Does Board Gender Diversity Improve The Performance of French Listed Firms?

Does board gender diversity improve the performance of
French listed firms?

Sabri Boubaker, Rey Dang, Duc Khuong Nguyen
Dans Gestion 2000 2014/1 (Volume 31), pages 259 à 269
Éditions Association de Recherches et Publications en Management
ISSN 0773-0543
DOI 10.3917/g2000.311.0259
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Sabri Boubaker,
Champagne School of Management,
Groupe ESC Troyes, France &
IRG, Université Paris Est, France
Rey Dang,
Groupe Sup de Co La Rochelle &
Université d’Orléans – LEO (Laboratoire
d’Économie d’Orléans), France
Duc Khuong Nguyen,

IPAG Lab, IPAG Business School, France
Does board gender diversity
improve the performance of
French listed firms?
G
ender diversity on boardrooms has recently attracted much attention from not only academic researchers
but also professional and policy makers. Identified as a “business case” of diversity by Cox and Blake
(1991) and Robinson and Dechant (1997), recent research on the role of female directors argues that gender-
diverse boards are likely to improve corporate performance and thus shareholder value.
From a theoretical perspective, the as an open system that depends on

agency theory and the resource de- external organizations and environ-
pendency theory, can explain the ment contingencies. It suggests that the
positive effect of board diversity on presence of female directors in boar-
firm performance. The agency theory drooms helps firms maximize access
emphasizes the role of the board of to critical resources through their skills,
directors in monitoring and controlling competences and knowledge, which
managers (Fama and Jensen, 1983; are different from those of male direc-
Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and sug- tors (Hillman, et al., 2007).
gests that gender-diverse boards may Empirically, several studies have inves-
help reduce agency problems between tigated the relation between board
managers and shareholders. Indeed, gender diversity and firm performance,
female directors are more likely to particularly in the United States. The
raise more questions than the other results are mixed casting doubt on the
directors, and might be also more presence of unique theoretical predic-
active and tougher monitors (Adams tion. For instance, Carter et al. (2003)
and Ferreira, 2009; Carter, et al. , consider a sample of Fortune 1000
2003; Farrell and Hersch, 2005). The firms in 1997 and document a positive
resource dependency theory, deve- relation between board gender diver-
loped by Pfeffer (1972) and Pfeffer sity and firm performance as proxied
and Salancik (1978), views a firm by the Tobin’s q. Adams and Ferreira
259
Gestion 2000 2 janvier - février 2014
(2009) show that female directors si- diversity has a different effect on ﬁrm
gnificantly affect the board inputs when performance over the different points
examining a sample of 1,939 firms of the conditional distribution. In addi-
over the 1996-2003 period. Conver- tion, the sign and signiﬁcance of the
sely, Carter et al. (2010) find no effect impact of gender diversity on firm
of board diversity on firm performance performance seems to depend on the
for S&P 500 firms over the 1998-2002 industry in which the firm operates.
period and 326 Fortune firms in 2003. Djoutsa Wamba et al. (2014) focus
The relation between board diversity on the differences in terms of social
and firm performance has also been and financial performance (i.e., client
studied on European listed firms. Using coverage rate and return on equity
a sample of Danish listed firms, Rose respectively) across microfinance ins-
(2007) finds insignificant relation titutions in Cameroon with respect to
between board gender diversity and their legal status and corporate gover-
firm value. Campbell and Mınguez- nance mechanisms. They typically find
Vera (2008), however, find that the that the presence of female directors in
presence of women on boards is as- the boardroom has a significant and
sociated with higher firm value when negative impact on the performance
studying Spanish listed firms. On the measures of cooperatives and mutual
contrary, Ahern and Dittmar (2012) insurance companies as well as on the
show a negative impact on firm per- financial performance of private firms
formance following the approval of the and for-profit non-governmental orga-
law on women’s quotas in Norway. nizations (NGO). Based on semi-struc-
Studying French listed firms, Belghiti- tured interviews, these authors explain
Mahut and Lafont (2010) offer a first this negative effect of female direc-
analysis of the relation between the tors by their higher risk aversion level
presence of female directors and firm relatively to their male colleagues. In
performance. They find that board particular, following these authors,
diversity improves firm performance. It the higher risk aversion is consistent
is however worth noting that this study with the findings of the Credit Suisse
does not control for the endogeneity Research Institute report (2012) that
problem that could arise from the fact companies with women on corporate
that firms with high performance are boards are more likely to have lower
more likely to appoint female directors. debt levels than those without women
In a related study, Solakoglu (2013) on corporate boards.
uses quantile regression analysis to In this study, we focus on the effect of
examine the association between gen- gender-diverse boards on firm finan-
