellt frolll Ihe
essence.
The Ash'ariles' conlinuily wilh Ihe prcvious Irlldilion represented hy Ihn Kulliih,
who is considered as one of Ihe Ihree greal founders of the Ash':U"ile sehool, hclieved
Ihal Ihe allribules of God are ma'ilni, addilional 10 God's essence; Ihey .Ire ncilher
idenlical with God's ,:.,sence nor olher than He. In Ihis way the t\sh'ariles prcserved Ihe
etemity of the allribute of will, and s pcech in order to prove lliat the Holy Qur'iin is nol
created. According to the Ash'arites, because of the ahsolule freedom of God,
ontologically speaking, He can possess His will eternally and create Ihe physical
world out of nothing in a chosen moment of time.
A1though the logical aspect was c1earer and more Iinguistically appropriale, the
onlological aspect still suffered from a lack of conviclion. Although logically, ail the
predicates of God, such as being knowing, willing, hearing, powerful etc. arc derived
from the marifnj subsisting in God's essence, these mariini funclion as (ma$iidir) in a
merely linguistic sense, as prcdicales in propositions about God. There is no problem,
then, for the Ash'arites to admit addilional predicates to the subject (God).
After resorting for a long time to the theme of the etemity of God's will, al
Juwayni provided this idea with a new philosophical interprelation. He maintains that
even the creation is generated by virtue of the eternal will; it is a result of a
particularization (takh$i$) of it. AI-Juwayni in this inventive conception gives an
ontologieal interpretation to the theory of marini. He holds that the mariini have two
aspects, one etemal and subsisting in God's essence, the other generated by its being
particularizcd in the sensible world.6 The same can be applied to the attribute of speech.
On the logical side, al-JuwaynI insists that these marani are merely mental
causes by which the propositions applied to God become possible; without these marini
such propositions c?uld not he understood. The predicates of God, therefore, are caused

8
by ma'iini or 'ilal inherent in God's essence, Furthermore, these predicates or aW$f
are states (alJwi/) that cannot be said to be existent or non-existent. But contrary to
the view of Ab Hashim, the inventor of the theory of states, these alJwil are known.
One who knows the essence does not necessarily know the predicates of this esscnce; the
predicates arc hence known separately from the essence.
As it was for the predecessors of al-Juwayni, the problem is due to the way in
which the attributes of God can be ascribed to Him by a convenient justification. The
statements God is knowing, willing, an so forth need to be rightly vindicated. The
logic of the mutnka/limn in general and the Ash'arites in particular was derived
from the grarnrnar of the Arabic language.
With reference to Arabic grammar, the controversy among the mutnkallimn
centered on the question of whence the attributes (aw$iif) such as knowing, willing,
powerful etc. were derived. For this reason we repeatedly read in the Ash'arite
literature the statement directed against the Mu'tazilites challenging them to answer
the question of the' infinitive of God's aW$iif. Are these aW$f such as knowing,
willing etc., due to the essence itself or to infinitives which inhere in the essence?
For the Ash'arites, these aw$f must, according to the Arabic language, be derived from
definite mll$iiclir; knowing should he derived from the mll$dar knowledge, willing
from will etc.
Though aI-Juwayni kept the fundamental belief of his SChOlll, which states that
the predicates applied to God are derived from ma cani, he adopted Ab Hashim's
theory that these predicates are alJwiil. In addition to this point aI-Juwayni strongly
emphasizes that these maciini, which are mll$iidir of derivation, are "mental causes"
(Ci/al Caq/iynh); they are mental existents (mawjdat dhihniynh), absolutely different
from the essences, which are real existents, mawjdiit fi a1-a'yiin. In this way aI-
Juwayni avoided two big problems. The flfSt is that by negation no real entity can
possibly he ascribcd te Gad save the mental entities (maciinll without which the

l)
predication to God wouId be impossible. The second is in escaping the dilemnm of
the predicates, i.e., whether or not these predicates arc different IlIv$iIf from God's
essence. Thus, in his adoption the theory of states, which presupposes that predicates
are neither existent nor non-existent, these predicates become aspects of God tlmt Ci\ll
be known separately but do not exist apart from the essence. Besides his emphasis on
the a1,Iwii/ as additional aspects in the epistemological sense, al-Juwayni also insists
repeatedly that without these a1)wii/ wc could not elaborate the sameness and
differences among things. Chapter two explains this.
Al-Juwayni thus provided the Ash'arite school with some philosophical
momentum by adopting certain Mu'tazilite themes and philosophical ideas such as
the necessarily Being (wiijib a/-wujd) for God to distinguish Him from possible
beings which are known by the fore-knowledge of God.
In a/-Shiimi/ fi U$/ a/-din, al-Juwayn constantly mentions two names as his
main sources, Ab Ishaq al-Isfara'n. who was his teacher when he was young, and Abu
Bakr al-Baqilliin (d. 403/1025) who espoused the philosophy of atomism and when was
the second major thinker in the Ash'arite school after ils founder al-Ash'ari. The implicit
but clear source for him in a/-Shiimi/ is the Mu'tazilite thinker Ab Hiishim al-JubbiPi.
Though he embraced many of his ideas al-Juwayni argues with him on those mallers
where he does not agree with him. In K. a/-Irshiid, an intensive and mature work, al-
Juwayni does not mention his sources from his school. Rather he declares more frankly
bis objections to the founder of the Ash'arite school.
The first chapter of this study focuses on the heated historical controversy
among the MU'tazilites thernselves and later with the Ash'arites. A controversy which
always left the door open for more evaluation and development in the kaliim discourse.
this controversy in tbis chapter centers on two points: first, demonstrating the unity of
Go<! at the same time as applying to Him the attributes as predicates in propositions
about Him; second, an effort has been made to create a systematic view of the law

10
of inference of the invisible (a/-ghii'ib) from the visible This was the
major point in thc criticism directed by the Ash'arites to the Mu'tazilites.
AnalY1.ing and describing the theory of al-Juwayni_ how he tried to overcome
the lacks in both schools, how he combined many from different sources
inlo one theory, and drove the ka/am discourse to ilS ultimate points_ is the subject of
the second chapter.
Finally, the conclusion allempts to touch on both aspects of al-Juwayni's
lhought, the completion and overcoming of the troublesome points in the ka/am in
general and in the Ash'arite school in particular, and how this allempt threw the ka/am
discourse into a new crisis that couId only he resolved by creating a fundamental
shift in many aspects.

Il
1 Ibn Ku\liib, Ab Sa'id alQa\liin (d.240/862) Iived in Ihe lime of Ihe Abbasl cllliph, IlIMIl'mun
(191211/813833), and w... one of Ihe most imponanl figures in lhe hislory of lsIamic kll/illl, 10 whum
ore due mosl of the Ash'orile issues. He criticizcd the school of Johm b. and Ihe Qiillirilcs. Ile
was conlemporary 10 alMu!)iisibl, and une of Ihe mllslers of Ihe Sufi Ill-Junllyd. Ihn Kullah
mainlained thal lhe world is generated and has a beginning, and God is IInnsccndel1l nhovc 1111
anlh",pomorphic qualilies and should hc described in the same way lhal Hc dcscribes lIi'"self. Ihn
Kulliib believes in Ihe possibilily of lhe vision of God, Ilnd in Ihe uncrealedness of Ihe hui Y Qur'an,
Moreover, lhc Iheory of Ihc allribules of God os ma'ilni was hcld by Ibn Kullllb. Sec Ibn TllymiYllh,
Minhiij ohl olsunnoh, cd. M.R. Slllim, (Clliro, 1385 hl, vol. 2, p. 251. Ilnd al-Subki, T"h"'I"' III-
shiif'iyuh olkubrii, (Cairo, hl, vol. 2, p.51. Ibn 'Asflkir, TI/hyin klldllih 1l1-IIIUll'lll, ell. Il. Qudsl,
(Damascus, 1347hl, p.116. and al-Ash'ari, Moqiiliir ol.i.<liilll;yln, cd. Il. Riller, ( ISlllnbul, Wicshaden,
1980l, p. 517.
2 AIShohrasliinf mentions in his olMilol, vol. l, p. 93. lhal lhe" filS! three lhinkcrs whu 8uI
involved in discussing the ko/iim issues, apon from the people of the llUd/th (IIhlnl-hndilhl, ore Ihn
Kulliib, Ab alcAbbiis alQaliinisl and alMu!)ibib!. These were Ihe mlljnr kalilm sources to lhe
Ash'orile kuliim, and began 10 suppon the lenets of the predecessors als Idn( in kulalll argumenlalion
and trodilional demonsllalions briihin
3 Ibn Sab'in, Bud alciirif, cd. G. Kalloroh, (Beiru!: Diir alAndalus and Diir alKindi, 1978l,
p.I44"
4 Here 'conlladiclion' is not meanl in the Hegelian sense, whereby philosophical discnurse,
according to him, is polorized inlo IwO major concepls opposite eoch olher. Ralher, whal is meant here is
ail the disporilies and disharmonies thatthe discoursc includes, ail inconsislencies Ihallhe discourse fails
loovercome. The queslions here an analylic, sceking 10 crilicilO the discoursc.
5 Harry A. Wolfson, The Philosophy o(the Ka/iim, (Cambridge.A.M: lIavDld Universily l'rcss,
1976l, p.210.
6 AIJuwayni in his book alcAqidah o/ni1Amiyuh mosl oflen uses Ihe lerm 'world' instclld of
Ihe common usage in lhe kallm, nornely, aloms and occidents. Moreover, alJuwaynl in lhis book
advances a new proof of lhe notion of creolion. He believed thal inasmueh as every existent in Ihe
world Jocks necessity in ilself, il is absolutely subjCCI only 10 the possibililY. Then Ihe world os a
whole Jacks an agent 10 create il (fiI'iI or mu'aththirl. Il is cie.. then thalalJuwaynl went beyunll the
ka/lm conceplions loward new lerms such os the necessDlily exislenl and lhe possibly exislcnt. Sce al
'Aqidah cd. M.Z. olKawthon, (Coiro, n.d). p. 12.

Chapter 1- The Historical Development

of the problem

Most reports dealing with the history of the kIIl1Im consider Jahm h. Safwall
(d.128n46) lhe first lheologian to speak widely about the issue of the lInity of God. The
same reports do nol mention, in regard 10 the same issue, the opinion of his contempomry
b. 'All' (13In48),the founder of the Mu'tazilite school, with lhe exception of al-
Shahrastni who makes a very short stalement about notion. According 10 al
Shahrastni:
negaled God's allributes, such as knowlcdge, power, will and Iife, hutthis
rudimentary statement was undeveloped, so maintained his opposition 10
those who believed in the reality of allributes, lhat he who posits a marna as an
elemal attribute posits two gods. 1
Regardless of whether this short statement was really made by or is seen
through the eyes of the later Mu'tazilite thinkers, it is not extensive enough in order tn
fumish an approach to the emergence of the question of God's unity. By in the
case of Jahm b. 1;iafwn we have various detailed reports concerning the question
mentioned above. Thus, we read in almi/al of alShahrastani, the following
Jahm believed that it is not pennilled to describe God in terms by which His
creatures can be described too. We cannot say, God is existent, living, knowing,
witling , because these terms can be predicated upon bath God and man; however
we can say that God is creator, actor, powerful, because these terms can only he
predicated upon God2
The point to be noticed, with respect to this beginning, is that the unity of God
had been established upon bath positive and negative In positive statements,
the terms which belong only to Gad Hirnself can be applied, whereas negative terms are
applied in order to exalt Gad abave ail other beings, and to formulate the unity of God in
an absolutely transcendent way.
This early allempt indicates that the unity of Gad may simultaneously realize
two goals, to deprive Gad, on the one hand, of ail predicates that can possibly Iiken Him

14
to other bcings, and, on the olher hand, 10 determine God in some partieular predicatcs
belonging only 10 Him, by which God can be underslandable, especially bccause Jahm
bclieves that truc bclief is 10 know GOd.3 Therefore, the point hcre is that, in his use of
positive as weil as negative terms, Jahm inlended in a primitive way to predicate upon
God the allributes that olher bcings do not have, as weil as to determine God as having
His own particular allributes by virtue of Himself, with no other being participating
with Him in such allributes. This point will bc the basic ground upon which ail
later mUlukallimn would base their efforts to create a proper formula conceming the
question of the determination of God's unity .
ln addition to those beginnings which emerged with Jahm b. ~ a f w a n , the last half
of the second and the first half of the third century of the Hijroh are considered the
formation pcriod of kaliim and a founding era in the history of Islamic theology. In
Ihat period we encounter the three great thinkers, Ab al-Hudhayl al-'Allaf (d.
235/857), Mu'ammar b. 'Abbad (cl. 220/842), and Ibn Kullab (d. 240/862), whose
Ihought inlluenced the whole following movement of the kaliim.
'Ibc attempts al creating one method for determining aIl beings:
The Mu'tazilite Ab aI-Hudhayl aI-'Allar, (d. 235/857) is considered, according to
most available sources, the founder of the cosmological philosophy of the kaliim, the
philosophy upon which ail the mUlakallimn in the early period, Mu'tazilites and
Ash'arites, depcnded, and the philosophy by which the kaliim formulated its own
view conceming the determination of being.
A central idea in the Qur'an is the concept of the oneness of God ( Taw{lid),
which wa.s understood by the kaliim, and ontologically established by Ab al Hudhayl,
a.s a means of purifying God from ail elements or conceptions that may disturb
such absolute transcendental Unity.
Two significant points must he understood in relation to the view established by

I ~
Abu al-Hudhayl: the concept of the unit y of God. and the concept of a physical thing
or body. For the former. Abu al-Hudhayl affirmed "w'tini as allrihutes of God. hut
he identified such ma'iiIIi with God's esscnce:4 since, for Ahli al Hudhayl. Goll knows
by virtue of a knowledge. this knol"ledge is He. and the sUlnc hoilis truc for the rest of
altributes.s ln dealing with the physicalthing. Ahu al-Hudlmyl eSlilhlished the kll/mll's
atomie philosophy. whieh wouId constitue the cosmologieal altitude of ail mlllaJGlllimll1l
in the carly period. Mu'tazilites and Ash'arites alike. Sueh philosophy regards the
physical world as a sum of things or bodies. each thing as composed of group of
atoms together with their accidents. Eaeh atom is considered as the ultimate constituent
element. and sueh an element is charaeterizcd. on one hand. as non-divisihle and. on
the other. as capable of receiving accidents. In other words. ail existents in Ihe context
of Abu al-Hudhayl's philosophy including God Himself. are trcated as hipartite: the
thing and its attributes or qualities.
Abu al-Hudhayl depieted the general view of the uni verse and elaborated the
world as the sum of things: every thing is constituled from an cssence wilh its
attributes. with respect to God. and from atoms with their accidents. with respect to
physical things.6 ln his philosophy. Abu al-Hudhayl although he also viewed the whole
of existence as separated units called things or beings. adduced two manners of
determination of these beings. God as the only perfect being is determined by and in
Himself. nothing can affect His essence. nothing can grant Him His altributes. while
the physical thing as a completely subordinate being is totally engendercd.
The qualities or accidents of physical thing are ail non-essential and
constantly changing by virtue of the other level of existence. Ail accidents including
the akwan-composition. separation. motion and rest-are occasioned by virtue of the
will of Goo;7 while the attributes ofGod are all essential. fixed and absolutely identified
with the essence.
Abu al-Hudhayl's atomic philosophy though it was accepted in general by both

16
Mu'ta1.ililes and Ash'arites was a1so subjecllo reformalion, modification and even hard
crilicism by bolh. Two major poinls in Ab al-Hudhayl's view would bc a subjecl of
work for laler mutukul/imn. The firsl is Ihe relation bclween God's essence and Ils
altribules, since Ab al-Hudhayl was influenced by Arislol1e who says Ihal God is
wholly life and knowledge, elc. 5uch a belief in Ihe altribules as ma'iini and an
idenlification of essence and ma'iini would open up a greal conlroversy among
succeeding mutakaJJimn. The second point is to be found in the basic kaliim law,
which is the inference of the invisible on the basis of the visible. (qiyis u/ghiPib 'ulii u/-
.hiihid). That is, mutakallimn especially the Ash'arites, proceeding from the
philosophy of the thing, heId the principle of the analogy the invisible level from the
visible one in order to deal, equally on the same principles, wilh ail bcings in exislence.
ln other words, such a law allows us to understand and regard God by means of Ihe same
foundations on which other beings. the physical ones. can be regarded. On this basis the
Ash'ariles criticized Ab al-Hudhayl's prescription of two methods in the determination
bcings: the determination of and by essence itself with respect to God. and the
determination by means of something additional in regard to physical things. Thus the
philosophy of Ab al-Hudhayl was criticized as not bcing a systematic philosophy.8
Ab al-Hudhayl's great contemporary. Mu'arnmar b. 'Abbad (d. 220/842).
altempted to provide a harmonized view of ail bcings in the universe. including Gad
Himself. on the basis of Ab aI-Hudhayl's atomic philosophy. He established a very
important and signilicant theory conceming the determination of bcing. Ab aIHudhayl
had struggled to balance two different relations bctween the thing and its qualities, thus
sacrilicimg a consistent altitude towards the uni verse. Mu'arnmar reformulated the
relation between the two sides by means of a philosophically inventive theory in the
history of thought. For Mu'arnmar. the accidents or (u/-akwun)-composition. separation.
motion. rest and ail other accidents that determine being-occur by means of ma'iini. In a
passage reported by aI-Ash'ari in aJ-Maqiilift we read the following:

17
A body, when it is moved, is moved only on uecount of u ml/'ml, which is the
[cause of the] motion. Were it not for this, there would he no reason for this body,
rather than for another body, to he moved at the time at which it is moved rulher
than to have heen moved at some prior time. Since Ihis is so, it may similarly he
reasoned with regard to the motion that, if lhere was no ml/'nii on accounl of
which it was the motion of the body moved, there would he no reuson for il to he
the motion of the body rather than the motion of some other body. And so this
ma'na is a ma'nii of the motion of the body moved on account of still another
marna, but there is no totality and sum 10 the ma'iin;; and they luke place nI n
single time. The same holds true of blaek and white, lhal is of the fact thut il is
the black of one body rather than of anolher and it is the white of one rUlher thnn
of another. 9
From Ab al-l;Iusayn al-Khayyat (d. 280/902), the Mu'tazilite lhinker, we hnve
another report coneeming MU'ammar's theory of ma'iini. Al-Khayyal states that:
Mu'ammar supposed that if there were two bodies at rest, and one of them should
start to move rather than the other, that he, Mu'ammar, believes that a ma'ml
should abide in one and not in the other. Mu'ammar adds that if this is a eorrect
judgment, there is then certainly another marna, by which the former ma'nii
has abided in the body and caused the motion, and that if some one asks, what
causes the second ma'na, my answer (Mu'ammar says) will he the same answer
which was given in order to explain the first ma'na, and so those ma'ni cause
euch other in an infinite way.lo
These ma'iini, as al-Shahrastiini explains are not the accidents. Rather ma'iin;
cause the accidents, since every single accident abides in a substrate, and it abides by
marna which necessitates it.11 This reasoning, of course, led to a helief in successive
order, or the daim in the causality, and Mu'ammar adds that motion differs from other
accidents not by itself (la bidhariha), but by the marna which necessitates the
difference. Furthermore, the theory of ma'iini inte1Jrets difference and sameness in i L ~
own particular terms. That is to say,
Two things which are mutually other (aJghayrayni) are mutually other by means
of a marna and the same holds true of two like things or two contrary things (aJ
li/(iini) or two different things (aJmukhraJilni). It can he said, therefore, that

