Jie 010 0145

The Open Innovation model: some issues regarding its
internal consistency
Danièle Bénézech
Dans Journal of Innovation Economics & Management 2012/2 (n°10), pages 145 à 165
Éditions De Boeck Supérieur
DOI 10.3917/jie.010.0145
© De Boeck Supérieur | Téléchargé le 11/11/2023 sur www.cairn.info via Université Catholique de Lyon (IP: 193.51.243.241)
Article disponible en ligne à l’adresse

https://www.cairn.info/revue-journal-of-innovation-economics-2012-2-page-145.htm
Découvrir le sommaire de ce numéro, suivre la revue par email, s’abonner...

Flashez ce QR Code pour accéder à la page de ce numéro sur Cairn.info.
Distribution électronique Cairn.info pour De Boeck Supérieur.

La reproduction ou représentation de cet article, notamment par photocopie, n'est autorisée que dans les limites des conditions générales d'utilisation du site ou, le
cas échéant, des conditions générales de la licence souscrite par votre établissement. Toute autre reproduction ou représentation, en tout ou partie, sous quelque
forme et de quelque manière que ce soit, est interdite sauf accord préalable et écrit de l'éditeur, en dehors des cas prévus par la législation en vigueur en France. Il est
précisé que son stockage dans une base de données est également interdit.
THE OPEN INNOVATION MODEL:
SOME ISSUES REGARDING ITS
INTERNAL CONSISTENCY
Danièle BENEZECH
CREM, CNRS (UMR 6211)
University Rennes 1, France
daniele.benezech@univ-rennes1.fr
The Open Innovation model, proposed by Chesbrough in 2003, aims to
describe how innovation management processes need to evolve. It refers to
the diversity of sources of knowledge which can be mobilised to generate a
new innovation dynamic within firms. Some of these sources are inbound,
while some others – quite important – are outbound. This is a new paradigm,
which is antithetical to the vertical integration model focused on internal
R&D activities. It is the opposite of closed innovation, which refers to pro-
cesses that only (or mainly) use internal knowledge.
Chesbrough’s proposal (2003 and 2006) has garnered significant interest
as well as induced discussion and controversy. Some scholars regard it as a
new kind of innovation process. Firms should implement new innovation
practices that ensure permeable boundaries in order to take advantage of the
diversity of available information by leveraging external sources (Chiaroni
et al., 2011). Others scholars compare it to a way of improving performance
through innovation (Laursen, Salter, 2006) or to obtain a competitive
advantage through the development of an ecosystem (Rohrbeck et al.,
2009). On the other hand, still other scholars are more critical of the
newness of the described mechanisms (Mowery, 2009; Trott, Hartmann,
2009). They doubt whether the model is genuinely innovative, as determi-
ned by whether its principles have already been observed. This paper per-
ceives those criticisms as part of a debate surrounding the way Chesbrough’s
model fits historical empirical observations – a debate referred to here as a
discussion on its external consistency. However, the Open Innovation model
is also built on implicit assumptions that should be scrutinised, in order to
get a sense of its paradigmatic character – in other words, its internal con-
sistency.
n° 10 – Journal of Innovation Economics 2012/2 145

Danièle BENEZECH
This paper charts an unnoticed theme in the current debate on Open

Innovation, namely the theoretical consistency of the model. This question
can be approached by studying the implicit assumptions on which the model
is built. Taking into account the model’s content, it can be suggested that
one might have doubts about its internal consistency. The present paper
argues that Chesbrough’s model seems to refer to theoretical assumptions
provided by different conceptual frameworks. Moreover, if the model of
Open Innovation is based on observed trends that have been present for
more than twenty years, it is not necessarily a new paradigm. The word
‘paradigm’ covers a set of principles and analytical tools designed to explain
a whole range of observations and established facts. The issue here is thus to
determine the degree of internal cohesion of the assumptions on which
Chesbrough’s model is based.
The contribution of this paper to the debate on Open Innovation is
threefold. First, it proposes a synthesis of the implicit assumptions included
in the model. The paper starts by scrutinizing the content of the Open Inno-
vation model by recalling some of the debates on its external consistency;
then specifies the content of its two broad topics to highlight underlying
theoretical assumptions. Second, focusing on the technology market, the
paper argues that critical uncertainty should be considered in order to
understand motivations for technology exchange, which is based on trust.
Patent-market failures undoubtedly result from asymmetric information.
But, beyond the acknowledgment of imperfect information, it could be rele-
vant to substitute it by assumption on incomplete information and critical
uncertainty. These constraints explain most relational contracts, pinpoin-
ting the issue of trust due to the previous interactions between firms and
their business partners. Third, referring back to the two topics, it can be seen
that one might doubt the internal relevance of this double proposal, related
to the incompatible implicit assumptions. The paper concludes by discussing
future directions for research in this area.
A PARADIGM SHIFT? ISSUES

IN THE EXTERNAL CONSISTENCY
OF OPEN INNOVATION
In his seminal books, Chesbrough (2003 and 2006) coined the term ‘open
innovation’ to describe a new model for organizing innovation within firms,
illustrating it with the cases of some large American companies. The opening
of the innovation process rests on internal and external flows of information,
146 Journal of Innovation Economics 2012/2 – n° 10

The open innovation model
knowledge, and ideas. The Open Innovation model provides benchmarks

for good practices in monitoring innovation processes through two coupled
suggestions: using patents as tradable goods to provide both additional reve-
nues and additional knowledge assets, and opening firms’ boundaries to
inflows and outflows of knowledge.
Chesbrough contrasts closed innovation, which could be thought of as the
‘old model’ of the innovation process, with open innovation. In closed inno-
vation, R&D performs internally in a company, without relationships with
external partners. The firm manages all the stages of the innovation process
by itself, from design to marketing. It uses property rights in a defensive way.
Intellectual property rights (IPRs) allows protection against imitation,
which decreases returns from a monopoly position resulting from investment
in R&D. If closed innovation guarantees the legal protection of innovation,
it reduces business opportunities to those with support within the firm itself.
It can also lead to an underdevelopment of patents, since those which are
not developed or commercially exploited by their holder may languish.
Chesbrough challenges firms instead to adopt an open business model,
which presupposes inflows and outflows of knowledge and ideas. Open Inno-
vation focuses on the identification of new opportunities as a result of
knowledge coming from outside the company. The partners of the firm (sup-
pliers, customers) and other related entities (competitors, universities, etc.)
are useful sources of information. In practice, internal sources of innovation
and external ones must be combined. In addition, Open Innovation must
allow the creation of additional value generated by sale or licensing of IPRs
not directly used by the holder.
According to Chesbrough (2006, p. 12), Open Innovation is a new
model of innovation management that will gradually permeate many indus-
tries: “Open Innovation’s explanatory power is not limited to a small number of
companies operating in a small number of US high technology industries”. The dif-
fusion process from large companies to SMEs is to be encouraged through
relevant policies. It can be identified in an overview of existing innovation
strategies of multinational corporations. As claimed by Gassmann et al.
(2010), Open Innovation should be able to thrive in all industries and all
enterprises. However, to drive new rises of innovative performance, each
organisation needs to integrate the model. Every firm should benefit from
having increased its attitude toward open innovation practices. To be able to
innovate as effectively as possible, companies must organise knowledge of
inflows and outflows. Open Innovation rests on the opportunity for all sectors
and firms to be bearers of innovation. This explains why it should be conside-
red as a paradigm. It has the potential to become the universal standard of
innovation management. Additionally, as noted by Chesbrough (2006,

