Fiori - Individual and Self-Interest in Adam Smith 2005

INDIVIDUAL AND SELF-INTEREST IN ADAM SMITH'S WEALTH OF
NATIONS
Stefano Fiori
L'Harmattan | « Cahiers d'économie Politique »
2005/2 n° 49 | pages 19 à 31
ISSN 0154-8344
ISBN 2747590690
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INDIVIDUAL AND SELF-INTEREST IN ADAM SMITH'S
WEALTH OF NATIONS1
Stefano FIORI2
Résumé : Individu et "self-interest" dans la Wealth of Nations de Adam Smith

Le but de cet article est de décrire la notion de "self-interest" et ses relations avec celle d'in-
dividu, considéré comme sujet économique, dans la Richesse des Nations. Le concept de
"self-interest" est analysé à travers trois différents points de vue qui en illustrent la com-
plexité. En outre, on démontre qu'il faut corriger la vision selon laquelle le "self-interest" est
un principe homogène et transparent, qui dirige les actions individuelles et spécifié par un
ensemble de caractéristiques partagées par la plupart des individus.
Summary: Individual and Self-Interest in Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations

The aim of this essay is to describe the concept of self-interest and show how it relates to
the idea of the individual as an economic agent, focusing only on Smith's Wealth of Nations.
Self-interest is analysed from three different perspectives that highlight its conceptual com-
plexity. The implication of the analysis is that modification must be made to the view that
self-interest is a homogeneous and transparent principle, able to guide individuals' actions,
and characterized by a set of features commonly shared by the majority.
Sintesi : Individuo e "self-interest" nella Wealth of Nations di Adam Smith

L'obiettivo di questo articolo è di descrivere la nozione di "self-interest" e le sue relazioni

con quella di individuo, considerato come agente economico, così come appare nella Wealth
of Nations. Il concetto di "self-interest" è analizzato attraverso tre diversi punti di vista.
Inoltre, si dimostra che occorre abbandonare la visione secondo la quale il "self-interest" è
un principio omogeneo e trasparente, che guida le azioni individuali, il quale sarebbe speci-
ficato da un insieme di caratteristiche condivise dalla maggior parte degli individui.
Classification JEL: B12, B31
Introduction
1. This article is based partly on Fiori (1992, 2001).

2. Assistant professor, Department of Economics "S. Cognetti de Martiis", University of Turin, via Po
53, 10124 Torino, Italy. Phone: +39 011 6702704, Fax +39 011 6702762, e-mail: ste-
fano.fiori@unito.it.
Cahiers d'économie politique, n° 49, L'Harmattan, 2005

Stefano Fiori
During the past thirty years, numerous studies have revised the traditional view
of Smith's economic agent as a mere self-interested individual, showing the close
connection between the Wealth of Nations (henceforth WN) and the Theory of
Moral Sentiments (henceforth TMS). Part of this debate has focused on the plurality
of motives that create individual behaviour in both the social and economic con-
texts, resulting in a consequent reinterpretation of the Smithian economic agent. In
addition, Smith's moral philosophy has been reinterpreted in order to understand the
emergence of institutions, and theoretical figures like the "impartial spectator" and
the "prudent man" have been considered in order to gain a more comprehensive
view of human behaviour. Nonetheless, the recent literature has also pointed out
some theoretical differences between TMS and WN, even though such analytical
revision does not constitute a contemporary version of das Adam Smith Problem3.
Bearing this general context in mind, the limited aim of this essay is to analyse
some questions about the individual as an economic agent, exclusively focusing on
the WN. In particular, this essay will consider the concept of self-interest, empha-
sizing the following three different points of view:
1) the features of the individual in a modern commercial society connoted by

the division of labour;
2) the idea of "self-interest" as it relates to each social group. The assumption
is that individuals assume (and perceive) their own interest from the view-
point of their reference social group;
3) self-interest as a persuasive argument that characterizes exchange processes.
The thesis of the essay is that the idea of self-interest exhibits a certain degree
of complexity, that self-interest is not the main incentive that drives human eco-
nomic behaviour, and that this idea, generally shared in the Smithian literature,