18
Mu'ammar and his followers mainlain lhal lhe ma'nii musl inevilably bc olher
lhan anylhing cise, from whenee il follows lhal ils olherness from anylhing else
is due 10 a second ma'nii exisling by means of lhe firsl ma'nii. Now lhis second
marnii musl inevilably bc eilher like anolher marnii or olher lhan il and different
from il. Bul ils likeness as weil as its olherness and difference is due to a third
ma'm, existing by means of the second ma'nii.12
What is quile readily seen from the above passages is that, a1though Mu'ammar
proceeds from the same kaliim tenets. namely, that the world is composed of substances
(atoms) and accidents, he argues that accidents are nol the direct creation of God, since
Gad docs not create anything but bodies. 13 Accidents occur or are occasioned by means
of ma'iinf. which reflect the causes of accidents. Mu'ammar. then, held the same structure
lhat was cosmologically established by Ab a1-Hudhayl. This structure was theoretically
based on belief in the atomic view: that a thing consists of two levels, one of them
representing the active cause or deterrninant principle.14 while the other is caused and
detennined. This laUer cannot bc isolated by and in itself; it is a1ways dependent upon
the fonner. the detenninant principle. and must a1ways bc fonned according to action of
efficient cause. 'Abd al-Qiihir al-Baghdadi likewise insists that the mariini cause the
accidents. from outside the body. and we find in a1-Baghdadi the passage which reads:
AI-Ka'bi, in his trcatise, reports in the narne of Mu'arnmar that motion, according
to him. differs from rest only by virtue of a marnii outside of it and in the sarne
way rest differs from motion in vinue of a marnii outside of it, and these two
mariini differ from two mariini other than themselves. This reasoning according
to him. maygo on to infinity.ls
Mu'arnmar. in order to theorize upon the deterrnination of a thing in its particular
bcing. replaced the direct creation by God of accidents, by an infinite chain of mariini,
while maintaining the idea that accidents are pennanently caused by something else. This
something else as a cnuse is a1ways imminent with the accident as a caused thing, since
marnii is onen tnken as lbl equivalent of the tenn "cause" (riIla).16

19
There is no doubt thatthe relation between the two levels bccame with Mu'amllUir morc
philosophical and doser than wilh Ab al-Hudhayl. The poinl here is Ihnl Ihe Icrm 11111"1111
nearly always means, in one sense or another, an inlrinsic, delerminant COlUSC uf somc rCOII
aspect of the being of Ihe subjecl. 17 Thus with Mu'ammar's theory, Ihe rCOII attcmpt 10
define determination of bcing could take place and, furthermore, attcmpts 10 OIpprOilch 01
being in its particular existence could be given new momentum.
Interestingly. we notice that Mu'ammar overcome Ab dcfccl in
regard to the issue (lf the determinalion of bcing. Mu'ammar systcmatically, for thc first
time, applied '.lis theory of ma'ani, to all beings including God Himsclf. 1t is this which
gives his theory additional importance in the history of Islamic Ihoughl. We arc told Ihnl
Mu'arnmar said:
God is knowing by virtue of knowledge, and His knowledge, belongs 10 Him by
virtue of a marna and this marna occurred in virtue of another marna, and thal
goes on in infinite succession, and the same holds true cuncerning ail of God's
attributes.18
This text helps us to realize the extent to which Mu'ammar's theory would
influence the Ash'arite school on the issue of the unity of God.
Regardless of the adjustments made to Mu'arnmar's theory in the later ka/am,
this theory, in its structure and ils way of understanding, thoroughly influenced the latter
mutakaJlimn , Mu'tazilites and Ash'arites. And as we shall sec, the first usage of
Mu'arnmar's theory would appear with the first opponent of the Mu'tazilites on Ihe issue
ofunity of Go<!. This was Ab Sa'id al-Qalliin, who was called 'Abd Allah b. Kullab (d.
240/862). He was working twenty years after Mu'arnrnar's death, and he is bclieved to
be the first to espouse. with sorne profound adaptation, the theory of ma'fini as
distinguishable causes of the attributes of God. He is the founder of a particular theory
about the issue of the unity of Go<! since Go<! is, according to hi m, co-eternal with His
attributes. Gad possesses these attributes by virtue of eternal ma'iini. The term eternal

20
here means, withoul beginning (qudim).19
According 10 al-Ash'ari, who adopted Ibn Kullb's opinion, Ibn Kullb and his
followers said: "Thal God is uneeasing (lum yuzul), wilh His names and altributes,
unceasing as knowing, powerful, living, seeing, hearing, generous, great. and having
majesly". He further states that Ibn Kullb and his followers "altributed to God.
knowledge, power. hearing. vision,life and speech."2a ln another text, alAsh'ari explains
Ibn Kullb's theory of God's altributes as being of affirmed and superadded ma'iini; by
saying that Ibn Kullb considers ail these altributes as altributes of essence ($ifil
dhl). He docs not distinguish hetween an essenee's attributes and attributes of action
($ifiil uPl). and aceording to him. the attributes of God are the same as His names. Ibn
Kullb takes two attribules as heing identical with God's essence, namely existence
and thingness (aJ-shay'iyah). God is nol existent in vinue of existence, and He is a thing
not in the sense of having anything; other than these two altributes. existence.
thingness. The rest of the altributes can neither be said to be identieal with God's
essence. nor not to he identical with His essence. The same also holds true conceming the
altributes themselves; these attributes cannot he said either to he identical with each
other, or not to he identical with each other.21
Ibn Kullb deals with matiini as heing applied to bath kinds of heings, God and
bodies. This is also a systematic view. by which ail beings in existence, including God
Himself. are determined in the same manner. But while ma'nii is an equivalent to
altribute ($ifah) with respect to God, it is equivalent to accident ( 'aral) with respect to
the body. In the case of bodies. ma'iini subsisting in them are called. by Ibn Kullab.
things. attributes ($ial) and accidents.22 For additional information conceming the term
attribute. we rearl in aJ-Maqiiliit that the attribute according to Ibn Kullab "cannot he
descrihed or qualified (aJ-$ifah Iii t$aI). and cannot subsist in virtue of itself. rather it
must subsist in the essence (dhiit) ofGod.23 The theory of matiini. therefore. as aJready
stated. was reformulated with Ibn Kullab. The notion of the infinite causality of ma'iini

21
is strietly avoided by him.
Now. with Ab al-Hudhayl's atomie philosophy Ihal regards the thing as essence
and qualities, Mu'ammar's theory of ma'ni, and Ibn Kullub's particular underslanding
of that theory. we beeome aware of the major features that wholly form Ihe fUlure
discussion and development in the ka/linl .
Other aspects of the problem:
The general features of this line of Ihinking, as given abave, which eoneern Ihe
unity of God or the determination of being, were not the sole line of thinking in the
ka/am, Indeed many attempts had been made in order propcrly to formulale a slanee,
from whieh one couId draw an adequate view of the issue of unity of Gad .
The line of thought established by the aforementioned thinkers represenls Ihe
more philosophieal attempt. and the more aeeepted one. whieh beeame laler on Ihe
subjeet of thorouhgoing discussion among Mu'tazilites and Ash'arites.
Regardless of the standpoints expressed by anthropomorphists (a/-mushabbihal. and by
those who believed that God is a body (a/-mujassimahl, sueh as Hisham b. al-l:Iakam,
our eoneem here is to trace the major direction of thought that widely dominated Ihe
Islamie kaliim and had ils outeome in aI-Juwayni's formulations.
There is no doubt that the sehool of the Mu'tazilites played the main role
in this partieular line's development. but apart from this line of thinking. we Iind within
the Mu'tazilite school many points of view taken in order to realizc the true unity of
Gad.
and J;>irir expressed an attitude whieh ean be ealled "negation by
means of affirmation" mcaning that ail God's esscntial attributes must be negated. God
is knowing. willing. powerful, in virtue of Himself, but if positive attributes sueh
knowledge and power are attributed to God. it is only to negate the opposite attributes
sueh as ignorance or powerlessness. because these attributes are not allowed to be

22
applied to GOd.24 Sorne of the Mu'tazilites argued, however, that God has attributes such
as knowledge and power, "J these attributes arc not predicated upon His essence, but
rather upon their objects, the object known and willed (a/ma'1m wa/ maqdr). Sorne of
them considered that any kind of attribution to God whether, positive or negative, is
delinitely wrong, and by contrast they refused to say either that God is knowing, willing,
or living, or that God is ignorant, powerless, or dead.2s But a11 of them were in
agreement on the fact that the truc unity of God must be understood in terms of the
negation of any additional or positive attributes. They admitted that God can be or
should be described in terms of other positive attributes, because God deserves these
attributes in virtue of Himself, not in virtue of ($iat) or ma'iini superadded to His
essence.
The previous points of view, particularly those of Ab a1-Hudhayl, Mu'ammar
and Ibn Ku11iib, on the determination of being either by means of itself or through ma'iini
superadded to il, and the issue of the determination of being in general and the unity of
God in particular, awaited new discussion and new contributions, especially by Ab 'Ali
al Jubbii'i, who theorized the Mu'tazilites' position and gave it a more philosophical
slant, and Ab a1'l;Iassan a1-Ash'ari. who reacted against his master Ab 'Ali and leaned
towards Ibn Ku11iib's theory. That is to say. a1-Ash'ari. who established the second
major school next to the MU'tazilites in the Islamic kaliim. fo11owed Ibn Ku11ab's stand,
though with sorne adaptation.
The efforts of the mutakallimn fo11owing these threc thinkers would be centred
upon formulating a coherent and systematic view of being to actualize the kaliim's
favorite law, "the analogy from the visible to the transcendental world" (qiyiis al-ghi'ib
'alii alshiihid). This meant that the ka/iim's endeavor should be to achieve the rules by
which a coherent picturc of the determination of being could be realized while keeping
at the same time the unity of God absolutely transcendental and pure. Therefore, in
order to solve such a difficull question according 10 the kaliim's way of thinking,

23
Ash'arites and Mu'tazilites wouId fight with as weil as influence ellch llther; this
conflict and influence wouId be manifested in the constant contributions presented by the
great thinkers from both schools. The debate about the above question WIlS Illllillly
among the Ash'arites and the MU'tazilites, and in our dealing with the signifiCllllt
thinkers of the kil/am, especially in the branch, we meet Abu 'Ali ul-Jubbll'i.
Ab 'Ali al-Jubbii' (d. 303/913), WIlS one of the grelltest musters in the
Mu'tazilite school, and it was to him the presidency of this school went, lifter Abu 111-
Hudhayl al-'Alliif.26 AIJubbii' systematized what was implicit in his predecessllrs'
efforts, by reformulating many aspects of the Mu'tazilites' doctrine, particullirly
conceming the issue of the unity of God .
First, with Ab 'Ali, the formula of how the attributes belong to God's essence is
expressed in a different way from that of Ab al-Hudhayl. God, according to Ab 'Ali,
deserves His attributes (knowing, powerful, living, existent) $ifilll/-dhiil for Himself.27
This formula means that God deserves to be described as knowing, willing, living and
existent not by means of mll'iini superadded to His essence, and not in terms of saying
that God's attributes are God Himself as weil; rather God by His very nature deserves
these attributes.
In fact this change in the formula does not present a perfect solution to the
specific relation between the essence and its attributes. We can find similar in
scattered Mu'tazilite writings which indicate that the main problem of how the allributes
can be predicated of God's essence was still difficult to solve. Do these attributes
reflect or identify the essence itself'? Or are they parts of this essence, or do they reflect
sorne things additional to the essence? If the former is the case, then the essence, besides
the fact that il is not independent, is also presupposed to be plural or to contain
plurality; if the latter is the case, the attributes indicate something else existing eternally
beside God, and God in this case is lacking other entities outside of Himself to be
determined.

The aspec! in view:

AI-Jubbii'i gives the follow ing description of God knowing:
The meaning of one's describing God as knowing (ma'nii alwa$fi liJJiihi bi-
unnuhu 'iilimun) is (a): the assertion of His reality (ilhbiilUhu); (b) : that He is
contrary to whatever cannot know, that he who says that He is ignorant states a
false proposition; (c): an indication that therc arc things that He knoWS.28
The Mu'tazilites' view as depicted by al-Jubbii'i is based on two major categories,
whereby the being can he detennined. These two main categories are the being itself
and the quality that helongs to it. The thing as either essence (al-dhiil) or thing (shay'L
God is called a thing as welUs treated as the basic unit in the whole of the kaliim's
philosophy; the universe is nothing else than things (ashiyiP), essences (dhawiil), each
essence having its own qualities or attributes that make it different and distinguishable
from other things.29
For the quality or the prcdicate of the subject (the thing), the dilemma that was
faced by the thrce previous thinkers concerning the way in which the unity of God
must he detennined naturally led the mulakalJimn to another question, this lime about
the logical aspect. In all the attempts prcsented by the three theologians, the attributes
of Go<! descrihed as ma'iini, were sometimes identical (Ab al-Hudhayl), sometimes
superadded (Mu'ammar and Ibn Kullab). The term marna itself inspired the next
generation of the mulakalJimn to ask the question: what are these ma'iini and then
what are these qualities derived from Ihem? are they entities like essences, or do they
have some other sort of being?
Al-Jubba'i who was trying to formulate philosophically his school's contributions,
and who was aware of the defects of Ab al-Hudhayl's philosophy, attempted to avoid
assigning the attributes of God any kind of particular existence. Ab Hudhayl had
understood the attributes as ma'iIn, whereas al-Jubba' was focusing on negating such

an underslanding. lnslead. he slaled Ihal Ihe allribules arc absolulety subordimllc 10

essence ilself. since the allribules of God arc affirmed. in order 10 express cilhcr Ihc
assertion (ithbiit) of the essence of God. or to express thc "posilivc" ncglllilllt
characterislic of God (1I/-slI/b) as knowing and nol ignorant. BUI ahhough Ihis lInswcr
the queslions: What are Ihese altribules? How do Ihey belong to God's esscncc? Do thcy
represent something additional 10 the essence or Ihey arc the esscnce itsclf" Thc
question slill awaited a more thorough and logically rigorous answer.
ln order 10 approaeh Ihe logical aspect of the problem. wc have to dent briel1y
wilh the Iinguislie and logieal sources that were available 10 the mutllkllllimun III that
time. and to show the degree of influence that these sources had upon them.
The first major account Ihat we can deal with is to be fourd in at-Ftirahi's
explication of the definition of the ealegory of quality. al-Fariibi (d. 339/950) stales Ihat
"The whole account in responce to the question. How is the thing? is properly staled in
terms of the response to the question. what is the thing?" These queslions aim to
determine a thing as distinguished from other things by means of its qualities. Thus. by
these questions. the formula of the thing is elicited. this formula is divided into two
categories:
These qualities are used either in terms of the external formulas of the thing. or
in terms of knowing the formula of the essence of the thing; and. then. the
formulas that express the essence of things. when they arc taken in terms of the
response to the question what is the thing. indicate what makes the thing
distinguishable in its essence frorn other things; and the formulas that express the
external aspect of the thing indicate what distinguishes the thing in its slates
(I$wiilihl) from other things. Distinguishing a thing in its essence from another
thing is like distinguishing the palm as such from the c1ass.... and distingusihing
one thing from another in its states is Iike distinguishing Zayd from 'Amr. in so
far as Zayd is a good man and 'Amr is a bad man.30
As long as these qualities express two aspects of a thing. the essential qualities
express the formulas by which the thing is distinguished in vinue of its essence from
the other things. while the external qualities express the formula by which the thing is

26
dislinguished from olher lhings in virtue of ils slales (aQwaJihi). Eisewhere al-Farabi
explains lhal lhese qualilies which answer lhe queslion of what is the thing or how it is
are the same as the differentiae and property. That is to say, the differentiae express the
cssential quality of the thing, and the property expresses the thing in its slatc which is
oUlside the essence of the thing. The properties are also of two kinds: those which are
absolute predicates, permanently inherent in the thing, such as 'laughing' for 'man'; and
non-absolute predicates, which are not absolutely inherent in the thing such as the
'engineer' for 'man'.31
The purpose of citing the texts mentioned above is to show that God's attributes
according to the Mu'tazilites cannot easily be subsumed under the previous Aristotelian
lerms. Professor Wolfson argues that the attributes of God in the Islarnic kalam are
nothing other than properties in the Aristotelian sense.32
The properties, according to Aristotelian logic explained by al-Farabi, always
belong to an external aspect of the being in bath the case of the absolute inherence and
that of the non-absolute inherence. In the Aristotelian sense properties are the states of
things and do not represent the essence of thing. Property is defined by Aristotle as "a
predicate which does not signify the essence of a thing, but yet belongs to that thing
alone".33 The Mu'tazilites, however, consider the attributes of God as belonging to the
essence of God (bi dhatihi or li nafsihl). The Mu'tazilites in general and aI-Jubba'i in
particular believed that God's attributes must essentially issue from and be manifested
by the very essence of God, though at the sarne time these attributes must not
constitute this essence, because of the absolutely pure unity of God. Therefore the
question of attributes cannot be understood in terms of borrowed philosophical elements,
but only in terms of the kaliim's context.
Many similarities can be found between attribute in the kaliim's sense. and
property in the Aristotelian sense. but they are not completely interchangeable. Property
is a universal term belonging only to one species. inherent in it absolutely or not

27
absolutely. but in both ca,es not essentially. The main feature of a property is 10 he
convertible with the thing that it belongs to, that is, the proposition 'A man is u luughing
being' is the same as the proposition: 'A laughing heing is mun'; or 'A mun is cupuhle of
learning grammar and science', is the same as, 'The heing who is cupuhle of leurning
grammar and science is man'; eonsequently, the subjeet and its predicahle propcrty ure
interchangeable.34 It is clear thatthis view was totally rejected hy the Mu'tazilites. Ahu
a1-Hudhayl, who posited the extreme position concerning God's allributes hy saying thul
God knows in virtue of knowledge. and that this knowledge is identical with GIllI
Himself. rejected the idea that the knowledge is God Himself.3s According to the
mutakallimiin God as a subject in a proposition cannot he interchangeable with His
attributes because God's essence neither absorbs nor is in any way constituted by Ils
attributes.
The second source available to the mutaka/limiin , besides the philosophical
worlcs, was the Arab grammarians' writings. Among them the question of the relation
between the subject and its predicates was a subject of contention. Two standpoints
concerning that problem dealt with its logical-Iinguistic character. The discussion among
the grammarians proceeded from their concern with establishing a the sentence or
linguistic proposition, such as 'Zayd is knowing'. In the grammarians' account we find
two different points of view. One of them was stated by alMubarrad (d. 285/898)who
said that the predicate is something other than the subject; while the other view w a . ~
expressed by Sibawayh (d. 177n93) who believed in opposition to al-Mubarrad that the
predicate of a nominal proposition must be something identical with the subjecl. 36
In order fully to explore a1Jubbii'i's view of predicates we have to recite his
theory of attributes and his classification of them. The attributes are:
1. That which a thing is called by virtue of itself (li-nafsihl). that which names or
describes the thing essentially and specifically as that which it is. This is expressed when
we say that "the atom is an atom" or that "God is Etemal". God's essence, thus, is His

