Ripso 231 0093

AFFECTIVE BIASES IN LIKELIHOOD PERCEPTION: A POSSIBLE ROLE OF
EXPERIMENTAL DEMAND IN MOOD CONGRUENCE EFFECTS
Sasa Drace, François Ric, Olivier Desrichard
Presses universitaires de Grenoble | « Revue internationale de psychologie sociale »
2010/1 Tome 23 | pages 93 à 110

ISSN 0992-986X
ISBN 9782706116285
Article disponible en ligne à l'adresse :
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
https://www.cairn.info/revue-internationale-de-psychologie-
sociale-2010-1-page-93.htm
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
© Presses universitaires de Grenoble | Téléchargé le 31/07/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 105.68.177.4)

Distribution électronique Cairn.info pour Presses universitaires de Grenoble.
© Presses universitaires de Grenoble. Tous droits réservés pour tous pays.
La reproduction ou représentation de cet article, notamment par photocopie, n'est autorisée que dans les
limites des conditions générales d'utilisation du site ou, le cas échéant, des conditions générales de la
licence souscrite par votre établissement. Toute autre reproduction ou représentation, en tout ou partie,
sous quelque forme et de quelque manière que ce soit, est interdite sauf accord préalable et écrit de
l'éditeur, en dehors des cas prévus par la législation en vigueur en France. Il est précisé que son stockage
dans une base de données est également interdit.
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)

RIPS / IRSP, 23 (1), 93-110 © 2010, Presses universitaires de Grenoble
Affective Biases in Likelihood Perception:

A Possible Role of Experimental Demand in Mood
Congruence Effects
Influences de l’affect sur la perception des probabilités : un possible rôle de la
demande expérimentale dans les effets de congruence
Sasa Drace*
François Ric**
Olivier Desrichard*
Abstract Résumé Key-words

Mood congruence,
Studies have found that positive Des travaux montrent que l’humeur likelihood estimates,
moods are associated with more positive est associée à des estima- naïve theories,

optimistic likelihood estimates than tions de probabilités plus opt i experimental demand
are negative moods. However, it is mistes que l’humeur négative. On Mots-clés
still unclear whether these effects peut toutefois se demander dans Congruence à
can be attributed to the direct influ- quelle mesure ces effets sont attri- l’humeur, estimations
de probabilités,
ence of mood and to which extent buables à l’influence directe de théories naïves,
they could be at least partially l’humeur ou bien s’ils peuvent au demande
explained in terms of application of moins partiellement être expliqués expérimentale
naïve theories. In Experiment 1, we par l’application de théories naïves.
observed mood congruence-like Dans l’Expérience 1, nous obser-
effects among participants who vons un effet de congruence affec-
were simply asked to apply their tive chez les participants qui ont
naïve theories regarding the effects pour tâche d’utiliser leurs théories
of mood on likelihood estimates. naïves concernant l’influence de
Experiment 2 revealed that mood l’humeur sur les estimations de
congruence effects (moods being probabilités. Dans l’Expérience 2, la
manipulated) were obtained only congruence affective est observée
when participants were not (l’humeur étant manipulée) unique-
constrained to respond honestly. ment lorsque les participants ne
When participants gave their esti- sont pas contraints de répondre
mates under bogus pipeline, they honnêtement. Lorsqu’ils répondent
no longer showed mood congru- sous bogus pipeline, l’effet de
ence effects. These findings suggest congruence disparaît. Ces résultats
*Université de Savoie, LIP EA4145, BP 1104 – 73011, Chambéry, France. Tel : +33 (0)4 79 75
91 24. E-mail: dracesasa@hotmail.com ; olivier.desrichard@univ-savoie.fr
**Université de Poitiers et CeRCA, UMR CNRS 6234, 99, avenue de Recteur Pineau, 86000
Poitiers; E-mail: francois.ric@univ-poitiers.fr
Revue internationale de psychologie sociale 2010 n° 1
93
RIPS_1_2010.indd 93 10/06/10 11:04:33

that experimental demand could be suggèrent que la demande expéri-
a plausible explanation for some mentale pourrait s’avérer une expli-
mood congruence effects observed cation plausible des effets de
in the laboratory on likelihood congruence observés sur les juge-
judgments. ments de probabilités en labora-
toire.
T hree decades of research suggest that moods have a perva-

sive impact on our judgments and color them in a congruent
way. Such effects have been observed in a variety of domains
including attitude objects (e.g., Mayer, Gaschke, Braverman, &
Evans, 1992), judgments about people (e.g., Forgas & Bower,
1987), the self (Sedikides, 1995), or the perception of future
events (e.g., DeSteno, Petty, Wegener, & Rucker, 2000; Johnson &
Tversky, 1983).