Danièle BENEZECH
p. 11), “any model that claims to be a new paradigm for industrial innovation must
account for anomalies that are not well-explained in an earlier paradigm”, for
example how to capture spillover from industrial R&D. In Open Innovation,
evidences provide such answers. Therefore, this model will come to corres-
pond gradually to a regular process of innovation, just as a paradigm descri-
bes a regular conceptual framework. Consequently, the Open Innovation
model can be viewed as referring to a revolution currently in process (Poot
et al., 2009).
Chesbrough’s proposal raises questions as to whether conditions which
amount to a paradigm shift are met. It supposes first the effectiveness of the old
paradigm of closed innovation and second, an actual current process for subs-
tituting it. A critical issue is therefore to what extent the Open Innovation
model complies with those requirements.
The emergence of a ‘new’ paradigm supposes that an older one can
actually be identified. However, as Trott and Hartmann (2009) argue, the
opposition between the closed model of innovation and the open one is a
false dichotomy, claimed by Chesbrough to exist without empirical evi-
dence. Chesbrough defines closed innovation as being related to six princi-
ples, which are actually inconsistent with the innovation practices
previously observed. Trott and Hartman conclude that Chesbrough has only
a partial perception of the effective model of innovation, and argue that the
sharp polarisation he presents is partly true and partly false. Following them,
from a historical perspective, firms have adopted some principles of open
innovation for a long time. This critical point of view is in keeping with a
long history of firm concern with the Open Innovation model. Mowery
(2009) shows several open innovation components can be found in the US
industrial R&D system in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Acknowled-
ging to him, industrial research followed a long-run tendency of opening and
co-operation, especially since the post-war period. At the opposite, this
period includes also stages which refer more to the closed model of innova-
tion than to the open one. Mowery’s analysis emphasises continuity in the
development of R&D management rather than disruption or radical change.
In Europe during the 1970s, institutions were devoted to supporting co-
operative R&D. For example, in Germany, Research Centres are created to
afford technical support to SMEs and carry out applied research for them
(Marteil, 1998). For example, some Networks of Technological Diffusion
(i.e., RDT: Réseau de Diffusion Technologique) were created in France from
the 1990s. SMEs need some help to identify useful partners with which to
co-operate, taking into account the diversity of needed competencies. For
another example, European research programs are set up to encourage pre-
competitive co-operation between firms (Humbert, 1993). Consequently,

since the 1980s, co-operation and outsourcing are tools increasingly used by
firms to reinforce their innovation process.
Thus, Open Innovation would seem more suitable to a long evolution of
research management than to the abrupt introduction of new principles. For
several decades, firms have adopted both inbound and outbound knowledge
sources, through the internal R&D process and external agreements and coo-
peration (Veugelers, 1997). Moreover, as underlined by Chesbrough himself:
“Today’s business reality is not based on pure open innovation but on companies
that invest simultaneously in closed as well as open innovation activities” (Enkel et
al., 2009, p. 312). A historical examination shows that there is no evidence
for claiming a paradigm revolution. From our point of view, open innovation
is not the only alternative to the closed model. This highlights two stylized
facts: first, a long process of dilution of firm boundaries; second, the develop-
ment of a market of technology and knowledge, in accordance with the idea
of what is usually called ‘the knowledge-based economy’.
This claim of a gradual evolution rather than a revolution can be strengthe-
ned by another argument, proposed by Christensen et al. (2005). According to
them, innovation supported by interaction between a firm and its environment
is not a recent process. Evolutionary economics has previously argued how the
learning and interacting processes led to a dynamic of innovation and techno-
logical change (Rosenberg, 1982; Lundvall, 1992). This approach proposes a
strong analysis of the way the innovation process can be expected to run, assu-
ming the importance of relationships and interactions between firms, other
economic actors, and institutions. The evolutionary economic literature
emphasises that learning effects support innovation dynamics and result partly
from interactions with customers and suppliers (Von Hippel, 1976). In this fra-
mework, the concept of ‘paradigm’ is largely used to describe historical evolu-
tion of the economic system, conforming to the Schumpeterian conception of
cycles and technological revolution (Dosi, 1982).
Consequently, one might consider that the main contribution of Ches-
brough would relate to the choice of the term ‘open innovation’ (Dahlander,
Gann, 2010). The concept can be considered a synthesis of observed trends,
even if the open model is in doubt due to the private exploitation of property
rights (Penin, 2008). The question of what is new in Chesbrough’s proposal
has thus been posed on several occasions. The question of whether a revol-
utionary shift is currently happening or will take place soon remains to be
debated, as noted even by Chesbrough himself in 2006 (p. 10): “It is far too
soon to claim that the paradigm of Open Innovation will make an enduring contri-
bution to our understanding of innovation. However, it is not too soon to claim
that it has already made an impact on our understanding of innovation”.

