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FRANCISCUS DE PRATO'S "TRACTATUS DE ENTE RATIONIS": A CRITICAL EDITION WITH
A HISTORICO-PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION
Author(s): Fabrizio Amerini and Christian Rode
Source: Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age , 2009, Vol. 76 (2009),
pp. 261-312
Published by: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin
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AHDIMA 76(2009)261-312
FRANCISCUS DE PRATO'S TRACTATUS DE ENTE RATIONIS

A CRITICAL EDITION WITH A HISTORICO-PHILOSOPHICAL
INTRODUCTION
par Fabrizio AMERINI

Department of Philosophy, University of Parma
Via M. D'Azeglio 85, 43 100 Parma (Italy)
et Christian RODE
Institut für Philosophie, Lehrstuhl Prof. Th. Kobusch
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
Am Hof 1,53111 Bonn (Germany)
Résumé
L'article présente l'édition critique du Traité sur l'être de raison (Tractatus de ente
rationis) de François de Prato , précédée d'une introduction historico-philosophique.
Ce traité est une des premières réactions italiennes à la diffusion de la philosophie
du langage et de la logique de Guillaume d'Occam. François y argumente contre la
réduction occamiste de l'être de raison aux actes de connaissance, entendus comme des
entités existant ' subjectivement ' (subiective) dans l'intellect. En suivant Thomas d'Aquin
et Hervé de Nédellec, il développe au contraire une théorie relationnelle et 'objective' de
l'être de raison.
Abstract
This paper provides a critical edition of Francis of Prato' s Treatise on Being of
Reason (Tractatus de ente rationis). It is prefaced by a historico-philosophical introduc-
tion. Francis's Treatise is one of the first Italian reactions to the diffusion of William of
Ockham 's philosophy of language and logic. Francis argues here against Ockham 's
reduction of being of reason to acts of cognition, accounted for as items existing
' subjectively ' (subiective) in the mind. By contrast, following Thomas Aquinas and
Hervaeus Natalis, he proposes a relational and ' objective ' account of being of reason.
Zusammenfassung
Dieser Beitrag umfasst eine kritische Edition eines Traktats des Franciscus de Prato
über das gedankliche Seiende (Tractatus de ente rationis), der eine historisch-philo-
sophische Einleitung vorangeht. Franciscus 'Abhandlung ist eine der ersten italienischen
Reaktionen auf die Verbreitung der Ockhamschen Sprachphilosophie und Logik.
Franciscus spricht sich gegen Ockhams Reduktion des gedanklichen Seienden auf
Erkenntnisakte aus, die wie in einem Zugrundeliegenden' (subiective) im Geist
existieren. Erfolgt stattdessen Thomas von Aquin und Hervaeus Natalis und plädiert für
eine relationale Beschreibung und , objektive ' Seinsweise des gedanklichen Seienden.
[Mots-clés: être de raison; François de Prato; Guillaume d'Occam; Hervé de

Nédellec ; logique]

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262 FABRIZIO AMERINI ET CHRISTIAN RODE
Part r : a brief historical sketch of the concept

OF BEING OF REASON
1 . Introduction
In statusstatus
his Tractatus
of being of being
reasonde( ens
of ente
rationis),
reasona being
rationisin (the
enssoul
, rationis),
( ens inFranciscus
anima), a de being Prato in addresses the soul ( the ens ontological in anima),
which was held to be the subject of logic. So the main issue of this treatise bears
witness to the close connection between metaphysics, particularly ontology, and
logic in the Middle Ages. As far as the status of being of reason is concerned, two
alternatives generally occur : Either it possesses predicamental being, i.e. it exists
in one of the ten Aristotelian categories, or it does not. Since being of reason is ens
in anima, being in the soul, this alternative can be expressed in terms of its
particular mode of being in the soul : Either the ens rationis exists subjectively and
in a real way in the soul, e.g. like a real quality in the soul as its real bearer or
substrate, or it exists objectively in it, like an object of cognition in the intellect.
This has consequences for the extension of logic and metaphysics : If being
of reason exists in a real way, nothing prevents its belonging to the field of
metaphysics. Otherwise it risks being excluded from the domain of this science.
In the first half of the fourteenth century, logic grew in significance and
popularity1. Among a number of philosophers the subject of logic was under
debate2. Moreover, there was a vital relationship between England and Italy.
Some students from Italy, particularly the region around Florence where
Franciscus de Prato was born, came to study in England, above all at the
University of Oxford3.
In 1 328 William of Ockham fled from Avignon to Italy, in 1 34 1 Walter Burley
lectured at Bologna. Ebbesen and Pinborg4 date Franciscus' s Treatise on being of
reason ( Tractatus de ente rationis) exactly to this period around 1340, «when
English philosophy was the new and exciting thing which the learned republic
discussed and reacted against, while Parisian doctrine was held to be better and
safer » 5. With his treatise, Franciscus combines both the interest in the ontological
* Although both the edition and the introduction are the outcome of a common work, Christian
Rode especially attended to the Part I and Part III (§ 1-4) of the Introduction, has constituted the text of
Franciscus' s treatise and established the apparatus. Fabrizio Amerini attended to the Part II and Part
HI (§ 5) of the Introduction and contributed to the revision of the text and the apparatus of Franciscus' s
treatise.
(1) K. Flasch, Das philosophische Denken im Mittelalter, Stuttgart 1986, p. 369.
(2) R. LAMBERTINI, « "Resurgant entia rationis". Matthaeus de Augubio on the Object of Logic »,
Cahiers de l 'Institut du Moyen Âge grec et latin ,59(1 989), p. 5 .
(3) W.J. COURTENAY, « The Introduction of Oxford Logic into Italy », in English Logic in Italy in
the 14th and 15th Centuries. Acts of the 5,h European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics ,
Rome 10-14 November 1980, ed. by A. MaierÙ, Naples 1982, p. 17.
(4) S.Ebbesen-J. PlNBORG, «Thott 581 4°, or 'De ente rationis, ' 'De definitione accidentis, '
'De Drobatione terminorum' ». in Enslish Lo2Ìc in Italv. d. 1 1 2.
(5) Ibid.

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FRANCISCUS DE PRATO'S TRACTATUS DE ENTE RATION I S 263
status of entia rationis and the interest in the new English logic, exemplified
primarily in the logical writings of William of Ockham. However, it should be
pointed out that Franciscus welcomed this new way of thinking.
In this first part of the introduction we would like to sketch one particular stage
of the history of the concept of being of reason, namely the direct influences on
our author, Thomas Aquinas and Hervaeus Natalis, while in the second part we
elucidate the opposing views of Ockham and Franciscus de Prato.
2. Aristotelian Foundations of the Distinction ens rationis -ens reale
Aristotle divides ens perse into being falling under the categories and being of
truth, the true being6. The latter being means either the affirmation of the
composed or the negation of the separated, and it has no existence outside our
mind but only in our thought. Aristotle excludes this true being from the realm of
metaphysics, as it is caused only by a passio , a quality of the soul or the thought7.
During the Middle Ages, these rather marginal remarks formed the foundation of
the distinction between the being of reason (ens rationis) and the real being (ens
reale), a distinction which first occurred in the Arabic philosophy8.
3. Thomas Aquinas
Already in his early De ente et essentia, Thomas draws the distinction between
ens in anima and ens extra animam9. The ens extra animam can be categorised,
whereas the ens in anima is identified with the truth of a proposition, i.e.
everything about which an affirmative sentence can be formed, even if this
sentence does not posit anything real (e.g. in the case of privations or negations).
Thomas gets back to this meaning of being of reason in his Metaphysics
Commentary (V, lec. 9) 10. In this work, Thomas divides being into ens per se and
ens per accidens , and ens per se into real being (ens reale or ens perfectum) and
being in the soul ( ens in anima) 1 1 .
On the one hand, Aquinas follows Aristotle in identifying being of reason with
propositional truth12, on the other hand, he broadens the concept of ens rationis
(6)Metaph.,V,7, 1017a22-35.
(J)Metaph.,V'A, 1027bl7-1028a6.
(8) A. Maurer, « Ens Diminutum : A Note on its Origin and Meaning », Mediaeval Studies , 12
(1950), p. 2 16-222.
(9) THOMAS Aquinas, De ente et essentia, I, Opera omnia , Roma 1976, t. 43, p. 369.
(10) For further evidence of the distinction ens rationis/ens reale , see A. KREMPEL, La doctrine
de la relation chez saint Thomas. Exposé historique et systématique , Paris 1 952, p. 342 ff.
(11 )In XII libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio, V, lec. 9, ed. R. SPIAZZI, Turin-Rome,
p. 238, n. 889.
( 1 2) Ibid. , p. 238-239, nn. 889-896.

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with his theory of verbum13. Thus being of reason consists in c

incomplex intentional being whose mode of existence is its being cogni
4. Hervaeus Natalis
While Aquinas did not always reveal the being of reason's mode of existence
fully, Hervaeus Natalis clearly opts for its objective inherence in the intellect. And
the ens rationis is in a particular manner objectively in the mind : it is a mode
(modus) which follows the object of the intellect, insofar as it exists objectively in
the mind. How do we have to imagine such a modus ? If we cognise a human being,
e.g., who thus exists objectively in the intellect, the mode of universality follows
immediately. Or the mode of truth follows a known state of affairs. Consequently,
this theory of being of reason makes strong ontological commitments ; it suggests
the existence of a sphere of objective entities, which inhere in the intellect in a
non-real or non-subjective way. Apart from this definition of being of reason as
mode, Hervaeus still knows of another kind of ens rationis : the figment or product
of imagination like the goat-stag ( hircocervus ) or the chimera. These beings of
reason do not reside on the ontological level of modes, but of objects of the
intellect. Therefore, they can form the basis for entia rationis of the first, modal
kind15.
In his Quodlibeta 16 Hervaeus deals with opposing opinions locating the ens
rationis subjectively in the mind and bearing striking resemblances to the theory
manifest in Ockham' s late work. Hervaeus confronts the view that a being of
reason like the universal is identical to the act of intellect, since nothing inhering
subjectively in the intellect, like the act of cognition, can act as an objectively
existing being of reason, e.g. as a universal. A universal has to be predicable of
many things, but the particular act of cognition lacks precisely this universal
predicability. Only if the act of cognising becomes itself the object of cognition
objective being and possible universality are attached to it, viz. as the universal
'act of cognition'. An act of intellect cannot serve as being of reason since ens
rationis or universal and individual should not be separated. Each individual is the
universal : for example, an individual animal is an animal, whereas the particular
act of cognising a man is really distinct from the particular man.
(13) See e.g. Quaestiones disputatae De ve ritate, q. 4, a. 1 , Opera omnia , Rome 1 970- 1 976, t. 22,
vol. I, fase. 2, p. 1 19.
(14) Ibid. See on this W.W.MEISSNER, «Some Aspects of the Verbum in the Texts of St.
Thomas », The Modern Schoolman , 36 ( 1 958- 1 959), p. 6 ff.
(15) HERVAEUS Natalis, In IV libros Sententiarum Commentario. Quibus adiectis est eiusdem
auctoris Tractatus de potestate Papae, ed. Parisiis 1647 (repr. Farnborough 1966), p. 203Ba-Ca.
(16) HERVAEUS Natalis, Quolibeta undecim cum octo ipsius profundissimus tractatibus, III,
q. 1, ed. Venetiis 1513 (repr. Ridgewood, N.J. 1966), fols. 67vb-70ra. A part of this question is edited
in J. PlNBORG, Logik und Semantik im Mittelalter. Ein Überblick , Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1972,
p. 203-205.

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FRANCISCUS DE PRATO' S TRACTATUS DE ENTE RATIONIS 265
As yet, we have taken for granted the difference between being objectively
and subjectively in the intellect. But this mediaeval distinction is in need of an
explanation as it runs crossways to modern concepts. The term 'subjective' does
not imply that something inhering subjectively is left to the choice of a cognising
subject or depends on the conception of someone. On the contrary, if an accidens
exists subjectively in a substance it inheres in the substance in a completely real
way as in an underlying substrate (ut in subiecto ). For instance, the white colour
exists subjectively in the wall, i.e. the wall is a real bearer of this colour. The
matter is different in the case of objective being. If something exists objectively in
the mind it is not located in it in a real way, but as an object of cognition, as
something cognised. In this way, objects of thought are in our intellect, e.g. the
objects of mathematics, a person we are thinking of at the moment or the table in
front of us we actually cognise.
But Hervaeus subdivides this objective mode of being even further : Either
something is in the intellect as an object of thought. This way not only being of
reason but also real being can be in the intellect. Furthermore, figments, products
of the imagination, belong to this first mode of objective being. Or something is in
a second objective mode of existence in the intellect, which is reserved especially
for entia rationis. It follows objects of thought, which exist in the first way
objectively in the intellect. For example, the universal 'man'emerges as a mode
that follows man, insofar as this concept is cognised by the intellect17.
Hervaeus strives to demonstrate that the mode of existence in question has to
be the objective one. The universal 'man'exists either in the intellect or in reality.
Not in reality, for this would lead to a return of Platonism. It does not exist
subjectively in the mind either, as the universal should be merely secundum
rationem distinct from its individuals. But a universal existing subjectively in the
intellect would be really distinct from its individuals. So with real existence
outside the mind and subjective existence in it being excluded, the only remaining
theoretical option is objective existence in the intellect 18.
Therefore, the process of cognition is no mere immanent one but refers to an
object and is an actio transiens. However, it is an actio transiens obiective or
secundum rationem intelligendi tantum , for there is no real transition to an object
but only a rational one 19 .
Of course, exponents of an ontology of real objects could raise the following
objection : Being of reason is nothing real, consequently it is nothing at all or
nothingness. Hervaeus retorts that being of reason is at least a kind of being and
can be predicated of real being, such as when we argue that 'man'is a universal. In
contrast, nothingness cannot be predicated of real being. Being of reason is not
identical to real being, but presupposes it, for it presupposes the real act of
(17) For the distinction objective/subjective being in the mind, see HERVAEUS, Quodlibeta , III,
q. l,fol.68rb.
(18) Ibid. , fol. 68rb-va.
(19)/Md.,fol.68va.

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cognising and the cognised object. Likewise, negations and privations

positive real being, but depend on it20.
Hervaeus introduces two kinds of nothingness : the nihil non ponend
posits nothing formally - e.g. blindness - and the nihil negando , which n
being whatsoever. As blindness only negates a particular and not all sort
it does not belong to nihil negando. Thus, being of reason is subsumed
nihil non ponendo , like blindness, and not under the nihil negando.
classified into real being and non-positive nothing. So Hervaeus avoids t
of nothingness per se falling under the concept of being. Hervaeus' s o
hierarchy can now be pictured as follows :
Nihil negando - nihil non ponendo (privations/being of reason) - ens re
Real being participates fully in the notion of being, whereas nihil non
shares the name of being only diminute. The Herveian ontology is or
towards real being but concedes a diminutive special status to being of rea
In detail, there are a number of different kinds of being of reason acc
the kinds of intellect in which they are located. So certain beings of
accompany the simple intellect, for instance the particular or the univers
entia rationis follow an object of the enunciative intellect, e.g. contrad
opposition, truth or falsehood. Finally, some result from the activity
discursive intellect, for example antecedent or consequent22.
In Aquinas, all intentions understood as mental words possessed
which consisted in being cognised, an objective being. Hervaeus differen
mode of existence of intentions to a greater extent. First of all, in De
intentionibus , he draws a distinction between an intendo ex parte intellig
an intendo ex parte rei. The intention on the part of the knower (ex par
gentis) is that which leads in a representative way (permodum repraese
to the intellect's cognition of an object. Among these intentions rank t
intelligibilis , the act of intellect and the mental concept. The intention o
of the thing (ex parte rei ) is the cognised object itself, insofar as an act of
terminates in it. There are still two more aspects to this sort of intention
one hand, there is the formal or abstract aspect of such an intention,
exactly the termination (terminado) of a tendency of the knower to th
object. Hervaeus identifies this terminus with the relation (habitudo)
cognised object to the act of cognition. So Hervaeus construes a doubl
tionship between subject and object - if we are allowed to speak in mod
here : ( 1 ) a tendency of the knowing subject to the object, and (2) a habitu
object to the subject. On the other hand, there is the intention in its mater
(materialiter et concreto ), which consists simply in that which is cognise
cognised object23.
(20) Ibid.
(21) Ibid. , fol. 68va-b.
(22) Ibid. , fol. 69vb.
(23) De secundis intentionibus , q. I, a. 1 , ed. Parisiis 1489, fol. a.iii ra.

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FRANCISCUS DE PRATO'S TRACTATUS DE ENTE RATIONIS 267
After this first distinction, Hervaeus introduces a second one between

different kinds of predicates which segments the sphere of intelligible objects
(i intelligibilia ) :
l.Some attributes are predicated of intelligible things not insofar as they are
objects of the speculative intellect, i.e. not insofar as they are objectively in the
intellect. These are features like 'man, ' 'cattle, ' 'white, ' 'black, ' and also priva-
tions like 'blindness, ' 'deafness.' All these attributes pertain to the field of first
intentions, and particularly to their concrete and material aspect, as they are
objects of cognition.
2. Other features are predicated of things insofar as they exist objectively in the
intellect, e.g. being abstract or universal. These characteristics fall under the
notion of second intention24.
Thereupon Hervaeus attaches different modes of existence to the distinct
moments and kinds of intention. The intention on the part of the knower does not
differ from real being in any respect, as the species or acts of knowing are true
things ( res verae). The first intention, as far as it is conceived concretely and
materially, pertains to the realm of real being since what belongs to the first genus
of intelligibilia are extra-mental objects, like man, whiteness or blackness. Only
the remaining formal moment of the first intention, its intentionality, as Hervaeus
puts it elsewhere25, the relation of the cognised thing to the act of intellect is a
being of reason distinct from real being, for such an habitudo is a rational relation.
As for second intentions, both their formal and their material aspect pertain to
being of reason26. Even though for Hervaeus being of reason is primarily
intentional being27, he approximates - unlike Aquinas - first intentions to real
being by identifying their material moment with real being28. The notion of being
of reason in its entirety is only attributed to second intentions, as the first intention
in concreto belongs to real being : « Et quia prima intentio in concreto est res ipsa
habens esse reale, secunda autem intentio est ens rationis [. . .] »29. Hervaeus does
not maintain the mental word's exposed mode of being and ranks the conceptus
(24) Ibid. , fol. a.iii rb.

{25) De secundis intentionibus , q. I, a. 2, ed. Venetiis 1513, fol.5r: «[...] intentionalitas, quam
obiectum, quod intelligitur, praeter rem, quae intelligitur, importât, quando dicitur prima intentio, sit
habitudo rei intellectae ad intellectum si ve ad actum intelligendi. [. . .] Ergo praedicta intentionalitas
non est ipse actus intelligendi nec eius habitudo ad intelligibile. Relinquitur ergo, quod sit habitudo
ipsius rei intellectae ad actum intelligendi, quae est relatio secundum rationem tantum». See the
elsewhere used edition with a slightly different text : De secundis intentionibus , q. I, a. 2, ed. Parisiis
1489, fol. a viii ra. It is interesting that the notion of intentionality in Hervaeus is used differently than
in modern texts : It does not signify a relation of the intellect to the world, but vice versa a relatedness
of the object to the intellect.
(26) De secundis intentionibus , q. I, a. 1 , fol. a iii rb-a.iii va.
{21) De secundis intentionibus , q. Ill, a. 2, fol. e. viii rb : « [. . .] ens rationis, quod dicit ipsum esse
intentionale[...] ».
(28) For this approximation, see T. KOBUSCH, Sein und Sprache : historische Grundlegung einer
Ontologie der Sprache, Leiden 1987, p. 390 ff.
(29) De secundis intentionibus , q. III, a. 2, fol. g.i va.

