Olaf Merk

GEOPOLITICS AND COMMERCIAL SEAPORTS
Olaf Merk
Armand Colin | « Revue internationale et stratégique »
2017/3 N° 107 | pages 73 à 83

ISSN 1287-1672
ISBN 9782200931476
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DOSSIER
Geopolitics and
commercial seaports
Olaf Merk1
Administrator Ports and Shipping
at the International Transport Forum (ITF)
at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD).
T
he relation between geopolitics and commercial seaports is relatively
unexplored. Whereas the links between commercial seaports and
economic, environmental and spatial development are well established,
the geopolitical context is, oddly enough, absent from the large majority
of port studies. Similarly, considerations about commercial seaports are
fairly scarce in most works on geopolitics: ports form part of the instruments of
economic statecraft, but are in most works only mentioned in passing.
Yet, insights in such links would be urgently needed. The last decade has
shown the emergence of state-owned companies – predominantly Chinese –
gaining control over a large set of strategically located world ports, a development
made official government policy with the formulation of the New Silk Road, one
of the parts of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The official statements
about this initiative are full of assurances about win-win collaboration, but many
governments might be wondering about the real strategic intent of the initiative
and related large investments in various world ports.
This paper wants to bring some more clarity into this subject. It will do so by
answering the following four questions:
– In what sense are commercial ports strategic geopolitical assets?
– What is the involvement of states in foreign ports?
– What are the impacts of state involvement in foreign ports?
– What are the implications for policy?
1. This article represents the views of the author and not those of the ITF / OECD.
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DOSSIER
Ports as geopolitical assets

There are three different ways in which ports could be considered geopolitical
assets, namely related to their potential to stimulate industrial development,
secure trade and energy needs, and enhance naval capabilities.
Industrial development
Ports have proved powerful tools to stimulate regional and national
economies. Powerful recent examples include the port-based development
of Singapore and of Shenzhen that was at the basis of China’s export-driven
manufacturing boom since the 1980s. Investment in foreign ports could be the
extension of such a strategy, namely to internationalise a national economy
and the domestic firms related to ports that would be involved in developing all
aspects of the foreign ports. So, ports could be ways to internationalise a whole
domestic maritime cluster, from port engineering and design, port construction,
dredging, port equipment, port operations, free trade zones, hinterland transport
services, freight train infrastructures, pipelines. The idea here is that ports are
entry points into a foreign economy.
Another way to frame this strategy is as a global stimulus programme destined
to benefit its own firms. This is particularly relevant when the home market faces
overcapacity and the possibilities for local investment are exhausted, for example
in countries that have more than enough port capacity. The local development in
the foreign nation could increase trade relations with the investing power, which
could give the investing state bigger geopolitical clout and “soft power” in that
region to achieve other ends.
Trade and energy security

Most countries are fairly to highly open economies, dependent on smooth
maritime transport for much of their energy supply, imports and exports.
Considering the presence of maritime chokepoints throughout the world
– such as the Strait of Malacca, the Suez Canal, or the Panama Canal – most
of the global trade flows come in the form of dense shipping routes, the Sea
Lines of Communication (SLOCs). The powers that control SLOCs control
most of the world’s strategic supply chains, including the ones that determine
energy security.
Ports form part of this strategic network that controls supply chains. Control
over a port means decision-power over which ships get priority in allocation
of berths and port services. In times of conflict, this could also mean the
possibilities to block ships. During the Cold War for example, the North Atlantic
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Geopolitics and commercial seaports
Treaty Organization (NATO) and communist countries did not have access to
each other’s ports.
Four sorts of strategic ports could be distinguished:
– gateway ports to resource-rich areas;
– gateway ports to dense consumer areas;
– hub ports along dense shipping routes and maritime chokepoints;
– ports that could open up the possibility of an alternative route or corridor.
Naval capabilities
Commercial ports could fulfil
functions for navies. Some commercial Nowadays, there seems to be
ports act as a naval base, in conjunction
convergence between naval and
with their commercial functions.
Traditionally naval and commercial port commercial port functions
functions have been conflicting, with
most large naval ports crowding out
commercial port functions; e.g. in Plymouth (United Kingdom), Toulon (France).
The US Navy has over the last decades shifted from concentration of naval ships
in a few places, to de-concentration and eventually back to a more concentrated
model1. Nowadays, there seems to be convergence between naval and commercial
port functions, which makes the appearance of mixed commercial-naval ports
more common2. Yet, major combat operations require logistics and support
capabilities that go well beyond what commercial ports could provide; an analysis
of China’s ports assets in the Indian Ocean concludes that only Chittagong
(Bangladesh) would meet most criteria to characterise military port facilities
used to support major US combat operations3.
Ports do not need to be full-fledged naval bases to be useful from a naval
perspective. Commercial ports can be the places where functions such as
refuelling, provisioning, ship repair take place. Nor is a dedicated military basis
needed to install sensitive communications and other equipment, such as radars
or even weapon systems4.
1. Brian Slack and John Starr, “Geostrategy, resources and geopolitics: implications for the US Navy
and naval port system”, Marine Policy, vol. 21, n° 4, July 1997.
2. Hance D. Smith and David Pinder, “Geostrategy and naval port systems: frameworks for analysis”,
Marine Policy, vol. 21, n° 4, July 1997.
3. Christopher D. Yung and Ross Rustici, “‘Not an Idea We Have to Shun’: Chinese Overseas Basing
Requirements in the 21st Century”, China Strategic Perspectives, n° 7, Center for the Study of
Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, October 2014.
4. Ibid.
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DOSSIER
Involvement of states in foreign ports