der diversity and firm performance in cial performance using a sample of
Turkey. The author shows that gender 105 French listed firms that belong
260
Does board gender diversity improve
the performance of French listed firms?
to the SBF 120 stock market index. In 105 firms and 284 firm-year observa-
contrast to previous studies, the empi- tions.1 Data on board characteristics
rical analysis relies on a simultaneous- are from the IODS database (Artenia-
equations approach that accounts for DataCG) and financial data are from
the potential endogeneity problem Thomson ONE Banker.
due to the interactions between board
diversity and firm performance. Our We proxy for firm performance using
main results show that the board gen- the Chung and Pruitt’s (1994) approxi-
der diversity has a negative effect on mation of Tobin’s q – which can explain
firm performance when we control for at least 96.6% of the variability of To-
the endogeneity issue, suggesting that bin’s q – defined as Q = (MVE + PS +
adding indiscriminately more female DEBT) / TA, where MVE is the market
directors to boards may give unin- value of common equity calculated as
tended results and lower firm perfor- the product of price per common share
mance. and the number of common shares
The remainder of the paper is orga- outstanding, PS is the liquidating value
nized as follows. Section 2 presents of outstanding preferred shares, DEBT
the data and the definitions of the va- is the value of the firm’s short-term lia-
riables used in the empirical analysis. bilities net of its short-term assets, plus
Section 3 presents the methodological the book value of the firm’s long-term
approach. Section 4 reports and dis- debt, and TA is the book value of total
cusses the empirical results. Section 5 assets of the firm.
concludes the paper.
Consistent with Campbell and
Mınguez-Vera (2008), among other,
Data and variables we proxy for board gender diversity
using a dummy variable, DWOMEN,
that that takes the value of one when
We start with all French listed firms at least one woman is present on the
that belong to the SBF 120 index over board, and zero otherwise. The second
the period 2009-2011. This index is proxy is the percentage of women on
based on the market capitalizations the board, PWOMEN, calculated as
of the 120 large firms traded on the the number of female directors divided
Paris Stock Exchange (Euronext). We by the total number of directors on the
then exclude financial firms (SIC codes board.
between 6000-6999) and regulated
utilities (SIC 4000-4999) since they 1 The sample firms are almost evenly distribu-
ted over the sample period with 93, 95, and
are subject to specific rules. These res- 96 firms for 2009, 2010 and 2011, respecti-
trictions leave us with a final sample of vely.
261
Following prior studies, we control for The coefficient of primary interest in our
a number of firm characteristics that study is β1. The effect of female direc-
may affect firm performance. Specifi- tors on firm performance is examined
cally, we include board size, BSIZE, by testing the null hypothesis (H0: β1
measured as the total number of direc- = 0) against the alternative hypothesis
tors on the board (Carter et al., 2010); (H1: β1 ≠ 0). The rejection of the null
firm leverage, LEV, calculated as the hypothesis implies that women play a
ratio of total debt to total assets (Bha- significant role in improving the perfor-
gat and Bolton, 2008); the return on mance of the firms in which they serve
assets, ROA, measured as the ratio of as board members.
net income before extraordinary items
and discontinued operations to its book As suggested by Hermalin and Weis-
value of assets (Adams and Ferreira, bach (2003) and Carter et al. (2003),
2009) and firm size, SIZE, proxied the relation between board composi-
by the natural logarithm of total assets tion and firm value may suffers from
(Hillman et al., 2007). endogeneity problems. This is espe-
cially true when it comes to the relation
between board gender diversity and
Methodology firm performance. The direction of cau-
sality could run both ways (Marinova,
Plantenga and Remery, 2010; Smith
Consistent with Campbell and et al., 2006). In other words, the pre-
Mınguez-Vera (2008), we test the fol- sence of women on corporate boards
lowing the model creates value and leads to higher per-
formance; and, alternatively, higher
Qit = β0 + β1 WOMENit + βn Ωit + µt + Ψi + εit (1) proportions of female directors are pre-
valent in well performing firms that are
where Q is the financial performance more willing to take risks with the ap-
of the firm proxied by the Tobin’s q, pointment of women on boardrooms. If
WOMEN is a proxy of the presence the bidirectional causality really exists,
of women on the board. It can be the board gender diversity could affect
presence of at least one woman on the firm performance and, vice-versa, firm
board (DWOMEN) or the percentage performance could also affect the ap-
of their presence of the board (PW- pointment of female directors. Statisti-
COB) depending on the specification. cally speaking, board gender diversity
Ω is a vector of control variables that could be correlated with the error terms
are deemed to affect firm performance. in Equation (1) and itself be a function
µt and Ψi refer to time effects and unob- of firm performance, which violates the
servable heterogeneity, respectively. usual assumptions of the ordinary least
262
squares (OLS) regression. Therefore, newly generated variables, predicted