Danièle BENEZECH
Nevertheless, the model puts an emphasis on a couple of articulated

mechanisms. Sources of information have to be diversified through increased
knowledge inflows and outflows in order to enhance the innovation process.
Patent exploitation has to be improved because of the knowledge and tech-
nology market, which takes part in the dynamics of innovation. Interactions
with partners and technology transactions are the two topics on which Open
Innovation focuses. Acknowledging previous debates, this paper proposes to
identify in each of them both recent and former dimensions.
ON THE NEWNESS OF THE OPEN

INNOVATION ASSUMPTIONS
Isckia and Lescop (2011) argue that the model of Chesbrough actually
includes two topics, which are complementary but also different:
a. The need to promote an efficient market for IPRs and their smooth
functioning. This market has to sustain unexploited (or underexploi-
ted) patent transactions by matching patent holders with potential
buyers. Symmetrical transaction gains would be achieved, resting on
the economic value of the patents. This will support the enhance-
ment of R&D and could be viewed as reducing the exploration-
exploitation dilemma (March, 1991). Exploration would be less risky
because innovation will become more easily profitable, even if the
research outcome does not match the strategic interests of the firm.
IPR and technology markets should afford widespread opportunities
to innovate by exploiting most of firm’s competencies.
b. The need to open firms to ideas, technologies and projects from
outside, in order to bolster or even strengthen their innovation capa-
bilities. The boundaries of the firm need to be permeable, so that out-
bound information and knowledge can flow through them. This
supports again a better trade-off between the exploration of new
opportunities and the exploitation of current feasibilities. Inbound
flows serve the purpose to improve the firm’s exploration capabilities;
outbound flows are involved in the exploitation of the firm’s basis of
knowledge and technology (Bianchi et al., 2011).
The first suggestion to expand the market for technology refers to the
previous proposal of open-market innovation proposed by Rigby and Zook
(2002). This deals with processes of simultaneously importing ideas, as a way

to build up blocks of innovation, and exporting them, as a way to raise cash

and identify the core competence (within the meaning of Prahalad and
Hamel, 1990). Open-market innovation can be highly valuable for firms,
depends on the business environment in which they are operating. It assumes
that the market is an efficient means to co-ordinate transactions. Here, the
conceptual framework is the mainstream approach to trade, regarded as
generating increasing returns through mechanisms of specialisation of
labour and generalisation of exchange. The market is held to be efficient in
organizing economic transactions, conforming to Walrasian assumptions.
Yet, economic agents are supposed to operate under perfect (or even boun-
ded) rationality conditions. On the other hand, the notion of the
knowledge-based economy is more recent and refers on the crucial role
played by knowledge diffusion in the whole economy. More precisely, while
one can identify references to the impact of knowledge as an ‘engine of pro-
duction’ in the writings of the founders of political economy, like Marshall,
Say or Ricardo (Cortes, 2009), the idea of commoditisation of knowledge
assets became powerful during the 1980s and has been especially prevalent
since the early 2000s (Guellec et al., 2010). Thus, this paper suggests that
regarding patents, technology, and ideas as tradable goods is mainly a recent
phenomenon. It presumes a new conception of knowledge, which rather
than seeing it as a pure public good is now considered as a tradable good,
based on an belief in its appropriability.
The second suggestion, focused on inflows and outflows, includes two
assumptions too. The importance of interactions for generating learning
effects and an innovation dynamic within a firm has been a well-known
issue since the mid-’80s, due to the contribution of Evolutionary Economics.
In contrast, however, the proposal for the adoption of an open business
model is something new, and presumes the permeability of boundaries. As
shown by Penin et al. (2011), open innovation encompasses different moda-
lities; some of them are rather lowly interactive, some others are actually
open and interactive. For example, crowdsourcing is one of these business
practices that the firm implements to really opening innovative activities
(Schenk, Guittard, 2011). This is a way to capture knowledge generated by
online communities through posting question on a web platform. Crowd-
sourcing platforms can be viewed as intermediaries in the knowledge sharing
process; they are related to a new type of business model which is at the
interface between open communities and traditional organisations (Chanal,
Caron-Fasan, 2010).
Taking into account previous arguments, it may be useful to summarise
these two broad topics of the Open Innovation model, as in Table 1:

Danièle BENEZECH
Table 1 – The double topic of the Open Innovation model
To enhance technology To innovate through both internal

Proposition
and IPR market and external interactions
Recent
no yes no yes
approach
Efficiency of Patents are Effectiveness of Open business

market as tradable interactions for model improves
co-ordination goods learning process. dynamic
Implicit
mechanism. efficiencies
assumption
The Walrasian’ Open-market The evolutionary Interactive
assumption innovation approach business practices
It is now quite legitimate to wonder about the consistency of such a
model, which defines two main principles, each with different underlying
assumptions. Consequently, this paper will now turn to focus on the first
topic, in order to identify its characteristics.
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
AND THE IPR MARKET FAILURES
Following Guellec et al. (2010), it is assumed here that the development of
a market follows three main phases, different in their substance but comple-
mentary in the achievement of market development: increased volume of
market transactions; improvement in the functioning of the market due to
the progressive reduction of market imperfections; the enlargement of the
market, which supports division of labour and standardised goods. The
knowledge-based economy means the development of such markets for
knowledge assets, like technologies, patents, or ideas.
The IPR market should enable the exploitation of patents not yet suffi-
ciently developed by their holders. It rests on the conversion of the IPR into
a good. It encourages R&D expenditure by making investment return easier
to secure. Trade gains will be achieved at the individual and global levels. In
this respect, the current system of exchange of patents is not working per-
fectly. Gambardella et al. (2007), using the European PatVal report, valued
the European patents market at 16 billion in 2002; its potential value
would be nearly 24.4 billion if the market could fulfil its function perfectly.
This is clearly a utilitarian conception of the Economics of knowledge, in
which technology or ideas are viewed as standard tradable goods likely to be
exchanged on a large scale through anonymous transactions. As Guellec et
al. (2010) point out, since the 1980s, there has been a major trend toward

knowledge ‘commoditisation’. The promotion of financial transactions in

patents is connected to this trend, conforming to the TRIPS agreement,
which came into force in 1995. But the patents market is subject to informa-
tion asymmetry. Therefore, the potential buyer of a patent bears all risks ari-
sing out of the development of the patented technology.
The asymmetry of information leads to two potential market failures.
The first one takes place before the conclusion of the contract and relates to
the risk of adverse selection. The second one refers to the conclusion of the
contract, which implies a risk of moral hazard induced by opportunistic
behaviour. These two risks generate transaction costs for patent traders,
incurred during or after the patent transaction. Some costs are induced by
the preliminary research in order to find the most suitable patent-holder.
The potential buyer encounters difficulties in ascertaining the various eco-
nomic opportunities embedded in the patents for which an exchange is pro-
posed. Some costs result from the uncertainty of the actual value of the
patent – in other words, the realisation of business opportunities that can be
identified only ex-post. There is, finally, risk related to possible opportunist
behaviour on the part of the patent holder. He could potentially use
knowledge derived from the assigned patent and preserved after the transac-
tion. The buyer can be negatively affected by this behaviour, a situation
which leads to anti-competitive practices and inability to obtain the whole
return on investment. Chesbrough (2006) himself stresses the negative
impact of imperfect information on the IPR market.
In Akerlof’s (1970) seminal model, some actors hold information that is
unavailable to others. Asymmetry of information rests on a quality differen-
tial difficult to observe by the potential buyer. Thus, the quality of the patent
is often questioned. Since the 1980s, some argue that the lower average qua-
lity of patents is due to a greater ease to obtain patents (Lallement, 2008).
According to Guellec et al. (2010), the 1980s are characterised by important
changes in National Innovation Systems, especially as regards patent-gran-
ting policy, both in the United States and in Europe. The US Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, created in 1982, has an active policy of wea-
kening the requirements for the granting of patents, particularly in terms of
the requirement for inventiveness. By its judgments, it also increased the pos-
sibility of damage as a result of litigation occurs affecting the market value of
patents. Thus, patents have become easier to obtain and have a greater eco-
nomic value. This creates strong incentives to obtain them. As a result, firms
have begun to adopt a strategy of defensive patent filling aiming at blocking
their competitors from occupying ‘underpatented’ areas to which either firm
might plausibly have a claim. During this period, the average quality of
patents has decreased, partly due to the strategy of patent thickets.