28
Eternity. He exists without beginning or end and His non-being is impossible. In the
case of contingent bcings, these predicates are true and valid even though the thing does
not exist in actuality, since, each individual has its bcing as real object of God's knowing
and power.
2. That which a thing is called by virtue of some other entity whose actuality in being is
the cause ('illa) or referential basis (ma'na) of the judgment (Qukm) which affirms a
predicate. These he divides into two classes: a) predicates which are true by virtue of
a "cause" which exists within the thing (Ii-'il/atin fihi), as when we say 'Zayd knows'
asserting thus anna lahu 'i/man, and, (b) those which are true by virtue of a 'cause
which is not in him' (li 'iJJatin /ii fihI), as, e.g. 'Zayd is mentioned' (Zaydun madhkrun)
asserting thus the existence of a statement or other kind of utterance .
3. That which a thing is called "by way of stating that it has reality in bcing" (ikhbiirnn
'an ithbiitihi), as when it is termed ka'in (bcing), mawjd (existent), and the like.
4. That which a thing is called by virtue of its coming to be after not having been (Ji.
hudthihi), e.g. hiidith, mUQdath (temporally, contingent), or because of its being existent
it is the act (fi'l) of an agent, as when it is termed mnP/ (made) or mnkhJq (created).
S. That which is called simply by way of distinguishing classes of beings, as when we say
that a particular motion is an accident ('arn/) or that black is a colour.
6. That which is called simply because it can be spoken of and a true statement made
concerning it, that it is a being (shay',thing). This is the ultimate and most universal
category, embracing ail beings, the real and the possible. 37
With aIJubbli'i, the Mu'tazilite's school in ilS B ~ r i a n branch had, for many reasons,
reached an impasse.
The philosophy of the Mu'tazilites concerning the deterrnination of being was still
suffering, first, from lack its of success in depicting the deterrnination of being in a
systematic manner, and in positing the most generai principles by which a being at the
visible and invisible levels can he deterrnined; and secondly, in delineating an adequate

29
stance towards the presentation of the absolute purity and transccndcnce of God.
AI-Jubbii'i's philosophy proceeding from its own foundations. as mentioned
earHer. was unable to solve these problems. Inherent problems in IWO major poinls
continued to challengc al-Jubbi'i as wcll as thc MU'taziiite school. The firsl one is
related to the nature of the relation between God's essence and Ils predicales: the second
is Iinked to the first. for the determination of being was still treated as being rudically
different at the invisible and the visible levels. AI-Jubbii'i differentiates in Ihe contingent
world between the being as the ground of ma'ni. and the ma'iini as entities existing
beside their objects; while, with respect to God. he removes the intermediate entilies
ma'iini and allows only the direct relation between the subject which is God Himself and
the act of description.
ln order to justify such differentiation. al-Jubbii'i discusses propositions such as
God is knowing, God is powerful, God is existent, etc. in terms of distinguishing betwecn
the language which is the subjective expression and the being which is an objectivc
entity. He held that the act of attributing is the altribule huwa and Ihat
the naming is the name, or in other words thal the attributes of Gad do nol poinl to
anything other than God; rather, they are merely our mode of speech.3B
The Ash'arites, as we shall see lalter, make a separalion between Ihe
(marni) and the act of description which is our stalement; therefore, our saying or
proposition could be either true or false, but nevertheless the being would objectivcly
exist with its attributes.39 By contrast, aI-Jubbii'i treats the sifah, the descriptive term. as
a word within the convention of language; within the particular context of its use, it
reflects the mind's grasp of the thing.40
With respect to the ontological aspect of aI-Jubba'i's theory concerning God's
attributes, we notice that the relation between God's essence and Its attributes is
demoralized. That is to say, in the case of God's being knowing, the predicate. in al
Jubbli'i's view is taken to assert only the reality of the subject in its simple identity with

30
itself. 1\ followed that aljubbii'i was then unable to discuss ontologically the difference
hetween heing knowing and being. as such. and how in the othemess that is indicated in
the statements. they are one in GOdAI Put another way. alJubb;'i did not present a
specific view by which God can bc maintained as a pure and simple essence and can be
determined by means of His altributes. On the other hand. the Mu'tazilites' theory in
general. and al-Jubbii'i's in particular. implies the possibility of imputing plurality to
God's essence with statements such as:
God is knowing in virtue of Himself (li nafsihl). powerful in virtue of Himself ' etc.
indicate that God's Essence is knowledge and power. because the reality of the
knowledge is in virtue of bcing that by which the knower is knowing; and the reality of
the power is in virtue of bcing that by which the powerful is powerful.42
Conceming the systematic view. al-Jubbii'i offers two manners of determining
bcing. The visible and sensible world is determined not by itself. but by something else.
namely by ma'iini, e.g. 'Zayd is knowing in virtue of ma'ni, that is a specific knowledge,
white God is determined by Himself, God is knowing in virtue of Himself (bi-dhiitihi).
Having adhered to this way of reasoning, the Mu'tazilites continued with the same
method in their elaboration of topical notions from Ab a1-Hudhayl to al-Jubba'i (with of
course sorne shift of meaning in the vocabularies and sorne small shift in the
elaboration).
New strategy in the MuCazilite school:
With Ab Hashim (d. 321/933), son of alJubba'i, the Mu'tazilite school.
underwent a profound transformation in order to reform and overeome the defects in the
system. That is, the framework of the Mu'tazilites' doctrine was inadequate for
exhibiting a systematic view that would elaborate the two levels in the universe by the
sarne principles of determination and a1so solve the dilemma of the relation bctwccn the
essence of God and His a t t r i b u t ~ without denying that thcsc attributcs nccd to have sorne

JI
form and realily.
As we have seen, lhe Mu'lazilites in their emphasis on lhe deniul of attrib,ltes us
having some form and reulily Iimiled lhemsclves onlologicully 10 one uspecl of
existence. This aspect is :he essence (uldh/) or the thing (ulslwy'). Such denial of
attribules led the Mu'tazililes 10 undersland God us mere essence, und 10 consider Ihe
determination of this essence as a Iinguislic matter, or mere human understunding Irying
to grasp what it cao l'rom lhis essence.43
The of Ab Hshim, the resull of long debate bclween attribulisls
and antiattributists, is expressed in the admission thal the attribules, corrcsponding 10 the
view of the attributists, especially the theory proposed by Ibn Kullb,44 ure somelhing
other than the subjeet. Ab Hshim called this kind of attribute, stale (I/), und it lies
behind the existent essence. It is not the essence itself, rather it is somelhing differl;nl;
yet, corrcsponding to his own sehool. this (l/ does not represent an independent und reul
existence.
Ab Hshim denies that these attributes are real entities. They are not lhings
(ashyii'),4S which means that Ab Hshim is still faithful to the Mu'lazilites' heriluge.
Rather they are mani festation l'rom the essence itself; for instance. the proposition' GmI
is knowing' means that Gad is knowing in virtue of Himsclf (li dh/ihl). The attribute
'knowledge' cannot be known as separate and independent l'rom the essence; rather, it is
known as predicated of the essence and issuing l'rom the essence. In this wuy Abu
Hshim affirmed states as attributes. These states cannot bc said either to bc existent or
not existent and can neither be said to be known nor to be unknown. This means lhey
eannot be known as separated entities. but f'oIther as existing a10ng ""ith the essence. Ab
Hshim says that reason apprehends the necessary difference between the thing such
in its purity and the tbing described and qualified by means of attributes. Therefore. one
who knows the essence (aJ-<1hifl) does not necessarily know that this essence is knowing
and one who knows the substance does not necessarily know that this substance occupies

32
space.46
Il is apparenl thal Ab Hashim pioneered a differenl and new path between
allributists and antiallributists. Ab Hashim's new theory was both a denial of the
extreme reality of allributes as conceived by the allributists and a denial of the extreme
nominal nature of allributes as conceived by Ihe antiallributists. Utilizing the old
Kullabite formula, but changing Ihe lerm 'allribule' 10 'state', Ab Hashim says of slales
Ihallhey arc "neilher God nor olher than God".47
ln facl, Ihis change in stralegy by Ab Hashim under Ihe influence of Ihe
allribulisls led naturally 10 dealing in a differenl way wilh Ihe queslion of Ihe
delerminalion of bcing in general and Ihe transcendence of Gad in particular.
Ab Hiishim allempled 10 reform his falher's bclief in Ihe difference bclween Ihe trulhs
(a/-t1aqiPiq), on Ihe unseen level and in Ihe malerial world. The unily of Ihe t1aqii'iq is
Ihus partly reslored by Ab Hiishim in lerms of the proposilion (he is knowing) innahu
<ii/imun. This proposilion is underslood, in ail cases, 10 refer 10 Ihe altribule ( ~ i f a h ) and 10
nssert ils aClualily;48 Ihe realily of an altribule as somelhing differenl from ils subjeci is
laken 10 bc applied 10 ail trulhs.
Ab Hiishim, in his new theory, wished 10 re-classify Ihe altribules, and he tried
to presenl Ihis c1assificalion as a general principle Ihal can bc applied 10 ail bcings. In
Ihe same Iheory of nltribules, he offers a theory of delerminnlion. This theory must deal
with a bcing by means of ail the possible rules by which Ihe bcing is determined in ail ils
aspeCIS. Firsl. Ihe bcing is delermined in ils being in ilself, in ils identily, by virtue of
ilself; and secondly, il is delermined by virtue of something else, by means of eilher the
marna or a/-li<il.
This c1a.'iSificalion was pUI by Ab Hiishim as follows:
(1) The attribules of the essence, the thing being ilself - the way it is in ilself (mii
huwa <a/ayhi li dhlftihl); this is expressed in our saying "the atom is an alom" or
"Gad is Etemal".
(2) The essential attribute which belongs to a thing "by virtue of the way it is in

33
itself' (Ji-mii hUW.1 '1I/lIyhi fi nllf.iM, that whose actuality is entailed ( muql"'/UII)
by the aUribute of the essence when it exists, as, for eXllll1ple, Ihc nlom's
occupying space or God's being living and knowing, etc.
(3) Those attributes whose actuality is caused (mu'//) by lin entitntive cnuse (/i-
'iJJu, Jj-mu'nii), as, for example, Z,Jyd's being knowing or li hody's hcing in
motion.
(4) Those attributes whose actuality is, or results direclly l'rom, thc lIclion of lin
agent or l'rom one of its stales which qualifies the performllnce of ils lICI. (5)
These are lhosc which arc termed /ii Ji-naf.ihi wa /a Ji. 'il/a.49
Although Abu Hshim's theory represents the demarcation poinl belween two
stages of the ka/iim, and although this theory is considered as a the most importnnl
anempt that had been made to systematize the Mu'tazililes' protracted efforts, il is slillll
subject of criticism in a number of respects. Thc first point of criticism is thlll while
Abu Hlishim sets forth in his classification of attributes as the most general rules and
principles according to which a being can be determined, he offers different applications
of these principles. For example the knowledge, Iife, will, power, and the vision of God
belong to the second kind of attribute, which is ( ~ i f i t naf.iyah) or the anributes of the
essence. In the case of Zayd, they belong to the third kind of anribute, (Iii(ul
ma'niiwyah or ~ i f i t al-ma'iini). According to Abu Hiishim there are two kinds of
determination, necessary and possible determination. In the case of the former, the
essence (aJ-dhiit) necessarily must be qualified by such and such an attribule, and the
issue here is especially related to the seven essential aUributes, knowledge, living,
hearing, seeing, power, will, elC.istence. God necessarily must have these aUributes
without any kind of causes or ma'iini causing them. As for the laUer-the possible
determination-a being could have or could not have these attributes. (knowing) can be or
not be predicated of Zayd. This kind of determination is causcd by mll'iini, so by possible
determination is meant the determination Ihat occurs as caused by ma'iini or olher
eauses. It follows thal Ihe altribule of knowing, for inslance, is predicated of God as
necessary (bil parrah), while the same attribute may be predicated of Zayd as possible.
The knowledge of Zayd is a possible attribute. Zayd may or may nol have il, bccausc for

34
Zayd to be knowing he must possess the prepouderance of knowledge, but it is
impossible to apply this condition to Il could be said that these two kinds of
determinations. the necessary and possible, constitute a shi ft in meaning for the old
Mu'itazilite bclier in the two kinds or attribution.
The second point or criticism that should be mentioned here is duc to the term
'state' (/,Iii/). This tenn had been used in the Arabic translation of Aristotle, as weil as in
the Arabic grammar, to indicate what is contingent and changed. As quoted earlier, al-
Fiiriibi's explication divided the category of quality (al-kayffyah) into two parts: the
pennanent quality that bclongs essentially to the thing, and indicates the essence of the
thing and makes it distinguishable from others; and the contingent quality which
belongs accidentally and extemally to the thing. The latter is called 'state' (/,Iii/). For
example, Zayd dirfers from 'Amr because of his state of being a good man, while 'Amr
dirfers from Zayd because of his state ofbeing a bad
The grammarians as weil used the tenn J;l to indicate situations that are
constantly changing. The term /,Iiil in grammar... is used chiefly to denote the function
of several nominal fonns that occur in the accusative in a variety of situations. Thus. for
example, al-Mubarrad says: when you say Zayd came to me walking, you do not intend
that it he primarily understood that he was walking, but rath;:r you state the proposition
that his coming took place in this situation (/,Iil) and your statement does not indicate
what was his situation (ma huwa fflu) before or after this moment (/,Jiil). The /,Iiil, thus, is
that wherein the act is performed (al maPlu ffhi). You state simply that his coming
occurred in the situation (/,Iiil) of walking . It is the same with '1 passed Zayd laughing'
and '1 met your brother
Ab Hiishim. in order to avoid the two extreme positions of the attributists and of
the antiattributists employed the tenn /,laI. The motive that lies behind this
employment is to be found in two respects. First, state is something that does not identify
the essence in the sense of Abii Hiishim's predecessors; rather it is a kind of

35
manifestation of the essence. Second, state is not an entity or thing, so (wulking of
Zayd) is a kind of situation expressed or manifested by Zayd, but il is absolulely nol un
entity in itself. Abu Hashim did not adopt the term /,JiiJ as defined in Logic and
Grammar. He shifted its meaning and dealt with il as a kind of essenlial allribule, as
issuing from the essence even if it does not renect Ihis essence. Allributes such us
knowing, Iiving,etc., issue from the essence, butthey are different from the essence and
cannot be said to be identical with the essence, since al-u/,Jwiil are something differenl
from the subject upon which they are predicated.
The third point of criticism has its origin in the fact that the allempt stands on the
pivotai point between keeping essence absolutely pure and on the one hand,
and determined and on the other hand. Abu Hashim is creative in his emphasis
on the state as standing in the middle area between being an attribute and something
different from the essence, on the one hand, and being deprived from any kind of
thingness and beingness, on the other hand. He gocs far in his description of the state,
describing it as not existent and not non-existent, not known and not unknown, not
mentioned and not non-mentioned, not etemal and not generated.s3
In order to negate a/-/,liil as being an entity, Abu Hshim answered, when he
was asked whether he knew the /,laI or not. that he did not know the /,liIl because any
admission as to the possibility of knowing al-/,liIl would lead to the admission that 11/-
/,liil is an entity.S4
Ab Hiishim's theory of attributes established a significant answer to a particular
existential question, which is very Islamic in ilS nature: How can a being be determined
without violating it and white conserving its specifie identity as it is7 However, Abu
Hshim maintained the states in an awkward position between being affirmed and not
arfmned. fixed and not fixed, existent and not existent, known and unknown. This dual
position led aI-Juwayni to adjust the theory of states and to malte the attributes known.
The available sourees indicate that the theory of states was rejected by aI-Jubbli'i.5S the

36
father and teacher of Ab Hashim, a ~ weil as by Ab all:Iasan alAsh'ar (d. 321/935),
the founder of the school of the Ash'arites. AI-Ash'ar, in contrast to al-Jubba''s as weil
as 10 Ab Hashim's point of view, adopted the theory of Ibn Kullab, the theory which
contends that the altribules of God are mll'iI subsisting in God's essence, since God is
knowing by a knowledge, powerful by a power, living by a Iife, etc. These altributes are
etemal and cannot he said to he identical with God Himself, nor to he other than He.56
In affirming that God's attributes are mll'iI, entities (llShyiP), alAsh'ar tried to
approach the problem of the relation between the essence and its attributes in a different
manner. That is to say, alAsh'ar, in order to demonstrate the unity of God in Its very
specifie identity Ils a transcendental essence, separated this Essence as such from its
altributes. He deall with the essence Ils a pure unity subsisting independently in itself,
and with attributes Ils distinct mll'iI subsisting not in themselves but in God's essence.
By reviewing aI-Ash'ar's arguments against the MU'tazilites, we can touch upon
how far he was concemed to prove that God's essence must be One and be
transeendental. In his alIblinah aIAsh'ar argues against Ab al-Hudhayl. If the
knowledge of God is God Himself, can one say: "Oh knowledge of Gad, give me your
merey"? Ab al-Hudhayl however refused to accept this argument.s7
In his aJ-Lumll', alAsh'ari puts this argument in a diaiecticai manner by saying:
Gad necessarily must know either in virtue of Himself (bi nafsihi), or in virtue of
knowledge separated from His essence. As a resull, if he knows in virtue of
Himself, His self, then, must be a knowledge. In this case, therefore, it
must either he said that the knowledge is knowing (hecause God is
knowing); or it must he said, that this knowledge does not know, and therefore
Gad does not knoW.5S
So apparently neither condition, according to aIAsh'ar, may properly be applied
to Gad. This led to his affirmation that Gad knows in virtue of knowledge, and it is
impossible that this knowledge be Gad Himself.
Wc might presuppose that Gad is knowing, neither in virtue of Himself nor in virtue of

knowledge. AlAsh'ari respond to this assertion by saying that if we allow Ihe previolls
statement, the result will he as follows: in the proposition "God is knowing", "knowing"
as used here either does not indieate God Himself or does not indieate the atlrihllte Ill'
knowledge as such. 59
The significance of the argument here is very clear. AI-Ash'ari atlempts tll c\arify
the distinction hetween the essence of God such, outside of any kind of mingling, and
to remove l'rom it any possibility that might signify a sort of plurality in God's essence.
and the attributes as superadded ma'iini.
Another argument raised by the Ash'arites against the Mu'tazilites' notion thal
"Gad is knowing by virtue of His essence" is that such a proposition wouId lead us tll
believe that God's attributes are identical with eaeh other since ail of thcm are idenlical
with the essence. Il would lead us to believe as weil that "God is knowing by virlue of
His will, and willing by virtue of His power",60 and so on.
In order to determine the types of attributes that bclong to God's essence, al-
Ash'ari divided the attributes into three classes:
1. Those expressions asmiP) which name or implicitly refer to the thing itself, the
thing's self (nafsuhu), tadullu 'ala naf.j a/ AlIihu mawjdun (God exists) or
al/,Iarakatu 'ara(lun (this particular motion or, every motion is an accident) al-Ash'ari
takes simply to mean jthbiitu nafsj assertion of the existence of the entity
is denoted by the subject term). Statements of this type refer to the self of the
2. Those predicates which refer to a marna (pl. ma'anj). AI-Ash'ari seems to prefer this
term to 'iJJa, although the two are synonymous in the context. These entities, whose
being is implied by predicates of this class (the ma'iini or 'ila/), are frequently, and in
some contexts normally, referred to as = ma'na= 'illa, "attributes".
3. Those predicates whicb refer to and therefore assert the reality of an action performed
by the subject. These kinds of predicates, in contrast with the ficst two, are generated
(mu/,ldath). They are not eternal, and Gad can be described by one of these attributes