ignoring the endogeneity problem may values, as instrumental variables to
lead to biased estimates and mislea- replace the Tobin’s q in the equation of
ding interpretations of the results. board gender diversity and WOMEN
in the equation of Tobin’s q, respecti-
Therefore, consistent with Carter et al. vely. This two-stage procedure allows
(2003) and Campbell and Mınguez- for the control of the simultaneity bias
Vera (2008), we control the problem between WOMEN and Q and pro-
of endogeneity by estimating the fol- vides unbiased and consistent estima-
lowing two-stage least-square (2SLS) tors for the coefficients of the system.
system of equations
Qit = β0 + β1 WOMENit + ∑ β x + εit

Empirical results
WOMENit = α0 + α 1 Qit + ∑ α z + εit (2)
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics
In this system of equations, firm perfor- for our sample firms. The mean Tobin’s
mance and board gender diversity are q is 1.09 which is above one, sugges-
jointly determined to grasp all the feed- ting that the average market value of the
back mechanisms that may be involved sample firms is greater than their ave-
with their relations. The vectors x and z rage book value. Firms feature higher
are exogenous variables that are deter- performance variability with a minimum
mined “outside” the system. Consistent Tobin’s q of 0.22 and a maximum of
with Campbell and Mınguez-Vera 7.86 (standard deviation amounts to
(2008), the vector x includes leverage 0.84). Our results are similar to those
(LEV), ROA, and firm size (FSIZE). The of Adams and Ferreira (2009) for the
vector z includes board size (BSIZE) U.S. market (1.19) but significantly
and firm size. lower than those reported by Carter et
It is worth noting that the aim of using al. (2003) with a value of 2.09.
a 2SLS method is to find instruments The average proportion of women on
that can predict endogenous variables French corporate boards (PWOMEN)
(i.e., firm performance and board is 12.98%. This result is in line with the
gender diversity that appear as expla- feminization wave of French corporate
natory variables in the simultaneous boards as evidenced by Nekhili and
equation system in our case). We use Gatfaoui (2013). Similar results are also
the OLS method to separately estimate, found by Dang et al. (2014), who re-
in the first stage, the predicted values port a proportion of 7.20% and 9.37%,
of Tobin’s q (Q) and board gender di- respectively, in 2007 and 2009. We
versity (WOMEN). We then use these note that there is a great disparity in the
263
presence of women on the boards of (2010), we analyze whether firm cha-

the SBF 120 companies. In fact, there racteristics depend on the presence
are companies with boards composed of women on boards or not. Table 2
of men only (PWOMEN = 0.00) and shows that, on average, firms with at
others with almost half of the members least one woman on the board have
are women (PWOMEN = 43.75). Table a better performance in terms of ROA,
1 also shows that, on average, 79.9% are more leveraged, and have larger
of the SBF120 firms have at least one boards than firms without female direc-
woman on their boards, compared to tors. However, there is no significant
68.3% reported by Dang et al. (2014). difference in terms of firm size and
Tobin’s q. Overall, our results are simi-
Consistent with Adams and Ferreira lar to the prior research. As highlighted
(2009) and Belghiti-Mahut and Lafont by Adams and Ferreira (2009),
Table 1 – Descriptive statistics for sample firms