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mentis as intention on the part of the knower among real being. What A
kept apart is approximated in Hervaeus. Both his theory of being of rea
theory of verbum attest to an increasing influence of real being.
Part h : franciscus de prato's criticism of ockham
1 . The Background of Franciscus 's Doctrine of Being of Reason
Thus far, we have seen how the problem of being of reason has bee
approached before Ockham. In the history of this problem, Ockham can be
regarded as a turning-point, especially because of the radical way he tries to get
of the sphere of being of reason. Ockham' s eliminati ve strategy takes two steps
First, Ockham divides the sphere of the real being into mental and extra-men
Then, he reduces every being of reason to one of these two kinds of real being, i
to the mental one. Ultimately, in Ockham' s world only two basic kinds of re
beings can be found. On the one hand, there are mental real beings, such as acts
cognition or mental habits31 ; on the other hand, there are extra-mental real bein
such as animals, stones, and so on, with their properties32. With respect to
Aristotle's Categories , the real beings of the first type are qualities (of the mind
whereas the real beings of the second type are substances and qualities
substances. All of these beings finally are thought as singular in character an
existing according to what has been said a 'subjective' mode of existence.
With such ontology at hand, Ockham accounts for the phenomenon
intellectual cognition as a bipolar process. In order to have the cognition of
extra-mental thing, say Socrates, it is sufficient to grant the existence of a singu
man and the existence of a singular mind, which are related to each other. Wh
does it happen when our mind gets acquainted with Socrates? Facing Socrate
our mind naturally and spontaneously reacts by emitting several mental ac
which dispose at different degrees of generality. In particular, it emits both an
of cognition which issues to the singular concept of this man and an act of
(30) See, for instance, WILLIAM OF OCKHAM, Summa Logicae , I, chs. 12 and 40, Ope
philosophica I, ed. G. GÁL, St. Bonaventure, N.Y 1978 (for other references to Ockham' s texts, s
below, edition, note 2).
(31) As is well known, in his final theory of concepts, Ockham does not draw any distinction
between concepts and acts of cognition. Natural-kind concepts are identical with the acts by wa
which such concepts have been formed, and these acts in turn are subjective qualities, modificatio
or impressions of the mind. Specifically, they are called natural signs of the extra-mental thing
causally produced by them. On Ockham' s theory of concepts and his evolution, see M.McCO
ADAMS, «Ockham's Nominalism and Unreal Entities», Philosophical Review , 86 (1977), p. 14
176,andEAD., William Ockham, 2 vols., Notre Dame, Indiana 1987, vol. I, p. 13-141.
(32) On Ockham's ontology, see McCordAdams, William Ockham , vol.1, p. 143-31
P. V. SPADE, «Ockham's Nominalist Metaphysics: Some Main Themes», in The Cambrid
Companion to Ockham , edited by P.V. Spade, Cambridge 1999, p. 100-1 17 ; G. Klima, « Ockham
Semantics and Ontology of the Categories », in The Cambridge Companion to Ockham , p. 1 1 8-14

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cognition which issues to the specific concept of man , while it needs to compare
Socrates with a thing of a different species, say a horse, in order to form the
generic concept of animal33. Once obtained, such mental acts are able to refer
back to that thing, so that the primary function that a mental act is called to serve is
to signify naturally those things by which it has been causally stimulated and to
stand for them in a proposition of the mental language.
Besides the reduction of the sphere of being of reason to that of real being, the
second mark of Ockham' s strategy is the reduction of concepts to acts of cognition.
At the beginning of his Treatise34, Franciscus de Prato puts emphasis on that a
philosophical proposal such as that of Ockham cannot be seen as a novelty. The
four arguments supporting this position which are recorded by Franciscus have
been employed in fact by many other philosophers, so Ockham' s eliminative
strategy appears to be, except for its virulence, a rather standard explanation of the
nature of concepts35. Franciscus' s remark is historically interesting, especially
because of his move of connecting Ockham to the Parisian tradition. In the prolo-
gue to his Treatise36, Franciscus says that he wants to follow closely Hervaeus
Natalis's doctrine. As has been stressed in the first part of this introduction,
Hervaeus belongs to those philosophers who deeply engaged themselves to reject
any position arguing for the identification between beings of reason or concepts
and acts of cognition. According to Hervaeus, concepts exhibit an objective mode
of mental existence, while acts of cognition a subjective one, hence they cannot
amount to the same thing. Especially in his Treatise on Second Intentions and in
his Quodlibet III, q. 1 37 , Hervaeus spent a lot of time to reject every mental-act
account of being of reason. The positions attacked there by Hervaeus were those
of Radulphus Brito, Simon of Faversham, and Durand of St.-Pourçain38, but they
seem to have been a philosophical commonplace in his time. When Ockham ela-
borates his arguments in favour of the reduction of concepts to acts of cognition,
Franciscus quite naturally regards them as rephrasing those elaborated by
Hervaeus' s adversaries. Accordingly, Franciscus thinks that in order to reject
(33) See e.g. OCKHAM, Quaestiones in libros Physicorum Aristotelis, q. 7, in Opera philosophica
IV, ed. S. BROWN, St. Bonaventure, N.Y. 1984, p. 41 1-412, lin. 9-35.
(34) See below, edition, § 2.
(35) Ibid., note 2.
(36) Ibid., § 1.
(37) These works date to around 1310s. On the life and works of Hervaeus Natalis, see
Th. Kaeppeli OP, Scriptores ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi, vols. I-III (A-S), Rome 1970-1980,
esp. vol. II, Rome 1975, p. 231-244, and Th. Kaeppeli-E. PANELLA OP, Scriptores ordinis
Praedicatorum Medii Aevi, vol. IV (T-Z), Rome 1993, p. 1 19-120.
(38) De secundis intentionibus, q. I, a. 2 ( Utrum actus intelligendi sit prima intentio) and q. II, a. 1
(Utrum secunda intentio sit actus intelligendi ). Compare this text especially with SIMON OF
Faversham, «Sophisma "Universale est intentio"», ed. T.Yokoyama, Mediaeval Studies, 31
(1969), p. 5-13, and Radulphus Brito, « Sophisma "Aliquis homo est species" », ed. J. Pinborg,
Vivarium, 13 (1975), p. 1 19-152. On these doctrines of intentions, see G. PINI, Categories and Logic
in Duns Scotus : An Interpretation of Aristotle's Categories in the Late Thirteenth Century, Leiden-
Boston 2002.

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270 FABRIZIO AMERESTI ET CHRISTIAN RODE
Ockham's arguments it suffices to renew Hervaeus's critique. In e

Franciscus's Treatise on Being of Reason can be presented as a fully He
inspired reply to Ockham.
In the first part we have already illustrated the main features of He
views of being of reason. In order to clarify Franciscus de Prato' s criti
Ockham we need to recall here two aspects of his explanation. Without
into the details of Hervaeus's doctrine, it is sufficient to point out th
Hervaeus, the main flaw of mental-act theories of concepts consists in that
not explain the process of intellectual cognition in a complete way. Acco
Hervaeus, if we want to account correctly for the cognition of an extern
we must treat cognition as a triadic process. Take again the case of the cog
Socrates. When we aim to explain how our mind arrives at cognising Socrat
not sufficient to refer to Socrates who can be cognised ( res extra) and to t
which can cognise Socrates. In addition, we must introduce a third ite
Socrates cognised {res cognita). Socrates as existing extra-mentally
starting-point of our act of cognition, but we can be said to be co
completely Socrates only when we know what kind of thing Socrates is,
when we know that Socrates is a man. Thus, it is man, not Socrates, what e
act of cognition stemming from the external Socrates 39 . Why should not
equate the cognised Socrates to the act of cognition of Socrates? The wh
when we know that Socrates is a man, man is a universal entity. Since in th
mental world we only come across singular men, man qua man cannot
outside the mind. Nevertheless man cannot exist in the mind subjectively
quality of the mind or as an act of cognition, for two reasons. As has been
the first part of this introduction, the first reason is that the act of cogn
Socrates is a singular entity, so that qua act, it cannot end its own cog
activity, while qua singular, it cannot grant the universality of cogniti
second reason is that the act of cognition of Socrates goes out of existen
is achieved {i.e. once our mind gets acquainted with Socrates), while the
of man remains as stored in the mind. A third item, i.e. man , therefore is
Particularly, man is said to be an object existing inside the mind, different
singular acts by which it has been caused and from the singular things fro
it has been remotely derived.
In his works, Hervaeus portrays this kind of intra-mental object by d
descriptions : i) as that which corresponds primarily to the concept of man
has been formed; ii) as that which is abstracted from the extra-mental
men ; iii) as that under which the extra-mental singular men fall ; iv) as th
correlate of an act of intellectual cognition ; v) as that which represents
rently any extra-mental singular men and, in turn, it is represented by the
concept of man ; vi) as the foundation and the subject of the intentional pro
being universal ; vii) as that which is predicated of the extra-mental sing
(39) See below, edition, § 88.

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from which it has been derived ; viii) as a real universal thing40. Such intra-mental
objects are supposed to be necessary in order to preserve the character of abstrac-
tness and universality of intellectual cognition, and to explain correctly the
phenomenon of predication. On the one hand, in a bipolar explanation of
intellectual cognition, only singular items are involved. But properly speaking, no
singular item can be said universal in predication, although it can be said universal
in signification or in representation (insofar as it is able to signify or represent
many things). On the other hand, nothing can be really connected to anything else
if it is really abstracted, i.e. really separated, from that thing. But an act of
cognition is really separated from the extra-mental things, so it cannot be really in
contact with them.
Hervaeus thinks that there is also another reason for rejecting every mental-act
account of concepts. Such reason insists on that, metaphysically, cognition
belongs to the category of Relation and, like any relation, cognition as well must
be explained in terms of a relation and its converse-relation. Consider the sentence
'we cognise Socrates'. This sentence logically displays a relational form, so it
must be explained in terms of the conjunction of two sentences, namely 'we
cognise Socrates' and 'Socrates is cognised by us'. The first sentence expresses
the relation from us to Socrates, while the second sentence expresses the
converse-relation from Socrates to us. Accordingly, we can achieve our cognition
of Socrates, i.e. the sentence 'we cognise Socrates' is true, when two ontological
conditions occur: first, we are cognitively related to Socrates and, second,
Socrates is cognitively related to us.
The metaphysical reason for subscribing to this view of cognition is that no
accident can inhere in two different subjects, while a subject receives the
denominative predication from the accident that inheres in it. Since a relation is an
accident, no relation can inhere in two different subjects. When we are to account
for the intellectual cognition of Socrates, therefore, it is not sufficient to refer to
items existing subjectively in the mind and actively oriented towards Socrates.
The relation that we bear to Socrates allows us to say only that we are cognising
Socrates, yet not that Socrates is cognised by us. In order to do so, we must further
grant the existence of a relation that Socrates bears to our mind when it is actually
cognising him. But when we try to refine our understanding of such a converse-
relation in the process of cognition, we realise that a singular extra-mental thing,
qua singular, is unable to bear such a relation for otherwise we should cognise
only that thing, even when that thing is no longer present to us. We achieve instead
our cognition of Socrates only when we know that Socrates is a man, namely when
our mind moves, by abstraction, from this singular man to the universal man.
Then, our mind is actually related to Socrates qua universal man just as Socrates is
(40) On such descriptions, see F. Amerini, Introduzione , in / trattati "De universalibus" di

Francesco da Prato e Stefano da Rieti ( Secolo XIV), Spoleto 2003 .

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actually related to our mind qua universal man. For these reasons, a th
being is required41.
The machinery of intentionality engineered by Hervaeus is the ph
context in which Franciscus' s Treatise has to be set. The basic intuition that
Franciscus inherits from Hervaeus is that an external thing may receive some
accidental, intentional properties only when it is in relation to the mind.
Specifically, an extra-mental thing becomes an intention in virtue of the relation
of intentionality or knowability that it bears to the mind, and this thing becomes a
first or a second intention if this relation holds firstly or secondly. The property of
being an intention is founded on the thing qua being cognised, even though it is the
mind that finds out such a property, hence attaching it to the thing cognised. A
property such as being an intention, therefore, fixes the extension of the notion of
being of reason. At the end of the day, following Hervaeus, Franciscus shows to
have some epistemological rather than metaphysical reasons for taking being of
reason as distinct from real being.
2. Franciscus of Prato 's Criticism of Ockham
Having recalled some aspects of Hervaeus' s doctrine of beings of reason, let

us focus more closely on Franciscus' s Treatise 42. Reading the treatise, one could
be left with the impression that the dispute between Ockham and Franciscus about
the nature of being of reason is far from being settled. Franciscus grounds his
theory upon a description of being of reason which Ockham preliminarily set
aside, while Ockham takes as a premise a definition of mental being which
Franciscus regards as unsatisfactory. Let us start by considering the four
arguments stated by Franciscus at the beginning of the Treatise 43 . They can be
considered as a sort of arguments by stipulation insofar as they tend to get rid of
(4 1 ) Hervaeus stresses this point especially in rejecting Peter Auriol' s treatment of intentions. On
the debate between Auriol and Hervaeus, see J. PlNBORG, « Zum Begriff der "intendo secunda".
Radulphus Brito, Hervaeus Natalis, und Petrus Aureoli in Diskussion», Cahiers de l'Institut du
Moyen Âge grec et latin , 13 (1974), p. 45-59; D. PERLER, «Peter Aureol vs. Hervaeus Natalis on
Intentionality », Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge , 61 (1994), p. 227-262;
ID., Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter , Frankfurt am Main 2002, p. 258-294 and 310-317;
and, for a different assessment of such a debate, F. AMERINI, « Realism and Intentionality : Hervaeus
Natalis, Peter Aureoli, and William Ockham in Discussion », in Philosophical Debates at Paris in the
Early Fourteenth Century , edited by S. Brown-T. Dewender-T. KOBUSCH, Leiden-Boston, 2009,
p. 239-260.
(42) For further discussions of Hervaeus' s doctrine, see F. Amerini, La logica di Francesco da
Prato. Con l' edizione critica della "Loyca " e del "Tractatus de voce univoca ", Florence 2005, p. 103
ff., and G. KORIDZE, Intentionale Grundlegung der philosophischen Logik : Studien zur Intentiona-
lität des Denkens bei Hervaeus Natalis im Traktat "De secundis intentionibus ", PhD Dissertation,
<URL=http : //w210.ub.uni-tuebingen.de/dbt/volltexte/2006/2264/>. For a detailed reconstruction of
Franciscus' s doctrine and its historical and philosophical background, see Ch. RODE, Franciscus de
Prato. Facetten seiner Philosophie im Blick auf Hervaeus Natalis und Wilhelm Ockham , Stuttgart
2004.
(43) See below, edition, § 3-6.

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FRANCISCUS DE PRATO' S TRACTATUS DE ENTE RATIONIS 27 3
beings of reason simply by redefining the notion of being of reason. For the time
being, we can put aside the case of the second intentions, such as species , genus ,
and so on, which Ockham and Franciscus likewise consider as pure products of
the reason. Both of them actually agree that a name of second intention like
4 species' refers to a name of first intention like 'man'. But they disagree on the
ontological status of a first intention. What is the nature of the first intention that is
signified by the term 'man' ? In order to answer this question, let us follow closely
the stages of Franciscus 's reasoning throughout the Treatise. We can distinguish
six stages.
(51) According to Ockham' s first set of arguments, the domain of being of
reason covers any entity existing in the reason and of which the reason can make
use in order to grasp extra-mental things. This is a consequence of the stipulation
that whatever exists must be real to some extent, so whatever exists in the reason
must be real as well for otherwise it could be simply a non-being. Moreover,
whatever exists must exist in a subjective way. Consequently, whatever exists in
the reason must also exist in a subjective way in the reason. The result is that every
being of reason cannot be other than an entity existing really and subjectively
in the reason. From Ockham's perspective, therefore, 'being 0/ reason 'means
nothing different from being in the reason. But in the reason, only acts of
cognition, to which any other mental entity can be reduced (for a rule of
economy)44, can exist subjectively. Therefore, every being of reason is the same
as an act of cognition existing subjectively in the reason45.
(52)What does Franciscus reply to these arguments? His move simply
consists in re-redefining in turn the notion of being of reason. His argument runs
as follows : No being of reason is a real being; but every act of cognition is a real
being ; hence no act of cognition is a being of reason. It is clear that, for Franciscus,
'being of reason' does not refer to a thing which is endowed with a real being in-
and-of the reason, but it refers to something which has a rational and non-real
being, i.e. a being engendered by the reason and dependent upon the reason. Here
we do not find arguments against Ockham's reduction of being of reason to real
mental being. We simply find Franciscus applying a definition aimed to preserve
the existence of an intra-mental dimension, which is regarded as distinct from
both the mental and the extra-mental dimension of the real being46. As a matter of
(44) Ibid., §3.

(45) Note that the fourth argument (§ 6) is slightly different from the precedent three. As a matter
of fact, it holds the same principle held by Franciscus (i.e. that every being is a real being or a being of
reason : § 5) but when applying it to its own case, it further holds that the categorial table is unable to
classify mental entities (§ 5). Ockham explicitly rejects this consequence, for he thinks of acts of
cognition as belonging to the third species of quality. For Ockham, the opposition at issue is that
between real being inside the mind (being of reason) and real being outside the mind (real being) (see,
significantly, § 14), while for Franciscus, it is that between being of reason (being inside the mind) and
real being (being outside the mind).

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fact, all the six arguments given in favour of the minor premise (i.e. th
of cognition is a real being) put at the top what they should put at the bo
proof, namely that what is a being of reason is not a real being.
Summing up the first two stages of Franci scus 's reasoning, ther
could illustrate their different conception of the domain of being wit
the following figure :
Ockham
y real mental being = being of reason, being in the mind

/ - > singular acts of cognition
being
N' real extra-mental being = being outside the mind

- » singular substances and singular qualities
Franciscus
in the mind singular acts of cognition
real being
/ NSv outside the mind - > singular item belonging to
/ the ten categories
being
NSSSy being of reason = being inside the mind

- > first and second intentions
(S3) At this point, Franciscus imagines that Ockham himself could allow that
his position meets some difficulties with the definition of 'being of reason'.
Ockham thus could concede that an act of cognition would be a real being rather
than a being of reason, since it belongs to the category of Quality. One could find it
reasonable indeed that what is a real being is not a being of reason, if the scope of
the investigation is precisely that of establishing whether a thing is a being of
reason or a real being. Nonetheless, in order to maintain the conclusion that an act
of cognition is both a being of reason and a real being, Ockham could suggest
redefining the notion of being of reason in the way we illustrate above and, at the
same time, introducing a crucial distinction. If we look more closely at the nature
of an act of cognition, we see that it can be understood in two ways : on its own
right, i.e. as a psychological entity, and as a representation of the extra-mental
things. In the first way, an act of cognition is a real being, but in the second way, it
may be maintained that it is a being of reason and a diminished being47.
{AI) Ibid., § 14. As we have recorded in the apparatus of sources, this distinction also had been
introduced by Hervaeus, although in a slightly modified version. Here is Hervaeus's text : « Ad huius
igitur evidentiam sciendum quod secundum ipsos 'actus intelligendi' potest accipi dupliciter. Uno
modo secundum quod est quidam actus realis, et sic non dicitur secunda intentio nec habere esse

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Accordingly, Ockham could propose narrowing down Franciscus' s six

arguments - and their main conclusion that every act of cognition is a real being -
to the first way of understanding the act of cognition. In the second way, however,
an act of cognition can be still described as a being of reason, but in the special
sense stipulated by Ockham, viz. as a being of which the reason can make use in
order to refer to the things existing outside the reason.
(S4) Franciscus 's three arguments against Ockham' s reply are not strongly
conclusive.
The first and third argument reveal the mutual misunderstanding existing
between Ockham and Franciscus. The Dominican thinker continues to pursue his
argument by division : what is real exists outside the mind according to Aristotle;
but what exists in the mind cannot exist outside the mind, by definition and
according to Ockham himself; so what exists in the mind cannot be a real being.
Against Ockham' s conclusion, therefore, no act of cognition can be a real being.
Furthermore, nothing can exist at the same time inside and outside the mind. But
Ockham claims that the same thing, i.e. the same act of cognition, is both real and
of reason, even though according to different respects. But it is impossible that the
same thing can exist both inside and outside the mind, even if taken according to
different respects, since 'being of reason' and 'real being' express two mutually
incompatible properties. Once again, these arguments work with a notion of
'being in-and-of reason', and more basically with a notion of 'reason', which is
understood differently by Ockham and Franciscus. While for the former, what is
in the reason inheres in but is not included inside the reason, for the latter, what is
in the reason is included inside but not inherent in the reason. Consequently, both
of them tend to confirm authoritatively their own position by referring to the same
Aristotelian texts (especially, to the Metaphysics , VI, chap. 4), which are
nonetheless interpreted, ineluctably, in different ways48.
The second argument, which is derived from Hervaeus, is rather obscure.
Consider the property of 'being abstract'. The subject of this property must be a
universal item, and every universal is a being of reason. At this point, if every
being of reason were reduced to an act of cognition, it would follow that the act of
cognition is the subject of the property of 'being abstract' . But no universal can be
really abstracted from the extra-mental singulars, for otherwise we would fall into
a Platonic position about universais, as has been already noted. Nevertheless, man
rationis tantum prout distinguitur contra esse reale. Alio modo accipitur actus intelligendi vice rei
intellecte, sicut pietura hominis dicitur homo, non quidem homo simpliciter, sed dicitur pictus homo
<homo> secundum quid. Unde dicitur pietura hominis secundum quid et diminutive homo. Sic etiam
actus intelligendi hominem vel equum dicitur diminutive et secundum quid homo intellectus vel
equus. Et quia actus intelligendi hominis licet sit simpliciter res quedam, non tarnen est simpliciter
homo, sed secundum quid et diminutive, et ideo actus intelligendi, prout accipitur vice rei intellecte,
secundum quid dicitur res intellecta; et per consequens ut sic dicitur habere esse rationis distinctum
contra esse reale sive contra esse simpliciter » (De secundis intentionibus , q. II, a. 1 , fol. 1 8a).
(48) Ibid. ,§3,16, and 99.