The latter association has been observed repeatedly both with
natural (measured) and manipulated moods. For example, Mayer
and colleagues measured existing mood and found it correlated
in a congruent manner with the perception of likelihood of desir-
able and undesirable future events (Mayer & Bremer, 1985; Mayer
et al., 1992; Mayer, Marnberg, & Volanth, 1988; Mayer & Volanth,
1985; see also Forgas & Moylan, 1987). Similar effects were
obtained when mood was manipulated. In a well-known series of
studies, Johnson and Tversky (1983) found that participants who
previously read a story that induced a negative mood were less
optimistic concerning the risks of various causes of death than
participants from a control group. In contrast, participants who
had previously read a story inducing a positive mood were more
optimistic. These findings have been replicated with the use of
various mood induction techniques such as hypnotic suggestion
(Wright & Bower, 1992), imagination (Costans & Mathews, 1993)
and Velten’s mood induction procedure (MacLeod & Campbell,
1992).
Two main explanations have been offered to accounts for these

findings. The associative network theory (Bower, 1981) posits
that moods activate congruent material in memory that is later
used to interpret incoming information. As a result, participants
Affective biases in likelihood perception
94
RIPS_1_2010.indd 94 10/06/10 11:04:33

in a positive mood perceive their environment in a more opti-
mistic way. Another explanation, the affect-as-information model
(see Schwarz & Clore, 2007), holds that people rely on their affec-
tive states as a source of information regarding the global status
of their environment (Schwarz, 1990). That is, the experience of
a positive affect informs people that their environment is safe
whereas a negative affect indicates that the environment is prob-
lematic. Thus, a positive affect would promote optimism whereas
a negative affect would lead to pessimism. Even though Bower’s
and Schwarz’s explanations are divergent about the involved
mediating mechanisms (i.e., mood as priming vs. mood as infor-
mation), they both hold that the affective state is the factor
causing the mood congruence.
We suspect however that these effects can be triggered by situa-

tional demand. Researchers have indeed frequently used highly
explicit and direct mood induction procedures. Explicit mood

induction procedures such as Velten’s procedure, story, hypnosis,
or imagination (see Kenealy, 1986; Larsen & Sinnett, 1991; Martin,
1990; Westermann, Spies, Stahl, & Hesse, 1996) may have made
participants especially focused on the goal of the study which in
turn could have led them to comply to the perceived situation
requirements (e.g., experimenter’s demand) by relying on their
theories about the expected effects of mood on likelihood judg-
ments (Orne, 1962). For instance, in the studies by Johnson and
Tversky, before they complete the judgment task the participants
were asked to indicate “how they would feel if they had read
upsetting or elating mood induction stories in their local news-
paper” (p. 23). Therefore, the participants may have surmised
that the researchers were examining the relationship between
mood and judgments and have thus adjusted their estimates to
comply with the assumed research hypothesis.
Research on mood-congruent recall has revealed findings consis-

tent with such a hypothesis. Mood congruent recall has been
found to depend on participants’ awareness that the study was
about the effects of mood (Parrott & Sabini, 1990) as well as on
participants’ attention to their mood (Rothkopf & Blaney, 1991).
When mood is manipulated in a subtle way, incongruent – rather
than congruent – mood recall occurs (Parrott & Sabini, 1990).
95
RIPS_1_2010.indd 95 10/06/10 11:04:34

Moreover, mood congruent recall has been observed just by
having participants apply their theories concerning the impact of
mood on memory (Eich & Macaulay, 2000; Perrig & Perrig, 1988),
in the absence of induced mood. In contrast, it has been shown
that mood congruence effects can be counteracted by instructing
participants before the mood induction that mood incongruent
recall will be expected (Alexander & Guenther, 1986). Thus,
these results suggest the operation of reflexive (or metacogni-
tive) processes in the occurrence of mood-congruent recall.
Given the bunch of evidence concerning mood-congruent recall,
it seems plausible that similar processes could take place in
mood-congruent judgment.
Yet, even though it has been demonstrated that people also

possess naïve theories about the impact of mood on judgment
(e.g., Isbell & Wyer, 1999), to date, it has not been shown that
application of these theories could be a sufficient condition for

the occurrence of mood congruent judgments. In the present
studies, we tested whether it is the case for likelihood estimates.
In a first experiment, we tested whether people possess naïve
theories about the impact of mood on likelihood judgments by
asking them to make likelihood estimates as they thought a
person in a happy (vs. a sad) mood would. Then, in a second
experiment, we tested the possible role of these theories in the
occurrence of mood congruence effect in laboratory context
when people’s mood was experimentally manipulated. To do so,
we included a “bogus pipeline” manipulation (Jones & Sigall,
1971) that was aimed at eliciting honest responding (for a review,
see Roese & Jamieson, 1993). Our reasoning was that if mood
congruence in likelihood judgments can be attributed to the
application of naïve theories in response to situational (e.g.,
experimental) demand, the effects of moods should be weak-
ened when participants were encouraged to respond honestly
(bogus pipeline condition).
Experiment 1
As stated above, individuals involved in mood congruence studies