Ports have long been public entities under control of the public authorities
of that particular country. This has changed drastically over the last decades,
due to two related developments: the privatisation of port operations and the
emergence of global terminal operators.
The privatisation of port operations is part of a world-wide wave of port
reforms, in which cargo handling activities were left to private actors, with the
port authority limiting itself to public roles: the landlord port model. This model
is now widespread and applied in around 80% of world ports – and pushed for by
organisations such as the World Bank, with their Port Reform Toolkit1.
The result of this development is the emergence of global terminal
operators. These are firms specialised in cargo handling – in particular with
regards to containerised cargo – that have port terminals in various countries.
The subsequent port reforms have provided them with ample opportunities
to add new terminals in new parts of the world to their portfolio. The largest
global terminal operators, such as PSA, Hutchison Port Holdings (HPH), Dubai
Ports World (DPW) and APM Terminals, are now each operating in 20-30
different countries.
This development has been facilitated by limited public finances in
emerging countries with large untapped potential for port development. It is the
privatisation of port functions, as well as the need for new ports, especially in
emerging markets, that has provided opportunities for states to become involved
in the ports of other states. There are various ways in which this can happen,
mainly via operating, financing, constructing and servicing foreign ports.
State-owned terminal operators

Most terminal operators are private firms, but a considerable share is state-
owned enterprises (table 1); their terminal assets represent approximately a
quarter of total global container port capacity. There are different shades of
government involvement in these firms. Two of the largest global terminal
operators, PSA and DP World, are generally considered companies that are purely
motivated by commercial motives. E.g. Temasek, one of the two sovereign
wealth funds of Singapore, holding 100 % of the shares of PSA, has shown better
commercial results and higher quality corporate governance than those of listed
firms in Singapore2.
1. World Bank – Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility, Port Reform Toolkit, 2nd edition, 2007.
2. Christopher C. Chen, “Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: An Empirical Survey
of the Model of Temasek Holdings in Singapore”, Singapore Management University School of Law
Research Paper, n° 6 / 2014, 21st Century Commercial Law Forum: 13th International Symposium
2013, December 2013; Isabel Sim, Steen Thompson and Gerad Yeong, “The State as Shareholder:
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Table 1: Port terminal operators owned by states (2015)

Operator Capacity (million TEU) Global rank State
PSA 53 1 Singapore
DP World 37 3 United Arab Emirates
Cosco 29 5 China
China Merchants 26 6 China
SIPG 30 City of Shanghai (China)
CMA CGM 3 France
HHLA 6 City of Hamburg (Germany)
Source: Own elaborations based on Drewry Maritime Research, Global Container Terminal Operators.
Annual Review and Forecast. Annual Report 2016, 2016.
This is different for the Chinese state-owned enterprises, Cosco and China
Merchants Holdings. These are closely aligned to Chinese government policy, so
their actions are not only driven by purely commercial motives. This is evident in
many ways: e.g. both companies are aligned to China’s Belt and Road Initiative,
Cosco and China Shipping were pushed by the Chinese government to merge in
order to form a national “champion” in container shipping, and the presentation
of certain investment projects are synchronised with political events, such as
Belt and Road Summits. The Chinese state-owned terminal operators currently
have a portfolio of 33 terminals outside China, in 19 countries, representing
13 million TEU (twenty-foot equivalent unit) in volume (table 2).
Terminal operators that are daughter companies of container shipping
companies are handling an increasing share of terminal operations. Some of
these shipping companies have been bailed out by governments, so their terminal
assets could also be considered to be linked to a government. This is for example
the case of the container shipping companies CMA CGM and HMM. Finally, some
terminal operators are owned by local governments, such as the city of Shanghai
(SIPG) and the city of Hamburg (HHLA). The last two have limited terminal
assets outside their home country, although SIPG has emerging ambitions
in operating foreign port terminals. Certain public port authorities have also
started to invest in foreign ports. This is for example the case of Rotterdam and
Antwerp. The motivation for these investments seems to be to stimulate links
with emerging markets.
The Case of Singapore”, Centre for Governance, Institutions & Organisations – Chartered Institute
of Management Accountants, June 2014.
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DOSSIER
Table 2: Container terminal operations by Chinese state-owned enterprises