Danièle BENEZECH
This term refers to a technology or product covered by a high number of

patents from the same holder. This has been observed most commonly in the
United States. This strategy could explain the increase of patent numbers
per unit of R&D, which is 25% over the last 20 years for OECD countries as
a whole. The number of deposits seems to be positively correlated to licen-
sing revenue flows, which grew during the same period. Since the 1980s,
these two variables have grown exponentially; licensing revenues passed
from US$10,000 million in 1980 to $83,000 million in 2000, while the num-
ber of granted patents followed a similar progression (Athreye, Cantwell,
2007). But from 2007, a series of legal decisions by the Supreme Court of the
United States made inventiveness requirements higher, accompanied by a
change to USPTO regulations concerning patent delivery. In the same way,
the European Patent Office followed a new policy intended to deter unfun-
ded requests for low-quality patents. Guellec et al. (2010) consider that these
policy directions led to stagnant demand in 2008, then to decreasing
demand (by about 10%) in 2009, even if the granted patents have increased
in subsequent year.
Thus, this issue is less the existence of the IPR market than the condi-
tions needed to improve the way it performs. Imperfect or asymmetric infor-
mation generates market failures as well as high transaction costs. On
average, patent transaction costs have been estimated at nearly 30% of
patent value (Guellec et al., 2010). Transaction costs and imperfect informa-
tion have also led to ‘patent sharks’ strategies being adopted by firms who
want to benefit from the exploitation of asymmetries of information to the
detriment of productive organisations (Reitzig et al., 2010).
An apparent solution consists of the establishment of market intermedia-
ries to gather information and set up conditions for an efficiently running
market. These intermediaries are supposed to be able to identify the effec-
tive value of patents (that is, their transaction value). The cost of the
patents does not reflect their future value, and the amount ultimately reco-
verable is dependent upon several factors, including tacit knowledge. As
noticed by Chesbrough, patent value rests only on exchange value, because
use value cannot be easily measured or forecasted. Consequently, it is diffi-
cult to conceive patents as just another commodity. Patents are not com-
mercial goods like any other, due to the essential intangible assets embedded
in them. The transferability of the use value incorporated in a patent is pro-
blematic. The suggestion to enlarge the IPR market is based on the assump-
tion of this transferability because, by definition, a market is the key notion
for exchange. The present paper argues that this is one of the paradoxes of
the Open Innovation model. It claims that the IPRs market has to be enlarged
to provide efficiency. But the key issue is what the real subject of exchange is:

technology, patents or knowledge – and furthermore, codified knowledge or

tacit knowledge.
However, the effectiveness of intermediation still remains unclear. For
example, a US company called Ocean Tomo has organised auctions on 749
pools of patents since April 2006. Only 38% were sold, and at a low price of
80% of what was expected on average (Perrot, Yvrande-Billion, 2010). It is
assumed in this paper that the usefulness of intermediaries can be called into
question, taking into account the uncertainty context of transactions.
According to Tietze and Herstatt (2010), technology transactions are per-
formed under conditions of uncertainty, which may be to the detriment of
market function.
TECHNOLOGY COMMODITISATION,
CONTRACTS AND CRITICAL UNCERTAINTY
Patent transactions are currently carried out in three different ways: face-to-
face exchange, licensing, or financial agreement. The first two types of con-
tracts are rarely simple commercial contracts negotiated on anonymous mar-
ket; they often include tacit or explicit contractual dimensions that
supposed specific relationships between the contracting parties. They are
relational contracts, in the sense of Williamson (1985).
This kind of contract can include several forms of compensation or des-
cribe dispute resolution procedures, but covers besides a broader range of sub-
jective information, such as, for example, the way transfer of knowledge is
supposed to be carried out. Conforming to Goetz and Scott (1981, p. 1091),
“a contract is relational to the extent that the parties are incapable of reducing
important terms of the arrangement to well-defined obligations. Such definitive
obligations may be impractical because of the inability to identify uncertain future
conditions or because of inability to characterize complex adaptations adequately
even when the contingencies themselves can be identified in advance”. When a
contract includes relational characteristics, it may seem difficult to engage
in market co-ordination because of the anonymous context. The technology
market can effectively perform only under conditions of low uncertainty.
The diversity of transaction forms should be kept running to provide various
negotiation frameworks. Perrot and Yvrande-Billion (2010) recommend
preserving this diversity, exhibiting the relational dimension observed in the
bulk of exchanges actually carried out.
Taking into account the effects of uncertainty leads us to identify one of
the key issues in the paradigmatic dimension of Open Innovation. The
impact of uncertainty on the functioning of the IPR market is now widely

Danièle BENEZECH
accepted. But the notion of uncertainty is too often viewed as equivalent to