clearly emerges from Smith's economic discourse. In fact, the first two analytical
problems (points 1 and 2) show that self-interest is neither a transparent principle
for individuals who are able to guide their actions correctly nor does it exhibit a set
of features commonly shared by the majority. Given this limited context, I shall not
examine how other moral "sentiments" or motives (for example, benevolence) could
oppose, curb, or balance self-interest.
All this implies that self-interest coincides neither with the principle so fre-
quently invoked in the liberal tradition (especially during the nineteenth century)
nor with the concept usually used in economic theory as an explicit (or implicit) as-
sumption for maximizing utility. In fact, it will be shown that Smithian individuals
are not the best judges of their own "interest," and this sheds light on their hypo-
thetical disposition "to improve" their condition. Finally, according to this view, the
3. In this regard, Vivienne Brown (1994) has stressed the difference between TMS and WN, respec-
tively, in terms of "dialogic" and "monologic" discourse. But see also Witzum (1998). Some reflec-
tions on the recent Smithian literature can be found in Raffaelli (1996), Tribe (1999), and Peil (1999).
20
Individual and Self-Interest in Adam Smith'sWealth of Nations
lack of a shared notion of interest points to some important problems concerning the
capacity of the market to realize a spontaneous order that is able to increase public
wealth.
1. Division of labour and individuals' "disintegration"
The first problem is linked with the possibility of individuals' abilities to con-
serve their "undivided personality" in a generic society that is organized by the divi-
sion of labour. As is well known, the term "division of employments" appears in
Book I of the WN4. The transition from the primitive age that preceded the division
of labour to the subsequent one can be interpreted as a generic phase in which indi-
viduals lost their original "undivided personality." This was necessary in order to at-
tain social and economic development. In fact, before the division of labour, all
individuals could discover and exercise their human faculties by applying them-
selves to any kind of activity. After the division of labour this was no longer possi-
ble, and personal faculties were, so to speak, separated from individuals and
gathered together in "social spaces" (those of specialized "professions") defined by
the division of labour. Smith also describes this process in terms of available time
for individuals:
"A shepherd has a great deal of leisure; a husbandman, in the rude state of
husbandry, has some; an artificer or manufacturer has none at all. The first
may, without any loss, employ a great deal of his time in martial exer-
cises; the second may employ a some part of it; but the last cannot employ
a single hour in them without some loss, and his attention to his own in-
terest naturally leads him to neglect them altogether" (WN, V.i.a.15).
Thus, the more the division of labour advances, the more the time available to

the individual for multifarious activities decreases (and correspondingly the indi-
vidual's intelligence decreases). There is no space for dividing one's time between
productive and unproductive labour, in which the latter corresponds to the "martial
exercises," activities that become a specific form of work (for example, that of the
soldier). Moreover, as the quotation shows, this process delineates the sequence of
the last three stages of society: pasturage, agriculture, and commerce (because, evi-
dently, the division of labour is almost nonexistent in the first stage, which is based
on hunting). It also means that the more societies evolve from one stage to another,
the more their complexity and their internal division of labour increase.
In short, before the division of labour, any activity was a direct manifestation
of personal faculties; after it, activities lost this distinctive feature. They were so-
cially organized and, I repeat, they were gathered together in different "social
spaces" (the spaces of employment, which is external to individuals), which gave
4. See also Smith (1978) and Meek and Skinner (1973).
21
Stefano Fiori
them new shape and ruled them coherently with the logic of the division of labour
(cf. Fiori and Pesciarelli 1999).
This was the first phase of the "disintegration" of the individual (Hont and Ig-
natieff 1988, p. 8). Intellectual labour, for instance, was now an activity undertaken
by specific groups (scientists, philosophers, etc.) and not the direct manifestation of
individual intelligence. This was the fundamental condition for the growth of social
knowledge and corresponding to it was the reduction of individual intellectual ca-
pabilities (Rosenberg 1965). Evidently, this condition was strictly connected to the
technical division of labour by which means further divisions were achieved in or-
der to increase productivity. Moreover, the principle of the division of labour al-
ways exhibited its properties homogeneously and the technical division was
conceived as an extension of the division among professions (WN I.i.2).
In Smith's view, this situation reflects the famous contrast between "barbarous
societies" (of hunters, shepherds, and the "rude state of husbandry") and commer-
cial societies. In the former, intelligence is connected to the possibility of individu-
als' exercising abilities, "invention," and creativity by means of "varied
occupations" (WN V.i.f.51). In the latter, on the contrary, Smith (referring to labor-
ers, or more precisely to the "greater part of those who live by labour, that is, of the
great body of the people" – WN V.i.f.50, emphasis added) says, "the life is spent in
performing a few simple operations" (WN V.i.f.50), and men become "stupid and
ignorant"5.
In sum, the "disintegration" of individuals can be observed in two processes:
First, the division of labour, as a general principle, which in precapitalistic ages