Port Terminal Country Share Equity TEU Operator
(million)
Europe
Ambarli Kumport Turkey 26 % 0.3 Cosco
Ambarli Kumport Turkey 40 % 0.5 CMHI
Antwerp Antwerp Gateway Belgium 20 % 0.4 Cosco
Antwerp Antwerp Gateway Belgium 4.9 % 0.1 CMHI
Bilbao Noatum Container Terminal Spain 39.5 % 0.2 Cosco
Dunkirk Terminal des Flandres France 44.6 % 0.1 CMHI
Las Palmas Leon y Castillo Dock Spain 23 % 0.2 Cosco
Le Havre GMP France 24.5 % 0.3 CMHI
Nantes TGO France 24.5 % 0.0 CMHI
Naples Molo Bausan Italy 50 % 0.2 Cosco
Piraeus Piraeus Container Terminal Greece 100 % 3.0 Cosco
Piraeus Piraeus Port Authority Greece 51 % Cosco
Rotterdam Euromax Terminal Netherlands 35 % 0.7 Cosco
Marseille-Fos Fos-Eurofos France 24.5 % 0.1 CMHI
Marsaxlokk Malta Freeport Terminal Malta 24.5 % 0.8 CMHI
Valencia Noatum Container Terminal Spain 51 % 1.1 Cosco
Zeebrugge Container Handling Zeebrugge Belgium 17 % 0.0 CMHI
Zeebrugge APM Terminals Zeebrugge Belgium 24 % 0.1 Cosco
Zeebrugge APM Terminals Zeebrugge Belgium 25 % 0.1 SIPG
Asia
Busan KBCT South Korea 20 % Cosco
Colombo CICT Sri Lanka 85 % 1.3 CMHI
Hambantota Hambantota Port Sri Lanka 85 % CMHI
Singapore Cosco-PSA terminal Singapore 49 % 0.8 Cosco
Singapore Pasir Panjang (Ph 3 & 4) Singapore Cosco
Africa
Abidjan TERRA Abidjan Ivory Coast 12.3 % 0.0 CMHI
Casablanca Somaport Morocco 49 % 0.2 CMHI
Djibouti Dolareh Container Terminal Djibouti 15.7 % 0.1 CMHI
Djibouti PDSA Terminal Djibouti 23.5 % 0.0 CMHI
Lagos Tin Can Island Terminal Nigeria 28.5 % 0.1 CMHI
Lomé Lomé Container Terminal Togo 50 % 0.3 CMHI
Tanger-Med Eurogate Tanger Morocco 19.6 % 0.3 CMHI
Americas
Houston Terminal Link Texas USA 25 % 0.1 CMHI
Long Beach Pacific Maritime Services, Pier J USA 46 % 0.9 Cosco
Miami South Florida Container USA 25 % 0.1 CMHI
Middle East
Port Said Suez Canal Container Terminal Egypt 20 % 0.6 Cosco
Damietta Container Terminal Egypt 20 % Cosco
Haifa New port Israel 100 % SIPG
Source: Own elaborations based on Drewry Maritime Research, op. cit. and own information collection.
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The terminals operated by terminal operators could be owned by the

operators, but in most cases this means the ownership of the right to operate the
terminal, so a concession or a lease. Terminal operators hardly ever own the entire
port. This is due to the fact that container ports are not often privatised. Even
in case of privatisation of the port, this is in most cases for a determined period.
Examples of countries that have fully privatised some of their ports include
United Kingdom and Australia. Examples of ports that are – predominantly –
owned by foreign states include Piraeus (Greece), in which Cosco has a 51 % stake,
likely to increase to 67 % in the next five years. China has recently opened its
first overseas naval base; it is located in Djibouti, next to the container terminals
operated by Chinese state-owned operators.
Finance and development aid