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is abstracted from Socrates. Therefore, when speaking of man , we are

speaking of the act of cognition of man, even if it is taken as the representa
many singular men, because such an act is really separated from Socrates.
In this form, the argument appears weak. Ockham could actually maintain
the act of cognition of Socrates is really abstracted and separated from So
while denying that such an act is universal. According to Ockham, an ac
cognition is singular on its own right and universal only in signification.
original form, Hervaeus' s argument significantly connected the property of
abstract to the property of being predicable, a connection which Franci
argument misses to underline. For Hervaeus, if something a is really sepa
from something else b , a cannot be really predicated of b. Franciscus form
such an argument again a few lines below, when arguing for Hervaeus Na
position49, and then he connects abstraction to predication. Anyway, it is
noticing that the manner of understanding predication (real vs. linguistic)
basic point of disagreement between Franciscus and Ockham.
(S5) Once having rejected Ockham' s position, Franciscus goes on to pr
Hervaeus' s, which he relates to Aquinas' s. Above we have partially present
position. It relies upon the distinction between subjective and objective be
distinction initially accepted by Ockham as well 50. A thing x exists subjectiv
(i) it exists as a subject (regardless it is mental or extra-mental) or (ii) it exist
accident inhering in a subject. By contrast, x exists objectively if (i) it is an
of cognition, insofar as it is collocated in prospectu intellectus , or (ii) it is a
of being following upon an object of cognition qua cognised object51. In th
sense of 'objective', both real beings and beings of reason have ob
existence, while in the second sense, only beings of reason are provided
objective existence. According to Franciscus, only this second condition pic
what a being of reason properly is52. Take again the case of the cogniti
Socrates. When we direct our mind onto Socrates, as has been said, then So
bears a relation (called 'intentionality')53 to the mind. Socrates exists subje
outside the mind. But once he has been cognised, he also exists objectively
mind. When Socrates has been cognised, however, he is no longer singul
universal. In particular, Socrates becomes universal in virtue of the rela
universality he bears to the mind. Such a relation, which coincides with
passive side of the cognition of Socrates, i.e. with Socrates' s being cognis
accidental with respect to the nature of Socrates, so Socrates can be
(49) Ibid., §33.

(50) On such a distinction and its epistemological implications, see K. H. Tachau, Vis
Certitude in the Age of Ockham. Optics, Epistemology and the Foundation of Semantics
1988 ; and, more recently, AMERINI, La logica di Francesco da Prato , p. 58 ff. (see there for
references).
(51) See below, edition, § 2 1 -22.
(52) Ibid. ,§23.
(53)/¿>i¿,§28.

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universal only in a denominative way, that is, in virtue of such a relation. More
precisely, once the mind cognises Socrates, it generates the property of being
universal by reflecting on Socrates qua being cognised, i.e. on man, since the
mind arrives at cognising Socrates only when it knows that he is a man. Therefore,
the mind can compare man with the extra-mental singular men, then considering
that man can be predicated of many singular men and hence finding out the
property of being universal. At this point, the mind can attach this intentional
property to man, which is the real subject of such a property.
According to this theory, both a man qua being cognised, underlying the
property of being universal, and the property of being universal itself, following
the man cognised, can be granted with objective being : the former insofar as it is
an object of cognition, the latter insofar as it is a mode of being attributed
accidentally by the mind to such an object. Specifically, the comparing activity
fulfilled by the mind gives rise to two different kinds of intentional properties : (i)
'absolute' properties, such as being an intention, obtained by comparing the thing
cognised directly with the mind cognising; (ii) 'respective' properties, such as
being a species or being universal, obtained by comparing a thing cognised with
other things cognised54.
Franciscus claims that the characterisation of being of reason as a mode
following the thing cognised qua cognised is able to preserve all the features
traditionally attributed to the being of reason. First, a being of reason is not a real
being : In fact, a being of reason is a mode following a thing, neither insofar as it is
a thing of a certain kind nor insofar as it is a real thing, but as it is a thing cognised.
Second, a being of reason is a being in the reason : In fact, it exists objectively, not
subjectively, in the reason. Third, a being of reason is produced (fabricatum ) by
the reason : In fact, it follows a thing qua cognised and, obviously, a thing can be
cognised only by the reason 55. Franciscus' s conclusion, therefore, is that 'being of
reason' cannot refer to an act of cognition, but to a mode of being concerning a
thing cognised qua cognised. Franciscus defends this conclusion with seven
arguments, drawn from Aquinas and Hervaeus. All the arguments aim to show
that there are some properties (such as being universal in predication)56 or some
relations57 that cannot pertain to an act of cognition but must pertain to a thing
cognised qua cognised.
(S6) After having illustrated Hervaeus's position58, the final stage of
Franciscus' s reasoning concerns objections and replies to objections59. In
particular, Franciscus discusses twenty one arguments, distributed into three
groups. They essentially single out three basic objections.
(54) /¿>/¿.,§28.
(55) Ibid., §24-27.
(56) Ibid., § 33.
(57) /¿>/¿.,§30-32, 34-36.
(58) Ibid.. S 20-28. and 29-36.
(59)/¿>/¿.,§ 37-102.

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27 8 FABRIZIO AMERINI ET CHRISTIAN RODE
(Obi) First objection: If every being of reason is not a real being,

nothing and a non-being60. But since this cannot be granted, for other
inconveniences could come out - among others, a being of reason would
same time a being and a non-being, the logic would deal with non-bein
being of reason could be predicated of anything -, consequently one ha
the antecedent of the above-mentioned consequence.
(Ob2) Second objection: No every being of reason is opposed
being61. This statement is proved by fourteen arguments. The leading
there is something, which can be called a being of reason, that follows
being : or insofar as it is caused by a real cause62, or insofar as it is foun
real being63, or even insofar as it moves reason to cognising64. Furt
whatever exists in the reason either is the reason itself (and then it is a s
or is something of the reason (and then it is an accident), but both of the
beings65. Nor can Franciscus escape such a conclusion by saying that a
reason is not an act of cognition but a relation that things bear to the min
a being of reason, qua relation, is still a real being66.
(Ob3) Third objection : No every being of reason is a mode following
cognised qua cognised, for otherwise, when cognising God, a being of r
a diminished being would be attributed to God and moreover, no mode
qua mode, can exist, subjectively or objectively, in the reason67.
Franciscus basically replies to these objections in a similar way. Hi
rely upon a couple of distinctions, which once again can be trace
Hervaeus, as has been said68. On the one hand, the term 'being' can be u
ways, i.e. formally and suppositively. Accordingly, a being of reason
being in the formal sense since it cannot be put into one of the ten c
nonetheless it is a being in the suppositive sense, viz. it is a being in
presupposes a being. Nevertheless, a being of reason is not a real being.
a being of reason presupposes a real being and it is founded upon a rea
being of reason is not founded upon a real being according to its ext
(60 )Ibid., §38-43. On such an objection to Hervaeus, see LAMBERTINI, «"Resur

rationis". Matthaeus de Augubio on the Object of Logic », op. cit. ; and, for a general su
debate on intentions in Italy in the Fourteenth Century, R. Lambertini, « La teoria delle
da Gentile da Cingoli a Matteo da Gubbio. Fonti e linee di tendenza », in L'insegnamento
a Bologna nel XIV secolo , edited by D. BUZZETTI-M. Ferriani-A. Tabarroni, Bo
p. 277-35 1 ; Amerini, La logica di Francesco da Prato , p. 103 ff.
(61) Ibid., §44-57.
(62) Ibid., §44.
(63) Ibid., §4%.
(64) Ibid., §50.
(65) Ibid. ,§51 and 54.
(66) Ibid., §56.
(61) Ibid., § 58-59.
(68) Hervaeus Natalis, Quodlibeta, III, q. 1 , fol. 68va.

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reality but according to the reality it has in the mind. This is the reason why it
cannot be called a real being while it can be called a being69.
On the other hand, the term 'nothing' also can be used in two ways, i.e.
formally and absolutely. A being of reason is a nothing in the formal sense but it is
not a nothing in the absolute sense. This is to say that a being of reason does not
state anything real, nonetheless it does not deny anything real since it presupposes
something real70.
According to these distinctions, Franciscus easily answers the first objection
(Obi). In this case, it suffices to translate all the sentences referring to 'nothing'
into sentences employing the distinction 'nothing absolutely '/'nothing formally' .
Thus, every sentence concluding that a being of reason is a nothing has to be
phrased into a sentence concluding that a being of reason is a nothing formally but
not absolutely71.
The answer to the second objection appears more articulated (Ob2). The basic
idea, again, is that a being of reason presupposes and is connected somehow to a
real being, nonetheless the connection between them, when cognition is concer-
ned, is not real. This means that by an act of intellectual cognition - i.e. every time
the reason cognises a thing and hence the thing is related to the reason - the thing
cognised is not modified in its real nature. As a result, both the production of a
being of reason and its attribution to the thing cognised are not real but only the
upshot of rational activities, i.e. activities of reason. In other words, in the case of
intellectual cognition a real cause can perform a purely rational action and hence
produce a purely rational effect without this entailing any inconvenience.
Although the production of mental acts is a real activity fulfilled by reason, the
production of mental objects, accomplished by the reason by means of such
mental acts, is only a rational production72. Accordingly, no being of reason can
inhere really in the thing cognised although every being of reason is founded upon
it. A being of reason's inherence in a thing cognised is an inherence of reason
{secundum rationem), in the sense that it is the reason that makes such an
inherence possible73.
These remarks show that Franciscus calls the reason to play a decisive role in
order to define the true nature of a being of reason. Nevertheless, the reason must
not be seen as the foundation of a being of reason. Nor must a being of reason's
inherence in a thing cognised be seen as dependent upon the reason. Consider the
case of the being of reason 'universal'. It is founded upon a thing, say man, not

(70) Ibid. , § 60-6 1 , and 64.
(7 1 ) For a slightly different distinction, i.e. that 'extensional' between being and real being, which
is labelled by Franciscus as 'more simple for the students, albeit not more true', see below, edition,
§ 73 and 77-80. This distinction relies upon the Avicennian twofold understanding of 'thing' {res),
which Franciscus would have been derived from Aquinas. According to Franciscus, this distinction
fits with the previous one, inherited from Hervaeus (see below, edition, § 75 and 81).
(72) Ibid. , § 82 and 90-9 1 .
(13) Ibid., § 84.

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insofar as man is a real thing (in this case, indeed, man is singular) but
man is a real thing cognised. In this case, the reason clearly results in
requisite' ( necessarius requisitus ) for the foundation of the being o
'universal' to the extent that, metaphysically speaking, it is a necessary
for the cognition of man. Nonetheless, being universal cannot be founded
ly speaking, upon the reason itself (which is, on the contrary, the founda
converse-relation, i.e. that of universally cognising a thing) but on
cognised. As has been said, this is due to the relational character Fra
attributes to cognition. Therefore, 'universal' indicates a mode of be
thing denominatively acquires in virtue of the cognitive relation that it b
reason74. But no cognitive relation is a real relation, thus it does not fall
traditional category of Relation75.
Finally, Franciscus answers the third objection (Ob3). His reply lo
follows from what he has argued so far. It is not puzzling to attribut
diminished being secundum rationem , although it would be the cas
being would be attributed to God secundum rem. Yet, as has been
cognition does not affect the nature of the thing cognised nor does i
something real to it76.
3. Conclusion
Summing up, Franciscus strictly follows Hervaeus in arguing for the existence
of a realm of entities endowed with objective being. According to his theory of
intentionality, an extra-mental thing becomes an intention and a mental object
only accidentally, for example only when it is cognised and, thus, related to the
mind. In virtue of such a relation, it acquires some intentional properties or modes
of being. Such properties or modes are founded upon the thing qua cognised. By
the label 'being of reason' , therefore, Franciscus means to refer both to a thing qua
cognised and, more properly, to all the modes of being following upon a thing
cognised qua cognised. The mind plays a decisive role in singling out such
intentional modes. Consequently, it turns out to be a necessary requirement in
order to ground such modes of being upon the thing cognised, although the mind
itself is not the foundation or the subject of such modes.
Philosophically speaking, the hallmark of Franciscus' s treatment of being
of reason consists in endorsing a relational rather than a mental-act account of
(74) In the same vein, the relation of being a son is founded on a son, nonetheless paternity is a
condicio sine qua non of such a relation, although that relation is not founded on paternity. See below,
edition, § 86. Likewise, one could say that being universal exists subjectively in the man secundum
rationemy although not secundum rem (see below, edition, § 87).
(75) Ibid. y § 94. This means, puzzlingly, that there are some items of the ontology that remain out
of the categorial classification. This is to say that although they exist in some way (i.e. objectively,
inside the mind), they cannot be conceptually classified, if not in a denominative way, viz. insofar as
they can be denominatively predicated of the items falling under the categories.
(16) Ibid. y § 96-98.

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FRANCISCUS DE PRATO' S TRACTATUS DE ENTE RATION IS 28 1
intentionality. According to him, intentionality is a bi-directional cognitive

relation, which comes out from the interaction between the mind and the world.
Franciscus proves the nowadays so-called 4in-existence' of mental objects by
reflecting on the relational character of cognition. From that he moves to argue for
the need of introducing universal objects in order to safeguard the universality of
cognition and predication. Of course, Franciscus's treatment faces all the
traditional problems that derive from postulating the existence of an intermediate
and intra-mental dimension of being. Nonetheless, it has the merit of having
provided such an 4 intentional' treatment of being of reason as to minimise the
metaphysical commitment of the traditional realistic account of universais.
Part hi : editorial prolegomena
1 . Manuscripts
Four manuscripts of the Tractatus de ente rationis by Franciscus de Pr

exist77 :
F Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, conv. soppr. J. V. 31 (fols. 74rb-

78vb);
K Copenhagen, Kongelige Bibliotek, Thott5Sì 4°(fols. 105r-l 1 lv);
P Prague, Kapitulní knihovna, C 58 (fols. 170va-175vb);
R Rome, Biblioteca Angelica, 1053 (fols. 55r-62r).
2. Interdependence of the Extant Manuscripts
2. 1 . The Mutual Independence of codices FKPR. Text samples78

2.1.1. Separate Variants of F
§ 1 : . . . quorum quosdam (quodam F) ignorantia premit . . .
§ 3 : . . . qui dividit ens (< om . F) communiter dictum . . .
§ 6 : . . . esset (esse F) in aliquo decern praedicamentorum . . .
§ 1 1 : ... philosophia dicitur scientia realis pro tanto (dicitur pro tanto
philosophia seu scientia naturalis sive realis F pro tanto naturalis
scientia sive realis K dicitur realis pro tanto P) . . .
§ 21 : . . . sicut species intelligibilis (om. F : intelligibiles P) . . .
§ 25 : . . . sed dicit quod (om. F) est modus consequens . . .
§ 39 : Sed hoc est (om. F) inconveniens . . .
§ 82 : Unde (om. F) sicut ista est mala consequentia . . .
(77) Th. Kaeppeli OP, Scriptores ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi , vol. I, Rome 1970, p. 396,
n. 1120, and F.Amerini, «La Quaestio "Utrum subiectum in logica sit ens rationis" e la sua
attribuzione a Francesco da Prato. Note sulla vita e gli scritti del domenicano Francesco da Prato (XIV
secolo) », Memorie Domenicane , 30 (1999), p. 209.
(78) For the purpose of clarity, in view of a rather large amount of variants in the text samples only
those variants are given which exhibit separate or conjunctive errors of the respective manuscripts.

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§ 85 : Alio modo {add. aliquid F) potest dici aliquid ens {om. F) .

§ 93 : . . . cum non-animal neget (negat F) equum.
2. 1 . 2. Separate Variants of K
§ 1 : ... ut doctrinam... Hervaei denigrare conentur {conzrentur
§ 6 : . . . quia non est naturalis potentia (passio K) . . .
§ 1 3 : Minor etiam apparet vera {om. K).
§18:... quod idem ens {om. K) est ens reale . . .
§ 30 : ... Philosophus, distinguens V Metaphysicae de triplice
K) ordine relati vorum, dicit quod . . .
§ 39 : . . . alborum (arborum K) aliud album et aliud non-album.
§ 63 : ... sicut caecitas non solum non dicit aliquam entitatem
simpliciter K) formaliter . . .
§ 86 : ... ut cognitum est (ens K) . . .
§ 97 : ... non tarnen diminuii realiter de perfectione eius {om.
convenit (competit K) . . .
2. 1 . 3. Separate Variants of P
§2: ... et quomodo ab invicem (ad invicem KR a se nonte
différant (distinguuntur P). Pro quo sciendum est {om. P) quod
§ 4 : Etiam (et P) anima {om. P) utitur actu intelligendi . . .
§ 14 : . . . quaedam forma perficiens potentiam (partem P) . . .
§ 1 8 : Istud dictum {om. P) patet VI Metaphysicae . . .
§ 23 : Concludo ergo : Ens rationis potest sic definiri sive desc
his potest dare talis definido de ente rationis P) . . .
§43: Quinto sequetur quod logica, quae tractat de secundis
intentionibus sive de entibus rationis, tractaret de nihilo; quod erit
(et logica tractans de secundis intentionibus tractat de nihilo quod
est P) inconveniens.
§ 48-50 : P features from fundatur alia relatio to potest esse obiectum
another hand.
§ 61 : . . . quia {om. sed add. s. I. P) supponit subiectum (obiectum P), in

quo fundatur.
§ 66 : . . . immo hoc habet (mv. P) ab opere rationis (intellectus P), ideo
ens rationis non dicitur ens {om. P) reale, sed (sicut P) ens rationis
§ 85 : ... et ideo {add. est P) non est ens reale, sed ens {om. P) rationis.
§ 98 : Ad secundum dico quod ens rationis est in anima obiective
(subiectiveP) ...
2. 1 . 4. Separate Variants of R
§ 1 : ... ne talium indiscreta {add. indiscreta R) scriptura . . .
§ 4 : . . . quia ratio " utitur » ipso ad {om. R) aliud . . .
§ 5 : Omne ens intentionale est ens rationis. Sed actus intelligendi est
ens intentionale. Ergo est ens rationis (om. R). Maior patet. . .
§ 14 : ... eo modo quo (quod R) animal dividitur . . .

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§ 2 1 : ... eo modo quo (quod R) dicitur esse in prospectu . . .