38
weil a ~ by ils contrary.
AI-Ash'ari in this classification scheme was influenced by al-Jubbli'i, his teacher
for many years when al-Ash'ari was a Mu'tazilite. Yet, al-Ash'ari speaks most often in
terms of a/-dalalah, that is to say, each one of these attributes indicate but is not identical
with, the indicated object. The first one indicates the identity of the essence, the second
the mn'iini, and the third indicates the actions.61 The significant point hCl'e in the use of
the term "indir:ation" (dnlii/ah) is to be found in al-Ash'ari's allemptto keep the essence
of God as a pure and absolute unity. The allributes according to al-Ash'ari are not
identical with God's essence (in opposite to the Mu'tazilites), nor are they to be
complelely separated from Him (this avoids the possibility of stating that other entities
stand beside God's essence).
The main point of contention between the Ash'arites and the Mu'tazilites is
particularly association with the second kind of attribute, the attributes of mnCiini. AI-
Ash'ari in opposite to the Mu'tazilites, as mentioned above, asserts that God's attributes
are derived from macani superadded to God's essence. AI-Ashcari himself, although
affimling the reality of attributes, avoided saying that these attributes are existents; he
also refused to discuss what kind of being belongs to God's attributes.62 At any rate, we
are able to trace al-Ashcari's opinion conceming God's attributes through his scallered
statements.
The main statement al-Ash'ari depended upon in terIns of his positing of the
theory is to be found in his saying that "God's attributes are neither His essence nor
other than the essence".63 A1though tbis statement is not new and had been employed by
many theologians, such as Ibn Kulliib; al-Ash'ari gave the statement the meaning that
scrved his viewpoint. By the first part of a statement. al-Ash'ari meant that God's
allributes are not identical with God's essence. This was intended to keep the
transcendental unity of God complctely pure. Nothing can he asserted on behalf of this
essence, whcthcr this assertion is (knowlcdge) as AbD al-Hudhyal believed. or (Etemity)

39
as al-Jubbii'i set forth. Nothing can be mixed with God's Self. Ali attributes indicalc
(tadu/lu) but are not identical with God Himself. The allributes of Ill/l'uni
ma'niiwiyah) indicate ma'jjni which are signified by the verbal noun or gcrund
(ma,iidir) and thus are revealed as possessing an ontological position. As for the second
part of the statement, al-Ash'ari the reality of allributes. This assertion, however,
does not mean that for him these allributes are separable from God's essence or are other
than He.64 in terms of having an independent reality. They are eternal (qlldillWIJ) and
additional (zii'idah), but solely through being assoeiated with God's essence. They are
not other, beeause otherness (aJ-ghayriyah), according to al-Ash'ari's definition is thut
"of every two existents, one of them possibly detaehed (mufiiriq) from the other; if this
detaehment oceurs in nothingness, a/-'adam, existence,time or pluce."6' This definition
of othemess removes any possibility that the attributes are other than God's essence.
As a result we are led to conclude that God's attributes do not subsist in und hy
themselves, but within God's essence. while God's essence subsists in itself. In other
words, God's attributes are not essences (dhawiit) since the only Etemal essence is God
but they existentially subsist and associate with essence.
By asserting the attributes as ma'iini, superadded to the object that they reside in, al-
Ash'ari succeeded in advancing systematic theory conceming the determinution (lf being
whether this being is God Himself or the human being:
Against al-Jubba'. aI-Ashcar insists that. for any given expression. the /Jaqiqah is
invariant. That is. ciilim cannot be narsin when used of God. and $ifiitu
ma'nii when used of Zayd. The paraphrase of any given term is always the sume
and so its referent: the ithbiit is. in ail cases. either of the a. such. of a
macnii, or of an action ( /i
C
] ).67
The systematic view presented by aI-Ashcar, does not lead in any way to the
conclusion that the two levels of existence. God and His attributes and the physical
world. are the same; aI-Ashcar deliberately distinguishes between them. In Zayd the

40
or altrihute is a contingent entity. Il is an accident ('aruf), contingent both in itself
and its relation to the body which is Zayd. Il is, thus, a being dislnct from him and so
strictly speaking, "other than he" (ghuyruhu). God's altributes, however, arc Eternal,
neither contingent as such nor in rcspcctto His being.68
But despite the systematic position, al-Ash'ari's point of view still suffered from many
weaknesses. For example: (a) AI-Ash'ari, in order ultimately to affirm the attributes
as additional mu'iini zii'iduh), insists that the attribute of everlasting (albaqii') is
ma'nii, and so God is everlasting by virtue of ma'nii which is baqii', this exaggeration
disaJlowed by his follower aJ-Juwayni. (b) AIAsh'ari did not propcrly answer the
question of the kind of existence the attributes have since he treated these attributes
as not subsisting in and by themselves. As they arc not essences (dhawiit), the
statements which can be applied to materiaJ substances as weil. Al-Ash'ari did not
adduce a propcr answer concerning the nature of entity the attributes have. This fact
pushed aJAsh'ari's fol1owers (aIBiiqilliini and al-Juwayni) to adopt the theory of states
(aQwiil) to negate any possibility of fixing the attributes as existents associate God's
essence. (c) The manner of treating the attributes of God in terms of indication (al-
duliiluh) was also a subject of doubt. For that reason we notice the fol1owers of aI-
Ash'ari hesitating to take the master's theory as it is.
These weaknesses in fact pushed and provoked al-Ash'ari's fol1owers to
reform the master's theory and to he open to the opponents' arguments. Al
Juwayni, in achieving such a reform, adopted sorne of the Mu'tazilites' terms, as we
shal1 see.

41
I.Abd alKarlm alShahm.'loni. K. nlmilnl vol. 1, cd. by SIIYll III
Kiloni. (Beirul: Dar alMa'rifah. n.d J. p.80.
2. alShahra'loni. Ibid. p. 90.
3. Ab all;lllSan alAsh'ari. MnqlUiit nlis/iimiyln wnikhtiliif cil. by lIellnlll
Riller. (Islanbul. Weisbaden. 1929'33 J. p.279.
4. alShahrastonl. nlMilnl. vol. 1. p. 50.
5. alAsh'ari. Mnqif/iit. p. 188.
6. Richard M. Frank. The Metnphysics of Crented Being AL'L'on/ing ru Ab nl/Il1dhnyll
'Alliff (Istanbul: Nederland HislorischArchaeologisch Inslitule in Hel Nabije Ooslen. 1966 J. p. 15.
7. R. Frank. Ibid. pp. 16-23.
8. Dy Ihe tenn systemalic which is expressed in Ihe law of inference of Ihe invisible from the
visible. is meant in the contexl of the knliim, the derivation of the judgemenl Ihal is. according
to the Ash'arites the true propositions thal are said of Gnd musl he bllSed upon Ihe same principles thal
by means of which the propositions employcd of zayd. Therefore. in a.much a. the descriptions sllid
of zayd are derived from accidents which are mn'ifnl subsisiting in zayd, the same thing is 10 he
applicable of Gnd, thal Gnd's propositions such lIS, knowing, willing, powerful. musl he derived fmm
ma'iInl abiding essentially and etemally in Gnd's essence. Ihal are knowledge, will.
9. aIAsh'ari, Maqiilift, p. 372. Sec also Harry H. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Knliim. p151.
10. Ab all;lusayn alKhayyot. K. cd. and Irans. by A.N. Nader (Beirut: alMaklnbah
alSharqiyah. 1957 J. p. 46.
II. alShahrastlini, alMital, vol. 1. p.67.
12. Fakhr aIDin aIRiizi, afkiir ni .mutnqaddim/n walmuta'akhkhirln. cd. hy
Taha Sa'd (Cairo: MaktnbatalKulliyiil, 1323 h J. p.I44. And RA. Wolfson, The Phi/o.,ophy of the
Ka/iim. p. 156.
13. aIShahrasllini, alMital. vol. 1. p. 66. And alAsh'ari, Mnqiiliit, p. 54g.
14. R. M. Frank. "AIma'nif: Sorne Renections on the Technical Meanings of Ihe Tenn in Ihe
Ka/iim and ils Use in \he Physics of Mu'ammar." Journal ofthe American Oriental Socieaty, 87, (1967 J,
pp. 248-59.
15. 'Abd alQiihir alBaghdiidi. a/Farq bayn al/iraq. cd. by M. 'J\bd al
I;lamid. (Cairo: Maklabal n.d J. p. 153. And H.A. Wol/son. The Philosophy of
\he Ka/iim. p. 154.
16. 'Abd aIJabblir aIHamadhiInl. alMughnl fi abwiib altaw/,Jld wa7-'adl. 16 vols. cd. by
AI,unad F. Abawlinl and Ibrilhlm Madkr. (Cairo: Wazliral aIThaqiifah. 1965 J. p. 253.
17. R Frank. A/ma'na. p. 252.
Ig. aIAsh'ari. Maqilift. p.488.
19. 'Abd aIJabblir, SharIJ al'Il$OI alkhamsah. cd. by 'Abd alKarim 'Uthmlio. (Cairn:
Maktabal Wahbah. 1965 J. p.183.
20. aIAsh'arf. Maqilil. p. 546.

42
21. alAshlar!, ihid, 546.
22. lIiAsh
l
ar;, Ibid, p. 370.
23. alAshluri, Ibid, p. 370.
24. atAshluri. ibid, pp. 386-87.
25. Majid Fakhry, A Hisrory of /sJamic Philosophy. "ans. by Kaml al Yziji (Beirul:
American University. 1947). p. 92.
26. Ibn rabaqiir aJmu"/aziJah. cd. S. Diwald (Beirut: n.d). pp. 80-85.
27. 'Abd alJabbr, SharQ, p. 182. And aJMajm' fi aJmuQl bi'J/aklif, cd. J.J. Houben,
vol.1. (Beirut: Imprimerie Calholique. 1965). p. 100.
28. alAshluri. Maqiilii/. p. 531. And R. l'rank. Beings and their allribules (Albany: Slate
Univershy of New York, i978), p. 15.
29. alShahrastni. Nihiiiya/ aJ/qdiim fi 'ilm aJkaJiim, cd. by Alfred Guillaume (Baghdiid:
Maktabat alMulhthanii. n.d). p. 135.
30. Ab alFiiriibi. K. aJmus/a'maJah fj'JmanJiq, cd. by Muhsin Mahdi
(Beirul: Diir alMnshriq. 1968), pp. 52-3.
31. alFrbi. pp. 75-6.
32. H.A.Wolfson. The PhiJosophy. p.277.
33. H.A.Wolfson. Ibid. p.227.
34. Man/iq ArisJ. cd. by 'Abd alRa!)miin Badawi. vol. 3. (Kuwail: Waqiilat alMalb'iil. and
Bcirul: Diir alQalam. 1980), p. 110. And J.M. Bochenski. A His/ory of FormaJ Logie (Indiana:
Univershy of Notre Dame Press). p. 52. And alrariibl. aJAJIiq. p. 76.
35. alAsh'arl. Maqiilii/. p.482. And alBaghdiidi. aJFarq. p. 127.
36. alMubnrrad. aJMuq/ar,fab. cd. M.A.Adima. vol 4. (Cairo: 1386). p. 127. and Sibawayh. aJ
Ki/iib, (Cairo: Bliiq. 1316) vol 1. p.287. In R.Frank. Beings. p. 15.
37. R. Frank. A/tribu/e. Artribu/ion. and Being: Three Islamic Views. In The Philosophies of
Exis/ence. cd. Parvis Norewedge (New York: l'oldham University Press. 1982). p. 262. and al Ash'arl.
Maqiilii/. p. 522.
38. alAsh'arl. Maqiilii/. p.529. And R.Frank. Beings. pp. 18-19.
39. Ab Bakr al.Biiqilliini. aJTamhld. cd. Richard J.McCanby (Beirut: alMaktabah al
ShaJqiyah. 1957 ). p. 213.
40. R. Frank. Beings. p. 18.
41. R. Frank. Ibid. p. 17.
42. 'Abd alQihir alBaghdidi. U$J aJ-djn. (Istanbul: Madrasat alDahiya\, Diir alFunun. 1928 ).
p.92.
43. R. Frank. Beings. p. 19.

44. H.A.Wolfson. The Phi/o.,r.;>hy. p. 210.

45. R. Frank. AI/ribule. Altribulion. p 267.
46. al-Shahra.,tiini. al-Mi/al. p. H2.
47. H.A.Wolfson. ThePhi/o.,ophy. p.211.
4H. R. Frank. Attribu/e. Artribulion. p.267.
49. R.Frank. ibid. pp.267-8.
50. 'Abd al-Jabbiir. Shar/J p.231.
51. alfiiriibi. a/-A/Iii? pp. 52-3.
52. R. Frank. Bdngs. p. 20.
53. al-Shllhr..tiini. a/Mi/aI. p.52. And al-Baghdiidi. aI-Farq. pp. 195-6.
54. al-Baghdfidi. alFarq. p. 196.
55. al-Shllhrastiini. Nihiiiyat. p. 131.
56. al-Shllhrastiinl. a/-Mi/aI. p. 95.
57. alAsh'ari. aJ-/biinah 'an a/-diyiinah. cd. by Fauqiyllh H. (Cai",: 1977). p. 42.
58. al-Ash'ari. K. aI/uma' Ii'/ radd 'aJii ah/ a/-zaygh wa/-bida'. In Thcology of al-A.h'ari. cd.
and Irans. by Richard J. McCarthy (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique. 1952). p. 14.
59. ai-Ash'ari. Ibid. p. 14.
60. alShIlhrastiinl. aIMi/al. p.95.
61. R.Frank. Arrribule. Attribulion. p.269
62. R. Frank. Ibid. p. 270.
63. al-ShIlhrastiinl. a/-Mi/aI. p. 95.
64. Michel AUard. Le Prob/eme des Attributs Divins dans la Doctrine d'al As/"arl
(Beyrouth: Imprimiere Catholique. 1965 J. p. 243.
65. Ab al-Ma'iili al-Juwaynl.aI-Shiimi/1i a/-din. cd. by 'Ali S. al-N..hshiir. B. 'Awn
and Sllhlr M. Mukhllr. (Cairo: Munsha'at a1-Ma'iirif. 1969 J. p. 332.
66. Sa'd al-Dln alTaflaZlnl. Shar/J al"aqll'id alnasaliyah. (Cairo: Malba'at
1939 J. pp. 778.
67. R.Frank. Arrribute. allTibution. p.270.
68. R.Frank. Ibid. p. 270.

Chapter fi: al-Juwayn' s Theory in K.

al-Irshad

Based on Ihe Egyplian edilion of M. Allard, in his lung sludy le

Problme des allribuls Divins dans la doclrine d'al-As'ari, believes Iiml ul-Juwllyni
presents two oullines conceming God's llllribules. The Iirsi one is as fulluws:
1. what il is necessary 10 SllY of God: pp.30-39 and 52-164.
2. what il is impossible to say of God: pp.39- 51 .
3. what it is possible to say of God: pp.165-186 .
The second oUlline is as follows:
1. The essential allributcs pp. 30-60 .
2. The attribules of mll'iini mll'nllwiyah): pp. 61-140 .
3. The names of God and their meanings: pp. 61-140 .
4. The anthropomorphist allributes and vision of God: pp.155-186.1
Significantly, neither of these outlines can be taken or studied
separately. Each includes the other, and any allempt that aims to follow one
seheme exclusively wouId he inadequate. The Iirst Olle lacks adequale justilication
from aI-Juwayni himself. Moreover it is very abstract and al-Juwayni ducs not
help us towards a deeper understanding of it. 2
The second outline is easier to approach, and it more or less expresses
the standpoint of the Ash'nrite schoo\. Il is bascd on the major concepls upon
which bolh Ash'nrites and Mu'tazilites are in agreement. Nevenheless, despite
these difficulties, this second outline must nol he elaborated separollely, bUI must he
taken in conjunction with the first one.
If we rely upon both the Egyptian and Luciani's editions, and examine al-
Juwayni's division of his book aJlrshad, we find that he divides the titles of the
subordinate chapters into three main headings.
The most general heading is indicated by the .. bab al qawl fi .....
(the chapter of saying of ...), this bab in tum is divided into many subheadings,
each one of these subheadings is called .. bab aJ..... (the chapter of ... \, and each