may in some cases respond to situational demand (e.g., mood
manipulation) and then rely on metacognitive processes (e.g.,
96
RIPS_1_2010.indd 96 10/06/10 11:04:34

naïve theories) to simulate mood effects. In Experiment 1,
psychology students were asked to fill up a typical likelihood
questionnaire as they thought a person in a happy (vs. a sad)
mood would. We reasoned that if naïve theories were contribu-
ting to the explanation of some mood effects, it would require
people to be able to replicate the effects of mood classically
observed in the literature (e.g., Johnson & Tversky, 1983) by
simply relying on their knowledge about these effects. Therefore,
participants who are asked to respond as a person in a positive
mood should display more optimistic estimates than participants
asked to respond as a person in a negative mood should.
Method
Participants. Thirty psychology undergraduates (24 females;
mean age = 19.4, SD = 1.4) were volunteers to participate in the
experiment. The experiment took place in two groups of 15

students. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two
answering conditions and did not receive any reward for their
participation.
Measures
Likelihood estimates. The questionnaire assessing likelihood esti-
mates included eight positive and eight negative events issued
from previous research (e.g., Dewberry, Ing, James, Nixon, &
Richardson, 1990; Weinstein, 1980). The eight positive events
were to find a lost friend, to realize a childhood dream, to have a
good job, to have a salary greater than 3000 euros a month, to
own a beautiful house, to travel, to have children, and to make
new friends. The eight negative events were to be late for an
important exam, to contract AIDS, to become an alcoholic, to
have one’s driving license revoked, to be imprisoned, to be
excluded from the university, to have a car accident as a driver,
and to get divorced.
Participants provided likelihood estimates on a scale ranging

from 0% (not likely) to 100% (very likely). An optimism index was
calculated by subtracting the ratings obtained for negative events
(a = .93) from those obtained for positive events (a = .97).
Therefore, positive scores indicate that positive events were
97
RIPS_1_2010.indd 97 10/06/10 11:04:34

perceived as more likely than negative events and reflect opti-
mistic likelihood perceptions.
Mood. Considering the possibility that participants could put

themselves in the corresponding mood in order to know what
would be the estimates of a person in a positive (a negative)
mood, participants were invited to complete the Brief Mood
Introspection Scale (BMIS; Mayer & Gaschke, 1988) just after the
likelihood estimates. Participants had to rate on 4-point scales the
extent to which he or she was feeling at “the very moment” each
of the 8 positive (e.g., happy, lively) and 8 negative (e.g., sad,
gloomy) feeling states. A BMIS score was calculated by averaging
the evaluations on the 16 scales (evaluations for negative items
were reversed; a = .80)1.
Procedure. At the beginning of tutorial classes each student

received a sheet of paper bearing the instructions: “We will

present you a set of events. For each of the events you will have
to rate the likelihood that it will occur to you.” Before starting,
participants were instructed that: “This study follows up an
earlier experiment in which other psychology students have
completed the same questionnaire while being in a positive or in
a negative mood. Though you will undertake the same task, we
will make no attempt to alter your mood. Instead, “I would like
you to fill up this questionnaire as you think someone in a posi-
tive (negative) mood would.” Next, participants received the
likelihood questionnaire and then completed the BMIS.
Results
Participants who answered as a person in a negative mood
reported less optimistic estimates (M = -28.85, SD = 18.60) than
participants who answered as a happy person (M = 70.14, SD =
14.21), t(28) = 16.38, p < .001, h2 = .90. The mood measure
revealed no difference between the two instruction conditions
(Ms = 2.76 vs. 2.80), t < 1. Therefore, the effects of instructions
on likelihood judgments are unlikely to be attributed to partici-
pants’ self-induction of the corresponding mood.
1. Consistent with Mayer and Gaschke (1988), factorial analyses conducted on BMIS items
revealed in both studies a first factor explaining 30% of the variance and opposing positive
and negative items.
98
RIPS_1_2010.indd 98 10/06/10 11:04:35

Discussion
In line with prior work (Wegener & Petty, 1997), the results indi-
cate that people possess naïve theories concerning the impact of
mood on likelihood estimates and that they are able to use them
to produce patterns of data that are similar to those obtained
with induced moods. Consistent with the mood congruence
hypothesis, participants predicted that a negative mood should
lead to a less optimistic view of the world than a positive mood.
Importantly, these results were observed in the absence of
instructions on participants’ mood, suggesting that participant’s
judgments were not mediated by their current (self-induced)
mood. Thus, these results corroborate and extend to the judg-
mental area previous findings indicating that the beliefs
concerning the impact of mood on memory play a role in mood
congruent recall (Alexander & Guenther, 1986; Eich & Macaulay,
2000; Perrig & Perrig, 1988) and thus question the role of mood

per se in the production of mood congruent judgment.
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 showed that people possess naïve mood-congruence