§ 58 : . . . Primo (om. R), quia, si hoc esset verum . . .
§71:... quae sunt entia (etiam R) rationis . . .
§ 83 : Unde poterat dici quod logica (om. R) referatur realiter . . .
§84: ... inquantum apprehendimus earn per modum cuiusdam
qualitatis informantis (informans R) divinam essentiam . . .
§ 89 : Modo sic est quod illud quod est in (om. R) ratione . . .
2.2. Reconstruction of Different Versions of the Text. Text Samples

Different versions can be reconstructed from conjunctive errors of single
manuscripts.
2.2. 1 . Reconstruction of Version ß. Conjunctive Errors of FK
§ 1 : ... ac etiam eius declaratoris excellentis doctoris magistři (om.
FK) Hervaei . . .
§17:... non abstrahitur (abstrahit FK) vel non separatur realiter . . .
§ 19: ... ens rationis non est aliquid existens subiective realiter in
intellectu nec in aliqua natura reali secundum suum esse reale (om.
FK)...
§23: Ens rationis est modus (om. FK) consequens obiectum
intellectum . . .
§ 29 : Quantum ad secundum est sciendum quod ista opinio probatur

multipliciter (potest confirmari multipliciter et FK potest
multipliciter declarari R).
§ 35 : . . . sed pro tanto dicuntur referri secundum rationem quia aliqua
(om. FK) referuntur ad ipsa.
§ 64 : Illud autem quod est purum nihil sive simpliciter nihil (om. FK)
§ 70 : Caecitas est nulla res formaliter vel nihil formaliter (om. FK) vel
non ens formaliter.
§ 88 : ... secundario movet (om. FK) ad cognitionem privationum et
negationum et entium rationis.
§ 100 : Ad secundum (tertium FK) dico quod . . .
2.2. 2. Reconstruction of Hyparchetype. Conjunctive Errors of FKP
§ 4 : . . . Ergo solum (solus FKP) actus intelligendi est ens rationis . . .
§ 16 : ... sub quorum uno, scilicet sub (om. FKP) qualitate, continetur
actus intelligendi . . .
§ 21 : ... entia rationis non dicuntur esse in intellectu primo modo, id
est (scilicet FKP) subiective . . .
§ 34 : . . . cum conveniat rei, ut sic abstráete (om. FKP) intellecta est . . .
§ 52 : Si realis, ergo terminus eius, qui est ens rationis, erit ens reale
(om. FKP)...
§ 65 : Si ens rationis sortitur nomen entis (om. FKP) ab ente . . .
§ 69 : Homo est prima intentio vel est (om. FKP) species.

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§ 82 : Actus intelligendi est actio solum (om. FKP) secundum r
§86: ... quando actus intelligendi habebit (habet FKP) ra

obiecti cogniti . . .
§ 89 : Nam aliquid habet (potest FKP) esse in ratione obiective .
2.3. Stemma codicum

o
FKP R
3. Editor
3. 1. The
For the
to the cl
columna.
Since a s
compreh
In order
in parent
3.2. App
Explicit
apparatu
apparatus
3.3. Crit
The criti
edition a
omissions etc.
As can be gathered from the stemma, cod. R was authoritative for the
constitution of the text. Only in cases of doubt manuscripts of hyparchetype a have
been consulted, above all F or K, as P is of minor quality. For this reason variants

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of P have been eliminated from the apparatus in order to improve the overall
readability.
4. Abbreviations
a columna 1
add. addidit, additum
b columna 2
c corpus articuli
cf. conferatur
corr. correxit, correctum
ed. edidit, editio
fol. folio
mg. additum in margine
inv. invertit, inversum
lac. lacuna
n. numerus
om. omisit, omissum

PL Patrologia Latina , ed. J. P. Mignę, 217 vols., Paris 1844-1855, and 4 vols.
Indices, Paris 1 862- 1 864
r recto
s. I. additum supra lineam

v verso
5 . Supplementary Note : de Rijk 's E
In the appendix G of his edition o

Lambert M. de Rijk provided a first
Reason. De Rijk' s edition is a good an
should be regarded as a provisional edi
manuscripts tradition but bases itsel
second, it contains some misprinting
For these reasons, we think that a new
(79) GlRALDUS Odonis O.F.M., Opera philoso

Leiden-Boston 2005, p. 745-775.
(80) Some cases: de Rijk' s edition, p. 750,
lin. 17 : producit instead of producitur ; p. 755
stile instead of scibile ; p. 765, lin. 22 : nichil
morales.

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Franciscus DE PRATO
TRACTATUS DE ENTE RATIONIS
(l)Quoniam testante beato Gregorio1 multis est cura «perversa lauda

« recta » corrumpere, quorum quosdam ignorantia premit, quosdama proterv
elatio erigit, adeo, ut doctrinam veridicam doctoris egregii sancti Thomae
etiam eius declaratoris excellentis doctoris magistři b Hervaei denig
conenturc, ne talium indiscreta0 scriptura ete importunaf doctrina ac nos
iuvenibus plurimum noxiaß nimium invalescat, cogitavi ad brevem tractat
reducere aliqua in operibus magistři Hervaei dispersim reperta, quae s
introductoria ad scientiam sancti Thomae et magistři Hervaei doctrinam. Q
tractatus, ut eius doctrina11 habeatur1 clariorJ, capitulis distinguetur.
(2) Primo videndum estk quid importetur1 per ens reale et ens rationism
quomodo abn in vicem différant. Pro quo sciendum est quod opinio aliquor
antiquorum2 fuit et est etP aliquorum modernorum3, praecipue Guill
Ockham4, quod ens rationis sit actus intelligendi tam rectus quam reflexus. Q
probatur duabus rationibus 1
(3) Prima talis est : Illud ens quod distinguitur contra omne ens existensr e
animam est actus intelligendi. Sed ens rationis est huiusmodi. Ergo et cete
Minor patet per Philosophum V et VI Metaphysicae 5, qui di vidit ens s commun
dictum in ens in anima et1 ens extra animam, et per ens in anima intelligunt o
(a) quosdam] quodam F (b) magistři om. FK (c)conentur] conarentur K (d) indiscreta
indiscreta R (e) et] ex K (f) importuna] inopportuna F (g) noxia add. et FK (h) doctrina] noti
(i) habeatur add. in FK (j)clarior om. FK (k)est om. K (1) importetur] importatur R (m
reale... rationis] ens rationis et ens reale K (n)ab] ad KR (o) aliquorum om. FK (p)et om
(q) rationibus add. quarum FK (r) existens mg. R (s) ens om. F (t) et add. inFK
(I)Gregorius MAGNUS, Moralia in lob , lib. VII, 37, ed. M. Adriaen, Corpus Chrisdanor
Series Latina 143, Turnhout 1979, p. 377, lin. 2-5.
(2) E.g. ARIST., Metaph. , V, 7, 1017a7-b9.
(3) E.g. Godefridus DE Fontibus, Quodlibet IX, q. 19, ed. J. HOFFMANS, Les Philoso
belges , t. IV, Louvain 1924, p. 270-281; GUALTERUS DE CHATTON, Reportado I, d. 3, q.2,
G.GÁL, in «Gualteri de Chatton et Guillelmi de Ockham controversia de natura conc
universalis», Franciscan Studies , 27 (1967), p. 199-212; Henricus DE Gandavo, Quodlib
Magistři Henrici Goethals a Gandavo doctoris solemnis , IV, q. 8, ed. Parisiis 1518 (repr. Lo
1961), fol.98v; V, q. 14, fols. 174r-179v; lOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, Ordinatio , I, d.27, q.
Vaticana, t. VI, Civitas Vaticana 1963, p. 87, n.59; JACOBUS DE ViTERBIO, Disputado prim
quolibet , q. 1, ed. E. YPMA, Cassiciacum , Supplement bd. I, Würzburg 1968, p. 7.
(4)Guillelmus DE Ockham, Ordinatio , I, d. 2, q. 8, ed. S.F.BROWN adlaborante G.G
Opera theologica II, St. Bonaventure, New York 1970, p.291, lin. 7-10; Exposido in lib
Perihermenias Aristotelis , prooem., § 6, edd. A. GAMB ATESE - S. F. BROWN, Opera philosoph
St. Bonaventure, New York 1978, p. 35 1-358 ; Summa Logicae , pars I, cap. 12, edd. PH. BOEHN
G.GÁL - S.F.Brown, Opera philosophica I, St. Bonaventure, New York 1974, p.42, lin. 3
lin. 39 ; Quodlibeta septem , IV, q. 35, ed. J.C. WEY, Opera theologica IX, St. Bonaventure, New
1980, p. 469-474.
(5) ARIST., Metaph. , V, 7, 1017a22-35; VI, 4, 1027bl7-1028a6.

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FRANCISCUS DEPRATO'S TRACTATUS DE ENTE RATIONIS 287
philosophi et doctores ens rationis, et per ens extra animam intelligunt ens reale.
Maiorem probat Guillelmusu Ockham6 sic, quiav nullum ens potest distingui
contra omne w ens extra animam nisi sit in anima subiective, et istax videtur esse y
satis nota. Nullum autem ens est in anima subiective secundum eum nisi actus
intelligendi, quia ipse vult quod species intelligibilis, actus2 intelligendi et
verbum mentale sint idem realiter, quia frustra ponitur distinctio et multiplicatio
inter aliqua inter quae aeque bene a potest sal vari unitas et identitas. Sed non debet
fieri «per plura, quod potest fieri per pauciora»7, ut patet I Physicorum 8. Sed
omnia quae dicuntur de specie b, de actu et de verbo mentali, possuntc attribuì soli d
actui ete salvari per solum actum, ut dicit. Sequitur ergo quod ens rationis sit actus
intelligendi f.
(4) Secunda ratio est ista : Pro tanto aliquod ens s dicitur ens rationis quia non
habet esse «nisi in ratione» et quia ratio «utitur» ipsoh ad1 aliud «vel propter
aliud J»9, id est propter obiectum. Sed nullum ens habet istas condiciones nisi
actus intelligendi. Ergo solum k actus intelligendi est ens rationis. Maior videtur
esse nota, quia, si aliquod ens haberet esse extra rationem, iam non posset dici ens
rationis, sed potius ens reale1. Etiam videtur quod m ratio fabricēt entia rationis utn
negotietur ° in eis loco et viceP obiectorum. Minor probatur, quia actus intelligendi
habet esse subiective solum i in anima. Etiam anima utitur actu intelligendi prop-
ter obiectum, quia per r actum intelligendi intelligitur s obiectum. Ergo et cetera.
(5) Tertio arguitur ab aliis sic: Omne ens intentionale est ens rationis. Sed
actus intelligendi est ens intentionale. Ergo est ens rationis. Maior patet, quia
omne ens aut est ens reale aut ens rationis l. Sed ens intentionale distinguitur contra
(u) Guillelmus om. FK (v)quia] quod K (w)omne om. FK (x)ista] illa K (y)esse om. FK
(z) actus] actum F (a) bene om. FK (b) specie add. et FK (c) possunt] potest FK (d) soli] solo FR
(e) et add. potest K (f) ens rationis. . .intelligendi] actus intelligendi sit ens rationis vel e converso FK
(g) ens om. K (h) ipso] ilio F (i) ad om. R (j) aliud] aliquid K (k) solum] solus FK (1) reale add. hoc
FK (m)quod] ut FK (n)ut s.l. R (o) negotietur] negotientur R (p)vice] voce FK (q) subiective
solum] solum obiective FK (r) per] propter FK (s) intelligitur] intelligit K (t) sed actus intelligendi
. . . rationis om. R
(6) Guillelmus de Ockham, Summa Logicae, pars I, cap. 57, p. 185, lin. 5 1-54; Expositio in
libros Physicorum Aristotelis, lib. I, cap. 1 1, § 9, edd. V. RICHTER - G. Leibold, Opera philosophica
IV, St. Bonaventure, New York 1985, p. 1 1 8, lin. 6-7 ; Ordinatio , I, prol., q. 1 , ed. G. GÁL adlaborante
S. F. BROWN, Opera theologica I, St. Bonaventure, New York 1967, p. 74, lin. 22-23.
(7) E.g. Guillelmus DE Ockham, Summa Logicae , pars I, cap. 12, p. 43, lin. 34-35 ; Expositio in
libros Physicorum Aristotelis , lib. I, cap. 13, § 4, p. 133, lin. 3 ; lib. Ill, cap. 2, § 51, p. 423, lin. 70, et
p. 432, lin. 54-55 ; lib. IV, cap. 6, § 1, edd. R. WOOD-R. GREEN -G. GÁL-J. GIERMEK -F.E. Kelley
- G. LEIBOLD - G.I.Etzkorn, Opera philosophica V, St. Bonaventure, New York 1985, p. 51,
lin. 46; lib. IV, cap. 17, §11, p. 183, lin. 3-4; Ordinatio , I, d. 14, q.2, ed. G.I.ETZKORN, Opera
theologica III, St. Bonaventure, New York 1977, p. 430, lin. 1 .
(8) ARIST. , Phys., 1, 4, 1 88a 1 7- 1 8 ; 1, 6, 1 89a 1 5- 1 6 ; VIII, 6, 259a8- 1 0.
(9) Guillelmus de Ockham, Summa Logicae , pars I, cap. 40, p. 1 13, lin. 64.

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ens reale. Ergo est ens rationis u. Minor patet per hoc, quia secundum
anima est ens intentionale. Sed actus intelligendi est ens in anima. Erg
(6) Quarto sic : Actus intelligendi non est ens reale. Ergo est en
Consequentia patet per hoc, quia dew quolibet* ente est verum dic
ensz reale vel ens rationis. Sed probo antecedens, quia, si actus inte
ens reale, esset a in aliquo decem praedicamentorum, cum decem pr
dividant sufficienter ens reale. Sed actus intelligendi non est in a
praedicamentorum b. Ergo non est ens reale. Maior est nota. Prob
quia, si actus intelligendi esset in aliquo d praedicamentorum, praec
praedicamento qualitatis. Sed hoc est falsum, quia, ut de se patet, non
specie, quia non est figura vel forma e constans circa quantitatem, nec
quia non est passio vel f passibilis qualitas, quia tales qualitates sunt
in secunda, quia non est naturalis potential vel impotentia, nec in pr
est habitus velh dispositio 10. Ergo et cetera.
(7) Contra istam opinionem arguo sic : Nullum ens rationis est en
omnis actus intelligendi est verum ens reale. Ergo nullus actus intel
rationis. Maior patet1: Ens rationis distinguitur contra ens reale c
dictum. Et ideo ens rationis non esfi reale k, sicut etiam quod distin
substantiam absolute dietam1, non est substantia"1. Probo minorem" m
(8) Primo0 sic: Illud est ens reale quod dicit perfectionem simp
actus intelligendi est huiusmodi. Ergo et cetera. Maior probatur p, qui
reale quod formaliter q dicit perfectionem realem. Sed quod dicit p
simpliciter, dicit perfectionem realem. Et per consequens est ens re
minorem, quia illud dicit r perfectionem simpliciter, quod melius es
non habere si ve quod habens est melius vel nobiliuss non habente*.
nobilius" est intelligere sivev habere actum intelligendi quam non i
non habere actum intelligendi w. Ergo actus intelligendi dicit per
simpliciter et per consequens est ens reale et non* ens rationis.
(9) Secundo sic : Nostra formalis beatitudo est verum ens reale.
formalis beatitudo est actus intelligendi. Ergo actus intelligendi e
reale. Probo maioremy, quia nostra formalis2 beatitudo est ultima3
(u) rationis add. minor patet per hoc quia secundum omnes ens in anima distingu
reale ergo est ens rationis FK (v) ergo et cetera om. R (w) de s. I. R (x) quolibet] quo
est K (z)ens om. R (a) esset] esse F (b)cum decem praedicamenta... praedicame
(c) probo minorem] probatio minons F minoris probado K (d) aliquo add. decem
forma] forma nec figura F forma neque figura K (f) vel] nec FK (g) potentia] passio
(i) patet add. quia FK (j) est add. ens FK (k) reale add. communiter dictum FK (1)
communiter vel absolute acceptant R (m) substantia] substantiam R (n) probo m
(o) primo sic om. FK (p) probatur add. quod R (q) formaliter om. FK (r) dicit om.
nobilius] perfectius K (t)sive quod habens... habente om. F (u)nobilius] perfectiu
FK (w)quam non intelligere... intelligendi om. R (x)non add. est K (y) probo ma
maiorisK (z) formalis om. F (a) ultima] formaliter F
(10) ARIST., Cat., 8, 8b25-10a24.

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perfectio, quae a nobis haben possitb, per quamc sumus perfecti realiter. Ens
autem rationis non facit nos perfectos0 realiter, cum non dicat perfectionem
realem. Minor etiam est nota tame per Aristotelem n, qui ponit nostrani felicita-
tem in actu speculativo intellectus, quam etiam perf doctores 12, qui dicuntß quod
nostra beatitudoh consistit in actu intellectus. Ergo et cetera.
(10) Tertio sic : Illud est ens reale quod producitur1 actione^ reali. Sed actus
intelligendi est huiusmodi. Ergo et cetera. Maior probatur per hoc, quia pro tanto
aliqua actio dicitur k esse realis quia habet terminům realem. Minor probatur, quia
actus intelligendi producitur1 realiter"1 per realem actionem intellectus agentis" et
etiam per realem actionem0 phantasmatis.
(11) Quarto 13 sic, quiaP illud est ens reale de quo considérât philosophus
naturalis. Sed actus intelligendi est huiusmodi. Ergo et cetera. Maior patet ex hoc,
quia naturalis philosophia dicitur scientia realis pro tanto ^ quia considérât de ente
reali, sicut logica dicitur scientia rationalisr quia tractat de ente rationis. Minor
patet, nam Philosophus, III De anima14, tractats de actu intelligendi. Ergo et
cetera.
(12) Quinto115, quia maiorem entitatem et perfectionem" habent accidentia

animae quam accidentia corporis v. Sed accidentia corporis wx, puta albedo et
nigredo et sie de aliis, sunt entia realia. Ergo et accidentia animae, puta actus
intelligendi, erunt entia realia.
(13) Sexto, quia illud est ens reale quod habet esse in praedicamento reali y.
Sed actus intelligendi est in praedicamento reali, scilicet qualitatis. Maior est nota
de se. Minor etiam apparet veraza. Ergo et ceterab.
(b)possit] potest F (c)quam om. R (d) perfectos] perfectiores K (e) tam om. R (f)per add.
muitos FK (g) dicunt] ponunt FK (h) nostra beatitudo mv. FK (i) producitur add. in K (j) actione
mg. K (k) dicitur ante aliqua FK (1) producitur] producit FK (m) realiter per om. FK (n) agentis]
agens K (o)per realem actionem om. FK (p)quia om. FK (q) dicitur... tanto] dicitur pro tanto
philosophia seu scientia naturalis sive realis F pro tanto naturalis scientia sive realis K (r) rationalis]
rationis FK (s) tractat] considérât FK (t) quinto add. sic K (u) et perfectionem om. K (v) accidentia
corporis inv. F (w) sed accidentia corporis om. R (x) corporis] corporum F (y) reali] realis qualitatis
R (z)sed actus intelligendi... vera om. R (a) vera om. K (b) cetera add. responsio Ockham et
sequentium eum K
(11) ARIST., Eth. Nic. , X, 7-8, 1 1 77a 12-11 79a32.

(12) Albertus Magnus, Super Ethica , lib. X, lec. 1 1, ed. W. Kübel, ed. Coloniensis, t. XIV,
pars II, Münster 1987, p. 747b-755b; Ethica, lib. X, tract. 2, ed. A. BORGNET, Opera omnia VII, Paris
1891, p.621a-633b; THOMAS DE AQUINO, Sententia libri Ethicorum , X, 10, ed. Leonina, t. XLVII,
vol. 2, Rome 1969, p. 582-585.
(13)Hervaeus Nat ALIS, Quolibeta undeeim cum octo ipsius profundissimis tractatibus ,
Quodl. III, q. 1, ed. Venetiis 1513 (repr. Ridgewood, N.J. 1966), fol. 68ra.
( 1 4) ARIST. , De an. , III, 3-8, 427a 1 7-432a 1 4.
(15) Hervaeus Nat alis, Quodl. III, q. 1 , fol. 68ra.