This table presents descriptive statistics for sample firms. The sample is drawn from
the SBF 120 index over period 2009-2011 period (n = 284). Data related to board
of director characteristics are from IODS database (ArteniaDataCG). Financial data
are from Thomson ONE Banker. Tobin’s q is calculated following Chung and Pruitt’s
(1994) approximation. PWOMEN is the percentage of women on corporate boards.
DWOMEN is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 when there is at least one
woman on the board of directors, and 0 otherwise. Return on assets (ROA) is mea-
sured as net income divided by total assets. Leverage (LEV) is measured as the book
value of debt (short- and long-term) divided by the book value of total assets. Firm
size (FSIZE) is the natural logarithm of firm sales. Board size (BSIZE) is equal to the
total number of directors on the board.
Variables Mean Median Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Q 1.091 0.856 0.841 0.215 7.860
PWOMEN (in %) 12.980 11.110 9.475 0.000 43.750
DWOMEN 0.800 - 0.401 0.000 1.000
BSIZE 11.563 11.00 3.367 3.000 19.000
FSIZE 8.338 8.196 1.556 0.112 12.023
LEV 0.271 0.233 0.265 0.000 2.538
ROA 0.046 0.047 0.066 -0.430 0.379
264
these comparisons suggest that firms’ neity issue. Bøhren and Strøm (2010)
choices to appoint female directors on also find a negative effect of board
board could be influenced by firm cha- diversity on firm performance when
racteristics. Therefore, we take these studying Norwegian listed companies.
firm characteristics into account in our Therefore, it is likely that the positive
regression analysis. relation documented in Belghiti-Mahut
and Lafont (2010) is caused by endo-
Table 3 reports the results of the estima- geneity problems. As for control va-
tion of the simultaneous equation mo- riable, firm leverage (LEV) and firm size
del of the relation between board gen- (FSIZE) do not seem to have significant
der diversity and firm value. The 2SLS effects on Tobin’s q. Return on assets
approach shows that the percentage (ROA), however, has a positive effect
of women on corporate boards (PWO- on Tobin’s q, which is not really surpri-
MEN) is negatively related to firm per- sing as more profitable firms are more
formance proxied by the Tobin’s q (at likely to have higher values (Campbell
the statistical significance level of 5%). and Mınguez-Vera, 2008). The third
This result is consistent with Adams and column of Table 3 shows that the im-
Ferreira (2009), who argue that the re- pact of firm value (Q) on the percen-
lation between board gender diversity tage of women on boards (PWOMEN)
and firm performance appears to be is not statistically significant. This result
negative after addressing the endoge- is consistent with that of Campbell and
Table 2 – Comparisons of firms with female directors to those without

This table reports the results of pairwise comparison of means of firm characteristics
in the groups of firms with at least one female director and firms without female
directors using t-tests of means. All variables are defined in Table 1. The number of
observations is 284. The t-test of equality of means are reported in the last column.
***indicates significance at the 1% level.
Firm Mean for firms with at least Mean for firms without
Difference
characteristics one female director (n = 227) female directors (n = 57)
Q 1.070 1.175 -0.926
ROA 0.053 0.020 2.522***
FSIZE 8.569 7.418 1.643
LEV 0.283 0.221 2.178***
BSIZE 12.075 9.526 5.476***
265
Mınguez-Vera (2008). It is worth no- women on boards (DWOMEN) does

ting that both board size (BSIZE) and not have a significant effect on Tobin’s
firm size (FSIZE) have a positive and q. This result seems to confirm that the
significant effect on the percentage of mere presence of women on corporate
women on corporate boards (PWO-
boards does not affect the value of a
MEN). This suggests that larger compa-
firm as highlighted by Campbell and
nies with larger boards are more likely
Mınguez-Vera (2008) and Terjesen et
to appoint female directors.
al., (2009). A for control variables, we
Table 3 also shows that the presence of find that return on assets (ROA) and
Table 3 – 2SLS estimates of the relation between firm value and the presence
of women on boards of directors
All variables are defined in Table 1. Absolute values of t-statistics are between brac-
kets. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***) and 0.05 (**) levels.
Variables Q PWOMEN Q DWOMEN
PWOMEN -2.752**
[-2.07]
DWOMEN 0.573
[1.10]
LEV -0.120 0.073

[0.72] [0.42]
BSIZE -0.000 0.023***

[-0.21] [3.23]
ROA 7.294*** 6.532***

[10.15] [8.62]
FSIZE -0.186 0.014*** -0.254*** 0.075***

[-6.12] [3.28] [-5.65] [4.18]
Q 0.018 0.110***
[1.49] [2.29]
Constant 0.001*** -80.445*** 334.817*** -231.407***