theories concerning the influence of moods on likelihood esti-
mates and that an application of these theories can be a sufficient
condition for the occurrence of mood congruence effects.
Experiment 2 was designed to test whether people also apply
their naïve theories about the impact of mood on judgment when
the situational demand is far more subtle. In this experiment,
participants were put in a positive or in a negative mood before
they filled up the same likelihood questionnaire as in Experiment
1. However, depending on the condition, half of the participants
completed the questionnaire following a bogus pipeline manipu-
lation. Our hypothesis was straightforward: If the mood
congruence effects could be attributable to the application of the
participants’ naïves theories in order to conform to the experi-
menter’s demand, mood congruence effects should be weakened
when participants complete the task under bogus pipeline. In
contrast, if the effects are due to the spontaneous mood
influence, the results should remain unchanged whether partici-
pants are under bogus pipeline or not.
99
RIPS_1_2010.indd 99 10/06/10 11:04:35

Method
Participants. Seventy psychology undergraduates (53 females;
mean age = 19.4, SD = 1.41) took part to fulfill a course require-
ment. Six participants expressed suspicion about the lie detector
story and their data were excluded from the experimental
sample, leaving a total of 64 participants in the experiment.
Mood induction procedure. We used the combined Mood

Induction Procedure (MIP) that associated two non-verbal MIPs:
a “Musical MIP” (e.g., Niedenthal & Setterlund, 1994) and a
“Pictorial MIP” (e.g., Bradley, Cuthbert, & Lang, 1996). Participants
viewed a series of pictures from the International Affective
Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1995). On the
basis of pretest in which participants rated a set of IAPS items (1
= negative; 9 = positive), we selected 26 pictures for the nega-
tive mood condition (M = 2.3, SD = 0.37, range 1.8 to 3.2) and
26 pictures for the positive mood condition (M = 7.3, SD = 0.32,

range 6.7 to 8.1)2. Because previous research has demonstrated
that music can markedly enhance emotional experience evoked
by IAPS slides (Baumgartner, Esslen, & Jancke, 2005), we paired
the slides with music selections. While viewing pictures, partici-
pants heard music selections that have been proven to induce
reliable mood states (Niedenthal, Halberstadt, & Setterlund,
1997; Niedenthal & Setterlund, 1994). Participants in the positive
mood condition heard selections from Mozart’s Eine Kleine
Nachtmusik and Divertimento op. 136, and Vivaldi’s Mandolin
Concertos. Participants in the negative mood condition heard
selections from Mahler’s Adagietto.
The mood manipulation procedure was intended to completely

engross participants’ attention. To this end, we presented the
music and pictures to participants via a virtual reality helmet (VFX
3D) connected to a computer fitted with high quality stereo
headphones and two small screens (0.7”) with liquid crystal
display.
2. The specific pictures we used are as follows. Positive mood: 1460, 1463, 1610, 1710, 1721,
1750, 2057, 2070, 2080, 2091, 2165, 2304, 2311, 2340, 2341, 2345, 2360, 2530, 2550, 2660,
5779, 5780, 5982, 7580, 8370, 8420. Negative mood: 2205, 2710, 2750, 2900, 3180, 3220,
6212, 6213, 6530, 6550, 6570, 9000, 9041, 9050, 9220, 9280, 9415, 9421, 9520, 9560, 9611,
9630, 9830, 9910, 9911, 9920.
100
RIPS_1_2010.indd 100 10/06/10 11:04:36

Measures
Mood manipulation check. Participant’s mood was assessed
with the BMIS (a = .80).
Likelihood estimates. Likelihood estimates were measured with

the same questionnaire as in Experiment 1. Again, scores for
negative events (a = .72) were subtracted from those obtained
for positive events (a = .80).
Procedure
Participants took part individually and were randomly assigned to
one of the four conditions of a 2(Mood) x 2(Bogus pipeline)
between participants factorial design. The experimenter described
the research as examining eyewitness testimony. We told partici-
pants that the experiment would consist in three stages. They
were told that that they would first view a series of pictures

(viewing stage). Instructions emphasized that participants should
attend carefully to the pictures because their memory would be
tested at the very end of the session. Participants then learned
that the experiment included a distraction stage between the
presentation of the picture and the memory test and that, in this
distraction stage, they would have to fill up a series of allegedly
unrelated questionnaires. The ostensible purpose of this stage
was to simulate real-world eyewitness identification situations in
which times passes and thoughts are diverted from the stimulus.
Participants were instructed that their memory for the pictures
would be tested thereafter in an identification stage. The experi-
menter added that the participants would hear music throughout
the session in order to isolate them from environmental noises
and to facilitate concentration on the pictures.
Mood induction. After the participants had indicated that they

had understood the procedure, they donned the virtual reality
helmet and the mood induction procedure was started. Each
picture remained on the screen for 15 seconds and was followed
by a black screen for 5 seconds. The end of the viewing stage was
indicated by a white screen.
Mood manipulation check and likelihood estimates. Then,