that of incomplete information (Arora, Gambardella, 2010). Troy and Werle
(2008) claim that two types of uncertainty have detrimental effects on the
market for patents: strategic uncertainty, which relates to asymmetric infor-
mation; and substantive uncertainty, which refers to a complete lack of the
information necessary to make decisions. According to them, uncertainty
weights on intermediaries business and conversely funds their existence. In
addition, “without uncertainty, intermediaries would not be needed – with too
much uncertainty they would not survive” (Troy, Werle, 2008, p. 17). This
paper argues that a third type of uncertainty can be identified, originating
from the ‘convention’ perspective of exchange, which promotes radically
questioning the market co-ordination mechanism.
The market supposes that the subject of an exchange must be a minima
partly known by contract partners for them to be able to organise a transac-
tion. The idea of critical uncertainty calls the assumption of this prerequisite
into question. Uncertainty is not sufficient to induce failure of an economic
calculation. Bounded rationality still remains compatible with the economic
analysis of market relations, on the condition that it is a substantive rationa-
lity (Simon, 1956). But, if the assumption of behaviour is about procedural
rationality, incompatibility occurs. Bounded rationality postulates that the
decision-maker has to search for alternatives, has incomplete knowledge,
and chooses actions that are expected to produce satisfying results. In other
words, it assumes that the relevant determining factor is the limits of human
cognitive capabilities.
Substantive rationality is defined as behaviour suitable to achieve goals
within the limits derived from given conditions, as for example a condition
of imperfect information. But, as argued by Simon, the process of searching
for satisfactory alternatives is also important to building a final choice. The
procedural dimension of decision-making affects the result – this is procedu-
ral rationality. This term refers to the behaviour of accurately identifying
results by appropriate deliberation. Procedural rationality focuses on how
the choice is made: the decision-making process determines the decision
result. The outcome of any decision depends on the previous deliberation
process. One might wonder whether such an approach will be relevant to
analysing transactions when the object of exchange is not previously well
known – this is called critical uncertainty (Thevenot, 2002). From this point
of view, agents do not know the relevant characteristics of the object which
is supposed to be exchanged. Market co-ordination deals with the possibility
of comparing actions or evaluating alternatives. Usually, commodities enable
actions to be compared by providing a commonly accepted identification of
the transaction object. However, when an object does not support common

expectancies about the future, it implies the need for another mode of co-
ordination of actions. Critical uncertainty supposes a deliberation process in
order to qualify object, then reach an agreement.
Neither technology nor ideas are commodities; they are the ‘subject’ of
transaction. Market co-ordination cannot happen without a prior agree-
ment on the effective nature of the exchange; that is, a qualification process.
Technology, ideas, and even patents are not fixed over time; their expected
value changes during the negotiation process, thanks to the tacit knowledge
embedded within them. They correspond to a set of knowledge assets whose
exploitation implies the mobilisation of evolving competencies due to a
continuous process of individual and collective knowledge creation and
conversion. Critical uncertainty results from unshared expectations about
the future value of technology, and then leads to market failure. The relatio-
nal dimensions of face-to-face contracts, as well as trust between partners,
are the co-ordination mechanisms which generate strong agreements. From
this perspective, direct interactions between economic partners are essential
to the qualification process.
The postulate of critical uncertainty leads us to argue that there is an
internal incoherence to the Open Innovation model, which focuses on the
putative need to enlarge the technology and IPR markets. The co-ordina-
tion mechanism must pass through either the market or the qualification
process. One might consider it relevant to support commercial transactions
and specialisation through market co-ordination, which means a rational
economic calculation (even under condition of bounded substantive ratio-
nality). This supposes that technology is an effective commodity with a
commonly expected use value. At the other end, interaction and the relatio-
nal dimension can be viewed as the main sponsor of an efficient innovation
process. Consequently, market intermediaries can cause adverse consequen-
ces by damaging innovation dynamics.
In scrutinizing Chesbrough’s position on the development of technology
and the IPR market, it appears that his implicit assumptions refer to an ortho-
dox approach to market co-ordination under the condition of asymmetric
information. These assumptions limit the explanatory character of the model
by occulting some transaction determinants. It would thus be relevant to take
into account another approach, which refers to other co-ordination processes
under conditions of procedural rationality and critical uncertainty. Interac-
tions, trust and confidence are some of the key factors which sponsor transac-
tion agreements and explain diversity of contracts, especially relational
contracts. The paradox between implicit assumptions made concerning tech-
nology transactions and those which must be made in order to understand the
various forms of effective transaction can be seen in the following Table 2.

Danièle BENEZECH
Table 2 – About relevance of the proposal to expand the technology market
Proposal To expand market for technology and IPRs
Implicit assumptions Useful assumptions to understand

of the Open Innovation model established facts
Information Imperfect and asymmetric: Imperfect and incomplete;

intermediaries as relational contacts, interactions,
risk-reducing agents impact of trust
Bounded Substantive rationality; Procedural rationality;

rationality natural uncertainty about critical uncertainty
exhaustive transaction conditions about the exchanged object
Doubt regarding consistency of the conceptual tools

The conceptual tools used by this model seem unsuited to understanding
the observed facts, especially those that describe the importance of face-to-face
contracts and the role of trust in the co-ordination mechanism. The postu-
late on critical uncertainty questions the global conceptual consistency of
the Open Innovation model. As noted above, the model includes two sug-
gestions. It will now be useful to look at the relationship between these two
proposals, to discuss the global relevance of Open Innovation.
ABOUT THE CONSISTENCY

BETWEEN THE TWO PROPOSALS
This paper investigates the relationship between business partners to

understand technology and patent transactions and discusses the crucial role
of critical uncertainty. But, as we mentioned earlier, the first Chesbrough’s
proposal to expand the market for technology refers to the mainstream
approach to trade, which supposes increasing returns provided by specialisa-
tion of labour. It could be now useful to explore the relevance between the
implicit assumptions of the model’s proposals.
First of all, one might notice that thinking about exchange value, which
distinguishes the production of the patent from its exploitation, actually
implies a model of the innovation process that is rather linear. In other
words, it supposes a radical break between the production of knowledge,
useful to develop a patentable device and patent it, and the ability to
exploit this patent. Patent evaluation and exploitation are connected with
a progressive specialisation of actors, assumed to produce efficiency gains.
This specialisation supports the establishment of intermediaries on the