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( 14) Ad ista obiecta respondet Guillelmus Ockham 16 et quidam al

quodc actus intelligendi potest dupliciter considerali : uno modo,
actus intelligendi est in see quidam actus et quaedam forma perfici
intellectivam. Et isto modo actus intelligendi est verum ens reale, s
sex rationes superius positae. Alio modo g potest considerali ut acci
vice obiecti, id est inquantum repraesentat suum obiectum. Et ist
intelligendi est ens rationis et ens diminutum. Et dicit 18 quod di visi
reale et ens rationis non esth di visio 1 in duo simpliciter opposita,
animal dividitur in rationale et in non rationale k. Sed per di visi
importatur, ut dicit119, quodm ensn reale quod est in anima0 distin
reali quod est extra animam. Unde ipse non vult quod ens rationis d
ente reali p communiter dieto sive ab omni^ ente reali, cum secund
rationis sit quoddam ens reale existens in anima. Sed vult quod
distinguatur solum r ab omni ente reali existente s extra animam20.
(15) Contra istum modum ponendi vel declarandi et1 etiam
conclusionem arguitur multipliciter u.
(16) Primo sic v : Quod continetur sub ente extra animam, non est e
Sed actus intelligendi continetur sub ente extra animam. Ergo no
anima. Maior patet V, VIW Metaphysicae21 . Et probatur per
Ockham x22, qui dicit quod ens in anima distinguitur contra ens ext
Minor patet, quia secundum Philosophum ibidem ens extra animam
decem praedicamenta, sub quorum2 uno, scilicet suba qualitate, con
intelligendi.
(c) quod om. K (d) inquantum add. in se FK (e) in se ante est K om. F (f) probant add. illae K
(g) modo add. actus intelligendi FK (h) est s.l. R (i) divisio om. FK (j) quo] quod R (k) in rationale
. . . rationale] morale F in rationale K (1) ut dicit ante importatur FK (m) quod om. FK (n) ens mg. R
(o) anima add. quod FK (p) reali] reale F (q)omni post reali FK (r) distinguatur solum] solum
distinguitur F solum distinguatur K (s) existente] quod est FK (t) et] vel FK (u) arguitur multipli-
citer] arguo F arguitur K (v) primo sic inv. F (w) V VI] et V et VI FK (x) probatur. . .Ockham] patet
per eum K (y) et probatur. . . animam om. F (z) quorum add. scilicet F (a) sub om. FK
(16) ex Hervaeo Nat ALIS, Quodl. III, q. 1, fol.68ra. Vide etiam STEPHANUS DE REATE,
Scriptum super Porphyrium, prol., q. 1 ( Utrum eñs rationis sit subiectum in loyca ), ms. Wroclaw,
Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, IV. Q. 4, fol. 2rb : « Set contra hoc est oppinio fratris Guilhelmi Ocham,
qui dicit quod ens rationis est actus intelligendi. Set actus intelligendi potest accipi dupliciter : uno
modo vice sui, et isto modo actus intelligendi non est ens rationis ; alio modo potest accipi vice rei
intellecte, et isto modo actus intelligendi est ens rationis. Hoc autem - ut dicit - est de mente
Phylosophi, V Methaphysice ».
(17) Non invenimus. Sed vide Hervaeus Natalis, Tractatus de secundis intentionibus , q. II,
a. 1 , ed. Parisiis 1489, fol. c.iii r-v.
(18) Guillelmus de Ockham, Summa Logicae , pars I, cap. 40, p. 1 1 3, lin. 60-85.
( 1 9) Ibid. , pars I, cap. 40, p. 1 1 3, lin. 67-74.
(20) Ibid. , pars I, cap. 40, p. 1 1 3, lin. 60-79.
(2 1 ) ARIST., Metaph. , V, 7, 1017a22-35; VI, 4, 1027bl7-1028a6.
(22) Guillelmus de Ockham, Sum. Log. , pars I, cap. 40, p. 1 1 3, lin. 67-74.

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FRANCISCUS DE PRATO'S TRACTATUS DE ENTE RATION IS 29 1
(17) Secundo23 sic : Hoc ens rationis, scilicet esse abstractum b, non convenit
illi quod est realiter separatum ab individuis contends sub re intellecta, quia
universale, cui convenit esse abstractum respectu particularium, non abstrahiturc
vel nond separatur realiter ab ipsis particularibus, quia universale non habet esse
realiter in rerum natura praeter particulada. Sed actus intelligendi, qualiter-
cumquee accipiatur, est realiter separātus ab individuis contends sub re intellecta.
Ergo et cetera. Probo minorem f, quia, quod realiter et universalité^ et vere nega-
tur ab aliquo, est realiter ab ipso divisum. Sed actus intelligendi, sive accipiatur ut
est quidam actus reads sive accipiatur vice obiecti sive vice rei intellectae, esth
realiter ed universadter et vere negatasi ab ipsis individuis, ut si intelligo homi-
nem, Socrates, qui est sub homine, non estk realiter1 actus intelligendi, quomo-
documque accipiatur actus intelligendi. Ergo actus intelligendi est quid realiter"1
divisum ab omnibus individuis contends sub obiecto intellectus, et per
consequens illud ens rationis, scilicet esse abstractum, non est actus intelligendi.
(18)Praeterean, di visio entis in ens° in anima et inP ens extra animam est
di visio entis in duo entia, quorum i unum non est realiter alterum. Istud dictum
patet VIr Metaphysicae 24 , ubi Aristoteles s dividit ens in anima contra ens extra
animam distinctum in decem praedicamenta1, de quo intendit tractare in
Metaphysica. Sed opinio superius posita ponit quod idem ensu est ensv reale et
ens w rationis diversimode consideratum. Nam dicit quod idem actus intelligendi,
ut est quaedam forma perficiens intellectum est ens reale etx ut tenet vicem y
obiecti est ens rationis. Ergo idem erit ens reale et ens rationis2; quod est falsum,
ut patet per superius dieta et per ea quae dicentur inferiusa.
(19) Et ideo est alia opinio beati Thomae et maģistri Hervaei25, quaeb ponit
quod ens rationis non est aliquidc existens subiective realiter0 in intellectu nec in
aliqua natura reali secundum suum esse reale e, sed est quidam modus consequens
obiectum intellectus, inquantum illud obiectum est intellectum ab intellectu, ita
(b)esse abstractum inv. F (c) abstrahitur] abstrahit FK (d)non lac. F (e) qualitercumque]
qualiscumque FK (f) probo minorem] probatio minoris FK (g) realiter et universaliter] universaliter
realiter F (h) est om. F (i) et] quod ex sive corr. R om. F (j)negatus] negatur F (k)est om. R
(1) realiter om. FK (m) realiter] reale FK (n) praeterea] propterea F prima K (o) in ens om. K (p) in
om. FK (q) quorum] quarum K (r) VI om. K] V F (s) Aristoteles] Philosophus FK (t) praedicamenta
add. et R (u) ens om. K (v) ens om. F (w) ens om. F (x) et om. R (y) tenet vicem] se tenet vice F tenet
se vice K (z) rationis add. ut dictum est FK (a) ut patet... inferius] et per ea quae dicentur inferius
clarius ostendetur FK (b) quae] qui K (c) aliquid] aliud F (d) realiter post intellectu FK (e) nec . . .
reale om. FK
(23) Hervaeus Natalis, Ouodl. III, a. 1 , fol. 68rb.

(24) Arist., Metaph. , V, 7, 1017a22-35; VI, 4, 1027bl7-1028a6.
(25) E.g. THOMAS DE Aquino, In duodeeim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expo sitio, lib. IV,
lec. 4, ed. R.M. Spiazzi, ed. Marietti, Taurini-Romae 1964, p. 160, n. 574; Hervaeus Natalis, In
quatuor libros Sententiarum Commentario, lib. II, d. 1, q. 1, a. 3, ed. Parisiis 1647 (repr. Farnborough
1 966), p. 203Ca ; Tr. de sec. int. , q. I, a. 1 , fol. a.iii r-b. v r ; q. II, a. 1 , fol. c.iii r-v.

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quod ens rationis non tenet sef ex parte actus intelligendi, sed tenet s
intellectae sive obiecti intellecti, inquantum etiam intellectum ests.
(20) Ad cuius opinionish evidentiam faciam tria, quia primo dec
opinionem1, secundo earn probabo, tertio arguam contra ea
obiectiones.
(21) Quantum ad primum sciendum esri quod aliquid dicitur esse in intellectu
duobus modis26. Uno modo subiective, sicut species intelligibilis k, actus intelli-
gendi, conceptus mentis et1 habitus intellectuales sunt subiective in intellectu quia
sunt in eo sicut in subiecto. Secundo modo dicitur aliquid m esse inn intellectu
obiecti ve. Esse autem in intellectu obiecti ve idem est quod0 esse in prospectu
intellectus p, sicut cognitum esti in cognoscente eo modo quor dicitur esse in
prospectu hominis totums illud quod homo videt. Modo1 sic est quod entia rationis
non dicuntur esse in intellectu primo modo, id estu subiective, quiav quae w sunt in
anima subiective sunt entia realia, sed dicuntur entia rationis esse in intellectu*
secundo modo, scilicet? obiective.
(22) Ubi est etiam za notandum quod esse inb intellectu obiective potest esse
duobus modis. Uno modo est aliquid in intellectu obiective0, quia scilicet est
obiectum cognitum ab intellectu d, et illud quod est isto modoe in f intellectu non
est semper ens rationis. Immo taie obiectum cognitum potest esse tarn ens reale
quam ens rationis g. Alio modo potest esse aliquid h in intellectu obiective1, non
quia sit obiectum cognitum, sed quia est quidam modus consequens obiectum ut
cognitum estJ, et illud quod isto modo estk obiective in intellectu1 semper est ens
rationis.
(23) Concludo ergom: Ens rationis potest sic definiri sive describi: Ens
rationis est modus" consequens obiectum intellectum0, inquantum obiectum
cognitum est.
(24) Per istam p opinionem salvantur clare omnia i quae dicuntur communiter
de ente rationis, quae sunt tria.
(25) Primum est quod ensr rationis distinguitur contra omne ens reale, et hoc
ponit istas positio*, quae non dicit quod ens rationis sit res, sed dicit quodu est
(f) tenet se inv. FK (g) etiam... est] intellecti F est intellecti K est intellectum R (h) opinionis]
positionis FK (i) opinionem] positionem FK (j) sciendum est inv. FK (k) intelligibilis om. F (1) et
om. F (m) dicitur aliquid inv. K (n)in s.l. F om. R (o)quod add. est F (p) intellectus] intellectu K
(q)estom. FK (r) quo] quod R (s) totum om. FK (t) modo] non K (u) id est] scilicet FK (v) quia add.
illaFK (w) quae s./. F (x) intellectu] anima FK (y) scilicet] id est FK (z) est etiam inv. FK (a) etiam
s.l. R (b) in s.l. F (c) obiective ante in K (d) ab intellectu om. FK (e) modo add. obiective FK (f) in
s.l. F (g) tam... rationis] ens reale et ens rationis indifferenter FK (h) aliquid ante potest FK
(i) obiective ante in K (j) est om. FK (k) est ante isto F (1) obiective in intellectu] intellectu obiective
F in intellectu K (m) ergo add. quod FK (n) modus om. FK (o) intellectum] intellectus F om. K
(p) istam] illam K add. enim FK (q) omnia add. illa FK (r)ens] est rationis R (s)ista] illa K
(t) positio] opinio FK (u) dicit quod om. F
(26) Hervaeus Nat ALIS, 7>. de sec. int., q. I, a. 1 , fol. a.iii v-a.iiii r; Quodl. III, q. 1 , fol. 68rb.

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modus consequens rem intellectam, non secundum se vel secundum suum esse
reale, sed inquantum est intellectav.
(26) Secundum quod dicitur de ente rationis est quod est ens in anima, et hoc w
ponit istax positio, quae dicit quod ens rationis est ens in anima y non subiective,
sed obiectivez.
(27) Tertium quod dicitur de ente rationis est quod est fabricatum ab intellectu,
quod optime sal vat istaa opinio, quae dicit quod ens rationis consequiturb rem
intellectam nonc secundum suum esse reale vel per opus naturae, sed inquantum
est intellecta. Non autem est resd intellecta nisi per opus intellectus, id est per
actum intelligendi. Si autem ens rationis esset actus intelligendie, non distin-
gueretur contra omne f ens reale, cum actus intelligendi sit quoddam ens reale ; nec
etiam esset fabricatums ab intellectu, sed potius ah phantasmate et a1 rebus extra,
cum actus intelligendi causeturJ ak phantasmatibus, aliquando etiam a rebus
exterioribus.
(28) Hie1 est notandum27 quod, cum ens rationis teneat se ex parte rei
intellectae sive obiecti intellecti et non ex parte animae vel intellectus sive actus
intelligendi, est clare m quoddam ens rationis quod convenit rei intellectae vel
obiecto intellecto in ordine ad actum intelligendi, et tale ens rationis vocatur
intentionalitas sive habitudo rei intellectae vel n obiecti intellecti. Et a0 tali ente
rationis obiectum intellectumP denominatur intendo. Est vero quoddam aliud
ens rationis quod convenit rei intellectae in ordine ad rem intellectam, et tale
ens rationis est multiplex, secundum quod diversimode una res intellecta i com-
paratur ad aliam rem intellectam, et sic etiam importatur per diversa nomina,
quae sunt ista, scilicet r 'universale', 'particulare', 'singulare', 'abstractum',
'species', 'genus' s, 'differentia', 'proprium', 'ventas', 'falsitas', 'antece-
dens'1, 'consequens'0, ' Syllogismus', 'praedicatum' v, 'subiectum' w, 'proposi-
ti' x et similia. Omnia istay formaliter accepta important ens rationis. Et haec
sufficiant de primo2.
(29) Quantum ad secundum est sciendum quod istaa opinio probatur
multipliciterb.
(v)non secundum se... intellecta] ut intellecta est FK (w)hoc om. F (x)ista] ilia K (y) anima
add. Scilicet K (z)obiective add. existens in intellectu FK (a) ista] ilia K (b) consequitur] non
sequitur FK (c) non om. FK (d) res om. FK (e) ens rationis. . .intelligendi] actus intelligendi esset ens
rationis FK (f)omne om. K (g) fabricatum] fabricatus K (h)a] ab R (i) a om. FK (j)causetur]
causaturF (k)a]abR (1) hic add. autem FK (m) clare] dare F (n) vel] sive FK add. habitudo K (o)a]
ab R (p) intellectum] intellectus FK (q) intellecta om. FK (r) scilicet om. F (s) species genus inv. F
(t) antecedens om. K (u) antecedens consequens inv. F (v) praedicatum] praedicamentum R
(w) subiectum om. KR (x) propositio om. FKR (y) ista] illa K (z)et haec... primo om. FK (a) ista]
illa K (b) probatur multipliciter] potest confirmari multipliciter et FK potest multipliciter declarari R
(27) Hervaeus Natalis, Tr. de sec. int. , q. I, a. 2, fol. a. viii r.

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(30) Primo sic: Philosophus, distinguensc V Metaphysicae 28 de

ordine relati vorum, dicit quod relativa tertii e ordinis ita se haben
refertur ad aliud secundum rem, aliud secundum rationem, sicut sci
ad scibile et mensuratum ad mensuram secundum rem, sed scibile
scientiam et mensura ad mensuratum secundum rationem f29. Sed r
per quam scibile refertur ad scientiam vel ad scientem, non est actu
sed est quidam modus ß vel quaedam relatio tenens se ex parte ob
cetera.
(31) Secundo sic : Relatio identitatis, per quam idem refertur ad se ipsum, est
relatio rationis sive ens rationis, cum relatio realis requirat extrema distincta
realiter1130. Sed identitas non est actus intelligendi, immo est quaedam relatio1
conveniens rei existenti extra intellectum, inquantum intellectusJ accipit rem
illam ut duo extrema illius relationis, scilicet identitatis k.
(32) Tertio sic: Relatio Dei ad creaturam possibilem est relatio rationis31,
licet1 relatio Dei ad creaturam actualem sive actu existentem, secundum
quosdam32, sit relatio realis, et tarnen illa relatio"1 non est actus intelligendi, sed
est relatio" fabricata per intellectum0.
(33)QuartoP33 sic : Universalitas per^ praedicationem, quae est ens rationis,
convenit illi quod est indifferens ad plura, quorum unumquodque est ipsum, sicut
quando Petrus intelligit equum universaliter, illa universalitas equir intellecti uni-
versaliter convenit equo absolute aeeepto, qui equus convenit singularibus equis,
quorum quilibet est equus, et illa universalitas non convenit actui intelligendi, qui
est in Petro, cum ille actus sit singularis. Ergo illud ens rationis non tenet ses ex
parte actus intelligendi, sed tenet se1 ex parte rei intellectae.
(34) Quinto sic: Scientia est de universalibus abstractis et separatis a
singularibus, ut patet I Posteriorum 34. Sed illa abstractio et" separatio non est
(c) distinguens add. in FK (d) triplice] tertio K (e) tertii ordinis inv. FK (f) aliud secundum
rationem. . .rationem] et aliud secundum rationem sicut scientia refertur ad scibile secundum rem vel
(et K) mensura ad mensuratum FK sed et mensuratum ad mensuram sed scibile refertur ad scientiam
secundum rationem et mensuram ad mensuratum R (g) modus] motus R (h) requirat... realiter]
requirat duo extrema distincta formaliter F teneat duo extrema distincta formaliter K extrema dicta
realiter R (i) relatio] ratio K (j) intellectus] intellectum R (k) identitatis] identitas R (1) relatio
dei . . . licet om. F (m) relatio] ratio K (n) relatio] ratio K (o) per intellectum] ab intellectu F (p) quarto
add. arguitur FK (q) per add. per R (r) equi] quae F qui K (s) tenet se inv. FK (t) tenet se inv. F (u) et]
siveFK
(28) ARIST., Metaph. , V, 15, 1020b26- 1021b 12.

(29) Vide THOMAS de Aquino, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q. 1 , a. 5, ad 15, ed. Leonina,
t. XXII, vol. I, fase. 2, Rome 1970, p. 21a-b.
(30) Thomas DE Aquino, Qu. de ver. , q. 1 , a. 5, ad 1 5, p. 2 1 a.
(3 1 ) Thomas de Aquino, Qu. de ver. , q. 1 , a. 5, ad 1 5, p. 2 1 b.
(32) E.g. Guillelmus de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, d. 30, q. 5, edd. G.I. Etzkorn - F.E. Kelley,
Opera theologica , IV, St. Bonaventure, New York 1979, p. 384, lin. 22 - 385, lin. 15.
(33) Hervaeus Natalis, Quodl. III, q. 1 , fol. 68ra-b.
(34) ARIST., Anal. Post., 1, 33, 88b30-32.

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realis, alias rediret opinio Platonis. Ergo est secundum rationem, ita quod ilia
abstractio est ens rationis. Et tarnen illa abstractio non est subiective in intellectu,
sed solum obiective, cum conveniat v rei ut sic abstráete w intellecta est.
(35) Sexto sic : Dextrum et sinistrum in columna, secundum omneš, dicunt*
relationem rationis y et non secundum remza, et tarnen illae relationes non dicunt
formaliter0 actum intelligendi nec fundantur inc actud intelligendi, sed tenente se
ex parte rei intellectae, quia conveniunt columnae diversimode consideratae in
ordine ad nos. Sed forte dicetur quod columnaf vel scibile non dicuntur referri
secundum rationem, quia aliqua relatio secundum rationem sit in eis, sed pro tanto
dicuntur referri secundum rationem quia aliqua ß referuntur ad ipsa. Sed hoc non
valet, quia omnis relatio denominai suum subiectumh denominatane intrinseca
et1 est in eo quod per ipsam refertur, et sic relatio secundum rationem est in eo
quod refertur secundum rationem.
(36) Septimo sicJ : Distinctio quae est inter hominem et animai, et distinctio
quae est inter relationem k et divinam essentiam, et distinctio quae est inter
attributa divina, et distinctio quae est inter ens et bonum, et sic de multis aliis, sunt
distinctiones secundum rationem, et per consequens sunt entia rationis, licet illa in
quibus fundantur illae distinctiones sint entia realia. Sed tarnen illae distinctiones
non dicunt formaliter actum intelligendi1, quia distinctio quae tenet sem ex parte
actuum intelligendi est distinctio realis, cum diversi actus intelligendi distinguan-
te realiter. Ergo tales distinctiones tenent11 se ex parte obiectorum si ve ex parte
rerum intellectarum et sunt quidam modi0 consequentes res non secundum esse
earumP reale, sed prout diversimode obiciuntur intellectui. Et sic patet de
secundo q.
(37) Quantum ad tertium est sciendum quod contra istamr opinionem arguitur
multipliciter.
(38) Primo sic : « Si ens rationis distinguiti^ contra» omnes «ens reale», « tunc
ens rationis erit nulla res, et per consequens » ens rationis erit « nihil ». « Sed hoc est
inconveniens, ergo et cetera » 35. Consequentia patet per magistrům Hervaeum136,
qui dicit quod nulla res et nihil convertunturu. Falsitas consequentis probatur
multipliciter.
(v) conveniat add. solum FK (w) sic abstráete om. FK (x) dicunt om. F (y) rationis om. R
(z) et... rem om. F (a) secundum rem] rei K (b) formaliter om. FK (c)in] supra FK (d)actu] actum
FKR (e) tenent] tenet FKR (f) columna] columnae FK (g) aliqua om. FK (h) suum subiectum inv.
K (i) et] id est R (j) septimo sic] sicut FK (k) relationem] rationem K (1) sed tarnen . . . intelligendi]
ipsorum actuum intelligendi FK (m) tenet se inv. FK (n) tenent] tenet FK (o)modi] modus R
(p) esse earum] eorum esse K inv. F (q) secundo add. impugnado verae opinionis K (r) istam] illam K
(s)omne] omnes F (t) magistrům Hervaeum] beatum Augustinum FK (u) nulla res...convertuntur]
omnino nulla res est nihil FK
(35) Hervaeus Natalis, Quodl. III, q. 1 , fol. 68va.