participants received the booklet including the BMIS and the
101
RIPS_1_2010.indd 101 10/06/10 11:04:36

likelihood estimates questionnaire. Participants in bogus pipeline
condition were connected to a MP 50 amplifier (Biopac Systems,
Inc., Santa Barbara, CA) by two electrodes placed on the palm of
their non-dominant hand. They were informed that they were
connected to a lie detector and that dishonest response would
affect their arousal level and would thus be detected by the
machine. Moreover, the experimenter further explained that only
participants whose responses at the end would be proven to be
honest could get the credits for participation. Participants in no
bogus pipeline condition were not connected to any machinery
and did not receive particular instructions.
Identification test. At the end of the experiment, participants

viewed a series of 10 negative and ten positive pictures. For each
picture category, half of pictures have been presented during the
mood induction phase whereas the other half have not. The
purpose of the identification stage was to ensure that the partici-

pants have paid attention to the affective material. All the
participants correctly identified the pictures they had seen during
the mood induction stage. When they had finished, the partici-
pants were thanked and debriefed.
Results
Mood manipulation check. The BMIS scores were submitted to
a 2 (Mood: positive vs. negative) x 2 (Bogus pipeline: present vs.
absent) ANOVA. This analysis revealed an effect of mood, F(1, 60)
= 66.63, p < .01, h2 = .53, with participants in negative mood
condition reporting being in a more negative mood (M = 2.26,
SD = 0.30) than those in positive mood inductions (M = 2.84, SD
= 0.28). The same was true for main effect of bogus pipeline, F(1,
60) = 4.28, p < .05, h2 = .07. Participants reported less positive
mood when under bogus pipeline (M = 2.47, SD = 0.43) than
when not (M = 2.62, SD = 0.40). However, the Mood x Bogus
pipeline interaction was far from significance (F < 1) indicating
no differentiable effects of mood induction in the two bogus
pipeline conditions.
Effects of mood on likelihood estimates. To examine whether

mood influenced participants’ judgments, the optimism scores
were submitted to a 2(Mood valence: negative vs. positive) x
102
RIPS_1_2010.indd 102 10/06/10 11:04:36

2(Bogus pipeline: present vs. absent) ANOVA (mean optimism
scores are presented in Table 1). The Mood x Bogus pipeline
interaction was significant, F(1, 60) = 5.16, p < .03, h2 = .07. No
other effect reached significance, all Fs < 1. The control (no
bogus pipeline) condition revealed a mood congruency effect,
F(1, 60) = 4.38, p < .05, h2 = .07. This effect did not occur in the
bogus pipeline condition, F(1, 60) = 1.25, p = .27.
Table 1:
Mood induction
Mean optimism scores
Negative Positive and standard deviations
M SD M SD as function of mood
induction and bogus
Bogus pipeline pipeline manipulation
Absent 33.0 19.4 46.8 16.4 (Experiment 2).
Present 40.1 18.5 32.7 20.1
Discussion
The results of the present study reveal that mood can bias likeli-

hood estimates in a mood congruent way, thus replicating
previous findings (Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Wright & Bower,
1992). However, we went one step further by showing that these
effects only occur when participants were not encouraged to
respond honestly. When constrained to respond honestly by a
bogus pipeline procedure, participants no longer exhibit mood
congruence effects. These results thus suggest that mood-
congruent judgment could be due to the application of naïve
mood theories in response to experimental demand, at least in
our experiment.
General Discussion
In the present paper we tested whether mood congruence

effects could be partially explained by experimental demand
characteristics. Consistent with this hypothesis, Experiment 1
showed that participants were able to simulate mood congruence
effects in a likelihood estimation task when just asked to answer
as a person in a positive vs. negative mood would. Experiment 2
extends these findings by showing that mood-congruence effects
do not occur when people are constrained to respond honestly.
In sum, it can be concluded from these set of studies that people
possess naïve theories concerning the impact of moods on judg-
103
RIPS_1_2010.indd 103 10/06/10 11:04:37

ment (Exp. 1) and that they may purposely apply these theories
in order to conform to the situational (e.g., experimental)
demand (Exp. 2).
The results of Exp. 2 are particularly at odd with a semantic

priming explanation (Blaney, 1986; Mayer, Gayle, Meehan, &
Haarman, 1990). According to this theoretical position, the
effects of mood should be the same whether participants were
constrained to respond honestly or not. It is difficult from this
point of view to explain why mood-congruence effects disappear
when participants are encouraged to respond honestly.
It could be argued that the absence of mood effects under bogus

pipeline was due to participants’ attempt to “correct” for their
mood bias (Wegener & Petty, 1997). When people are motivated
to make accurate judgments, they can correct for mood influ-
ences by adjusting their judgments in the opposite direction of