technology market and makes effective the co-ordination mechanism. But

this linear design appears to be in conflict with proposals intending to foster
openness in the innovation process. When innovation is assumed to follow a
linear process, that is relevant to specialised market participants, feedback and
interaction are virtually excluded from the framework. But in Open Innovation,
interactions are a way to improve the innovation process. Consequently, argu-
ments for enhancing the market for technology and the pure financial transac-
tions of patents can be viewed as mismatching the importance of the intangible
dimension of technology.
Moreover, many outsourcing processes seem to be driven by williamso-
nians’ medium- or long-term contracts, according to the degree of specificity
of assets convenient to produce the object of exchange (Lohtia et al., 1994).
Trust is a critical element in economic transactions. Evidence strongly sup-
ports that inter-organisational trust impacts transactions costs and perfor-
mance outcomes (Dyer and Chu, 2003). The impact of trust on governance
choice is driven by the threat of opportunistic behaviour. Collaborative
innovation is risky. Risk depends on the incentives that the partner may
have towards opportunism. According to Nooteboom (1996), trustworthi-
ness varies between firms. It is some extent impersonal, when organisation
follows a given set of behavioural routines, but also to some extent personal,
in bounds of kinship and proximity. Consequently, the degree of asymmetry
between partners impacts the outcome of co-operation for knowledge-sha-
ring. As shown by Alvarez and Barney (2001), an overreliance on trust can
put an entrepreneurial firm at significant risk and that, under circumstances,
alliance can threaten the survival of an entrepreneurial firm. It should be
noticed that trust can be viewed as a significant factor moderating the way
SMEs perceive the potential business opportunities derived from either explo-
rative or exploitative networking collaborative activities (Brunetto, Farr-
Wharton, 2007). The creation and maintenance of trust-based relationships
through innovation networks, a form of open innovation, reduces transaction
costs, risk and is crucial to long term relationships (Skardon, 2011).
But, transaction costs economics can be viewed unsuitable to model
these dynamic innovative capacities. Analysing trust effects on collabora-
tion decisions, Hoffmann et al. (2010) demonstrate an opportunism-inde-
pendent effect that increases the transaction value of a collaborative
exchange but encompasses additional non-economic motives for collabora-
tion. Transaction costs theory assumes that the exchanged object is determi-
ned by initial provision. When learning effects and interactions are viewed
as sources of knowledge creation, another assumption has to be made: that
the exchanged object is collectively built on during the transaction process,

Danièle BENEZECH
for example when technology transfers include the cross-border assignment

of employees. Interactions are a way to reduce uncertainty by enhancing
trust. In addition, they spark an evolution process in the effective object of
the exchange. In short, exchange is based on the ability to interact, which is
a prerequisite of any transaction. This induces that collaboration is often
interpreted from a resource-based perspective. Outsourcing, for example,
becomes a means of reaching resources that are unavailable internally but
are nevertheless fundamental for the company’s performance.
Furthermore, following Cohen and Levinthal (1990), it can be supposed
that company have specific competencies, needed to be able to absorb
knowledge coming from outside. A firm must have absorptive capacity,
which results from a permanent adaptation and allows the exploitation of
both internal and external resources, as in the case of Open Innovation
(Spithoven et al., 2011). The why-who framework proposed by Miotti and
Sachwald (2003) to describe the determinants of cooperation is built on a
resource-based perspective. The propensity to co-operate on R&D depends
on the absorptive capabilities of the firms involved. By applying capability-
based arguments to organisational boundaries, Lichtenthaler and Lichten-
thaler (2009) underline the importance of non-efficiency perspectives, which
go beyond analysing transaction costs. Drawing on the concept of absorptive
capability, they propose a relevant capability-based framework for open inno-
vation processes, promoting a firm’s critical capabilities of managing internal
and external knowledge.
Consequently, the relevance of an Open Innovation model based on
bounded substantive rationality, to apprehend the nature of contracts invol-
ving knowledge-sharing between firms remains to be demonstrated. Critical
uncertainty cannot be reduced to asymmetry of information; and viewing
intangible knowledge as a tradable asset supposes that social and personal
interactions will be needful which can hardly be codified or precisely defi-
ned in a commercial agreement. The internal consistency of Open Innova-
tion is therefore questionable from the point of view of the compatibility
between its two topics. As argued above, motivations to co-operate deal
with interpersonal relationships, trust, and critical uncertainty (Table 3).
Previous interactions (before the transfer negotiations or the knowledge-
sharing) which promote trust facilitate a deliberation process concerning
the effective object of exchange, in all its dimensions. Most technology con-
tracts and innovation networks deal with personal relationships between
partners. Relationships based on trust support both technology transactions
and co-operation for R&D, and the implicit assumption should refer to an
ongoing process of learning, knowledge creation and knowledge-sharing.

Table 3 – The two topics of Open Innovation: the question of internal consistency
To expand the technology market To innovate through interactions
The efficient functioning of the market Learning and trust effects
Information Resources, capabilities and competence
Doubt regarding the compatibility of the two conceptual frameworks used
Proposal to connect this two-side model:

assumption of critical uncertainty
CONCLUSION
Chesbrough seeks to demonstrate the existence of a process of opening of
innovation which transcends the firm’s boundaries, a trend which has been
observed for about thirty years and is growing. The paradigmatic character of
this proposal is based on examples which are incompatible with a closed
model of innovation. These examples are viewed as being unexplainable ano-
malies belonging to a preceding paradigm of closed innovation. Chesbrough
suggests that a revolution in the nature of innovation has been or is taking
place, founded on a very particular definition of the supposed previous para-
digm. This argument has been the subject of much criticism and debate.
This paper proposes some issues with the internal coherence of the model,
scrutinizing the implicit theoretical framework. It has seemed useful to start
by describing the two topics of the model, in order to pinpoint their under-
lying assumptions. Focusing on the first topic, enhancing the market for tech-
nology, then on the internal logic between the two proposals, the paper
argues that critical uncertainty should be considered in order to understand
motivations to both technology exchange and cooperation. It advocates an
integrative approach to knowledge-sharing based on a resource-based pers-
pective, which cannot be reduced to transactional contracts.
It seems to us that the principal assumption mobilised by Open Innova-
tion amounts to the standard assumption of bounded substantial rationality.
Additionally, as this paper has shown, it appears relevant to take into
account procedural rationality and critical uncertainty. This is a radical
shift, which provides a useful framework to understand some established
facts related to the impact of trust and non-economic motives for transac-
tions and collaboration. Whereas Open Innovation relates to mainstream
hypothesis, one might doubt both the internal consistency of the double
proposal and the global relevance of the model to understand the current
opening innovation process.

Danièle BENEZECH
The question of the universal relevance of the model still remains