introduced a simple "division of employments" and reorganized and included per-

sonal faculties in social spaces. The more this process advances, the less these facul-
ties are the free manifestation of human abilities, but rather obey the rules that are
separated from individuals. Of course, every age has experienced a division of la-
bour (WN I.ii.3); consequently, the process by which individuals are separated from
their faculties assumes greater importance the more the division of labour is a fun-
damental characteristic of a market society.
Second, the technical division of labour, which emerges clearly in modern

manufacturing, denotes a more profound level of individual disintegration. It re-
duces human capabilities, which are not solely separated from agents but undergo a
process of fragmentation (in fact, work becomes a set of a "few simple operations").
5. This theme, well known in the Smithian literature, is linked to that of the loss of "martial spirit,"
that is, the "civic" spirit that links individuals to their community. With reference to the models of an-
cient Greece and the Roman Republics cf. WN V.i.f.56-60. For a wider contextualization of these top-
ics see Pockok (1975) and Vivenza (2002).
22
These arguments raise a number of questions: How do individuals (as divided

entities) in a market society really know what their own "interests" are? Does the
condition of partiality influence their knowledge of self-interest? Can they possess
a shared view of self-interest? Are economic agents really the best judges of their
interests? In rude societies - Smith says – "[e]very man […] can form a tolerable
judgment concerning the interest of the society" (WN, V.i.f.51), but this is not so in
a market society6.
2. Self-interest and social groups
This topic can be further analysed by considering the role of the individual as a
member of a social class.
The thesis sustained is that each "order of society" (labourers, capital owners,
and landlords) exhibits (and acts in consequence of) a specific view of its specific
interest. This latter seems to mould individual interest, which emerges through a
process whereby agents assume the point of view of their reference groups, so that
collective perspectives determine subjective ones. In particular, these various no-
tions of self-interest (which social groups embrace) are not convergent. Conse-
quently, people do not share a common concept of personal "interest." Moreover,
the inclination to improve one's personal condition7 acquires different meanings
based on the distinctive features of each social group. Finally, these meanings ex-
plain why each class is characterized by different choices and behaviours.
First, Smith affirms that "every improvement" in market society increases rents
and wages. Nonetheless, both landlords and labourers are unable to recognize the
close connection between their real "interest" and "the general interest of society"
(WN I.xi.p.1-8)8. Their "real interest" consists of improving their personal circum-

stances in terms of private wealth. But, Smith remarks, both social groups fail to
perceive the difference between their "real interest" and their subjective (or per-
sonal) one. The latter generally leads them astray from the correct way to improve
their condition. The dichotomy between real interest and the subjective perception
of one's own interest is very important, because the first term represents the ideal
principle that should direct individual choices and the latter is the motive that actu-
6. The role played by "opinion" (and "judgment" of the people), how it relates to both public matters
and politics, and how a peculiar notion of interest emerges is dealt with in Winch (1978, pp. 168-9).
Cf. also Skinner (1992, p. 150).
7. In the Smithian literature, the concept of interest is connected with (and sometimes identified as)
the "uniform, constant, and uninterrupted effort of every man to better his condition" (WN II.iii.31).
See also WN III.iii.12, WN IV.ix.28, and WN IV.v.b.43.
8. In these pages Smith explains that rent increases in direct result from improvements in cultivation
and "with the increase of the produce," and this is related to the "improvement in the circumstances of
the society." As for labourers, "wages […] are never so high as when the demand for labour is con-
tinually rising" (WN I.xi.p.9).
23
Stefano Fiori
ally determines individual decisions in the economic arena, although it usually pro-
duces erroneous agent performances9.
The reasons for this dichotomy are described in terms of structural conditions
that connote both classes (landlords and labourers). In short, the difference between
real and subjective interest is not a mere temporary "visual illusion"; on the con-
trary, it is rooted in the historical and functional roles fulfilled by each social class.
In fact, Smith maintains that the landlords often do not possess a "tolerable knowl-
edge" of their real interest. This latter is not mere ignorance; instead, it mirrors
structural (and historical) features of landowners. Consequently, Smith writes,
"That indolence, which is the natural effect of the ease and security of
their situation, renders them too often, not only ignorant, but incapable of
that application of mind which is necessary in order to foresee and under-
stand the consequences of any publick regulation" (WN I.xi.p.8, emphasis
added).
Even in modern commercial society, landowners, who are the heirs of feudal
landlords, maintain "that indolence" that impedes them from understanding their
real interest. This indolence is rooted in a material condition of life connoted by
"the ease and security of their situation."
Consequently, they conceive their own interest as lying in increased consump-
tion, instead of increased wealth. This means that the subjective representation of
their self-interest prevails over the "real" one. Only the former guides the choices of
landlords as economic agents. The same propensity for consumption led the great
proprietors to exchange their entire surplus and their power "for a pair of diamond
buckles" (WN III.iv.10). Finally, the contrast with the merchants sheds further light
on these phenomena:

"A merchant – Smith says - is accustomed to employ his money chiefly in
profitable projects, whereas a mere country gentleman is accustomed to
employ it chiefly in expence" (WN III.iv.3).
Once again, subjectively different notions of interest produce divergent plans

and decisions: for landlords their interest coincides with increasing consumption,
for merchants with increasing profits.
9. Some authors have emphasised the role of the subjective perception of self-interest, although often
not in analytical terms. See, for example, Viner (1927, p. 133) and Winch (1978, p. 167). In particular,
like many Smithian scholars, Winch stressed that self-interest is determined by a number of motives in
addition to the pecuniary ones (e.g., honour, vanity, social esteem, love of ease, love of domination,
etc.).
24
Similar considerations apply to labourers, who are prevented by their material

circumstances from distinguishing real from subjective interest. As a consequence,
Smith maintains,
"though the interest of the labourer is strictly connected with that of the
society, he is incapable either of comprehending that interest, or of under-
standing its connection with his own. His condition leaves him no time to
receive the necessary information and his education and habits are com-
monly such as to render him unfit to judge even though he was fully in-
formed" (WN.xi.p.9).
From this quotation one can infer that
1) self-interest is neither transparent nor well-defined for the labourer: he is

"incapable" of understanding how his self-interest is connected to the gen-
eral interest. This hypothetically implies that such a condition may prompt
him to act contrary to his "real interest";
2) the labourer lacks "the necessary information." This can be considered as a
consequence of his structural position in the system of the division of la-
bour, which shapes his entire life and determines his partiality as human be-
ing;
3) Finally, the labourer is "unfit to judge [the connection between private and
public interest] even though he was fully informed." His "divided personal-
ity" implies that the problem does not merely concern the amount of infor-
mation. In fact, additional information would not change his inability to
understand the external world10.
All this implies, as Smith himself affirms, that the labourer as an economic