[11.32] [-5.98] [2.18] [-4.23]
N 284 284 284 284
R² 0.349*** 0.133*** 0.346*** 0.155***
F-statistic 49.81 12.42 35.80 16.47
266
firm size have, respectively, a positive tions of this negative effect include the
and a negative impact on firm value greater increase in the board’s monito-
(Q). This result is consistent with Camp- ring (Adams and Ferreira, 2009) and
bell and Mınguez-Vera (2008), among risk aversion from having females in
other. Leverage (LEV) does not seem the board of directors (Djoutsa Wam-
to impact Tobin’s q. The forth column ba et al., 2014). Overall, our results,
of Table 3 shows that larger firms with which are generally consistent with the
larger boards and higher Tobin’s q are literature (Adams and Ferreira, 2009;
more likely to appoint at least one wo- Campbell and Mınguez-Vera, 2008),
men on the board. point out that addressing the endoge-
neity issue is important when investiga-
ting the relation between board gender
diversity and firm performance.
Conclusion As usual, our study also has several li-
mitations. First, using only a three-year
The purpose of this paper is to examine period, our analysis is based on a quite
the business case for gender diversity. short time period that makes the results
More specifically, we investigate the re- specific to the period under study. Ex-
lation between the presence of female tending the sample to cover a longer
directors on corporate boards and period may provide better confidence
financial performance proxied by To- in the results. Second, as suggested by
bin’s q (Campbell and Mınguez-Vera, Belghiti-Mahut and Lafont (2010), our
2008; Carter et al., 2003). To do so, analysis could be extended to small
we use a panel of French listed firms and medium-sized enterprises as they
during the 2009-2011 period and pro- represent nearly 97% of companies in
vide evidence of a negative and statis- France in 2009.
tically significant effect of the percen-
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269

Does Board Gender Diversity Improve The Performance of French Listed Firms?

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Duc Khuong Nguyen,

From a theoretical perspective, the as an open system that depends on

squares (OLS) regression. Therefore, newly generated variables, predicted

Qit = β0 + β1 WOMENit + ∑ β x + εit

presence of women on the boards of (2010), we analyze whether firm cha-

Table 1 – Descriptive statistics for sample firms

Variables Mean Median Standard deviation Minimum Maximum

Q 1.091 0.856 0.841 0.215 7.860

PWOMEN (in %) 12.980 11.110 9.475 0.000 43.750

DWOMEN 0.800 - 0.401 0.000 1.000

BSIZE 11.563 11.00 3.367 3.000 19.000

FSIZE 8.338 8.196 1.556 0.112 12.023

LEV 0.271 0.233 0.265 0.000 2.538

ROA 0.046 0.047 0.066 -0.430 0.379

Table 2 – Comparisons of firms with female directors to those without

Q 1.070 1.175 -0.926

ROA 0.053 0.020 2.522***

FSIZE 8.569 7.418 1.643

LEV 0.283 0.221 2.178***

BSIZE 12.075 9.526 5.476***

Mınguez-Vera (2008). It is worth no- women on boards (DWOMEN) does

Variables Q PWOMEN Q DWOMEN

LEV -0.120 0.073

BSIZE -0.000 0.023***

ROA 7.294*** 6.532***

FSIZE -0.186 0.014*** -0.254*** 0.075***

Constant 0.001*** -80.445*** 334.817*** -231.407***

N 284 284 284 284

R² 0.349*** 0.133*** 0.346*** 0.155***

F-statistic 49.81 12.42 35.80 16.47

a dummy variable. Potential explana-

Ø. Bøhren, R. Ø. Strøm, 2010, « Governance K. A. Farrell, P. L. Hersch, 2005, « Additions to

C. Rose, 2007, « Does Female Board Represen-

N. Smith, V. Smith, M. Verner, 2006, « Do

N. Solakoglu, 2013, « The Role of Gender Di-

S. Terjesen, R. Sealy, V. Singh, 2009, « Women

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ROA 7.294* 6.532*

FSIZE -0.186 0.014* -0.254* 0.075***

Constant 0.001* -80.445* 334.817* -231.407*

R² 0.349* 0.133* 0.346* 0.155*