the assumed mood influence. We believe that this interpretation
is unlikely to be true in the present experiment because partici-
pants in the bogus pipeline condition were instructed to be
sincere and honest, not to be accurate. Therefore, it is difficult to
understand how such a motivation to be sincere could have led
to correction effects in this situation. Moreover, in order to
explore this hypothesis further, we have analyzed the correla-
tions between participants’ self-evaluation on BMIS and optimism
scores independently for the control and bogus pipeline condi-
tion. If participants in the bogus pipeline conditions have
corrected their estimates on the bases of their mood then we
should observe a negative relation between optimism and their
self-reported mood. However, we observed a positive correla-
tions between BMIS and optimism scores in the control condition
(r = .32, p < .08) but no correlation in the bogus pipeline condi-
tion (r = -.02).
Although a correction bias seems unlikely to account for our

results, the bogus pipeline procedure produces specific unex-
pected effects. We observed that the participants in the bogus
pipeline condition reported a more negative mood than partici-
pants who were in the control condition. Thus, one may propose
that the bogus pipeline procedure has canceled out the effects of
positive mood induction. This explanation appears unlikely since
104
RIPS_1_2010.indd 104 10/06/10 11:04:37

mood induction still influenced participants’ self-reported mood
in the bogus pipeline condition and this effect was somewhat
stronger than in the control condition. There is however another
explanation for the main effect of bogus pipeline on participants’
mood: people tend to report more positive moods that they
effectively experience. Expressing positive emotions is indeed
perceived as socially desirable (e.g., Harker & Keltner, 2001).
Thus, it is possible that the use of the bogus pipeline has led
participants to be honest and to attempt to report their current
feelings more accurately than it is usually the case in mood
studies. Yet, we acknowledge that our findings should be repli-
cated with the use of other methods. This could be accomplished
by informing some participants of the hypothesis, or by assessing
the extent to which participants are aware of the hypothesis. If
the experimental demand is a valid explanation, then the mood
inductions should have a stronger effect on likelihood estimates
among participants who believe that the study is about the effects

of mood.
It is worth noting that we found striking differences between the

effects we observed with induced moods and when participants
were asked to simulate mood effects. Indeed, the mood congru-
ence elicited by simulation was stronger than the effect evoked
by actual mood. This quantitative difference suggests further that
in real mood studies, mood-congruence effects could be partially
due to participants that are demand prone and that could exag-
gerate their estimates by relying on their naïve theories. Thus, it
would seem important to develop devices to check participants’
proneness to experimental demand.
Taken together, these findings suggest that the experimental

demand can be considered as a plausible explanation for effects
of mood on judgment, at least on some occasions. It is of course
worth noting that, by writing this, we were not intended to totally
discard the role of affective states on cognitive processes and
judgments. Indeed, recent research found mood effects even
when participants are clearly not aware of the manipulation and
thus of the demand. For instance, Ruys and Stapel (2008) found
that subliminally induced mood (measured both with direct and
105
RIPS_1_2010.indd 105 10/06/10 11:04:38

indirect measures) produced expected effects on subsequent
information processing.
Therefore, rather than denying mood influence on cognitive

processes, we would like to suggest that a portion of effects of
this kind can be explained by experimental demand, especially
when the link between mood and the measures at hand is partic-
ularly salient and when people possess naïve theories they can
rely on to provide a satisfying answer. This conclusion echoes the
one offered from other research on the role of mood on memory
(Alexander & Guenther, 1986; Eich & Macaulay, 2000; Perrig &
Perrig, 1988) and advocates for the use of more sophisticated
procedures and designs in order to really appreciate the direct
effects of mood, and of affective states in general, on cognitive
processes and on social judgment in particular.
References

Alexander, L., & Guenther, K. R. (1986). The effect of mood and
demand on memory. British Journal of Psychology, 77, 343-350.
Baumgartner, T., Esslen, M., & Jancke, L. (2005). From emotion
perception to emotion experience: Emotions evoked by pictures
and classical music. International Journal of Psychophysiology,
60, 34-43.
Blaney, P. H. (1986). Affect and Memory: A Review. Psychological
Bulletin, 99, 229-246.
Bower, G. H. (1981). Mood and memory. American Psychologist,
36, 129-148.
Bradley, M. M., Cuthbert, B. N., & Lang, P. J. (1996). Picture media
and emotion: Effects of a sustained affective context.
Psychophysiology, 33, 662-670.
Constans, J. I., & Mathews, A. M. (1993). Mood and the subjective
risk of future events. Cognition and Emotion, 7, 545-560.
DeSteno, D., Petty, R. E., Wegener, D. T., & Rucker, D. D. (2000).
Beyond valence in the perception of likelihood: The role of
emotion specificity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
78, 397-416.
106
RIPS_1_2010.indd 106 10/06/10 11:04:38