agent is certainly not the best judge of his own self-interest.
Capital owners, as is well known, are the exception compared with the previ-
ously identified social groups. They know their self-interest and consequently, at
first glance, there is almost no difference between their real and subjective percep-
tions of interest. The former, in fact, coincides with the endeavour to improve their
circumstances in terms of increasing private wealth, so that the "merchant ‘coher-
ently' is accustomed to employ his money chiefly in profitable projects" (WN
III.iv.3); he follows the "principle of turning a penny wherever a penny was to be
got" (WN, III.iv.17). Therefore, the "better knowledge of their own interest" (WN
I.xi.p.10) defines the "superiority" of capital owners over both "country gentlemen"
and (implicitly) labourers. But the interest of capital owners "is always in some re-
10. The cases of both landowners and labourers show that failures of self-interest as the guide for de-
cision making depend neither on "an error in logic" nor on "imperfect knowledge" (which appears as
"incomplete factual information"), as argued by Stigler (1975, pp. 245-6). In both cases, in fact, the
social class structure determines landowners' and labourers' preferences and decisions.
25
Stefano Fiori
spects different from, and even opposite to, that of publick" (WN I.xi.p.10)11.
Hence the capital owners' clear notion of self-interest implies the possibility of an
improper use of such knowledge from which selfish behaviour may derive. This en-
genders a new problem. In order for (real) self-interest to allow action by the "in-
visible hand," it must be consistent with the public interest. Smith, in fact, considers
the growth of private and public wealth to be an essential condition for market or-
der. If the capital owners' behaviour is selfish, the "optimal" market order fails and
economic agents increase their wealth, damaging the public12. The gains of selfish
merchants are losses for other individuals because free competition is altered. Con-
sequently, in this case, too, the subjective notion of interest (the selfish view) guides
(as in previous cases) the concrete choices of agents (merchants). The selfish inter-
est prevails over the real (and appropriate) one. The latter involves the correct ex-
ploitation of opportunities and an ability to invest capital in the most profitable
branches of industry. It implies proper behaviour in the economic arena and enables
the "invisible hand" to act correctly. In contrast, the subjective selfish interest of
merchants prevails over the ideal one, in which the term "ideal" denotes an "inter-
est" that is able to generate a harmonious coherence between private and public
welfare.
However, it should be pointed out that the subjective view of personal interest
of landowners and labourers depends on a lack of understanding of what the real in-
terest is. This means that there is no choice among alternatives. However, in the
case of capital owners, this does not happen, and they are able to choose between
two options (selfish or proper, self-interested behaviour). Nonetheless, the main
problem remains: the subjective view prevails over the real one and determines
agents' decisions. This is an assumption that also applies to action by the "invisible
hand": "every individual" pursues "his own interest," and it is not his intention to
"promote" social welfare (WN IV.ii.9). Even well-informed agents do not consider

how their choices modify public wealth. Consequently, in "optimal" conditions, the
"invisible hand" brings about the convergence of both private and public welfare,
although this does not occur if agents do not follow their "real" interest and act self-
ishly against the public interest. In short, with regards to capital owners, knowledge
of the general interest is not a condition that is able to influence their decisions be-
cause the public (general) interest is achieved unintentionally by the "invisible
hand." Like the other agents, they act in accordance with their personal views, aims,
and preferences.
Finally, as in the case of the previous social groups, the structural position of
capital owners is an essential determinant of the representation of their private in-
terest. More specifically, their superior knowledge with respect to that of the other
11. "To widen the market and to narrow the competition is always the interest of the dealers" (WN
I.xi.p.10).
12. Additionally, "Smith went on to argue that the individual in the pursuit of his own interests should
do so in a way which respects the interests and needs of others" (Skinner 1992, p. 143).
26
classes, in most cases, prompts them to refer to the selfish view when forming their
decisions.
We can synthesize the themes previously discussed as follows.
1) The "real interest" - that is, the propensity to better one's own condi-
tion by increasing private wealth - is not, in many cases, a transpar-
ent notion for economic agents;
2) Economic agents, given their structural and social position in mar-
ket society, choose and exhibit preferences according to a subjective
view of their own interest, which generally does not coincide with
the ideal one (real interest);
3) The concept of subjective interest is not homogeneous among
agents. The functional position in market society, in terms of class,
profoundly influences this perception;
4) This argument assumes importance when considering "the great
body of the people" that lives by labour, whose human "disintegra-
tion" impedes it from having a correct perception of its "real inter-
est."
3. Self-interest as persuasive instrument
Given these premises, it is evident that no transparent and shared notion of "in-
terest" really guides the choices of economic agents. Nevertheless, a further argu-
ment requires examination. What happens in usual transactions, when individuals
exchange something with the "butcher," the "brewer," or the "baker"? The thesis
sustained here is that a fundamental role is performed by persuasion and not simply
by self-interest.

A classic interpretation of the apologue of the "butcher," the "brewer," or the
"baker" has depicted Smith as a theoretician of self-interest, although numerous
studies have demonstrated that his "moral" view essentially modifies this narrow in-
terpretation.
In a famous passage, Smith remarks that a human being needs the "help of his
brethren," so that
"it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be
more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and
shew them that it is their own advantage to do for him what he requires of
them" (WN I.ii.2, emphasis added).
To invoke "only" benevolence in a market context is not a persuasive argu-

ment. On the contrary, according to Smith, the strategy consists in a) addressing the
other agents' "self-love in his favour" and b) showing "them that it is their own ad-
27
Stefano Fiori
vantage to do for him what he requires of them." At first, both actions do not re-
quire the agent to be selfish; rather, Smith points out, the first step of the persuasive
strategy consists in showing the other parties of the transaction what their self-love
consists of, and, particularly, what advantages they will obtain from the exchange.
We start not from our self-interest (or self-love) but from others' self-interest (al-
though we are "interested" in accomplishing a certain transaction).
Once again, "self-love" (as well as self-interest) is not a transparent principle.