46
lIne lIf lhese suhheadings is divided as weil inlo many ilems called sections

Whal must he menlioned here is Ihat. although al- Juw:.yn follows lhis
melhod lIf division in his book. in sorne places he violales his own melhod. For
whalever reason. he docs nol consislenlly follow lhe plan Ihal he sel oui in his
writing. This viollition can he juslified if wc rcmemher Ihal alJuwayn's wrilings
Iry 10 achieve many goals al Ihe same lime. Thal is 10 say. al-Juwayn. firsl of ail.
is an Ash'arile Ihinker; he primarily had 10 maintain Ihe main ideas of his school.
Secondly. al-Juwayn had adopled sorne MU'lazilite poinls. and Iherefore he was
Irying 10 insert Ihesc adopled nOlions in Ihe body of his wrilings wilhoul harming
basic Ash'arile lenels. For inslance. in Ihe chapter on Ihe essenlial allributes al-
Juwuyn lulks aboui Ihl'ee kinds of altribules. Sorne of Ihese arc negalive altribules
deul wilh in his chapler on "whal il is impossible 10 altribule 10 God". Such a
seclion rcminds us of Ihe Mu'lazililes' definilion of God's altribules which slales
Ihal sorne of God's altribules should he viewed in an essenlially negalive way as we
hllve seen in Ihe firsl chapler. As anolher example. a1Juwayn c1assified Ihe altribule
of aJ-bllqii' (Everlasling) in Ihe chapler on Ihe altribules of marini. Ihough he
considercd il as an essenlial altribute nafsiyah). Il is c1ear here. Ihen. Ihal al
Juwuyni adopled Ihe MU'lazilile sland on Ihis poinl. He did nol PUI this altribule
in the chapler on the essenlial allribules mercly in order 10 maintain the basic
shape of c1assificalion of attributes which was held by his school's founder, a1-
Ash'ari, who helieved Ihal aJ-baqii' is an altribule of marna.
According to Ihe divisions mentioned above, alJuwayn begins dealing
wilh God's attributes in aJ-Irshad under the heading of "bab aJqawl fima yajib li-
ll;hi tari/ii min aJ- (Ihe chapler on asserting whal il is necessary 10 altribule
10 Gad). In Ihis chapler a1-Juwayn explains thal whal is necessary 10 he altribuled
10 God is of two kinds: Ihe essenlial altribules nafsiyah) and Ihe altribules

47
of ma'ni ma'nawiyalJ). For the nrst group of <lllrihules, <l1-Juw<lyni
implicitly subsumed il <lS <1 bab. With respect to the second group <l1-Juwuyni
explicitly pUI il in <In independenl bah. und of course e<lch of lhese hallS is
ramified into many
Thus concerning the theory of God's allrihules. <l1-Juw<lyni presents his
analysis in three m<ljor eh<lpters: 1. The chapler on asserting wh<l' il is necess<lry
ta allribule ta Gad: pp. 3078. 2. The chapter on affirming of knowing <lllrihules
(bab a/-qaw/ fi itlJbiit a/-ci/m biJ pp. 79-140. 3. The me.ming of God's nmlles:
pp. 141-165.
The first main chapter is divided into lhree subhe<ldings: <1. biib .u-
nafsiyah (the essential attributes). b. bab al-cilm bil wa/,Jdniyah (the knowledge of
the unity of Gad). c. bab ilhbiil a/-ci/m bi/ al-macnawiyah (affirming lhe
altributes of macni).
The unity of Gad. according ta al-Juwayn. must bc understood in terms of
two aspects. external and internaI. Externally. "it is willed by numing Gad as
One-that there is no similar and comparable (na?:ir) ta Him.") Internully "Gad is
the thing which is not divided... He is not compound; bccause if it were so
supposed... every part of Him wouId subsist in itself us knowing. living.
powerful. and that would bc a declaration of the affirmation of two gadS."4
ln dealing with the whole of al-Juwayni's stand on the unity of Gad in its two
'aspects we have ta approach his theory of the altributes. which is according to
him, the "basic issue forthe people of the unity of Gad" {Cumdalah/ a/-law/,Jic/).s
AI-Juwayni advanced his contribution using material from both theories. the Ash'arites.
and the Mu'tazilites. investing and incoporating the long-standing debates bctween
them. Although he was an Ash'arite thinker. he was open ta his school's opponents.
and ta material which helped him in his effort ta find a mature view about the
issue of the unity of Gad in particular and the issue of the determination of the thing

48
in general.
The existent had been viewed in the philosophy of the ku/iim as essenee (dhiit)
and qualities Il was the object of a very tough controversy among the
mUluku//imiin. Proceeding from its own grounds and principles, each school
presented its understanding of both matters: the nature of the allribute itself, and the
relation of such an attribute to the essence. It is obvious here that any formulation that
can be made of these two mallers would, as weil, give a different concept to the
existent itself.
The theory of states (li-abwi1):
Before starting a discussion of al-Juwayn's point of view on the attributes,
we have to deal with his theory of states (II./Iwii/). This theory is presented in al-Irshiid
in the section on the allributes of ma'iini under the subheading biib al quwl fi ithbiit al
'ilm bil $iliit, but because of the necessity of first knowing the primary theory we have
to begin with il.
As we have seen in the first chapter, the controversy among the Mu'tazilites and
the Ash'arites was centred upon the question of attributes. Do these attributes belong
to and, therefore, are to be identified with the essence itself (the Mu'tazilites), or they
are supcradded to the essence (the Ash'arites)? The theory of states was created by Ab
Hshim in order to solve this connicl. Ab Hashim had taken a middle position
between the two schools. He held that the attributes are manifest from and entailed
directly by the essence, but they are not the essence in the sense heId by his
predecessors. They are, rather, different from il. States, according to him, have
forfiS and reality.
The Ash'arite's school represented by al-Baqilliini was hesitant in dealing with
such a theory, but in the final stages al-Biiqilliini overcome his hesitation about
adopting the theory of states, 6 and bis follower al-Juwayni did so as weIl.

49
AI-Juwayni's adoption of the states comes first of ail as Il solution 10 Ihe
dilemma of the rellltion between the essence: and altributes. That is to say, .. /-llllII'II/,
according to al-Juwayni, arc nothing other than "aspects ( IVUjU/WII) of the essence". 7
These aspects must not be understood in relalior to the concepls of eilber the
Mu'tazilites or the Ash'ariles, They arc neither identical Wilh nur superudded tu Ihe
essence. They arc, ralher, inherent in very nature of the essence.
These aspects, although not essences, form addilional and differcnt entities
l'rom thc AI-Juwayni placed much emphasis on thc fact th,1I thc states arc
entities which arc independent of the essence, besides focusing on the fact Ihat the
attributes arc aspects of the essence. He maintains that "our doctrine is that Ihe
objects known (a/-mar/miit) are divided into existence (lVujdl, nothingncss
(radam), and an attributc of existence ($ifit wujd) which cannot be described as
either existence or nothingness".8
Two points, then, arc made by ai-Juwayni in order to harmoni7-c thc theory of
states with his school's tradition. The first deals with essence's aspects as forming
independent entities, and considers that the is a known object, though it is
neither known nor unknown in Ab Hashim's theory. Morcover, for Ab Hashim thc
states cannot be apprchended independently since they arc known to be prcdicated
upon the essence. On the contrary, ai-Juwayni, with his understanding that Ihe states
are objects, believes that "the states as aspects of being can be known independently
apart l'rom the essence. "9
Socondly, al-Juwayni adopted the theory of states in order to deul properly
with the question of similarities and differcnces among things. He constantly places
emphasis upon the fact that "the negation of to the impossibility of an
elaboration on this similarity and difference."lo That is, "everything by which
similarity and difference occur conceming the essences and mariini is an additional
/,141:' Il According to ai-Juwayni the similarity and difference within things cannot be

50
explained except in terms of admission of the u1;Jwlil, hecause uJu1;Jwlil represent the
substantial a ~ p e c t s of the essence r.nd, at the same time, are additional to il. They are
not the same a ~ the essence itself. al-Juwayn says that
if we negate the states... our aim hecomes c1ear in disassociating the similarity
from sorne a ~ p e c t s with the difference from the other aspects; so in our
negation of the states, we negate the additional aspects and the attributes of the
esscnce.12
Il can be said, therefore, that the attributes as being u1;Jwlil are necessarily
associated with the essence they belong to, and every single entity has its own
particular aspects. Such aspects are never separated from the essence. They
particularize and distinguish such an essence from ail other essences; they form its
identity and reflect the very nature of il.
Concerning other characteristics of the states, al-Ju','!ayn says that "state
cannot he defined except by analysing its parts as caused and uncaused."13 The
qualification of astate, then,
cannot he either in the definition (pad) or in the description (rasm) but by
mentioning its parts and levels, hecause the definition and description must he
equal to the object defined neither more specific nor more general, or else
this leads to a regress.14
As for the emphasis on the fact that the state is an aspect of the essence
known scparately, aIJuwayn as a mutakallm does not accept the notion that the Qlil
can occupy the position of a Platonic idea or an Aristotelian definition. That is to say,
the Greek philosophical systems were based on either the hierarchy of ideas or the
classification of definitions, and both were rejected in the early kaliim. For this
reason aIJuwayn, although helieving that the states are independent aspects by
which the sameness and difference among things can he realized, refused to he
involved in., cating a definition of the /;IiI in order to avoid the aforementioncd

51
positions.
The state, therefore, is divided into two parts. the caused and uncauscd,
mu'al/al wa ghuyr mu'aJ1al. By the tirst one is meant the altributes occurring by
virtue of mu'ni, whercas the second one helongs to the essence necessarily without
any kind of additional causes. The lalter refers to the essential ultributcs 111-
nafsiyah).15
For example. the uncaused altributes arc to he found in the csscntial
altributes of God, sueh as Eternity. Everlastingness. and Oneness. They can also he
found in the essential attributes of atoms that arc ealled such as the
oeeupaney of space of the atom and its having accidents. On the other hand. the
cllused attributes can he seen in every case in whieh the essence can he to
exist apart from and without the attribute. God can he imagined as existing without
heing knowing. The negation of the attribute of knowing does not mean negation of the
essence itself; this kind of attribute is called caused (mu'aJ1aluh). The altributes occur
by virtue of ma'ni residing in the essence and eausing the corresponding altributes.
Though. the negation of an uncaused essential altribute leads to the negation of the
essence itself. the essence of God eannot he if the attribute of Eternity is negated.
Wbat il is nesslI1'Y 10 say of God (the essential attributes):
Concerning the essential attributes. aI-Juwayni detines al-$ifah
foIlows:
Every attribute that affirrns the essence is inhercnt with it as long the
essence exisls. and is not eaused by virtue of causes rcsiding in the attributed
object... so "oceupying space" is an attribute inhercnt along with the substance
inasmueh as the essence of substance lasls. and it (the attribute of occupancy)
is not caused by virtue of something supcradded to the substance. 16
Under the title of essential attributes (aJ-$ifiit aJ-nafsiyah) aI-Juwayn implicitly

52
inscrts three groups of attributes without c1assifying them in a definite way, but it
can he easily seen that these three groups of essential allributes arc as follows:
1. What can be called the essence itself. 2. The affirming allributes which are
additionalto the essence. Once again it must be mentioned here that al-Juwayni does
not use the term "additional" in the same sense as Ab Hashim; rather, he means that
these allributes can be known separately apart from the essence, in contrast to Ab
Hiishim who held that the essential states cannot be apprehended apart from the
essence). 3. The negative attributes.17
By the first kind, alJuwayni means the "existence". He refused to call it an
allribute because, according to hi m, the allribute in ail cases must be something
additional to the essence, it is known separately while the existence is not additional,
it is the essence itself. lt is not an attribute in the MU'taziiites' sense.
AI-Juwayni argues thatthe existence is completely the same as the essence. One
is not an allribute of the other; rather, they are synonymous with each other. To
understand this view, we have to trace the ontological source from which al-Juwayni
proceeded and follow its developmenl.
ln the philosophy of the ka/am, at least before al-Juwayni, the question of
existence means exclusively the question of the existent, that is, What is the existent?
The problem of existence was a point of great controversy among the Mu'tazilites and the
Ash'arites. Each school proceeded from its own understanding of creation towards
theorizing a view of existence, a view that reflected cosmologically two different
approaches which, incidentally, influenced many other important issues in the the
ka/iim.
Because we do not have the writings of the early mutaka/limn , sufficient reports
arc not available about the origin of the question of What is the existent? According to
al-Ash'ari, the question had been raised for the most part in terms of the problem of
God's attributes, "Can God be called a thing (shay') or not?"18 Al-Ash'ari states that ail

53
the mutakaJ/imn except Jahm b. ugreed thut God cun be culled u thing (shlly'l.
The problem urnong them, however, wus in delining the meuning of the existent. Some
of the mutakllllimn suid thut
The meuning of God us being u thing is the sume us the rneuning of God :IS
being existent; this is the doctrine of the people who suy thut the thing is
existent. Dthers said thut the meuning of God us bcing u thing is uflirming Him;
those people bclieve thut things (1I1-ashiyiPl ure things und uflirmed liS Il things
bcfore their existence .., this is Il suying of ul-Khuyyl.19
It is noteworthy thut in terms of discussion of the mellning of the thing, the
Mu'tazilite thinker a1-Khuyyl delines the thing as whut is uflirmed (1I1muthblltl, which
meuns that the thing eun be ealled u thing even bcfore its existence. AI-Jubb'i gives
unother delinition of the thing, but still is in line with al-Khuyyl; he says that
"saying 'thing' is u feature of everything thut is known (1I1-qllwl shllY' /ikul
mll'lm) for everything eun bc mentioned und cun bc told about."20
In order to deline the thing in the eontext of the controversy concerning God's
attributes, the discussion led the mutakllllimn to two different views. The lirst one is
expressed by the Mu'tazilites und was c1eurly represented by al-Jubb', who delined
the thing as a known object. This explicitly led to the consideration thut even the
nonexistent (1I1ma'dm) cun bc called a thing, bceause the nonexistent cun he known
und therefore it is a thing. This Mu'tazilite view expressed by a1-Jubb' was established
upon the Qur'iinic passage, "Surely the earthquake of the Hour is a mighty thing."21
The Mu'tazilites urgued that Go<! nurnes the Hour as a thing though it docs not yet exist,
whieh meuns that the nonexistent is a thing too.
For the Mu'tazilites, therefore, there is a distinction bctween the thing und the
existent, since these two terms ure not equivalent to each other. 'Thing' is a more
general term thun the 'existent' because the term 'thing' includes the nonexistent as weil.
For that reason the term 'object known' (aJ-ma'lm), which is equivalent to 'thing', is

54
the mo.t gen.:ral category in the Mu'tazilites' thought.
The Mu'tazilites thus bclieved that things arc things befme their actual existence. This
altitude is called the "thingness of the nonexistent" (shlly'iYllt IlI- mll'dm), which was
established by and arter him, adopted by the Mu'tazilites who
followed him.22
AIAsh'ar and his followers in the classical period simply deny the distinction
which is made by the Mu'tazilites between the essence and the existence. The
possible (al-ma'dm) simply is not. God's essence, thus, is His existence, whose
nonbcing is impossible (yasta.!JiJu 'adamuhu). Ibn Kulliib, as we have earlier
seen, says that He is existent "not through an act of existence" (mawjd la bi
wujd) and is a bcing (shay') "not by a mil'na by virtue of which He is a
being" ( la li- ma'na lahu kiina shay'an). 23
As for the Ash'arites, they contend that the most general category is not
alma'/m, the object known, but rather the existent (al-mawjd). AIJuwayn
presents this philosophical point as follows:
The people of truth (ahl a/-Qaqq ) have arrived at the fact that the truth of
a thing is existent; every thing is an existent and every existent is a thing,
and what cannot be described as a thing can not be described as an
existent as weil, and what cannot be described as an existent can not be
described as a thing too... while the Mu'tazilites believe that the truth of
thing is a/-ma'/m, the object known ...and accordingly they say that every
nonexistent is a thing.24
The Ash'arites, although identifying the thing and the existent and denying,
therefore, the distinction between the essence and the existence, still believed
existence to be an attribute. This attribute, however, according to Ibn Kulliib does
not occur by a ma'na; rather, it is an essential attribute nais). Existence (a/.
wujd) is an attribute belonging to those attributes
which refer,to the being itselfthe thing's Self nalsuhu, is conceived, it would
seem, in contrast to the Mu'tazilies, more as object \han as essence): tBdullu
'a/a nals Thus, with Allihu mawjdun (Gad exists) or a/Qarakatu

55
'Maqun (the motion is an accident) al-Ash'ari takes simply as ithbiIru nats 11/-
(the assertion of the existence of the entity denoted by the subject term);
they refer to the self of the
The basic starting point in al-Juwayni's t hcory of the unity of God is to he
found in his fundamental belief that the existence is not an allribule but is
God Himself. He says in his al-Irshiid, "the convenient thing is to consider the
existence not as an altribute, that is, the existence is the essence ils-self, it is
not as the spatiality of the substance, because the spatiality is a superadded
attribute to the essence of the substance".26
Here al-Juwayni as an Ash'arite thinker, and because of the doctrine of
his school that t!>ere is no difference between the essence and the existence of
God, pushes this principle as for as it will go. Al-Juwayni was aware of his stand as
being different from his masters' altitude and felt that his masters "were prolix
(mutawasi'n) in considering existence as one of God's altributes". 27
From this fundamental starting point we can now apprehend the importance of al-
Juwayni's contribution in regard to the determination of God's essence.
The problem of the determination of the essence of God was a great dilemma
in the ka/am; and a huge part of the discrepancy between the Ash'arites and the
Mu'tazilites proceeded from the question What is the essence of God?
After he detennined the essence of Gad as the existence, al-Juwayni gocs on to
talk about the rest of the essential attributes nafsiyah). These essential altributes
are employed by him to define as wellto detennine the nature of the existence of God.
5uch a detennination must he made because on his view, existence is the most
common or inclusive term in the universe; though existing both Gad and the physical
world participate with each other.
God's existence. thus. is distinguished from other sorts of existence by His own
essential attributes. These attributes are of two kinds: affirmative altributes and

56
negative attributes.
The essential affirmative attributes that bclong only to God arc: a. Eternity
(ul-qidum), b. Aseity, God subsists by virtue of Himself (qiyiim AI/iihu bi nu{sihl),
c. Everlastingness, (al-buqii'), and d. Oneness (ul-wubdiiniyuh). These attributes arc
inherent in God's essence, they certainly and positively refer to the essence of
God. The essential attribules arc the mosl specifie attributes by which essence
possesses ils particular identity, yet at the same time distinguish this essence from ail
other essences (dhawiit).
The essence or being can be delermined. after its being existent. by the
essential attributes. the attributes which are indissoluble from the being as long as
the being exists. These attributes then intrinsically give the being ils particuliarity;
through them the existents can be seen as being different from each other. even though
they ail have existence in common. God. therefore, is distinguished and possesses
His identity by virtue of His particular essential attributes. which are. Oneness.
Etcrnity, subsisting in Himself, and Everlastingness. By virtue of these attributes
God is determined as possessing His special existence.
'The essential attributes, 1l-8l Il-Nsfsysb:
By the attribute of Eternity aI-Juwayn means that God's being is
beginningless (ghayr muftata.(l).28 To support his view ?J-Juwayni presents two
arguments; the first one is expressed as follows: "if God's being is generated He
would then be lacking a generator (mubdith). the same thing can be said of his
generator. and thus the same can be applied to beginningless events. but it can be
seen that this prove to be futile".29
The second argument depends. interestingly. on a special notion of time.
'Eternity' is described in terms of aI-Juwayni's understanding and in contradiction to
those who maintain that Elernity means an endless succession of tme. A1-Juwayn