Various states offer financial support for port construction in foreign nations.
This can take different forms. Some countries have national development banks,
sovereign wealth funds or other vehicles to invest in ventures that are considered
strategic. For example, China funds many foreign port projects via its two
national development banks: the China Development Bank and the China Exim
bank (Export-Import Bank of China). It has also initiated a fund, the Silk Road
Fund, to finance projects that form part of the Belt and Road Initiative. Finally,
China has initiated the creation of a new multilateral development bank, the
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), that is also supposed to finance
port projects along the New Silk Road. Financial support can also come in the
form of development aid, such as grants and technical assistance. The Japan
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has consulted in many overseas port
projects, as a first step in more extensive cooperation on port development. The
involvement of China in Sri Lanka’s port sector started with China’s offer to
have CHEC (China Harbour Engineering Company) repair the fisheries port in
Hambantota after it was hit by a tsunami.
In practice, many of these instruments provide ways to stimulate new
port development to be designed and constructed by the nation that provided
the finance. So the finance comes with strings, more or less subtle. In some
cases this is clear from the outset, e.g. when the financial commitment comes
with the consortium that will construct or develop the port. In other cases, the
transfer of port assets takes place after the foreign state defaults on its payments
on the loan. In some cases, loans are provided with repayment in kind: the loan
of the China Exim Bank to construct the port of Bata in Equatorial Guinea will
be repaid in oil. The banks also frequently finance the Chinese state-owned
construction companies directly, without the money going into bank accounts
of the host governments1.
1. Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift. The real story of China in Africa, New York, Vintage Books, 2009.
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DOSSIER
Port construction
Many new port development projects come into the form of a contract in
which the port is designed and built by a private construction company before
being operated, e.g. in the form of build-design-transfer (BOT) public-private
partnerships (PPPs). The way foreign states can get involved in this – in addition
to owning global terminal operators that bid for such projects – is via state-
owned construction companies, active in port construction. Examples are the
China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) and China Communications
Construction Company (CCCC), active in dozens of port development projects
throughout the world. In almost
Many new port development projects all cases the construction by these
come into the form of a contract in companies is accompanied by finance
from a Chinese state-owned bank,
which the port is designed and built by such as the China Exim bank, and
a private construction company before followed by operation by a Chinese
state-owned terminal operator, e.g.
being operated China Merchants Holding.
Port services
Another way in which states – via their state-owned enterprises – can become
involved in foreign ports, is via the provision of port services and equipment,
e.g. dredging, towage services and port equipment. For example, the Chinese
state-owned CHEC and CCCC have both dredging subsidiaries. The Chinese port
equipment manufacturer ZPMC is one of the subsidiaries of the state-owned
CCCC. China has given container-screening equipment to various emerging and
developing countries. State-owned enterprises involved in port construction are
often the same that are engaged in linking these ports to their hinterlands: e.g.
CCCC is involved in many hinterland corridor projects in Africa.
One of the ways in which state-owned companies have managed to get a
competitive advantage in port development is by providing a comprehensive
package to foreign states, including attractive loans, construction, dredging,
operation and equipment. New coalitions start to emerge: e.g. CCCC and ZPMC
bidding together for an ideas competition on developing part of the Steinwerder
terminal in the port of Hamburg.
A wide range of impacts

The fact that states are involved in foreign ports could have various impacts
on these ports, their cities and states. We identify here local employment effects
and geopolitical loyalties.
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Local development
Port construction, operation and service provision have the potential to
create local economic value in foreign ports. This local development effect
could arguably be lower when these activities are carried out by state-owned
enterprises: employment and economic opportunities for their nationals could
be one of their goals, whereas fully private entities would be indifferent to the
nationality of workers or sub-contractors. There is anecdotal evidence that
supports this claim. Many of the jobs involved in constructing the port of Kribi
(Cameroon) went to Chinese workers, rather than local Cameroon workers. Of
the 1,125 workers in the port in August 2013, only around half were reported to
be from Cameroon1. An additional concern is that the imported labour might
corrode local labour rights and trade unions.
Geopolitical loyalties
Investment by state-owned enterprises in a foreign state creates leverage vis-
à-vis policies of the foreign state. The foreign state might feel obliged or pressured
to align to policy preferences of the state
that has invested in it. This could be
support for that state’s foreign policy The investment of state-owned
in supranational organisations. For companies in foreign ports could in
example, the absence of Greek support
for European Union (EU) condemnation some parts of the world be
of human rights issues in China has been considered as a geopolitical threat
associated by the Chinese investments
in the port of Piraeus2. In other ports, the
foreign investments of states like China and Russia create different geopolitical
loyalties that could complicate common EU positions.
The investment of state-owned companies in foreign ports could in some
parts of the world be considered as a geopolitical threat. This is for example the
case in the Indian Ocean, where Chinese port investments in foreign ports have
been labelled “a string of pearls” encircling India. Whether this is a real threat
or not, it has stimulated India to align with Iran in joint construction of the
Iranian port of Chabhadar, not far from the Chinese constructed port of Gwadar
(Pakistan), Indian investment in the port of Sittwe (Myanmar) and the Japanese
to construct a port in North Sri Lanka (Trincomalee), to counter-balance the
Chinese constructed port of Hambantota in the South of Sri Lanka.
1. Shannon Tiezzi, “What’s It Like to Have China Build You a Port? Ask Cameroon”, The Diplomat, 27
February 2015.
2. Helena Smith, “Greece blocks EU’s criticism at UN of China’s human rights record”, The Guardian,
18 June 2017.
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DOSSIER
Policy implications
and risk mitigation strategies
Various states have put in place policies to mitigate risks related to their port
assets. This includes scrutiny of foreign investments, regulation on majority
shares and port governance.
Scrutiny of foreign investments