(36) Ibid.

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(39) Primo sic, quia, si ens rationis est nihil, tunc divisio entis in e
ens rationis v eritw divisio entis* in ens et nihil, et per consequens ess
entis y in ens et non-ens, cum nihil et non-ens convertantur2. Sed h
inconveniens, scilicet quod ens dividaturb in ens et non-ens, sicut eti
divisio esset inconveniens : alborume aliud album et f aliud non-album.
(40) Secundo, «quia s illud quod esth» nulla res vel «nihil non praedicatur de
aliquo ente reali *, quia istaJ est falsa : 'Ens reale est » nulla res vel « nihil k' . Sed ens
rationis praedicatur de ente reali saltem denominative, ut cum dicimus : 'Homo
est universalis' vel 'Homo est species' » 37.
(41) Tertio1: Quia sequeretur quod contradictoria verificarenturm de eodem
simul; quod est impossibile. Probatio consequentiae11, quia, si ens° rationis est
nulla res, sequitur quod sit non-ens, quia nulla res et nonP-ens convertuntur. Et ex
alia parte ponitur quod sit ens, cum siti ens rationis. Et sic ens rationis erit ens et
non-ens.
(42) Quarto r : Si ens rationis est nulla res et nihil, videtur multi
tam excellens doctor quantum fuit magister Hervaeus, qui f
tractatum de secundis intentionibus, quae sunt entia rationis, volu
ad tractandum1 de nihilo si ve de his quae nihil sunt".
(43) Quinto38 : sequeturv quod logica, quae tractat de secundis i
si ve de entibus rationis*, tractarety de nihilo ; quod2 erit a inconven
(44) Secundo principaliter arguiturb quod ens rationis non disti
omnec ensd reale. Primo sice : Quia illud est ens reale quod habet
Sed ens rationis habet causam realem. Ergo est ens reale. Maior pat
alio dicitur aliquid esse causa realis nisi quia habet effectum rea
minorem g, quia intellectus si ve actus intelligendi est causa entiu
entia rationis sint fabricata ab intellectu. Sed intellectus sive actu
causa h realis, ut de se patet. Ergo et cetera.
(v) in ens. . .rationis] rationis et entis rei F in ens rationis et ens rei K (w) erit]
FK(y) entis om. FK (z) convertantur] convertatur R (a) est om. F (b) divi
(c) etiam] et FK (d) ista] illa K (e) alborum] arborum K (f) et om. K post aliud
(h) est om. R (i) praedicatur... reali] potest de aliquo ente reali praedicari
(k) nulla... nihil] nihil vel nulla res F (1) tertio add. sic FK (m) verificarentur
(n) probatio consequentiae] probo consequentiam FK (o) ens add. est R (p) non s
om. FK (r) quarto add. sic FK (s) fecit om. R (t) tractandum] faciendum unum tr
dum tractatum K (u) nihil sunt inv. FK (v) sequetur] quia sequeretur FK (w) inten
(x) rationis add. quod FK (y) tractaret] tractet R (z) quod add. est F (a) quod er
(b) arguitur add. sic scilicet F scilicet K (c) omne ens inv. K (d) ens om. R (e)
(f) dicitur aliquid. . .realem] aliquid dicitur esse reale nisi quia habet causam reale
esse reale causans nisi quia habet causam realem K (g) probo minorem] pr
(h) entium rationis . . .causa om. K
Ol) Ibid.
(38) Hervaeus Natalis, Tr. de sec. int., q. II, a. 3, fol. c.vi v.

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(45) Secundo i sic: Scientia refertur J realiterk ad suum scibile, ut patet V

Metaphysicae39. Sed omnis relatio realis habet terminům realem, cum relatio
dicatur realis a1 termino reali. Sed logica, quae est de ente rationis, est quaedam
scientia. Ergo refertur realiter ad suum scibile, scilicet ad ens rationis. Ergo
oportet quod ens rationis dicat terminům realem et per consequens sit quoddam
ens reale"1.
(46) Tertio sic : Ens rationis " aut est per se existens et sic est substantia, aut est0
alteri P inhaerens et sic est accidens. Sed tam substantia quam accidens est1* ensr
reale s.
(47) Quarto sic : Ens rationis aut est quid increatum et sic est Deus, aut ens
creatum et sic est creatura. Sed tam Deus quam creatura est ens reale1.
(48) Quinto" sic : Quod v fundatur in aliquo secundum suum w esse reale est ens
reale*. Sed aliquod ens rationis est huiusmodi. Ergo et cetera. Maior videtur esse
notay. Sed probatur minor2, quia habitudoa rei intellectae ad actum intelligendib
immediate fundatur super ipsam rem intellectamc et non super actum intelligendi,
quia super actum intelligendi fundatur alia relatio, oppositad, quae est relatio
realis.
(49) Sexto e : Quod est subiective in ente reali est ens f reale. Sed ens rationis ß
est huiusmodi. Ergo et cetera. Maiorh est concessa per magistrům Hervaeum40.
Sed probatur minor, quia plus videntur1 dependere a subiecto entia rationis quam
accidentia corporalia. Sed accidentia corporalia sunt subiective in ente reali. Ergo
multo magis entia rationis. Minor est notai. Sedk probatur maior, quia entia
rationis minus habent de entitate quam1 accidentia corporalia.
(50) Septimo, quia"1 obiectum intellectus comparatur ad intellectum ut
movens ad motum. Nam intellectus movetur ab" obiecto. Sed ens rationis potest
esse obiectum intellectus, cum possit intelligi ab intellectu. Ergo potest movere
intellectum. Sed omne movens ad actum realem est ens reale.
(51) Octavo0 sic : Omne quod est in ratione, vel est ipsa potentia rationis vel
est actus rationis vel dispositio ad actum rationis41. Sed omnia ista sunt entia
(i) secundo] tertio principaliter arguitur FK (j) refertur] refert K (k) realiter add. realiter K (1) a]
ad R (m) rationis dicat... reale] rationis sit ens reale F reale sit ens rationis sit ens reale K (n)ens
rationis om. FK (o) est] ens F (p) alteri] autem R (q) est om. K (r) ens mg. R (s) reale add. ergo et
cetera FK (t) quarto sic... reale om. FK (u) quinto] quarto FK (v) sic quod om. K (w) suum om. K
(x) est ens reale mg. R (y) videtur esse nota] patet FK (z) sed probatur minor] minor probatur FK
(a)habitudo] habitus F (b) actum intelligendi] intellectum FK (c) ipsam rem intellectam] ipsa re
intellecta FK ipsa intellecta R (d) relatio opposita] relatio F ratio K (e) sexto] quinto sic FK (f) ens]
est K (g) rationis s.l. R (h) maior add. patet et FK (i) videntur] videtur R (j) nota add. de se F de se
probatur K (k)sed om. FK (l)quam add. entia sive FK (m) septimo quia] sexto sic FK (n)ab] a R
(o) octavo] septimo FK
(39) ARIST., Metaph. , V, 15, 1021a29-b3.

(40) Hervaeus Natalis, Quodl. III, q. 1 , fol. 68ra.
(4 1 ) ARIST. , Eth. Nic. , II, 4, 1 1 05b 1 9-2 1 ; De an. , III, 8-11,431 b20-434a2 1 .

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realia. Sed pro tanto dicitur aliquid esse ens rationisP quia^ est in ratio
cetera.
(52) Nonor sie : Ens rationis, cum non sit ens increatum, oportet quod sit ens
productum, et tunc quaero de eius productione, quia sua productios aut1 est realis
aut rationis. Si realis, ergo terminus eiusu, qui est ens rationis, erit ens reale v. Si w
rationis, ergo erit dare ens rationis ante omne ens rationis ; quod est impossibile.
(53) Decimo* sic: Productio primi entis rationis aut est ens reale auty ens
rationis. Si est2 ens reale, ergo eius terminus3 erit ens reale, quia non pro alio
diciturb aliqua productio realis nisi quia per earn producitur ens reale. Si dicaturc
quod ilia productio0 sit ens rationis, ergo ante primum ens rationis erit daree ens
rationis ; quod est impossibile.
(54) Undécimo f sic : Sicut se habet terminus realis ad actionem transeuntem
realiter, ita se habet ens rationis ad actionem transeuntem secundum rationem.
Sed terminus realis est idem cum actione transeunte realiter et est in eodem
subiective cum ea. Ergo ens rationis erit idem cum actu intelligendi, qui est actio
transiens secundum rationem. Et per consequens sequitur quod ens rationis sit ens
reale et quod sit in intellectu subiective s et non solum obiective. Nam actus
intelligendi est ens reale et esth subiective in intellectu. Maior et minor sunt
concessae per magistrům Hervaeum42. Ergo conclusio erit vera, quae tarnen
conclusio est contra magistrům Hervaeum1, qui dicit quod ens rationis non est ens
reale nec esti subiective k in1 intellectu.
(55) Duodecimo"1 sic: Illud dicit" ens reale cuius contradictorie oppositum
negat ens reale. Ista maior° patet, quia illud dicit una pars contradictionis quod
altera negat. Sed ens rationis et purum nihil opponuntur contradictorie, etP
secundum magistrům Hervaeum43, qui dividit ex opposito ens rationis <i contra
purum nihil. Sed purum nihil negat ens reale. Ergo ens rationis dicit ens reale.
(56) Tertio decimor sie : Illud est ens reale quod reducitur ad praedicamentum
reale s. Ens rationis est huiusmodi. Ergo et cetera. Maior est nota de se. Probatur
minor1, quia ens rationis est habitudo sive relatio rei intellectae ad actum intelli-
gendi vel est habitudo rei intellectae ad rem intellectam". Sed omnis habitudo sive
relatio reducitur ad praedicamentum relationisv, sicut omnis substantia reducitur
(p) sed... rationis] ens autem rationis ideo dicitur FK (q)quia] quod K (r)nono] octavo FK
(s) quia sua productio om. FK (t) aut add. est K (u) terminus eius inv. FK (v) erit ens reale om. FK
(w) si] ens add. F (x) decimo] nono FK (y) aut] vel R add. est F (z) est om. K (a) eius terminus] et
terminus eius FK (b) dicitur posi productio FK (c) dicatur] dicat R (d) illa productio om. FK (e)dare
s.l. R (f) undécimo] decimo FK (g) subiective] obiective K (h) et est om. K (i)ergo conclusio ...
Hervaeum om. FK (j) est] sunt K (k) subiective] obiective F (1) in om. R (m) duodecimo] undécimo
FK (n) dicit] dicitur FK (o) maior] propositio FK (p) et] etiam FK (q) ex opposito ens rationis] ens
rationis ex opposito FK (r) tertio decimo] duodecimo FK tricésimo primo R (s) reale add. sed FK
(t) probatur minor inv. K (u) vel est. . .intellectam om. FK (v) reducitur. . .relationis] est in praedica-
mento relationis FK
(42) Hervaeus Natalis, Quodl. III, q. 1 , fol. 68 va ; Quodl. IV, q. 4, fol. 9 1 ra.
(43) Hervaeus Natalis, Tr. de sec. int. , q. II, a. 3, fol. d.iii r-v.

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FRANCISCUS DE PRATO'S TRACTATUS DE ENTE RATION IS 299
ad praedicamentum substantiae, excepto Deo, qui est substantia illimitata ad

praedicamentum. Relatio autem w est unum de decem praedicamentis realibus*.
Ergo et cetera.
(57) Quarto decimo* sic: Illud quod praesupponit aliud2 est aliquida, et per
consequens est ens reale b, quia ens reale et aliquid convertuntur. īsta maior patet,
quia illud quod nihil est non praesumit aliud0. Sed ens rationis praesumit actum
intelligendi et rem intellectam. Ergo est aliquid in se et per consequens est ens
reale in sed.
(58) Tertio principaliter arguiture, quia non videturf quod ens rationis g sit
modus consequens rem intellectam velh obiectum intellectum propter duo.
Primo ' quia, si hoc esset verum, sequeretur quod quando intelligimus Deum, tunc
fundetur in Deo aliquod ens rationis, et cum ens rationis sit ens diminutum,
sequetur quod ens diminutum ponatur in Deo J.
(59) Secundo sic : Omne ens rationis est ens in anima. Sed modus consequens
obiectum cognitum non est ens in anima. Ergo et cetera. Maior est concessa ab
omnibus k. Probatur minor, quia modus consequens obiectum cognitum non est in
anima subiective, ut de se patet, nec etiam obiective, cum non sit obiectum, sed
modus obiecti. Ergo et cetera1.
(60) Pro solutione istarum"1 difficultatum ego praemitto et dico quod ens
potest dici dupliciter. Uno modo formaliter, sicut si diceremus quod substantia est
formaliter ens et quantitas est formaliter ensn. Alio modo dicitur ens denomina-
tive vel suppositive tantum, sicut si diceremus quod in homine caeco caecitas non
est formaliter et positive ens, sed est ens suppositive et denominative, pro quanto
supponit hominem, in quo fundatur, et a° quo etiam caecitas ilia denominatur
humana, quia potest vocari et denominali caecitas humana. Et sic caecitas est ens
tantum suppositive et denominative p.
(w) relatio autem] sed relatio FK (x) unum... realibus] praedicamentum reale FK (y) quarto
decimo] tertio decimo FK (z) aliud om. K (a) aliquid] aliud ergo K (b) reale add. ista patet F illa patet
K (c) ista... aliud om. FK (d) praesumit actum... se] praesupponit ens reale ergo et cetera FK
(e) arguitur] videtur FK (f) quia non videtur om. FK (g) rationis add. non FK (h) vel] ut K (i) primo
om. R (j) sequetur. . .deo] tunc aliquod ens diminutum esset in deo F tunc aliquod ens diminutum erit
in deo K (k) omnibus add. sed FK (1) ergo et cetera] hic ponuntur quaedam pro solutione rationum
dictarum K om. F (m) istarum] dictarum FK (n) formaliter sicut. . .ens] dicitur ens denominative vel
suppositive tantum sicut si diceremus quod in homine caeco caecitas est ens denominative et
suppositive pro quanto supponit hominem in quo fundetur a quo et caecitas illa denominatur humana
quia potest vocari et denominali caecitas humana et sic caecitas est tantum ens suppositive et
denominative F uno modo dicitur ens denominative vel suppositive tantum sicut si diceremus quod in
homine caeco caecitas est ens denominative et suppositive pro quanto supponit hominem in quo
fundatur a quo et caecitas illa denominatur humana quia potest vocari et denominali caecitas humana
et sic caecitas est tantum est suppositive et denominative K (o) a] ab R (p) dicitur ens denominative
. . . denominative] ens potest accipi formaliter sicut si diceremus quod substantia vel quantitas est
formaliter ens F ens potest accipi formaliter sicut si diceremus quod substantia vel quantitas est
quantitas est formaliter ens K

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(61) Et sie per oppositum nihil potest aeeipi duobus modis44. Uno m
eo quod non dicit aliquam entitatem positivam r formaliter5, licet si
minative vel suppositive. Et isto modo realis privatio sicut1 caecitas es
maliter, licet sit ens suppositive, quia supponit subiectum, in quo fun
modo accipitur nihil negative v et simpliciter pro tanto quia non dicit en
ter nec suppositive, sed omnia negat. Sicut w ens accipitur dupliciter'
liter et ens suppositive, itay nihil accipitur dupliciter, scilicet nihil fo
nihil simpliciter si ve purum nihil.
(62) Apparet ergo z ex his a quod illud idem quod est ens suppositive t
nihil formaliter, et patet quod illud quod est nihil formaliter tantum
inter ens formaliter et nihil simpliciter sive purum nihil. Dico erg
rationis non est ens formaliter ñeque estb nihil simpliciter sive purum n
est ens suppositive tantum sive nihil formaliter. Nam, ut dictum est,
quod est ens suppositive tantum vel denominative tantum est formaliter
converso omne illud quod est nihil tantum0 formaliter este ens supposit
(63) Hic etiam est notandum quod privatio realis, puta caecitas f, s
huiusmodi, et entia rationis in aliquo conveniunt et in aliquo differu
rationis et privatio conveniunt in hoc, quods nullum ipsorum ponit
aliquam entitatem formaliter, propter quod unumquodque ipsorum d
nihil formaliter vel non positi ve J. Conveniunt etiam in hoc, quodk
que ipsorum supponit aliquam entitatem. Et ideo dicuntur entia
tantum1 vel denominative. Sed in hoc differunt"1, quia ens rationis
ponat formaliter aliquam entitatem, non tarnen negat aliquam enti
potest argui sic : Ens rationis non ponit formaliter aliquam entitate
negat aliquam entitatem. Nam consequentia ista° non valet, quia aliu
ponere et aliud est negare, sicut patet in alio exemplo : Animal vero
aeeeptum non ponit sive non includit formaliter rationale, nec tarn
quod animal absolute aeeeptum neget sive excludat formaliter ra
ergo dico quod ens rationis non negat formaliter aliquam entitatem
ponit formaliter aliquam entitatem, sed bene supponit aliquam enti
Privatio veros realis, puta caecitas, non solum non ponit formaliter
entitatem, immo etiam negat sive privat aliquam entitatem", sicut ca
(q) modo om. K (r) positivam om. FK (s) formaliter add. ita quod non est aliquod en
entitas formaliter FK (t) realis privatio sicut] privatio et F privatio sive K (u) funda
F (v) negative] privative FK (w) sicut add. ergo FK (x) dupliciter add. scilicet FK (
FK (z) ergo] autem FK (a) ex his om. K (b) neque est] nec F (c) dico ergo. . .nihil om.
formaliter inv. FK (e) est add. enim F (f) caecitas] recitas K (g) quod] quia FK (h) v
FK (i) esse om. F (j) non positive] suppositive ens F positive K (k) quod] quia FK (1
denominative FK (m) differunt] differì K (n)non tarnen... entitatem om. K (o)ista]
mg. R (q) vero] autem K enim F (r) nec etiam. . .entitatem om. R (s) vero om. K (t) for
(u) aliquam entitatem add. simpliciter K
(44) Hervaeus Natalis, Quodl. III, q. 1 , fol. 68va.

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FRANCISCUS DE PRATO'S TRACTATUS DE ENTE RATION IS 30 1
solum non dicitv aliquam entitatemw formaliter, immo etiam negat si ve privat
visum.
(64)Unde concludo* quod ens rationis est nihil formaliter si ve nihil non
positive, sed non potest dici quod sit nihil negative, cum ens rationis nony neget
aliquam entitatem. Nec etiam potest dici quod ens rationis sit simpliciter nihil sive
purum nihil, cum ens rationis sit ens suppositive. Illud autem quod est purum nihil
sive simpliciter nihil2 nullo modo est ens, neque formaliter ñeque suppositive3.
(65) Sed hicb est unum dubium talec : Si ens rationis sortitur nomen entisd ab
ente quod sibi supponitur, cum illud ens quod praesupponitur enti rationis sit ens
reale, ens rationis vocabitur ens reale. Nam dicimus quod caecitas est ens reale
sive privatio realis quia privat ens reale, scilicet visum, et fundatur in ente reali,
scilicet in animali.
(66) Ad hoc dico quod, licet illud ens a quo ens rationis e sortitur nomen entis
suppositivi sit ens reale, tarnen quia illud ens reale non praesupponitur enti
rationis secundum suum esse reale circumscripto opere intellectus, immo hoc
habet ab opere rationis, ideo ens rationis non dicitur ens reale, sed ens rationis f,
quia ens rationis non habet quod supponat ens reale, nec habet quod sit ens
suppositive ß, nisi per opus rationis h. Non sic autem est de caecitate et de quacum-
que alia privatione reali. Nam caecitas per realem actionem expellit habitům sibi
oppositum, et fundatur in animali secundum esse reale animalis circumscripto
opere intellectus, et ideo merito caecitas est ens reale sive privatio realis1.
(67) His praemissis respondeo ad argumenta quae sunt in oppositum superius
factaJ.
(68)Adk primum45 dico quod illa consequentia est vera1, antecedens et

consequens sunt vera, scilicet"1 quod ens rationis distinguitur" contra omne ens
reale et quod ens rationis0 est nihil, scilicet formaliter et non positiveP. Et ad illai
quae sunt contra hoc, dico ad primumr quod divisio entis in ens reale et ens rationis
non est divisio entis s in ens et nihil simpliciter sive non-ens simpliciter, sed est
divisio entis in ens formaliter et ens suppositive1. Nec est ibi «divisio» entis «in
aliqua duo perfecte » et aequaliter" « participantia rationem » entis, « sed » est v divisio
entis « in duo, quorum » unum « participât perfecte » 46 et aliud diminute w, sicut etiam
(v) dicit ex ponit formaliter corr. s.l. K (w) entitatem add. simpliciter K (x) concludo] concedo
K (y) non om. R (z) nihil om. FK (a) suppositive] positive K (b) hie] hoc K (c) dubium tale inv. FK
(d) entis om. FK (e) rationis om. R (f) rationis add. non dicitur ens reale sed ens rationis R
(g) suppositive] reale sive positive FK (h) rationis] intellectus FK (i) realis add. responsiones quae
fiunt ad rationes opposita supra K (j) quae . . . facta] in oppositum quae sunt facta superius FK (k) ad] a
R (1) vera] bona K add. et FK (m) scilicet om. K (n) distinguitur] distinguati FK (o) ens rationis
add. non K (p) positive] suppositive FK (q) illa] alia FK (r)ad primum om. K (s) entis om. FK
(t) suppositive add. nec est ibi divisio entis in ens formaliter et ens suppositive R (u) aequaliter]
qualiter R (v) est s. I. R ( w) diminute] diminutive FK
(45) Supra, § 38-39.