57
states that "times are expressed by existents heing compared with olher exislents,
and if each existent is viewed in comparison wilh othcr exislcnls. Ihe lalesl willlhen
be its lime,"3o Viewed in Ihis way. Etcrnily does not mean a succession of lime
because God is incomparable wilh other existcnls hefore the creation of Ihe world.
Concerning the allribute of subsisting by Himself. al-Juwayni helieves in
agreement with his masters that this atlribute means the transcendenee of Gml
from being lacking to substratum. And the proof "is that if God occupics space,
and His existence is lacking in that place. this place wouId he eternal too and
would be an atlribute of God. as every place is atlribuled to the object which
Decupies it."31
By mentioning these affirmative atlributes. al-Juwayni points to the essential
attributes which determine primarily the particular nature of God's essence ur the
nature of the existence of God. the existence being distinguished by ils special
identity from all other beings.
AI-Juwayni gocs on to insist upon the difference of God's essence from
other essences by reciting the third group of essential atlributes. These are the
negative ones. That is. "one of God's essential atlributes is His difference from
generated objects; God is eompletely dissimilar from them. and not one of them
resembles Gad."32
But before dealing with the negative attributes al-Juwayni begins the section
( f a ~ / ) . with a philosophical introduction that elarifies his important view on
difference and similarity.
The truth of sirni1arity and difference :
The theory of similarity and difference arrived with al-Juwayni at the highest
point to be reached in the philosophy of the kaliim. With al-Juwayni we cao see how
this problem was solved on the basis of developing issues in the kaliim; or, in other

58
wllrds, based on the fundamental shifl in the kuliim's view conceming the concept of
thing, al-Juwayni was in a position to present u mature theory of similurity and
difference. The dominant standpoint beforc al-Juwayni was the view of the universe
as the sum of things.
ln arder to prove the difference of God from other beings, kuliim avoided
dealing with common concepts or terms and therefore bclieved that every thing is
completely different from all other things. "The one determincd single thing docs
not include in any respect participation, and so the common and general thing
docs not exist at all.")) AIJuwayni, instead changed this standpoint from bclief
only in difference to a conceptual theory that rcgurded the possibility of similarity
within bcings.
Flrst of all. al-Juwayni states that existence is the most common term
among things. Il is the ontological ground of ail bcings, including Gad Himself. AI-
Juwayn: counters those who contend that Gad cannot bc describcd by any kind of
common terms and cannot bc "describcd in terms of existence, bccause if this is
done Gad will bc similur to generated things (uJ-/;Iawiidirh).")4 by saying that
If you contend that participation in one of the affirmative allributes
necessitates participation in ail the other attributes. your contention is false.
bccause wc know that black and white participate with each othel by
bcing accidents. bcsides the fact that they are differcnt from each other by
one of them bcing black and the other white...Rather, even if they admit
participation in one attribute. Ihis docs not necessitale participation in
other attributes. It can bc said to them: What is the objection to stating that
generated bcings and the Etemal Being pdlticipate with each other in the
attribute of existence. for Gad is particularized by the attributes of bcing
lord and gad. adjectives, and since participation in existence docs not
indicate participation in generation.)s
Inasmuch as ail bcings participate with each other in existence. the real
difference bctween things depends upon the identity of every single being. This
identity is constituted by virtue of essenlial attributes (aJ-$ifit al-nafsiyah). Such

59
altributes indicate thal lhe being is as il is in ilself. These allributes arc nnl causcd
by any kind of causes, that is, "the essential allribute is every aftrll1utive ullribule
related to the essence (dhiIt) not 10 superadded ma'nll of il.".lh It is inherenl ami
appcrtains to the very essence of the being, "the essenlial allribule is every allrihule
which cannot be dclusively negated. with assuming that the essence exists....11 If,
therefore. the essential allribule is hypothelically removed the essence ilsclf
wouId vanish a ~ weil.
B a ~ e d on lhe aforemenlioned definilion of identily. al-Juwayni works nul his
theory of similarity and difference. That is, the substantial similarity between two
things occurs if "sorne of them can be instead of the other" (id/III . ~ l I d d a
a!Jlldllhumii mllSsoddll al-iIkhar).38 One exislenl can be similar to another exislent if
both are equal to each other in ail essential altributes. if one of lhem identifies
eompletely the olher. Otherwise. there are two differcnt things: "in the case of
every two existents. sorne essential attributes have been affirmed 10 one of them,
and not to the other". 39 The word "som.:" herc means that Ihe difference is not
judged in the same way as the similarity, since if the similarity requires absolule
identification bctween ail essential attributes of two things, the difference. on the
contrary. dces not rcquirc absolute distinction between two Ihings.
The differcnce bctween two differcnt Ihings cannot be evalualed in lhe same
way Ils the similarity; that is. the truth of similarity is in the equality of Ihe
two similar describcd things in ail their essential attribules. while lhe
differcnce dces not rcquirc the differcnce in all such altributes, since lhe
differenee cannot bc realized except bctween two existents, so Ihe nccessity
of talking about the difference requires approaching the participalion of two
different Ibings in the existence.40
The important point to bc noticed .11 aI-Juwayni's veiw is that. the idenlily of
an existent cannot bc determined by only one essential attribute; being is
detennined ralber by all the essential attributes Ibat the bcing possessess. This

60
leads us ta say that "in arder ta illustrate lhe similarity, it is necessary ta
enumerate ail the essential attributes."41
Such a point of view is more open than the MU'taziiites' view that was
still faithful ta the nOlion crealed by alJubblPi and adopted by his son Ab
Hashim and his followers. This notion stated thal the sameness among things is due
ta one specific allribule, the attribute of the Essence ($ifilU ul-dhiil), black bcing
black and Gad bcing Elernal. AIJuwayni. rather, holds that the sirnilarity and
difference are delermined by a group of allributes, the group which essentially
determines the identily of bcing.
Il can be said then that bolh principles. the principle already mentioned
and the one which states that the difference between two things indispensably
requires the sameness in sorne other aspects. allow a view of the world in its
particular variety and interference. Such variety and interference are adrnited for
every bcing in its difference and as bcing distinguished by its nature and identity
from other bcings.
Besides the terms similarity (ulmumiilhuluh) and difference (alikhtiliil),
which are determined by the essential attributes. a1-Juwayni talks about the concept
of participation (al-rnushiir:lkuh). With this concept al-Juwayni deals with the
universals.42 According ta hirn. things participate with each other in virtue of
different groups of allributes; they are the allributes of muCiini. AI-Juwayni
maintains that every essential attribute is uncaused (lu lucallal), it is permanently
unseparated frorn its own essence. and every single identity is constitutionally
particularized by its specific essential attributes. There is no distinct cause by
which Gad can bc Eternal or a substance can he occupying space. An attribute
such as knowing is considered as a caused attribute ($ifuh mu'allaluh). It occurs
by virtue of mucni. such mucni causing the judgrnent or proposition of "Gad is
knowing" and. in the sarne way, "Zayd is knowing". Knowledge, then. is a

61
general concept. God and Zayd can he altribuled Wilh il by virtue (lf which God
and Zayd are deserving of Ihe same judgmenls Ihal ure cuused by Ihe same lerm.
AIJuwayn helieves Ihal "a lhing can purticipale wilh whal is differenl from il in
certain generul altribules. Black, for example, conlrasls wilh while; bul il purticipales
wilh Ihe while in exislence, and by virlue of Iheir being Iwo accidenls und
colours."43
Whal mUSI he al ways noliced in al-Juwayni's underslanding of Ihe geneml
altribules is lhal Ihey ure conslanlly accompanied by IWO fundamenlal nolions.
These nolions are Ihose of Ihe judgmenl or qualificalion (all.JUkm) and cause ('ilIa).
The altribules of ma'iini as Ihey are superadded 10 Ihe essence cause and provide
Ihe essence wilh specifie predicales; knowledge, Ihus, is deuil wilh as a general
altribule, and as a delerminanl principle, causing a deljnile judgmenl for bolh Gad
and Zayd.
Il is obvious, then, Ihal Ihe general ma'iini, in al-Juwayn's view, ure
employed in order 10 solve Ihe debalable issue of Ihe judgmenls Ihal are said la
he of bolh Ihe Visible (alshiihid) and Invisible (alghii'ib). Thal is, proceeding
from Ihis principle, Ihe trulhs are varianl in IWO levels. The Mu'lazililes declined
10 apply Ihe same judgmenl 10 bolh God and man; Ihey conlended Ihal Gad
necessarily has His own altribules by virtue of Himself, while man may possess
Ihe same altribules in a probable way.
Gad is knowing by virtue of Himself (bi dhiIliM, man is knowing
by virtue of somelhing else. This is Ihe malter which is considcred by Ihe
Ash'ariles as violaling the mosl fundemenlal basis of Ihe kalam, Ihe of Ihe
anulogy of the Unseen le' el in lerms of :he visible one, and breaking up Ihe
syslematic cosmological treaUDenl of ail heings in Ihe universe. AI-Juwayn
the Mu'tazililes' notion thal stales thal a judgmenl can he caused al one lime (in
respecl of man), and uncaused al another lime (in respecl of Gad). By saying

62
Ihat "the biggesl of your mistakes and the most clear confusion and ignorance is
your distinction belween Ihe visible and invisible in the judgment of cause (fi
1,Jukm a/-'i/la)," al-Juwayni adds Ihat "such a stand is regarded as arbitrary."44
The judgmenl of cause or reason (1,Jukm al-'illa), is regarded by al-Juwayni as the
same al both levels.
If il is accepted that a judgment is caused in virtue of cause in Ihe Seen
level.... Ihe conneclion of the cause and the caused (a/-ma'll) in balh the
visible and invisible levels must he decided so thatthey are inseparable from
each olher. and one of them must be negated if the olher is negated. In
this way we can state that knowing (a/-'iilim) at the seen level is a
knowing heing caused by the knowledge.4s
Il is remarkable Ihat aI-Juwayni does nol approach. like the Mu'tuzilites.
the problem of judgment in the context of necessity (in respe':t of God) and
possibility (in respect of man). By contrast. he holds that the cause and the object
caused are necessarily Inherent within each other in ail cases, if one of them exists
the other. by necessity. exists too. This is what is called the rotation (aJ-dawarJn),
or the coextensiveness and coexclusiveness (fard wa 'alcs), and which means thatthe
1,Jukm tums around the 'illa and is bound to its existence and nonexistence.46
The ma'iini. thus, are not independent entities existing in a different world
apart from the concrete existents, whether this world is the Platonic or the mental
world. They are not objective substances as weil as subjective categories; they
simply exist as long as the being deserves to be qualified by such and such an
altributc. and do not exist if the thing is not qualified by such and such an attribute.
They are general because the 'illa as weil as being a defining quality is coextensive
(IIJUllll1"id), which means that it is applied to ail individual cases of the object for which
it was destined, and it is coexclusive. (mun'akis) which means that is excludes every
other case of an object withoutthis special 'illa.47
Despite the resultant similarity and difference in the flfSt sense (which is built

on Ihe allribules of Ihe identity of the thing). participation (:I/-mus/liimk:llIl is

viewed in al-Juwayni's case as bcing rcprcsented in Ihe general (lUkm. (qulliiticalionl.
in lerms of which mllny beings ure qUlllilied. Things can bc differcnt L'om eaeh
other in lerms of Iheir particulur essences, which are conslituted by virlue of the
essenlial allribules. BUI Ihings can participllle wilh each olher in the same !lUkm if
Ihey arc classilied under the sarne mll'n or 'illll. God is llbsolutcly distinguished bl'
His particulur idenlily but He participales wilh Zayd in the same /.Jukm by bcillg
knowing. Such a sla!emenl can bc similurly applied ta ail other bcings.
Il musl bc said herc Ihal, Ihe general /.Jukm docs nOI lead la Ihe abrogalion of
the differences bclween Ihe individual cases of applicalions. i.e. God is knowing
and Zayd is knowing. These Iwo proposilions cannat be underslood in Ihe same way:
ralher, Ihe same /.Jukm Ihal is applied la Gad and la Zayd implies a difference in
degree and maybc in nalure of Ihe mll'n of knowledge which is causing Ihe same
/.Jukm la bo prcdicaled bolh of Gad and of Zayd.
Afler elabomling upon the posilive aspecls of Ihe '$scnlial allributes (the
which delermine Ihe nalurc of Ihe essence of Gad and aflirm His particulur identily).
al-Juwayni cornes la Ihe negalive aspecls of Ihe essenlial allribules in order to
emphasize the differcnce of Gad l'rom ail olher bcings.
The negative essential attributes :
Under Ihe {II$/ "Whal il is impossible la say of Gad", aI-Juwayni lisls four
negalive altribules: 1. The impossibilily of describing Gad by Ihe allribule of
occupying space, 2. Gad, contrary la the Kaniimiyah, is nol a body, 3. Gad docs nol
conlain accidents, 4. Il is impossible for Gad la bc a substance.4K
Il is in Ihe conlexl of whal il is impossible la say of Go:!, aI-Juwayni \reat' Ihe
negalive allribules. He subsumes Ihese altribules under aJ-$iat al-nafsiyah la show
how Ihe essence of Gad is distinguished l'rom ail Ihe beings of the world of

64
generation, and to place emphasis on the ultimate transcendence of God. This in
spite of the fact that God's essence is viewed in the same context as the
determination of beings in terms of having (and being determined by) both kinds of
allributes (the essential and the mu'ni ones) and is seen as "participating a10ng with
generated heings in some of the affirmative allributes."49
God's essence must not he picturcd in any kind of rcprcsentational or eoncrcte
form. God, therefore, is not a substance, because God, as an absolutely pure and
transcendental heing, cannot he thought of as heing thrce fundamental characteristics
of substance:
1."God is elevated above occupying space and heing particularized in dimensions."so
The anthropomorphists (al-mushubiha) and al-Karramiyah were guided by the sura,
"The all-Compassionate seated Himself upon the Throne"(xx, 5) and held that God is
particularized in specific spatial dimensions. AI-Juwayni maintains, against such
heliefs, that
The heing who occupies space possibly adjoins other bodies, and every thing
adjoining other bodies can indispensably he either equal to their quant;ties or
equalto the quantities of their parts, or sorne sides of God adjoins them; 50,
cvery principle which leads to consideration of God as a quantity or to
portioning Him is an apparent infidelity.sl
ln contrast to al-Ash'ari, the founder of his school, al-Juwayni takes the
position of the Mu'tazilite school and interprcts the sura as a Iinguistic metaphor. By
isuwii' according to him, is meant domination and overcoming.s2
2. The second feature of "God is not a substance" is to he found in the unacceptability
of God's possessing a substrate of accidents. Since, depending on the basic source
in the kuliim, the very nature of accidents is to he found in their renewal and
generation, a1-Juwayni denies that God can possess a substrate of continuous
generation. According to a1-Juwayni every generated heing whatsoever, cannot

65
precede the things generated. If a generative process bclongs to God this slutement
wouId mean that God is also a generaled bcing.53
Beside lhe previous two negalive atlribules which ail dcny God is Il
substance. al-Juwayni also negates the bclief thut God is a body.54 Procecding from
his major concern. the complete difference between the Eternlll and pure Being IIml
Ihe generated world. al-Juwayni refules such Il Karrmiyan urgumellt by suying IIUlt:
The body is the compounded bcing. to speuk truly ... and if you [the speech is
directed to the Karriimiyan sect] name God as a body and affirm of Him the
realities of bodies. you face IWO choices: either to negate the proof of the
generation of the aloms. thal is, its struclure based on their acceplanee of
composition, juxtaposition and difference; or to generalize and decide the pronf
of the generation of the Crealor.55
Th =-=c=--.=af=fi=1lID=a=ti=o=n::.....::;o=-f--=kn=o=-w=in::cg'--=th=cc...;a=t=tr1=b=u=t""'cs:......:o=..f--,ma=.CiiJ.i=-.,_-=tl=.--,;taLsl:
ma:nBwtfab::
The attributes of ma'ini. in facto are considered to bc one of Ihe most imponant
pans in the ka/iim's literature. Because of them conllicts and cleavages took place.
Proceeding from a different understanding. each sect advanced its own view on the
issue of the unity of God. The real talV/,Jid. according to the mutakallimn. w a ~ b a ~ e d
on the method of treating the question of whether Ihe seven affirmative positive
attributes (life, will. power, knowledge. hearing. vision and speech) are identical
with God's essence (the Mu'tazilites ) or the ma'ini ure superadded to the essence (the
Ash'arites. and the Maturidies).
Al-Juwayni, who came after a long historical debate bctween the Mu'tazilites
and the Ash'arites, atlempted to reconcile their theories through adopting the more
convineing aspects of each view and avoidin1! other aspects that were the subject nf
hard criticism. He maintained his school's tradition in conlirming that the attributes-
$ifiit in its infinitive formulae such as knowledge. power,etc.- are ma'ini. But on the
other side, the essence which is attributed or caused by sueh ma'lini is called the

66
essence with uQwi ('u/ii uQwi). Or in other words, al-Juwayni harmonized the
theory of his school in ilS belief in mU'iini as allribules in the sense that they are
mu,\'iidir from wich the predicates can be derived; and the Mu'tazilite thinker Ab
in the theory of IIl,1wiil. The lheory which confirms that the prellicates of
God such as power. will. knowing. etc. are aspects of God's essence, states of the
essence ul,lwiilun iii dhiil. The major goal of al-Juwayni's adoption of the uQwi is to
create a method by which the relations among things that are based on sameness and
difference can he aClualized. That is to say. in affirming the uQwiil the upholders of
such theory affirm the essence and its additional By these additional aspects
which are inseparable from the essence the sameness and difference among things can
he realized. Al-Juwayni says:
What is convenient in terms of the III,1Wiil is that if we describe something in
existence. we therefore, affirm that it has. after its existence. attributes such as
the atom occupying space or accident such as knowledge, ignorance. will. or
power. These attributes are additional to existence for the people who affirm
the uQwi. and they are the same as the essences for the people who negate
them.s6
lt can .. said, then. that without admission the uQwi. the assemblage of
different things into one truth is impossible. which means therefore that "the negation
of l,li leads to the abolition of the mental causes and of ail the truthS."S7
ln dealing with the attributes of mll'iini al-Juwayni divides the chapter into two
parts: affirm knowing in the qualifications of attributes, II/-'ilm bi al,lkiim 1I/-$ifil,
and affirm knowing in the attributes that necessitate their qualifications. a1-$ifilll/-
mjibah Ji al,lkiimihii.ss By the first. al-Juwayni means the necessary predications that
one must affirm of God. since God positively must he predicated upon such attributes
as powerful. willing. knowing,etc. A1though most of the mUlakallimn agree on such
necessary propositions,s9 this part represents a controversial issue in the kll/iim,
particularly against those who reject the thesis that if it is possible to predicate the