Some countries apply a screening process to the foreign direct investments
in their territory. The screening process in the US required some notoriety due
to a case involving terminal operator Dubai Ports World, a state-owned company
from the United Arab Emirates. Although the screening did not find arguments
to block the acquisition of P&O Ports by DP World in 2006, the political process
related to the screening played up fears related to national security that in the
end became so pervasive that DP World withdrew its bid. This case is generally
considered a textbook case of politicisation of a screening process leading to an
undesirable outcome, namely de facto blockage of a foreign investment that
did not seem to be problematic from a national security perspective1. This does
not mean that such screening processes cannot be useful. The EU is currently
reflecting some sort of a foreign investment screening mechanism.
Regulations on majority shares

Some countries limit the foreign participation in port terminals to 49% and
require foreign operators to form local joint ventures with local partners. This is
for example the case in Mexico2. Even if a country does not have such regulation
in place, it could in practice still be very difficult for foreign operators to access
that market. Until the early 2000s, Chinese law required that foreign terminal
operators had to enter a joint venture with local Chinese partners, and could
not hold more than 49% of the shares in that joint venture. Despite reform
that removed these restrictions, there is still no foreign terminal operator that
has a majority stake in any Chinese terminal3. Inversely, countries do not need
a law or regulations to avoid foreign majority shares of strategic port functions.
The Sri Lanka government renegotiated an agreement with the Chinese, in
which Chinese Merchants Holding would get an 80% of the terminal operations
in Hambantota port, but only a 49% share in Hambantota International Port
1. Deborah M. Mostaghel, “Dubai Ports World Under Exon-Florio: A Threat to National Security or a
Tempest in a Seaport?”, Albany Law Review, vol. 70, 2007.
2. OECD, Review of the Regulation of freight transport in Mexico, Paris, OECD Publishing, 2017.
3. Theo Notteboom and Zhongzhen Yang, “Port governance in China since 2004: Institutional
layering and the growing impact of broader policies”, Research in Transportation Business &
Management, vol. 22, March 2017.
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Group Services Co., a separate entity in charge of port authority functions such
as security operations1. A related notion is reciprocity: so allowing the same
market access conditions to the investor from a state as exist in that state for
foreign investors.
Re-appraisal of public port functions

Another strand of measures relates to a clear division of task between foreign
port operator and a local public entity in charge of strategic public functions,
related to security, safety, territorial planning and port-city relations. Part of
the renegotiation of the privatisation of the Piraeus port was about the need to
keep some strategic port authority functions in the public domain. However, a
movement of corporation of port authorities has led them to focus on commercial
functions, sometimes ignoring their strategic functions to protect and serve the
public interest. The same changes in port governance that have increased the
possibilities of states to become active in foreign ports, have also stimulated
these ports to ignore their strategic role in safeguarding national security vis-à-
vis such states. ■
1. Shihar Aneez, “Sri Lanka’s cabinet ‘clears port deal’ with China firm after concerns addressed”,
Reuters, 25 July 2017.
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Olaf Merk

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GEOPOLITICS AND COMMERCIAL SEAPORTS

Armand Colin | « Revue internationale et stratégique »

2017/3 N° 107 | pages 73 à 83

Distribution électronique Cairn.info pour Armand Colin.

Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)

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Ports as geopolitical assets

Trade and energy security

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Involvement of states in foreign ports

State-owned terminal operators

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Table 1: Port terminal operators owned by states (2015)

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Table 2: Container terminal operations by Chinese state-owned enterprises

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The terminals operated by terminal operators could be owned by the

Finance and development aid

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A wide range of impacts

Iris107-MEP.indd 80 30/08/2017 10:50

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Scrutiny of foreign investments

Regulations on majority shares

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Re-appraisal of public port functions

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