Dewberry, C., Ing, M., James, S., Nixon, M., & Richardson, S.
(1989). Anxiety and unrealistic optimism. Journal of Social
Psychology, 130, 151-156.
Eich, E., & Macaulay, D. (2000). Are real moods required to reveal
mood-congruent and mood-dependent memory? Psychological
Science, 11, 244-248.
Forgas, J. P., & Bower, G. H. (1987). Mood effects on person
perception judgments. Journal of Personality and Social
Forgas, J. P., & Moylan, S. (1987). After the movies: The effect of
mood on social judgements. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 13, 467-477.
Harker, L., & Keltner, D. (2001). Expressions of positive emotion
in women’s college yearbook pictures and their relationship to
personality and life outcomes across adulthood. Journal of

Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 112-124.
Isbell, L. M., & Wyer, R. S. (1999). Correcting for mood-induced
bias in the evaluation of political candidates: the roles of intrinsic
and extrinsic motivation. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 25, 237-249.
Johnson, E. J., & Tversky, A. (1983). Affect, generalization, and the
perception of risk. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
45, 20-31.
Jones, E. E., & Sigall, H. (1971). The bogus pipeline: A new para-
digm for measuring affect and attitude. Psychological Bulletin,
76, 349-364.
Kenealy, P. (1986). The Velten mood induction procedure: A
methodological review. Motivation and Emotion, 10, 315-335.
Lang, P. J., Bradley, M., & Cuthbert, B. (1995). International affec-
tive picture system. Gainesville, FL: Center for Research in
Psychophysiology.
Larsen, R. J., & Sinnett, L. M. (1991). Meta-analysis of experi-
mental manipulations: Some factors affecting the Velten mood
induction procedure. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
17, 323-334.
107
RIPS_1_2010.indd 107 10/06/10 11:04:38

MacLeod, C., & Campbell, L. (1992). Memory Accessibility and
Probability Judgments: An Experimental Evaluation of the
Availability Heuristic. Journal of Personality and Social
Martin, M. (1990). On the induction of mood. Clinical Psychology

Review, 10, 669-697.
Mayer, J. D., & Bremer, D. (1985). Assessing mood and affect-

sensitive tasks. Journal of Personality Assessment, 49, 95-99.
Mayer, J. D., & Gaschke, Y. N. (1988). The experience and meta-

experience of mood. Journal of Personality and Social
Mayer, J. D., Gaschke, Y. N., Braverman, D. L., & Evans, T. W.

(1992). Mood-congruent judgment is a general effect. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 119-132.

Mayer, J. D., Gayle, M., Meehan, M. E., & Haarman, A.-K. (1990).
Toward better specification of the mood-congruency effect in
recall. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 26, 465-480.
Mayer, J. D., Marnberg, M. H., & Volanth, A. J. (1988). Cognitive

Domains of the Mood System. Journal of Personality, 56,
453-486.
Mayer, J. D., & Volanth, A. J. (1985). Cognitive involvement in the

mood response system. Motivation and Emotion, 9, 261-275.
Niedenthal, P. M., & Setterlund, M. B. (1994). Emotion congru-

ence in perception. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
20 (4), 401-411.
Niedenthal, P. M., Halberstadt, J. B., & Setterlund, M. B. (1997).

Being happy and seeing „happy“: Emotional state mediates visual
word recognition. Cognition and Emotion, 11, 403-432.
Orne, M. T. (1962). On the social psychology of the psychological

experiment: With particular reference to demand characteristics
and their implications. American Psychologist, 17, 776-783.
Parrott, W. G., & Sabini, J. (1990). Mood and Memory Under

Natural Conditions: Evidence for Mood Incongruent Recall.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59 (2), 321-336.
108
RIPS_1_2010.indd 108 10/06/10 11:04:39

Perrig, W. J., & Perrig, P. (1988). Mood and memory: Mood-
congruity effects in the absence of mood. Memory and Cognition,
16, 102-109.
Roese, N. J., & Jamieson, D. W. (1993). Twenty years of bogus

pipeline research: A critical review and meta-analysis. Psychological
Bulletin, 114 (2), 363-375.
Rothkopf, J. S., & Blaney, P. H. (1991). Mood congruent memory:

The role of affective focus and gender. Cognition and Emotion,
5, 53-64.
Ruys, K. I., & Stapel, D. A. (2008). How to heat up from the cold:
Examining the preconditions for (unconscious) mood effects.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94, 777-791.
Schwarz, N. (1990). Feelings as information: Informational and

motivational functions of affective states. In E. T. Higgins & R. M.