emphatically open to debate due to the normative view it implies. The
model supposes that opening innovative practices must be implemented by
firms to induce a dynamic of innovation in an isomorphic sense, according to
which a procedure (supposedly) observed for large firms will be necessarily
reproducible for all companies. It is, however, necessary to pursue further
analysis of the relevance of the Open Innovation model to all types of orga-
nisation. Open Innovation supposes a need to improve incoming and
outgoing flows in order to support the innovation process. Large firms adopt
an approach of combination of strategies through agreements to collaborate
on their innovative projects. But most SMEs seem to choose between strate-
gies: either they focus only on in-house innovation, or they decide to co-
operate with partners. A generalisation of the model to all companies could
result in a situation wherein SMEs are better able to deploy areas of specia-
lisation on behalf of large firms, reinforcing the dependence of the latter on
the former.
As well as the firm’ size, it should be useful to connect Open Innovation’
arguments to public policy. As claimed by Wang et al. (2012), an overview
of open innovation impacts on National Innovation Systems is still lacking.
Nevertheless, critical effects can be identified, which state that open inno-
vation practices reinforce the effectiveness of national systems of innovation
and diversify its innovation networks. These insights may have important
policy-making implications, fostering an opening environment. But they
should especially be checked and evolved, in particular by taking account of
the size of firms involved both in IPRs market and collaborative networks.
REFERENCES
ALVAREZ, S., BARNEY, J. (2001), How entrepreneurial firms can benefit from alliances
with large partners, Academy of Management Executive, 15 (1), 139-148.
AKERLOF, G. (1970), The market for ‘lemons’: quality uncertainty and the market mecha-
nism, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84 (3), 488-500.
ARORA, A., GAMBARDELLA, A. (2010), Ideas for rent: an overview of markets for
technology, Industrial and Corporate Change, 19 (3), 775-803.
ATHREYE, S., CANTWELL, J. (2007), Creating competition ? Globalization and the
emergence of new technology producers, Research Policy, 36 (2), 209-226.
BIANCHI, M., CAVALIERE, A., CHIARONI, D., FRATTINI, F., CHIESA, V. (2011),
Organisational modes for Open Innovation in the bio-pharmaceutical industry: An explo-
ratory analysis, Technovation, 31, 22-33.
BRUNETTO, Y., FARR-WHARTON, R. (2007), The moderating role of trust in SME
owner/managers’ decision-making about collaboration, Journal of Small Business Manage-
ment, 45 (3), 362-387.

CHANAL, V., CARON-FASAN, M. (2010), The difficulties involved in developing Busi-

ness Models open to innovation communities: the case of a crowdsourcing platform,
M@n@gement, 13(4), 318-341.
CHESBROUGH, H. (2003), Open Innovation: The New Imperative for Creating and Profiting
from Technology, Harvard MA, Harvard Business School Press.
CHESBROUGH, H, VANHAVERBEKE, W., WEST, J., (2006), Open Innovation. Researching
a New Paradigm, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
CHIARONI, D., CHIEA, V., FRATTINI, F. (2011), The Open Innovation Journey: How
firms dynamically implement the emerging innovation management paradigm, Technovation,
31, 34-43.
CHRISTENSEN, J., OLESEN, M., KJAER, J. (2005), The industrial dynamics of Open
Innovation – Evidence from the transformation of consumer electronics, Research Policy,
34, 1533-1549.
COHEN, W., LEVINTHAL, D. (1990), Absorptive Capacity: a new perspective on lear-
ning and innovation, Administrative Science Quarterly, 35 (1), 128-152.
CORTES, D. (2009), Peut-on parler réellement d’une économie de la connaissance, Working
Paper n°2, LEREPS, Toulouse, December 2009.
DAHLANDER, L., GANN, D. (2010), How open is innovation, Research Policy, 39 (6),
699-709.
DOSI, G., 1982, Technological paradigms and technological trajectories, Research Policy,
11, 147-162.
DYER, J., CHU, W. (2003), The role of trustworthiness in reducing Transaction Costs and
improving performance: Empirical evidence from the United States, Japan, and Korea,
Organization Science, 14, 57-68.
ENKEL, E., GASSMANN, O., CHESBROUGH, H. (2009), Open R&D and open innova-
tion: exploring the phenomenon, R&D Management, 39 (4), 311-316.
GAMBARDELLA, A., GIURI, P., LUZZI, A. (2007), The market for patents in Europe,
Research Policy, 36 (8), 1163-1183.
GASSMANN, O., ENKEL, E., CHESBROUGH, H. (2010), The future of open innovation,
R&D Management, 40 (3), 213-221.
GOETZ, C., SCOTT, R. (1981), Principles of Relational Contract’, Virginia Law Review,
67, 1089-1150.
GUELLEC, D., MADIES, T., PRAGER, J.-C. (2010), Les marchés de brevets dans l’économie
de la connaissance, Rapport du Conseil d’Analyse Economique, Paris, La Documentation
Française.
HOFFMANN, W., NEUMANN, K., SPECKBACHER, G. (2010), The effect of inte-
rorganizational trust on make-or-cooperate decisions: Disentangling opportunism-
dependent and opportunism-independent effects of trust, European Management Review,
7, 101-115.
HUMBERT, M. (1993), À propos des tentatives d’organisation du développement techno-
logique en Europe, Cahiers d’Économie Mondiale, 7 (1), 47-80.
ISCKIA, T., LESCOP, D. (2011), Essai sur les fondements de l’innovation ouverte, Revue
Française de Gestion, 210, 87-98.

Danièle BENEZECH
LALLEMENT, R. (2008), Politique des brevets : l’enjeu central de la qualité face à l’évolu-
tion des pratiques, Horizons Stratégiques, Revue du Conseil d’Analyse Stratégique, 7, Janvier-
Mars, 1-15.
LAURSEN K., SALTER, A. (2006), Open for innovation: the role of openness in explaining
innovation performance among UK manufacturing firms, Strategic Management Journal, 27
(2), 131-150.
LICHTENTHALER, U., LICHTENTHALER, E. (2009), A capability-based framework
for Open Innovation: complementing absorptive capacity, Journal of Management Studies,
46 (8), 1315-1338.
LOHTIA, R., BROOKS, C., KRAPFEL, R. (1994), What constitutes a transaction-specific
asset? An examination of the dimensions and types, Journal of Business Research, 30 (3),
261-270.
LUNDVALL, B. (1992), National Systems of Innovation. Towards a Theory of Innovation and
Interactive Learning, London, Pinter Publishers.
MARCH, J. (1991), Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning, Organization
Science, 2 (1), 71-87.
MARTEIL, O. (1998), L’organisation des politiques d’innovation en faveur du tissu
industriel : analyse des expériences allemandes et françaises (1980-1995), Économies et
Sociétés, série W, 4 (7), 183-214.
MIOTTI, L., SACHWALD, F. (2003), Co-operative R&D: why and with whom ? An inte-
grated framework for analysis, Research Policy, 32, 1481-1499.
MOWERY, D. (2009), Industrial R&D in the third industrial revolution, Industrial and
Corporate Change, 18 (1), 1-50.
NOOTEBOOM, B. (1996), Trust, opportunism and Governance: A process and control
model, Organization studies, 17 (6), 985-1010.
PENIN, J. (2008), More open than open innovation? Rethinking the concept of openness in inno-
vation studies, Working Paper, WP BETA Strasbourg, n°18.
PENIN, J., HUSSLER, C., BURGER-HELMCHEN, T. (2011), New shapes and new stakes:
a portrait of open innovation as a promising phenomenon, Journal of Innovation Economics, 1
(7), 11-29.
PERROT, A., YVRANDE-BILLON, A. (2010), Brevets à vendre? Les modes de coordina-
tion des échanges de droits de propriété intellectuelle, in Guellec, Madies, Prager (eds), Les
marchés des brevets dans l’économie de la connaissance, Rapport du Conseil d’Analyse Écono-
mique, Paris, La Documentation Française.
POOT, T., FAEMS, D., VANHAVERBEKE, W. (2009), Toward a dynamic perspective on
open innovation: a longitudinal assessment of the adoption of internal and external inno-
vation strategies in the Netherlands, International Journal of Innovation Management, 13 (2),
177-200.
PRAHALAD, C., HAMEL, G. (1990), The core competence of the corporation, Harvard
Business Review, 68 (3), 79–91.
REITZIG, M., HENKEL, J., SCHNEIDER, F. (2010), Collateral damage for R&D manu-
facturers: how patents sharks operate in markets for technology, Industrial and Corporate
Change, 19 (3), 947-967.