Why should other agents be shown their self-love? If self-interest were perfectly
known, no reason would prompt an individual to show others either self-love or the
advantages derived from a given exchange. Everything would be perfectly known
before the transaction. On the contrary, personal "interest" must emerge as a conse-
quence of the exchange relationship. It is not the premise but the conclusion of the
process.
The persuasive element also emerges in the following sentence:
"Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this.

Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want" (WN
I.ii.2).
The economic relation must not be rationally selfish; instead, it must be per-
suasive, because the aim of both parties is to obtain precise advantages, and this en-
tails discovering what their reciprocal interest is.
This point was well made in Lectures on Jurisprudence (henceforth LJ(A)), in

which Smith argued:

"If we should enquire into the principle in the human mind on which this
disposition of trucking is founded, it is clearly the natural inclination
every one has to persuade. The offering a shelling, which to us appears to
have so plain and simple a meaning, is in reality offering an argument to
persuade one to do so and so as it is for his interest" (LJ(A), p. 352, em-
phasis added).
In my view, the context just sketched permits reinterpretation of the famous

apologue of the "butcher" and the relative argument about benevolence:
"It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker,
that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We
address ourselves, not to their humanity, but to their self-love, and never
talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages" (WN I.ii.2,
emphasis added).
28
The same theme recurs on another occasion. Smith does not claim to be selfish,
but instead points out that the persuasive strategy is to show others their "own inter-
est" because it is not transparent to them. On the contrary, benevolence is not a
good means of persuasion in the market13.
As shown, there are a number of reasons why the notion of self-love/self-

interest is not evident to the eyes of economic agents. Their subjective perception
differs considerably from what Smith calls individual's "real interest." Conse-
quently, addressing the "advantages" of landlords is very different than addressing
those of capital owners. The views of personal interest to which they refer are pro-
foundly different, and this implies that different strategies of persuasion must be
used.
13. All this, evidently, does not mean that ethics disappears from the economic discourse.
29
Stefano Fiori
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Fiori - Individual and Self-Interest in Adam Smith 2005

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INDIVIDUAL AND SELF-INTEREST IN ADAM SMITH'S WEALTH OF

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Résumé : Individu et "self-interest" dans la Wealth of Nations de Adam Smith

Summary: Individual and Self-Interest in Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations

Sintesi : Individuo e "self-interest" nella Wealth of Nations di Adam Smith

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Classification JEL: B12, B31

1. This article is based partly on Fiori (1992, 2001).

Cahiers d'économie politique, n° 49, L'Harmattan, 2005

1) the features of the individual in a modern commercial society connoted by

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1. Division of labour and individuals' "disintegration"

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4. See also Smith (1978) and Meek and Skinner (1973).

In sum, the "disintegration" of individuals can be observed in two processes:

First, the division of labour, as a general principle, which in precapitalistic ages

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Second, the technical division of labour, which emerges clearly in modern

These arguments raise a number of questions: How do individuals (as divided

2. Self-interest and social groups

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Once again, subjectively different notions of interest produce divergent plans

Similar considerations apply to labourers, who are prevented by their material

From this quotation one can infer that

1) self-interest is neither transparent nor well-defined for the labourer: he is

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We can synthesize the themes previously discussed as follows.

3. Self-interest as persuasive instrument

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To invoke "only" benevolence in a market context is not a persuasive argu-

Once again, "self-love" (as well as self-interest) is not a transparent principle.

The persuasive element also emerges in the following sentence:

"Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this.

This point was well made in Lectures on Jurisprudence (henceforth LJ(A)), in

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In my view, the context just sketched permits reinterpretation of the famous

As shown, there are a number of reasons why the notion of self-love/self-

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Brown V. (1994), Adam Smith's Discourse. Canonicity, Commerce and Conscience,

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