Sorrentino (Eds.), Handbook of motivation and cognition:
Foundations of social behavior (vol. 2, pp. 527-561). New York :
Guilford Press.
Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (2007). Feelings and phenomenal

experiences. In E. T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social
psychology: Handbook of basic principles (pp. 385-407). New
York : Guilford Press.
Sedikides, C. (1995). Central and peripheral self-conceptions are

differently influenced by mood: Tests of the differential sensitivity
hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69,
759-777.
Wegener, D. T., & Petty, R. B. (1997). The flexible correction

model: the role of naive theories of bias in bias correction.
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 29, 141-201.
Weinstein, D. (1980). Unrealistic optimism about future life

events. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39,
806-820.
Westermann, R., Spies, K., Stahl, G., & Hesse, F. W. (1996).

Relative effectiveness and validity of mood induction procedures:
a meta-analysis. European Journal of Social Psychology, 26,
557-580.
109
RIPS_1_2010.indd 109 10/06/10 11:04:39

Wright, W. F., & Bower, G. H. (1992). Mood Effects on Subjective
Probability Assessment. Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 52, 276-291.
110
RIPS_1_2010.indd 110 10/06/10 11:04:39

Ripso 231 0093

Transféré par

Informations du document

Titre original

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Ripso 231 0093

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

AFFECTIVE BIASES IN LIKELIHOOD PERCEPTION: A POSSIBLE ROLE OF

EXPERIMENTAL DEMAND IN MOOD CONGRUENCE EFFECTS

Sasa Drace, François Ric, Olivier Desrichard

Presses universitaires de Grenoble | « Revue internationale de psychologie sociale »

2010/1 Tome 23 | pages 93 à 110

© Presses universitaires de Grenoble | Téléchargé le 31/07/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 105.68.177.4)

Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)

Affective Biases in Likelihood Perception:

Abstract Résumé Key-words

© Presses universitaires de Grenoble | Téléchargé le 31/07/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 105.68.177.4)

Revue internationale de psychologie sociale 2010 n° 1

RIPS_1_2010.indd 93 10/06/10 11:04:33

T hree decades of research suggest that moods have a perva-

© Presses universitaires de Grenoble | Téléchargé le 31/07/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 105.68.177.4)

Two main explanations have been offered to accounts for these

Affective biases in likelihood perception

RIPS_1_2010.indd 94 10/06/10 11:04:33

We suspect however that these effects can be triggered by situa-

© Presses universitaires de Grenoble | Téléchargé le 31/07/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 105.68.177.4)

Research on mood-congruent recall has revealed findings consis-

Revue internationale de psychologie sociale 2010 n° 1

RIPS_1_2010.indd 95 10/06/10 11:04:34

Yet, even though it has been demonstrated that people also

© Presses universitaires de Grenoble | Téléchargé le 31/07/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 105.68.177.4)

As stated above, individuals involved in mood congruence studies

Affective biases in likelihood perception

RIPS_1_2010.indd 96 10/06/10 11:04:34

© Presses universitaires de Grenoble | Téléchargé le 31/07/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 105.68.177.4)

Participants provided likelihood estimates on a scale ranging

Revue internationale de psychologie sociale 2010 n° 1

RIPS_1_2010.indd 97 10/06/10 11:04:34

Mood. Considering the possibility that participants could put

Procedure. At the beginning of tutorial classes each student

© Presses universitaires de Grenoble | Téléchargé le 31/07/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 105.68.177.4)

Affective biases in likelihood perception

RIPS_1_2010.indd 98 10/06/10 11:04:35

© Presses universitaires de Grenoble | Téléchargé le 31/07/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 105.68.177.4)

Experiment 1 showed that people possess naïve mood-congruence

Revue internationale de psychologie sociale 2010 n° 1

RIPS_1_2010.indd 99 10/06/10 11:04:35

Mood induction procedure. We used the combined Mood

© Presses universitaires de Grenoble | Téléchargé le 31/07/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 105.68.177.4)

The mood manipulation procedure was intended to completely

Affective biases in likelihood perception

RIPS_1_2010.indd 100 10/06/10 11:04:36

Likelihood estimates. Likelihood estimates were measured with

© Presses universitaires de Grenoble | Téléchargé le 31/07/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 105.68.177.4)

Mood induction. After the participants had indicated that they

Mood manipulation check and likelihood estimates. Then,

Revue internationale de psychologie sociale 2010 n° 1

RIPS_1_2010.indd 101 10/06/10 11:04:36

Identification test. At the end of the experiment, participants

© Presses universitaires de Grenoble | Téléchargé le 31/07/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 105.68.177.4)

Effects of mood on likelihood estimates. To examine whether

Affective biases in likelihood perception

RIPS_1_2010.indd 102 10/06/10 11:04:36

© Presses universitaires de Grenoble | Téléchargé le 31/07/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 105.68.177.4)

In the present paper we tested whether mood congruence

Revue internationale de psychologie sociale 2010 n° 1

RIPS_1_2010.indd 103 10/06/10 11:04:37

The results of Exp. 2 are particularly at odd with a semantic

It could be argued that the absence of mood effects under bogus

© Presses universitaires de Grenoble | Téléchargé le 31/07/2022 sur www.cairn.info (IP: 105.68.177.4)