67
altributes upon God. then His creatures can he so predicated too. Some philusophers
and helievers in the interiority (Bliniyah) say. for inslance. "we do not deserihc God
as existing, because in doing so. we would descrihe Him as heing similar to generaled
objects."60 Jahm b. ::;afwan, as weil, who was under I.he influence of Newplatonisl11
refuses to altribute God in the attributes by whieh others ean also he deserihed. such
as existent, living, knowing and willing.61
AI-Juwayni emphasizes the necessity of altributing to God positive und
affirming attributes, thereby eountering the so-called groups of al-mu'aliJah. people
who disallow the attribution to God of positive attributes.62
In this chapter. al-'ilm bi aMm al-$ifit. al-Juwayni discusses the Mu'tazilites in
the attribute of will. that both Ash'arites and Mu'tazilites agreed on the necessily of
ascribing willto God, they disagreed with each other about considering will elemal or
generated. AI-Juwayni argues against the Mu'tazilites with regard to the altribute of
will beeause of the different meanings given to such an attribute.63 Both agreed on the
proposition of "God is willing", but the meaning of such a proposition was subject to
rigorous Iilutual eriticism. While the Ash'arites believed that the will of Gad is an
etemal attribute Iike the rest of $ifit al-dht, the Mu'tazilites maintained that the
will of God is a generated attribute. God crt:;ated it in no substratum (l fi
ma{!all).64
AI-Juwayni discusses many veiws eonceming the proposition "God is willing",
he first Ab Qasim al-Ka'bi who says that God cannot he altributed
willing in the truth ('ali al-/,Iaqiqah), and of al-Na.ar who attributed Gad as willing in
a negative way: "the meaning of 'God is willing' is that He is not dominated and
overcome." 65 AI-Juwayni then presents his argument, the argument that is considered
as a development to the Ash'arites school's view in proving the etemity of will.
In contrast to the philosophers, the mutakallimn , as is weil known, believe that
Gad created the physical world out of nothing. a cosmological altitude was the

68
basis of division concerning Ihe altribule of Will among Ihe Mu'tazilites and Ash'arites.
For the Mu'lazilites, Ihe will of God is a generated allribllte. God produced His will al
Ihe lime of His decision to create Ihe world. The Ash'ariles, on Ihe olher hand,
mainlained Ihat Ihe allribule of will is elernal. Bul while a1-Ash'ari himself relied on
Ihe dialectical argumenl in order 10 prave Ihe elernily of God's will, he slill argues
that: "if the living being does nol will any Ihing, il is necessary Ihal il be allribuled 10
the inverse of will Ihrough infirrnilies such as absenl-mindedness, hated. elc."66 Al-
Juwayni defends the elernily of will in a different argumenl of his own invenlion,
holding thal Ihe elernal Will of God particularizes or specifies Ihe crealion al a
definile lime ralher Ihan others.67 According 10 a1-Shahrasliini, Ibn Rushd. and Luciani.
Ihe idea of specificalion had been invenled for Ihe first time by al-Juwayni,68 who
gave Ihe argumenl of the elernity of will new onlological aspeCls and momentum.
Saving Ihe freedom of God. al-Juwayni conlends Ihat God, the necessary Being
elernally possesses His attribute of will. and at a moment of His own chossing J.le
partieularizes (yukhll$i$) it in crealing the physical world.
The attributes that nccessitate their qualifications. (al-mt al mjibah li
!!b
1cim
;bs):
Wilh respecl 10 the attributes of ma'an al-Juwayni kepl 10 the traditional
allilude of Ihe Ash'arite school. wbich was persistence of the long time of thinking.
and great vareity of veiws. slarting with Ab al-Hudhayl. passing to Mu'ammar and Ibn
Kulliib. This tradition was always subject of justification and adaplation. A1-Juwayni,
in tum, presenled his own theory which is not meJ'l" reptition 10 bis maslers, al-Ash'ar
or al-Bqilliini. rather he reformulaled and reinvented the theory of ma'i in order to
make it more conveneint to bis other opinions Iike bis theory of states. That is,
according to him. Ihe seven affirrning attributes. in a simple statement. are ma'i
superadded to Ihe God's essence. BUI. in facl, al-Juwayni does not follow such a

69
tradition without adding sorne justifications. The method of dcaling wilh the
allributes of mu'Mi remains as it is: the being or Ihing acquires some of ils
characteristics by virtue of additional "entilies" which cause these features. Thal is,
al-Juwayni, though holding to the shape of the Ash'arite conception, pinces
emphasis on the logical aspect of this understanding. since for him the 1II/1"/ln; IIrc
not ontological entities. Rather they are, significantly, "mental causes" ('i/al
'aqlyah).69 such mental causes necessitate qualifications for their substratums (llJjihu
aMiiman li ma/;Jilliha). 70
AI-Juwayni, as representing the climax of the early Ash'arite kull1m, made
every effort possible to apply consistently the rule of qiyil$ al-ghil'ib 'ulil 11/-shiilJid 10
ail beings in the universe including God Himself. For him, every being in the univcrsc
has two kinds of determinations: the specifie ones, those which pertain pcrmanently
and absolutely to the being and determine its identity; and the determinalion Ihat
cornes from additional ma'iini. This laller kind of determination is not necessary in
terms of a existence of the being itself.71 The nature of the atom, for instance,
necessarily has its identity as a being occupying space and n:ceiving its accidents,
while such an atom can accidentally be at rest or motion only in ternIS of additional
ma'iini affecting il. ln other words. the essential allributes express the very essence of
being and reflect its truth in the way that it is. while the attributes of ma'l1Ii do not
have the same logical or ontological function; they do not express and do not manifesi
the truth of being as the essential ones do. A1-Shahrastiini explains this idea a.s follows:
We say. with respect to God, that He is the Eternal existent. subsisting in virtue
of Himself. rich. one. infinite in His existence and essence (dhilt). and allthesc
attributes belong to one truth; but to attribute to God the qualities of living.
knowing. being powerful. these belong to different truths and distinguishable
propertics. every one of which is particularized in a restricted aspect and truth.
and has;ts peculiar benefit. which il indicates. and its own nexus (muta'aliq).
So if truths differ from each other with respectto these aspects. then they differ
from each other in their essences and one of them cannot be instead of the other.
The reason. (a1-
t
aql) therefore. distinguishes these matllni in virtue of thesc
aspects...,so it is impossible for reason to combine different properties in one

70
truth.72
AI-Shahrastlli c1early distinguishes bctween the identity of a bcing as one truth
which identifies itself, and the superadded qualities that a bcing is entitled to or is
qualified to obtain on the basis of its pre-established essential existence. For, the
essential attributes manifest always the same truth, or definite bcing. Etemity cannot
be for any bcing but God, the accidents cannot exist except in the atom. However
knowledge, power, life, etc. can bc ascribed to many bcings; they express different
truths and entities; and this leads to the statement, according to the Ash'arites, that
what reflects different truths is not essential in any sense.
These ma'in are not objective ideas such as those of Plato, nor second
causes which are essences, such as those of the MusFm philosophers; rather, they are
mental entities, demonstrating and justifying the characterization of a bcing by this
or that kind of quality. These ma'in are absolutcly not essences and they do not have
in any sense the qualifications of the essences. Moreover, the ma'an cannot be
understood as being arranged in a vertical order in terms of causing one another,
in either the ontological (example of Plato) or logical (example of Aristotle) senses.
They are, rather, dealt with in a horizontal manner, and this is the chief departure
from Mu'ammar's theory.
Ma'an, then, ascribc to a bcing specific qualifications. A bcing is knowing
in whom knowledge resides, al-'iilim man qiima bibi aJ.'iJm. The knowledge as a
ma'na and as a "mental cause" ('illa) is inseparable from its caused object (ma'1l),
and it is not possible to assess one of them without the other.13 Our statements 'God
is knowing', and 'Zayd is knowing', cannot he true without assessment of the
knowledge as a cause causing such propositions. Likewise, it is not possible to
assess the knowledge without assessing ils substratum as a knowing being.14
This inseparable relation between cause and caused object must be understood,

71
as al-Ju\\'ayni constantly emphasizes, in the logicul context, und not in the
on\ological con''::<.t us the Mu'tuzilites ulwuys try to critsize the Ash'urites with.
That is, the necessituting, or the term cuusing," does not IIlcun th.1I
God is cuused to be attributed us knowing. AI-Juwuyni, in order 10 cl uri l'y snch
un importunt position distinguishes between whut is rehlted to the "quulificlllion"
(/,lUkm) and what is related to the "existence" (wujd), the lIlullcr which secms to
hpve misied the Mu'tuzilites.
For the Mu'tazilites, any being that oblains its attrihutes hy virtue nI'
something cise (for instance, the mu'iini) is a needy being lacking unolher cntity
in order to bestow upon it such attributes. God, however, because of His richness
docs not need anything else; it is impossible that He needs m'l'iini to get sOllle of His
attributes.
AI-Juwayni in the context of his rcsponsc. argues that the Mu'tazilites arc
confused: they mix up the "qualification" of necessity and possibility with the
neeessary and possible "existence." ln existence. God a necessary being cannut he
caused or affected by anything else. in contrast to generated beings; whereas, the
ma'iini necessitate only their qualifications (Cjibu al,Jkiimuha) and do not necessitate
either the existence or the essence of God. Al-t:l'Ii/ does not mean creation ur
innovation; rather. al-ta'lil means mental entailing (iqti/ii' 'aq/i). and the Irue
inherentness (al-tuliizum al-l,Jaqiqi). Necessity and possibility do no then prevent thc
understanding of the inherentness and entailment. So, accordingly. it is mcnlally
possible 10 cause ta'liJ. the necessary being by necessity and the possihle being by
possibility.7
4
The other argument that al-Juwayni raises against the Mu'tazilites is about
possibility and necessity. The Mu'tazilites contend that beings obtain their attributes
not in the context of: nafsiyah and ma'nawiyah, but in the context of:
necessity and possibility; that is to say. sorne of attributes belong to sorne beings

72
neeessarily while lhe same allribules belong 10 otber beings God is
knnwing by necessily. Zayd is knowillg in possible way. because in tbe case of God
we cannnt assume Gnd's bcing wilhout bcing knowing. whereas we can do so in case
nf Zayd, ln nlher words. a/ra'/il (or applying ma'an; as causes) according 10 Ihe
cannol be applied exeepl in lhe case of possibk Ihings. whereas in lhe
case of necessary Ihings ra' /il is nol .i1lowed.75
AIJuwayni replies lhal the meaning of knowledge necessilates ilS
qualification. is inberent in il. inseparable from il. and as sueb uucs nol serve as Ibe
relation bctween Ihe rower and ilS object. Furthermore. if we presuppose lbal Ihe
qualificalion occurs wlhoul a necessilating il. il is lile same as presupposing
a cause wilhoul necessilating ils qualificalion.76 This )rolds implieitly to positing
independent ma'iill; or enlities apart from Ibings or objects. an idea whicb wa;
completc1y rejected by the murnkallimn .
Moreover. the same qualification in God is knowing, Zayd is knowing. ducs
not mean in any sense that the cora.enl of such propositions is the same in buth cases.
The marna knowledge when is predicaled upon two different beings ducs not lead
10 the decision that these two beings have the same content of knowledge.71 God
and Zayd participate with each other only in the form of the I.JUkm, but each one
of them has his own knowledge in different content and context. God's knowledge is
comprehensive, universal. while Zayd's is Iimited. finite, conditioned.
AIJuwayni. in his allempt to generalize the law of qiytis al ghti'ib 'alti al shiihid. to
cover ail beings in the universe, relutes the Mu'tazilites' standpoint that trcats the
unity of God in an arbitrary way apart from ontologieal and logical laws.78
ln order to makc the fundamental law of "What is approved in al-shiihid
musl be applied to al-ghii'ib "79 contain ils full meaning, Our thinkcr POSils four
roles by which the application of the law of qiyiis al ghti'ib 'alti al shiihid in terms of
l'i!it al ma'iilli. can he absolutely true.

These four rules are as follows:

1. The cause. or the relation of eause and efreel. Ir it is del1lunslmted tlml the
bukm is caused by virtue of a cause ut the visible level. it is neeessury tu upply sueh
a bukm to bolh the visible and invisible levels.
2. The condition. the relation of the conditiun und eunditiuned. If the lil/km is
conditioned by virtue of u condition in the visible level. it is neeessury lu upply such u
relation to the invisible level. For instunce. the knowing tu he knowing he lIlust he
conditioned by virtue of a condition of life: this relutiun. thercfore. is truc in both
levels.
3. The truth. or definition of the relation of llUkm with the essence. If u truth
has been posited at the visible levei. it is necessary to el(tend this truth 10 the
invisible level. Concerning the trulh of knowing that it is a subjeet in wholll the
knowledge resides. al-Shahrastiini el(plains that
If the conditions of the definition are available und true the definiliun eall he
el(tended to all beings that deserve this definition: the definition of kllowing.
that one possesses knowledge (badd al 'iilirn annahu dhu ri/ml. of heing
powerful that one possesses power. and of willing that one possesscs a will....
it is necessary. therefore. to apply such definitions to the invisible levcl sinee
the truth does not differ at both levels.Ko
4. The sign. (al daliJ J. of the relation hetween the sign and what it symholi7.cs. If a
sign indicates an object. this indication must also he true on IWO levels. KI Our
predieate "knowing" indicates the marna of knowledge that resides in the knowing:
sueh an indication is true on hoth levels.
The bencfit {lf using ma'Bni:
By virtue of the theory of ma'iini. the Ash'arites in general and al-Juwayni in
particular were able to present their own solution to sorne problematic issues in the
ka/am, that is, the issues relating to attributes that have an ontological aspect. In otber

74
words, in Icrms of the unit y of God and His altributes sorne of God's altribules were
more central and /IIore focused than others. The imponance of such altributes
cornes fll1rn the nalure of these altrihutes. That nature consists of two aspects. The
:Iltrihules are will, knowledge, power and speech; each one of thern has two
dimensions, one belongs to the essence of God, the other is related to something
other Ihan Gad.
Based on their belief that the attribules of God are nol ma'iini, but God owns
such altrihutes by virtue of Hirnself (bi dlltihi or li dhiilihl), the Mu'tazililes were
confronted with one of two solutions: either to say that God used His will in the
eternal (which rneans that the world is eternal 100 because of the essential
connection bctween God's essence and His altributes), or to say that this attribute
is generated as is the altribute of speech. It is weil known that the Mu'tazililes
chose the second solution.
For the Ash'arites. will, knowledge, power and speech are not essenlial; rather.
they are ma'iini. They bclieved that these altributes are eternal ma'iini in one aspect
and temporal in the other. More precisely. these altributes pnain to God eternally.
but God used them at a definite moment in time, or God reveals their other
dimension with regard to the world and man.
As mentioned earlier. God's will is eternal in one aspect and temporal in the
moment of panicularization ( t a k h ~ i ~ ) in the other. As sreech. "the doctrine of
people of the trulh is that God speaks by vinue of eternal and bcginningless
speech."H2
Such speech is a ma'na subsisting in the God's Self. This aspect of speech is
neither lelters nor sounds. and the etemal speech connects (yata'allaqu) with
ail the abjects of speech though its unity. It is arder with the ordered abjects.
prohibition with objects prohibiled. news with objecls bcing lold. The speech
can bc joined ta ail renewed objects. without any renovation in Itself.83

75
Knowledge. power. and will share Ihe smne jllnclion in a\Jllwayni's
IInderstanding. That is. God's knowledge has Iwo aspects. as a 1lI11,"1II in its elerna\
IInily and in its nexus with generaled objecls; the same holds lrue for Ihe will lIIu\
power.s4
The chapter of discourse on the meaning of
hab al gawl fi maCinf asma""' Anib tacaIii:
The tapie of the meaning of God's names is considercd as Ihe fllndamenta\one
in the conflict bctween the Mu'lazilites and the Ash'arites. Ils importance cumes l'rom
the philosophical background of each group in conceptualizating ils view on the lInity
of Uod. Accordingly. this tapie refiects the justificatory and demonslralional aspecls
of each schoo\'s defence of this attitude ta the unily of Gad and His allriblltes.
Consistent with their belief that the attribules of Gad arc identica\ with His
essence and that at the same time. Gad is absolutely pure and nol compound. Ihe
Mu'tazilites were faced with a pcrp\exing alternative. that is. they had either tu
admit that our language about the attributes of Gad Gad Himself. which
means that Gad is approachable by our understanding. or la consider Ihat our talk
of Gad is merely human language and nothing more.
The Mu'tazilites. who held that language is human convenlion W.I
muwiila' ah). and does not include any myslical dimension. were "virtuaHy furccd
la treat the attributes formally as linguistic phenomena."s5 Abu 'Ali alJubba'i
explains this stand by saying "the act of attributing is the allribute (lI/wa$f huwa al
$ifah) and that the naming is the name. i.e.....when one wouId say. 'The Eternal is an
attribute'. he wouId say. 'That is wrong. for the Eternal is the thing describcd (al
while the attribute is our saying "Gad" and our saying "the
Etemal"."86
Meanwhile though the Mu'tazilites identified the attribute and the act of

76
amibuting wu the Ash'arites, who proceeded from a different
standpoint and wh" heId that the language is traditional and auditory (Iuwqi{ wa
J, and held that the allributes are lIIa'lini reside in the essence of God,
disCllnnected the allribute and the act of allributing. AI-Biiqilliini explains the
Ash'arites' allitude:
The allribute 1l1-$ifuh is the thing which exists in the object described (al-
.. and grants it the attributing (Il1.WU$f) that issues from the attribute...
The attributing is the saying of the attributor to God or to sorneone else that
He is knowing, living. powerful... Such attributing, which is heard speech or
statcmcnt about it. is other than the attribute which subsiMS in the essence of
God, that by virtue of which He is knowing, powerful and willing. Aiso our
saying 'Zayd is living, knowing and powerful' is an attributing of Zayd
and news about his being in the way that attributes entail him: such saying
can be trUe or false, but the knowledge and power of Zayd ltl'C twc attributes
existing in Zayd's essence since the act of uttributing issues from them.s7
Clearly, the Ash'arites distinguished between the attrib.Jte which lies beyond
our language and a kind of objective existence beside the being described itself.
and the act of attributing which is the effort of attributor. and expressed through
speech. Such speech can be wrong or right, while the described object with its
objective allributes remains the same apart from our linguistic attempts to
approximate il.
AI-Juwayni basicaJly maintained the same Ash'arite distinr.tion between the
allribute and the act of allributing. since "the attributing is the saying of an
allributor, huwu quwl aJ-wii$if J. and the attribute is the object indicated by
the attributing."ss AIJuwayni harshly criticized the Mu'tazilites' identification of the
allribute with the act of attributing and their belief that bath the nurne and the attribute
are the sayings of attributors. for Ihis would leads us to say that God has no nurnes
and attributes from the Etemity because "there is no saying from the Etemity. and
he who pretends that God in His Etemity has no attribute of Godness. he departs
from religion."s9

77
ln spite of his criticism, alJuwayni sharcs wilh the Mu'luzililes lheir helief lhul
language is a human convention (muwii/a'ah ).90 Il is neilher holy nor mysliclll. Ile
thus renects Il philosophical trelltment to the issue of the unily of God und lIis
lItlributes, smce if l:.e atlribute is li lhing indicllled by our lunguuge, slIch utlribllle is
/;liil and is not, as mentioned earlier, an objeclive entity which cunnol he suid lu he
eilher existent or nonexistenl.
The traditional attributes (al-sifft al-sam
c
iyah or li-khabarysJJ):
Once aguin, on this issue, a1-Juwayni a significant departure l'rom his
school. The issue of 1I1-$ifit aJ-khllbarYllh was a very controversiul point Ihut ul
Ash'ari strongly maintained against the Mu'tazilites, who did not uccept thcse
atlributes as they arc, and interpreted them otherwise. AIAsh'ari maintains that u/-$ililt
khllbaryah must he taken as they arc mentioned in the Qur'lin, withoUI inlerpretatiun
and (without asking how) (bilii kayf).9\ AI-Juwayni took the side of lhe Mu'tazilites
though he did not reject his master's attitude without reviewing il. AI-Juwayni c1early
reveals his stand by saying: "some of our masters helieved that hands, eyes and face
arc Iixed llttributes and they affirm it by way of tradilion rather than by reason, bul
the truth for us is that the hands means power, eyes sight and the face existcnce...J2
AI-Juwayni refused to accep t these completely anthrcpomorphic atlributes in
order to avoid any possibility of likening God to His creatures. In so doing he
rejected his school's stand a'ld took the position of their opponenls finding a
more intellectual view apart l'rom representational pictures.