(46) Hervaeus Natalis, Quodl. III, q. 1 , fol. 68vb.

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hic entium aliud positivům et aliud privativum si ve negativum. Necx s

albo et non-albo ex una parte et de ente reali et de y ente z rationis ex alia
non-album excludit album simpliciter, sed ens rationis non excludit si
ens reale, immo ipsum supponit, ut dictum est.
(69) Ad secundum1547 dico quod, licet0 illud quod estd nihil simplic
quod est purum nihil non praedicetur de aliquo ente reali, tarnen illud
nihil tantum e formaliter sive illud quod est nihil tantum non posit
praedicari denominative de ente reali, sicut patet de caecitate. Nam ca
est f nihil vel nulla res formaliter, potest praedicari denominative de hom
ista e potest esse vera: 'Homo est caecus'h. Modo sic est quod ens rati
dicit nihil simpliciter, sed dicit nihil tantum formaliter, et ideo potest p
ente reali. Unde ista1 est vera : 'Homo est primai intendo vel estk speci
verum est1 quod ens rationis111 vel illud quod est nihil vel nulla res form
potest praedicari de ente reali essentialiter. Unde istae sunt falsae : 'Hom
formaliter', 'Homo est nulla res formaliter' n, 'Homo est caecitas'. Pot
praedicari denominative, ut dictum est.
(70) Ad tertium48 dico quod istaP propositio est vera : 'Ens rationis
res formaliter q, sive ens rationis est nihil r formaliter, sive ens rationis
formaliter', sicut etiams est vera : 'Caecitas est nulla res formaliter ve
maliter1 vel non-ens formaliter'. Sed istau esset falsa : 'Ens rationis est nihil sim-
pliciter vel nulla resv vel nulla res simpliciter vel non-ens simpliciter, id est nullo
modo est ens', quia ens rationis aliquo modo est ens, quia est ens suppositive. īsta
etiam non sunt contradictoria : 'Ensw rationis est ens suppositive et non estx ens
formaliter'. Sed ista y essent2 contradictoria a : 'Ens rationis est ens formaliter et
non est ens formaliter' . Et etiam istab essentc contradictoria : 'Ens rationis est ens
suppositive et non est ens suppositive' . Et ideo ratio non valet.
(71) Ad quartum49 dico quod, licet excellens doctor magister Hervaeus
multum subtiliaverit se ad faciendum magnum tractatum de secundis intentioni-
bus, quae sunt entiad rationis, non propter hoc potest argui quod entia rationis non
sinte nihil formaliter, quia beatus Thomas50, qui fuit excellentior eo, subtiliter et
(x) nec] neque enim est F ñeque est K (y) de om. FK (z) ente] ens K (a) simpliciter post reale K
(b) secundum add. argumentum FK (c) licet om. F (d) est om. K (e) nihil tantum mv. K (f)est5./. R
(g) ista] illa K (h) caecus] caecitas K (i) ista] illa K (j) prima] primaria K (k) est om. FK (1) scilicet
verum est] verum est autem FK (m) ens rationis] illud quod est ens rationis F illud quod est rationis K
(n) formaliter add. vel FK (o) autem] tarnen FK (p) ista] illa K (q) nulla res formaliter] formaliter
nulla res F nihil formaliter K (r) nihil] nulla res K (s) etiam add. ista F illa K (t) vel nihil formaliter
om. FK (u) ista] illa K (v) vel nulla res om. RF (w) ens] est K (x)est om. K (y) ista] illa K
(z) essent] est F esset K (a) contradictoria] contradicho F (b) ista] illa K (c) essent] erunt FK esset R
(d) entia] etiam R (e) sint] sunt FK
(47) Supra, § 40.

(48) Supra, §41.
(49) Supra, § 42.
(50) THOMAS DE Aquino, Quaestiones disputatae de malo, qq.4-15, ed. Leonina, t.XXIH,
Rome 1982, p. 103a-278b.

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diffuse tractavitf de peccato originali, veniali et mortali et disputavi^ etiam

quaestiones de malo, et tarnen secundum eummet et beatum Augustinum51
peccatum et malum nihil est formaliter11. Dico ergo ad argumentum quod, si
magister Hervaeus fecisset tractatum longum de eo quod est simpliciter nihil, id
est omnino nihil », tunc esset mirandum ; sed non est mirandum si fecit tractatum de
eo quod est nihil solum formaliter, est tarnen ens suppositive. Tale autem ens est
ens rationis ; immo tractare de tali ente rationis fuit valde utile et necessarium, quia
per notitiam talis entis docemur J qualiter res diversimode obiciuntur intellectui et
quomodo diversificantur actus intelligendi et rationes obiectivae, sicut etiam est
utile scirek quid sit et qualiter creatur1 peccatum, quia per notitiam peccati
docemur"1 qualiter in nobis regulantur actus morales".
(72) Ad quintum52 dico sicut ad quartum, quod, licet esset inconveniens quod
aliqua scientia tractaret de eo quod est omnino et simpliciter nihil, non tarnen est
inconveniens quod tractet0 de eo quod estP nihil solum formaliter, cum illud tale
sit ens suppositive, sicut non esset inconveniens esse aliquam scientiam quae
tractaret de peccato originali veH veniali vel mortali, quae nihil formaliter
dicunturr. Logica ergo convenienter tractats de ente rationis, quod est nihil
formaliter tantum, sed est ens 1 secundum quid, id est suppositive.
(73) Et quia iste" modus ponendi, scilicet quod ens rationis sit formaliter nihil,
est forte difficilis et obscurus iuvenibus, ideo ego ponov unum alium modum
loquendi de ente rationis, qui erit facilior et clarior, licet non verior, et dico quod
potest satis probabiliter teneri quod, licet ens rationis sit nulla res formaliter sive
nullum ens reale et per consequens sit nihil reale w, non tarnen sequitur quod sit
formaliter* nullum ens simpliciter vel nihil simpliciter; immo dico quod ens
rationis est formaliter ens, quia est ens rationis, quia in plus se habet ens quam ens
reale y, cum ens dividatur in ens reale et ens rationis. Unde dico quod istaez
propositiones sunt verae : 'Ens rationis formaliter est nulla res'et 'Ens rationis est
(f) tractavit] tractatum FK (g)et disputavit inv. FK (h)et malum... formaliter] sive malum
formaliter est nihil FK (i) simpliciter nihil. . .nihil] simpliciter id est omnino nihil F simpliciter sive
nihil omnino K (j) docemur] docentur K (k) etiam... scire] est utile FK (1) creatur] causatur FK
(m) docemur] arcemur F (n) morales] mortales KR (o) tractet] tractaret K (p) est om. K (q) vel om.
FK (r) dicuntur] dicunt FK (s) tractat] tractet F (t) ens om. FK (u) iste] ille K (v) pono] ponam FK
( w) et per consequens . . . reale om. FK (x) formaliter om. FK (y) reale] rationis FK (z) istae] illae K
(5 1 ) E.g. THOMAS DE Aquino, Commentum in librum II Sententiarum , d. 34, q. 1 , a. 1 , ad 1 , ed.

P. Mandonnet, t. II, Paris 1929, p. 873 ; d. 34, q. 1, a. 2c, p. 876; Qu. de malo, q. 1, a. 1, p. 6a; Summa
contra gentiles, lib. I, cap. 71, edd. C. PERA - P. MARC - P. CARAMELLO, ed. Marietti, Turin-Rome
1961, vol. II, nn. 605-607, p. 83b-84a; AUGUSTINUS, De Genesi contra Manichaeos , lib. II, cap. 29,
43, PL 34, col. 220; De ordine , lib. II, cap. 7, 23, ed. W.M.GREEN, Corpus Christianorum, Series
Latina 29, Turnhout 1970, p. 119-120; De moribus Ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus
Manichaeorum , lib. II, cap. 2, 2, PL 32, col. 1346; De Civitate Dei, lib. XI, cap. 9, edd. B. DOMBART-
A. KALB, Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina 48, Turnhout 1955, p. 330.
(52) Supra, §43.

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formaliter3 nihil reale' . Sed istaeb sunt falsae : 'Ens rationis est formaliter nullum
ens'et 'Ens rationis est formaliter nihil'0. Nam sicut ista est vera: 'Accidens
formaliter est nulla substantia', tarnen istad est falsa: 'Accidens est formaliter
nullum ens vel nihil' e, ita istaf est vera : 'Ens rationis est formaliter nulla res et
nihil reale', tarnen istaß est falsa : 'Ens rationis esth nullum ens formaliter', quia
ens rationis est formaliter ens.
(74) Notandum esť hie quod res potest accipi dupliciteri53. Uno modo stricte,
pro eo quod est in rerum natura praeter opus intellectus et secundum quodk
descendit a1 rato esse et firmo, secundum aliquos, et sic ens rationis non est res, et
res isto modo accepta habet se in minus quam ens. Alio modo potest accipi res
large, prout convertitur cum ente et prout, secundum aliquos, descendit abm hoc
verbo 'reor, reris', et isto modo ens rationis sicut formaliter est ens rationis ita
formaliter est res rationis.
(75) Notandum est etiam11 quod iste° modus loquendi de ente rationis, licet sitP
contra magistrům Hervaeum quantum ad modum quern ipse ponit, non tarnen est
contra eum quantum ad conclusionem ; immo concordat cum eo. Secundum ergo^
istamr viam facile erit responderé ad argumenta superius positas.
(76) Nam potest dici ad primum54, quod, licet ens rationis non sit ens reale
stricte accipiendo ens reale, non tarnen1 sequitur quod sit nihil simpliciter, et per
consequens divisio entis in ens reale et ens rationis nonu erit divisio in ens et nihil
vel non-ens.
(77) Ad secundum55 dico quod quando v ens rationis praedicatur de ente reali,
non praedicatur illud quod est nihil formaliter de ente reali. Immo illud quod est
formaliter ens praedicatur denominative de ente reali w, cum ensx rationis sit
formaliter ens secundum i s tum y modum loquendi de ente rationis.
(78) Ad tertium56 dico quod, licet ens rationis sit nulla res stricte accipiendo
rem, non tarnen sequitur quod sit nullum ens simpliciter.
(79) Ad quartum57 dico quod magister Hervaeus tractando2 de ente rationis
non tractavit de nihilo simpliciter. Immo tractavit de aliquo ente, cum ens rationis
sit aliquod ens formaliter secundum istum modum loquendi de ente rationis.
(a)est formaliter inv. K (b)istae] illae K (c)et ens... nihil] vel nihil R (d)ista] illa K (e)nam
sicut... nihil om. R (f)ista] illa K (g)ista] illa K (h)est add. formaliter K (i) notandum est] nota
tarnen FK (j) dupliciter] duobus modis FK (k) quod] secundum F quam K (1) a] ad R (m) ab] a FK
(n) etiam] autem FK (o)iste] ille K (p)sit add. licet sit K (q) secundum ergo] et secundum FK
(r) istam] illam K (s) argumenta superius posita] quinqué argumenta superius facta F (t) tarnen om. K
(u) non om. FK (v) quando] ante F (w) immo. . .reali om. F (x) ens om. F (y) istum add. secundum F
(z) tractando add. de secundis intentionibus vel FK
(53) THOMAS DE AQUINO, Commentum in librum ¡I Sententiarum, d. 25, q. 1 , a. 4, 1. 1, p. 6 1 1 -6 1 2 ;

etiam BONAVENTURA, Commentarium in II librum Sententiarum , d. 37, dub. 1, ed. Collegii
S. Bonaventura, Opera omnia H, Ad Claras Aquas 1 885, p. 876a.
(54) Supra, § 38-39.
(55) Supra, § 40.
(56) Supra. §41.
(57) Supra, § 42.

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FRANCISCUS DE PRATO'S TRACTATUS DE ENTE RATIONĪS 305
(80) Ad quintum58 dico sicut ad quartum, quod logica tractans de secundis

intentionibus si ve de entibus rationisa non tractavit de nihilo simpliciter, cum ens
rationis sit aliquod ens.
(81) Patet ergo quod iste b secundus modus loquendi c est magis facilis et magis
clarus ad solvendumd argumenta, sed primus modus, qui est secundum
magistrům Hervaeume, est verior.
(82) Ad secundum argumentum principale f 59 dico quod ens rationis
distinguitur contra omne ens reale accipiendo ens reale stricte. Et ad primam
probationemß quae est in oppositum dico quod ens rationis non habet causam
realem. Et quando dicitur quod actus intelligendi est causa entis rationis et actus
intelligendi est causa realis, dico quod, licet actus intelligendi sit ens reale, non
tarnen est causa realis vel actio realis; immo est causa vel actio solum secundum
nostrum modům intelligendi sive secundum rationem, et ideo non oportet quod
illud quod dicitur effectus eius sit ens reale vel effectus realis, sed sufficit quod sit
ens secundum rationem vel secundum nostrum modum intelligendi. Sed forte
dicetur sic : Actus intelligendi est actio secundum rationem et non realis, ergo
actus intelligendi est ens secundum rationem et non est ens reale, per locum ab
inferiore ad suum superius constructive. Ad hoc dico quod argumentum ab
inferiore ad suum superius cum dictione destruente vel diminuente non tenet
constructive. Unde sicut ista est mala consequentia : 'Ovum est animal solum in
potentia, ergo ovum est ens solum in potentia', ita ista est mala consequentia:
'Actus intelligendi est actio solum secundum rationem, ergo est ens solum
secundum rationem'. Immo actus intelligendi est verissimum ens reale. Nota
tarnen hic quod, si actus intelligendi comparetur ad suam causam productivam,
tunc actus intelligendi est actio realis, cum actio et actus productus sint idem
realiter intrinsece. Actus autem intelligendi in nobis est actus realis productus,
ergo erit actio realis. Si vero actus intelligendi comparetur ad ens rationis vel ad
quodcumque suum obiectum, ut ad obiectum terminatur, tunc est actio solum
secundum rationem. Posset etiam aliter responderi ad probationem istam factam
in oppositum, scilicet quod non semper effectus causae realis est ens reale. Nam
homo est causa peccati et deformitatish in actu morali1 et tarnen peccatum et
deformitasJ non sunt entia positiva realia, et ideo ratio k non concludit. Prima
tarnen responsio est melior in proposito.
(a) sive de entibus rationis om. FK (b)iste] ille K (c) loquendi] dicendi K (d) solvendum]
solvenda FK (e) qui ... Hervaeum] qui est magistři Hervaei FK (f) argumentum principale inv. K
(g) probationem] propositionem R (h) deformitatis] deformitat K (i) morali] mortali KR
(j) deformitas] deformitans K (k) ratio s. /. R
(58) Supra, §43.

(59) Supra , § 44.

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(83) Ad secundum60 dico quod scientia refertur realiter ad

quando scibile est ens reale. Sed quando scibile est ens rationis, tu
refertur secundum rationem. Scibile autem, si ve sit ens reale1 si ve si
refertur semper"1 secundum rationem". Hoc intellexit Philosophus
sicae61. Potest etiam aliter responden ad istud argumentum, scilic
scientia est sic de ente rationis0 quin etiam sitP aliquo modo«* de ente
ut de materiali subiecto. Nam ens rationis non potest esse obiectu
quin etiam simulr cum eo et eodem actu intelligatur ens reale, sic
possumus intelligere privationes et negationes quin intelligatur sim
eodem actu s habitus et entia positiva. Et hoc est quod dixit Avicenn
quod logica est de secundis intentionibus adiunctis primis. Secundae
sunt entia rationis, sed1 primae sunt entia realia. Et sic logica est de e
de formali obiecto, sed de ente reali ut de materiali obiecto. Unde pote
logica" referatur realiterv ad suum scibile materiale, sed refertur
rationem ad suum formale scibile si ve ad suum formale obiectum - qu
(84) Ad tertiumw63 dico quod ens rationis non est per se existe
ñeque alteri inhaerens realiter et ideo y non2 substantia ñeque accid
reale; est tarnen alteri inhaerens secundum rationem, et nullum esse
liter" habet, et ideo est ens secundum rationem sive ens rationis. No
quod non omne illud quod est inhaerens secundum rationem est ens
sapientia divina inhaeret secundum nostrum modum intelligendi si
rationem essentiae divinae, inquantum apprehendimus earn perb m
dam qualitatisc informantisd divinam essentiam, et tarnen sapientia
ens rationis e ; immo est verum ens reale, et ratio est quia, licet sapien
secundum rationem ß, habet tarnen formaliter verum esse reale. E
reale h non ratione illius inhaerentiae, sed ratione esse realis quod form
Ens vero rationis sie inhaeret secundum rationem quod nullu
formaliter dicit, licet dicat vel habeat esse reale suppositive.
(1) sed quando. . .reale om. K (m) refertur semper] semper solum F refertur solum
add. et FK (o) rationis om. R (p) sit post aliquo modo FK (q) aliquo modo mg. R (r
F (s) actu add. simul FK (t)sed] et FK (u)quod logica om. R (v) realiter om. F
secundum K (x) realiter] formaliter FK (y) ideo om. F (z) non odd. est neque FK (a) r
inv. F (b) per] secundum K (c) cuiusdam qualitatis inv. K (d) informantis] inform
om. R (f)inhaereat add. inhaereat R (g) sapientia... rationem] secundum rat
inhaereat FK (h) et ideo est ens reale om. FK (i) reale] sive reale formale K
(60) Supra, § 45.

(61) ARIST., Metaph. , V, 15, 1021a29-b3.
(62) AVICENNA Latinus, Liber de Philosophia prima sive Scientia divina , tr. I, cap
RIET, Leuven-Leiden 1977-1980, p. 10, lin. 73-74.
(63) Supra , § 46.