RIGBY, D., ZOOK, C. (2002), Open-market innovation, Harvard Business Review, October,
80-89.
ROHRBECK, R., HOLZLE, K., GEMUNDEN, H. (2009), Opening up for competitive
advantage – How Deutsche Telekom creates an open innovation ecosystem, R&D Mana-
gement, 39 (4), 420-430.
ROSENBERG, N. (1982), Inside the Black Box: Technology and Economics, Cambridge MA,
Cambridge University Press.
SCHENK, E., GUITTARD, C. (2011), Towards a characterization of crowdsourcing practices,
Journal of Innovation Economics, 1 (7), 93-107.
SKARDON, J. (2011), The role of trust in innovation netwroks, Procedia-Social and
Behavioral Sciences, 26, 85-93.
SIMON, H. (1976), From Substantive to Procedural Rationality, in Latsis (ed.), Method
and Appraisal in Economics, Cambridge MA, Cambridge University Press, 130-131.
SPITHOVEN, A., CLARYSSE, B., KNOCKAERT, M. (2011), Building absorptive capa-
city to organize inbound open innovation in traditional industries, Technovation, 31, 10-21.
THEVENOT, L. (2002), Convention of co-ordination and the framing of uncertainty, in
Fullbrook (ed.), Intersubjectivity in Economics, London, Routledge, 181-197.
TIETZE, F., HERSTATT, C. (2010), Technology market intermediaries and innovation, com-
munication at the DRUID Summer Conference, June 16-18, London.
TROTT, P., HARTMANN, D. (2009), Why ‘Open Innovation’ is old wine in new bottles,
International Journal of Innovation Management, 13 (4), 715-736.
TROY, I., WERLE, R. (2008), Uncertainty and the market for patents, Working Paper, Max
Planck Institute for the study of societies, MPifG WP 08/2.
VEUGELERS, R. (1997), Internal R&D expenditures and external technology sourcing,
Research Policy, 26 (3), 303-315.
VON HIPPEL, E. (1976), The dominant role of users in the scientific instrument innovation
process, Research Policy, 5 (3), 212-239.
WANG, Y., VANHAVERBEKE, W., ROIJAKKERS, N. (2012), Exploring the impact of
open innovation on national systems of innovation – A theoretical analysis, Technological
Forecasting and Social Change, 79, 419-428.
WILLIAMSON, O. (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational
Contracting, New-York, The Free Press.

Jie 010 0145

Transféré par

Informations du document

Titre original

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Jie 010 0145

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

The Open Innovation model: some issues regarding its

Article disponible en ligne à l’adresse

Découvrir le sommaire de ce numéro, suivre la revue par email, s’abonner...

Distribution électronique Cairn.info pour De Boeck Supérieur.

n° 10 – Journal of Innovation Economics 2012/2 145

This paper charts an unnoticed theme in the current debate on Open

A PARADIGM SHIFT? ISSUES

146 Journal of Innovation Economics 2012/2 – n° 10

knowledge, and ideas. The Open Innovation model provides benchmarks

n° 10 – Journal of Innovation Economics 2012/2 147

148 Journal of Innovation Economics 2012/2 – n° 10

n° 10 – Journal of Innovation Economics 2012/2 149

Nevertheless, the model puts an emphasis on a couple of articulated

ON THE NEWNESS OF THE OPEN

150 Journal of Innovation Economics 2012/2 – n° 10

to build up blocks of innovation, and exporting them, as a way to raise cash

n° 10 – Journal of Innovation Economics 2012/2 151

Table 1 – The double topic of the Open Innovation model

To enhance technology To innovate through both internal

Efficiency of Patents are Effectiveness of Open business

152 Journal of Innovation Economics 2012/2 – n° 10

knowledge ‘commoditisation’. The promotion of financial transactions in

n° 10 – Journal of Innovation Economics 2012/2 153

This term refers to a technology or product covered by a high number of

154 Journal of Innovation Economics 2012/2 – n° 10

technology, patents or knowledge – and furthermore, codified knowledge or

n° 10 – Journal of Innovation Economics 2012/2 155

accepted. But the notion of uncertainty is too often viewed as equivalent to

156 Journal of Innovation Economics 2012/2 – n° 10

n° 10 – Journal of Innovation Economics 2012/2 157

Table 2 – About relevance of the proposal to expand the technology market

Proposal To expand market for technology and IPRs

Implicit assumptions Useful assumptions to understand

Information Imperfect and asymmetric: Imperfect and incomplete;

Bounded Substantive rationality; Procedural rationality;

Doubt regarding consistency of the conceptual tools

ABOUT THE CONSISTENCY

This paper investigates the relationship between business partners to

158 Journal of Innovation Economics 2012/2 – n° 10

technology market and makes effective the co-ordination mechanism. But

n° 10 – Journal of Innovation Economics 2012/2 159

for example when technology transfers include the cross-border assignment

160 Journal of Innovation Economics 2012/2 – n° 10

To expand the technology market To innovate through interactions

The efficient functioning of the market Learning and trust effects

Information Resources, capabilities and competence

Doubt regarding the compatibility of the two conceptual frameworks used

Proposal to connect this two-side model:

n° 10 – Journal of Innovation Economics 2012/2 161

The question of the universal relevance of the model still remains

162 Journal of Innovation Economics 2012/2 – n° 10

CHANAL, V., CARON-FASAN, M. (2010), The difficulties involved in developing Busi-

n° 10 – Journal of Innovation Economics 2012/2 163

164 Journal of Innovation Economics 2012/2 – n° 10

n° 10 – Journal of Innovation Economics 2012/2 165

Vous aimerez peut-être aussi