78
1. Michel Allard, I.e des Attribut.. Divin.. dan la Doctrine d'alAsh'aTI
(Ileyrnulh: Imprimerie Calhulique, 1965), pp. 38485.
2. Ihid, p. 3ri5.
3. al-Juwayn), allrshiid iliI qawiili' aladillnh fi alj'tiqiId, ed. by: M. Y.Musii and A. A.'Abd
all;Iamld (Cairn: Ma,ba'alalKhunjl, 1950), p. 52.
4. Ihid. p. 52.
5. Ibid, \-. 61.
6. alShahra.-tlinl. 'Abd alKarlm. alMilal wa'i ni/lal. vol.l. ed. by: M.S. alKiliin). (Beirul: Diir al
Ma'rifah, n.d). p. 95.
7. Ibid, p. 82.
8. Ibid, p. 82.
9. Sayf alDln almidl. GhiIyat almnriim fi 'ilm alkaliim, ed: H. 'Abd alLa'if (Cairn: al
Majlis alNUi. 1971). p.30.
10. alJuwaynl. nJ-Shiimil fi aldin. ed. by: . alNashshiir, F.B. 'Awn and S.Mukhliir.
(Cairn: Munsha'al alMa'iirif. 1969). p. 294. 316. 320.
II. al-midl. GhiIyal. p. 28.
12. "IJuwayni. nJShiimil, pp. 31516.
13. alJuwaynl. allrshiid. p. 80.
14. a\midi, GhiIyal. p. 27.
15. alJuwaynl. nJShiimil, p. 629. 650, and a\midi. GhiIyal. p. 29.
16. alJuwayni. nJShiimil. p. 30.
17. Ibid. pp. 30-60.
18 . alAsh'nrl. MaqiI/iIl alis/amiyin wa ikhlilaf almu$allin. ed. by: H. Ritter. (Istanbul.
Weisb.len. 1929jj). p. 518.
19 . Ibid. p. 518.
20. Ibid. p. 519.
21. The Korin lnleeptelcd. lrans and inlro by A.L. Arberry (Oxford: Oxford University
Press. 1991). XXII. 1. p.333.
22. a\.Juwaynl. nJ-Shiimil. p. 124.
23. R. Frank. Aruibule, Aluibulon and Being: Th= lslamie views. In The Philosophies of
Existence. cd. by: l'.Norewcdge (New York: Fordham University Press. 1982) p.271.
24. a\.Juwayni. nJ-Shiimil. p. 124.
25. R. Frank. Allribelte. p. 269.

79
26. nl.luwnynl. n/frshiJd. p. 31.
27. Ibid. p. 31.
28. nlluwayni. n/frshiid. p. 32.
29. Ibid. p. 32.
30. Ibid. p. 32.
31. Ibid. p. 34.
32. Ibid. p. 34.
nlShnhrnslani. NihiIynr 1/;qdiIm fi ti/m n/kn/iIm. ed. by: A. Guillaume (lIl1ghdad: MlIklllhlll
nlMulhthl na. n.dl. p. 132.
34. nlluwnynl. n/Shiimi/.I'. 318.
35. Ibid. p. 320.
36. Ibid. p. 301\.
37. Ibid. p. 308.
38. Ibid. p. 292. nnd nfIrshiId. p. 34.
39. nfIrshiId.p.34.
40. Ibid. pp. 38-9.
41. nf-IrshiId. p. 35.
42. The universol in nJ-Juwnynl's view ennnoi he e1nbornted excepl in lerm.' of the pmp".iti"n.
the universnl is not on entity exisng nport from heing predicated upon in other WON'. III deal
with lhe common lerms. nccording 10 nl-Juwnyni. we hnve III .1.... fi::;l. Irom the lhing il.elf and.
second. to regard the predicnles thnt lhis thing gnins in the conleXI of nttribulion and. lhird. we have 10
seek the cnuse thnt is tI,e common term which cnused such predicalion 10 this thing nnd olher lhings.
43. nf-IrshiId. pp. 36-7.
44. nf-Shilmi/. ilp. 297-98.
45. nf-Irshlid.... 1'.83.
46. Josef Von Ess. "The LogicnJ Slruclure of Islamic Theology". in L08<' in CI..
Isfamie Cufrure. ed. by G.E. von Grunebnum. (Los Angcles: Univcrsity ofCalifomia. 1967).1'.39.
47. Ibid. 1'.39.
48. nfJrshIid, pp. 39-51.
49. Ibid. p. 39.
50. Ibid. 1'.39.
5J. Ibid. p. 40.

80
S2. Ibid, p. 40.
H Ibid, pp. 44-S.
Ibid, pp. 32-43.
SS Ibid, "p. 423.
S6. alSh5mi/, p. 630.
S7. Ibid, p. 633.
SR. al-Irshiid, p. 61.
S9. NiMyat ,p. 170.
60. alShiimi/, p. 31 R.
61. Maqii/iit, p. 4949S. a/Farq, p. 211-12, and a/Mi/al, 1,86.
62. The Mu'tazililes, mislakenly, arc accused or being mu'alli/ah, people who suspend
auributing posilive auributes to God, on the conlrar/, Ihe Mu'tazilites posilively affirm such
proposilions (alJkiim as: Gad is Powerfu', Knowing,etc, bUI they negate the view that the
a!tribules as ma'iini necessilate these propositions. Mu'alli/ah in ract must correctly bc those who
rcject even the posilive propositions (Gad is Knowing,elc), such as Jahm b.
63. alRiizi, afkiir al.mulaqaddimin wa'i muta'akhkhirin. cd. by: T.R. Sard. (Cairo:
Maktabat a)Kulllyat, 1323.h) p. 168.
64. al-Shahrastiint, NiMyat, p. 244.
6S. allrsMd, p. 63, and NiMyat, p. 238.
66. al-Ash'arI, K. a//uma' fi '1 rndd 'a/ii ahl a/-zaygh wa/bida'. In Theo/ogy ofa/-Ash'lUi. cd and
lmns by: R. McCanhy (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 19S2) p. 18.
67. a/-lrshiid, p. 64.
68. l;Iusiim al-AIOsi, l;Iiwiir bayn al-fa/asifah wal mutakallimin (Beirut, al-Mu'assasah al
'Arubiyah, 1980), p. 140.
69. allrshiid, p. 83, and a/Shiirni/, p. 642.
70. a/Sh5mil, p. 646.
71. al1rshiid. pp.S4-S.
72. Nihiiyat ,p. 193.
73. a/lrshiid. p. 88.
74. Ibid, p. 89.
7S. Ibid. p. 84.
76. NiMyat, pp. 183-84.

77. nllrshiJd, p. 85
78. Ibid, p. 89
79. Ibid. p. 85..
80. NiMynt. p. 190.
81.1rshiid, pp. 834.
82. Ibid. p. 98.
83. Ibid. p. 127.
84. Ibid, pp. 99-137.
85. R. Frnnk. Beings nnd Their Attribute.. (Albany: Siale Univ."ily of New Yurk. 1978) p.19.
86. Ibid. pp. 18-19.
87. nl-Bliqilllini, K. al-Iamh/d, pp. 213-14.
88.1rshiid. p. 141.
89. Ibid. p. 141.92. nllrshiid. p. 155.
JO. af-5hiimi/. p. 632.
91. AJ, Wcnsinck. The Muslim Crced (London: Cambridge Universily Press, 191>5). p.86.
92. afJrshiid. p. 155.
KI

Conclusion

Concerning the unity of God. al-Juwayni presents his conlribution us a

solulion 10 some issues which were points of connict among the lIIU1akallimulI . The
transcendental unily of God was the subjecl of heated discussion among Iheologians.
Il had been understood and inlerprcted from differenl points of view. The Mu'tilZilites
and the Ash'arites relied. dispite their differences. on the same prime grounds in the
ka/iim. Both disagreed with the exaggeration and the extremist positions taken by
some mutaka//imn in terms of cither elevating God above any possible positive
description (for example. Jahm b. $afwn) or depicting God Wilh very human
features (for example. Hishiim b. al-l;Iakam). The Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites were
troubled in creating a convenient formula for the nolion of the transcendent unity of
God in terms of its relation to the attributes. The Mu'tazilites. according 10 their bclief
that God is ttle only true being. werc disinclined to actualize this formula in a way Ihat
did not safeguard the unity of God apart from any kind of entities that might
accompao:y Him. whatever these entities might be. They thus differed from the
Ash'arites who weI':" seeking for a true explanation of the positive descriptiuns that
ought to be applied to God. This is because positive predicates. such a ~ knowing.
willing. being powerful etc., should be recognized as separ.lte qualifications thal arc
derived from their real infinitives. according to the logic of the Arabic language.
Even though the Mu'tazilites succeeded in formulating the true unity of God.
they were troubled when it came to explaining the logical aspect of the positive
attributes. and most of them. as we have seen, explained such positive allributes in
terms of the dialectical way, that is. they employed these predicates in on..cr either
to prove (ithbiit) the essence of God or to negate the opposite of Him. God. for
instance, is predicated as being powerful just to negate any kind of powerlessness (al-
'ajz) in Him. In their beHef in the ma'iIni the Ash'arites aimed to achieve two p o i n L ~ ,
the flfSt was. to purify the essence of God from any kind of admixture. That is to say,

84
in sellling on the ma'iini as bcing different from the essence, the Ash'arite s thought
that they had found the proper formula against the Mu'tazilites, who identified the
allributes with God's essence and thereforc mixed the essence with its attributes and the
allributes with each other, The second point is logical, namely, that the positive
predicates according to the Ash'arites arc derived from thesc ma'ini as bcing ma.,adir
appcrtaining in this way the philologists (ahl al-lughah),
The thcory of states invented by Abu Hashim came into view in order to treat
the problem of the positive allributes as predicates in propositions about God in
Mu'tazilite thoughl. With Abu Hashim the formula for these positive allributes had
changed. God is not qualilied as knowing, powerful etc. in virtue of Himself (bi
nll(sihi or bi dhiilihi), but He is qualified according the way that He is (Ji mii/lUwa 'alihi
fi nll(sihi).1 Abu Hashim admitted. then, prcdicates additionalto the essence: one who
knows tbe essence does not necessarily know the allributes of that essence. The
essence for Abu Hlishim possesses its state a an attribute stands behind its existence as
an essence1
The theory of states in fact remedied the problem of the positive attributes in
Mu'tazilite thought that was a subject of criticism from other schools such as th:
Ash'arites and the Maturidies. But the problem of derivation of u.ese attributes still
remained without a prc!lCr answer. Otherwise. the Ash'arites who believed in the
mll'ini as ma:;adir subsisting in God's essence still suffered from their opponents'
criticism that they associated other etemal entities with God .
AI-Juwayn in his effort to overcome these obstacles emphasized two points.
The first one is about the ma'ini. He strongly stresses that these ma'ini arc intellectual
('lIqliyah) and stand a causes for the derived prcdicates of Gad. These ma'iini arc not
entities exi,! Ilg in the extemal world, nor arc they metaphysical causes Iike the
intelligences of the philosophers. nor does Gad lack them as attributes. They arc only
mc:ntal existents without which we cannot justify logically the propositions about Gad.

The second poinl is to be found in al-Juwayni's adoplion of the theory of stutes

in order to emphasize once again thal thc prcdicales of God are uspccts of Him known
separately from the essence but thatthey do nol el(ist 'lpUrt from il.
The importance of al-Juwuyni's theory of Ihe unit y of God COllles, on Ihe one
hand. from being shaped und formulated on the b'isis of how the Ash'urite school
invested Ihe whole kalm's heritage and ail the mulak'lllimun 's contributions in the issue
of the unily of God. On the olher hand. al-Juwayni's theory represented il trunsitionul
slage belween Iwo pcriods in Islamie Iheological discourse. We can say thui. tirstly, with
al-Juwayni Ihe kaliim's discourse succeeded in reforming itself and tinding rcmedies to
Ihe problems encountered by Ihis discourse. secondly. and in terms of this development
the kaliim's diseourse was faced with other questions cmcrg:ng from thc nature of the
atomic view that bound this discourse.
For the first major problem. the nature of the relation betwcen the cssence and its
attributes. al-Juwayni surpassed both the Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites in dealing with
it. He felt that remaining in the traditional discussion about whether the allributes arc
identical with the essence or not would not lead to any propcr exit. As a consequence,
he shifted the vocabularies and c o n c e p t ~ that were means of treatment for hoth
schooIs and replaced the notion of 'identification' with the notion of inherence (.1/-
ta/zum). The attributes of God. according to him, el(isting as permanent and
inseparable aspects. Ol'e innate and ingrained; they are absolutely indispensahle.
pertaining to the essence of God, God being as such by his very nature in the highest
sense.
These attributes are of two kinds. renecting two kinds of trulhs as weil. The !irst
kind. though it is expressed by many words, points to one truth that is the essence of
God. Our saying Etemal does not indicate a truth different from that indicated by
saying Subsisting by virtue of Himself. The same is true of saying that God is
Everlasting (biiqin). as He is beginningless.

116
Naturally, inasmnch as these attribules indicale one truth, und us particularil.cll
to one essence. they ure essentially inhercnt with thut essence. their occurrcncc
connected substantially with the essence. They ure not, if the essence is nut, lhey are
inherent in the essence as long as the essence exists. In other words they arc nol causcd
by any kind of causes.
The second kind of attributes, expresses many different truths. Knowledge is
not the same as will and power; speech is differcnt from life. These uttributes indiculc.
therefore. different truths and because of this these aUributes cannot essentiully
embody the very nature of God's essence. The essence must be one truth. pure,
uncompound, without corruption. as it is EtemaI.
Beside these two kinds of attributes, aI-Juwayni, as we have seen, ultimately
insisted upon the absolute identification between the essence and existence of God.
Existence is not an attribute of God. but God is the same a . ~ existence. God a . ~
existence itself could then be described as the Prime, the Etemal. unlimited by any
kind of places. subsisting in Himself. This Prime existence is not undetermined maUer;
it is, rather, pure existence. It is One in the sense of being completely simple.
Furthermore, aI-Juwayni apparently maintains that Gad as existence pnrticipates wilh
ail existents in the generated world in the attribute of existence.
A1-Juwayni argues against those who believe that such participation (eads to
admission that Gad is a subject of generation too. There are two kinds of existence:
One. Etemal, Uncompounded. Unlimited. the Origin and Creator of the other; the
second. limited. composite from atoms and accidents. occasioned in time and thus
generated. The relation between these two kinds of existence. determined through the
attributes of macw. or more specifically. the world as being created, is a result of
particularization of the attribute of will. The will of Gad is Etemal in one aspect and is
connected. in terms of the notion of specification (al.talch$IJ), with the generated world
at a definite moment chosen by Gad. in the other aspect. Speech. as weil. is etemal

87
allribule in one aspect and determined in terms of leUers and words to he revealed to the
human heing in the other aspect.
As a rcsult al-Juwayni in his trcatment the problems of the ka/iim advances a
specifie understanding based on the same epistemological grounds as the ka/iim. He
derived his views an ultimate Iimits from what the Ash'arite ka/iim discourse couId
afford. In short, God is the existence itself, this existence has its essential attributes, it
is Eternal, Unlimiled, and Existent by virtue of itself, from which, and through the
pnrticulnrization of the attribute of ma'nii, which is the attribute of will, the generated
world emerged. The attributes of maCjjni are mental (CaqJiyah), causing the positive
prcdicates which are additional aspects to God's essence, through which God can he
involved in the various relations of similarities and differences with the rest of
existents.
This understanding, produced by a1-Juwayni in order to remove the obstacles in
the Ash'nrite ka/am, is contradicted by the epistemological ground in the ka/iim that
a1-Juwayni proceeded from. More precisely, the basic issues in the early ka/iim, such
as the notion that regards the whole universe as the sum of things, including God
Himself, and the methodological law that infers the invisible (a/-ghii'ib) from the visible
(a/-shifhid), would stand in contradiction to a new understanding that regards God as
the existence itself and the world as a result of the particulnrization of the attribute of
Will. The will is an aspect of God's essence. This contradiction hecomes valid in the
history of discourse when it reaches to a bigh degree its goals and therefore faces the
possibility of constructing a new strategy. The case with a1-Juwayn is the same. That
is, the philosophy of atomism or the philosophy of the universe as the sum of things
can no longer be a valid ground after the division of the universe into two kinds of
existence: the absolute unlimited existence etemaIly prior to ail other beings, and
the generated one, limited and compound. Ai-Juwayn bimself in bis Iater writings
avoided mentioning the atoms and their accidents as the constituents of the worId;

88
rather. he inclined to talk about the notion of world.)
This contradiction or crisis of Ash'urile discourse embodied in alJuwuyni's
thinking interprets purtly utleast the confused effort mude by his studcnl ulGhllzli 10
establish a coherent system. and interprets the destiny of the kali/III discourse in ilS
demanding uJliance with philosophy. us reprcsented by ul-Rz und ul-Ij.

89
1. 'Abd alJabh6r. Shurll a/k,humsuh. cd. by 'Abd alKarim 'Ulhm5n. (Cairo: Maktabal
WahbA. 1965I.P. 182.
2. 'Abd alKarlm alShahrasI5nl. K. a/milal walnibal. vol. \, cd. by Mubammnd Sayd al
Kiliinl.<Rcirut: D5r alMa'rifuh. n.dl. p.82.
3. R.M. Frank. Dodies and Aloms: The Ash'urile Analysis.ln Islamie Philosophy and Theo/ogy.
cd. M. Mannura. (Albany: Slale University of New York. Press. 1984). p. 402. And sec F. MubmDd.u1
Juwaynl: Imllm all;lurumaln. (Cairo: alHay'uh 1970). p. 196-202.

90
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