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(85) Ad quartum64 dico quod esse quid creatum potest accipi duobus modis.
Uno modo, quia! est per sek terminus realis creationis, et sic1 ens rationis non estm
quid creatum, necn propter hoc sequitur quod sit Deus, quia solum illud ens
increatum est Deus quod est ens reale et nullo modo causam habet. Alio modo0
potest diciP aliquid ens^ creatum quia consequitur aliquid exs creatione alterius,
et sic aliquod ens rationis1 erit ensu creatum, cum aliquod ens rationis consequa-
turv obiectum intellectum non realiter, sed secundum rationemw ex creatione vel
productione actus intelligendi*. Vel potest dici brevius quod ens rationis est quid
creatum non realiter, sed secundum rationem, et ideo non est ens reale, sed ens
rationis.
(86) Ady quintum65 dico quodz aliquida fundari in aliquo secundum suum
esseb reale potest intelligi duobus modis. Uno modo, quod fundetur super rem
secundum suum esse reale remoto omni actu intelligendi et per opus naturae. Alio
modo, quod fundetur in re secundum suum esse reale concurrente actu intelli-
gendi et per operationem intellectus, inquantum ipsa res est intellecta et obiective
in intellectu secundum suum esse reale. Hac distinctione praemissa, dico quod
illud quod fundatur in re secundum suum esse reale primo modo semper est ens
reale, sedc illud quod fundatur in re secundum suumd esse reale secundo modo
numquam est ens reale e. Ens autem rationis numquam fundatur in re primo modo,
sed aliquando secundo modo. Nota tarnen hic quod, licet ens rationis numquam
possit fundari in re nisi mediante actu intelligendi vel nisi concurrente actu
intelligendi, non propter hoc oportet quod actus intelligendi sit fundamentům
entis rationis, cum ens rationis fundetur in obiecto cognito et non in actu
intelligendi, ut dictum est supra66, sed verum est quod actus intelligendi est
necessario requisitus ad hoc quod ens f rationis fundetur in re, sicutß patet in alio
exemplo : Filiatio non potest fundari in filio nisi mediante paternitāte vel nisi
concurrente paternitāte, et tarnen paternitas non est fundamentům filiationis, sed
est aliquid necessario requisitum ad hoc quodh filiatio fundetur in filio, quia, si
cessaret paternitas, cessaret filiatio. Idem dico de actu intelligendi et de ente
rationis. Quantum ad istud propositum, nota etiam1 hic quodi, cum de ratione entis
rationis sit quod fundetur in obiecto cognito, ut cognitum estk, tunc solum poterit1
(j)quia] qui K (k)per se om. FK (l)sic] isto modo FK (m)est om. R (n)nec] neque FK
(o) modo add. aliquid F (p) dici] accipi K (q) aliquid ens om. F (r) ens om. K (s) ex ex in corr. s.l. R
(t) rationis om. R (u)ens om. FK (v) consequatur add. aliquod K (w) non... rationem om. R
(x) intelligendi add. in intellectu FK (y) ad] a R (z) quod om. R (a) aliquid] aliquod F (b) suum esse
inv. K (c)sed] secundum K (d)suum om. FK (e) reale om. R (f)ens] est R (g)sicut] ut FK
(h)quod]utFK (i) etiam] tarnen et FK (j) quod] quia F (k) est] ens K (1) poterit post rationis FK
(64) Supra, §41.

(65) Supra, § 48.
(66) Supra, § 84.

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ens rationis fundan in actu intelligendi quando actus intelligendi

rationem obiecti cogniti", sicut quando intelligo0 me intelligere, alias n
(87) Ad sextum67 dico quod esse subiective in aliquo potest in
dupliciterP : uno modo realiter, alio modo secundum rationem tantum
dico quod illud quod est subiective realiter in aliquo semper est ens rea
quod est in aliquo subiective ^ solum r secundum rationem non oportet qu
reale. En^autem rationis est solum subiective secundum rationem s in ente reali
intellecto, et sie intellexit magister Hervaeus68.
(88) Ad septimum69 dico quod obiectum intellectus comparato ad
intellectum in1 duplici ordine causae, scilicet velu in ordine v causae moventis vel
in ordine causae terminantis. Modo sic est quod illud quod comparato ad intellec-
tum in ratione obiecti moventis semper est ens reale, sed illud quod comparato ad
intellectum w in ordine vel in genere* causae terminantis solum si ve in ordine
obiecti solum terminantis y non oportet quod sit ens reale. Non2 oportet quod
omne obiectum intellectus sive omne quod intelligitoa moveat intellectum, alias
privationes et negationes non possent a nobis b intelligi, quia talia, cum non
habeant entitatem formaliter, non possunt movere. Et si quaeratur quando intel-
lectus intelligit privationes et negationes0 et entia rationis, a quo moveturd, tunc
dico quod tunc moveto ab ente reali. Nam ens reale est illud quod movet intel-
lectum primo e ad cognitionem sui, secundario movet f ad cognitionem priva-
tionum et negationumß et entium rationis. Cum ergoh ens rationis comparetur ad
intellectum in ratione obiecti1 terminantis solum et non moventis, non oportet
quod ens rationis sit ens reale.
(89) Ad octavum70 dico quod illa maior est insufficiens. Nam aliquid habet J
esse in ratione obiective quod non estk potentia rationis nec1 actus intelligendi
necm dispositio ad actum intelligendi. Huiusmodi autem est ens rationis. Nec
dicito aliquid esse ens rationis quia sit" in ratione subiective, sed quia est in
ratione obiective modo quo supra71 expositum est. Modo sic est quod illud quod
est in° ratione subiective p realiter est ens reale % sed illud quod est in ratione
obiective non oportet quod sit ens reale.
(m)habebit] habet FK (n) cogniti om. FK (o) intelligo] intelligis K (p) dupliciter om. FK
(q) subiective ante in K (r) solum post rationem FK (s)non oportet... rationem om. R (t)in om. K
(u)vel om. FK (v)in ordine om. F (w) ad intellectum add. solum R (x)vel in genere om. FK
(y) si ve... terminantis om. FK (z) non add. enim FK (a) intelligitur add. quod FK (b)a nobis post
intelligi K (c) privationes et negationes] negationes et privationes FK (d)movetur] moventur R
(e) primo ante movet F ante intellectum K (f) movet om. FK (g) privationum et negationum] negatio-
num et privationum FK (h) ergo] igitur FK (i) ratione obiecti] ordine causae FK (j) habet] potest FK
(k)est add. in K (l)nec] neque FK (m)nec] neque FK (n)sit add. ens rationis FK (o)in om. R
(p) subiective om. FK (q) reale] realiter K
(67) Supra, § 49.

(68) Hervaeus Natalis, Ouodl. IH, a. 1 . fol. 68ra.
(69) Supra, § 50.
(70) Supra. §51.
(71) Supra, § 2 1 -22.

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(90) Ad nonum72 dico quod ens rationis potest dici large et improprie ens
productum. Et quando quaeritur utrum eius productio sit realis vel secundum
rationem, dico quod productio entis rationis non est productio r realis, sed est
productio rationis sive secundum rationem. Et quandos dicitur1 'ergo erit dare ens
rationis ante omneu ens rationis', dico quodv non sequitur, quiaw, licet productio
entis rationis sit productio* secundum rationem, est tarnen verum ens reale, quia
aliud est esse actionem vel productionem secundum rationem y et aliud est esse
ens rationis vel secundum rationem, ut declaratum2 est supra73.
(91) Ad decimum74 dico quod productio primi entis rationis est verum ens
reale, sed est productioa solum secundum rationem, ut dictum est supra75.
(92) Ad undecimum76 dico quod ilia maior propositio in aliquo sensu est vera
et in aliquo sensu est falsa. In istob sensu est vera, quod sicut terminus actionis
transeuntis realiter est in eo quod habet se passive realiter et non est in eo quod est
agens realiter, itac ens rationis, quodd est terminus actionis transeuntis secundum
rationem, est in eo quod habet see passive secundum rationem et non f ine eo quod
est agens secundum rationem, ut agens est. Sed non est vera in isto sensu, scilicet
quodh sicut actio transiens realiter est idem cum termino suo et simul cum eo, ita
actio transiens secundum rationem est semper idem cum termino suo et simul cum
eo in eodem ; immo ista duo genera actionum in multis différant, licet in aliquo
conveniant. Sed magister Hervaeus77 accipit illam maiorem in ilio sensu in quo
est vera.
(93) Ad duodecimum78 dico quod aliqua possunt esse contradictoria ad

invicem dupliciter : uno modo per se et primo, sicut ens et non-ens, homo et non-
homo. Alio modo possunt aliqua' esse contradictoria per se, sed non primo, sicut
homo et non-animal et sicut accidens et non-ens. Hoc praemissoi, dico quod illa
quae sunt contradictoria primo modo, scilicet per se et primo k, ita se habent quod
totum illud ponitur una pars contradictions quod altera pars negat1. Unde tantum
ponit vel dicit m animal et ens quantum11 negat ° non-animal et non-ens. Sed
quando aliqua contradicunt sibi secundo modo, scilicet per se et non primo, tunc p
(r) productio om. FK (s) quando add. quaeritur K (t) dicitur ex quaeritur corr. mg. K (u) omne
om. FK (v) dico quod om. FK (w) quia] quod K (x) productio om. FK (y) actionem. . .rationem] pro-
ductionem rationis FK (z) declaratum] probatum FK (a) productio om. FK (b) isto add. enim FK
(c) ita add. etiam FK (d) quod om. FK (e) habet se mv. K (f) non add. est FK (g) in s.l. R (h) quod
om. K (i) aliqua om. FK (j) praemisso] promisso R (k) et primo om. R (1) ponitur una pars. . .negat]
quod ponit una pars contradictions totum altera negat FK (m) ponit vel dicit] ponunt FK
(n) quantum] quam R (o) negat] negantFK (p) tunc] tarnen R
(72) Supra ,§ 52.

(73) Supra, §82.
(74)Simra,§53.
(15) Supra, § 82.
(76) Supra, § 54.
(77) Hervaeus Natalis, Quodl. IV, q. 4, fol. 9 Ira.
(78) Supra, §55.

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non oportet quod tantum ponat una pars contradictionis ^ quantum alt
Unde non tantum ponit vels dicit homo quantum negat non-animal,
esset equus, cum non-animal neget1 equum. Ens autem rationis et p
contradicunt sibi non primo modo, sed secundo, id est contradicunt sib
non primo, et ideo non oportet quod ens rationis dicat formaliter ens
purum nihil neget ens reale.
(94) Ad tertium decimum79 dicendumv quod illa maior est vera in
sedw minor est falsa. Et ad probationem, cum dicitur quod omnis relat
ad praedicamentum relationis, dico quod verum est de relatione real
autem rationis nec aliquod ens rationis non x reducitur ad aliquod prae
nisi forte denominative, inquantum entia rationis possunt praedicar
native de entibus realibus, quae habent esse in praedic amento y reali2.
(95) Ad quartum decimum80 dico quod non oportet quod illu
praesupponit aliquid reale sit formaliter ens reale. Nam privatio, pu
non est aliquid reale formaliter et tarnen praesupponit ens reale, cu
privatio sit negatioa in determinato subiecto81. Etb quando dicitur quo
est nihil non praesupponit aliud c, dico quod verum estd de eo quod e
nihil, sed illud quod est solum nihil reale formaliter6 potest aliud f prae
sicut patet de privatione. Patet ergo quod ens rationis potest praesupp
reale et tarnen in se non est« aliquid reale formaliter.
(96) Ad tertium principale82 dico quod ens rationis est modus con
obiectum intellectus, ut cognitum est. Et cum Deus possit a nobis int
quod ens rationis fundatur in Deo intellecto a nobis, sicut fundatur in
nobis hintellectis.
(97) Et ad1 primam probationem quae est in oppositum, dico quod
inconveniens quod ens diminutum conveniat Deo secundum rationem
esset inconveniens quod ens diminutum conveniret Deo realiter. Ens v
convenit Deo secundum rationem. Vel posset aliter dici quod non est
niens quod ens diminutum conveniat Deoi, sed bene esset inconvenien
conveniret Deo diminute. Et aliud est dicere quod alicui conveniat ens
(q) contradictionis om. K (r) altera negat] negat altera pars contradictionis K (s) vel
(t) neget] negat F (u) id est contradicunt sibi] scilicet FK (v) dicendum] dico FK (w) sed
(x) non om. K (y) praedicamento] praedicamentum R (z) reali om. R (a) negatio om.
quod R (c) aliud] aliquid FK (d) verum est inv. FK (e) solum nihil reale formalite
formaliter solum K (f) aliud] aliquid K (g) est om. F (h) a nobis post intellectis FK (i) ad
bene esset. . .deo om. R
(19) Supra, §56.

(80) Supra, §57.
(81) AwST.,Metaph.,lV,2, 1004al5-16;IV,6, 101 Ibl9-20;X,4, 1055b3-8.
(82) Supra, § 58.

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et aliud quod sibi conveniat ens diminute k. Potest etiam aliter dici1 quod ens
diminutum potest esse duplex : uno modo, quia diminuii de perfectione"1, et tale
ens diminutum non convenit Deo. Alio modo est ensn sic diminutum quod° non
diminuii P realiter4* de perfectione eius cui convenit, et tale r potest convenire Deo.
Ens autem rationis, licet sit ens diminutum, non tarnen diminuii realiter de
perfectione eiuss cui convenit1, et ideo potest competere Deo et fundan in Deo,
quando Deus" a nobis intelligitur.
(98) Ad secundum83 dico quod ens rationis est in anima obiective, etv non quia
sit semper obiectum, sed quia est modus obiecti, ut obiectum est.
(99) His visis, respondeo ad quattuor argumentaw quae fuerunt posita suprax
in principio huius capituli. Et ad primum 84 dico quod minor est vera, sed maior est
falsa. Nam actus intelligendi non distinguitur contra omne ens y existens extra
animam, de quo ente extra animam loquitur Philosophus, VI z Metaphysicae 85.
Immo actus intelligendi continetura sub ente extra animam, cum actus intelligendi
sit in praedicamento qualitatis, sed verum est quod actus intelligendi distinguitur
contra omne ens reale b existens0 extra animam subiective, sed hoc non est ad
propositum nec ad intentionem Philosophi vaditd. Utrum autem actus intelligendi
et conceptus mentis et species intelligibilis e sint idem vel non, nonf pertinet ad
praesentem materiam.
(100) Ad secundum g 86 dico quod minor est vera, sed maior est falsa. Nam pro
tanto dicitur aliquid esseh ens rationis quia est modus consequens rem inquantum
est obiective in ratione, et non pro alia causa dicitur aliquid esse1 ens rationis. Neci
etiam est verum quod ratio utatur ente rationis vice obiecti realis. Immo ens ratio-
nis consequitur obiectum inquantum ratio k est usa obiecto. Et ad probationem
dico quod non oportet quod illud quod est extra animam subiective sit ens reale,
dummodo sit in anima obiective. Sic1 est in proposito. Nam, licet ens rationis non
sit in anima subiective"1, immo sit extra animam subiective", est tarnen0 in anima
obiective, modo quoP dictum est supra87. Et ideo non oportet quod sit ens reale.
(k) et aliud est. . .diminute] aliud enim est dicere ens diminutum convenit deo et aliud est dicere
tale ens diminute convenit deo F aliud est enim dicere ens diminutum convenit deo et aliud est dicere
ens diminute convenit deo K (1) potest etiam aliter dici] vel posset dici FK (m)de perfectione]
perfectionem FK (n) ens] est K (o) quod] quia F (p) diminuit] diminuet K (q) realiter add. aliquid K
(r) tale add. ens FK (s) eius ont. K (t) convenit] competit K (u) deus post nobis K (v) et om. FK
(w) argumenta om. R (x) supra om. FK (y) ens add. reale FK (z) VI] V F (a) continetur] continentur
KR (b) reale om. FK (c) existens om. F (d) vadit ante ad intentionem FK (e) et conceptus ...
intelligibilis] et species intelligibilis F species intelligibilis K (f) non om. R (g) secundum] tertium
FK (h) dicitur aliquid esse] aliquid dicitur F (i) dicitur aliquid esse] aliquid dicitur F aliquid dicitur
esse K (j)nec] neque FK (k) ratio s.l. F add. iam FK (1) sic] sicut K (m) sit in anima subiective]
subiective in anima R (n) sit extra animam subiective om. FK (o) tarnen om. FK (p) quo] quod R
(83) Supra, §59.

(84) Supra, §3.
(85) Arist., Metaph. , VI, 4, 1 028a3-6.
(86) Supra, § 4.
(87) Supra, §22.

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Illud autem ens quod non^ est in anima subiective ñeque obiective, ben
reale.
(101) Ad tertiums88 dicendum1 quod ens intentionale potest accipi dupliciter :

uno modo large pro omni eo quod per modum alicuius repraesentationisu ducit
intellectum in cognitionem alterius, sive sit species intelligibilis, sive sit actus
intelligendi, sive conceptus mentis; et isto modo hoc nomen intentionale' potest
extendi v ad omnem similitudinem sive ad quodcumque exemplar ducens in
cognitionem rei, et sic accipiendo intentionale actus intelligendi est ens inten-
tionale, et intentionale w isto modo acceptum non est ens rationis, immo est verum
ens reale. Alio modo potest accipi intentionale stricte, prout distinguitur contra
omne ens reale, et tale* intentionale est ens rationis. Sed actus intelligendi non est
tale ens intentionale, et ideo ratio non valet.
(102) Ad quartumy89 dico quod consequentia2 est vera, seda antecedens
est falsum. Et ad probationem antecedentis dico quod actus intelligendi est in
tertiab specie qualitatis. Et quando dicitur quod ea quae sunt in tertia specie quali-
tatis sunt sensibiles qualitatesc, dico quod passio etd passibilis qualitas non solum
dicunte qualitates sensibiles, sed etiamf intelligibiles qualitates ß, de quarum
numero est actus intelligendi, cum secundum Philosophum, III De anima 90 ,
intelligere sive actus intelligendi sith quoddam pati sive quaedam passio* J.
(q)non om. FK (r)ens om. R (s)tertium] quartum FK (t)dicendum] dico FK (u) alicuius
repraesentationis] repraesentativi FK (v) hoc nomen. . .extendi] potest ostendi nomen intentionale R
(w) intentionale post modo K (x) tale add. ens K (y) quartum] quintum FK (z) consequentia add.
non FK (a) sed] et FK (b) tertia] quarta R (c) sensibiles qualitates inv. FK (d) et] vel K (e) dicunt]
dicunturF (f) etiam om. K (g) intelligibiles qualitates inv. FK (h) sit] est K (i) sit... passio] quoddam
pati sive quaedam passio est F (j) passio add. et cetera K explicit tractatus de ente rationis add. FK
explicit primum articulum de ente rationis add. R et in hoc terminatur tractatus de ente rationis
compilatus a fratre Francisco de Prato de ordine fratrum praedicatorum magistro in theologia et cetera
et cetera add. P
(SS) Supra, §5.

(89) Supra , § 6.
(90) Arist., De an. , HI, 4, 429al 3- 1 5 ; III, 5, 429b24-25.

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FRANCISCUS DE PRATO'S "TRACTATUS DE ENTE RATIONIS": A CRITICAL EDITION WITH

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/44514688

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FRANCISCUS DE PRATO'S TRACTATUS DE ENTE RATIONIS

par Fabrizio AMERINI

[Mots-clés: être de raison; François de Prato; Guillaume d'Occam; Hervé de

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Part r : a brief historical sketch of the concept

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2. Aristotelian Foundations of the Distinction ens rationis -ens reale

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with his theory of verbum13. Thus being of reason consists in c

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cognising and the cognised object. Likewise, negations and privations

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After this first distinction, Hervaeus introduces a second one between

(24) Ibid. , fol. a.iii rb.

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Part h : franciscus de prato's criticism of ockham

1 . The Background of Franciscus 's Doctrine of Being of Reason

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Ockham's arguments it suffices to renew Hervaeus's critique. In e

(39) See below, edition, § 88.

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(40) On such descriptions, see F. Amerini, Introduzione , in / trattati "De universalibus" di

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2. Franciscus of Prato 's Criticism of Ockham

Having recalled some aspects of Hervaeus' s doctrine of beings of reason, let

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(44) Ibid., §3.

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y real mental being = being of reason, being in the mind

N' real extra-mental being = being outside the mind

in the mind singular acts of cognition

NSSSy being of reason = being inside the mind

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Accordingly, Ockham could propose narrowing down Franciscus' s six

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is abstracted from Socrates. Therefore, when speaking of man , we are

(49) Ibid., §33.

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(Obi) First objection: If every being of reason is not a real being,

(60 )Ibid., §38-43. On such an objection to Hervaeus, see LAMBERTINI, «"Resur

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(69) See below, edition, § 65-66.

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intentionality. According to him, intentionality is a bi-directional cognitive

Part hi : editorial prolegomena

Four manuscripts of the Tractatus de ente rationis by Franciscus de Pr

F Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, conv. soppr. J. V. 31 (fols. 74rb-

2. Interdependence of the Extant Manuscripts

2. 1 . The Mutual Independence of codices FKPR. Text samples78

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§ 85 : Alio modo {add. aliquid F) potest dici aliquid ens {om. F) .

§ 61 : . . . quia {om. sed add. s. I. P) supponit subiectum (obiectum P), in

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§ 2 1 : ... eo modo quo (quod R) dicitur esse in prospectu . . .

2.2. Reconstruction of Different Versions of the Text. Text Samples

§ 29 : Quantum ad secundum est sciendum quod ista opinio probatur